From the “Gimli Glider” that ran out of fuel at 41,000 feet to general aviation pilots who selected empty tanks, a four-decade pattern of aviation accidents show that fuel management errors consistently prove fatal when altitude and time work against recovery efforts. Too low, too late: When fuel emergencies become deadly

An analysis of the US National Transportation Safety Board reports suggests that 95% of fuel-related aviation accidents stem from human error rather than mechanical failure, with pilots repeatedly making critical mistakes in high-stress situations involving fuel controls, tank selectors and cut-off switches.

The margin for error becomes razor-thin during the most demanding phases of flight. What separates survival from catastrophe often comes down to precious seconds and hundreds of feet of altitude — factors that determine whether crews have sufficient time to diagnose problems, execute recovery procedures and restart failed systems before impact.

The deadly arithmetic was evident in Air India Flight 171 crash, where a preliminary investigation report revealed both engine fuel cut-off switches moved from “RUN” to “CUTOFF” position just one second apart during take-off. Despite crew attempts to restore fuel flow within 10-14 seconds, the Boeing 787 crashed 32 seconds after lift-off, killing 260 people.

To be sure, the circumstances of why the cut-off was engaged is unclear. Cockpit voice recordings captured one pilot asking his colleague why he engaged that switch, to which the other pilot said he hadn’t.

In the moments that followed, the pilots attempted to fix the error and the engines appeared to be coming back online but there was simply not enough time.

The 1983 case of Air Canada Flight 143 illustrates how altitude could have saved lives. When the Boeing 767 lost both engines after it ran out of fuel at cruising altitude, pilots had nearly 20 minutes to glide 65 miles to an emergency landing at Gimli, Manitoba. All 69 people survived.

Contrast that with cases where fuel emergencies occur during take-off or approach phases. A recent Nashville crash killed five family members when a pilot of a small plane incorrectly positioned a fuel selector during approach, starving the engine of fuel, with insufficient altitude for recovery.

An NTSB annual statistic compilation focussing on fuel-related issues in 2017 shows fuel management causes more than 50 general aviation (smaller plane) accidents yearly, with nearly half involving commercial or air transport-rated pilots — dispelling assumptions that experience prevents such errors.

But these have reduced over the years, especially as planes themselves have become more sophisticated.

Historical cases reveal recurring human factors: confusion under pressure, inadequate training on fuel systems, and design vulnerabilities in aircraft controls. The 1978 United Airlines Flight 173 crash — where crew focus on a landing gear problem led to fuel exhaustion — prompted development of modern crew resource management training used industry-wide.

Switch and selector design has emerged as a persistent vulnerability. Multiple accidents involve pilots moving fuel controls to incorrect positions or failing to fully seat selectors between marked positions. The locking mechanism in fuel switches was thus a response to that.

The NTSB continues to cite fuel management as the sixth leading cause of general aviation accidents, with investigators noting that proper training and procedural compliance could prevent the vast majority of these incidents.