A fresh conflagration in the Middle East following Israeli and then US strikes on Iran, and the Iranian response, has created a dilemma for Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, for whom this volatile region is not a strategic priority, but who feels compelled nevertheless to be seen as a significant regional player. There are two risks. First, there is the risk of being irrelevant. Others create realities on the ground, and these new realities may leave Russia on the sidelines in the Middle East, undermining the credibility of its great power pretensions. Second, there is the risk of doing too much. As Russia’s key regional partner – Iran – takes a thrashing, the Kremlin could find itself inadvertently drawn into a broader conflict it cannot afford, and that would be an unwarranted distraction from the much more important theatre: Putin’s war in Ukraine.

So far, Putin has handled his Iranian problem with considerable skill, which has meant doing very little, in practice, to help Iran. This is nothing new. Moscow’s policy towards Iran – and the Middle East more generally – has been marked by opportunism born of a substantial mismatch between Russia’s modest capabilities and its great power ambitions.

Russia’s relations with the current regime in Iran go back to the latter’s very founding. The Kremlin perceived the Iranian revolution as an opportunity to acquire a new client in the Middle East, replacing the United States as Iran’s partner and friend. The Soviets, despite their ties to the Iraq of Saddam Hussein, adopted careful neutrality during the Iran-Iraq War. They refused to take Iraq’s side for fear of antagonising Tehran. Saddam was angered by such treachery and vented his frustration in letters to the Soviet leaders: ‘These actions, respected comrade [Brezhnev], leave a bitter residue in one’s soul…’

The Soviet war in Afghanistan made it difficult, however, for Tehran to engage productively with its northern neighbour. It was only after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 that the relationship began to develop, especially when the Russians embraced opportunities for trade in arms and in sensitive technologies. No business deal was more sensitive than Moscow’s agreement, in 1995, to build a civilian nuclear reactor at Bushehr. The Americans were alarmed by the possibility that Iran would redirect these technologies to its weapons programme, but Russian-Iranian cooperation continued, and the Bushehr reactor began operations in 2010.

Meanwhile, Moscow and Tehran engaged in a broad conversation about their shared vision of the world order, finding themselves to be more or less on the same page. Both were in favour of ‘multipolarity’ and keeping the United States and other Western powers out of what each regarded as their ‘sphere of influence’ in the Caspian and in the Caucasus. As Hassan Rouhani (later president of Iran) told the Russians in 1995: ‘It’s important to make sure that third countries do not get involved in our relations. Iran and Russia must make sure that our enemies are frustrated in their hope that we fall out.’

Still, the Russian-Iranian relationship was not problem-free. The Kremlin watched jealously for signs of rapprochement between Tehran and Washington and – by some accounts at least – secretly worked to undermine the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which, Putin reportedly feared, would lead to the reduction of Iranian support for Russia’s other regional ally, Bashar al-Assad’s Syria. Raising Western sanctions on Iran could also lower world oil prices, a problem for an oil exporter like Russia. Above all, the normalisation of Iran’s relations with the West could work against Putin’s efforts to build an alternative ‘bloc’ of countries that would defer to his idea of post-Western world order.

Fortunately for Putin, this normalisation never happened. Instead, with the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Tehran proved a reliable partner, willing to supply military technologies to Russia, most importantly, drones. Moreover, in January 2025, Russia and Iran signed a treaty on a comprehensive strategic partnership that calls for a further deepening of bilateral military cooperation, even as it rails against ‘unipolarity and hegemony in world affairs’ (a clear reference to the United States).

Israel’s strikes against Iran beginning on 13 June 2025, created a certain expectation that Russia would do something for the sake of its strategic partner. True, it was not obliged to. The partnership treaty – which in any case was not even officially in force – does not have a mutual defence clause (which makes it a non-aggression pact, rather than a treaty of alliance). But, after all, Iran came to Russia’s help in Ukraine: wasn’t it only just that the Kremlin reciprocated?

When, on 20 June, Putin was asked as to what he planned to do, the Russian president was non-committal. He attempted to construct a rationalisation for Russia’s inaction, which included, bizarrely, the notion that Israel was an ‘almost Russian-speaking country’, that Russia had a large Muslim population (which is largely Sunni), and had extensive ties in the Arab world (which, from the logic of his comments, he could not afford to antagonise by siding with Shia Iran). Putin also claimed that, even by remaining in Iran, at the civilian nuclear sites, which the Russians still helped run, Moscow was helping their Iranian friends.

All of these arguments fall short. There are in reality two basic reasons why Putin has been treading cautiously. First, he is worried about running foul of the United States and President Donald Trump, who not only backed Israel’s strikes on Iran but, on 22 June, ordered the US military to carry out its own strikes on the country. For months, Putin has worked hard to entice Trump into pulling the plug on Ukraine. These efforts have not been wholly successful, but even what limited progress has been achieved can be easily jeopardised if Trump comes to see Russia as a spoiler in the Iranian game.

Instead, what Putin has tried to do in his own dialogue with Trump has been to highlight Russia’s usefulness as a potential mediator, an offer that Trump seemingly rejected out of hand. As the latter put it: ‘He [Putin] actually offered to help mediate, and I said: do me a favour. Mediate your own. Let’s mediate Russia first, okay?’

The second—and related—reason why Putin can’t do much about Iran is simply that all of his efforts currently and for the foreseeable future are concentrated on Ukraine. He can ill afford to divert any military equipment, least of all drones and missiles, to Iran even if he were asked to (and it is not clear that he has been asked to). Putin has argued rather that the Russians are helping Iran by fighting the same forces (i.e. the West) that are also opposed to Iran.

Following US strikes on Iran, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi travelled to Moscow with a letter from Ayatollah Khamenei. The content of this latter has not been disclosed. Putin received Araghchi on 22 June. In carefully weighed comments, he noted that ‘the completely unprovoked aggression against Iran has no basis and no justification whatsoever’. He did not mention the United States. The Russian foreign ministry was a little more forthcoming, condemning the American bombardment of Iran, while former president Dmitry Medvedev – known for his militant and radical pronouncements – hinted in a tweet at the prospect of Russia supplying Iran with nuclear warheads. This immediately triggered a sharp and threatening rebuke from Trump. Medvedev promptly dialled down his rhetoric, probably not without an annoyed prod from the Kremlin.

Through his inction in the face of an acute regional crisis, Putin has undermined his credibility in the Middle East, which has already suffered a serious setback in the wake of the overthrow of the Syrian dictator and Putin’s long-time client Bashar al-Assad. He has shown clearly that Russia’s regional influence is not as great as it seemed just a decade ago. Back then, the Kremlin intervened decisively to rescue a desperate client in Syria. Now Putin is stuck in the Ukrainian quagmire and has neither the capability nor the intention to bail out his Iranian friends if and when they come to grief.

For a cynical strategist like Putin, this is not a problem. Iran – and the Middle East more broadly – are just a sideshow to Russia. What happens here matters, not least because it can make oil prices go up or down. In the end, what really matters to Putin is what happens on the battlefields of Ukraine. It is on his conquest of Ukraine that he has pinned his legacy, not on his provisional non-alliance with the Iranian regime and the brave new multipolar world that it allegedly represents.

While the West rightly resists Russian aggression, European leaders risk self-respect and global standing by appeasing Donald Trump.

Since Russia launched its full-scale war against Ukraine, political leaders, experts, journalists, and a renewed cohort of peace activists have consistently warned against appeasing Vladimir Putin. Their argument is clear: authoritarian leaders are not deterred by pleasantries or concessions, but solely by a resolute will to resist. Force, they contend, must be met with force.

Given the substantial financial, political, and military support the West has channelled to Ukraine, accusing Western leaders of appeasing Putin is far from the truth. The unwavering backing for Ukraine stands in stark contrast to the infamous Munich Agreement of 1938, when Britain and France effectively surrendered Czechoslovakia’s independence without the Czechoslovak government even being present. Until recently, the West had steadfastly supported Ukraine in defending its sovereignty. The decisiveness and scale of military aid were constrained not by a desire for appeasement, but by Russia’s nuclear capabilities. Lately, even Donald Trump appears willing to confront Putin with force, provided it offers a lucrative business opportunity, as American solidarity with Ukraine now hinges on Europe’s willingness to bear the financial burden.

Fighting Putin is undeniably the correct course of action. Without the determination to resist his assault on Ukraine, any peace deal that does not equate to capitulation remains an illusion. However, even President Zelenskyy has indicated that a battlefield victory over Russia may not be feasible, and that some difficult concessions might be the price for a free Ukraine. Therefore, seeking an armistice while maintaining military support is not appeasement, but a pragmatic attempt to save Ukraine, which is slowly succumbing on the battlefield.

Paradoxically, while there is much discourse about an appeasement of Putin that simply is not occurring, hardly a word is uttered about the appeasement that is taking place. Donald Trump is engaging in blackmail and bullying tactics against countries worldwide, including traditional American allies. He has shown a willingness to accommodate Putin, expresses sympathy for various dictators, has authorised military action against Iran, threatened the national sovereignty of Greenland, Canada, and Panama, violated the American constitution, displayed complete disregard for international laws and rules, and abused state power to pursue domestic opponents. He is a bully who unequivocally comprehends only the language of strength.

Yet, instead of speaking out, governments, businesses, media outlets, and billionaires are scrambling to appease Trump. Witnessing such widespread capitulation and obeisance, there appears to be no limit to his escalating demands for “making America great”. Mark Rutte, NATO’s General Secretary, not only refers to Trump as “daddy”, but also cheerfully laughs when Trump expresses a desire for Greenland, and publicly thanks him for blackmailing NATO member states into increasing military expenditure to five percent of GDP. Presidents and prime ministers meticulously rehearse their White House meetings, strategising how best to please Trump or, at the very least, avoid the mistreatment meted out to figures like Zelenskyy or Ramaphosa.

The German Chancellor pleads, “Please stay with us.” Keir Starmer, the UK Prime Minister was observed kneeling to retrieve papers the American leader had dropped in front of rolling television cameras. While an appropriate gesture of courtesy, it was nonetheless a telling image. Almost all countries – with the notable exception of China – are attempting to appease Trump, hoping he will humiliate and punish someone else. The free world remains silent when Trump threatens Brazil with 50 percent tariffs unless it drops the legal case against Jair Bolsonaro, who contemplated a coup after losing the election. Canada, too, faces punitive tariffs and the ominous threat of annexation as the 51st state of the USA.

European leaders have particularly compelling reasons for their policy of appeasement. Indeed, appeasement is often undertaken for seemingly good reasons. European leaders are convinced that resisting Putin necessitates appeasing Trump.

Tariffs and pressure on allies for higher military spending are two of Trump’s mechanisms for making others pay for America’s perceived greatness. In this new geopolitical scramble for global influence, he seeks to impose greater costs on friends and foes alike to maintain and rebuild America’s global leadership role. In their eagerness to placate Trump, European leaders seem to overlook that by abandoning any semblance of self-respect, they also forfeit their standing as independent actors in the eyes of the world, and perhaps more crucially, in the eyes of their own citizens. Their apparent weakness could fuel European voters’ desire for authoritarian leaders who promise to act as “little Trumps” rather than Trump’s appeasers.

The desperation of European leaders is understandable, as they “do not hold the cards”. They placed their trust in the transatlantic partnership. They accepted that their military forces were an integral part of a US-controlled NATO. Consequently, they are now largely incapable of independent action. The United States forged a military alliance in which it alone calls the shots. The US spending more on defence than other NATO member states was not altruism, but the cost of a security arrangement that precluded the proliferation of nuclear weapons and cemented the Pax Americana.

Given the dual dependency of sustaining their economies by exporting to the US and containing Russia through reliance on US military might, Europeans find themselves in the uncomfortable position that Trump might withdraw military protection if they retaliate against his tariffs with counter-trade measures. In the short term, Trump possesses all the leverage.

The “old continent” must choose between appeasement and a further loss of national sovereignty, or a courageous strategy to evolve into a truly independent global actor.

The latter demands decisive leadership and a willingness to sacrifice narrow national interests in favour of genuine European sovereignty, and it carries the inherent risk of antagonising Trump. The former will occur by default if Europe continues to act as it has in the past.

Building an independent, united Europe is far more ambitious than maintaining an alliance dominated by a single superpower. No single European country is powerful enough to be the undisputed hegemon of Europe. Neither Germany nor France, nor even both together, are strong enough to bend the rest to their will. Therefore, even the stronger nations must be willing to subordinate their national sovereignty to qualified European majority rule. Greater decision-making power and significantly larger budgetary resources need to be transferred to the EU level. To avoid endless conflicts with perennial refuseniks, there must be an accessible mechanism for them to leave the EU, or alternatively, a majority decision mechanism to terminate their membership.

Instead of debating individual policy issues, the core question is whether countries like France or Germany are prepared to take the lead in agreeing to genuine power sharing within a community of small and medium-sized states.

The policy of the new German Chancellor offers little cause for optimism. He remains opposed to common European bonds and has introduced national border controls. He demands that Europe abolish the due diligence law, which was passed after years of consultation and compromise by European institutions, simply because Germany no longer approves of it. At a time when Europe urgently requires unity, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz is vetoing EU measures aimed at pressuring Israel to end what was termed “ genocide” in Gaza . How can he expect to maintain and lead a united Europe on Ukraine if he insists on a “German Sonderweg” (special path) on Gaza? Instead of outlining a vision of collective European military strength, he announced in Lithuania that Germany intends to build the continent’s strongest conventional army. Is he not aware that this might evoke uneasy memories among Germany’s neighbours?

In any event, it is a far too narrow perspective to believe that European strength can be achieved solely through increased military spending. Certainly, a coordinated European arms industry and a clear-eyed analysis of how to spend scarce resources on necessary weapons, rather than those the military-industrial complex wishes to sell, makes perfect sense. However, Europe’s only chance of success lies in this being accompanied by greater solidarity within Europe and the courage of diplomatic multilateralism that forges new global alliances to isolate those who seek to subjugate the rest of the world to their will.

Instead of appeasing Trump, Europe needs to swiftly conclude trade agreements like Mercosur, strengthen domestic demand to reduce export dependency, transform its universities into genuine world campuses, invest in inclusive migration policies, and invite the Global South as a true partner in shaping fairer global rules and laws. A meaningful due diligence law, the implementation of the European directive on minimum wages, and robust collective bargaining are modest but crucial building blocks on this path.

While authoritarian strongmen tend to mobilise nationalism to bolster their aggressive and authoritarian policies, this option does not exist for Europe. There is nothing remotely akin to European nationalism, and attempting to ignite nationalistic sentiments would divide Europe rather than unite it. Europe is, despite its deficiencies, currently the most advanced model of multilateralism. This is the vision of governance it must embody, and the model it can offer to the world. Europe must be a beacon of tolerance, open debate, and social inclusion. It needs to lead on ecological transformation and advance the regulation of big technology companies and artificial intelligence.

Europe will either succeed as an alternative to the rule of force, willing to stand its ground against bullies on both sides of the Atlantic, or it will fade into insignificance. Europe’s capacity to develop an alternative to appeasing Trump depends on visionary European leaders and, ultimately, on the European people. They must be convinced that Europe will not only increase its defence expenditure but also deliver for them as a multi-ethnic, fair, inclusive, democratic, supra-national community of equals.

Recent articles discuss Putin’s ongoing challenges in the Ukraine war, his strategic decisions, and the shifting geopolitical landscape affecting Russia’s influence.

geopoliticalfutures.com

Putin’s dilemma continues to shape global geopolitics as tensions rise in Ukraine. As of 2025-07-22 14:00:00, the conflict remains unresolved, with implications for international stability and security.

5 Key Takeaways Putin faces challenges in geopolitical strategy.

Ukraine intensifies military focus on Moscow.

Russia’s global influence continues to decline.

Strategic decision-making remains critical for Putin.

Kremlin shows no interest in war resolution.

Recent reports indicate that despite Russia’s diminishing global influence, Putin remains steadfast in his military objectives. This situation raises questions about the future of diplomacy and peace in the region.

Fast Answer: Putin’s commitment to the Ukraine war highlights significant geopolitical tensions, impacting global stability and international relations.

What does this mean for the international community? The ongoing conflict poses critical challenges that require urgent attention. Analysts suggest that understanding Putin’s strategic decision-making is vital for predicting future developments.

Russia’s military strategy shows no signs of slowing down.

Global leaders must navigate complex diplomatic waters.

The erosion of Russia’s clout may lead to unpredictable outcomes.

The ongoing war in Ukraine poses a serious threat to global peace and security, necessitating immediate international cooperation.

As the situation evolves, the international community must remain vigilant and proactive in addressing the challenges posed by this conflict.

In analyzing the process by which the Russia-Ukraine war will end, the most critical factor, as I have argued before, is that by not defeating Ukraine, Russia already has lost the war. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s primary interest was in creating and controlling a buffer between Russia and Poland on the eastern edge of NATO. Beyond that, he wanted to recover Russia’s status as a great power, which it had held from the end of World War II to the collapse of the Soviet Union. When it lost this status, it lost its dominion over Eastern Europe and the eastern half of Germany. It also lost unchallenged command of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, ceased to be more powerful than China and surrendered much of its influence in the Middle East. Its power in the Third World withered as well, losing its place to China – now the only true rival of the United States.

For Russia, the loss of military significance was accompanied by an inability to become a major economic power. Under the czars and the communists, Russia had always been an economic weakling. Although it had vast and valuable lands, as well as a reasonably educated population, Russia has continued to be what can most kindly be called an underperforming economy.

Russia’s decline started and ended well before Putin became president, of course. His rise to power depended on the private sector – the oligarchs who, in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, consolidated a substantial portion of the economy and integrated into the global economic system. The oligarchs were the significant force that made Putin president, and the Russian economy had by then developed nicely, considering where it had started.

Putin held a traditional Russian view on high national priority: securing Russia from invasion and intrusion from the outside. From Putin’s point of view, the only way for the country to emerge economically was to be secure from attack. For Putin, that meant recovering as much of the buffer zone as he could from the losses Russia suffered in the 1990s, and thus securing Russia’s western border.

In Ukraine, he obviously overestimated the power of the Russian military and underestimated the resilience of the Ukrainians, not to mention the support they received from the U.S. and Europe. Putin believed that Russia would secure a victory before the U.S. and Europe stepped in.

The failure to rapidly overrun Ukraine has led to another problem: the economy. The Russian economy deteriorated as resources were diverted to the military and away from the civilian sector. Just last week, reports emerged that three major Russian banks had requested help from the central bank to bail them out. The major losers in this war, apart from the dead, were the oligarchs, whose assets were frozen by foreign banks and who could no longer attract much-needed investment from other countries. They also lost much of their access to foreign markets (how much depended on how badly a given market needed Russian hydrocarbons). The economy had not yet truly bloomed when Russia invaded Ukraine, but it was on the right track. The war has since derailed its progress.

Given the failure in Ukraine and the inability to resurrect Russian power, it is impossible for Putin to make peace. U.S. President Donald Trump dangled the possibility of an entente with Russia, including a significant economic relationship and U.S. investment, in return for ending the war. At the time, I thought Putin would welcome the offer, but it is now clear that he will not cease hostilities on the basis of his retaining the small territory he has taken. The cost in lives and economic development, not to mention the damage to his own credibility, make a settlement unrealistic, at least right now.

His strategy is a desperate attempt to break Ukraine with massive drone attacks, largely but not exclusively on Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital. Having no other options, he has adopted a strategy that the Germans tried on Britain during World War II. Where Hitler tried to bomb Britain into submission using the Luftwaffe as a weapon of terror, Putin, for want of other options, has unleashed a terror attack on Kyiv, disregarding an important lesson of the past: airpower alone rarely achieves victory.

Important among Putin’s many mistakes is his miscalculation of Trump. He saw Trump’s urgency to negotiate and played along in a deliberate effort to mislead him. He did not understand that although Trump may praise Putin publicly for his apparent commitment to peace, that would not necessarily be his final word on the matter. He had made Trump look foolish for the praise, and no American president can afford to look a fool. The obvious response was that Trump resumed weapon deliveries to Ukraine. As important, Trump reconciled with NATO in a very public way, and the Germans sent a tank brigade to Lithuania and committed to rearming, surely triggering long memories in Russia.

Trump has said that if the war is not ended in 50 days, he will inflict massive economic damage on Russia by penalizing not only Moscow but also any nation that buys certain Russian exports. Putin’s gamble that Ukraine would capitulate from the drone attacks on Kyiv has failed, and his only remaining hope is that Trump is bluffing and will continue to accept the Russian refusal to end the war. (Former President Dmitri Medvedev called it as much publicly.)

In this, I think he is making a massive mistake. First, Trump cannot tolerate being held in contempt. Second, personalities aside, if Trump lets the 50-day threat amount to nothing, he will undermine his own credibility among the nations of the world and the U.S. public.

Trump is facing the reality that all U.S. presidents face – after the first 100 days are over, opposition begins to emerge on all sides. Trump’s approval polls are weak, and his own supporters are divided. This is not abnormal or unrecoverable for Trump, but this is not the time to look weak and frightened of Putin. Certainly, many Americans do not want to be involved in the Russia-Ukraine war, but that does not mean Trump can afford to be weakened by allowing himself to be played the fool.

Key to all this is the internal politics in Russia. Putin is a dictator, but failure can bring down dictators as easily as anyone else. And the threat that Trump made – to severely strike at Russia’s economy if peace is not achieved – would have dire consequences for Moscow. Putin would have failed militarily and economically, creating a crisis among the people who may be closest to him but who do not want to go down with him. I do not know all the palace intrigue of Russian politics, but if it turns out Trump isn’t kidding this time about massive economic actions, Putin will be in a much worse position. At this point, I don’t believe Trump can afford to renege.

Putin gambled on the chance he could break Ukraine in one last, ruthless effort. Instead, the U.S. has pulled close to NATO and is sending weapons to Ukraine in concert with Germany, which has also deployed tanks closer to Russia’s border. The mystery is whether Putin can politically survive his ongoing miscalculations.

CNN —

The Russia hawks’ initial reaction to President Donald Trump’s tougher stance on Vladimir Putin was positive.

That included a Monday joint statement from Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham and Democratic Sen. Richard Blumenthal calling Trump’s threat of ramped-up economic penalties if Russia doesn’t cut a peace deal in next 50 days “a real executive hammer to drive the parties to the negotiating table.”

But a day later, a real sense of skepticism about Trump’s threats has crept in.

The Russians have basically shrugged it off and even treated it as a green light to take what they can in the next several weeks. Ukrainians and foreign leaders have expressed fears about what happens over the next 50 days. And even some Trump allies in Congress and elsewhere are wondering: Why the delay? Why not pass the sanctions legislation that more than 80 senators already support today?

Trump by Tuesday afternoon rejected criticisms of that timetable.

“Oh, I don’t think 50 days is very long, and it could be sooner than that,” he said. “I don’t think 50 days is very long. “

The president has often pushed off major decisions and announcements by giving himself a future deadline that he might or might not abide by (often “two weeks”). He did recently strike Iran right after a 60-day window he had given it to cut a nuclear deal that never arrived. But there seems to be a growing fear that this is just more kicking the can down the road or a pointless intermission.

Perhaps most striking Tuesday were the comments of a pair of Republican senators.

Sen. Rick Scott of Florida praised Trump for his desire to bring Putin to the table. But he said the Russian leader is “not going to change.”

“I don’t know why he gave him that many days. From my standpoint, I think Trump’s being very generous,” Scott told CNN’s Manu Raju. “I would love there to be sanctions now. I’d love there to be tariffs now.”

Sen. Thom Tillis of North Carolina said the 50-day timetable “worries” him.

Tillis said Putin could use the time to ramp up efforts to win the war quickly or try to gain power “after having murdered and potentially collected more ground as a basis for negotiation.”

As CNN’s Matthew Chance noted, officials in Moscow were breathing a sigh of relief about an announcement that could have been much worse for them – and may now view it as license to do what they can over the next 50 days.

While Russia has called Trump’s threats and the weapons he said he’s funneling to Ukraine “very serious,” Russian officials like Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev – a key Putin ally – also publicly downplayed the 50-day timeline.

“Trump issued a theatrical ultimatum to the Kremlin,” Medvedev posted on X. “The world shuddered, expecting the consequences. Belligerent Europe was disappointed. Russia didn’t care.”

The markets in Russia also appear to have shrugged. The New York Times reported Tuesday that Moscow’s stock index jumped up 2.5 points on Tuesday, potentially because secondary sanctions appear more distant now – if they ever arrive.

Fears that Trump is giving Russia too long a leash were also prominent in Europe.

Officials including European Union foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas praised the tougher stance but cast the timeframe as a very long one.

Former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who has often allied with Trump, praised him for “turning up the heat on Putin.”

“But why wait? Putin is butchering innocent people every day. Let’s get this thing over,” Johnson posted on X, adding: “Let’s sanction the Putin enablers now.”

The dilemma for Russia hawks is readily apparent. On the one hand, Trump is saying tougher things about Putin than he ever has before, and they want to give him credit for that – however belated they might think that pivot is.

But given Trump’s unpredictability and the fact that he’s treated Putin with kid gloves plenty before, they might also view this as a smokescreen and not tough enough. So now that Trump appears to have soured on his Russian counterpart, they might want to gently push him toward more urgent action.

What seems clear is that the concerns about the 50-day deadline have registered.

Trump grew testy Tuesday when pressed on the matter.

“You should’ve asked that same question to Biden,” Trump said, repeating one of his frequent refrains that it’s really his predecessor who is responsible for Putin’s unprovoked invasion of its neighbor. “Why did he get us into this war? You should ask that question.”

Graham also seemed to respond to critics of the 50-day timeline, saying Trump very recently demonstrated how serious such deadlines can be – on Iran.

“If Putin and others are wondering what happens on day 51, I would suggest they call the Ayatollah,” Graham posted on X. “If I were a country buying cheap Russian oil, propping up Putin’s war machine, I would take President Trump at his word.”

The comparison isn’t perfect. Trump didn’t threaten to bomb Moscow. And the option to get tougher on Russia is a lot easier for Trump to make; it basically just involves telling Congress to pass a bill it appears poised to pass whenever called upon.

We’ll see if Trump feels compelled to get tougher, quicker.