Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Jennie Olmsted, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey, Justin Young, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 15, 2025, 9pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on August 15, except for reports about the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 16 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US President Donald Trump met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska, on August 15. Trump and Putin initially planned to meet one-on-one, but the talks expanded to a three-on-three format, including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff, for unspecified reasons.[1] Leading Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev claimed that the talks went “remarkably well” following the three-on-three discussions.[2] Trump and Putin then held a joint press conference. Putin addressed the crowd first and spoke in Russian, reiterating several long-standing Kremlin information operations about the war in Ukraine, Russian history, and the US-Russia relationship.[3] Putin invoked the geographical closeness of Alaska and the Russian Federation and called back to US-Soviet military cooperation during the Second World War in order to artificially highlight bilateral US-Russia relations. Putin emphasized the importance of solving the “root causes” of the war in Ukraine, which the Kremlin has defined as NATO’s eastward expansion and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers.[4] Putin also accused European states of attempting to undermine the negotiation process. These statements are two standard narrative lines that the Kremlin employs in order to justify its illegal invasion of Ukraine and to drive a wedge between the United States, Europe, and Ukraine.[5] Trump then spoke for a shorter time than Putin and emphasized that the meeting had been “productive,” but that the US and Russian delegations reached “no deal.” Putin concluded by addressing Trump in English and inviting him to Moscow.[6] Trump and Putin left the press conference stage without taking any audience questions, and a luncheon planned for after the meeting was reportedly cancelled.[7]

Putin said nothing in the joint press conference to indicate that he has moderated either his war aims or his willingness to compromise on them and reiterated language he has used since 2021 to justify Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Putin again demonstrated that he has not changed his views on Ukrainian sovereignty since 2021 and remains disinterested in serious peace negotiations with Ukraine. Putin used the joint press conference following the August 15 Alaska summit to evoke the Kremlin’s long-standing narrative that Russia and Ukraine share the “same roots” and that Russia considers Ukraine to be a “brotherly” nation.[8] Putin published an essay on the “Historic Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” in July 2021, in which he similarly ideologized that Ukrainians and Belarusians have always belonged to the Russian nation because of their shared “historical and spiritual space.”[9] ISW previously assessed that the essay, which Putin published less than a month after meeting with then-US President Joe Biden in Geneva in June 2021, was an ultimatum to Kyiv as it openly questioned Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Putin stated in the essay that Ukraine was a ”product of the Soviet era shaped on the lands of historical Russia,” and reiterated these arguments in his February 2022 declaration of war against Ukraine as a justification for his full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[10] The continuity between Putin’s statements at the August 15 press conference with Trump and his previous statements demonstrates that he remains committed to the view that Ukraine’s existence as a state and territorial integrity depend on Ukraine’s alignment with Russia.

Trump stated that the United States and Russia did not come to a firm agreement about the war in Ukraine. Trump reported that he and Putin “made great progress” and agreed on “many points,” but did not agree on other points.[11] Trump did not elaborate on the specifics of what the US and Russian delegations discussed, upon what points the delegations agreed, and which points remain in contention. Trump stated that “there’s no deal until there’s a deal” and stated that he will inform Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and NATO states about the conversation and that an agreement on Ukraine is “ultimately up to them.”[12] Trump reiterated his timeline that any bilateral economic agreements with Russia will come after the war is “over with.”

Russia conducted drone and missile strikes in Ukraine in the hours before the August 15 Alaska summit, causing civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Voronezh and Bryansk oblasts and 97 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the direction of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast on the night of August 14 to August 15.[13] Russian forces used drones to target frontline areas of Sumy, Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Chernihiv oblasts, and the missiles to target Kharkiv and Chernihiv oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down or suppressed 63 Shahed-type and decoy drones over northern and eastern Ukraine.[14] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the two Iskander-Ms and 34 drones struck 13 locations throughout Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that the ballistic missiles hit cars in Dniprovskyi Raion, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and an agricultural enterprise in Koryukivka Hromada, Chernihiv Oblast, killing and wounding civilians.[15] Russian drones hit an ambulance and a civilian car in Velykapyskarivka Hromada, Sumy Oblast, on the morning of August 15, killing one civilian.[16] Ukrainian officials and media sources reported on the evening of August 15 that a Russian drone hit the Sumy City Central Market, damaging retail outlets, an educational institution, and other buildings.[17] A Russian milblogger acknowledged that Russian forces conducted drone strikes against Sumy, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv oblasts “on the eve of the [Alaska] meeting.”[18] US President Donald Trump responded to the August 15 Russian strikes while en route to Alaska, noting that Russian President Vladimir Putin is “trying to set a stage” ahead of the summit.[19] Trump stated that the Russian strikes will “hurt” Putin’s ability to make a deal with Trump. Russia continues to conduct drone and missile strikes that result in high civilian casualties even as Trump has repeatedly called on Russia to stop strike series that disproportionately affect civilian areas.[20] The United Nations (UN) reported on August 13 that Russian air and drone strikes in July 2025 contributed to the highest total monthly casualty toll since May 2022.[21]

Ukrainian officials continue to indicate that Ukrainian counterattacks are stabilizing the situation east and northeast of Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk). Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on August 15 that Ukrainian forces have stabilized Russian penetration near Pokrovsk and Dobropillya.[22] Trehubov stated that Ukrainian forces continue to destroy the Russian assault groups in the area and that Russian forces have not been able to redeploy additional troops to the area. A Ukrainian corps operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on August 15 that Ukrainian forces cleared Pokrovsk of Russian groups and individual soldiers who had previously infiltrated the settlement.[23] A Ukrainian corps operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on August 15 that Ukrainian forces cleared Hruzke, Rubizhne, Novovodyane, Petrivka, Vesele, and Zolotyi Kolodyaz (all northeast of Dobropillya).[24] A Ukrainian source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported on August 15 that Ukrainian forces have in part stabilized the situation along the Vesele-Zolotyi Kolodyaz-Kucheriv Yar line (northeast of Dobropillya).[25] ISW has not observed broader reporting about Ukrainian forces clearing settlements in the Russian penetration near Dobropillya at this time. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 15 that elements of the Russian 5th, 110th, and 132nd separate motorized rifle brigades (all of the 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) initially advanced several hundred meters east of Pankivka (east of Dobropillya) but that Ukrainian counterattacks from Volodymyrivka and Shakhove (both north of Pankivka) pushed back the Russian advance.[26] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 114th and 132nd separate motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) have been attempting to hold Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya) and to repel Ukrainian counterattacks in the Ivanivka-Zapovidne direction (north to east of Dorozhnie) since August 13.[27] A Russian milblogger also acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya).[28] The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces had tactical successes near the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway.[29] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Volodymyrivka and Shakhove.[30] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claimed Russian advances, however.

The Russian military command is reportedly trying to redeploy forces and means to reinforce and exploit the penetration near Dobropillya but has so far been unsuccessful. Mashovets stated that small infantry groups of the Russian 5th, 110th, and 132nd separate motorized rifle brigades (all three of the 51st CAA) conducted the initial penetration, but that the total number of Russian forces that conducted the tactical breakthrough did not exceed 300 to 350 personnel.[31] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command tried to consolidate the penetration by redeploying elements of the 114th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) to near Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) and Zapovidne.[32] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command asked senior commanders in the area to provide additional forces and means by redeploying up to two battalions with armored vehicles from the 8th CAA (SMD), which is largely operating in the Toretsk direction, to support the other elements of the 51st CAA that conducted the tactical breakthrough.

Ukrainian officials continue to conduct evacuations of settlements near the Russian penetration area, however, likely reflecting the increased Russian drone threat due to the Russian advance near Dobropillya. Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin announced on August 14 the mandatory evacuation of families with children from Druzhkivka (northeast of Dobropillya) and villages in Andriivka Hromada, northeast, north, and northwest of Zolotyi Kolodyaz, noting that roughly 1,800 children live in these settlements.[33] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s use of drone strikes to generate battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects in the Ukrainian near rear is severely hindering Ukrainian evacuation efforts in the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya area.[34]

Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure overnight on August 14 to 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 15 that Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) and other Ukrainian elements conducted a drone strike against the Rosneft Syzran Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast, causing explosions and fires.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Syrzan Oil Refinery is one of Rosneft’s largest refineries and produces a wide range of fuel products, including aviation kerosene for the Russian military. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone strikes, posted images on August 15 showing smoke over the Syzran Oil Refinery.[36] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Syzran Oil Refinery in February 2025.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 15 that the Ukrainian SSO and other Ukrainian forces also struck the Russian Olya Seaport in Astrakhan Oblast, including the Port Olya 4 vessel, which was carrying Shahed-type drone components and ammunition from Iran.[38] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Russian military uses the Olya Seaport as a logistics supply point for military goods from Iran. The Ukrainian SSO Command reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed the Port Olya-4.[39] Astrakhan Oblast Governor Igor Babushkin claimed that Russian air defenses downed Ukrainian drones targeting the Olya Seaport and that drone debris damaged a ship.[40]

Russian opposition outlet Baza reported on August 15 that there was an explosion at the Elastik Gunpowder Factory in Ryazan Oblast.[41] Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov confirmed that there was an “emergency situation” at a plant in the area that killed five and injured 100 others and declared a state of emergency in the municipality.[42] The Russian Investigative Committee (Sledkom) opened an investigation into the violation of safety procedures following the explosion.[43] Kovalenko posted footage on August 15 showing an explosion at a gunpowder plant in Ryazan Oblast, noted that there were roughly 50 workers at the plant, and stated that “something strange” occurred at the plant.[44] Ukrainian sources have not yet claimed responsibility for the strike, however, and ISW cannot confirm its causes at this time.

Key Takeaways:

US President Donald Trump met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska, on August 15.

Putin said nothing in the joint press conference to indicate that he has moderated either his war aims or his willingness to compromise on them and reiterated language he has used since 2021 to justify Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

Trump stated that the United States and Russia did not come to a firm agreement about the war in Ukraine.

Russia conducted drone and missile strikes in Ukraine in the hours before the August 15 Alaska summit, causing civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure.

Ukrainian officials continue to indicate that Ukrainian counterattacks are stabilizing the situation east and northeast of Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk).

The Russian military command is reportedly trying to redeploy forces and means to reinforce and exploit the penetration near Dobropillya but has so far been unsuccessful.

Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure overnight on August 14 to 15.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Limited fighting continued in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 15.[45]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked southwest of Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) along the Seim River shore.[46]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger, citing unnamed Ukrainian military analysts, claimed that Russian forces advanced into Novokostyantynivka (near the international border north of Sumy City) and that the settlement is a contested “gray zone.”[47]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Novokostyantynivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and toward Sadky on August 14 and 15.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novokostyantynivka, Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City), Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City), and Sadky.[49]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) continue to face the threat of encirclement in an unspecified forest area, likely referring to previous reports of the Russian military command abandoning elements of the regiment near Sadky on August 12.[50] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced on two flanks and from the rear, forcing Russian forces to hastily retreat to unprepared positions. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are struggling with logistics and are unable to resolve supply problems with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in forested environments. The milblogger added that Ukrainian forces are actively targeting elements of the regiment with drones.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are working with elements of the 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) in the Sumy direction.[51]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Hlyboke, Synelnykove, and on the south (left) bank of the Vovcha River on August 14 and 15.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Synelnykove.[53]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast stated that Russian forces operating in the Vovchansk direction mostly leverage small infantry groups for assaults because Ukrainian strikes against Russian armored equipment have forced the Russian military command to pull Russian materiel, such as tanks and artillery systems, back to Russia.[54]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne on August 15 but did not advance.[55]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast stated on August 15 that the intensity of Russian military activity in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AOR) decreased compared to the first half of July 2025, particularly near Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burlyk).[56]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka; north of Kupyansk near Radkivka and Holubivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka; and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on August 14 and 15.[57]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[58]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Borova itself; northeast of Borova near Zahryzove; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Olhivka on August 14 and 15.[59]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Ivan Group of the 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions southwest of Lozova (northeast of Borova).[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Stavky (north of Lyman) and into western Zarichne (east of Lyman).[61]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Serednie, Shandryholove, and Karpivka; north of Lyman near Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 14 and 15.[62]

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on August 15 that Russian forces in this direction are attempting to set conditions for a mechanized assault by using engineering detachments to build river crossings, including across the Chornyi Zherebets (Zherebets) River.[63] The officer added that Russian forces in the Lyman direction are conducting motorcycle assaults in small fireteams of four to eight infantrymen. The officer noted that Russian forces are using anti-heat vision cloaks and tents to evade detection and constantly reinforcing elements of the Russian 3rd (Southern Military District [SMD]) and 20th (MMD) combined arms armies (CAAs) operating in the Ukrainian unit’s area of responsibility (AOR) with drone detachments. The officer added that Russian forces operating near Lyman are increasing air strikes with guided glide bombs and other munitions and drone strikes, suggesting that Russian forces are intensifying their offensive tempo. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on August 15 that Russian forces in the Lyman direction are leveraging small infantry groups in day and night assaults, expecting that some of the groups will reach assigned rally points in the Ukrainian near rear.[64]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 11th Tank Brigade (25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Serebryanske forest area.[65] Drone operators of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[66]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Siversk itself; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; south of Siversk near Pereizne; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka, and Vasyukivka on August 14 and 15.[67]

The Ukrainian Dnipro Grouping of Forces reported on August 15 that Russian forces in the Siversk direction increased their use of guided glide bomb strikes from eight to 22 in the past three days (since August 12).[68]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 15 that Russian forces advanced in Mykolaivka (just west of Chasiv Yar).[69]

Russian forces attacked north of Chasiv Yar near Minkivka and Orikhovo-Vasylivka and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora on August 14 and 15.[70]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1065th Artillery Regiment (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Mykolaivka.[71]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[72]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Poltavka, south of Rusyn Yar, and toward Sofiivka (all northwest of Toretsk).[73]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk near Oleksandro-Kalynove, Katerynivka, Yablunivka, Popiv Yar, Rusyn Yar, and Poltavka and toward Stepanivka and Pleshchiivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on August 14 and 15.[74]

A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported that Russian forces have been fighting for Toretsk for more than one year and that the brigade has killed or wounded more than 50,000 Russian forces in that time – roughly five divisions’ worth.[75]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka and the Kleban Byk reservoir.[76] Drone operators of the 98th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian logistics in the Kostyantynivka direction.[77]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

See topline text for reports of activity east and northeast of Dobropillya.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 15 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk).[78] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces likely withdrew from Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[79] Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 1437th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial reserve call-up), with support from elements of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), advanced from Udachne toward Zvirove (east of Udachne).[80]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Fedorivka, Novoekonomichne, Zapovidne, Mayak, Shakhove, Krasnyi Lyman, Zaytshok, and Vesele; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske, Sukhetske, Zolotyi Kolodyaz, and Rubizhne; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Myrolyubivka, and Mykolaivka and toward Balahan; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, and Kotlyne and toward Molodetske on August 14 and 15.[81]

A servicemember of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are attacking during both the day and night and continue to use tactics to accumulate small groups of one to two personnel for further attacks.[82] The commander of a drone crew operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces continue to conduct repeated highly attritional, infantry-led assaults to attack the same positions.[83] An aerial reconnaissance officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces continue to attack in groups of two to six personnel.[84] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Ukrainian forces are using “Hiyena” unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) that can carry 26 kilograms of explosives to attack Russian fortified positions or infantry in buildings.[85]

Mashovets reported that the area of responsibility (AoR) of the 2nd CAA (CMD) extends approximately from the southern outskirts of Pokrovsk to Myrolyubivka.[86] Mashovets stated that the AoR of the 41st CAA (CMD) extends approximately from Kotlyne to north of Oleksiivka (southeast of Novopavlivka) and that the AoR of the 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD), which includes personnel from occupied Ukraine, is approximately from Myrolyubivka to Popiv Yar (northeast of Pokrovsk and northwest of Toretsk).

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are fighting in the Surove-Bilytske direction (north of Pokrovsk) and that elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are fighting near Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[87] Mashovets stated that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are fighting in southern Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk).[88] Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are striking Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk and Rodynske.[89]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and northwest of Andriivka-Klevtsove (southeast of Novopavlivka).[90]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Novoukrainka; south of Novopavlivka toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai, Tovste, Zirka, Andriivka-Klevtsove, and Ivanivka on August 14 and 15.[91]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 15 shows elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) raising a flag in western Oleksandrohrad (east of Velykomykhailivka), indicating that Russian forces recently seized Oleksandrohrad and Voskresenka (southeast of Oleksandrohrad).[92]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Vorone (southeast of Velykomykhailivka) and advanced west of Oleksandrohrad to the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk Oblast border area.[93

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Myrne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and Voskresenka, and toward Novoselivka; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka and Zelene Pole, and toward Zaporizke, Komyshuvakha, and Novoheorhiivka on August 14 and 15.[94]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Vorone, Sichneve (southeast of Velykomykhailivka), and Sosnivka (south of Velykomykhailivka).[95] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly conducting unguided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions in Novoselivka.[96]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger posted a map on August 15 that claimed that Russian forces advanced into central Temyrivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[97]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Olhivske, Novodarivka, and Temyrivka on August 14 and 15.[98]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Poltavka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[99]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 15 that Russian forces are advancing from the southeastern side of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) in order to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) between Orikhiv and Zaporizhzhia City.[100] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing on the southeastern side of Mala Tokmachka.[101]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and toward Prymorske on August 15.[102] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked within Stepnohirsk.[103]

Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Head Ivan Fedorov stated that Russian forces struck a highway near Orikhiv with a first-person view (FPV) drone, injuring one civilian.[104]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Plavni (west of Orikhiv).[105] Elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka.[106]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on August 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson City direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivsky road bridge and southeast of Kherson City near Bilohrudyi Island on August 14 and 15.[107]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating on unspecified islands of the Dnipro River Delta.[108] Drone operators of an unspecified Russian VDV artillery brigade, likely the 52nd VDV Artillery Brigade, are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River with Lancet loitering munitions.[109]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for today’s report on Russian air, missile, and drone campaign,

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

US President Donald Trump called Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko on August 15 ahead of the Alaska summit and thanked Lukashenko for releasing 16 prisoners.[110] Trump stated that the United States and Belarus discussed the release of 1,300 additional prisoners, the Alaska summit, and plans for a future Trump-Lukashenko meeting. Belarusian state news agency Belta claimed that Lukashenko invited Trump and his family to visit Belarus and that Trump agreed.[111] Belta added that Trump and Lukashenko discussed bilateral relations, regional affairs, and war in Ukraine. Lukashenko recently met with US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg on June 21 and requested an interview with Time Magazine published on August 8.[112]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/trump-putin-alaska-summit/card/top-putin-aides-will-join-trump-meeting-AAWryfNUXRFLA6qJJf1o ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/63871

[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/updates-trump-putin-meet-alaska-summit-war-ukraine-2025-08-15/

[3] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/trump-putin-alaska-summit?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAgDtYYBoHGseNzklHvHtk1TURzZ0KSHNmP21v9MG8m_XImpjI4NLv9X5BdH5nI%3D&gaa_ts=689fc8c1&gaa_sig=lqBHP6Jl4yS655aH2kk0wEQU3lcfdQGiTb0jeXFT_SqEUJkDVooxf7pZCrbjnAS7nMINZOdLDF-hL8MlgUEM4A%3D%3D

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070325

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080225; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031825; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122924

[6] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/trump-putin-alaska-summit?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAgDtYYBoHGseNzklHvHtk1TURzZ0KSHNmP21v9MG8m_XImpjI4NLv9X5BdH5nI%3D&gaa_ts=689fc8c1&gaa_sig=lqBHP6Jl4yS655aH2kk0wEQU3lcfdQGiTb0jeXFT_SqEUJkDVooxf7pZCrbjnAS7nMINZOdLDF-hL8MlgUEM4A%3D%3D

[7] https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/trump-putin-meeting-alaska-ukraine/#post-update-4b3acefa

[8] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77793

[9] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/66181

[10] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/67843

[11] https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-putin-meeting-news-08-15-25#cmedgbprz00053b6vgezqijf0

[12] https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-putin-meeting-news-08-15-25#cmedgbprz00053b6vgezqijf0

[13] https://t.me/kpszsu/40434

[14] https://t.me/kpszsu/40434

[15] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/23635 ; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1091620-raketna-ataka-po-dniprovskou-rajonu-e-poranenij/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/okupanty-vdaryly-balistychnoyu-raketoyu-po-selu-na-chernigivshhyni/; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/23420

[16] https://t.me/prokuraturasumy/4475; https://t.me/grigorov_oleg/432; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1091144-rosijskij-dron-atakuvav-civilnu-avtivku-na-ohtirsini-zaginuv-colovik/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/na-sumshhyni-vorozhyj-bezpilotnyk-atakuvav-mashynu-medykiv-ye-zagyblyj/;

[17] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1091688-armia-rf-vdarila-po-centru-sum-zdijnalas-pozeza/; https://t.me/grigorov_oleg/433

[18] https://t.me/dva_majors/77472

[19] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/trump-putin-alaska-summit/card/trump-says-drone-attacks-are-negotiating-strategy-ahead-of-talks-mI67MUFTzjj3gofLyPeV

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081325; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar07292025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072125; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070825 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2025

[21] https://ukraine.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2025-08/Ukraine%20-%20protection%20of%20civilians%20in%20armed%20conflict%20%28July%202025%29_ENG.pdf

[22] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/zhaliyutsya-v-telegrami-shho-hlopczi-goli-j-bosi-rosijsku-infiltracziyu-poblyzu-dobropillya-zupynyly-j-vidsikly/

[23] https://t.me/corps7DSHV/224

[24] https://t.me/azov_media/7159

[25] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/22318

[26] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2921

[27] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2921

[28] https://t.me/wargonzo/28507

[29] https://t.me/wargonzo/28507

[30] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176012

[31] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2921

[32] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2922

[33] https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/10352

[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081325

[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27842

[36] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9628

[37] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021925

[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27823

[39] https://www.facebook.com/usofcom/posts/1138440454766888?ref=embed_post

[40] https://t.me/babushkin30/8726

[41] https://t.me/bazabazon/40058 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/40063

[42] https://t.me/tass_agency/331268

[43] https://t.me/tass_agency/331262

[44] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9632

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822

[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32481

[47] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97755

[48] https://t.me/rybar/72833 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77472 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4832 ;

[49] https://t.me/severnnyi/4832 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77472 ; https://t.me/rybar/72833

[50] https://t.me/severnnyi/4836 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2025

[51] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97758

[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507; https://t.me/severnnyi/4832; https://t.me/dva_majors/77472

[53] https://t.me/dva_majors/77472; https://t.me/severnnyi/4832

[54] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/yak-tilky-vyyavlyayut-zhyrnu-czil-tudy-praczyuyut-usi-na-harkivshhyni-rosiyany-ne-ryzykuyut-pokazuvaty-tehniku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0

[55] https://t.me/wargonzo/28507

[56] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/yak-tilky-vyyavlyayut-zhyrnu-czil-tudy-praczyuyut-usi-na-harkivshhyni-rosiyany-ne-ryzykuyut-pokazuvaty-tehniku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0

[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507

[58] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40868

[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507

[60] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1956027445997658237; https://t.me/privet_iz_doma152/16823; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1956353186375016773

[61] https://t.me/tass_agency/331172; https://t.me/tass_agency/331195

[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32490

[63] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/vorog-vykorystovuye-kytajski-namety-rosiyany-hochut-peretyagty-tehniku-cherez-chornyj-zherebecz/

[64] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/kill-zony-popovnyuyutsya-tilamy-rosiyan-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-okupanty-nevdalo-pidkradayutsya-vnochi/; https://t.me/ombr66/1930%5C

[65] https://t.me/operationall_space/5777; https://t.me/voin_dv/16465;

[66] https://t.me/voin_dv/16464

[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32490

[68] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/na-siverskomu-napryamku-okupanty-vtrychi-zbilshyly-vykorystannya-kabiv/

[69] https://t.me/wargonzo/28507

[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822

[71] https://t.me/mod_russia/55597

[72] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1956107606587793677 ; https://t.me/z4lpr/1171

[73] https://t.me/wargonzo/28507; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32223

[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77472

[75] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/zamist-pereglyadu-futbolu-rosiyany-obraly-pomerty-v-toreczku-staleva-sotka-peremolola-kilka-vorozhyh-dyvizij/

[76] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40868 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40813 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97743

[77] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32467

[78] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30272; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9802; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/22120

[79] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2922

[80] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2922

[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://t.me/dva_majors/77472; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507

[82] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/15/vidsotkiv-50-vedut-ptashky-poblyzu-pokrovska-rosiyany-pokladayutsya-na-karty-v-telefoni/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O14SWvrF1AU

[83] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/nazad-ty-200-vpyerod-uvidim-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-u-rosiyan-nevelykyj-vybir/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ScdUZNkwcYc

[84] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/zhodnyh-genialnyh-planiv-tilky-kilkist-operator-droniv-pro-shturmy-okupantiv/

[85] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/giyena-na-kolesah-ukrayinskyj-robot-kamikadze-znis-ukriplennya-voroga-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/; https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1BvAKBx5sY/

[86] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2919

[87] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2921

[88] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2921

[89] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1956353087708205220; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/413

[90] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40865; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66705

[91] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678

[92] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1956275486776287456; https://t.me/voin_dv/16472; https://t.me/osintpen/1627; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9797

[93] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40865; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66705

[94] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66705; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175932; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507

[95] https://t.me/voin_dv/16468

[96] https://t.me/voin_dv/16478

[97] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97767

[98] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822

[99] https://t.me/voin_dv/16476

[100] https://t.me/dva_majors/77472

[101] https://t.me/wargonzo/28507

[102] https://t.me/dva_majors/77472; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507

[103] https://t.me/dva_majors/77472; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507

[104] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/23798

[105] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32467

[106] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97747

[107] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822

[108] https://t.me/mod_russia/55578

[109] https://t.me/mod_russia/55571

[110] https://t.me/pul_1/17844; https://t.me/sotaproject/101786; https://t.me/bbcrussian/84217; https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115033133751064517

[111] https://t.me/pul_1/17844; https://t.me/sotaproject/101786; https://eng.belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-invites-trump-and-family-to-visit-belarus-170549-2025/

[112] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2025

August 20, 2025, 7pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1 pm ET on August 20, 2025. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 21, 2025, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin is demanding that Russia have a veto over any Western security guarantees for Ukraine in an effort to undermine ongoing US, European, and Ukrainian efforts to establish conditions for lasting peace in Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated on August 20 that any serious discussions on Western security guarantees for Ukraine without Russian input are a “road to nowhere” and that Russia “cannot agree” that now-proposed “collective security issues” can be resolved without Russia, effectively demanding a Russian veto over Western security guarantees for Ukraine.[1] Lavrov also threatened that Russia will take “firm and harsh” action to ensure that Russia’s “legitimate interests” are a part of any postwar security arrangement for Ukraine.

The Kremlin is likely trying to inject its demands into the ongoing US, European, and Ukrainian joint effort to create a security structure that will serve as a safeguard against a future Russian re-invasion in the event of a peace settlement.[2] Granting Russia veto power over Western security guarantees would enable the Kremlin to dictate conditions that will weaken Ukraine’s ability to resist another Russian invasion by preventing Ukraine from forming binding bilateral or multilateral security agreements such as are now being discussed, increasing and modernizing its military, and receiving support from Ukraine’s partners. Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova recently said that Russia could not tolerate the presence of troops from NATO member states in Ukraine as part of any security guarantees.[3]

European leaders recently released a joint statement reaffirming that no peace agreement should place limitations on Ukraine’s armed forces or on its cooperation with third countries nor can Russia have veto power over Ukraine’s pathway to joining the European Union (EU) or NATO.[4] European Commission Vice President Kaja Kallas stated on August 19 that Russian President Vladimir Putin cannot be trusted to honor any promises or commitments to permanently cease military activity against Ukraine and that any security guarantees must be robust and credible to deter the Russian military command does not re-group and launch a future invasion of Ukraine.

The Kremlin appears to be demanding that any security guarantees be based on those proposed in the Istanbul 2022 framework, which would grant Russia and its allies the right to veto Western military assistance to Ukraine and leave Ukraine helpless in the face of future Russian threats. Lavrov stated on August 20 that Russia is in favor of collective security guarantees that are “truly reliable” and that a good example of such guarantees was evident in the 2022 Istanbul Ukraine-Russia negotiations, which would have permanently prohibited Ukraine from joining NATO, imposed limitations on the Ukrainian military, and banned Ukraine from receiving Western military assistance without any imposing restrictions on the size or capability of Russian forces.[5] The security guarantees proposed in the draft 2022 Istanbul Protocol treated Russia as a neutral security “guarantor state” of Ukraine along with the other permanent members of the UN Security Council, failing to identify Russia as a belligerent in the war. The outlined security guarantees would give China and Russia veto power over any action the guarantors could take in response to a renewed Russian attack by granting the UN Security Council the authority to take “measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”[6] Such “security guarantees” would allow the Kremlin and its allies to dictate the means and tools that Ukraine could use to defend itself against Russia and restrict the ability of other guarantor states to come to Ukraine’s assistance.

The Kremlin is continuing to indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin is unwilling to have an immediate bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on the timeline proposed by US President Donald Trump. Lavrov stated on August 20 that Putin confirmed his readiness to continue direct negotiations with Ukraine in the Istanbul format.[7] Russian and Ukrainian delegations have engaged in three rounds of bilateral talks in Istanbul since February 2025, which have resulted in nine prisoners of war (POW) exchanges, but little more.[8] Lavrov claimed that Putin would consider raising the level of the delegation heads after working groups had been established but added that a summit between Putin and Zelensky would need thorough preparations that could take time. Several US officials have stated that Putin promised Trump that he would meet with Zelensky following the multilateral summit between the United Stated, Ukraine, and European leaders on August 18.[9] Trump stated on August 18 that Zelensky and Putin need to meet urgently and that waiting too long before having a leader-level bilateral meeting would result in thousands of deaths.[10] Lavrov may have attempted to portray the Kremlin’s proposal of continued negotiations within the Istanbul framework and working groups as fulfilling Putin’s reported promise to Trump to hold a bilateral meeting with Zelensky. Continued negotiations within the Istanbul framework are a far cry from a head of state-level bilateral meeting, however, and Lavrov’s statement is likely part of the Kremlin’s continued efforts to protract peace negotiations and deflect blame for delays onto Ukraine and the West.

The Russian economy continues to face budget deficits as a result of increased defense spending and detrimental effects of Western sanctions and secondary tariffs. Reuters reported on August 20 that the Russian government is preparing to increase taxes and reduce its spending as it attempts to maintain its defense expenditure amid economic cooling.[11] Russian Finance Ministry data indicated that the Kremlin ran a budget deficit of 4.9 trillion rubles (roughly $61 billion) from January to August of 2025, exceeding the target for the entire year by a quarter.[12] Russian Federation Council Committee on Budget and Financial Markets Chairperson Antatoly Artamonov claimed in late July 2025 that Russia needed to “urgently start fiscal consolidation” amidst increasingly pessimistic economic indicators and a decline in oil and gas revenues.[13] Reuters reported that Russia spends over 17 trillion rubles (roughly $211 billion) or 41 percent of its federal budget on its defense and national security. A Russian government source stated that Russia’s defense spending likely constitutes more than the stated eight percent of Russian GDP and assessed that defense spending if unlikely to decrease in 2026 or in an event of a ceasefire.[14] Reuters reported that the Russian government is increasingly pulling funds away from the healthcare and education sectors, and Russian officials are pushing for Russia to reallocate funds from non-defense budgetary items to the defense sector. Reuters reported that Russia has relatively a low debt-to-GDP ratio of around 20 percent; however, this metric is much less consequential as Russia is a rentier state which uses oil and gas revenues and Russia’s sovereign wealth fund to fund its war in Ukraine. The sovereign wealth fund is a state-owned investment fund that Russia pulls money from to avoid incurring debt, but Putin is steadily depleting the fund’s liquid reserves to fund its war in Ukraine.[15]

Russia is jeopardizing its economic stability and the livelihoods of Russian civilians to increasingly feed its defense industrial base (DIB) and sustain the war effort in Ukraine. Russia faces a growing list of costs from the war, including providing compensation for servicemembers and their families, expanding its DIB, and sponsoring recruitment drives for its war in Ukraine.[16] Russian officials have repeatedly attempted to convince the Russian population that the Russian federal budget prioritizes civilian and social expenditures while continuing to allocate greater sums of the budget to defense spending.[17] The Russian government also must face the future costs of compensating veterans and their families by providing them with financial, medical, and psychological support from the government over the coming decades.

Secondary tariffs are likely forcing Russia to sell oil below market price, which could be decreasing the incoming flow of foreign funds into the Russian economy and depleting Russia’s primary source of wealth. Bloomberg reported on August 20 that India’s state-owned oil refineries purchased an increased amount of Russian oil from August 18 to 19, and Russian deputy trade representative in India Yevgeny Griva told Bloomberg on August 20 that Russia expects India to continue buying Russian oil because of a five percent discount.[18] Bloomberg reported that Russia deepened its discount from one dollar in July 2025 to $2.50 a barrel to Dated Brent, likely to incentivize Indian refineries to purchase Russian oil amidst secondary tariffs.[19] Bloomberg reported that Chinese oil refiners stepped up purchases of Russian flagship oil as some Indian companies pulled back purchases of Russian oil in August amidst US threats of tariffs.[20] Bloomberg reported that China received shipments of 75,000 barrels per day from the Urals, a marked increase from the year-to-date average of 40,000 barrels per day. Secondary tariffs may cost Russia additional foreign funds if Russia is unable to successfully convince tariffed countries to buy more oil from Russia that would compensate the difference between the discount and market price. ISW continues to assess that secondary sanctions will likely further impact the Russian economy by undercutting Russian oil revenues which are essential for the Kremlin’s financing of its war against Ukraine.[21]

The Kremlin is reportedly considering replacing Russian Investigative Committee (Sledkom) Chairman Alexander Bastrykin, likely as part of the Kremlin’s efforts to form a new and younger elite. Moscow-based business newspaper Vedomosti reported on August 20 that the Kremlin is considering Bastrykin for the vacant position of Chairman of the Russian Supreme Court.[22] Unspecified sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration, Supreme Court, and judicial community told Vedomosti that Bastrykin’s replacement presents an opportunity to “introduce new blood” to Sledkom, given that Bastrykin has headed Sledkom since 2011 and is approaching the age of 72. The Kremlin allowed Bastrykin to remain in office past the age of 70 in September 2024.[23] The Kremlin’s replacement of Bastrykin is in line with Putin’s recent practice of reshuffling older members of his inner circle to other roles rather than retiring or firing them, as demonstrated by the appointment of former Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev to oversee the Russian shipbuilding industry in May 2025.[24] Putin has been recently promoting younger officials who have significant involvement with the Russian war effort such as former Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin, who became the youngest ever member of the Russian Security Council in September 2024.[25] The promotion of younger officials connected to the war effort is consistent with Putin’s February 2024 announcement that he is forming a new elite out of veterans and committed supporters of the war effort.[26]

Key Takeaways:

The Kremlin is demanding that Russia have a veto over any Western security guarantees for Ukraine in an effort to undermine ongoing US, European, and Ukrainian efforts to establish conditions for lasting peace in Ukraine.

The Kremlin appears to be demanding that any security guarantees be based on those proposed in the Istanbul 2022 framework, which would grant Russia and its allies the right to veto Western military assistance to Ukraine and leave Ukraine helpless in the face of future Russian threats.

The Kremlin is continuing to indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin is unwilling to have an immediate bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on the timeline proposed by US President Donald Trump.

The Russian economy continues to face budget deficits as a result of increased defense spending and detrimental effects of Western sanctions and secondary tariffs.

Secondary tariffs are likely forcing Russia to sell oil below market price, which could be decreasing the incoming flow of foreign funds into the Russian economy and depleting Russia’s primary source of wealth.

The Kremlin is reportedly considering replacing Russian Investigative Committee (Sledkom) Chairman Alexander Bastrykin, likely as part of the Kremlin’s efforts to form a new and younger elite.

Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Toretsk, and Velykomykhailivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 19 and 20.[27]

A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing in the direction of Novyi Put (southwest of Glushkovo).[28]

Sources in the Ukrainian military told The New Voice of Ukraine (NV) that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian BARS Kursk Unmanned Systems Battalion base in Oboyansky Raion, Kursk Oblast, where Russian forces stationed drones overnight on August 19 to 20.[29] Social media sources geolocated footage of the strikes on August 20.[30]

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed on August 20 that the FSB detained three Ukrainian servicemen conducting a sabotage and reconnaissance operation in an unspecified area of Bryansk Oblast’s international border area.[31]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Sumy direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 19 and 20 indicates that Russian forces advanced seized Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City) and into central Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City).[32]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Andriivka (north of Sumy City) and west of Varachyne (northeast of Sumy City).[33]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy City near Ryzhivka and Bezsalivka; north of Sumy City near Kindrativka; and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on August 19 and 20.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Varachyne and Sadky.[35]

Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on August 20 that Russian milbloggers are mentioning Sumy Oblast less frequently because Russian forces in Sumy Oblast are suffering losses and gradually retreating in several areas of the oblast.[36] A Ukrainian reserve officer noted that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 2025 plan to create a buffer zone in Sumy Oblast failed since Russian forces only maintain two small pockets in the oblast.[37]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Kindrativka.[38] Elements of the 1434th Akhmat-Chechnya Regiment, including an attached Storm V company of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Varachyne.[39]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Tykhe (northeast of Kharkiv City).[40]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Synelnykove, and on the south (left) bank of the Vovcha River on August 19 and 20.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Synelnykove.[42]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne and southeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Katerynivka on August 19 and 20 but did not advance..[43]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northeastern and northern Kupyansk.[44]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka; northwest of Kupyansk near Myrove; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka, Fyholivka, and Kamyanka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on August 19 and 20.[45] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking within Kupyansk itself.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Synkivka and Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[47]

The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on August 19 that a Russian drone struck an ambulance in Kupyansk, in violation of international law.[48]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA] (Moscow Military District [MMD]) and infantry, likely of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are operating in the Kupyansk direction.[49] Elements of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) are reportedly operating near Stepova Novosellivka.[50] Drone operators of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA, MMD) and the Udaya Drone Group (reportedly of the 68th MRD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kupyansk and in the Kupyansk direction, respectively.[51]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova toward Olhivka and near Hlushchenkove on August 19 and 20.[52]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 1st GTA (MMD) are operating near Zahryzove.[53]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 20 indicates that Russian forces advanced within southern Zarichne (east of Lyman).[54]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove and Serednie; north of Lyman near Karpivka, Zelena Dolyna, and Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 19 and 20.[55]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces in this direction launch small infantry group assaults against Ukrainian positions at all times of the day, attacking from multiple directions simultaneously and constantly bringing up reserves to prolong assaults, sending as many as 10 successive small infantry groups per assault wave.[56] The NCO reported that Russian forces are supported by drone operators using Mavic, Lancet, and first-person view (FPV) drones, and occasionally leverage motorcycles for these assaults. The NCO noted that terrain features in this direction, including the Chorny Zherebets River, prevent Russian forces from leveraging armored vehicles. The NCO also stated that the Russian military command is deploying drone operators as close as possible to the line of contact in this direction in order to strike at Ukrainian firing points and logistical routes in the rear and that fighting is attritional in Lyman direction.[57]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD), and the 1st and 15th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 1st GTA, MMD) are operating toward the west (right) bank of the Oskil River and Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman).[58] Mashovets stated that elements of the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division (1st GTA, MMD) are operating south of Karpivka. Mashovets stated that elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are operating near Ridkodub and that elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are operating near Hrekivka (north of Lyman). Drone elements of the BARS-16 Kuban Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions west of Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman).[59]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Siversk and south of Novoselivka (east of Siversk).[60]

Russian forces attacked north of Siversk near Serebryanka and in the Kreminskyi forest area, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and Novoselivka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, south of Siversk near Pereizne, and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on August 19 and 20.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Serebryanka.[62]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Vyimka.[63]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the eastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka (southwest of Chasiv Yar).[64]

Russian forces attacked south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Predtechyne and southwest of Chasiv Yar near Kostyantynivka on August 20.[65]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kostyantynivka (Chasiv Yar) direction.[66] Sniper elements and drone operators of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating and striking Ukrainian positions in the Kostyantynivka direction and near Chasiv Yar, respectively.[67] Elements of the 299th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[68] Drone operators of the 8th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD]), including its 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade and 238th Artillery Brigade, are reportedly coordinating Lancet drone strikes against Ukrainian positions near Kostyantynivka.[69]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Oleksandro-Shultyne (north of Toretsk).[70]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Oleksandro-Shultyne, Dyliivka, and Bila Hora; west of Torestk near Shcherbynivka; and northwest of Toretsk near Kleban Byk, Katerynivka, Pleshchiivka, Yablunivka, Rusyn Yar, and Poltavka and toward Stepanivka on August 19 and 20.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shcherbynivka.[72]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd LNR AC, SMD) are reportedly operating near Oleksandro-Shultyne.[73] Elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Kleban Byk.[74]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces retook Petrivka (north of Pokrovsk).[75] ISW did not previously extend assessed advances or claims over Petrivka and does not assess that Ukrainian forces retook Petrivka in the last 24 hours, given that Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian forces retook the settlement on August 15.[76]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Pankivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[77] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forced advanced north of Poltavka and northeast of Poltavka within Volodymyrivka, east of Shakhove, toward Sofiivka, and north of Kucheriv Yar.[78]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Krasnyi Lyman; northeast of Pokrovsk near Shakhove, Zapovidne, Novoekonomichne, Fedorivka, Mayak, Sofiivka, Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Vesele, Kucheriv Yar, Zatyshok, and Volodymyrivka and toward Myrnohrad; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Hrodivka, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on August 19 and 20.[79] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Russian penetration northeast of Dobropillya, including north of Pokrovsk near Rubizhne and northeast of Pokrovsk near Zolotyi Kolodyaz and Zapovidne.[80]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 20 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking along the entire perimeter of the Dobropillya penetration.[81] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking Russian positions at the base of the penetration in order to cut off the salient along the Nykanorivka-Mayak line but that Russian forces still hold several positions along the railroad west of Sukhetske. Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces broke through to Mayak and are fighting in the settlement.

Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are operating in the Dobropillya penetration appear to be reinforced by up to one and a half battalions-worth of reserve units but that command will need time to regroup manpower and materiel before any units can press north of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[82] Mashovets stated that the Russian 41st CAA and 2nd CAA (both of the Central Military District [CMD]) are accumulating personnel and materiel near Pokrovsk in anticipation of future attempts by the 51st CAA to break through toward the northern outskirts of Pokrovsk and sever the ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Dobropillya, though this breakthrough is delayed due to Ukrainian counterattacks.[83] Mashovets reported that the Russian 114th and 132nd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) are operating northeast of Pokrovsk between Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and attacking toward Kucheriv Yar in order to advance to the remaining Russian assault units within the settlement but cannot break through.[84] Mashovets stated that the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion (77th Motorized Rifle Regiment, reportedly of the 7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD) and the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are attacking Ukrainian positions east of Nykanorivka and seized a windbreak north of Zatyshok (all northeast of Pokrovsk). Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 137th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA) and the 72nd Spetsnaz Battalion (reportedly of the 3rd AC) are attacking toward Hrodivka and Myrnohrad and advanced one kilometer toward Promin (all east of Pokrovsk).[85] Mashovets stated that elements of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) are operating near Udachne but have not advanced and that the 1437th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during 2022 partial reserve call up) are still operating in Zvirove.

Russian milbloggers claimed on August 20 that the Dobropillya penetration remains a fluid part of the frontline and that neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces are able to seize the initiative.[86] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces maintain positions in Zolotyi Kolodyaz despite Ukrainian counterattacks and that Russian forces are consolidating positions in Rodynske.[87] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces allegedly cleared Zolotyi Kolodyaz and Kucheriv Yar but did not affirm those reports.[88]

An intelligence officer of a Ukrainian special forces unit operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on August 20 that Russian forces are using anti-drone thermal imaging cloaks and transporting electronic warfare (EW) systems to forward infantry positions to counteract Ukrainian drone activity.[89] The intelligence officer reported that Russian forces often attempt to transport EW systems to the line of contact on motorcycles and scooters due to Ukrainian drone activity impeding Russian forces’ access to GLOCs.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st DNR AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Pokrovsk direction.[90] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Myrnohrad.[91] Electronic warfare elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[92]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Novoukrainka; south of Novopavlivka near Zirka, Hrushivka, and Dachne and toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Hrushivske and Tovste on August 19 and 20.[93]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly coordinating airstrikes against Ukrainian positions near Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[94] Drone operators of the 656th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 657th Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (both of the 29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Filya.[95] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novopavlivka.[96] Elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Novopavlivka) direction.[97]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 20 shows elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) raising a flag in northern Novoheorhiivka, indicating that Russian forces recently seized Novoheorhiivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[98] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade with the seizure of Novoheorhiivka.[99] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on August 20 that Russian forces seized Maliivka and advanced east of Vorone (both southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[100]

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets stated on August 20 that elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) and the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) advanced toward Voskresenka (east of Velykomykhailivka) and Sichneve (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[101] Mashovets added that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD) and 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th CAA) advanced up to 2 kilometers southeast of Velykomykhailivka between Zaporizke (southeast of Velykomykhailivka) and Novoserhiivka referring to Novomykolaivka or Novoheorhiivka) from the Temyrivka-Vilne Pole line. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Vorone and advanced toward Komyshuvakha (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[102]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Zelenyi Hai; east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka and Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Shevchenko, Zaporizke, Sichneve, and Vorone and toward Komyshuvakha.[103]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 20 that Russian forces advanced along both sides of the O-080619 Velyka Novosilka – Hulyaipole road and in the Novopil – Novoivanivka direction (all northeast of Hulyaipole).[104] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized and advanced north and south of Temyrivka and toward Novomykolaivka (both northeast of Hulyaipole).[105]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Temyrivka, Obratne, and Zelene Pole and toward Novohryhorivka on August 19 and 20.[106]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1198th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Hulyaipole.[107] Drone operators of the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast and artillery elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[108]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Plavni (southwest of Orikhiv) and south of Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[109]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; southwest of Orikhiv near Nesteryanka; west of Orikhiv near Plavni, Stepnohirsk, and Shcherbaky; and northwest of Orikhiv toward Prymorske on August 19 and 20.[110]

Geolocated footage published on August 20 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian command post in Myrne (southwest of Orikhiv) and Ukrainian drones striking a Russian S-300V air defense system north of Oleksiivka (southeast of Orikhiv).[111]

Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction on August 20 but did not advance.[112]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and elements of the Naval Detachment of the 88th Hispaniola Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near the coast of occupied Crimea.[113]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 19 to 20. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea and 93 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Millerovo cities; Primosko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[114] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 62 drones and one Iskander-M ballistic missile and that one missile and 31 drones struck 20 locations in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones and missile damaged civilian and energy infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Sumy oblasts.[115] Sumy Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported that Russian forces struck a residential area in Okhtyrka, Sumy Oblast, injuring 18 civilians.[116] Izmail Raion Administration reported that Russian forces struck port infrastructure and caused a fire at a fuel and energy infrastructure facility in Izmail, Odesa Oblast.[117]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk on August 20 to discuss opportunities to expand bilateral relations.[118] Pezeshkian stated that Iran and Belarus share common interests and that both countries seek to combat US and European efforts to ”push unilateralism” in the regional and international affairs.[119] Pezeshkian emphasized that Iran and Belarus can cooperate to mitigate the effects of international sanctions.[120] Iranian and Belarusian officials signed 12 memorandums of understanding (MoU) focused on increasing bilateral trade, military-tech cooperation, and mutual investment during Pezeshkian’s visit.[121] Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Abbas Araghchi stated on August 20 that Iran plans to sign a comprehensive strategic partnership with Belarus.[122] Iran and Belarus have increased defense and security cooperation in recent years.[123] Iran showcased military equipment at a Belarusian military exhibit in May 2025.[124] Iran has reportedly worked to establish a drone factory in Belarus since May 2023 to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[125]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

April 19, 2025, 10:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on August 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accurately stated that the Kremlin’s objective in Ukraine is to politically control all of Ukraine rather than to seize select Ukrainian territories such as Donetsk Oblast. Lavrov claimed in a televised interview on August 19 that the Kremlin has “never talked about the need to seize any territories” from Ukraine and that Russia’s goal was not to seize Crimea, Donbas, or other areas of Ukraine.[1] The claim seems bizarre in the context of Russia’s repeated demands that Ukraine and the West recognize Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territory, including territory Russian forces do not control. It reflects the deeper Russian aims in Ukraine, however, quite accurately. Lavrov reiterated that Russia’s war objectives concern “protecting” the people in Ukraine from the Ukrainian government, which the Kremlin falsely portrays as illegitimate and oppressive.[2] Lavrov’s description of the Kremlin’s aim to “protect” Ukrainians from their own government reflects the fact that the Kremlin seeks to remove the democratically elected Ukrainian government and replace it with a pro-Russian government that would allow the Kremlin to control Ukraine without needing to fight for physical control over territory or annex it. Lavrov notably made demands during the interview that reject Ukraine’s sovereignty including that Ukraine repeal laws regarding language and religion that are the proper concern only of the government of a sovereign state. Lavrov stated explicitly “there can be no talk of any long-term [peace] agreements” with Ukraine “without respect” for Russia’s security and the rights of Russian-speakers in Ukraine, as “these are the reasons that must be urgently eliminated in the context of a settlement.”[3] The Kremlin’s continued insistence on controlling Ukrainian domestic affairs reflects the arguments made by Russian President Vladimir Putin in his 2021 essay arguing that Ukraine should not exist independently of Russia.[4]

Lavrov’s August 19 statement further emphasizes the Kremlin’s broader objective of obtaining full political control over Ukraine before Russia ends its war.[5] Considering Russia’s territorial demands separately from demands concealed by its references to “root causes” obscures the reality that the Kremlin views its war demands as indivisible – the Kremlin aims to accomplish all of these goals and has shown no willingness to compromise any of them or sacrifice some for others to facilitate or complete a peace process. The Kremlin has repeatedly defined its war aims as Ukrainian demilitarization, government change in favor of a pro-Russian proxy government, and Ukrainian commitments barring it from joining NATO and other international alliances.[6] Kremlin officials have consistently reiterated throughout the war and negotiations process that Russia will achieve these war aims either militarily or diplomatically in line with Lavrov’s August 19 statements.[7]

Russia launched the full-scale invasion in 2022 after failing to secure control over Ukraine by other means. Russia has long attempted to exert control over former Soviet states through continuing cognitive warfare efforts.[8] Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, in which the Ukrainian people protested for a transparent Western-style government, threatened effective Russian control over Ukraine and prompted the Kremlin to launch a series of cognitive warfare efforts in order to stop and reverse the loss of Russian influence in Ukraine.[9] Russian President Vladimir Putin accelerated his efforts to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty following the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution that drove out Ukraine’s Russia-friendly president, Viktor Yanukovych, and in favor of a democratically elected, pro-Western government.[10] Russia illegally occupied and annexed Crimea in response, accelerated hybrid operations, and backed separatist forces in eastern Ukraine.[11] Putin tried to force Ukraine to legitimize the Russia-invented Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) in the 2015 Minsk II accords that established the ceasefire that Russia broke fully in 2022. The Kremlin pressured Ukraine to extend the legal limited autonomy of the regions in December 2019 and to enshrine broader autonomy for Donbas as a constituent part of Ukraine into the Ukrainian Constitution so that the DNR and LNR could serve as conduits for Russian influence in and ultimately control over the government in Kyiv, but Ukraine rejected this effort.[12] The Kremlin ultimately launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 after this failure to bring Ukraine back under Russian control. Putin has long denied Ukrainian sovereignty and alleged that Ukrainians have always belonged to the Russian nation because of their shared “historical and spiritual space.”[13] Putin used these claims as part of his justification for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which was the culmination of eight years of failed efforts to regain control of Ukraine through hybrid warfare campaigns.

Russia similarly seeks to exert influence over the internal governance of other former Soviet countries, including NATO states, effectively denying their sovereignty and setting conditions to threaten their independent governance. Russian officials are setting informational conditions to justify exerting control over former Soviet states, including NATO members Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, by denying the legality of the collapse of the Soviet Union.[14] The Kremlin asserts its right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Baltic States by prosecuting officials who remove Soviet-era war monuments and citizens who graffiti them within these states’ sovereign territories in absentia under Russian law that does not apply to those states.[15] Russia notably launched one of the first ever cyberattacks against Estonia in response to the Estonian government’s decision to relocate a Soviet “Monument to the Liberators of Tallinn.”[16] Russian efforts to exert control over the Baltics has failed. Russia has been much more successful in establishing control over both Belarus and Georgia, however, by launching hybrid operations in both countries and backing pro-Russian governments that are loyal to the Kremlin.[17] The Kremlin now seeks to bring Belarus further into Russian control through the Union State framework and to eliminate the facade of an independent Belarus completely.

Lavrov implicitly rejected suggestions that Russia might accept Western security guarantees for Ukraine. Lavrov stated on August 19 that Russia and Ukraine cannot make any long-term agreements that do not take into account Russia’s “security interests,” very likely referring to Russia’s demand for Ukrainian “neutrality.”[18] Russian officials have long insisted on Ukrainian neutrality and non-alignment with NATO as a precondition to negotiations, and Russia is likely setting information space conditions to oppose Western security guarantees for Ukraine.[19] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated on August 18 that Russia “categorical[ly] reject[s]… any scenario that envisages the appearance in Ukraine of a military contingent with the participation of NATO countries.”[20] The Kremlin’s demand ostensibly for Ukraine’s neutrality is in fact meant to isolate Ukraine from its allies and deny Ukraine its sovereign right to form alliances even as Russia insists on de facto control over Ukraine’s domestic internal affairs.[21]

Russian forces appear to be attempting to counterattack Ukrainian forces clearing the Russian infiltration near Dobropillya as Ukrainian forces increasingly threaten the base of the penetration. Geolocated footage published on August 18 and 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in an area northwest of Poltavka and northeast of Volodymyrivka (both southeast of Dobropillya).[22] Russian milbloggers also claimed on August 18 and 19 that Russian forces are bypassing Volodymyrivka toward Sofiivka (northeast of Volodymyrivka) and are flanking Ukrainian positions in and near Shakhove (immediately north of Volodymyrivka) from the west in the main penetration and from the east near Volodymyrivka.[23] The Russian advance and pattern of attacks support an August 18 assessment from Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets, who stated that elements of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) are attacking in the area east of Volodymyrivka to threaten the flank of Ukrainian forces that are attempting to cut off the base of the Russian penetration east and northeast of Dobropillya.[24] The base of the penetration is relatively narrow compared to its depth and runs along the Dorozhnie-Mayak-Volodymyrivka line (all southeast of Dobropillya). Mashovets assessed on August 18 that Russian forces attacking east of Volodymyrivka were advancing more slowly than Ukrainian forces attempting to cut off the base of the penetration, and noted that the forces operating within the main penetration are largely elements of the 51st CAA (SMD). Mashovets reported on August 19 that fighting begun for Mayak – indicating that Russian forces no longer exert firm control over Mayak and other settlements forming the base of the penetration and that Ukrainian forces are now threatening the heart of the penetration.[25] Milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced toward or into Vesele and that heavy fighting is ongoing near Zolotyi Kolodyaz (both northeast of Dobropillya in the main penetration).[26] An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating near Dobropillya reported on August 19 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack near Vesele and that Russian forces are attempting to bring forward reserves to reinforce within the penetration.[27]

Russian infiltration tactics and a low manpower density along the frontline in the Pokrovsk direction have seemingly allowed Russian forces to restore limited, tactical maneuver east and southeast of Dobropillya – at least temporarily. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk direction have a low manpower density along the frontline in the Pokrovsk direction, particularly near Dobropillya, and do not have continuous defensive positions but rather intermittent outposts on the frontline.[28] The terrain near Dobropillya consists of wide, open fields and a low density of settlements. These factors all favor rapid, tactical gains even in conditions of positional warfare, allowing Russian forces to attempt a flanking maneuver in support of a tactically significant penetration. Russian forces do not appear to have established a continuous defensive line within their narrow penetration east and northeast of Dobropillya, likely in part due to the infiltration tactics used to achieve the penetration. The tactical penetration is also a reflection of this low manpower density and relatively sparse positions on the frontline, in combination with favorable terrain in the area, can permit a degree of tactical maneuver. Russian forces likely remain unable to restore operational maneuver to the battlefield in the near-term in large part due to the threat Ukrainian drones pose to Russian armored vehicles.

Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on August 19. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) reported on August 19 that Russia released the bodies of 1,000 deceased Ukrainian soldiers, including the bodies of five soldiers who died in Russian detention.[29] The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs reported that Ukraine previously listed the servicemembers on the lists of severely wounded or severely ill prisoners to be exchanged in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements.[30] Russian authorities confirmed that Russia returned the bodies of 1,000 KIA Ukrainian soldiers on August 19 and claimed that Russia only received the bodies of 19 KIA servicemembers.[31]

Ukrainian authorities implicated a soldier of the Russian 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment in the executions of two Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast in Summer 2024. The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on August 19 that it opened an investigation into a Russian soldier of the 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) who participated in the executions of two Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW) at the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant on June 16 and July 2, 2024.[32] The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office noted that the Russian soldier, whom Ukrainian forces captured after the seizure of the plant on September 24, 2024, told Ukrainian investigators that a Russian commander ordered the execution of the Ukrainian POWs.[33] There has been a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025, and ISW continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling their subordinates to conduct systemic executions in direct violation of international law.[34]

Key Takeaways:

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accurately stated that the Kremlin’s objective in Ukraine is to politically control all of Ukraine rather than to seize select Ukrainian territories such as Donetsk Oblast.

Russia launched the full-scale invasion in 2022 after failing to secure control over Ukraine by other means.

Russia similarly seeks to exert influence over the internal governance of other former Soviet countries, including NATO states, effectively denying their sovereignty and setting conditions to threaten their independent governance.

Lavrov implicitly rejected suggestions that Russia might accept Western security guarantees for Ukraine.

Russian forces appear to be attempting to counterattack Ukrainian forces clearing the Russian infiltration near Dobropillya as Ukrainian forces increasingly threaten the base of the penetration.

Russian infiltration tactics and a low manpower density along the frontline in the Pokrovsk direction have seemingly allowed Russian forces to restore limited, tactical maneuver east and southeast of Dobropillya —at least temporarily .

. Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on August 19.

Ukrainian authorities implicated a soldier of the Russian 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment in the executions of two Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast in Summer 2024.

Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces advanced near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 18 and 19.[35]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked from Yastrubne, Sumy Oblast, toward the international Kursk border area (southeast of Glushkovo).[36]

Two unspecified sources told Reuters on August 18 that Ukrainian drone strikes on August 13 and 14 damaged Lukoil’s Volgograd City oil refinery and that the refinery will halt oil processing until mid-September 2025 at the earliest.[37] Reuters reported that the strike damaged three distillation units with a combined daily processing capacity of 42,270 metric tons and noted that the refinery produced 5.1 percent of Russian refineries’ total oil volume in 2024.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on August 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that unspecified elements of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) advanced within Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[38]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Novokostyantynivka and Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City within Yunakivka on August 18 and 19.[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Stepove, Novokostyantynivka, and Oleksiivka and northeast of Sumy City near Varachyne.[40]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Seredyna-Buda (northwest of Sumy City), Mohrytsya (northeast of Sumy City), and Velyka Pysarivka (southeast of Sumy City).[41]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Hlyboke, Synelnykove, and on the south (left) bank of the Vovcha River on August 18 and 19.[42]

The deputy head of a Ukrainian fire support unit operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast stated on August 19 that Russian forces have conducted ineffective frontal assaults on Vovchansk since May 2024 and that Russian forces maintain positions in ruined buildings within the city.[43] The officer added that Russian forces continue attempts to assault Ukrainian positions in small infantry groups but that Ukrainian drone operators strike Russian force concentrations, preventing Russian assaults. The officer noted that Russian forces are moving infantry fighting vehicles close to the frontline but are unable to leverage tanks due to Ukrainian drone activity.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne and toward Khatnie on August 18 and 19.[44]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 19 but did not make advances.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka and toward Blahodativka; just northwest of Kupyansk near Myrove; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, Radkivka, and Holubivka and toward Kolodyazne; northeast of Kupyansk near Novovasylivka, Kamyanka, and Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on August 18 and 19.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Synkivka.[46]

An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on August 19 that Russian forces are supplying forward units operating in this direction through drone drops and individual personnel carrying ammunition and provisions.[47] The officer reported that Russian forces are increasingly leveraging anti-drone thermal imaging cloaks to evade Ukrainian drones during assaults, and that Russian infantry stop intermittently in dugouts and trenches to allow the cloaks to cool down in order to evade drone detection.

The commander of Ukraine’s National Guard reported on August 18 that Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced-platoon sized Russian mechanized assault of four MT-LB armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) and a tank in the Kupyansk direction.[48]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Cherneshchyna on August 18 and 19.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have seized over half of the Serebryanske forest area (southeast of Lyman).[51]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove and Karpivka and toward Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna, Ridkodub, and Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near Torske, Zarichne, Dibrova; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and Hryhorivka and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 18 and 19.[52]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces have concentrated large numbers of manpower in this direction and are constantly conducting highly attritional small infantry group attacks ranging in size from two to four personnel and leveraging large numbers of Lancet, Molniya, and Cube (or “Kub”)-type drones.[53] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are leveraging large numbers of personnel to assault and attempt to infiltrate Ukrainian defensive lines but that these personnel are often poorly trained, financially motivated recruits.[54] The spokesperson attributed Russian forces’ ability to maintain positions along the frontline in the Lyman direction to a numerical, rather than quality, advantage in manpower. The spokesperson also noted that Russian forces are attempting to concentrate armored vehicles in hidden positions, possibly in preparation for renewed mechanized assault attempts in the Lyman direction.[55]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Yampil.[56]

The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on August 19 that SBU drones struck two Russian ammunition depots in Bilokurakyne, Luhansk Oblast, overnight on August 18 to 19.[57] The SBU stated that the depots are located along a railway branch leveraged by the Russian military command to supply materiel to Russian forces operating in the Pokrovsk direction. NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies in the area.[58]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along the north (left) bank of the Siverskyi Donets river toward Dronivka (northwest of Siversk) in order to support efforts to envelop Siversk in a semicircle.[59]

Russian forces attacked north of Siversk near Serebryanka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, south of Siversk near Pereizne, and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on August 18 and 19.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Serebryanka.[61]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 18 that Russian forces recently advanced to the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal east of Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[62]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Maiske (northwest of Chasiv Yar), within Mykolaivka (west of Chasiv Yar), south of Stupochky, southeast of Predtechyne (south of Chasiv Yar), and into southeastern Kostyantynivka (southwest of Chasiv Yar).[63]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, northwest of Chasiv Yar toward Virolyubivka, west of Chasiv Yar within Mykolaivka and toward Stinky, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on August 18 and 19.[64]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian logistics in the Kostyantynivka (Chasiv Yar) direction.[65] Artillery elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction.[66]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Poltavka (northwest of Toretsk).[67]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Bila Hora; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and northwest of Toretsk near Poltavka, Rusyn Yar, Yablunivka, Kleban Byk, Katerynivka, and Stepanivka, and toward Berestok, Pleshchiivka, and Nelipivka on August 18 and 19.[68]

Ukrainian Kostyantynivka Military Administration Head Serhiy Horbunov stated on August 19 that Russian forces conducted ten FAB-250 unguided glide bomb strikes against civilian infrastructure in Kostyantynivka, damaging residential and administration buildings and a school.[69]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction stated on August 19 that Russian forces in this direction have suffered heavy losses over the past year of fighting.[70] The spokesperson added that Russian forces in the Toretsk direction recently began leveraging unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for logistical support but are deploying the UGVs under infantry escort, making the transports vulnerable to Ukrainian drone strikes.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Hrodivka.[71]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Krasnyi Lyman; northeast of Pokrovsk near Shakhove, Zapovidne, Novoekonomichne, Fedorivka, Dorozhnie, Mayak, Sofiivka, Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Myrnohrad, Vesele, Sukhetske, and Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Hrodivka, and Myrolyubivka and toward Balahan; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Leontovychi, Kotlyne, Udachne, and toward Molodetske and Novopidhorne on August 18 and 19.[72] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Mayak.[73] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Sofiivka, and Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Pokrovsk).[74]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces continue to accumulate forces in this direction and constantly launch large numbers of camouflaged small infantry group assaults in ongoing attempts to infiltrate Ukrainian positions and observation posts, but that Ukrainian drones are repelling them.[75]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Myrnohrad.[76]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 19 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Ukrainian forces cleared elements of the Russian 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and elements of an unspecified 229th Regiment (unidentified – possibly a typo in reference to the 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 90th Tank Division) from a 2.5-kilometer section of the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border area near Kotlyarivka and Horikhove (east of Novopavlivka).[77]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka, southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Novoukrainka, south of Novopavlivka near Zirka and toward Filiya, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Hrushivske on August 18 and 19.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Filiya.[79]

A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that the majority of Udachne is now a contested “gray zone.”[80]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near the Dnipropetrovsk border area in the Novopavlivka direction.[81] Drone operators of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Zaporizhzhia (south of Novopavlivka).[82]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 18 shows Ukrainian forces raising a flag in Oleksandrohrad (east of Velykomykhailivka), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently retook the settlement. [83]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Zelenyi Hai (northeast of Velykomykhailivka).[84]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Zelenyi Hai and toward Ivanivka; east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka and Oleksandrohrad; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Shevchenko, Novodaryvika, Maliivka, and Vilne Pole and toward Komyshuvakha on August 18 and 19.[85]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Vorone and Novoselivka (both southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[86] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) are reportedly conducting unguided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions near Novoselivka.[87]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Temyrivka, Novopil, Novodarivka, Olhivske, and Zelene Pole and toward Novoivanivka and Novohryhorivka on August 19.[88]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhia direction.[89] Drone operators of the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Vremivka (Hulyaipole) direction.[90]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Nesteryanka and west of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka, Stepnohirsk, Plavni, and Kamyanske on August 18 and 19.[91] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 19 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Stepnohirsk.[92]

Geolocated footage published on August 19 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian fuel train west of occupied Tokmak (south of Orikhiv), setting several fuel tanks on fire.[93] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that elements of the Ukrainian National Guard, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU), Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), and two Ukrainian brigades coordinated the strike.[94]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly coordinating Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) strikes against Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv,Novoandriivka, and Lukyanivske (northwest of Orikhiv).[95] Elements of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) and artillery elements of the 7th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[96]

Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction on August 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson City direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivsky road bridge, southeast of Kherson City near Bilohrudyi Island, and southwest of Kherson City near Dniprovske, on August 18 and 19.[97]

A Russian milblogger reported on August 19 that Russian forces have been striking Ukrainian positions near Mykilske (northeast of Kherson City) and other areas on the west (right) bank Kherson Oblast for a several weeks and that this area is a potential zone of interest for Russian forces.[98]

A Ukrainian open-source intelligence channel posted satellite imagery on August 19 showing a damaged Russian Kasta-2E2 mobile radar system near Khutorok, occupied Crimea, following a Ukrainian drone strike on the radar system at an unspecified time between August 6 and 11.[99]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 18 to 19. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched five Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Rostov and Voronezh oblasts and occupied Crimea; five Kh-101 cruise missiles from strategic bombers over the Caspian Sea; and 270 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[100] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 230 drones, two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, and four Kh-101 cruise missiles and that four missiles and 40 drones struck 16 locations in Ukraine and debris fell in three locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones and missiles damaged civilian infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Poltava oblasts and that two Russian Iskander-M ballistic missiles struck civilian infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia City, killing three civilians and injured 36.[101]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on August 18 that elements of the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense arrived in Russia to participate in missile launches, anti-air operations, and aerial combat exercises at the Ashuluk Training Ground in Ashuluk, Astrakhan Oblast, ahead of the Zapad-2025 joint Russian-Belarusian military exercises in September 2025.[102]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

August 16, 2025, 9pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on August 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Various US officials indicated that Russian President Vladimir Putin may be willing to compromise on some war termination demands, but Putin’s own statements and Russian official statements contradict these claims. US President Donald Trump stated on August 16 that his meeting with Putin and subsequent call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European and NATO leaders were productive.[1] Trump stated following that “all” determined that the best way to end Russia’s war in Ukraine is to begin direct negotiations for a peace agreement, rather than a ceasefire agreement. Trump announced that he will meet with Zelensky at the White House on August 18 and that he and Zelensky may schedule a subsequent meeting with Putin if the August 18 meeting goes well. Trump did not specify whether the subsequent meeting with Putin will be bilateral or trilateral, though Trump told Fox News following the Alaska summit on August 15 that both Putin and Zelensky want Trump to attend a leader-level meeting.[2] Axios correspondent Barak Ravid reported on August 16, citing an unspecified source who was on Trump’s call with Zelensky and European leaders, that Trump stated that Putin expressed interest in a comprehensive settlement to end the war rather than a ceasefire and stated that “a quick peace agreement is better than a ceasefire.”[3] Bloomberg reported, citing sources familiar with the matter, that Trump stated on this call that Putin wants Ukraine to cede all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts but noted that it is up to Ukraine to decide what to do with its territory.[4] The sources told Bloomberg that Putin proposed to effectively freeze the front line in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. The sources reported that Trump expressed the United States’ readiness to contribute to security guarantees for Ukraine so long as the guarantees do not involve NATO, and that Trump suggested that Putin would accept this. Axios reported, citing a source with direct knowledge of Trump’s phone call, that Trump informed Zelensky and the European leaders that Putin claimed that Russian forces were making significant battlefield progress and that Putin could seize all of Donetsk Oblast.[5] The source told Axios that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff briefed Zelensky and NATO leaders during the call on how Putin views territorial issues and what Putin is willing to give in return. The source reported that Witkoff informed the leaders that Putin is willing to end the war and commit to abstaining from seizing more Ukrainian territory and not to attack Ukraine or other countries in a new war.

It is unclear what Putin offered in his meeting with Trump beyond reiterating his demand for Donetsk Oblast and offering a limited ceasefire with no known timeframe in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov stated on August 16, after the Alaska Summit, that he did not know when Trump and Putin would meet again and that the subject of a trilateral meeting between Putin, Trump, and Zelensky has not been discussed.[6] Ravid reported that a source briefed on Trump’s talks with Putin stated that Putin proposed to freeze the frontline in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts in exchange for Ukraine’s withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast and that the US delegation perceived that Putin is open to negotiations regarding Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[7] Ravid reported that Putin requested that the United States recognize “these four oblasts” (presumably Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, although the reporting is not clear) and occupied Crimea as Russian. The Financial Times (FT) reported, citing four sources with direct knowledge of the talks, that Putin demanded that Ukrainian forces withdraw from all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as a precondition for ending Russia’s war in Ukraine.[8] Three of the sources told FT that Putin offered to freeze the frontline in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts and not to launch new attacks to seize additional territory (it is not clear if he meant in those two oblasts or elsewhere), in exchange for Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Senior Russian officials and most sources speaking to Western media did not indicate that Putin mentioned Sumy or Kharkiv oblasts, which is notable because Russian forces are also conducting offensive operations in these regions. Newsmax White House correspondent Mike Carter reported on August 15, citing unspecified sources, that Putin dropped his objections to teaching the Ukrainian language in Ukraine and NATO states providing security guarantees to Ukraine that would enable NATO states to defend Ukraine if Russia violates any agreement.[9] Carter reported that the unspecified sources stated that Russia and Ukraine still need to work out the definition and implementation of a ceasefire.

Putin’s demand for all of Donetsk Oblast is the most clear and consistent demand coming out of the Alaska Summit. Putin may have also offered a limited ceasefire in southern Ukraine in exchange for Donetsk Oblast, but other details of Putin’s offer to Trump remain unclear. Putin has established territorial demands over the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, which are typically the subject of war termination negotiations, as preconditions for any possible future ceasefire in Ukraine. A former senior Kremlin official suggested to FT that Putin is prepared to compromise on other issues, including territory, if Putin is satisfied that an agreement addresses the “root causes” of the war.[10] The Kremlin has repeatedly defined root causes as NATO’s eastward expansion and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers and has repeatedly invoked this phrase as shorthand for Ukraine’s full capitulation to Russia and the resumption of Russian control over Ukraine.[11] Putin’s demand that any agreement address these “root causes” is not a compromise from his original war aims, and reports that Putin “compromised” on issues such as Ukraine’s ability to teach its own language in its own country are designed to obfuscate Putin’s actual unwillingness to compromise.

Ukrainian forces would not be able to conduct a safe and orderly withdrawal from unoccupied Donetsk Oblast in accordance with Putin’s demand without a full ceasefire across the entire theater, however. A Ukrainian withdrawal from the remainder of Donetsk Oblast – which ISW continues to assess would be a major strategic military and political concession – without a full ceasefire that extends to long-range strikes and all frontline activity would pose major risks to both withdrawing Ukrainian forces and Ukrainian forces in rear areas in Kharkiv Oblast. Putin notably has not offered a ceasefire under which Ukrainian forces would be able to safely withdraw across the Donetsk Oblast border and defend rear areas against renewed Russian aggression on the flanks. The Donetsk Oblast administrative boundary is far from Ukraine’s main defensive line in Donetsk Oblast known as the “fortress belt,” and even if Putin implemented a ceasefire long enough for Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Donetsk Oblast, renewed Russian ground assaults and fires both from advancing forces in Donetsk Oblast and forces on the flank in Kharkiv Oblast would threaten Ukrainian forces along the frontline and in rear areas.[12] A Ukrainian withdrawal would likely result in large force concentrations along major Ukrainian thoroughfares and defensive structures that Russian aviation, drones, and artillery would likely target upon the expiration of a ceasefire. These strikes would degrade Ukrainian forces’ combat capabilities, including Ukraine’s ability to defend against renewed Russian efforts to advance into Kharkiv Oblast from Donetsk Oblast or along the right flank in Kharkiv Oblast. Russian forces operating in Donetsk Oblast would also likely pursue withdrawing Ukrainian forces along routes of egress, threatening to rout the withdrawing Ukrainian forces and degrade their ability to establish new defensive positions in Kharkiv Oblast. Russian forces in Donetsk Oblast would likely also receive fire support from Russian forces already operating in neighboring Kharkiv Oblast, which would further threaten the rear of the withdrawing Ukrainian forces. These Russian strikes would also make it untenable for Ukrainian forces to maintain their positions on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River and set conditions for Russian forces to push further into Kharkiv Oblast from Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. A partial ceasefire that does not extend to Russian military activity in Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts would therefore be insufficient for assuring the safe withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the remainder of Donetsk Oblast.

ISW continues to assess that a potential Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast would degrade Ukraine’s defensive capabilities and defense industrial base (DIB) and put hundreds of thousands more Ukrainian civilians under Russian occupation. Ukraine would require robust international security guarantees and the immediate deployment of an international peacekeeping contingent to deter future Russian aggression. ISW continues to assess that surrendering currently unoccupied areas of Donetsk Oblast to Russia would position Russian forces extremely well to renew their aggression against Ukraine on much more favorable terms, having avoided a long and bloody struggle for this territory and given Russia the opportunity to build up manpower and weapons stocks.[13] ISW previously noted that allowing Russia to occupy the remainder of Donetsk Oblast would concede Ukraine’s fortress belt to Russian forces, and this fortress belt also includes significant DIB infrastructure. Russian forces have notably been unable to advance to or envelop the fortress belt since Fall 2022. The Russian military command would almost certainly work to rapidly establish lasting positions throughout the fortress belt and utilize the fortress belt’s DIB for military production if Ukrainian forces withdraw from their positions in Donetsk Oblast. ISW also previously noted that the Donetsk Oblast border area is naturally poorly suited to act as a robust defensive line due to its few settlements, open fields, and natural obstacles such as the Oskil and Siverskyi Donets rivers.[14] A Ukrainian withdrawal across the Donetsk Oblast border would therefore also require the deployment of a robust international peacekeeping force and large-scale investment in infrastructure compatible with a large-scale, long-term ceasefire monitoring mission to prevent future Russian aggression. The absence of a full ceasefire on the frontline and regarding long-range strikes would likely preclude the deployment of this international force, however.

Seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast would likely be a difficult and years-long effort for Russian forces rather than a quick effort as Putin likely aims to portray, as Russian forces remain unable to secure operationally significant advances or advance faster than foot pace. Putin has remained committed to slow, grinding advances on the battlefield through attritional infantry assaults – constraining the maximum possible rate of Russian advance to footpace.[15] Ukrainian drone strikes have significantly complicated the Russian military command’s ability to tactically employ heavy equipment, as Russia has not figured out how to adequately protect armored vehicles and tanks from Ukrainian drones.[16] Russian forces have therefore been unable to restore mechanized maneuver to the battlefield to create and exploit breakthroughs and achieve operationally-significant advances.[17] The Russian military command has implemented an operational pattern that leverages creeping partial envelopments of frontline towns and settlements before beginning street-by-street frontal assaults to force Ukrainian withdrawals. Russian forces have proven unable to make significant advances in Ukraine by conducting frontal assaults.[18] The Russian military command has failed to operationalize its envelopment tactic against a significant Ukrainian defensive line and will likely be unable to leverage this tactic to seize the fortress belt cities that form the backbone of the Ukrainian forces’ defense rapidly — such an operation three and a half years into the war would likely be a multi-year effort with significant Russian personnel and material losses.[19] Russian forces have also recently leaned on infiltration tactics to make tactically-significant advances, but have thus far struggled to exploit these infiltrations and consolidate positions in their paths of advance at scale.[20] Russian forces currently have no means of rapidly enveloping, penetrating, or otherwise seizing Ukraine’s fortress belt or the remainder of unoccupied Donetsk Oblast, which Putin has demanded as a precondition for a ceasefire with no comparable Russian concessions.

Putin’s reported rejection of a full ceasefire in Ukraine and the ongoing Russian offensives in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts indicate that Putin intends to continue his war in Ukraine while negotiations are ongoing — a point that Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev welcomed. Medvedev stated on his Russian- and English-language Telegram channels on August 16 that the Trump-Putin meeting “demonstrated that negotiations are possible without preconditions” while Russia continues its war in Ukraine.[21] The Kremlin appears to have successfully narrowed discussions of the war in Ukraine to the fate of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts — the four oblasts that Russia illegally annexed in September 2022.[22] Russian forces continue offensive efforts to advance into northern Sumy Oblast and northern and eastern Kharkiv Oblast, however. Putin’s reported demands largely do not address the fate of these oblasts or the Russian military efforts within them. Russian forces would presumably continue their offensive efforts in these areas while negotiations are ongoing. Putin is attempting to obfuscate his unwillingness to commit to a comprehensive ceasefire by repackaging one of his war aims as a prerequisite to negotiations for a permanent peace. Putin likely aims to both stave off further US sanctions that could hinder Russia’s ability to finance its war effort and to extract further US, Ukrainian, and European concessions through the ongoing negotiation process.

The Kremlin reportedly instructed Russian media outlets to present the Alaska summit as a meeting between two superpowers and to prepare Russian society for the possibility of a protracted war in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on August 16 that the Kremlin disseminated an instruction manual to pro-government and state-run media outlets in Russia after the summit to report that “no deal [on Ukraine] was reached at the summit — and that no deal could have been reached.”[23] Meduza reported that the Kremlin instructed media outlets to claim that Trump and Putin did not discuss “Ukrainian and European demands for an unconditional ceasefire,” that Trump urged Zelensky to make a deal with Putin, and that Trump greeted Putin on the tarmac as a gesture of goodwill. Meduza reported that the Kremlin instructed media outlets to describe the meeting as “historic” because “Putin restored Russia’s status as a great superpower” and to describe Trump and Putin as “equals.” Meduza quoted the manual as claiming that “the revival of Russia’s power and authority is the result of recent years,” likely referring to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, long-term military reorganization efforts, and strengthened ties with states including Iran, North Korea, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since February 2022.[24] Meduza reported that the Kremlin issued a separate instruction manual before the summit stating that media outlets should emphasize that Putin spoke with Trump about “Kyiv’s unwillingness to negotiate,” that Russia is ready for any scenario in the talks, and that it is Putin — rather than Trump —who sets the agenda for US-Russian relations.[25] Meduza reported that the pre-summit manual instructed reporters to emphasize that the United States and Russia have many avenues for “mutual understanding” and that bilateral cooperation would not be limited to the “Ukrainian issue.” A media strategist working with the Russian Presidential Administration’s political team told Meduza that the Russian government aimed to prepare the Russian public for the possibility that the summit would fail to pause fighting and emphasize that Putin is setting the terms — cohering with ISW’s long-held assessment that the Kremlin is not setting informational conditions for Russians to accept an end to the war that does not amount to a Russian victory on Putin’s terms.

Russian officials continue rhetorical campaigns designed to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty and peace negotiations and to legitimize Russia’s war in Ukraine. Russian State Duma Deputy Alexei Zhuravlev claimed in an interview with Russian outlet News dot ru on August 16 that Trump and Putin communicated as political equals and that the summit was a major event in global diplomacy.[26] Zhuravlev also claimed that the United States understands the ”root causes” of the war in Ukraine — a term Russian officials use as shorthand to reiterate Putin’s pre-war demands of Ukrainian neutrality and regime change.[27] Zhuravlev claimed in another interview to Russian outlet Gazeta dot ru that the war in Ukraine can only end if the United States “confirm[s] Russia’s security guarantees” and added that Ukraine and the EU should not be involved in the peace process.[28] Russian officials have frequently claimed that Ukrainian and European leadership are prolonging the war in Ukraine and are not interested in peace negotiations in an effort to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty, deny Kyiv a role in the peace process, and divide Ukraine from its allies.[29] Russian Federation Council Committee on Constitutional Legislation and State Building Chairperson Andrei Klishas claimed that the meeting between Trump and Putin confirmed Russia’s desire for a long-term and just peace and that Russia will achieve this goal either through military or diplomatic means.[30] Klishas also reiterated a long-standing Russian claim that there can be no unconditional ceasefire in Ukraine.[31] This rhetoric reinforces to a domestic Russian audience that it must not expect Putin to compromise on his long-held, public demands to achieve his full objectives in Ukraine.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who was part of the Russian delegation in Alaska, arrived in Anchorage on August 15 wearing a USSR sweatshirt in a staged media stunt.[32] Lavrov likely sought to present Russia as the inheritor of the Soviet Union and simultaneously equate Russia and the United States as comparable superpowers, in line with the reported Kremlin command to Russian media to report that Putin restored Russia to its great power status, a status that Putin and other Russian officials have long complained was lost when the Soviet Union collapsed.[33] Russian officials have claimed that the Soviet Union never legally dissolved and that the Soviet Union therefore still exists, with Russia as the legal inheritor of its power, territory, and treaties — setting informational conditions to exert control over former Soviet Union states.[34] ISW continues to assess that Russia very likely maintains territorial ambitions beyond occupied Crimea and the other four Ukrainian oblasts it has illegally annexed.[35] Lavrov also likely sought to present the war in Ukraine as a matter that falls within Russia’s sphere of influence in which other states should not interfere, similar to Russian Presidential Advisor Anton Kobyakov’s claim in May 2025 that the Soviet Union still legally exists and that the war in Ukraine is therefore an “internal process.”[36] Putin also stated during the joint press conference with Trump on August 15 that Russia and Ukraine share the “same roots” and that Russia considers Ukraine to be a “brotherly” nation, a long-standing Kremlin narrative with roots in Putin’s July 2021 essay on the “Historic Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” that also seeks to present the war in Ukraine as an internal affair.[37]

Ukrainian forces likely cleared several settlements within the Russian penetration northeast of Dobropillya. Geolocated footage published on August 15 shows Ukrainian forces clearing Russian positions and taking Russian prisoners of war (POWs) northeast of Dobropillya within Vesele and Hruzke (northeast of Dobropillya).[38] The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed the 1st Azov Army Corps (AC) August 15 report that Ukrainian forces cleared six settlements northeast of Dobropillya, including Hruzke, Rubizhne, Novovodyane, Petrivka, Vesele, and Zolotyi Kolodyaz in operations from August 12 to 15.[39] The Ukrainian General Staff and 1st Azov AC stated that Ukrainian forces killed 271 Russian personnel, wounded 101, and took 13 POWs, and that Ukrainian forces destroyed one Russian tank, two armored vehicles, and 37 motorcycles and other vehicles in these operations. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces only advanced in unfortified areas northeast of Dobropilllya and that Russian forces are strengthening their positions in the northern section of the penetration.[40] One Russian milblogger denied Ukrainian claims that Ukrainian forces advanced in the salient but conceded that Ukrainian forces entered Vesele and Zolotyi Kolodyaz.[41] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces are holding their positions near Zolotyi Kolodyaz.[42] Another Russian milblogger complained that the Russian penetration is not sustainable because it is too narrow and vulnerable to Ukrainian interdiction efforts and assaults that threaten Russian forces’ ability to sustain the penetration.[43] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are unable to cut the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway because the base of the penetration is too narrow for its depth, and that Russian forces need to widen the penetration’s flanks before fighting toward the highway. The footage of Ukrainian forces recapturing settlements northeast of Dobropillya and the lack of reporting suggesting that Russian forces are reinforcing and resupplying the penetration enough to exploit the penetration indicates that Ukrainian forces have likely retaken these settlements, as multiple Ukrainian sources have now reported.[44] This footage and these reports also suggest that Russian forces very likely do not have stable and enduring positions within the penetration and likely do not control the area between Russian positions east and northeast of Dobropillya and the base of the penetration southeast of Dobropillya.

Key Takeaways:

Various US officials indicated that Russian President Vladimir Putin may be willing to compromise on some war termination demands, but Putin’s own statements and Russian official statements contradict these claims.

It is unclear what Putin offered in his meeting with Trump beyond reiterating his demand for Donetsk Oblast and offering a limited ceasefire with no known timeframe in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.

Putin’s demand for all of Donetsk Oblast is the most clear and consistent demand coming out of the Alaska Summit.

Ukrainian forces would not be able to conduct a safe and orderly withdrawal from unoccupied Donetsk Oblast in accordance with Putin’s demand without a full ceasefire across the entire theater, however

ISW continues to assess that a potential Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast would degrade Ukraine’s defensive capabilities and defense industrial base (DIB) and put hundreds of thousands more Ukrainian civilians under Russian occupation. Ukraine would require robust international security guarantees and the immediate deployment of an international peacekeeping contingent to deter future Russian aggression.

Seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast would likely be a difficult and years-long effort for Russian forces rather than a quick effort as Putin likely aims to portray, as Russian forces remain unable to secure operationally significant advances or advance faster than foot pace.

Putin’s reported rejection of a full ceasefire in Ukraine and the ongoing Russian offensives in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts indicate that Putin intends to continue his war in Ukraine while negotiations are ongoing — a point that Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev welcomed.

The Kremlin reportedly instructed Russian media outlets to present the Alaska summit as a meeting between two superpowers and to prepare Russian society for the possibility of a protracted war in Ukraine.

Russian officials continue rhetorical campaigns designed to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty and peace negotiations and to legitimize Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces likely cleared several settlements within the Russian penetration northeast of Dobropillya.

Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces advanced near Siversk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Limited fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on August 16.[45]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast.[46] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and crossed the Seim River.[47]

Ukrainian forces likely struck a Russian defense industrial base (DIB) enterprise in Stavropol Krai overnight on August 15 to 16. The Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Krai Mayor Mikhail Minenkov claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the city’s industrial zone overnight on August 15 to 16.[48] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported, citing locals, that there were at least nine explosions and a fire near the Azot chemical plant in Nevinnomyssk.[49] Astra noted that the August 15 to 16 strike marks the third strike against the Azot Chemical Plant thus far in Summer 2025. Astra reported that the Azot chemical plant is Russia’s largest producer of nitrogen fertilizers and ammonia and is located roughly 650 kilometers from Ukrainian-controlled territory.[50]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Novokostyantynivka and Varachnye and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on August 15 and 16.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novokostyantynivka, Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City), and Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[52]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate near Sadky.[53]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on August 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 15 that Russian forces advanced to the south (left) bank of the Vovcha River in central Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[54]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on August 15 and 16.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked on the south (left) bank of the Vovcha River and near Synelnykove.[56]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on August 16 that Russian forces are attacking blindly in small infantry groups with drones to guide their routes of advance and are leveraging motorcycles and foliage and motorcycles to advance more quickly.[57]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and Khatnie on August 15 and 16.[58]

The Ukrainian Dnipro Grouping of Forces reported that Russian forces increased their guided glide bomb strikes to support assaults in the Milove and Khatnie directions.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also struck Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) with unguided glide bombs.[60]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[61]

Geolocated footage published on August 16 indicates that Russian forces recently conducted a roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault southwest of Lyman Pershyi (northeast of Kupyansk).[62]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Zapadne and toward Kolodyazne; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka; and west of Kupyansk near Solobivka on August 15 and 16.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Petropavlivka.[64]

The commander of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces are wearing civilian clothes to disguise themselves as locals to infiltrate Ukrainian battle formations in the Kupyansk direction.[65] Combatants dressing as civilians to support efforts intending to injure, kill, or capture an adversary is classified as perfidy and is illegal under international law.[66] The Ukrainian commander reported that Russian forces have maintained the intensity of their attacks and are trying to interdict Ukrainian logistics in the Kupyansk direction.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions with Groza Leska fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones near Kupyansk.[67]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove on August 15 and 16, but did not advance.[68]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[70]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Serednie, Shandryholove, and Karpivka; north of Lyman near Ridkodub and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Yampolivka; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 15 and 16.[71]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[72]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 16 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Serebryanka (north of Siversk).[73]

Russian forces attacked toward Siversk itself, north of Siversk near Serebryanka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, south of Siversk near Pereizne, and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on August 15 and 16.[74]

The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction stated that recent rainfall has complicated Russian forces’ attempts to field infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs).[75]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and toward Bondarne on August 15 and 16.[76]

Ukrainian Kostyantynivka Military Administration Head Serhiy Horbunov stated on August 15 that Russian forces conducted two first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against civilian infrastructure in Kostyantynivka, killing one Ukrainian civilian.[77]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Oleksandro-Shultyne, and northwest of Toretsk near Pleshchiivka, Yablunivka, Kleban Byk, Rusyn Yar, Poltavka, and Katerynivka, and toward Stepanivka on August 15 and 16.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[79]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly coordinating artillery strikes of elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) against Ukrainian positions near Kleban Byk.[80]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

See topline text for reports of activity east and northeast of Dobropillya.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Rodynske (northeast of Pokrovsk) and are attacking on the north and northeast outskirts of the settlement.[81] Another Russian milblogger refuted claims that Russian forces are attacking in Rodynske, claiming that Russian forces hold positions in the north and northeastern outskirts but that Ukrainian forces maintain positions within the settlement.[82]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Sukhetske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Fedorivka, Novoekonomichne, Nove Shakhove, Zapovidne, and Zatyshok; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Troyanda, Leontovychi, Kotlyne, and Udachne on August 15 and 16.[83]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces continue to constantly attack in small infantry fire teams of one to two personnel and are attempting to camouflage themselves with greenery and anti-drone thermal imaging cloaks.[84] The spokesperson added that Russian forces are attempting to use motorcycles to bypass Ukrainian positions. The commander of a Ukrainian drone crew operating in the Pokrovsk direction assessed that Russian forces continue to fear the heavy losses necessary for an operation against Pokrovsk itself and are attempting to encircle Pokrovsk and Dobropillya (north of Pokrovsk) instead.[85]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian AirNomads Group reportedly continue to operate in the Pokrovsk direction.[86]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne, Novoukrainka, and Horikhove; south of Novopavlivka toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Novokhatske and Tovste on August 15 and 16.[87]

A servicemember of a Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion operating in the Novopavlivka direction stated that Ukrainian drone strikes, mines, and anti-tank ditches are denying Russian forces the ability to advance closer than five kilometers from the frontline in this direction.[88] The servicemember stated that Russian forces continue to conduct small infantry assaults of two to four personnel to several areas to attack Ukrainian positions from multiple sides.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Novopavlivka) direction.[89]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently recaptured Andriivka-Klevtsove (northeast of Velykomykhailivka).[90]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka, Oleksandrohrad, and Myrne; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vilne Pole, Vorone, and Maliivka, and toward Zaporizhske, Komyshuvakha, and Novoheorhiivka on August 15 and 16.[91]

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on August 16 that the Russian military command is sending small infantry groups of two personnel to bypass Ukrainian positions, enter a given settlement, and film themselves raising a Russian flag in order to falsely claim seizures of settlements and create the false perception of Russian advances.[92] The GUR reported that Russian forces recently filmed themselves near Andriivka-Klevtsove for this purpose, but that Ukrainian forces control the settlement.

Order of Battle: Artillery and drone elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly participated in the August 15 claimed seizure of Vorone.[93] Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to operate near Oleksandrohrad.[94] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) reportedly continue unguided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions in Novoselivka (east of Velykomykhailivka).[95]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Zelene Pole and toward Olhivske on August 15 and 16.[96]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[97]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka, south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka, southwest of Orikhiv near Nesteryanka, west of Orikhiv near Plavni and Stepnohirsk, and northwest of Orikhiv toward Prymorske on August 16.[98]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv.[99]

Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction on August 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivsky road and rail bridges and southwest of Kherson City near Bilohrudyi Island on August 15 and 16.[100]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating on the Dnipro River islands.[101]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 15 to 16. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile and 85 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[102] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 61 drones over northern and eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted frontline areas in Sumy, Donetsk, Chernihiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces damaged civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts.[103]

The US Special Inspector General Quarterly Operation Atlantic Resolve report from April 1 to June 30 indicated that a US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report confirmed that the increase in Russian use of ballistic missiles with enhanced maneuverability has undermined the effectiveness of the Patriot air defense system in Ukraine.[104] The report stated that Ukraine is struggling to consistently down Russian ballistic missiles due to Russian tactical technological improvements, including enhanced guidance and maneuverability systems, that allow missiles to fly irregular flight paths and adjust paths in-flight rather than only flying along typical ballistic trajectories. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported in late May 2025 that Russian adaptations to its ballistic weapons were complicating Ukraine’s efforts to intercept these ballistic missiles[105]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media, as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115037569702889410

[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/16/world/europe/trump-hannity-interview-fox-news.html ; https://www.foxnews.com/video/6376968557112

[3] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1956619580744274342

[4] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-16/zelenskiy-says-he-will-meet-trump-in-washington-on-monday

[5] https://archive.ph/7th56 ; https://www.axios.com/2025/08/16/trump-zelensky-meet-white-house-putin-summit

[6] https://t.me/tass_agency/331561 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/331562

[7] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1956722650123841678 ; https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1956724881732599961

[8] https://www.ft.com/content/6b0b4912-9438-4de0-aebe-2a8dd804cbab

[9] https://x.com/MikeCarterTV/status/1956506083079680103

[10] https://www.ft.com/content/6b0b4912-9438-4de0-aebe-2a8dd804cbab

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080825 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041925

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080825

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080825

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080825

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080525 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070125

[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061625

[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081025

[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar120724

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080825

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081325

[21] https://t.me/tass_agency/331571 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/602 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/91

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20

[23] https://meduza dot io/en/feature/2025/08/16/putin-restored-russia-s-status-as-a-superpower

[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121624; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122623; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121723; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121823; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120723; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar073025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-ukraine-warning-update-initial-russian-offensive-campaign-assessment

[25] https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/08/15/propagandistam-rekomendovali-ne-obnadezhivat-rossiyan-pered-sammitom-putina-i-trampa-v-ankoridzhe-vot-o-chem-budut-govorit-v-gossmi

[26] https://news dot ru/vlast/v-gosdume-obyasnili-kakaya-fraza-trampa-sulit-snyatie-sankcij-s-rossii

[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070325

[28] https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/news/2025/08/16/26508452.shtml

[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022625

[30] https://t.me/tass_agency/331563

[31] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725 ;

[32] https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/08/15/lavrov-ussr-russia-trump-putin-ukraine-summit-alaska/

[33] https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/08/16/putin-vosstanovil-otnoshenie-k-rossii-kak-k-velikoy-derzhave-trebovaniya-kieva-dazhe-ne-obsuzhdalis; https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7632057; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-rues-soviet-collapse-demise-historical-russia-2021-12-12/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025

[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030424

[35] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025

[36] https://t.me/agentstvonews/10328 ; https://t.me/severrealii/30495

[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2025; http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/66181

[38] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30294; https://t.me/HolodniyYar_93ombr/1439; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1956445467296104912

[39] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/271-rosiyanyn-nazavzhdy-zalyshyv-pole-boyu-azov-zachystyv-6-sil-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/; https://t.me/azov_media/7159 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1956410147233771808 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1956411132001784116 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27846

[40] https://t.me/yurasumy/24354; https://t.me/wargonzo/28528

[41] https://t.me/yurasumy/24361

[42] https://t.me/yurasumy/24354

[43] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2955

[44] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081525

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847

[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847

[47] https://t.me/severnnyi/4840

[48] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/drones-attacked-azot-chemical-plant-in-stavropol-krai/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/89723

[49] https://t.me/astrapress/89723

[50] https://t.me/dva_majors/77564

[51] https://t.me/dva_majors/77564 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28528 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4840 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847

[52] https://t.me/severnnyi/4840 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77564

[53] https://t.me/severnnyi/4840

[54] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32496

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32496

[56] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32496

[57] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/16/slipyh-shturmovykiv-vedut-pomyraty-yihni-zh-roboty-poblyzu-vovchanska-rosiyan-masovo-utylizuyut/

[58] https://t.me/wargonzo/28528 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738

[59] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738

[60] https://t.me/wargonzo/28528

[61] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13852

[62] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1956665765538508803 ; https://t.me/skyraders/776

[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28528 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13852

[64] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13852

[65] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/16/chuvaky-v-czyvilnomu-vykonuyut-speczyfichni-zavdannya-nepodalik-kupyanska-aktyvni-vorozhi-dyversanty/

[66] https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/perfidy?afd_azwaf_tok=eyJraWQiOiJCMERCQzkzNTgwRTlCM0FCNzJBRUMyRDQ4RjU0MDYwRkI5Rjc2ODIzMEE5OUJDOEEyQUE0MUEwMkE0RjIzNTUzIiwiYWxnIjoiUlMyNTYifQ.eyJhdWQiOiJjYXNlYm9vay5pY3JjLm9yZyIsImV4cCI6MTc1NTM4NzY5MCwiaWF0IjoxNzU1Mzg3NjgwLCJpc3MiOiJ0aWVyMS03YzY0NDU3ZmMtYnRsNnciLCJzdWIiOiIxOTEuOTYuMTIyLjUzIiwiZGF0YSI6eyJ0eXBlIjoiaXNzdWVkIiwicmVmIjoiMjAyNTA4MTZUMjM0MTIwWi1yMTdjNjQ0NTdmY2J0bDZ3aEMxTE9ObWM1czAwMDAwMDExYTAwMDAwMDAwMG43bnAiLCJiIjoidkR2YUkzU2hQWGhlYVpUQkxQTy1qLU0xV2JDMTRxOVBrYlY0UWVJOGRWWSIsImgiOiJ6RzJjOHlianMzS0ViV1oyZmU1S1dlbG9ZQkdCRS1Yemp4b00tWTFNTk44In19.VmeeKq3sRMyLISuDjXxphUfPVbvXVJ91GQdc9HToDgJsEG6wLdpyhySnQ3brL-V_BBB8bCq7cRU8m7XyAzmm6RyRZ8sUL4Nd1GZEOrGr_fOLX-jpb-UiFTF7sxUOdhtinSA0WJhY1PcZ6OK4jxVuVNZ6Bl0YUhL6HZkXpeRBh9K1biVc9PbATtnA9ojhIf8o1jgU6tSO1m_iDELNhfRhgFFyDCmEOu-B26nq2I7wutu7uJim_3jmlcdy9QpOPffPUrqUqNqti07M2TMOmFErr7flVXpGunMI173mk7ZtNjsZ5hHd8EsdRY8Bqm–fRFiD3Gc4yjyDPLZeqaTHCA8cw.WF3obl2IDtqgvMFRqVdYkD5s

[67] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97842

[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738

[69] https://t.me/mod_russia/55613 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/55615 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32542 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32542 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77590 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66738 ; https://t.me/sashakots/55601

[70] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32539

[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32539

[72] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/20539

[73] https://t.me/osintpen/1642; https://t.me/shock3OA/1933

[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32546

[75] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/16/vse-peretvoryuyetsya-na-take-safari-na-siverskomu-napryamku-vshhent-rozbyrayut-shturmovi-grupy-rosiyan/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0

[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847

[77] https://www.facebook.com/sergij.gorbunov.197981/posts/pfbid0Q6rk1Y6gkXETfDDsmwx4hEMYhv6hKAuETG8ht1KiWhiovJH5VGTB21vzgoAoyY8yl

[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738; https://t.me/wargonzo/28528

[79] https://t.me/wargonzo/28528

[80] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14183

[81] https://t.me/dva_majors/77564

[82] https://t.me/yurasumy/24355

[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32550 , https://t.me/wargonzo/28528 , https://t.me/dva_majors/77564

[84] https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1HcYjRrAbE/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/16/rezhym-nevydymky-ne-spraczyuvav-pid-pokrovskom-vorozhi-grupy-shhodnya-stayut-mishenyamy/

[85] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1092170-armia-rf-moze-zajti-v-pokrovsk-ale-boitsa-velikih-vtrat-komandir-zagonu-bpla/

[86] https://t.me/voin_dv/16490 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32548 ;

[87] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738

[88] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/16/yakshho-zastrybuye-v-riv-to-bude-jomu-aj-yaj-yaj-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku-rosiyan-galmuyut-fortyfikacziyi/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-O_iTjCYsKI

[89] https://t.me/dva_majors/77574 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77601

[90] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9806; https://t.me/OVMBr_5/269; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1956600815470391789

[91] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32538; https://t.me/wargonzo/28528

[92] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6668

[93] https://t.me/mod_russia/55618; *GRAPHIC* https://t.me/voin_dv/16484; https://t.me/voin_dv/16488; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97867; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32551

[94] https://t.me/dva_majors/77564

[95] https://t.me/voin_dv/16491

[96] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738

[97] https://t.me/voin_dv/16480

[98] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/dva_majors/77564; https://t.me/dva_majors/77564; https://t.me/wargonzo/28528

[99] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97850

[100] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847

[101] https://t.me/mod_russia/55621

[102] https://t.me/kpszsu/40478

[103] https://t.me/synegubov/16537 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/16/vorog-obstrilyav-harkivsku-oblast-poshkodzheno-zhytlovi-budynky/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/udar-po-czentru-sum-vorog-atakuvav-misto-bezpilotnykom-na-misczi-vluchannya-pozhezha/; https://t.me/sumy_mva/547

[104] https://www.twz.com/land/ukraines-patriots-now-struggling-with-enhanced-russian-ballistic-missiles ; https://www.stateoig.gov/uploads/report/report_pdf_file/oar_q3_fy25_final_508.pdf

[105] https://kyivindependent dot com/the-missile-no-longer-flies-straight-ukraine-says-russia-improved-its-ballistic-missiles/

Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, Jennie Olmsted, Christina Harward, Anna Harvey, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter

August 17, 2025, 9:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on August 17. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US officials acknowledged that Putin has yet to demonstrate a willingness to offer the concessions necessary to reach a peace agreement. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated in an interview with Face the Nation on August 17 that both Russia and Ukraine need to make concessions in order to achieve a peace agreement.[1] Rubio noted that any agreement in which only one side makes concessions would be a surrender, not a peace agreement. Rubio stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin offered “a couple” of unspecified concessions at the August 15 Alaska summit, but did not offer enough concessions to reach a just peace agreement immediately. Rubio reiterated Trump’s August 13 statement that the United States is not in a position to accept or reject a deal on behalf of Ukraine and that Ukraine must decide for itself what conditions it will accept for a peace deal.[2] Rubio stated that the Trump administration wants a deal that allows Ukraine to rebuild its country and to “be assured” a Russian invasion “never happens again.” Rubio stated that harsher US sanctions against Russia would end the peace talks and continue the war for at least another year to a year and a half. ISW continues to assess that Putin has not moderated his original war aims throughout the full-scale invasion and has offered no indication that he intends to change or compromise on these aims in any peace talks with Ukraine.[3]

Russia will be unable to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast rapidly through force, as Russian forces have failed to do for over a decade. Russia could only rapidly seize all of Donetsk Oblast if Ukraine concedes to Putin’s demand and withdraws from the remainder of the oblast. Axios reported on August 16, citing a source with direct knowledge of Trump’s August 16 call with Zelensky and European leaders, that Trump stated that Putin told him that Russia could seize all of Donetsk Oblast if Putin so desired.[4] Putin’s claim that Russian forces will inevitably seize all of Donetsk Oblast if the war continues is false. The Russian campaign to seize all of Donetsk Oblast has been ongoing since Russia’s first invasion in 2014 and remains incomplete. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted on August 17 that Russia has tried and failed to seize all of Donetsk Oblast in the past 12 years of fighting in eastern Ukraine.[5] Russian forces have been bogged down in campaigns to seize multiple towns and cities in Donetsk Oblast since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, and Russian forces are still struggling to achieve the objectives of several of these campaigns today. Seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast will very likely take Russian forces multiple years to complete after several difficult campaigns.

Russian forces have historically thrown themselves into costly campaigns to seize fortified or urban areas in eastern Ukraine, a reality far from Putin’s claims of rapid advances. Russian forces undertook four notable campaigns in eastern Ukraine in 2024 into 2025 that illustrate how difficult it will likely be for Russian forces to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast through force.[6] Russian forces first began efforts to retake Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast in October 2023 and have conducted multiple separate campaigns aimed at seizing the town in the nearly two years since.[7] Russian forces are currently struggling to complete the encirclement or envelopment of Kupyansk from the northwest and have not yet seized the settlement despite 22 months of offensive operations. Russian forces began a dedicated effort to seize Toretsk, Donetsk Oblast in mid-June 2024.[8] Russian forces started this effort not far from the positions that Russian forces held prior to the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022. Russian forces seized Toretsk by August 1, 2025, taking 14 months to advance about 6.4 miles from the southeastern outskirts of Toretsk to the northwestern outskirts of Toretsk.[9]

The Russian campaign for Chasiv Yar, Donetsk Oblast, began in May 2023 after Russian forces seized Bakhmut (east of Chasiv Yar), and Russian forces intensified efforts to seize Chasiv Yar in April 2024.[10] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces completed the seizure of Chasiv Yar on July 31, 2025, although ISW has yet to observe evidence that Russian forces have seized the entirety of the settlement.[11] It has taken Russian forces 26 months to advance about 6.8 miles (roughly 11 kilometers) from western Bakhmut to the western edge of Chasiv Yar.

Russian forces began efforts to seize Pokrovsk, Donetsk Oblast, in February 2024 after the seizure of Avdiivka and have dedicated multiple efforts to seizing Pokrovsk through frontal assaults, envelopment, or encirclement – all of which have thus far been unsuccessful after more than 18 months.[12]

Recent Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk do not indicate that Russia can rapidly seize fortified or urban areas. Russian forces took open areas without any significantly fortified settlements during their recent penetration northeast of Pokrovsk near Dobropillya.[13] Russian forces still have not demonstrated any capability to rapidly seize large, fortified positions, however, as the campaigns for Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk have shown.[14] Russian forces are struggling to supply and reinforce their tactical penetration near Dobropillya and defend against Ukrainian counterattacks on the flanks —suggesting that Russian forces may not be able to consolidate their positions and exploit this penetration. The Russian effort for Dobropillya is just one part of Russia’s broader 18-month effort to seize Pokrovsk, moreover. Russia’s efforts near Dobropillya result from the failure of Russia’s initial effort to encircle Pokrovsk from the southwest and northeast, causing the Russian command to try a deeper envelopment further northeast and north. ­ ­

None of these many-months-long efforts to take Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk have been at the scale needed to seize all of Ukraine’s fortress belt – Ukraine’s highly fortified, main defensive line in Donetsk Oblast that consists of cities that are significantly larger in terms of size and population.[15] Russian efforts to seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast by force would take several years, given the number of fortified urban areas Russian forces must overcome to reach the Donetsk Oblast administrative boundaries.

Russia continues to deny Ukraine’s sovereignty and to demand the right to dictate Ukrainian domestic affairs. The New York Times (NYT), Reuters, and BBC, citing anonymous European officials, reported on August 17 that Putin asked Trump on August 15 for guarantees that Russian would become an official language again in parts or all of Ukraine and that Ukraine would end its “persecution” of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP).[16] The UOC MP is not an independent religious organization, but rather is the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church’s (ROC) subordinate element in Ukraine.[17] The ROC is notably an element of Russia’s hybrid warfare toolkit, particularly in the Kremlin’s efforts to promote Kremlin narratives and Russian nationalist ideology to sustain and expand Russia’s influence in former Soviet states.[18] The ROC has also advocated for the codification of a Russian state ideology premised on the idea that Ukraine should not exist.[19] Putin’s demands regarding the Russian language and the protection of the ROC’s activities in Ukraine via the UOC MP deny Ukraine the right to establish its own domestic laws as a sovereign and independent state.

Putin’s demands that Ukraine make Russian an official language again and allow the UOC MP to operate in Ukraine are similar to Russian demands to exert control over Ukraine’s domestic affairs in the 2015 Minsk accords. The Minsk II agreement required Ukraine to amend its constitution to give more autonomy to the Russia-controlled Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic (DNR and LNR) and expand their role in Ukraine’s politics.[20]

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s insistence that any peace agreement must address Russia’s perceived “root causes” of the war will make it difficult to reach a peace agreement as rapidly as Trump desires, given the complexity of the “root causes.” Putin reiterated his ongoing demand that any peace agreement must eliminate the “root causes” of the war during the joint press conference at the Alaska summit on August 15.[21] Putin stated on August 1 that the “main thing” in the peace process is the eradication of the war’s “root causes,” which Putin described as issues related to Russia’s security, the use of the Russian language in Ukraine, and the conditions for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) – the ROC’s arm in Ukraine.[22] Putin’s demands to formalize Russian as an official language in Ukraine and protect the ROC in Ukraine come from Russia’s demands of Ukraine that the Kremlin made in the Spring 2022 Istanbul negotiations. Russia demanded in Spring 2022 during the Istanbul negotiations that Ukraine “prevent restrictions and discrimination” against the UOC MP and restore all of the church’s rights.[23] Russia also demanded in Spring 2022 that Ukraine guarantee the Russian language as an official language.[24] Marco Rubio responded to a question regarding Putin’s demands at the Alaska summit during an interview with Face the Nation on August 17, stating that Putin’s demands to address the alleged “root causes” allude to long historical complaints that the Kremlin has repeatedly invoked.[25] Rubio stated that the United States is not going to focus on the “root causes” but rather on halting the fighting.

Russia’s “root causes” extend beyond Ukraine, and eliminating them would require substantial negotiations with NATO. Russian officials have defined one of the “root causes” of the war as NATO’s alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia’s borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s.[26] Russia issued a broad set of ultimatums to the United States in December 2021 demanding that NATO commit to not accepting Ukraine or any other countries as new members; not deploy any military forces to states that became NATO members after May 1997; refrain from military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia; and refrain from deploying intermediate-range missiles within range of Russian territory.[27] The 2021 ultimatums also demanded that the United States commit to upholding the ban on NATO enlargement and refrain from deploying weapons in Europe. Putin’s demand that any peace agreement eliminate the “root causes” of the war in Ukraine would require a lengthy, complicated negotiation process not only with Ukraine but also with NATO and the United States. Russia’s demands about the “root causes” are demands for massive NATO concessions that would jeopardize NATO’s integrity and European and US security more broadly.

Putin’s offer of a Russian law forbidding a future invasion of Ukraine is not credible because Russia has already twice broken previous binding international commitments not to invade and because Putin has shown that he can freely change Russian law as he desires. US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff stated on August 17 that Putin agreed during the Alaska summit that Russia would “legislatively enshrine” promises that Russia would not invade any other territory in Ukraine or elsewhere in Europe – likely referring to the creation of new Russian legislation or amendments to the Russian Constitution.[28] Putin has extensively disregarded and amended the Russian Constitution to support his political objectives, as evidenced by the Kremlin’s manipulation of the 2020 vote for a constitutional amendment to allow Putin to run for president again in 2024 and potentially remain in power until 2036.[29] Putin’s two invasions of Ukraine also broke Russia’s obligations under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum to respect the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine within Ukraine’s borders at the time.[30] Russia has continually violated international agreements prohibiting aggression against Ukraine, including the Minsk agreements.[31] Putin’s promise to codify Russian promises against future aggression into Russian legislation or the Russian Constitution is neither credible nor a concession, and there is no evidence to suggest that Putin would abide by any such law forbidding a renewed invasion of Ukraine after concluding a peace agreement.

The details about Ukrainian security guarantees to which Putin may have agreed remain unclear at this time, but the Kremlin may be attempting to resurrect its demands about security guarantors from April 2022 that would have neutered such guarantees. Axios stated on August 16 that sources briefed on Trump’s call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders after the Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska stated that Putin said he was willing to discuss security guarantees for Ukraine and mentioned the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as one of the possible guarantors.[32] Witkoff stated on August 17 that Trump and Putin came to an agreement that the United States and Europe could “effectively offer Article 5-like language” as a security guarantee for Ukraine against future renewed Russian aggression – referring to NATO’s collective defense clause.[33] Putin’s reported suggestion that the PRC could be a security guarantor mirrors Russia’s proposed peace settlement in Istanbul in April 2022. The April 2022 proposed treaty listed the PRC, several Western states, and Russia as the security guarantors for Ukraine.[34] Russia demanded in the proposal that guarantor states provide Ukraine with aid in the event of a future attack only after all guarantor states had agreed to such a decision. The PRC is a close Russian ally that has significantly helped the Russian war effort and defense industrial base (DIB), and the PRC would not be a neutral guarantor.[35] Russia’s involvement in the guarantee would make it meaningless. The parameters of the security guarantees for Ukraine that Putin is reportedly willing to accept are unclear. Any future peace settlement that includes stipulations similar to the demands that Russia made in April 2022 requiring unity among guarantor states would enable the PRC (or Russia, if Russia is one of them) to veto any decisions to help Ukraine in the event of another Russian invasion.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in Brussels on August 17 to meet with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and to participate in a Coalition of the Willing teleconference.[36] The teleconference aimed to coordinate Ukraine’s and Europe’s positions before Zelensky’s visit to the White House on August 18. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Italian President Giorgia Meloni, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte, and Von der Leyen announced that they will accompany Zelensky during his meeting with Trump.[37]

Key Takeaways:

US officials acknowledged that Putin has yet to demonstrate a willingness to offer the concessions necessary to reach a peace agreement.

Russia will be unable to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast rapidly through force, as Russian forces have failed to do for over a decade. Russia could only rapidly seize all of Donetsk Oblast if Ukraine concedes to Putin’s demand and withdraws from the remainder of the oblast.

Russian forces have historically thrown themselves into costly campaigns to seize fortified or urban areas in eastern Ukraine, a reality far from Putin’s claims of rapid advances .

. Recent Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk do not indicate that Russia can rapidly seize fortified or urban areas .

. Russia continues to deny Ukraine’s sovereignty and to demand the right to dictate Ukrainian domestic affairs.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s insistence that any peace agreement must address Russia’s perceived “root causes” of the war will make it difficult to reach a peace agreement as rapidly as Trump desires, given the complexity of the “root causes.”

Russia’s “root causes” extend beyond Ukraine, and eliminating them would require substantial negotiations with NATO.

Putin’s offer of a Russian law forbidding a future invasion of Ukraine is not credible because Russia has already twice broken previous binding international commitments not to invade and because Putin has shown that he can freely change Russian law as he desires.

The details about Ukrainian security guarantees to which Putin may have agreed remain unclear at this time, but the Kremlin may be attempting to resurrect its demands about security guarantors from April 2022 that would have neutered such guarantees.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Limited fighting continued in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 16 and 17.[38]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on August 17 that two companies of the Russian 346th Motorized Rifle Regiment (Mobilization Reserve) are operating near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and that the number of Russian soldiers in the unit who are deserting is increasing.[39]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during 2022 partial reserve call up) are reportedly operating near Tetkino.[40]

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike in Kursk Oblast that severely wounded the Russian Northern Group of Forces Deputy Commander. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on August 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian column on an unspecified sector of the 38K-040 Rylsk-Khomutovka highway and seriously wounded Russian Northern Group of Forces Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Esedulla Abachev.[41] The GUR reported that Abachev required an arm and leg amputation after the strike. Geolocated footage published on August 17 shows at least three damaged and burned Russian transport vehicles along the highway south of Zhuryatino (just north of Rylsk).[42]

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian logistics hub in Voronezh Oblast. A GUR source reported to Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne and Ukrainian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) news agency ArmyInform that the GUR, Ukrainian State Border Guard Service, and other Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Lisky railway station, disrupting rail traffic and damaging the rail connection[43] The GUR source stated that the Lisky railway station is a critical railway hub that supplies Russian forces in occupied Ukraine and that the strike disrupted the supply of Russian ammunition and personnel. Geolocated footage published on August 16 shows a fire at the Lisky railway station in Voronezh Oblast.[44] Voronezh Oblast Governor Aleksandr Gusev claimed that Russian air defense downed at least six drones and that drone debris damaged a power line at a railway station.[45] The Russian Federal Passenger Company claimed that drone debris at the Lisky railway station delayed 14 trains.[46] Russian opposition outlet Astra published footage on August 17 showing a drone strike and subsequent explosion near the Lisky railway station.[47]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Sumy direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novomykolaivka (north of Sumy City).[48]

Unconfirmed claims: The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 17 that Ukrainian forces advanced near Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[49]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka, Novokostyantynivka, and Varachnye and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on August 16 and 17.[50] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Sadky (northeast of Sumy City) and Novokostyantynivka.[51]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Sadky.[52] Elements of the 106th VDV Division, including of its 137th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[53]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Tykhe and west of Synelnykove (both northeast of Kharkiv City) on August 16 and 17.[54]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Synelnykove on August 16 and 17.[55] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchanski Khutory and Synelnykove.[56]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne on August 17 but did not advance.[57]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, Holubivka and Zapadne; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and Kamyanka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on August 16 and 17.[58]

The head of unmanned systems of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on August 17 that Russian forces have recently become more active in the area.[59] The head noted that Russian forces are attacking in small infantry groups as part of efforts to seize Kupyansk. A non-commissioned officer (NCO) in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that small Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups of three to five soldiers are trying to infiltrate Ukrainian positions in areas such as Kivsharkivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[60]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Stepova Novoselivka.[61] Drone operators of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[62]

Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on August 17 but did not advance.[63]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 17 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Kolodyazi (north of Lyman) and Dibrova (east of Lyman).[64]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove and Serednie; north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Karpivka, Zelena Dolyna, and Kolodyazi and toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on August 16 and 17.[65]

A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on August 17 that Russian forces are attacking largely with sabotage and reconnaissance groups in an effort to reach the Ukrainian near rear.[66] The servicemember noted that drone operators accompany the sabotage and reconnaissance groups. The servicemember reported that Russian forces are using light vehicles to bring supplies to frontline positions but noted that Russian servicemembers sometimes must transport supplies on foot up to 30 kilometers. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a transformer substation in Lyman, disrupting power supply in southern Lyman and complicating Ukrainian logistics.[67]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Vovchiy Yar (northwest of Lyman).[68]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 17 but did not advance.

Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) with seizing Serebryanka (northeast of Siversk).[69] ISW assessed that Russian forces seized Serebryanka as of August 16.[70]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on August 16 and 17.[71]

Ukrainian 11th AC Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported that Russian forces have increased the number of assaults and artillery and air strikes in the Siversk direction and are attacking with a large number of personnel, armored vehicles, and motorcycles.[72] Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces have so far failed to achieve their Summer 2025 task of gaining a foothold on the outskirts of Siversk. Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces are accumulating troops at the Lysychansk Oil Refinery in occupied Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk) and will likely conduct mass assaults with equipment by the end of August 2025. Zaporozhets added that it is still unclear how many pieces of equipment Russian forces have accumulated at the refinery but that Russian forces will definitely use motorcycles in future large-scale assaults.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Soledar (Siversk) direction.[73]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces reported ground activity in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 17.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced southeast of Nelipivka (northwest of Toretsk).[74]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Oleksandro-Shultyne; northwest of Toretsk near Pleshchiivka, Poltavka, Kleban Byk, and Katerynivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on August 16 and 17.[75] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shcherbynivka.[76]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a Geran-2 drone strike against Raiske (northwest of Toretsk).[77]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and artillery elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Kleban Byk.[78] Elements of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Nelipivka.[79]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk).[80]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Pokrovsk and Dobropillya).[81]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Nove Shakhove, Zapovidne, Novoekonomichne, and Volodymyrivka; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Troyanda, Leontovychi, Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne and toward Molodetske on August 16 and 17.[82]

A Ukrainian reserve officer noted that the intensity of the Russian assaults that initially infiltrated Ukrainian positions east and northeast of Dobropillya is not sustainable and that Russian force quality, attrition, fatigue, and increased operational tempo will limit how long Russian forces can maintain their current pace in the area.[83] A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a drone platoon operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are intensifying their use of modified fiber optic drones that can wait in standby mode “for a long time” for Ukrainian equipment targets to appear.[84] The NCO stated that Russian forces have modified drones to extend the amount of time they can stay in the air, allowing Russian forces to conduct reconnaissance longer.[85]

Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Police stated that Russian forces conducted a Geran-2 drone strike against Svyatohorivka (just west of Dobropillya), killing two civilians.[86] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted Geran-2 and glide bomb strikes against Bilozerske (north of Dobropillya).[87]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) and drone operators of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[88] Drone operators of the 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Myrnohrad.[89]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground attacks toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove; south of Novopavlivka toward Filya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Tovste and Novokhatske on August 16 and 17.[90]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Zaporizhzhia (south of Novopavlivka).[91]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Myrne and Voskresenka; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Shevchenko, Ternove, Novomykolaivka, and Maliivka on August 16 and 17.[92]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Sichneve (east of Velykomykhailivka) is a contested “gray zone.”[93]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Komyshuvakha (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[94] Drone operators of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Sosnivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[95]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Olhivske and Temyrivka on August 16 and 17.[96]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Poltavka (east of Hulyaipole) and Novohryhorivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[97]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) and Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[98]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka, south of Orikhiv toward Novodanylivka, southwest of Orikhiv near Nesteryanka, and west of Orikhiv near Plavni and Stepnohirsk on August 16 and 17.[99] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Stepnohirsk and Plavni and near Kamyanske (west of Orikhiv) and Mala Tokmachka.[100]

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that the GUR destroyed a Russian ammunition depot near the Korvatskyi passage in occupied Melitopol on August 16, killing at least six Russian naval infantrymen and a Chechen Vostok-Akhmat Battalion drone crew.[101]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Stepnohirsk, and elements of the Russian 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) and the BARS-1 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[102]

Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction on August 16 and 17 but did not advance.[103]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile and 60 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast.[104] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 40 drones over northern and eastern Ukraine and that 20 drones and the missile struck 12 locations in the frontline areas of Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. The spokesperson for a Ukrainian border guard unit reported on August 17 that Russian Shahed drones struck Chernihiv Oblast.[105]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.