Mohammed Sinwar’s likely death fails to break Hamas, ‘Post’ learns
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Diverging Reports Breakdown
Iran’s Leaders Stress Their Right to Respond to Israel’s Strikes
Iranian officials have made it clear that they do not want a direct war with Israel. They want to preserve their allies, the so-called ring of fire around Israel. Iran faces enormous economic problems, making it wary of an extended and costly war. There is internal disquiet over the possibility that Ayatollah Khamenei’s second son, Mojtaba, might succeed him. The powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps will have an important say and is considered more willing to confront Israel. The damage to allies over the past year, as well as its clear technical and military weakness compared with Israel, will put more pressure on Iran to advance its nuclear program and go for a bomb. But Iran also knows that a series of American presidents — including Donald J. Trump, who is running neck and neck against Vice President Kamala Harris in the U.S. presidential race — have vowed to prevent Iran from attaining an operational nuclear weapon. The Islamic regime is both committed to the destruction of Israel, but also to preserving its power in a country in which it is increasingly unpopular.
A view of Tehran after explosions were heard on Saturday during an attack on Iran by Israel.
Iran faces a dilemma after the Israeli strikes on Saturday.
If it retaliates, it risks further escalation at a time when its economy is struggling, its allies are faltering, its military vulnerability is clear and its leadership succession is in play.
If it does not, it risks looking weak to those same allies, as well as to more aggressive and powerful voices at home.
Iran is already in the middle of a regional war. Since the Hamas-led attack on Oct. 7, 2023, Israel has moved swiftly to damage the militant group in Gaza and other Iranian proxies, including Hezbollah, the Houthis and its allies in Syria and Iraq.
These groups represent Iran’s “forward defense” against Israel, the heart of the nation’s deterrence. They have been badly weakened by the Israeli military’s tough response since Oct. 7, which weakens Iran, too, and makes it more vulnerable.
Iranian officials have made it clear that they do not want a direct war with Israel. They want to preserve their allies, the so-called ring of fire around Israel.
After Israel struck Iran, Tehran on Saturday publicly played down the effect of the attack and showed ordinary programming on television. It did not immediately vow a major retaliation, but simply restated its right to do so.
Adding to its reticence, Iran faces enormous economic problems, making it wary of an extended and costly war with Israel. It has been heavily penalized by the United States and Europe over its nuclear program, forcing it to move ever closer to Russia and China.
Image Members of Hamas’ Qassam Brigades this month in Tripoli, Lebanon. Israel has moved hard against Iran’s proxies, including Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iranian allies in Syria and Iraq. Credit… Diego Ibarra Sanchez for The New York Times
The Islamic regime is also dealing with serious domestic dissent over rising prices and its harsh rule, which play into any calculation for retaliation. The regime is both committed to the destruction of Israel, but also to preserving its power in a sophisticated country in which it is increasingly unpopular.
That is one reason, analysts believe, the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, allowed the election of a more moderate president, Masoud Pezeshkian, after the harder-line Ebrahim Raisi died in a helicopter crash. Against the backdrop of domestic unrest, Mr. Pezeshkian has pushed for new talks on Iran’s nuclear program in return for a lifting of economic sanctions, outreach that most likely could take place only with the permission of the supreme leader.
The nuclear program is its own dilemma. The damage to allies over the past year, as well as its clear technical and military weakness compared with Israel, will put more pressure on Iran to advance its nuclear program and go for a bomb.
Iran is already within weeks of creating bomb-quality uranium, and there are strong voices in Iran arguing that the best deterrent against Israel and the United States is to have nuclear weapons, as Israel itself possesses. But Iran also knows that a series of American presidents — including Donald J. Trump, who is running neck and neck against Vice President Kamala Harris in the U.S. presidential race — have vowed to prevent Iran from attaining an operational nuclear weapon.
Complicating matters, a quiet battle has emerged over the succession of Ayatollah Khamenei, who is 85. With Mr. Raisi gone, there is internal disquiet over the possibility that Ayatollah Khamenei’s second son, Mojtaba, 55, might succeed him. The powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps will have an important say and is considered more willing to confront Israel.
Whatever Iran’s ultimate calculation, hoping to avoid a larger war does not mean it can.
Image Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, in June in Tehran. Mr. Khamenei, 85, is believed to be seriously ill, and there is a quiet battle over succession. Credit… Arash Khamooshi for The New York Times
Both Israel and Iran are eager to restore the so-called deterrence effect that they believe comes with retaliatory strikes. As they see it, it enhances their ability to intimidate each other and allows them to limit each other’s power, in what Jeremy Shapiro, a former American diplomat, has called their “geopolitical manhood.”
This past week, as might be expected, Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, said that “in the event of an Israeli attack, the shape of our response will be proportionate and calculated.”
These back-and-forth attacks, however carefully calibrated, can easily spill over into wider violence if a hospital or a school is hit, even by accident, and causes significant civilian casualties.
As Daniel C. Kurtzer and Aaron David Miller wrote this week in Foreign Policy, “a spiraling tit for tat would likely prompt the Israelis to expand their target set, at a minimum, to include economic infrastructure.” From there, they added, “it’s certainly possible to imagine a regional escalation, including Iranian attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure.”
But Iran may also choose to heed American and British advice to call an end to this round of retaliations as negotiations for cease-fires in Gaza and Lebanon gather pace.
Ali Vaez, the Iran project director for the International Crisis Group, said on X that Israel’s response was “considerably more robust” than the one in April.
Israel struck Iranian air defenses and missile manufacturing sites in three provinces, while also attacking targets in Iraq and Syria, according to Israel officials. But it avoided key infrastructure, energy and nuclear sites.
Image A store on Saturday in Tehran. Adding to its reticence to retaliate, Iran faces enormous economic problems, making it wary of an extended and costly war with Israel. Credit… Abedin Taherkenareh/EPA, via Shutterstock
The key question, Mr. Vaez said, was simple: “Whether Tehran will absorb the hit and try to draw a line under this exchange or up the ante again with a counter-response.”
For Iran, the argument for climbing down the escalatory ladder is a strong one. But there are powerful voices like the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which regularly press for a more aggressive response.
The desire for Washington and Israel, too, is that the conflict with Iran “becomes once again a shadow war and not an overt war,” said David Makovsky, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “In today’s world that would be an achievement. You don’t end the enmity but bring it under control.”
Sanam Vakil, the director of the Middle East Program at Chatham House, said that the U.S. presidential election in November is also a factor. “If Iran wants to avoid a broader escalatory conflict in advance of the uncertain U.S. election, it must take the hit and play a longer strategic game focused on diplomatic outreach to the region and openings should they emerge from the West,” she said.
By playing down the effect of the strike and pressing for a cease-fire, she said, “Iran will try to turn the tables on Israel and translate its military weakness into diplomatic openings.”
Mohammed Sinwar’s likely death fails to break Hamas, ‘Post’ learns
This is the last man standing out of the original five, which the Post learned would make him’s next military chief. He was the one in control of the remaining 58 Israeli hostages (around 21 of which are believed to be alive) when his brother, October 7-architect Yahya Sinwar, was killed. This is the one that has the potential to be the first person to break through the wall that has been in the way of this article. This was the first time that this article has been able to see how far this article is from the start of the story. This article is the first of a two-part series on The Jerusalem Post, with the second part coming on Monday. The second part of the series will look at how this article could change the way the story is written. The first part of this series will focus on how the story would be written if this article were to be published.
In fact, not only did that likely assassination not break Hamas’s fighting spirit, the IDF said on Sunday that there was no longer any one potential center of gravity, be it person, military headquarters, or territorial area, which the army could strike or take over that would instantly lead to the terrorist group’s collapse.
Rather, the military is now pursuing a strategy of attrition. First, it is attacking any Hamas terrorists who are still organized or who are still trying to fight.
Second, it is taking over most of the Gaza Strip and assuming control of food distribution in the enclave as part of a longer-term strategy of breaking down all the various elements of Hamas’s power and control over its population.
By doing so, the IDF is attempting to slowly convince Gazans that they can break free of the fundamentalist terrorist group.
Mohammed Sinwar likely dead, but no official confirmation yet
Part of the difficulty in finishing off Hamas in one fell swoop is how deep various aspects of its power are, even as all of its members have been hit hard by the IDF during this war.
If pre-war Hamas had 15,000 or more rockets, it now has only dozens to hundreds of medium to longer range ones, none of which it has managed to fire in recent months. Moreover, it only has a hundred to a couple of thousand mortars, of which it has managed to fire a few dozen at most over recent months.
Broadly speaking, Hamas ceased to be a strategic rocket threat by around January 2024, but the fact that it still has many rockets and rocket parts hidden throughout Gaza means that it would be hard to utterly quash that threat in one operation.
Likewise, while the IDF refused to give updated numbers regarding Hamas forces on Sunday, defense sources recently placed Hamas terrorists at around 20,000-25,000, not far from some estimates at the start of the war.
These forces are much more poorly armed and trained. They have no real ability to coordinate their efforts, but they are also hard to just remove from the board since they are mostly anonymous and hiding in humanitarian zones among the civilian populace.
Further, Hamas tunnels allow them to continue to hide and move about in parts of Gaza without being tracked.
While the IDF has destroyed enormous amounts of Hamas tunnels, including all or most of its strategic ones, the military continues to find new, unexpected tunnels on an almost daily basis.
Not long ago, some estimates were that 75% of Hamas’s tunnels may still not have been destroyed. However, it is possible that all of its larger strategic tunnels, formerly used for communications, intelligence, and weapons manufacturing, may have been destroyed.
On May 13, the IDF dropped a large number of bombs on a tunnel hideout under a hospital in Gaza in order to target Mohammed Sinwar.
Sinwar has been leading Hamas. He was the one in control of the remaining 58 Israeli hostages (around 21 of which are believed to be alive) since mid-October 2024, when his brother, October 7-architect Yahya Sinwar, was killed by military forces in Rafah.
Without Sinwar, Gaza Brigade chief Izz al-Din Haddad will be the last man standing out of the pre-war original five Hamas commanders of that brigade, which the Post learned would make him Hamas’s next military chief.
With so many Hamas commanders killed, it is possible that if Haddad is killed, there will no longer be a senior Hamas official capable of coordinating a full hostage release deal, given that many hostages are held separately by small disconnected Gazan terrorist cells.
The IDF said that it believes Hamas has retained a significant capacity to maintain coordination concerning this issue, since this is the terrorist group’s sole remaining bargaining chip.
Nevertheless, no specific evidence was presented of who the next Hamas official will be who can maintain command over all the disparate groups holding Israeli hostages in Gaza.
Analysis: Why Sinwar’s death does not mean a breakthrough in the Israel-Hamas war
The killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar is a major blow to the group, says Peter Bergen. He says the Israelis have killed Hamas leaders before with no appreciable effect on their security. Bergen: Hamas’s violence will wane for some time, but it seems unlikely that the organization will completely collapse. It is hard to imagine a formal cease-fire setting up for Israel to re-occupy Gaza, he says, and Hamas needs to be defeated to be able to negotiate a deal with Israel. The White House expresses hope that Sinwar’s death will catalyze cease- fire talks, return of hostages, and prisoner swaps, Bergen says. The Council on Foreign Relations has been working with the Israeli government on a range of issues, including the Gaza conflict, since 2001. The group’s work can be found at: http://www.cfr.org/news/features/features-top-stories/2014/10/29/the-killing-of-hamas-leader-yahya-sinwar.html.
The Israelis have done a lot of damage to Hamas, killing more than half of their estimated 20,000-plus fighters in arms at the start of the war last October, and the killing of Yahya Sinwar is a major blow.
It would seem an opportune moment for the Israelis to declare victory and go home, ceding the Gaza Strip to the stewardship of a combination of the United Nations, Europeans, and Arab states for reconstruction and redevelopment. That is the hope, at least of many outside actors, including U.S. and UN officials and other cease-fire advocates.
However, it is important to understand that while Hamas is on the ropes, the history of the conflict suggests that Sinwar’s killing will possibly not change all that much. After all, the Israelis have killed Hamas leaders before with no appreciable effect on their overall security.
WATCH: Hamas, Hezbollah and Israel refuse to back down from conflict after Sinwar’s death
Throughout the last year, Yahya Sinwar proved that he and Hamas were formidable adversaries of the more powerful Israel Defense Forces, masterfully drawing the Israeli military into a difficult urban fight that killed a large number of Israeli soldiers and was destined to damage Israel’s international standing.
It is possible that after Sinwar’s death, Hamas’s violence will wane for some time, but it seems unlikely that the organization will completely collapse. Even if it did, armed cadres of the group will likely continue to fight. Over the medium to long term, a new group could emerge to carry on the resistance.
Is there any Hamas military figure that could replace Sinwar?
Sinwar was an uncompromising nationalist and Islamist who sought Israel’s destruction. He was known to clash with Hamas leadership outside of Gaza, which some analysts and commentators allege have been more willing to strike interim deals with Israel (though they never really have). He is not irreplaceable, however.
READ MORE: What is Hamas? What to know about its origins, leaders and funding
The problem for Hamas is that their roster has grown thin since last year’s Oct. 7 attack. The Israelis have killed some of the most well-known Hamas leaders since then, including political leaders Ismail Haniyeh and Saleh al-Arouri, military figure Marwan Issa, and apparently military leader Mohamed Deif, who is believed to have been killed in an Israeli air strike last July, though Hamas never confirmed his demise.
Khaled Meshaal, the one-time leader of the Hamas political office who is currently in Doha, is a possible successor as leader of the organization outside of the Gaza Strip. There is also Moussa Abu Marzouk, a founder of Hamas and once-permanent resident of the United States, who also now resides in Doha. Khalil Hayya was a deputy to Sinwar before he left the Gaza Strip for cease-fire talks in Qatar this summer.
Lebanon-based Osama Hamdan who once served in the Hamas office in Tehran and as the head of the organization’s International Relations Department is another contender. Some media in the United States and Israel are also reporting that Sinwar’s brother, Mohamed, is a candidate to take over leadership of Hamas. It is unclear if any of these figures, with the exception of Meshaal, have the kind of support within Hamas necessary to lead the group.
What does this mean for the issue of hostages, prisoner swaps and any moves toward a cease-fire?
U.S. President Joe Biden’s statement about Sinwar’s killing suggests that there is now an opportunity to end the war, which would presumably mean the return of hostages, estimated at more than 100.
LISTEN: White House expresses hope that Sinwar’s death will catalyze cease-fire talks, return of hostages
Needless to say, Hamas’s ability to demand the release of large numbers of Palestinian prisoners has diminished dramatically. Indeed, Israelis have floated the idea of granting amnesty to anyone in Gaza who releases a hostage. They clearly believe that Hamas is so broken without Sinwar and others, it cannot negotiate, and that its grip on the Gazan population is so weak that the Israelis can go straight to the Palestinian population.
It is hard to imagine a formal cease-fire now. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and especially his rightwing partners in his governing coalition have maintained that Hamas needs to be defeated and that military pressure — as opposed to a negotiated deal, which many Israelis support — is the best way to bring hostages home.
Given this, a more realistic expectation is that members of the government will continue to advocate that Israel press its military advantage in Gaza. That is setting up Israel for a re-occupation of Gaza, which some of the prime minister’s partners no doubt support.
Left out, of course, are the roughly 2 million Palestinians of Gaza who have suffered enormously. A cease-fire would benefit them the most, but Israeli political dynamics are such that the Israelis could choose to continue the fight despite holding such a dominant position.
Yahya Sinwar’s Death Is a Tricky Opportunity – The New York Times
Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s pitiless leader, had been killed by Israeli forces in southern Gaza. To take satisfaction in the violent end of another human being, even an enemy, is almost always wrong. But there are exceptions. Sinwar”s death — like bin Laden’S in 2011 or Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s in 2019 — is among them.
I’m not alone in the feeling — and I don’t just mean among people who share my politics. In The Times’s report on Sinwar’s death, a 22-year-old Gazan identified as Mohammed said the news marked “the best day of my life.”
“He humiliated us, started the war, scattered us and made us displaced, without water, food or money,” Mohammed said. “He is the one who made Israel do this.” Many other Gazans, perhaps a majority, undoubtedly feel the same way. It is Hamas’s reign of terror over them — which Sinwar enforced through a regime of Stasi-like domestic surveillance and extreme brutality toward anyone who questioned Hamas’s edicts or ran afoul its moral code (including for the crime of being gay) — that inhibits them from saying so out loud.
What is the challenge now? Some analysts think the main issue is whether Sinwar’s demise can facilitate a deal that frees the hostages, ends the fighting and allows reconstruction in Gaza to begin.
Analysis: Hamas has been hit hard by Israel, but is not out in Gaza
Israel has failed to defeat Hamas, but Palestinians in Gaza express mixed feelings about the group remaining in power. Hamas has undoubtedly been hit hard in the last 15 months, analysts and experts told Al Jazeera. It has likely lost thousands of fighters, including its military leader Yahya Sinwar, and, according to the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), its weapons stockpile is depleted. But as the dust settles in Gaza, it is clear that Hamas has not been eradicated and still has a presence in the Gaza Strip. Hamas fighters have prominently featured in the handover of Israeli captives as part of the ceasefire deal with Israel. And members of the Hamas-run civil administration have resumed work. Hamas claims it has lost between 6,000 and 7,000 members from its armed and civilian wings. But, the report says, most of Hamas’s estimated 25,000 fighters are likely still alive and in hiding. The UN says that nearly 70 percent of the deaths during this period were women and children.
On January 14, a few days before the ceasefire in Gaza took effect, the now-former US Secretary of State Antony Blinken addressed a crowd at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC.
Over the last 15 months, Blinken has played a crucial role in supporting Israel’s military campaign against Gaza, a campaign that human rights organisations have described as genocidal, in which at least 47,300 Palestinians have been killed.
The goal for Israel, as stated by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, was the total defeat and elimination of Hamas. But speaking in one of his final appearances as Secretary of State on January 14, Blinken struck a different tone.
“We assess that Hamas has recruited almost as many new militants as it has lost,” Blinken said. “That is a recipe for an enduring insurgency and perpetual war.”
Hamas battered but not defeated
Hamas has undoubtedly been hit hard in the last 15 months, analysts and experts told Al Jazeera. It has likely lost thousands of fighters, including its military leader Yahya Sinwar, and, according to the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), its weapons stockpile is depleted.
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But as the dust settles in Gaza, it is clear that Hamas has not been eradicated and still has a presence in the Gaza Strip.
Hamas fighters have prominently featured in the handover of Israeli captives as part of the ceasefire deal with Israel. And members of the Hamas-run civil administration have resumed work. If there is any authority in Gaza, it still appears to be Hamas.
“Hamas has an interest in creating an image of strength that is extremely orchestrated, and we should see that as a propaganda exercise,” Hugh Lovatt of the ECFR, told Al Jazeera.
Lovatt added, however, that after “over a year of fighting, the [Hamas] fighters remain very much in control of Gaza”.
“Hamas is trying to show Israel that it failed to destroy it but also that the movement will have a veto over Gaza’s future going forward because neither Israel, the PA [Palestinian Authority], or the international community will be able to impose a post-conflict governance or security arrangement,” Lovatt said.
The scenes during the captive releases have caught many off guard, including Palestinians in Gaza.
“I was very surprised to see the number of the Qassam [Hamas’s military wing] fighters during the release of the Israeli captives,” Fathi al-Ladawi, 67, displaced from Rafah to Nuseirat in central Gaza and a father of eight, told Al Jazeera. “The scale of the strikes and bombardment, especially in northern Gaza, made us think Hamas’s human and military resources had been significantly depleted. But what we saw proves they are still strong – perhaps even stronger than before.”
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“[Hamas] was able to hold on to its hostages, who looked to be in good condition, and was able to negotiate and sign a ceasefire agreement with the parties that swore to annihilate it,” Omar Rahman, a fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, told Al Jazeera.
Hamas has also, according to Blinken’s statement, been able to recruit enough fighters to replace those it lost during the war.
The actual number of Hamas fighters killed during the war is difficult to know for certain. Hamas claims it has lost between 6,000 and 7,000 members from its armed and civilian wings, according to an ECFR report, based on interviews with two senior Hamas members. But, the report says, most of Hamas’s estimated 25,000 fighters are likely still alive and in hiding.
Netanyahu claimed that 20,000 “terrorists” had been killed as of November 2024, while Israel’s Military Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said approximately 3,000 had been killed between October 6, 2024, and the ceasefire. The UN’s Human Rights Office says that nearly 70 percent of the verified deaths during this period were women and children.
“Only Hamas knows how many members of their military wing, the Qassam Brigades, were killed,” Hamze Attar, a Palestinian military analyst who is from Gaza, told Al Jazeera. “We’re seeing several posts mourning the relatives in a way that uses language indicating that they were fighting, but Hamas did not announce anything.”
Hamas can maintain resistance ‘for many years’
Among the few acknowledged losses are a handful of Hamas’s leaders.
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On the first day of the ceasefire on January 19, Hamas’s spokesperson, known only as Abu Obeida, delivered what he claimed was a “victory speech”. He paid tribute to some of Hamas’s fallen members, including Sinwar, whose death was recorded by an Israeli drone in October; political bloc leader Ismail Haniyeh, killed in Tehran in late July; and Saleh al-Arouri, killed in Lebanon in January 2024.
Attar pointed out that Abu Obeida did not include the name of Mohammed Deif, the elusive figure who was one of the al-Qassam Brigades’ founders. Israel claimed to have killed Deif in late July, but the death was never officially acknowledged by Hamas.
Among the living include the reported de facto head of Hamas in Gaza, Mohammed Sinwar, a figure Israel considers more hardline, well-trained and more of a mastermind than his late brother, Yahya, and Ezzedine Haddad, who oversees the Qassam Brigades in northern Gaza.
Israel’s stated goals also included destroying Hamas’s infrastructure, most notably its vast network of tunnels. However, according to Israeli media, Hamas’s tunnel network is still largely operational, though estimates about how much of it is still intact vary significantly. Hamas members told ECFR that many of the tunnels have been restored or preserved and, in some cases, even expanded.
Hamas’s rocket arsenal may have been significantly depleted by Israel. Still, the improvised and primitive rockets can be rebuilt with unexploded ordnance that remains around Gaza.
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Hamas recycles “unexploded Israeli rockets, bombs, and artillery shells to use as improvised explosive devices and produce new projectiles”, the ECFR report said.
Hamas’s adaptability as a fighting force, developed over the years as a reaction to Israel’s tactics against it, means it has been built to take numerous blows and still be able to carry on as an organisation.
Hamas popularity
Hamas is not only a military organisation but has run the Gazan government since 2006, when it beat Fatah in the elections.
The movement’s popularity has grown in the West Bank, especially since it led an attack on southern Israel on October 7, 2023. In Gaza, some have expressed dissenting opinions towards the group, but there is still little evidence that its popularity has not been greatly impacted by the war.
Some criticisms have attacked Hamas’s failure to predict Israel’s lengthy and brutal response to the attack. Others have claimed Hamas dragged them into a war the people of Gaza, nearly all of whom have lost family, friends and their homes, did not ask to be a part of.
One of their critics was 45-year-old Wael Darwish, from northern Nuseirat.
“This was a catastrophe, not a victory,” he said. “We’ve suffered the greatest disaster in history. If there’s any minor triumph, it’s because of the people’s resilience, not Hamas.”
“While I don’t deny the sacrifices of the resistance, we’re tired,” Darwish said. “The resistance must also consider its people. We’ve shed enough blood.”
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“If Hamas remains in power, I’ll leave Gaza immediately,” he continued. “Many feel the same.”
Even before October 7, Hamas faced domestic opposition – including protests against the group’s policies. Some Palestinians in Gaza, however, said the last 15 months had changed their opinion of the group.
“I was happy to see the people, their numbers, and the safety of the Hamas fighters,” Fatima Shammali, 64, a mother of 11, told Al Jazeera. “Although I don’t usually support Hamas, my support for them grew during the war because they managed to counter, even slightly, the Israeli military arsenal.”
Nihal Barakat, 43, a mother of eight who was displaced from the Shati refugee camp to Nuseirat, agreed. “I expect Hamas’s popularity has increased after this war,” she said. “As for its strength, it remains intact, and we hope it is channelled for the benefit of the people.”
“It is clear that many Gazans are frustrated and angry at [Hamas],” Lovatt said. People were angry that Hamas didn’t think through the consequences of their October 7 attack and failed to plan for the “inevitable, disproportionate violent response against Gaza”, Lovatt added.
Lovatt said that criticism of the group was “felt in Hamas itself”, especially among the moderate wing of the group. There were “a lot of criticisms of [late Hamas leader] Yahya Sinwar’s actions and that of a few others who took unilateral decisions”, the analyst said, based on his interviews for the ECFR report.
But even disapproval should not be taken as an endorsement of Israel’s tactics or its occupation of Palestine, experts said.
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“During the genocidal war on Gaza, people did not collaborate [with Israel] because they are the enemy and an occupation,” Attar, the military analyst, said. “It is not about Hamas. It is about identity, the resilience and the continuity of Palestinian people. It is not because they love Hamas, but because they love Palestine.”
“The occupation of our land must end. The world needs to stand with us to determine our fate,” al-Ladawi, the displaced father of eight, said. “Spare us from more war; we are exhausted. We should not be punished simply because among us are members of Hamas, Fatah, [Palestinian Islamic] Jihad or any other faction.”