Stay informed with the most important Ukraine breaking news today. This page compiles the top headlines and critical updates from across Ukraine, offering a real-time snapshot of key developments.

Whether it’s military updates, political changes, or international reactions — we bring you the latest Ukraine news as it happens. All reports are carefully curated from verified sources and KyivPost correspondents on the ground.

Daria Novikov, Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, and George Barros with Nate Trotter and William Runkel

June 6, 2025, 8pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45 am ET on June 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

A senior Ukrainian official reported that the Russian military intends to seize half of Ukraine by the end of 2026. Russian forces are highly unlikely to be able to make such large advances in such a narrow time frame, given Russia’s current offensive capabilities and assuming that the flow of Western aid to Ukraine continues. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa told reporters on June 5 that Russia likely seeks to seize the full extent of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by September 1, 2025, and create a buffer zone along the northern Ukrainian-Russian border by the end of 2025.[1] Palisa also stated that Russia intends to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River and seize Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts by the end of 2026, depriving Ukraine of access to the Black Sea. Western sources published a map on June 4 and 6 that Palisa reportedly presented to US officials and journalists.[2] The map suggests that Russia intends to seize roughly 222,700 additional square kilometers of Ukrainian territory and hold a total of 336,300 square kilometers by the end of 2026 – almost double the roughly 162,000 total square kilometers that Russia held as of the first month of Russia’s initial full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The total area of Ukraine is roughly 603,500 square kilometers.

Palisa’s map of purported Russian operational objectives suggests that Russian forces will attempt to seize and leverage positions in Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts to support concurrent efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts prior to September 1, 2025. Palisa’s map suggests that the Russian military command does not intend for Russian forces to seize Zaporizhzhia City by September 1. Palisa’s map suggests that Russian forces seek to leverage these positions to eventually seize Zaporizhzhia City, which is consistent with the Russian government’s formal territorial demands for all Zaporizhia Oblast.[3]

It remains unclear on what basis the Russian military may be able to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast within the next three months or even advance the 50 to 80 kilometers from the current Russian frontline to the administrative boundaries of Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces have spent the last 15 months advancing between 30 and 50 kilometers from the outskirts of Avdiivka to their current positions northeast and southwest of Pokrovsk, a far slower rate of advance than the one necessary to seize all of Donetsk Oblast by September 1. The rate of Russian advance as depicted by the map also appears to assume that Russian forces will be able to fight through the Kostyantynivka-Kramatorsk-Slovyansk fortress belt – a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions in Donetsk Oblast – at a rate never demonstrated by Russian forces at any point during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian forces have not fought through a comparable town since Russian forces engaged in a year-long and pyrrhic effort to seize Bakhmut that ended in May 2023.[4]

Palisa’s assessment posits that Russian forces would then sequentially attempt to seize the remainder of Kherson Oblast and create a “buffer zone” along the international border in northern Ukraine by the end of 2025. Palisa’s map suggests that Russian forces would attempt to ford the Dnipro River, retake the remainder of Kherson Oblast, marginally advance further in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and establish a defensible buffer zone along the international border in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts by the end of 2025.[5] The Russian military command would likely have to redeploy significant Russian forces from other areas of the frontline to accomplish these objectives, assuming Ukraine’s international partners continue supporting Ukraine.

Russian forces would struggle to seize the remainder of Kherson Oblast, as it would require crossing the Dnipro River, establishing a lodgement on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River, seizing Kherson City, and then advancing further west and north to the oblast’s administrative borders. Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces have successfully conducted cross-river operations at scale across the Dnipro River since Russia’s withdrawal to east (left) bank Kherson Oblast in November 2022, and the establishment of significant Ukrainian defenses in west bank Kherson Oblast since liberating this area will only further hamper Russia’s ability to seize the remainder of Kherson Oblast.[6]

A series of intensified, simultaneous Russian offensives into northern Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts would spread Russia’s manpower and materiel along the entire thousand-kilometer-long frontline and likely exacerbate existing constraints. Russia’s reported operational objectives through the end of 2025 are consistent with long-standing Russian demands that Ukraine concede the illegally annexed Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea, however.[7]

The Russian military command’s purported objectives for 2026 extend far beyond Russia’s formal territorial demands and aim to seize a significant part of central Ukraine and most of southern and eastern Ukraine. Palisa’s map suggests that Russian forces intend to seize the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River, which includes the rest of unoccupied Zaporizhia Oblast, and all of Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Poltava oblasts; and half of Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Palisa’s map suggests that Russian forces also intend to seize parts of southern Ukraine west of the Dnipro River, including most of Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts. Russian forces will have to seize nine currently unoccupied oblast capitals – Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, and Poltava cities – with an estimated pre-war population of over 5.6 million people.[8] Russia has not captured an oblast capital city since March 2022, when Russian forces seized Kherson City and subsequently lost it eight months later. This goal would require Russian forces to advance over 300 kilometers from the furthest point of the international border to Kyiv City within the next 18 months.

Russia’s purported military campaign plans for 2025 and 2026 are consistent with long-standing Russian territorial objectives and recent statements by pro-Kremlin voices in the information space. Kremlin officials have repeatedly demanded that Russia create a “buffer zone” along the international border in northern Ukraine to defend Russian cities in Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts against Ukrainian drone and artillery strikes and ground operations.[9] Kremlin officials also routinely invoke the Kremlin’s concept of “Novorossiya” – which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine – to justify ever-expanding Russian territorial ambitions in eastern and southern Ukraine.[10] Russian officials have previously characterized Kharkiv and Odesa cities as “Russian” cities.[11] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov told Kremlin newswire TASS on May 31 that Ukraine risks losing Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Sumy, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Mykolaiv cities if Ukraine refuses a peace settlement in the near future.[12]

Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated in April 2025 that the “return” of the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River to Russia is “fundamentally important” and an “absolute priority.”[13] Saldo called for Russia to completely control the areas of the Dnipro River that pass through Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts – a call for Russia to not only gain control over parts of Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy but to control parts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, which Russia has not formally claimed or illegally annexed. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev recently reiterated his previous calls for Russia to occupy most of Ukraine as a buffer zone – apart from a relatively small area of Volyn and Lviv oblasts along Poland’s border – and leave Ukraine as a rump state, which underscores the extent of long-term Russian territorial objectives in Ukraine.[14] Palisa’s map does not suggest whether Russia may have military plans to seize additional territory of Ukraine beyond 2026, but it is unlikely that Russian President Vladimir Putin would be satisfied with seizing slightly more than half of Ukraine if Russian forces could fulfill their purported 2026 plans.

The Russian military is likely unable to achieve its purported 2026 objectives, given the significant manpower and materiel losses Russian forces have sustained over the last three years of war and the Russian forces’ inability to achieve operational maneuver on the battlefield. Putin’s theory of victory depends on the Western alliance backing Ukraine, abandoning Ukraine as a necessary condition to bring about this scale of advance.[15] Russian forces have thus far failed to restore operational maneuver on the battlefield in Ukraine and conduct the kind of rapid, mechanized maneuver necessary to make operationally significant breakthroughs of Ukrainian defensive lines, and have not done so since 2022.[16] Western sources estimated that Russia has suffered almost one million casualties and lost well over 10,000 tanks and armored vehicles over the last three years of war.[17] Russian forces would also be pursuing complicated offensive operations in the face of mined gray zones, Ukrainian defensive lines, Ukrainian drones, and populated Ukrainian towns and cities along a thousand-kilometer-long frontline. Any operational plan that would require the Russian command to spread its limited offensive capabilities along the entire frontline to make significant advances from Odesa to Chernihiv oblasts would likely exacerbate Russian combat power shortage issues and undermine the Russian military’s ability to achieve its objectives.[18]

Russian forces would only be able to achieve these reported operational objectives if the situation along the frontline changes dramatically in the near future, such as Russia suddenly restoring operational maneuver or the sudden collapse of Ukrainian defensive lines. ISW previously assessed that delays in Western aid provision to Ukraine in 2023 and 2024 provided Russian forces with sufficient leverage to regain the battlefield initiative and make operationally significant gains, and that the Kremlin is currently engaged in an effort aimed at convincing the West that Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable and that the West should abandon supporting Ukraine.[19] Russia’s only real hope of winning its war in Ukraine is to convince the West to abandon Ukraine, and Putin is therefore seeking to prevent the future supply of Western military aid to Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Western aid remains vital to Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against Russian aggression and is crucial for ensuring a just and enduring peace in Ukraine and long-term security in Europe.[20] Russia is very unlikely to seize half of Ukraine if the international coalition continues supporting Ukraine.

Russian forces conducted the second-largest series of missile and drone strikes of the war overnight on June 5 to 6. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on June 6 that Russian forces launched 452 projectiles, including 407 Shahed and mock drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[21] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched six Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Kursk and Voronezh oblasts; 36 Kh-101 cruise missiles from airspace over Saratov Oblast and the Caspian Sea; two Iskander-M cruise missiles from occupied Dzhankoy, Crimea; and one Kh-31P anti-radar missile from airspace over the Black Sea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 406 drones and missiles, including 199 Shahed and decoy drones, of which 169 were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW); four Iskander-M/KN-23 missiles, and an additional two of these missiles were lost and did not reach their targets; 30 Kh-101 cruise missiles; and two Iskander-K cruise missiles.

Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes hit 19 locations, including civilian infrastructure, high-rise buildings, and energy infrastructure in Kyiv, Lviv, Ternopil, Chernihiv, and Kremenchuk cities and elsewhere in Kyiv, Volyn, Sumy, Poltava, Khmelnytskyi, and Cherkasy oblasts.[22] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that these Russian strikes injured at least 49 civilians and killed at least three.[23] The Ukrainian Attorney General’s Office reported that Russian strikes against Kyiv City alone killed at least three and injured 22.[24] Russian forces notably conducted their largest strike series of the war with 479 total drones and missiles less than a week prior, on the night of May 31 to June 1.[25]

Ukrainian forces continue efforts to innovate and expand their air defense umbrella to counter Russian strike packages. Ukrainian Deputy Strategic Industries Minister Anna Hvozdiar reported that Ukrainian forces are testing drones to intercept other strike drones and that Ukrainian forces have downed over 160 Shahed drones over Kyiv Oblast since February 2024 using these interceptors.[26] Russian forces have recently been adapting their strike packages and drone strike packages to effectively penetrate and overwhelm Ukraine’s air defense umbrella and inflict maximum damage, and attempting to combat Ukraine’s drone and counter-drone capabilities.[27]

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian military facilities, airfields, and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities overnight on June 5 to 6. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Engels Air Base in Saratov Oblast and at Dyagilevo Air Base in Ryazan Oblast, damaging at least three fuel and lubricant tanks at Engels and causing a fire and secondary explosions in the area.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that it is still clarifying the damage at Dyagilevo Air Base but that there are reports of a large fire in the area. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko published footage showing fires at an oil depot in Engels and the Dyagilevo Air Base.[29] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin and other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian drones struck an industrial enterprise in Engels and caused a fire.[30] Kovalenko reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the JSC Progress Plant in Michurinsk, Tambov Oblast, which produces stabilization and control systems for missile, artillery, and aviation systems.[31] Kovalenko also implied that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified Russian military facility in Bryansk Oblast.[32] A geolocated image shows a large fire with possibly secondary detonations at the Bryansk International airport near Oktyabrskoye.[33] Russian opposition media, citing sources in the Russian Ministry of Emergency Services, reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Mi-8 combat helicopter and damaged a Mi-35 combat helicopter parked at the Bryansk airport.[34] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 174 drones over Russia and occupied Ukraine overnight, including an unspecified number of drones in Bryansk, Saratov, Ryazan, and Kursk oblasts.[35]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 6 that Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against Russian military command posts of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), including its 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment, near Kulbaki, Kursk Oblast.[36]

Russia’s Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the first time since September 2022, likely prematurely due to increased Kremlin pressure to project economic stability. The Russian Central Bank announced on June 6 that it had lowered its key interest rate from a 22-year high of 21 percent to 20 percent.[37]

ISW has observed reports of rising tensions between Kremlin officials and the Central Bank, namely between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina, over Russia’s compounding economic constraints related to sanctions and labor shortages that very likely factored into the Central Bank’s decision.[38] The Kremlin intensified pressure on Nabiullina to lower the key interest rate from 21 percent and maintain the facade that Russia’s economy is stable. Putin postured the Russian economy as “stable and reliable” in December 2024, soon after Nabiullina raised the key interest rate to 21 percent – the highest since 2003 – in October 2024 to combat rising inflation rates and blamed Nabiullina for mishandling rising interest rates.[39] ISW observed unverified reports in March 2025 of a federal audit of the Central Bank, and Russian officials indicated in the days leading up to the announcement that they “expect” the Central Bank to lower the key interest rate.[40]

The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that the Russian inflation rate hovered around nine to 10 percent, when the actual figure is likely closer to 20 percent as of March 2025.[41] The Kremlin’s efforts to pressure the Central Bank into prematurely lowering its key interest rate to maintain the facade of economic stability will likely drive further economic instability and contribute to elevated levels of inflation.

Key Takeaways:

A senior Ukrainian official reported that the Russian military intends to seize half of Ukraine by the end of 2026. Russian forces are highly unlikely to be able to make such large advances in such a narrow time frame, given Russia’s current offensive capabilities and assuming that the flow of Western aid to Ukraine continues.

The Russian military command’s purported objectives for 2026 extend far beyond Russia’s formal territorial demands and aim to seize a significant part of central Ukraine and most of southern and eastern Ukraine .

. Russia’s purported military campaign plans for 2025 and 2026 are consistent with long-standing Russian territorial objectives and recent statements by pro-Kremlin voices in the information space.

The Russian military is likely unable to achieve its purported 2026 objectives, given the significant manpower and materiel losses Russian forces have sustained over the last three years of war and the Russian forces’ inability to achieve operational maneuver on the battlefield. Putin’s theory of victory depends on the Western alliance backing Ukraine, abandoning Ukraine as a necessary condition to bring about this scale of advance

Russian forces conducted the second-largest series of missile and drone strikes of the war overnight on June 5 to 6.

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian military facilities, airfields, and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities overnight on June 5 to 6.

Russia’s Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the first time since September 2022, likely prematurely due to increased Kremlin pressure to project economic stability.

Russian forces recently advanced in Belgorod and Sumy oblasts and near Lyman and Velyka Novosilka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian and Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 5 that Ukrainian forces re-entered and established positions within Guyevo (southwest of Glushkovo).[42]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked southwest of Glushkovo near Tetkino and Popovo-Lezhachi; and south of Glushkovo and in the direction of Novyi Put on June 5 and 6.[43] Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 5 and 6.[44]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) and the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Tetkino.[45]

Russian forces recently advanced in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[46]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on June 6.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 5 shows that Russian forces recently advanced south of Andriivka (north of Sumy City) and likely seized the settlement.[47] Additional geolocated footage published on June 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[48]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced to Varachyne (north of Sumy City) and north of Zapsillya and Myropillya (both northeast of Sumy City).[49]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Oleksiivka, Novomykolaivka, and Andriivka; and northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka and Yunakivka on June 5 and 6.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pysarivka (north of Sumy City).[51]

Order of Battle: Drone elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade reportedly continue to operate in Sumy Oblast.[52] Elements of the 40th and 155th naval infantry brigades (both Pacific Fleet) reportedly participated in the recent claimed seizure of Kindrativka and continue fighting in the area.[53] Elements of two regiments of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Andriivka.[54] Elements of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions between Volodymyrivka and Bilovody (both northeast of Sumy City).[55] Elements of the 76th and 106th VDV divisions are reportedly operating near Yunakivka.[56]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Starytsia, and Vovchanski Khutory on June 5 and 6.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian “Anvar” Spetsnaz detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Velykyi Burluk direction (east of Kharkiv City).[58]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, reportedly elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), seized Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk).[59] Other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have not yet seized all of Kindrashivka and that Ukrainian forces remain in southern Kindrashivka.[60] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Kindrashivka.[61]

Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and toward Holubivka, Dovhenke, and Putnykove; northeast of Kupyansk toward the international border near Krasne Pershe; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on June 5 and 6.[62]

Russian sources published footage on June 6 of Russian forces conducting an airstrike against a bridge near Kupyansk.[63] Kupyansk Military Administration Head Andriy Besedin confirmed that Russian forces struck the bridge and noted that Russian forces strike the bridge weekly.[64]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[65] Elements of the Russian BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Valuyki (in Belgorod Oblast northeast of Kupyansk) direction.[66]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Olhivka on June 5 and 6.[67]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 4 indicates that Russian forces advanced in the Serebryanske forest area (east of Lyman), and additional geolocated footage published on June 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Zelena Dolyna (north of Lyman) and northwest of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[68]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Lyman toward Karpivka; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr, Ridkodub, Lypove, Novomykhailivka, and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske and the Serebryanske forest area on June 5 and 6.[69]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces suffered 3,200 personnel casualties – about a brigade’s worth – in the Lyman direction in Spring 2025, including 840 casualties in May 2025 alone.[70] A soldier in another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are conducting assaults in groups of five to 10 motorcycles and that Russian training for motorcycle assaults has improved.[71] The Ukrainian soldier reported that Russian forces carry out electronic warfare (EW) during these assaults, complicating Ukrainian defensive operations. The soldier stated that the Russian military command docks the salaries of Russian soldiers to fund the purchase of Chinese-produced motorcycles for these assaults.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Siversk toward Serebryanka, northeast of Siversk toward Hryhorivka, and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on June 5 and 6.[72]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Siversk direction reported on June 6 that Russian forces are hiding from Ukrainian drones in basements, pipes, and damaged equipment whenever they hear Ukrainian drones fly overhead and that Russian forces are struggling to counter Ukrainian drones with shotguns and other small arms fire.[73] The Ukrainian drone unit commander reported that Russian forces cannot use unmanned ground vehicles, likely due to the difficult terrain and large elevation differences in this direction.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Chasiv Yar itself, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and Bila Hora, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Predtechyne on June 5 and 6.[74]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) reportedly continue operating near Chasiv Yar, and drone operators of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in the Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka direction.[75]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on June 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk), in western Yablunivka, and south of Oleksandro-Kalynove (both northwest of Toretsk).[76] A Russian milblogger claimed Russian forces advanced from Yablunivka and Dyliivka to the Kleban-Byk Reservoir (northwest of Toretsk).[77] The milblogger stated that Russian forces’ operation near the Kleban-Byk Reservoir seeks to encircle Ukrainian forces operating in the vicinity of Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk), Novospaske (southwest of Toretsk), Katerynivka (southwest of Toretsk), and Oleksandro-Kalynove.

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Kleban-Byk, Popiv Yar, Poltavka, Yablunivka, Pleshchiivka, and Nelipivka and toward Stepanivka, Oleksandro-Kalynove, and Rusyn Yar; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on June 5 and 6.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zorya (southwest of Toretsk).[79]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[80]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Malynivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[81] Russian milbloggers first claimed that Russian forces seized Malynivka on May 13.[82] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Malynivka, east of Myrolyubivka (northeast of Pokrovsk), and north of Yelyzavetivka (east of Pokrovsk).[83]

Russian forces continued offensive operations on June 5 and 6 toward Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko Pershe, Malynivka, Myrolyubivka, and Myrne and toward Koptieve; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Novotoretske, and toward Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Kotlyne, and toward Zvirove.[84] A Russian milblogger claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Myrolyubivka.[85]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian National Guard brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are using electric scooters to conduct rapid infantry assaults against Ukrainian positions and are also using motorcycles to deliver ammunition and supplies to the frontline.[86]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 6 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed Claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized eastern Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and advanced southwest of Bohdanivka (southeast of Novopavlivka) and that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) advanced north of Horikhove (both east of Novopavlivka).[87]

Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Novopavlivka near Nadiivka, Novoserhiivka, Novooleksandrivka, and Muravka and east of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Nadiivka on June 5 and 6.[88]

A servicemember in a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported on June 6 that Russian forces are rarely using armored vehicles in the area due to Ukrainian drone operations and that Russian forces are fielding an average of eight to 10 motorcycles per day.[89]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on June 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Bahatyr, Andriivka, and Oleksiivka on June 5 and 6.[90] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 5 and 6 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr and Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[91]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Odradne.[92]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 6 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Fedorivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[93] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed on June 6 that Russian forces seized Fedorivka.[94]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Fedorivka.[95] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near and in southern Komar (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), south of Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), in the area between Vilne Pole and Zelene Pole (west of Velyka Novosilka), and west of Novopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[96]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Komar and Fedorivka; west of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Shevchenko; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole, Rivnopil, Novopil, and Novosilka on June 5 and 6.[97] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Fedorivka, Komar, Novopil, and Zelene Pole.[98]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue to operate in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[99]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults in the Hulyaipole direction on June 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka and toward Poltavka on June 5 and 6.[100]

A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported that Russian forces restarted active ground operations near Malynivka on June 5 after this area of the front had been inactive for a long time, and are attacking in groups of seven with little to no equipment.[101] The source noted that neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces are using a large number of drones in the area.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Luhivske (southeast of Orikhiv).[102]

Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Pyatykhatky and toward Novoandriivka; and west of Orikhiv toward Pavlivka on June 5 and 6.[103]

A servicemember of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported on June 6 that Russian forces rarely use armored vehicles in assaults and instead conduct regular motorcycle assaults with an average of eight to ten motorcycles per day in the Orikhiv and Novopavlivka directions.[104]

Order of Battle: Elements of the “Nemets” group of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[105]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on June 6 but did not advance.[106]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2025/06/05/ukraine-reveals-russias-larger-war-strategy-00390707

[2] https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1930898823611621733; https://x.com/HelloLauraKelly/status/1930384195454439436; https://x.com/ak_mack/status/1930385027377836107

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-22-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2024

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut

[5] https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1930898823611621733; https://x.com/HelloLauraKelly/status/1930384195454439436; https://x.com/ak_mack/status/1930385027377836107

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030424; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022224; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051824

[8] https://index.minfin.com.ua/ua/reference/people/town/; https://datacommons.org/ranking/Count_Person/City/country/UKR?h=wikidataId%2FQ160584&hl=ru

[9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051724

[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlins-occupation-playbook-coerced-russification-and-ethnic-cleansing-occupied; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar05022025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225

[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlins-occupation-playbook-coerced-russification-and-ethnic-cleansing-occupied; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar05022025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar053125

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125 ; https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/23734449

[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2024

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/denying-russia%E2%80%99s-only-strategy-success

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-and-problem-restoring-maneuver-contemporary-war

[17] https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-battlefield-woes-ukraine ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010425 ; https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-many-tanks-has-russia-lost-in-ukraine

[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar120524

[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv

[20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25-2025

[21] https://t.me/kpszsu/35833

[22] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1930889182802506190; https://mfa.gov dot ua/news/andrij-sibiga-prokomentuvav-nichni-udari-rosiyi-po-ukrayinskih-mistah; https://www.facebook.com/lomako.oleksandr/posts/pfbid0MBsRuuPseBNdpnNfm8iifisk68B2xnRhrHYQryTPyjabaXNkCcCaCmbGvSecDsdSl; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/06/vybuh-za-vybuhom-vnochi-chernigiv-atakuvaly-odrazu-troma-typamy-rosijskoyi-zbroyi/ ; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/21281; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/5681; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/06/tryvozhnyj-ranok-u-stolyczi-shho-vidomo-pro-rujnuvannya-v-shesty-rajonah-kyyeva-pislya-kombinovanogo-udaru/ ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/43811 ; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/12175; https://suspilne dot media/ternopil/1035821-unaslidok-nicnoi-ataki-na-ternopil-e-travmovani/; https://t.me/V_Negoda_TODA/3424; https://t.me/V_Negoda_TODA/3426; https://t.me/V_Negoda_TODA/3425; https://t.me/V_Negoda_TODA/3438; https://t.me/V_Negoda_TODA/3439; https://t.me/V_Negoda_TODA/3440 ;

[23] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1930889182802506190;

[24] https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/30418

[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125

[26] https://suspilne dot media/1035475-mi-ne-zenemosa-za-tim-sob-povtoriti-sahed-gvozdar-z-minstrategpromu-pro-ukrainski-droni-ta-udari-po-rosii/v

[27] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052425

[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25188

[29] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9361

[30] https://t.me/busargin_r/8847 ; https://t.me/smi_saratov/25112 ; https://t.me/smi_saratov/25113 https://t.me/smi_saratov/25115 ; https://t.me/smi_saratov/25117 ; https://t.me/oko_gora/15506 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/149866 ; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/1869 ; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/1870; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/1871; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/1872

[31] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9361

[32] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9359

[33] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1930732635367653616; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1930733258213585146;

[34] https://t.me/astrapress/83145 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/38032 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/38033 ; https://t.me/astrapress/83029; https://t.me/astrapress/83031 ;

[35] https://t.me/tass_agency/318612 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53481

[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25188

[37] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/24161557

[38] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032325

[39] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122424

[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-6-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2025

[41] https://swedenherald.com/article/svantesson-wants-to-expose-russian-economic-bluff ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2025

[42] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36776

[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29738; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92963; https://t.me/rusich_army/24004; https://t.me/wargonzo/26998

[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170

[45] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92963

[46] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/28705; https://t.me/striks_zsu/76

[47] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/28694; https://t.me/khornegroup/3159; https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1930640353608061036

[48] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/28707; https://t.me/OMBR156/628; https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1930942881176400305

[49] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36828; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31791

[50] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36776; https://t.me/wargonzo/26998; https://t.me/rybar/71036; https://t.me/rybar/71030; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36828

[51] https://t.me/rybar/71030

[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29713

[53] https://t.me/rybar/71030

[54] https://t.me/dva_majors/72829; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1931009251398611075

[55] https://t.me/rybar/71030

[56] https://t.me/rybar/71030

[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11569

[58] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92953

[59] https://t.me/wargonzo/26994 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36784 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36781 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31789; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64881

[60] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36809; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29751

[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36781; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36809

[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11569

[63] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167422; https://t.me/mod_russia/53497

[64] https://suspilne dot media/1035771-nato-nadast-ukraini-20-mlrd-dopomogi-tramp-prosiv-putina-ne-davati-vidpovid-na-operaciu-pavutina-1199-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1749221642&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[65] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92962

[66] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64903

[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11569

[68] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9322; https://t.me/ombr_63/1242; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9323; https://t.me/bbps_vidarr/219

[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11569; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167429; https://t.me/dva_majors/72851

[70] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/06/sterly-czilu-brygadu-v-66-ombr-rozpovily-pro-rezultaty-vesnyanogo-vorozhogo-nastupu/

[71] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/06/myasni-shturmy-na-motoczyklah-yak-rosijski-komandyry-zmushuyut-soldativ-platyty-za-vlasnu-smert/

[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11569

[73] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/06/truba-ne-ryatuye-na-siverskomu-napryamku-okupantiv-lovlyat-u-najnespodivanishyh-shovkah/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mIvKxmpdGEU

[74] https://t.me/wargonzo/26998; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11569

[75] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29713; https://t.me/Liniya_fronta6/3848 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36810

[76] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167429 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29695 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36783

[77] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64884

[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11569 ; https://t.me/rybar/71042 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170

[79] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29695

[80] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36792

[81] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167429

[82] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14-2025

[83] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64878 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29698

[84] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26998 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11569 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64878 ; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21962

[85] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64878

[86] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11535 ; https://t.me/spartan_ngu/2435

[87] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36783 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36806 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64879 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64879 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23380

[88] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11569 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29698

[89] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/06/vyyizhdzhayut-shhob-buty-znyshhenymy-boyecz-pro-shhodenni-moto-ataky-rosiyan-na-zaporizhzhi/

[90] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0MMGCGZwbKaqbCzzUrYzFxb7eSk766jsUJDqixEvny8J2uxyVuYMUPPnUzMtbcNZSl ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64872

[91] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29693 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15347

[92] https://t.me/army29th/286 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1931016103809155530

[93] https://x.com/creamy_caprice/status/1930918444431486990; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9326; https://t.me/voin_dv/15341; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9320; https://t.me/voin_dv/15333; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1930946958954274991; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1930914807752053019

[94] https://t.me/mod_russia/53488 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29752 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53490 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/23684 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27007 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93006 ; https://t.me/sashakots/54135 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23381 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64895

[95] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64843

[96] https://t.me/wargonzo/26998 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64883 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23381 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64895 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29693 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26981

[97] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0MMGCGZwbKaqbCzzUrYzFxb7eSk766jsUJDqixEvny8J2uxyVuYMUPPnUzMtbcNZSl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11569 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/72851 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15347 ; https://t.me/rybar/71039 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64895 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64872

[98] https://t.me/wargonzo/26998 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15347 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29693

[99] https://t.me/voin_dv/15336

[100] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21962 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23382 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170

[101] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21962

[102] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31794

[103]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0MMGCGZwbKaqbCzzUrYzFxb7eSk766jsUJDqixEvny8J2uxyVuYMUPPnUzMtbcNZSl

[104] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/06/vyyizhdzhayut-shhob-buty-znyshhenymy-boyecz-pro-shhodenni-moto-ataky-rosiyan-na-zaporizhzhi/

[105] https://t.me/wargonzo/27010

[106] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0MMGCGZwbKaqbCzzUrYzFxb7eSk766jsUJDqixEvny8J2uxyVuYMUPPnUzMtbcNZSl

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 7, 2025

Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, Christina Harward, and George Barros with William Runkel and Nate Trotter

June 7, 2025, 4:15 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45 am ET on June 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia baselessly accused Ukraine of failing to conduct a prisoner of war (POW) exchange and to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers on June 6 — part of the Kremlin’s efforts to undermine mutually agreed upon confidence building measures with Ukraine. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, Russian First Deputy Chief of Information of the General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU) Alexander Zorin, and Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin claimed on June 7 that Russia was prepared to exchange severely wounded and sick POWs, POWs under the age of 25, and 6,000 bodies of KIA soldiers on June 6 as Russia and Ukraine agreed to during the most recent bilateral talks in Istanbul on June 2.[1] Zorin further claimed that Russian representatives waited for Ukrainian representatives on the border of Belarus to work out the technicalities involved in exchanging the bodies, but that Ukrainian representatives never arrived, and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova and Deputy Chairperson of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs Andrei Klimov claimed that Ukraine refused to repatriate the KIA bodies. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs refuted Russian officials’ claims and clarified that Ukraine and Russia have not yet agreed upon a date for the repatriation of the bodies and that the two parties are still finalizing lists for the POW exchange.[2] The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs reiterated that Ukraine remains fully committed to engaging constructively to ensure the successful implementation of the KIA repatriation and POW exchange. The Kremlin remains committed to promoting narratives that vilify Ukraine, likely to socialize its domestic audience ahead of Russia’s possible rejection of any peace agreement in the future and to discredit Ukraine on the international stage. The Kremlin’s unwillingness to engage in good faith in lower-level confidence building measures designed to facilitate larger peace negotiations further demonstrates Russia’s disinterest in peace negotiations.

Russian officials continue efforts to deflect blame away from Russia and onto Western states for the lack of progress toward a peace settlement. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov accused European states of becoming the main obstacle to negotiating peace in Ukraine, as European states seek to disrupt negotiations on June 6.[3] Ryabkov also claimed that German Chancellor Friedrich Merz opposes peace in Ukraine and is trying to convince US President Donald Trump to return the United States to “the path of escalation” in the war.[4] Ryabkov claimed that the United States is aware that Russia will not stray — even in the face of threats of more sanctions — from its position on the need to eliminate the alleged “root causes” of the war (a phrase which Kremlin officials have repeatedly used to call for regime change in Ukraine and changes to NATO’s open-door policy and other unilateral American concessions which the Trump administration described as being “too much“).[5] ISW continues to assess that Russia is uninterested in meaningful negotiations with Ukraine and is very likely setting information conditions to protract or possibly expand the war.[6]

US President Donald Trump signaled on June 6 that he could be willing to increase sanctions against Russia. Russia’s economic struggles, however, have been and will continue to be driven by Russian military losses on the battlefield. Maximum US economic pressure against Russia is not possible without continued military sales to Ukraine. Trump stated to reporters on June 6 that he would be willing to “use [The Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025, a bill in the US Senate] if it’s necessary” and impose additional sanctions on Russia if Russia demonstrates that it will not “make a deal” or stop fighting.[7] The Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025 has wide bipartisan support in the US Senate and has 82 cosponsors as of June 7.[8]

Any increased economic pressure against Russia — while a positive policy development — by itself is insufficient to force Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table or change Putin’s theory of victory. The continuation of Western military aid to Ukraine remains pivotal to the execution of a pressure campaign against Russia that could force Putin to recalculate his theory of victory.[9] Putin’s theory of victory rests on the assumption that the Russian military can sustain creeping, incremental advances on the battlefield longer than Ukrainian forces can defend and longer than the West is willing to support Ukraine. Putin’s strategy will very likely continue to guide his decision to refuse to engage substantively with the United States and Ukraine in peace negotiations. Achieving a peace in Ukraine that is acceptable for US interests necessitates sustained Russian battlefield losses or a significant Russian battlefield setback. The United States must continue equipping Ukrainian soldiers as Russia’s battlefield losses remain the key driver of Russia’s current materiel, manpower, and economic problems. Western aid, particularly of weapons systems that only the United States can provide at scale and quickly, would allow Ukrainian forces to better defend their positions, slow Russian advances, and inflict even more serious losses on the Russian military. Higher and even more unsustainable Russian casualty rates on the battlefield, particularly when they are disproportionate to the territorial gains they generate, would risk Putin’s efforts to balance “butter and guns” and maintain domestic support.

Key Takeaways:

Russia baselessly accused Ukraine of failing to conduct a prisoner of war (POW) exchange and to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers on June 6 – part of the Kremlin’s efforts to undermine mutually agreed upon confidence building measures with Ukraine.

Russian officials continue efforts to deflect blame away from Russia and onto Western states for the lack of progress toward a peace settlement.

US President Donald Trump signaled on June 6 that he could be willing to increase sanctions against Russia. Russia’s economic struggles, however, have been and will continue to be driven by Russian military losses on the battlefield. Maximum US economic pressure against Russia is not possible without continued military sales to Ukraine.

Any increased economic pressure against Russia – while a positive policy development – by itself is insufficient to force Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table or change Putin’s theory of victory.

Ukrainian forces advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Kupyansk, Novopavlivka, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued attacks in Kursk Oblast on June 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced east of Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[10]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 6 and 7.[11] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked south of Gornal (south of Sudzha along the international border) and southwest and east of Tetkino.[12]

Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Ukrainian fire control over Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Tetkino is complicating Russian evacuations, deployments of reinforcements, and logistics.[13]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 7 that the Ukrainian Air Force shot down a Russian Su-35 fighter jet in the Kursk direction.[14] A Russian milblogger linked to Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) sources reported on June 7 that Russia lost a Su-35S in Kursk Oblast and that the pilot survived.[15]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), 98th VDV Division, 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Machine Gun Artillery Division, 68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]), and 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating in Tetkino.[16] Infantry elements of the Aerospace Forces (VKS), including elements of its 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion, are reportedly operating in Tetkino.[17] ISW will assess the implications of the Russian Aerospace Forces creating infantry units in its forthcoming Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Update.

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on June 7.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 6 and 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northeastern Kindrativka (north of Sumy City), in southern Oleksiivka (east of Kindrativka), in eastern Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City), and east of Loknya (east of Yablunivka).[18]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian airborne (VDV) elements entered Sadky (southeast of Loknya) and that Russian naval infantry elements entered Khotin (south of Kindrativka).[19] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Yablunivka, southeast of Loknya, and southeast of Yunakivka.[20]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Sumy City toward Mala Korchakivka, Khotin, and Varachyne, and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Yablunivka, and toward Sadky.[21] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked south of Kindrativka and near Yunakivka.[22]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 51st VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) and 83rd Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[23] Elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Khotin and Pysarivka (just east of Khotin).[24] Elements of the Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz “Aida” Detachment are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[25]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 7 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[26]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on June 6 and 7.[27]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[28]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 28 and June 6 indicates that Russian forces advanced north of Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk).[29] ISW assesses that this advance did not occur in the past 24 hours.

Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and toward Kutkivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on June 6 and 7.[30]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian “Anvar” Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) and the 347th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv Oblast along the international border.[31] Elements of the 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and drone operators of the “Kontora” Group (1st GTA, MMD) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[32]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Tverdokhlibove and toward Novoserhiivka and Olhivka on June 6 and 7.[33]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Zelena Dolyna (north of Lyman), south of Zelena Dolyna, and north of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[34]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Lyman near Karpivka and toward Vovchyi Yar; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr, Ridkodub, Novomykhailivka, and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske and the Serebryanske forest area on June 6 and 7. [35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Siversk toward Serebryanka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka, and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on June 6 and 7.[36]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and Bila Hora, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Predtechyne on June 6 and 7.[37]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Dyliivka (northeast of Toretsk).[38]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Popiv Yar, Poltavka, and Yablunivka and toward Pleshchiivka, Kleban-Byk, Oleksandro-Kalynove, Stepanivka, and Rusyn Yar; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Nova Poltavka on June 6 and 7.[39]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA), and the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[40] Drone operators of the “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Pleshchiivka and Ivanopillya (north of Pleshchiivka).[41]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk toward Kotpieve; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Myrne, Yelyzavetivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Zvirove on June 6 and 7.[42] Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on June 7 that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked with six motorcycles toward Koptieve and attacked with the support of a tank, three armored vehicles, and four motorcycles toward Malynivka.[43]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[44]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoleksandrivka, Novoserhiivka, and Novomykolaivka and toward Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Troitske, Horikhove, and Bohdanivka on June 6 and 7.[45]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove).[46]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove toward Zaporizhzhia and Dachne and west of Kurakhove near Bahatyr, Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Kostyantynopil on June 6 and 7.[47] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Zaporizhzhia (a settlement northwest of Odradne).[48]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Komar (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[49]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Novopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and reached the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border.[50]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko, Vilne Pole, Komar, Vesele, and Burlatske and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole and Novopil on June 6 and 7.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Komar, Fedorivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), and Vilne Pole.[52]

A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 114th and 394th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are moving to the Russian rear for rest and replenishment after having seized Zelene Pole and Novopil.[53]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Piddubne (northwest of Komar).[54] Elements of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[55]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 7 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the southeastern outskirts of Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[56]

Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka and toward Poltavka on June 6 and 7.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Hulyaipole.[58]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Novodanylivka (southeast of Orikhiv).[59]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; southwest of Orikhiv near Pyatykhatky, Stepove, and toward Novoandriivka; and west of Orikhiv toward Pavlivka on June 6 and 7.[60]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]), including its 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction, and drone operators of the BARS-Sarmat Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv and Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv) directions.[61]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on June 7 but did not advance.[62]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[63]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 6 to 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast; six Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from the airspace above occupied Zaporizhia Oblast; one Iskander-K cruise missile from Rostov Oblast; and 206 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[64] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 87 drones and neutralized six Kh-59/69 missiles and one Iskander-K missile, and that 80 drones were ”lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched two missiles, 48 Shaheds, and four guided glide bombs against civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City, killing three civilians and injuring at least 20.[65] Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov reported on June 6 that the June 6 to 7 strike was the largest Russian strike against Kharkiv City since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion.[66] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Head Serhii Lysak stated on June 7 that Russian missiles and drones damaged civilian infrastructure in Dnipro City and injured two civilians.[67]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on June 6 that Russian forces conducted a “double-tap” strike in Kyiv City and killed two first responders during the strikes on the night of June 5 to 6, which likely amounts to a war crime.[68]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://tass dot ru/politika/24166989 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/24166003 ; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24166277 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/24166511 ; https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/12912 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/318837 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/318838 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/318841 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/318845 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/318848

[2] https://t.me/Koord_shtab/12959 ; https://t.me/Koord_shtab/12954

[3] https://t.me/tass_agency/318767;

[4] https://t.me/tass_agency/318770

[5] https://t.me/tass_agency/318782 ; https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/07/politics/vance-russia-ukraine-talks

[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053125; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030825

[7] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LRkGiKk3Wxs ; https://suspilne dot media/1036715-tramp-zaaviv-so-udari-ukraini-dronami-dali-putinu-privid-dla-bombarduvan/; https://www.pravda.com dot ua/eng/news/2025/06/7/7516089/

[8] https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/trump-russia-sanctions-senate-dea1f81d ; https://suspilne dot media/1036643-bilij-dim-tisne-na-kongres-dla-pomaksenna-sankcij-proti-rosii-wsj/ ; https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/1241/titles#:~:text=A%20bill%20to%20impose%20sanctions,Ukraine%2C%20and%20for%20other%20purposes.

[9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage

[10] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36844

[11] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25223; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25199 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25196

[12] https://t.me/rusich_army/24016; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36844; https://t.me/wargonzo/27018; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93058; https://t.me/rusich_army/24010

[13] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36844; https://t.me/dva_majors/72900

[14] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25221; https://t.me/kpszsu/35912

[15] https://t.me/fighter_bomber/21375

[16] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36844; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36848; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93058;

[17] https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/21293 ; https://t.me/voenacher/81823 ; https://t.me/voenacher/81823 ; https://t.me/rybar/71064; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93058

[18] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9333; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1931232691581587668; https://t.me/Waryaz_we_are/239; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9329; https://t.me/wild_hornets/3056; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9334; https://t.me/Pil0tX/270; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9328; https://t.me/fpv_odin/319

[19] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36843; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64915; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93032

[20] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64913; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64915; https://t.me/wargonzo/27018; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31804

[21] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64913; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93052; https://t.me/dva_majors/72900

[22] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64913; https://t.me/rusich_army/24016; https://t.me/dva_majors/72900

[23] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31807; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36860

[24] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167545

[25] https://t.me/dva_majors/72904

[26] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13360

[27]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25223 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25199 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25196 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11650

[28] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13354

[29] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/933 ; https://t.me/viddmaks/207 ; https://t.me/viddmaks/208

[30]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25223 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25199 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25196 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11650 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13360

[31] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93035 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93067

[32] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93026 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93049

[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25223 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25199 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25196 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11650

[34] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167529

[35]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25223 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25199 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25196 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11650

[36] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11650; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25223; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25196; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25199

[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25223; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25199; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25196; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11650

[38] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1931305827232534658; https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/22826

[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25223; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25199 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25196; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11650; https://t.me/dva_majors/72900

[40] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13896; https://t.me/sashakots/54151; https://t.me/dva_majors/72912

[41] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167546

[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25223; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25199 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25196; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11650;

[43] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11650

[44] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9335; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36858

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25223; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25199 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25196; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11650

[46] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9332; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1931241235848794534; https://t.me/oaembr46/1540

[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25223; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25199 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25196; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11650

[48] https://t.me/voin_dv/15364; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167578

[49] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9337; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DKmPzyFM-06/?igsh=cG5kcjdkYmgwNWhx

[50] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167529; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64914

[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25223; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25199 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25196; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11650

[52] https://t.me/voin_dv/15364; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167578

[53] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36842

[54] https://t.me/voin_dv/15350

[55] https://t.me/voin_dv/15356

[56] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31810

[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25223; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25199; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25196; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02wK5st6qUjTJwGejrpEpDFbMDWph3bfSQUvtDHwCd7L585LeTyRJByGVQUem5gvdtl; https://t.me/voin_dv/15364

[58] https://t.me/voin_dv/15365

[59] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36856

[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25223; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25199; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02wK5st6qUjTJwGejrpEpDFbMDWph3bfSQUvtDHwCd7L585LeTyRJByGVQUem5gvdtl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29792

[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36856; https://t.me/rogozin_do/7171; https://t.me/ZS42MSD/3385

[62] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02wK5st6qUjTJwGejrpEpDFbMDWph3bfSQUvtDHwCd7L585LeTyRJByGVQUem5gvdtl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25223; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25199

[63] https://t.me/mod_russia/53514

[64] https://t.me/kpszsu/35902

[65] https://t.me/synegubov/14828; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1037117-vdruge-za-den-rosiani-vdarili-po-harkovu-e-zagiblij-i-poraneni/; https://t.me/synegubov/14789; https://t.me/synegubov/14790 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2607; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2609; https://t.me/synegubov/14801 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2608; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/23406 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1036713-sahedi-atakuvali-kiivskij-rajon-harkova-seria-vibuhiv-prolunala-u-misti-vnoci-7-cervna-stalasa-pozeza/?utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2624; https://t.me/synegubov/14802; https://t.me/synegubov/14803; https://t.me/synegubov/14804; https://t.me/synegubov/14805 ; https://t.me/synegubov/14807 ; https://t.me/synegubov/14808 ; https://t.me/synegubov/14809 ; https://t.me/synegubov/14810; https://t.me/synegubov/14813; https://t.me/synegubov/14817 ; https://t.me/synegubov/14822 ; https://t.me/synegubov/14824 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2615 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2617 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2618 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2622; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2627; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2612; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2614 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2621 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2624; https://t.me/Klymenko_MVS/1471; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/07/u-harkovi-zbilshylas-kilkist-poranenyh-unaslidok-masovanogo-obstrilu-rf/; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1037051-so-vidomo-pro-stan-poranenih-vnaslidok-nicnoi-ataki-po-harkovu-vnoci-7-cervna/; https://x.com/MVS_UA/status/1931216733504671888

[66] https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2619

[67] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/21943; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/07/potroshheni-avtomobili-bagatopoverhivky-ta-navalni-zaklady-naslidky-udaru-na-dnipropetrovshhyni/; https://t.me/astrapress/83260

[68] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/rosiyani-postijno-namagayutsya-rozkoloti-svit-shob-ne-dati-p-98305; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/06/zagalom-80-lyudej-postrazhdaly-vnaslidok-rosijskoyi-ataky-po-ukrayini/

June 4, 2025, 8:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Correction: This update was corrected on June 5, 2025, to change the name of the town that Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade seized from “Pershe Travnya” to “Novokostyantynivka.” We regret the error.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on June 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin is fixating on recent train derailments in Russia in order to further long-standing Kremlin narratives claiming that Ukraine is an illegitimate negotiating partner that is uninterested in peace, likely to distract the broader information space from recent Kremlin officials’ statements about Russia’s own disinterest in a negotiated settlement. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting with members of the Russian government on June 4 and discussed the May 31 collapse of two railway bridges in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts.[1] The meeting included a staged statement from a children’s doctor who promoted the Kremlin’s longstanding justifications for its initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and full-scale invasion in 2022. Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin claimed during the meeting that Ukrainian special services “without a doubt” conducted an operation to down railway bridges in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts on May 31, but did not present concrete evidence to link the collapsed bridges to Ukraine. Putin claimed that the train derailments confirm that the “already illegitimate” Ukrainian government that previously “seized power” is “gradually degenerating into a terrorist organization.” Putin questioned if Russia can negotiate with “terrorists” and questioned why Russia should agree to Ukraine’s proposed 30-day or longer ceasefires, claiming that Ukraine will use the ceasefires to continue to receive Western weapons provisions, mobilize military personnel, and prepare “other terrorist acts.” Putin claimed that the Ukrainian government “does not need peace at all” and values power over peace. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated that Putin later emphasized Ukraine’s alleged “terrorism” during a phone call on June 4 with US President Donald Trump.[2] Ushakov repeated Putin’s claim that Ukraine has “degenerated into a terrorist organization.”

Kremlin officials have long alleged that the current Ukrainian government is “illegitimate,” and Putin previously questioned on March 27 how Russia can negotiate with Ukraine as “neo-Nazi formations” are allegedly ruling the country.[3] Putin has also repeatedly used questions about Ukrainian force generation and Western weapons deliveries to reject Ukraine’s previous ceasefire proposals.[4] Putin’s June 4 claims that the Ukrainian government is a “terrorist organization” with which Russia cannot negotiate, and which will exploit any longer-term ceasefire, is the latest iteration of this Kremlin effort to justify delaying the negotiation process and prolonging the war by attacking Ukraine’s sovereignty as a legitimate negotiating partner. The Kremlin is likely linking its messaging surrounding the train derailments and Ukraine’s alleged perpetuation of “terrorism” in order to distract from Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev’s claim on June 3 that Russia needs the negotiations in Istanbul to result in Russia’s “swift victory and the complete destruction” of the Ukrainian government and not a “compromise[d] peace on someone else’s delusional terms.”[5]

Putin also used his June 4 phone call with Trump to further falsely portray Ukraine as an illegitimate negotiating partner that is uninterested in peace. Ushakov stated that Putin talked with Trump about the May 31 train derailments in Russia, the June 1 Ukrainian strikes against Russian military air bases, and the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in Istanbul.[6] Putin alleged to Trump that Ukraine was responsible for the train derailments. Ushakov claimed that Russia “did not succumb” and attended the Istanbul negotiations despite Ukraine’s “provocations.” Putin’s statements to Trump are also likely aimed at distracting from Russia’s own disinterest in negotiations and continued preparations for a prolonged war effort so as to avoid possible future US sanctions by painting Ukraine as a bad actor.[7]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to express Ukraine’s willingness to negotiate with Russia to establish a just and lasting peace. Zelensky stated on June 4 that the Ukrainian delegation to Istanbul has not received a response to the ceasefire proposal it presented during the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian talks.[8] Zelensky also proposed that Ukraine and Russia implement a comprehensive ceasefire until Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with Zelensky in order to demonstrate a mutual commitment to de-escalation.[9] Zelensky stated that Ukraine is ready to negotiate with Russia any day and that Russia can choose the location of negotiations. Zelensky said that he is willing to meet with Putin even without a ceasefire in order to prove Ukraine’s willingness to negotiate.

Ukrainian and Western officials and open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage resulting from Ukraine’s “Operation Spider’s Web” long-range drone strike series against Russian air bases on June 1. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) published new footage on June 4 from Operation Spider’s Web showing Ukrainian drones approaching the wings, sides, tops, and underbellies of Russian fixed-wing aircraft at various airfields.[10] The SBU reported that the footage shows first-person view (FPV) drones striking A-50 airborne early warning and control (AWACS) aircraft, Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic bombers, Tu-22 supersonic bombers, An-12 transport aircraft, and Il-78 aerial refueling tankers at Belaya Air Base in Irkutsk Oblast; Olenya Air Base in Murmansk Oblast; Dyagilevo Air Base in Ryazan Oblast; and Ivanovo Air Base in Ivanovo Oblast. Some of the clips in the video show aircraft on fire. The SBU stated that Ukrainian drones struck 41 Russian aircraft. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the SBU stated that Russia will be unable to restore half of the Russian aircraft that Ukraine struck or that it will take Russia years to restore them.[11] A senior NATO official reported to Ukrainian news outlet Suspilne that Operation Spider’s Web damaged 40 Russian aircraft and confirmed that the operation destroyed 10 to 13 aircraft.[12] The official also stated that Russia may respond to the loss of its strategic bombers, which Russia uses to launch cruise missiles against Ukraine, by adjusting strike packages to include more drones and ballistic missiles and fewer cruise missiles. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that a NATO official stated that Russian forces previously used the destroyed aircraft to launch over 3,000 cruise missiles that have struck critical infrastructure and civilian targets in Ukraine since February 2022.[13]

Maxar satellite imagery collected on June 4 indicates that Ukrainian drone strikes destroyed at least two Tu-22 bombers and three Tu-95 bombers at Belaya Airbase (see embedded imagery below). Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) group AviVector posted satellite imagery on June 4 that indicates that Ukrainian drones destroyed four Tu-95MS bombers and one An-12 transport aircraft at Olenya Airbase.[14] AviVector assessed that Ukrainian forces destroyed seven Tu-95MS bombers, four Tu-22M3 bombers, and one An-12 transport aircraft and likely damaged a Tu-95MS bomber at Olenya and Belaya airbases.

Russian Tu-95 strategic bombers at Belaya Airbase on May 22, 2025, before Ukrainian drone strike. Source: Satellite image ©2025 Maxar Technologies.

Russian Tu-95 strategic bombers at Belaya Airbase on June 4, 2025, after Ukrainian drone strike. Source: Satellite image ©2025 Maxar Technologies.

Russian Tu-22 strategic bombers at Belaya Airbase on May 22, 2025, before Ukrainian drone strike. Source: Satellite image ©2025 Maxar Technologies.

Russian Tu-22 strategic bombers at Belaya Airbase on June 4, 2025, after Ukrainian drone strike. Source: Satellite image ©2025 Maxar Technologies.

Ukrainian special services reportedly used artificial intelligence (AI) to direct drones during Operation Spider’s Web. The SBU stated on June 4 that it used “autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms and manual operator intervention” to conduct the June 1 strikes against Russian air bases.[15] The SBU stated that some drones lost signal during flight and switched to performing their missions using AI along a preplanned route. ISW recently assessed that Russia and Ukraine have demonstrated some integration of limited AI capabilities into drone operations but have not deployed them at scale on the battlefield.[16] Promises of an immediate AI and machine learning (ML) drone revolution are premature as of June 2025, even in the wake of Operation Spider’s Web, given that both Russian and Ukrainian forces will need to allocate more time, testing, and investment to deploy these drones on the frontlines en masse.

Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) announced on June 4 that the UK will invest a total of £350 billion (roughly $474 billion) to provide Ukraine with 100,000 drones in 2025 — a tenfold increase from the 10,000 drones that the UK provided Ukraine with in 2024.[17] The UK MoD stated that the UK has already provided Ukraine with 140,000 rounds of artillery ammunition in 2025. The UK will also allocate an additional £247 million (roughly $335 million) for the training of Ukrainian forces in the UK through the Interflex training project and will contribute £40 million (roughly $52 million) to materiel procurement efforts within the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) mission.[18] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced during a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) on June 4 that the first Ukrainian long-range weapons system produced in Ukraine with German financial backing could enter service with the Ukrainian military within ”just a few weeks.”[19]

Key Takeaways:

The Kremlin is fixating on recent train derailments in Russia in order to further long-standing Kremlin narratives claiming that Ukraine is an illegitimate negotiating partner that is uninterested in peace, likely to distract the broader information space from recent Kremlin officials’ statements about Russia’s own disinterest in a negotiated settlement.

Putin also used his June 4 phone call with Trump to further falsely portray Ukraine as an illegitimate negotiating partner that is uninterested in peace.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to express Ukraine’s willingness to negotiate with Russia to establish a just and lasting peace.

Ukrainian and Western officials and open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage resulting from Ukraine’s “Operation Spider’s Web” long-range drone strike series against Russian air bases on June 1.

Ukrainian special services reportedly used artificial intelligence (AI) to direct drones during Operation Spider’s Web.

Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 4 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 3 that Ukrainian forces advanced towards Guyevo (south of Sudzha).[20]

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 3 and 4.[21] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked in the directions of Guyevo, Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[22]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Tetkino.[23]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on June 4.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 4 shows Russian servicemembers raising a flag in central Vodolahy (north of Sumy City), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[24] A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a reformed Soviet-era unit) with seizing Vodolahy.[25]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Varachyne (north of Sumy City) and Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City), and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Andriivka (north of Sumy City), but some milbloggers claimed that fighting continues for the settlement and that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in southern Andriivka.[27] Milbloggers also claimed that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) seized Novokostyantynivka (northwest of Kindrativka).[28] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Andriivka and near Nova Sich, Yunakivka, Korchakivka, Sadky (all northeast of Sumy City), and Iskryskivshchyna (northwest of Sumy City).[29]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Oleksiivka, Novomykolaivka, Mala Korchakivka, and Andriivka, and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, Yablunivka, and Oleksandriya on June 3 and 4.[30]

A sergeant operating in a Ukrainian company in the Sumy direction stated on June 4 that Russian forces have changed tactics and are launching infantry assaults in squads of about eight to 10 people, compared to the fireteams of about four personnel they used in May 2025.[31] The sergeant stated that Russian forces are using motorcycles, vehicles, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to rapidly advance, establish positions, and accumulate forces for further attacks.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast.[32] Drone elements of the “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Pavlivka (northwest of Sumy City).[33]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanskyi Khutory on June 3 and 4.[34] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchansk.[35]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported that Russian efforts to destroy settlements as they attack them leave Russian forces with no cover from Ukrainian drones, degrading Russian forces’ defensive capabilities.[36] The spokesperson of Ukraine’s Kharkiv Operational-Tactical Group reported that Russian forces have not accumulated 50,000 troops to prepare to assault in the Kharkiv direction, contrary to some previous Ukrainian reporting.[37] The spokesperson stated that Russia is attempting to develop reserves in the Kharkiv direction, but not in quantities that are sufficient to begin large-scale offensive operations to break through Kharkiv Oblast. The spokesperson also stated that Russian forces in the Kharkiv direction lose about a company’s worth of personnel every day.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating on the outskirts of Vovchansk.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near the international border near Kamyanka and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka on June 3 and 4.[39]

Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported on June 4 that Russian forces are conducting air strikes against Kupyansk with FAB-500 and FAB-1500 glide bombs and then shelling the bomb impact point with multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) in an attempt to strike first responders—essentially conducting “double-tap” strikes that likely amount to war crimes.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 4 that Russian forces in the Kupyansk direction have changed their ground maneuver tactics and are conducting envelopment operations rather than encirclement operations to minimize losses and conserve resources.[41] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces conduct glide bomb, artillery, and tank strikes to pinpoint Ukrainian firing positions before conducting an air strike and additional drone reconnaissance. The milblogger claimed that several Russian units then conducted a ground assault with ATVs and motorcycles to occupy Ukrainian trenches while other units held the Russian breakthrough point. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces call the tactic “triple strangulation.”

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Stepove and toward Cherneshchyna and Olhivka on June 3 and 4.[42]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 4 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on June 4 that Russian forces advanced southeast of Karpivka and north, east, and south of Zelena Dolyna (both north of Lyman).[43]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 4 that Russian forces seized Ridkodub (north of Lyman), but ISW assesses that Russian forces had seized the settlement as of May 29.[44]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Lyman toward Serednie, Shandryholove, and Vovchyi Yar; north of Lyman near Karpivka, Ridkodub, Zelena Dolyna, Novyi Myr, and Lypove, and toward Hlushchenkove; and northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne on June 3 and 4.[45]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), including its 283rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, are reportedly operating in Ridkodub.[46]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground assaults northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on June 3 and 4.[47]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 4 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 3 that Russian forces advanced within Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar) but that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in southern Stupochky.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Chasiv Yar and in Shevchenko Microraion (southwestern Chasiv Yar).[49]

Russian forces conducted ground assaults near Chasiv Yar itself; northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka, and toward Bila Hora; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on June 3 and 4.[50]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 299th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[51]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within western Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk) and south and west of the settlement.[52]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced north of Yablunivka, Zorya, and Romanivka (both southwest of Toretsk).[53]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk near Krymske; east of Toretsk near Druzhba; northwest of Toretsk near Popiv Yar, Poltavka, Yablunivka, and Rusyn Yar; southwest of Toretsk near Romanivka and Zorya; and west of Toretsk near Nova Poltavka and Novoolenivka on June 3 and 4.[54] Ukraine’s Khortytisa Group of Forces reported on June 4 that Russian forces conducted an assault using two armored vehicles and eight motorcycles near Yablunivka.[55]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 13th “Rusich” Detachment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating near Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[56] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) and 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[57]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Malynivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[58]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 4 that Ukrainian forces advanced in Myrolyubivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Malynivka and north of Shevchenko Pershe (northeast of Pokrovsk) and near Yelyzavetivka (east of Pokrovsk).[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko Pershe, Malynivka, Myrolyubivka, Myrne, and toward Raiske; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Hrodivka; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Zvirove on June 3 and 4.[61]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on June 4 that Russian forces recently conducted an assault with 10 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and more than 16 motorcycles.[62] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are intensifying small-group infantry assaults after transferring additional manpower to the Pokrovsk direction. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are increasingly using motorcycles and vehicles to conduct assaults and are only using IFVs to transport infantry.

Order of Battle: Drone operators from the 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD), rocket artillery elements of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), and elements of the “Typhoon” detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[63] Elements of the 39th and 1472nd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Malynivka.[64] Drone operators of the “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk).[65]

Russian forces conducted operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 4 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on June 4 that Russian forces advanced north of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka), southwest of Bohdanivka (southeast of Novopavlivka), and near Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and Troitske (southeast of Novopavlivka).[66]

Russian forces conducted ground assaults northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Novomykolaivka, and east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka and Horikhove on June 3 and 4.[67]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Troitske.[68]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on June 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and Bahatyr and southwest of Kurakhove near Odradne and Rozlyv on June 3 and 4.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 4 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Odradne.[70]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Komar and Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[71]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil and northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole, Fedorivka, and Komar on June 3 and 4.[72] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 3 and 4 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), Komar, and Zelene Pole (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[73]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on June 4.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Polohy (Hulyaipole) direction.[74]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Robotyne (south of Orikhiv).[75]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations southwest of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky, Stepove, Kamyanske, and Mali Shcherbaky on June 3 and 4.[76]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi on June 3 to discuss the situation at the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) amid recent indications that Russia intends to connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid.[77] Zelensky emphasized the importance of the IAEA’s presence at the ZNPP to ensure compliance with international law. Grossi stated that the IAEA has not observed any evidence of Russia trying to restart operations at ZNPP.[78] The IAEA published a note on June 3, which Russia reportedly gave to the IAEA, that stated that Russia, however, has developed a procedure to transfer power from Russia’s unified power system to the ZNPP as a precaution to avoid complete blackouts if the ZNPP’s Dniprovska and Ferosplavna powerlines became disconnected.[79] Grossi previously stated on May 17 that the ZNPP had been reliant on a single power line for over a week after military activity in the area disconnected the backup line.[80] Greenpeace’s Ukraine service reported on May 27 that Russia has laid powerlines in occupied Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts — the first observed indications that Russia is acting upon its long-held plans to connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid.[81]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on June 4 but did not advance.[82]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment in the Kherson direction.[83]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 3 and 4 and during the day on June 4. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 95 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[84] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 36 drones and that 25 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that the drones struck residential areas and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Zaporizhia, and Donetsk oblasts.[85] Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov reported that Russian forces also launched two missiles against Kharkiv City overnight on June 3 and 4.[86] The Ukrainian Ground Forces reported that Russian forces conducted a missile strike against a Ukrainian training ground in Poltava Oblast during the day on June 4.[87]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met with People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping in Beijing on June 3 to discuss strengthening Chinese-Belarusian ties and cooperation.[88]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77099

[2] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77101

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012425 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025

[4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060325

[6] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77101

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050325

[8] https://suspilne dot media/1034417-ce-ultimatum-a-ne-memorandum-zelenskij-vperse-prokomentuvav-tekst-memorandumu-rf/

[9] https://suspilne dot media/1034527-pripinenna-vognu-mae-statis-do-zustrici-lideriv-zelenskij/

[10] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y-ksNjIAkJo ; https://suspilne dot media/1034621-sbu-pokazali-zapisi-z-droniv-pid-cas-operacii-pavutina/

[11] https://suspilne dot media/1034627-polovinu-litakiv-aki-rf-urazila-cerez-operaciu-pavutina-nemozlivo-vidnoviti-zelenskij/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y-ksNjIAkJo

[12] https://suspilne dot media/1034605-u-nato-zaavili-so-pid-cas-operacii-pavutina-sbu-poskodili-blizko-40-litakiv-rf/

[13] https://meduza dot io/news/2025/06/04/predstavitel-nato-soglasno-dannym-razvedki-v-rezultate-ataki-ukrainskih-dronov-unichtozheno-ot-10-do-13-rossiyskih-samoletov-povrezhdeny-40

[14] https://x.com/avivector/status/1930197847372083433; https://t.me/avivector/2667 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/06/04/opublikovany-sputnikovye-snimki-aerodroma-olenya-posle-ataki-ukrainskih-dronov-na-nih-vidno-chetyre-unichtozhennyh-tu-95

[15] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y-ksNjIAkJo ; https://suspilne dot media/1034621-sbu-pokazali-zapisi-z-droniv-pid-cas-operacii-pavutina/

[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/battlefield-ai-revolution-not-here-yet-status-current-russian-and-ukrainian-ai-drone

[17] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/tenfold-increase-in-uk-drone-deliveries-for-ukraine-at-50-nation-ukraine-summit; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/04/ponad-330-mln-dlya-interfleks-snaryady-ta-vnesok-u-misiyu-nsatu-brytaniya-nadaye-paket-dopomogy-ukrayini/; https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/posts/pfbid02K3G1ny4fG5yse7PE8NB5k3PjX6U4hQ5yzaxWusFsy2zAPYKrGdaLqwFv3GswhiqUl; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/04/rustem-umyerov-brytaniya-ogolosyla-pro-rekordnyj-paket-dopomogy-shho-do-nogo-uvijshlo/

[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-2-2024

[19] https://ua dot interfax.com.ua/news/general/1077321.html; https://suspilne dot media/1034689-nimeccina-finansuvatime-virobnictvo-dalekobijnoi-zbroi-v-ukraini-pistorius/; https://www.bmvg dot de/de/aktuelles/ukraine-kontaktgruppe-bruessel-neue-partner-5952190

[20] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36703

[21] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25133; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25103

[22] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29601; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29628; https://t.me/dva_majors/72711

[23] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92844

[24] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9301; https://t.me/zvezdanews/158730

[25] https://t.me/epoddubny/23665

[26] https://t.me/yurasumy/23321; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31749; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36712; https://t.me/yurasumy/23334 https://t.me/mod_russia/53434

[27] https://t.me/notes_veterans/23698; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31749; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29598; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36703; https://t.me/yurasumy/23321; https://t.me/dva_majors/72711

[28] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64824; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36703

[29] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64824; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29598; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64829; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92870; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31749

[30] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29598; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36703; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167063; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64824; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36712; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29623; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21955; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92875; https://t.me/dva_majors/72729; https://t.me/dva_majors/72711; https://t.me/yurasumy/23321; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64836

[31] https://suspilne dot media/1033859-rosiani-zabigaut-riut-lezanki-cekaut-nastupnu-grupu-para-ludej-vizivae-ak-vidbuvaetsa-nastup-rosian-na-sumsini/

[32] https://t.me/mod_russia/53443

[33] https://t.me/epoddubny/23664

[34]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25133 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25108 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25103 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11423

[35] https://t.me/tass_agency/318214

[36] https://www.facebook.com/share/v/16Hjji4GDx/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/03/zrujnovani-domivky-ne-ryatuyut-zagarbnykiv-taktyka-vypalenoyi-zemli-bye-po-rosiyanah/

[37] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/03/shhodnya-vtrachayut-po-roti-rosiyany-namagayutsya-nastupaty-v-rajoni-vovchanska-ta-dvorichnogo/

[38] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167069

[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25133; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25103; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11423

[40] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1034407-90-kerovanih-aviabomb-aki-rf-vipuskae-po-harkivsini-vlucaut-u-kupansku-sinegubov/

[41] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13331

[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25133; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25103; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11423

[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36719 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29642 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31752 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36719 https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29642

[44] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2025 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53435

[45]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25133 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25108 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/1142 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31752 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/318222

[46]https://t.me/motopatriot78/36719 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92871 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36723 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53438

[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25133; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25103; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25103

[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29594

[49] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29594; https://t.me/dva_majors/72711

[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25133; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25103; https://t.me/wargonzo/26963; https://t.me/dva_majors/72713; https://t.me/rusich_army/23973

[51] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29608

[52] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9306; https://t.me/VARTOVI_36/625; https://t.co/UtkPp9Q5xJ; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1930203471199764507; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9296; https://t.me/kanaldoBro33/7485

[53] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64823

[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25133; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25103; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11423; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31746; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64823

[55] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11423

[56] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167084

[57] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13881; https://t.me/mod_russia/53443

[58] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1929646923902046663; https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/22734

[59] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31746

[60] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31746; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1929968512954499423 https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64831

[61] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11423; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25133; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25103; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64831; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29620

[62] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/04/10-bmp-pishly-na-shturm-8-zgorily-2-pidbyti-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-vidbyly-masovanu-ataku/

[63] https://t.me/wargonzo/26973; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36722 https://t.me/mod_russia/53427

[64] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36726

[65] (https://t.me/milinfolive/149718; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1929968512954499423; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1929646923902046663; https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/22734

[66] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31758; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29620

[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25133; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25103

[68] https://t.me/mod_russia/53425

[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25133; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25103; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02wAnP3kvCpQkbnUgGE1Emo859biXrYrHNLyNvvc6WXk3JiYEL53BxH6qNMKSG5yx8l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11423

[70] https://t.me/voin_dv/15313

[71] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167076

[72]https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29596 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167076 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15313 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/72711

[73] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167076 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15313 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/72711

[74] https://t.me/voin_dv/15314

[75] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29614

[76]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25108 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25103 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02wAnP3kvCpQkbnUgGE1Emo859biXrYrHNLyNvvc6WXk3JiYEL53BxH6qNMKSG5yx8l

[77] https://www.president. dot gov.ua/news/prezident-zustrivsya-z-gendirektorom-magate-98241; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/03/bezpeka-yadernyh-obʼyektiv-i-sytuacziya-na-zaporizkij-aes-prezydent-zustrivsya-z-gendyrektorom-magate/ ; ; https://www dot president.gov.ua/news/chitka-nalashtovanist-rosiyi-na-vijnu-i-voni-cyu-svoyu-nalas-98237 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14475 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1929973396034531751 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1929973399809323354 ; https://www dot president.gov.ua/news/prezident-zustrivsya-z-gendirektorom-magate-98241

[78] https://suspilne dot media/1033867-magate-ne-mae-dokaziv-so-rosia-namagaetsa-zapustiti-u-robotu-okupovanu-zaes-grossi/

[79] https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2025/infcirc1295.pdf; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1034115-rf-povidomila-magate-pro-rozroblenu-proceduru-peredaci-naprugi-na-vlasni-potrebi-zaes-vid-edinoi-energosistemi-rosii/

[80] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-291-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine ; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1019943-grossi-intensivno-spivpracue-z-ukrainou-ta-rf-sodo-nastupnoi-rotacii-personalu-magate-na-zaes/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-17-2025

[81] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-27-2025#:~:text=The%20Kremlin%20is%20setting%20conditions%20to%20establish%20permanent,illegally%20occupy%20and%20annex%20additional%20territory%20in%20Ukraine.

[82] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25108 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02wAnP3kvCpQkbnUgGE1Emo859biXrYrHNLyNvvc6WXk3JiYEL53BxH6qNMKSG5yx8l

[83] https://t.me/dva_majors/72755

[84] https://t.me/kpszsu/35609

[85]https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02wAnP3kvCpQkbnUgGE1Emo859biXrYrHNLyNvvc6WXk3JiYEL53BxH6qNMKSG5yx8l ; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/8332; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/04/visim-poranenyh-roztroshheni-budynky-ta-udar-po-punktu-ekstrenky-hersonshhyna-znovu-pid-vognem-rf/ ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/9843; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1034027-rf-atakuvala-odesu-ta-rajon-bezpilotnikami-aki-naslidki/ ; https://t.me/odesa_prokuratura/1382 ; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/36019; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/04/12-droniv-vdaryly-po-zavodu-bioetanolu-sumshhyna-rozlyv-patoky-pozhezha-ta-poshkodzheni-budynky/ ; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1034005-rosia-udarila-po-virobnictvu-bioetanolu-na-sumsini/ ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14474 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1929997646175056204 ; https://www dot president.gov.ua/news/chitka-nalashtovanist-rosiyi-na-vijnu-i-voni-cyu-svoyu-nalas-98237

[86] https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2583; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/04/vorog-vdaryv-po-harkovu-raketamy-bpla/ ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/81114

[87] https://www.facebook.com/UALandForces/posts/pfbid0Ag3HTjg9x2t4Ky4N2eHBCc4g95itFmF7o7vzQnuF8oV6DhCmfg1nwExfdGktY9yel?rdid=K7C5qeZ8966uNDf3; https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/24284 ; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1034529-4-cervna-armia-rf-atakuvala-navcalnij-pidrozdil-na-poltavsini/

[88] https://t.me/pul_1/17062 ; https://t.me/pul_1/17068 ; https://t.me/pul_1/17069 ; https://t.me/pul_1/17070 ; https://t.me/pul_1/17071 ; https://president dot gov.by/ru/events/vstreca-s-predsedatelem-kitajskoj-narodnoj-respubliki-si-czin-pinom ; https://t.me/pul_1/17075; https://www.belarus.kp dot ru/online/news/6407515/

June 3, 2025, 6:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:40 am ET on June 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Kremlin officials publicly acknowledged that Russia seeks the “complete destruction” of Ukraine, indicating Moscow’s disinterest in good faith peace negotiations and a near-term resolution to the war. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on June 3 in posts on his Russian- and English-language Telegram channels that Russia needs the negotiations in Istanbul to result in Russia’s “swift victory [in Ukraine] and the complete destruction” of the Ukrainian government and not a “compromise[d] peace on someone else’s delusional terms.”[1] Medvedev stated that Russia’s June 2 Istanbul memorandum was in line with these goals and threatened that Russia will “explode” everything and “disappear” anyone who opposes Russia in response to the June 1 long-range Ukrainian drone strikes against Russia. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on June 3 that Russia’s Istanbul memorandum is aimed at “eliminating the root causes” of the war in Ukraine and that people should not expect “immediate decisions” from Istanbul.[2] Peskov stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin is interested in a future trilateral meeting with US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, but that Putin wants to hold this meeting after all of the technical details are worked out as part of a future ceasefire or long-term peace agreement.[3]

Russian state media has previously cautioned the Russian public against expecting any significant results from ongoing Ukrainian–Russian negotiations, although Russian officials continue to falsely project interest in good faith peace negotiations to US and Western officials.[4] Russian officials have recently engaged with the United States in a series of bilateral meetings and as part of ongoing US efforts to mediate an end to the war in Ukraine, but Russian officials have yet to demonstrate a willingness to compromise on any of their long-standing demands to bring about peace in Ukraine.[5] ISW noted on June 2 that Russia’s Istanbul memorandum reflects the Kremlin’s long-standing public demands for Ukraine to make significant territorial and political concessions while Russia offers no concessions of its own.[6] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to pursuing demands that amount to nothing short of Ukraine’s full capitulation and that Russia will continue to pursue this objective so long as Putin believes Russia can militarily defeat Ukraine.

Ukraine struck the Kerch Strait Bridge on June 3 for the third time since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported that SBU agents mined the underwater support pillars of the Kerch Strait Bridge and detonated the equivalent of 1,100 kilograms of TNT at 0444 on June 3.[7] The SBU reported that the operation took several months to plan and execute and stated that this is the third time that Ukraine has conducted an operation against the bridge. The SBU reported that the structural integrity of the bridge is in critical condition. The SBU released an image of the bridge which indicates that the explosion did not damage the roadway, though the force of the explosion threw structural elements onto the roadway. Geolocated footage published on June 3 shows an explosion at the base of the Kerch Strait Bridge.[8] Russian opposition outlets Sota and Astra and Russian milbloggers circulated footage indicating that Ukraine conducted a naval drone strike against the bridge around 1500 on June 3, though it is unclear if the strike caused damage to the structure.[9] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that damage to the Kerch Strait Bridge undermines Russia’s ability to resupply Russian units and facilities in Crimea.[10] The Kerch Strait Bridge is a critical Russian logistics route, and Russian forces heavily defend the bridge with layered air defense, anti-sabotage measures, and personnel who monitor surface and underwater activity.[11] Russian sources claimed that authorities temporarily halted traffic across the bridge, but later claimed that traffic resumed.[12] Russian state media and the Russian government have not responded to the strike as of this publication.

Western officials and open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage following the Ukrainian long-range drone strike series (Operation Spider Web) on June 1. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat told Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda on June 2 that Ukrainian officials estimated about 10 to 12 of Russia’s 19 Tu-160 bombers and 36 of Russia’s 57 Tu-95 bombers were operational prior to Ukraine’s June 1 strikes on Russian airbases.[13] Bloomberg reported on June 2 that a senior Western official stated that Ukrainian special services likely destroyed or damaged at least seven Tu-95 bombers and four Tu-22 bombers during the June 1 strike.[14] Bloomberg also assessed that Russia will likely struggle to repair and replace aircraft damaged in the June 1 strike as its strategic aviation fleet relies on critical Western components that Russia has failed to source in the wake of Western sanctions. The New York Times (NYT) reported on June 3 that Western officials and military analysts assessed that Ukrainian special services likely destroyed or damaged six Tu-95 bombers, four Tu-22M bombers, and one A-50 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, and that Ukrainian special services may have destroyed or severely damaged up to 20 Russian strategic aircraft during the strike.[15] Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight assessed on June 3 that satellite imagery and open-source analysis indicate that Ukrainian special services likely destroyed or damaged 11 bombers of various types and one An-12 transport aircraft.[16] Frontelligence noted that publicly available satellite imagery has yet to confirm reporting that Ukrainian special services destroyed or damaged over 20 bombers. Ukrainian military observer Tatarigami and journalists from the Telegraph and Insider stated on June 3 that Ukrainian special services shared a video of Ukrainian drones striking at least two A-50 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft and that Ukraine may release this video soon.[17] ISW has not observed the video’s publication as of the time of this report but will continue to monitor for additional information.

Russia continues to produce and stockpile missiles and drones to strike Ukraine, demonstrating Russia’s continued commitment to winning the war through military means. Ukrainian outlet New Voice (NV) reported on June 3, citing Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), that Russian forces had stockpiled over 13,000 ballistic, cruise, and other missiles as of mid-May 2025, including: almost 600 Iskander-M ballistic missiles, over 100 Kinzhal hypersonic ballistic missiles, almost 300 Kh-101 cruise missiles, over 400 Kalibr cruise missiles, up to 300 Kh-22/32 cruise missiles, about 700 Oniks cruise missiles and Zirkon anti-ship missiles, about 60 North Korean-produced KN-23 ballistic missiles, and about 11,000 S-300/400 air defense missiles.[18] NV reported that the GUR also estimated that Russia can produce roughly 150–200 missiles per month, including: 60 to 70 Iskander-Ms, 10 to 15 Kinzhals, 20 to 30 Kh-101s, 25 to 30 Kalibrs, up to 10 Kh-32s, and 20 to 30 total Oniks and Zirkon missiles. Russia had been launching increasingly large strike packages against Ukraine containing missiles prior to June 1, and Ukraine’s June 1 strikes targeting Russian airfields and bombers will degrade Russia’s ability to conduct further large air-launched cruise missile strikes against Ukraine. Ihnat told Ukrainska Pravda that the June 1 strikes did not destroy all of Russia’s strategic bombers and that Russia retains the ability to strike Ukraine with missiles launched from strategic bombers.[19] Ihnat noted that roughly half of all Russian long range strike drones launched against Ukraine are decoys, while the other half are real Shahed drones. Shahed drones have long dominated Russian strike packages, and Russian forces have recently been using more ground-launched ballistic missiles than air-launched cruise missiles. ISW continues to assess that Russian efforts to increase domestic drone and missile production and ongoing adaptation of strikes packages are likely part of a broader effort to prepare for a long war in Ukraine and possibly a future war against NATO.[20]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced a series of Ukrainian military command changes on June 3. Zelensky appointed former Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi as the Commander of Ukraine’s Joint Forces Command.[21] Zelensky appointed Drapatyi as the Commander of Ukrainian Ground Forces on November 29, 2024, and Drapatyi recently submitted his resignation in response to a June 1 Russian missile strike on a Ukrainian training unit.[22] The position of Ukrainian Joint Forces Commander has been vacant since February 26, when Zelensky appointed then Joint Forces Commander Major General Andriy Hnatov as Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff.[23] Zelensky and Umerov also announced on June 3 that they appointed Brigadier General Oleh Apostol as Commander of the Ukrainian Air Assault Forces, Major General Ilhor Skybiuk as Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Major Robert Brovdi (callsign “Madyar”) as Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces, and Colonel Vadym Sukharevskyi as Deputy Commander of Operational Command “East.”[24] Sukharevskyi previously served as Commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces.[25]

Key Takeaways:

Kremlin officials publicly acknowledged that Russia seeks the “complete destruction” of Ukraine, indicating Moscow’s disinterest in good faith peace negotiations and a near-term resolution to the war.

Ukraine struck the Kerch Strait Bridge on June 3 for the third time since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Western officials and open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage following the Ukrainian long-range drone strike series (Operation Spider Web) on June 1.

Russia continues to produce and stockpile missiles and drones to strike Ukraine, demonstrating Russia’s continued commitment to winning the war through military means.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced a series of Ukrainian military command changes on June 3.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced near Kurakhove.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian Advance: Geolocated footage published on June 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[26] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 3 that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced southeast of Novy Put (also southwest of Glushkovo).[27]

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 2 and 3.[28] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 2 and 3 that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), in Guyevo (southeast of Sudzha), and south of Gornal (southwest of Sudzha).[29]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), the 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]), and motorized rifle elements subordinated to the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) are reportedly operating in Tetkino.[30]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on June 3.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on June 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on June 3 that Russian forces recently seized Andriivka (north of Sumy City), but one milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing in Andriivka’s southern outskirts.[31] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces seized Oleksandriya (northeast of Sumy City), near Andriivka and Yunakivka (southeast of Andriivka), towards Mala Korchakivka (southeast of Andriivka), and along the Snagnost River in a wide area near Yablunivka (east of Andriivka).[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City), but other milbloggers denied this claim.[33]

Russian milbloggers claimed on June 2 and 3 that Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Andriivka, Novomykolaivka, and Kostyantynivka and toward Khotyn and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and toward Myropillya.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 2 and 3 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Oleksandriya toward Guyevo (northeast of Sumy City).[35]

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat told Ukrainska Pravda on June 2 that Russian forces are intensifying strikes against Sumy Oblast, including with KABs.[36] Ihnat characterized the intensification as a scorched-earth tactic.

Order of Battle: Drone elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division and “Anvar” Spetsnaz detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Sumy direction and in Shostka raion, Sumy Oblast (further northwest of Sumy City).[37]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 3 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on June 2 that Russian forces advanced over 120 meters in Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[38]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanskyi Khutory on June 2 and 3.[39]

The Russian Air Force is reportedly testing new guided glide bombs with unified planning and correction modules (UMPK) with an extended range in Kharkiv Oblast.[40] Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office Head Spartak Borysenko reported on June 3 that Russian forces launched four extended-range glide bombs at Kharkiv Oblast from Tomarovka, Belgorod Oblast on May 31 as part of new glide bomb testing. Borysenko stated that the upgraded glide bombs have a range of 95 kilometers, an increase from the bombs’ previous range of 60-80 kilometers. Borysenko stated that Russian forces can strike any location in Kharkiv City and some settlements south of Kharkiv City using these bombs when Russian aircraft sortie from the Russian air base in Tomarovka. Borysenko reported that Russian forces used similar extended-range glide bombs against Sumy Oblast in May 2025.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and toward Dovhenke and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Mala Shapkivka, and Stepove Novoselivka on June 2 and 3.[41]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and the “Anvar” Spetsnaz detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Bryhadyrivka (southwest of Kupyansk) and Milove (northeast of Kupyansk along the international border).[42]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove, east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai, and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Stepove and toward Olhivka on June 2 and 3.[43]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are developing an offensive in the Borova direction from Russia’s recently formed salient near Ridkodub (southeast of Borova).[44]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 3.

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Karpivka, Ridkodub, Zelena Dolyna, Hlushchenkove, Shandryholove, and Novyi Myr; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on June 2 and 3.[45]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 73rd Artillery Brigade (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating North Korean M-1978 “Koksan” self-propelled artillery near Kreminna (east of Lyman).[46]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 7th Military Base, 49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced in the Siversk direction.[47]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Siversk towards Serebryanka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on June 2 and 3.[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Chasiv Yar, in central Chasiv Yar itself, and near Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[49]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and Bila Hora on June 2 and 3.[50]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion and 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (both of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[51]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on June 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD), advanced in northwestern and western Yablunivka (west of Toretsk).[52] Russian milbloggers claimed Russian forces advanced toward Rusyn Yar and Poltavka (both west of Toretsk).[53]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself, east of Toretsk near Druzhba; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Poltavka, Popiv Yar, Yablunivka, Pleshchiivka, and Nelipivka on June 2 and 3.[54]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attacking in small assault groups and clearing key Ukrainian strongholds step-by-step to make advances between Toretsk and Pokrovsk.[55] Another Russian milblogger, however, claimed that overextended Russian logistics and Ukrainian reinforcements have slowed Russian advances in the Toretsk direction.[56]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (Toretsk) direction.[57]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 3 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) with recently seizing Shevchenko Pershe (northeast of Pokrovsk).[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in a forest between Malynivka and Yelyzavetivka (both northeast of Pokrovsk) and that elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are clearing Malynivka.[59] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the eastern and southern outskirts of Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk).[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko Pershe, Yelyzavetivka, Malynivka, Myrne, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne on June 2 and 3.[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 3 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west and south of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka) and have seized most of Horikhove (east of Novopavlivka).[62]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Novomykolaivka, and Muravka and east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka on June 2 and 3.[63]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[64]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized half of Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove).[65]

Russian forces continued ground attacks west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Bahatyr, and Oleksiivka on June 2 and 3.[66] A milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked south of Oleksiivka and near Zelenyi Kut (west of Kurakhove).[67]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Komar (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[68]

Russian forces continued ground attacks west of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil, Novosilka, and Vilne Pole; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Komar, Shevchenko, and Fedorivka; and north of Velyka Novosilka toward Novoukrainka on June 2 and 3.[69] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Komar, Shevchenko, and Fedorivka.[70]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Komar.[71] Drone operators of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[72]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on June 3.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1198th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Polohy direction.[73]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky and Stepove on June 2 and 3.[74]

A Russian milblogger claimed that the area between Robotyne (south of Orikhiv) and Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne) has become a contested “gray zone” in recent weeks.[75]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating north of Robotyne, and drone operators of the Chechen “Vostok-Akhmat” Battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Orikhiv direction.[76]

The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported on June 3 that Ukrainian forces destroyed one Russian Buk-M3 air defense system in an unspecified location in southern Ukraine.[77]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on June 3.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 2 to 3. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 112 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[78] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 60 drones and that 15 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes hit residential areas and civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa cities.[79]

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) strike against Sumy City, killing at least four civilians and injuring at least 25 civilians.[80]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/76 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/587

[2] https://t.me/tass_agency/318104 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/318105 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/318107 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/318109 ; https://meduza dot io/paragraph/2025/06/03/kompromissy-s-ukrainoy-tema-dlya-peregovorov

[3] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7775362

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032425; https://t.me/tass_agency/307331; https://t.me/tass_agency/307301; https://t.me/tass_agency/307302; https://t.me/tass_agency/307303 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013025 ; https://tass dot ru/interviews/23001625

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031825 ; https://ru.usembassy.gov/president-trumps-statement-on-his-call-with-president-vladimir-putin/

[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060225

[7] https://www.facebook.com/100066507582416/videos/pcb.1076252331268343/716206554278174?locale=uk_UA; https://t.me/SBUkr/14960 ; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/ssu-destroys-supports-of-the-crimean-bridge/; https://youtu.be/BW_QfDcEhbc; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/03/zradnyk-u-naczgvardiyi-sbu-pidirvaly-krymskyj-mist-lymanskyj-vidmak-strim-armiyatv/; https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/06/03/sbu-utverzhdaet-chto-provela-operatsiyu-po-podryvu-podvodnyh-opor-krymskogo-mosta

[8] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1929858263178158494; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1929866881038483492; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1929882460059324526

[9] https://t.me/sotaproject/98693; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/80612; https://t.me/astrapress/82768; https://t.me/romanov_92/47565; https://t.me/dva_majors/72675; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64818

[10] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/03/u-vms-rozpovily-yak-urazhennya-krymskogo-mosta-povplyvaye-na-rosiyan/

[11] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/ssu-destroys-supports-of-the-crimean-bridge/

[12] https://t.me/most_official/15359 ; https://t.me/most_official/15359; https://t.me/sevdortrans_ru/4523 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29520; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36691; https://t.me/rybar/70969 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/37942; https://t.me/sashakots/54075; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29572 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29559; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92815; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92820; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92822 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/72673; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/1776; https://t.me/tass_agency/318157

[13] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/articles/2025/06/3/7515296/

[14] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-06-02/ukraine-s-long-range-strike-on-nuclear-bombers-rattles-moscow

[15] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/02/us/politics/ukraine-russia-drone-attack.html

[16] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1929795063615295593

[17] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1929896965342413252; https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1929897365105676539; https://x.com/JimmySecUK/status/1929894575369302054; https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1929910132197958094; https://x.com/michaeldweiss/status/1929909529275175045; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/06/03/ukraine-strikes-putin-prized-spy-plane/

[18] https://nv dot ua/ukr/ukraine/events/gur-pro-raketni-zapasi-rf-iskander-kinzhal-kalibr-h-101-cirkon-chi-vistachit-dlya-novih-udariv-50519076.html

[19] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/articles/2025/06/3/7515296/

[20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120224; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050925;

[21] https://www.president dot gov.ua/documents/3842025-55257

[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125

[23] https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/3752024-51077; https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/1482025-54041; https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/2012025-54317

[24] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/19jr6k2HwH/; https://www.president dot gov.ua/documents/3862025-55265; https://www.president dot gov.ua/documents/3852025-55261

[25] https://t.me/usf_army/600

[26]https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/28627; https://t.me/OSHP_225/5008

[27] https://t.me/rusich_army/23949

[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25070 ; https://t.me/s/GeneralStaffZSU ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25100

[29]https://t.me/motopatriot78/36675 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/72614 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92772 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29512 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/20283 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29554 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26941 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/72614 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/23949

[30] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92772 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/20283

[31] https://t.me/wargonzo/26948 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/318092 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53410 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92803; https://t.me/sashakots/54073; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36679; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64802; https://t.me/rybar/70968; https://t.me/dva_majors/72640; https://t.me/yurasumy/23302

[32] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64790; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64796; https://t.me/dva_majors/72614; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29512

[33] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64790; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36675; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/8874

[34] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64790; https://t.me/wargonzo/26941; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29512; https://t.me/rybar/70968; https://t.me/dva_majors/72614; https://t.me/yurasumy/23302

[35] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64790

[36] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/articles/2025/06/3/7515296/

[37] https://t.me/epoddubny/23656; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29524

[38] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29497 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29512

[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25100; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25073; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25070 https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11356

[40] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1032987-pid-cas-udariv-po-harkivsini-rf-pocala-viprobovuvati-novij-modul-planeruvanna-so-dozvolae-aviabombam-letiti-dali/

[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25073; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25100; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25070; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11356

[42] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1929630499477344651; https://x.com/franfran2424/status/1929578872627929336; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/224; https://t.me/epoddubny/23656

[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25073; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25100; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25070; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11356

[44] https://t.me/dva_majors/72614

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25070; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25100; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25073; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11356

[46] https://x.com/OSINTua/status/1929893161645592826 ; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1929900276057584013

[47] https://t.me/mod_russia/53402 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149459 ; https://t.me/ZA_FROHT/36369

[48]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25070 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11356 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25073

[49]https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167025 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/72614 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26941 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31743 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/72614

[50]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25100 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25070 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11356 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25073

[51] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29524

[52] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64801 ; https://t.me/rybar/70963 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23303

[53] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64801 ; https://t.me/rybar/70963 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23303

[54]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25073 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25100 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25070 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64801 ; https://t.me/rybar/70963

[55] https://t.me/rybar/70963 ;

[56] https://t.me/yurasumy/23303

[57] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92776

[58] https://t.me/wargonzo/26938

[59] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36665 ; https://t.me/rybar/70963

[60] https://t.me/yurasumy/23304

[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25100 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25073 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25070 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11356 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26941

[62] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36669 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23305

[63] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64797 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25100 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25073 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25070 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11356

[64] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9292; https://t.me/spetsnazb/755

[65] https://t.me/yurasumy/23306

[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25100; https://t.me/s/GeneralStaffZSU ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0qK96ZSxBBXp6WNF8fWV8minfpZmZr5C7HaXPRM7XTYPA6zc3oqdoU9mHhARAKSbal; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25070; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11356; https://t.me/wargonzo/26941; https://t.me/yurasumy/23306

[67] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64800

[68] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64800

[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25100; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25073; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25070; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64800; https://t.me/wargonzo/26941

[70] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64800; https://t.me/voin_dv/15298; https://t.me/wargonzo/26941

[71] https://t.me/voin_dv/15289

[72] https://t.me/voin_dv/15299

[73] https://t.me/voin_dv/15284

[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25100; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25073; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0qK96ZSxBBXp6WNF8fWV8minfpZmZr5C7HaXPRM7XTYPA6zc3oqdoU9mHhARAKSbal; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25070

[75] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36658

[76] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36658; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5767

[77] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0qK96ZSxBBXp6WNF8fWV8minfpZmZr5C7HaXPRM7XTYPA6zc3oqdoU9mHhARAKSbal

[78] https://t.me/kpszsu/35539

[79] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/43594 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/03/ulamky-droniv-siyaly-vogon-ta-rujnuvannya-chernigiv-pid-udarom-chetvero-poranenyh-zgorily-budynky-ta-desyatky-avto/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/43594 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/03/ulamky-droniv-siyaly-vogon-ta-rujnuvannya-chernigiv-pid-udarom-chetvero-poranenyh-zgorily-budynky-ta-desyatky-avto/; https://t.me/DSNS_Kharkiv/14664; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1033095-vnoci-3-cervna-rosiani-atakuvali-peredmista-harkova-na-teritorii-postovogo-terminala-zajnalasa-pozeza/; https://t.me/synegubov/14662; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/43602 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/03/palayuchi-sklady-z-yizheyu-ta-rozbyti-haty-rosiya-znovu-atakuvala-odesu-chetvero-lyudej-postrazhdaly/; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1033119-vibiti-vikna-virva-ta-zgorila-avtivka-foto-naslidkiv-ataki-na-odesu-i-svidcenna-ocevidciv/

[80] https://t.me/kobzarartemsn/4636?single ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/03/vorog-zavdav-udaru-po-czentru-sum-ye-bagato-poranenyh-odna-lyudyna-zagynula/ ; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/36004; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/06/03/rossiyskie-voyska-nanesli-raketnyy-udar-po-tsentru-sum-pogibli-ne-menee-dvuh-chelovek-raneny-okolo-20; https://smr.gov dot ua/uk/novini/podiji/34135-vorog-potsiliv-v-avtivki-u-tsentri-sum.html; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1033143-armia-rf-udarila-po-sumah-so-vidomo/; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1929815700043919433