2:22 p.m. EDT

MS BRUCE: Thank you, ma’am. Thank you. Hi, everyone. Hi. Welcome back. Appreciate you being here. Thank you. Everyone set? We’re good? Great. Welcome aboard, everyone. Thank you again for being here.

For generations the Middle East has been dealing with the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism, with the attack on Israel on October 7th by Hamas reminding us of what’s at stake. Due to the wisdom of the American people, President Trump’s election to a second term has offered the world a chance to see an American leader committed to solving many of the world’s existential threats with determination.

Now, as the conflict between Israel and Iran continues, President Trump has also been clear that Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has also stated that fact as he has traveled the world working to implement President Trump’s vision of peace and security. That statement has also been uttered from this podium many times.

The fact that Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon is clear. As the White House reminds us, since taking office President Trump has clearly stated, no fewer than a dozen times, that Iran cannot be allowed to have a nuclear weapon, for anyone who’s unclear on that fact. President Trump has made the same pledge no fewer than 40 times before taking office, even as far back as 2011. One of the highest priorities of the Trump Administration is the safety and security of the American people. To that end the Department of State has established the Middle East Task Force to help coordinate support for U.S. citizens, our U.S. diplomatic missions, and personnel and diplomatic engagement. The task force is operating 24 hours a day.

Over the past week, to help keep U.S. citizens informed, we have issued more than 30 security alerts to countries in the region and updated the Travel Advisories for Iraq and Israel. We remind U.S. citizens not to travel to Israel or Iraq and not to travel to Iran under any circumstances. We continue to monitor the complex and rapidly evolving situation on the ground as we continue to assess and address the needs of U.S. citizens. We urge all U.S. citizens to regularly visit travel.state.gov for the latest Travel Advisories and security updates and to enroll in the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program, also known as STEP, to receive timely alerts and guidance from the State Department.

For Americans needing assistance – and there we have a bit of the website there for you – call +1-202-501-4444. That number again is +1-202-501-4444. If you’re on that website you can also click on that red box; it will take you to a page where you can search for the embassy of your interest, where you are, where you would like to connect to be able to get help from the embassy in the country where you are. And of course, the numbers there as well for your closest U.S. embassy.

I also want to add a couple other things here as we’re dealing with this. It is certainly a rapidly evolving dynamic, but to conclude the topper here today, I want to recognize the State Department and other U.S. Government teams around the world working under threat on behalf of the American people, particularly those in Israel and Ukraine who spent another night sheltering in bunkers as they came under attack. Our priority is the safety of Americans overseas and here at home. It is the priority of Secretary Marco Rubio. It is the priority of everyone who works in this building, and the thousands of American citizens who work anonymously and whom you will never see, who are working in embassies and consulates around the world and working with those local nations to be there for American citizens and to help facilitate American diplomacy.

Our priority is the safety of Americans – yes, here at home, but also overseas. We thank all of those working on behalf of the American people, all of you watching from home and from around the world. We thank you, and from – for everyone around the nation, we know and honor your work as we begin another briefing here, ready to take your questions.

All right. Yes, sir.

QUESTION: Yes, hi, Tammy. Thanks. Thanks for that. Could you give us some more details on this task force, how it’s going to work and specifically if it’s going to help Americans potentially leave the region, be repatriated or – and depending on the countries that they’re in, and any more detail that you can give on that?

MS BRUCE: Right. Well, I won’t be giving you – just as a reminder of how today is a little bit of a different day for the briefing. There is always things that I can’t say to you, and yet we have a long back and forth. Sometimes we have a little bit of a debate. I won’t engage in that today. My responses will be perhaps a bit quicker than usual, and I’ll be moving around more quickly to reach as many of you as I can. And there will be – there will be less that I can answer for you because of the circumstances that we’re dealing with around the world.

So it is – just want you to know it’s not personal, but we’re working on certain things like the task force, as an example. The task force is a group of people who are working, taking the calls of people, of American citizens around the world, making sure that they get connected with what they may need in that region. I won’t go into the details of all that the task forces do, of course, but it’s about information, making sure people here at the State Department and people – that we get the information we need, but also people around the world, American citizens, get directed to the information that they may need as well.

So I’m – I’ll leave it at that, but this is something that the State Department does when there is a situation that requires it, and this is one of those times.

QUESTION: Tammy, I’m sorry, but I just have a question on the phone number.

MS BRUCE: Sure, Matt. Sure. Of course.

QUESTION: That phone number that you – that you gave, if you call that number, which I can do right now, right, what do you – who do you get?

MS BRUCE: You get an individual who is —

QUESTION: The task force or —

MS BRUCE: Yeah, no, you don’t get the task force.

QUESTION: Oh.

MS BRUCE: That phone number is a – is a general phone number. The task force is busy. (Laughter.) But it’s – it is a separate unit that is established to take the calls, to assist American citizens who call to the embassies. Particularly you’re going to be referred to embassies who can help you get what it is you need. So good question. Thank you, sir.

QUESTION: Thanks.

MS BRUCE: All right. Yes, Andrea.

QUESTION: Just a quick question. There’s some specific consular needs, one in particular that I’m aware of, and there may be more than one. It is an American citizen in Iran, which – where there is no embassy, no consulate.

MS BRUCE: Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: Would that be the Swiss protectorate? Would there be other options? Has Consular Affairs give any advice as to what to do about Americans right now stuck in that place?

MS BRUCE: I can’t speak to any advice or information regarding individuals in Iran at this point.

QUESTION: Okay. But – and what about American Israelis or Israeli Americans either wanting to come out or wanting to get back home? El Al, I believe, has resumed flights in some small measure for people who’ve – some people have kids in Israel and they were visiting the States, and there is – they’re American citizens. Is there anything that they can do? Where should they – should they call this number?

MS BRUCE: Well, obviously if you know – and we encourage every American when you travel, is to contact your local embassy or consulate, let them know you’re there, make sure you know where they are, have those numbers, and that’s what I would recommend no matter where you’re traveling but certainly in the Middle East, is know where those entities are. Know where the embassy is.

QUESTION: But —

MS BRUCE: So if you’re – if you’re in Israel, obviously it’s Tel Aviv, it’s Jerusalem.

QUESTION: Are they open, the —

MS BRUCE: Well, they will answer their phone. So there is – there is contacts that can happen in the midst of all of this, and of course I think that that’s the advice for wherever you are. But clearly if you’re in a certain area, it’s obvious in this case that there are certain limitations in that region and that – contact the embassy, the one that is nearest to you, and you will at the very least make sure they know where you are, but also they will give you some options for the plans that you would like to make.

Yes, Humeyra.

QUESTION: Tammy, I understand your limitations, but I have to ask this.

MS BRUCE: I know you do; it’s your job, and I appreciate that. I’m here to take questions, not necessarily to always answer them.

Yes, ma’am.

QUESTION: Yeah, last night President Trump said he wants a real end, not a ceasefire. So does the United States support or pursue regime change in Iran, or are we just talking about dismantling Iran’s nuclear enrichment, and would that include the United States helping Israel strike Fordow?

MS BRUCE: Well, I’m certainly not going to characterize what President Trump says or tweets for that matter. He doesn’t need characterizing. He is one of the most transparent, one of the most clear individuals that we’ve known. I think that we can take his word for his word. But I’m not going to speculate on, in a larger sense, what that would mean. That is up to the President. He is the singular guiding hand about what will be occurring from this point forward, as he has been, and I think that that dynamic is pretty clear. He says he wants an end – as he has said about every conflict that he has as a peacemaker worked, to stop peacefully through diplomacy. That has been his commitment, and he wants these things – as he said about a number of situations, not for a month or six months, but durable ends to this nature of forever wars. And that has been his posture, and that’s his posture now.

QUESTION: Okay, I have an easier follow-up.

MS BRUCE: Yes, ma’am.

QUESTION: How many people —

MS BRUCE: I’ll take a hard one too. It’s all right.

QUESTION: How many people so far have contacted U.S. missions in Israel or elsewhere, American citizens seeking help to depart the country that they’re in in the Middle East?

MS BRUCE: Yes, I won’t discuss those details of the numbers involved with the embassies.

QUESTION: Are you guys planning to facilitate charter planes to get people out or military evacuations?

MS BRUCE: I will not discuss what our plans are in that regard.

Yes, ma’am.

QUESTION: Just to follow up on that really quickly.

MS BRUCE: Sure.

QUESTION: Are you guys considering at all operations that would help Americans who want to leave the region from evacuating?

MS BRUCE: I know that our commitment is to the safety and security of Americans around the world.

All right. Yes, sir.

QUESTION: Just and —

MS BRUCE: Yes, sir, go ahead.

QUESTION: Tammy, would the U.S. Government like to see regime change in Iran?

MS BRUCE: I – first of all, I’m certainly not going to remotely address that. It would require me to speculate or speak on behalf of the President, which I will not do. What we’ve seen, though, is clear – is months and repeated statements that all he wants is a peaceful world. His activity and the activity and the nature of the actions that the United States has taken, and his special envoys have been rooted in one thing, which is negotiations looking for diplomatic solutions to generational problems that he wants solved diplomatically. That has been his constant posture. And there has been nothing that has changed in his – what he wishes for, what he would hope to accomplish. And so, of course, that’s not something I’m going to address.

QUESTION: Is the U.S. Government and the Israeli Government on the same page when it comes to the intelligence about Iran’s nuclear weapons program?

MS BRUCE: That is a question for the White House, and perhaps the NSC. That’s not something I can answer here.

Nadia.

QUESTION: Thank you, Tammy. The President said he want to see Iran offer unconditional surrender. I’m not going to ask you to comment on the President’s statement, but I’m going to ask you if the Secretary is involved in any kind of diplomatic missions with his allies, with the Germans, with the French, trying to offer something to the Iranians as a way out.

MS BRUCE: Well, I – again – would not speak on the details of any diplomatic conversations, if they occurred, between whom, what those details would be. We know, of course, the Secretary and the President were at the G7. Their constant work, from the moment they came to office, has been to – and certainly Secretary Rubio – is to open up conversations and to lead the world through diplomacy to make a difference. But that’s the only thing that would guide me when it comes to the nature of the decisions they’re making at this point.

Yes, ma’am.

QUESTION: Without getting into the details of the conversations, is the door to diplomacy with Iran on its nuclear program still open from the U.S. perspective?

MS BRUCE: That would be a decision made by President Trump.

QUESTION: Have you heard from the Iranians signaling interest in continuing discussions?

MS BRUCE: That is not something that I can speak to.

Yes, ma’am.

QUESTION: Thank you. Going back to the consular piece of this in Israel, the latest security alert from the embassy there still says the embassy is not in a place to evacuate or directly assist Americans. Do you have any timeline on when that might change for the Americans who are stranded in that country? And just looking at how quickly the security situation has changed there, the travel alert was raised to a Level 4 from Level 3 for the entirety of the country. Is that a sign that the State Department was caught on its back foot a little bit by this change, because Americans still can’t get help?

MS BRUCE: I can say the answer to the – that last question is no. We are working 24/7 to ensure the safety and the security of Americans around the world. I can say that the Department of State is always planning for contingencies to assist private U.S. citizens’ departure from crisis areas, and we will alert the U.S. citizenry community if there is – and when there is – additional information to share regarding their options during any crisis but certainly this one as well.

When it comes to how quickly people can expect a dynamic – the American government, the State Department, our military – you’ve seen all of these assets, all of these departments involved in this dynamic in one fashion or another – are working exclusively for the safety of this nation and the safety of the American people, wherever they may be.

Yes, sir.

QUESTION: Thank you, Tammy. At the top you said that you’re advising U.S. citizens not to travel to Israel or Iraq or Iran under any circumstances. Do you have any more general guidance for Americans in the Middle East more broadly as a region? Are there other countries that you’re advocating people depart from?

MS BRUCE: Well, at our website we have our travel alerts. We also have moved them on our State Department Twitter, our social media accounts. Those are for the public to see. Would there be – what is the specific one for people to look to if they want to look for specific country travel alerts? Is it travel.state.gov?

So travel.state.gov, and you will see every travel alert. Therefore you, depending on if you’re going to be traveling – and it’s not just for the Middle East – or if you’re in a country right now, you can get your information there.

Yes, sir.

QUESTION: Thank you, Tammy.

MS BRUCE: All right.

QUESTION: Two questions. In your topper you also recognized American diplomats serving in Ukraine and Israel, who spent another night in a bunker.

MS BRUCE: Yes.

QUESTION: Well, one of American citizens happened to be killed by the Russians last night in Ukraine. Do you have any comment? And will the U.S. Government act to protect American citizens in Ukraine?

MS BRUCE: Yes, we are aware of last night’s attack on Kyiv, which resulted in numerous casualties, including the tragic death of a U.S. citizen. We condemn those strikes and extend our deepest condolences to the victims and to the families of all those affected. The President, in the recent past, has made his thoughts clear about striking the civilian areas in that regard. And just to reiterate again, which is that the thread throughout all of the work that we do, is the department has no higher priority than the safety and security of U.S. citizens abroad.

And we can confirm the death of a U.S. citizen in Ukraine, and we stand ready to provide all possible consular assistance. And out of respect to the family during this obviously horrible time, we have no further details to offer in that regard.

QUESTION: Thank you. And second topic, in light of Israel-Iran tension, some of our colleagues from VOA Persian service were called back reportedly. How much does the event today – events of past few days signify the role of VOA and other outlets to counter these narratives from U.S. enemies?

MS BRUCE: Yes. I’m not going to go into the details of what we’re doing when it comes to communications into that region or into specific countries.

Yes, sir.

QUESTION: Thank you, Tammy. Two on related topics. Number one, the administration kind of kept this conflict between Israel and Iran at arm’s length over the first few days, and now, since last night and especially into today, we’re hearing the President say we, we, we more – we have control over the skies; we know where the supreme leader is. He’s kind of taking more ownership of the situation directly. Is that feeling trickling down to this building as well? Is there more of a ownership of the situation in the State Department as well?

MS BRUCE: Well, I, again, can’t characterize the feelings of the President of the United States. We know that he is our lead. We know that he is the guiding hand. We know that he is one of a few who know all the details, and he is clearly – has a mission and an agenda that has involved diplomacy and changing the world for the better for people. In the meantime, of course, things change; our experiences change. He’s making comments that are a reflection of what he – what matters to him. And of course, what matters to the President matters to the State Department and every other department. I think that it is fair to say that his leadership and his reelection to the second term was because people here in the United States were tired of the status quo. And what the world has seen is a peacemaker and someone who can make a difference, and that’s what they’re looking forward to.

QUESTION: Final question – can I get in one more?

MS BRUCE: One more.

QUESTION: There’s no special envoy for Iran. Several key locations in the Middle East don’t have a confirmed ambassador. We speak often about the day-after situation in Gaza. What about the day-after situation in Iran? Is the State Department ready for it?

MS BRUCE: Well, the State Department and the Trump Administration – while you may not see things immediately, just because it’s not maybe in the news or you’re not present for things that occur, doesn’t mean they’re not occurring. I would remind everyone that the State Department, as I found out, is sort of like the military; it’s 24/7. It is not something that is a basic 8 to 5 dynamic. And it’s because people are working around the world constantly. It is literally their mission, personally; their work is what they do and are committed to. So while you may see a certain thing in a static framework, it doesn’t mean that we have not worked on that, or are not working on that, or that things will begin to happen.

So it’s just a reminder that there’s – it’s not about the day after. We are working before, during, and after. It is the anticipation of people with history and an experience when it comes to the history, not just of a building and of a department of the United States, but the history of people working on diplomatic issues throughout the world. And they work for this department; they are committed to those issues, and that is what makes the State Department so effective, in addition to the leadership that is afforded by Marco Rubio as guided by Donald Trump.

Yes, sir. You’ve been waiting.

QUESTION: Thank you. Tammy, the NATO summit is in The Hague next week.

MS BRUCE: Yes.

QUESTION: President Trump and Secretary Rubio came back early from the G7 summit because of the nature of what’s going on in the Middle East. If this situation is still unfolding next week, should we expect some kind of changes to the delegation, changes to travel? Should we be anticipating that if the situation is still ongoing?

MS BRUCE: I can’t tell you if anything will change. I know it has not so far. But as we have experienced from day to day, or even sometimes hour to hour, things do change. This is a very dynamic event. We’ve all had our special situations that we’re interested in, and we all want diplomacy to work, and we’ve been cheering on summits and ceasefire discussions, et cetera. This is something that is moving – as things tend to – very rapidly. So I would say that anything is possible, but at this point in time that is still certainly on the books. But that’s going to be, obviously, to the – that’s a presidential trip; that’s going to be up to the White House, and I’m sure will be affected by their decision making based on what they see.

Yes, sir.

QUESTION: Thanks, Tammy. Two questions, please. First of all —

MS BRUCE: Can you tell me, sir —

QUESTION: Yeah. Alan Fisher from Al Jazeera English.

MS BRUCE: Very good. How do you do?

QUESTION: Fine, thank you. The U.S. intelligence assessment on March 26th was that Iran was not working towards a nuclear bomb. What’s changed? The U.S. position seems to be that it was very close.

MS BRUCE: Well, again, I can’t speak to intelligence assessments, what may or may not have changed, or to the fact that it is President Trump and his team who are seeing things that matter when it comes to the decision making. And I think that that’s what’s happened here.

QUESTION: That was the testimony —

QUESTION: Second question is if the President, in his first term, was willing to give the Taliban 18 months to come up with a deal, why was there only 60 days given to the Iranians to discuss something which is much more complicated?

MS BRUCE: Again, I’m not going to discuss the details of the decisions made by the President.

Andrea.

QUESTION: That – I’m just saying that was Tulsi Gabbard’s testimony in open session to the committees of – that that was the —

MS BRUCE: Well, yes. And as I’ve noted, today is not that day.

Next. Yes. Yes, sir, in tie and the white shirt.

QUESTION: Thank you, Tammy.

QUESTION: Were you just suggesting that the assessment has changed?

MS BRUCE: Andrea, we’re moving on please. Let’s – please – be able to manage this less —

QUESTION: I’m just trying to get a clarification.

MS BRUCE: Sir, in the back there.

QUESTION: Thank you, Tammy. My question is the other week we were talking about the negotiations between Iran and the U.S., and the President was very optimistic about it. And now drastically everything has changed, and we are talking almost about a full-scale war between Israel and Iran. How do you name the procedure right now? Is – has the negotiations failed or how can we name it?

My second question will be: The Iranian state TV has been targeted by the Israeli air force. How do you see that? Do you see a state TV channel as a legitimate target?

MS BRUCE: Well, you’d have to ask Israel about their decisions when it comes to the choices with what they strike and what they don’t.

QUESTION: Your view about this.

MS BRUCE: And on your first question, which now is already – what was your first question?

QUESTION: My first question: after all this – after these escalations, how do you name the process?

MS BRUCE: Oh, well, I would say that you would look to the President of the United States for how he is characterizing what has occurred. And he is very open and transparent with that and does it with his many conversations with the media and also on Truth Social. He is clearly accessible, certainly with his remarks, and he has said a number of things on social media that I think might answer your question.

Yes, Said.

QUESTION: Thank you. Very quick question on Gaza, can I do that?

MS BRUCE: Of – well, yeah, are we continuing still with —

QUESTION: Well, I also have one on Iran.

MS BRUCE: I will come to you on Gaza, Said, I promise. But let’s continue with the topic at hand. So yes, sir, in the back.

QUESTION: Thank you – thank you so much, Tammy. Two questions. One question on Iraq that relates to Iran. Iranian-backed groups Kata’ib Hizballah threatens the U.S. against interfering in the Israel-Iran conflict, which they say any American intervention in the conflict would prompt the group to target the U.S. interests across the region. Have you reached to the Iraqi Government and what’s your message to these groups?

And the second question: What’s the State Department’s assessment of diplomacy? Have you put diplomacy on a side or are you still believe that they will not seek any war with Iran?

MS BRUCE: Well, again, I’m not going to comment on the nature of how the White House or the President or the DOD will respond to certain remarks or demands made by someone, so you’ll have to ask the DOD regarding their reaction in that regard. I would also, though – I know that the President’s Truth Social, he’s made it very clear even I think today. And I think I’ve got that right here. This is, again, one of the things we have learned about President Trump is that when he tweets, when he speaks, the world watches. And it’s the most clear framework that we can learn of his approach.

He has – I don’t know if I can get to the exact one, but he has made it very clear that – oh, yes, here we go. He has noted that, “[W]e don’t want missiles shot at civilians, or American soldiers. Our patience is wearing thin. Thank you for your attention to this matter!” He is making it clear, I think here, regarding certain choices on the ground that are being made and that what we’ve asked for regularly is – and what he has made clear is that we were not a part of the initiation of this, certainly; we’re not a part of Israel’s attacks on Iran. That I think was made – stated very clearly by both Secretary Rubio and the President. And that’s important for them for people to know. And in this case, of course, the President has made it clear that if Americans are hurt or in this case missiles shot at civilians or American soldiers, that there would be a repercussion. I think that that would not be surprising.

All right. We’ll go – well, more on —

QUESTION: Iran.

MS BRUCE: All right. Iran. We’ll close with you, sir.

QUESTION: Thank you so much. Can you tell us about the role of partner countries in mediation efforts with Iran like Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and UAE? President Trump recently concluded successful trip to the Middle East. What can you tell us about the role of these partner countries?

MS BRUCE: Well, it’s clearly – he went with a goal in mind. He makes deals. He’s the best dealmaker in the world. These partners in the Middle East that we have, they understand clearly our intentions and what our goals are, thankfully, again, to the approach and the style of President Trump. So it’s – I think that when it comes to, again, the best person who could explain his feelings and thoughts about what’s accomplished on any issue is the President himself. So I’d refer you back to what he writes and what he is posting on I think a very regular basis, which is helpful to people like me and I think to the world at large as well.

QUESTION: Despite Israel’s concerns —

MS BRUCE: All right. All right.

QUESTION: Can I have one more? Despite Israel’s concerns, President Trump is still trying to negotiate with Iran for a nuclear deal, showing that his priority is peace in the region. President Trump has once again recently offered to mediate on Kashmir, but the Modi government said that they don’t need Trump’s help. Does President Trump needs Modi permission to bring peace in South Asia by resolving the Kashmir issue?

MS BRUCE: Well, yes, this is – every country, as President Trump has stated, has a right to define its own future. He offers his help, and it’s up to whoever he’s offering it to whether or not they’ll accept it. We live in a fascinating, exciting time where we’ve got a man who can make the difference and he’s generous about making that difference. He could have chosen to have this term be about anything other than peace and making America great again, but he’s stuck with that. He is committed to that. It is part of his overall commitment to the country. So I would not speak to the nature of another country’s decision making. That’s up to them. But I think all of us are grateful that we have a President who is willing to help and wants to help.

Now, you had one more on Iran, and then we’ll go to Said.

QUESTION: Can you confirm a report that the former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been killed in Tehran?

MS BRUCE: I can’t confirm that or report on that or discuss it.

All right, thank you. Said.

QUESTION: Thank you. Very quick question on Gaza.

MS BRUCE: Yes, sir.

QUESTION: In the last 48 hours or the last three days, dozens of Palestinians have been killed at the aid centers and so on. Is – with everybody focused on Iran, does this situation still garner some interest or attention from this building or from the United States of America? And are you urging the Israelis to hold off whatever – the amount of firepower they are firing at these aid seekers?

MS BRUCE: Well, we of course are always saddened to hear reports about any mass casualty situation or shootings. I don’t know who isn’t, no matter what the dynamic. The IDF has said a particular incident is under review, and that is helpful, and we’ll see what their review comes up with. And in the meantime, I think it is important also when it comes to the nature of the efforts to get aid and food to the Gazans, we now know – can report that the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation now is working at four distribution sites and has distributed nearly 26 million meals to date.

So it is, again, a conversation about whether or not the State Department cares. Every day there’s a demonstration, and when we think about the State Department, it’s people. It’s people who’ve committed their lives to a diplomatic life, to a life of foreign service, to a political life to try to make the difference for the world. So we see that manifesting here, and as we also know with today’s events and today’s conversations, there is a reason why we need people like President Trump and the American commitment to peace abroad.

All right. Yes, go ahead.

QUESTION: Yeah. It’s been reported over the weekend that the Secretary (inaudible) – the Secretary – actually, the President —

MS BRUCE: Yes.

QUESTION: — would expand the travel ban to 36 other countries. A lot of them, from what I understand, are in Africa. There’s already 19 countries that are affected by the travel ban to a different extent. Can you share any details, elements you have on this plan?

MS BRUCE: I can speak a little bit about it, not into the detail of what – about the decision making or the process in that regard, but we are of course committed to protecting our nation’s citizens by upholding the highest standards of national security and public safety through our visa process in particular. As laid out in President Trump’s Executive Order 14161, “Protecting the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats,” the visa adjudication process has got to ensure that U.S.-bound foreign travelers do not pose a threat to the national security and public safety of the United States. That is I think a very low bar and is a bar that every nation should be able to adopt.

To protect the national security and national interest of the United States and its people, the Department of State and other U.S. Government agencies assess other countries’ security capabilities, information sharing, and identity management practices; exploitation of the U.S. visa system such as overstay rates; and failure to facilitate the repatriation of their removable nationals. So noting where a country perhaps, as you did, is located, the geoposition – the actual location – of a country is not a factor, or what continent that country is on. These are about very specific aspects about whether or not the United States feels it can trust the information we rely on those countries for to determine whether or not they’ll get a visa. We don’t – we rely on the vetting and the presentation of information from other nations in order to say yes, you can or you can’t come.

In this particular instance, I think that it’s clear as we’re looking at providing a period of time, countries being told if they don’t – they don’t get to that point where we can trust them, then they’ve got to change the system, update it, do whatever they need to do to convince us that we can trust the process and the information they have. So that is the goal of this. The Secretary will have the discretion to determine whether or not someone is on that list as we then also continuously vet the nature of what’s happening within these conversations, and the goal is so that we can all move forward, so that people can come to the country, and that’s our goal.

All right.

QUESTION: A follow-up on that real quick?

QUESTION: (Off-mike.)

MS BRUCE: Yes, sir. Yeah. I don’t know why you’re so far in the back, Michele, but —

QUESTION: I’m far away in the back. I’m sorry. I was —

MS BRUCE: With NPR, yes.

QUESTION: Yes. Just following up on that, there was a deadline given for these 36 countries tomorrow to come up with their action plan. I wonder if you’ve heard back from any of them yet.

MS BRUCE: I – no, that’s – that’s incorrect. I can just tell you that that’s not correct. The fact is, is that they will have a considerable amount of time to rectify whatever the situation is that the State Department is determined is affecting the nature of our trust in how we issue a visa.

All right, yes, and we’ll take —

QUESTION: Yes, please.

MS BRUCE: Yes, sir, with the beard there. Yes.

QUESTION: Thank you. Has the United States —

MS BRUCE: Can you tell me your name, sir, and your outlet?

QUESTION: Mostafa Abdou, Shafaq News.

MS BRUCE: Okay. Welcome aboard.

QUESTION: Thank you. Has the United States received any official request from Baghdad to help prevent Israeli overflights in Iraqi airspace? And what is Washington’s response to such a request?

MS BRUCE: Again, you would need to speak to the Department of Defense and the White House regarding that. I won’t speak to the details of conversations, certainly, about anything of that matter involving any country, and I think that will be it for today as we return.

Thank you all for your patience, and I expect to see you again later in the week.

Thank you very much, everyone.

QUESTION: Thank you.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MS BRUCE: Thank you. Appreciate it.

(The briefing was concluded at 2:58 p.m.)

# # #

Designations of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) expose and isolate the designated terrorist organizations, deny them access to the U.S. financial system, and create significant criminal and immigration consequences for their members and supporters. Moreover, designations can assist or complement the law enforcement actions of other U.S. agencies and governments. Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) mandates that the Department of State review FTO designations every five years to determine whether an FTO still meets the relevant criteria. The law requires that the Secretary of State revoke a designation if the Secretary finds that the circumstances that were the basis of the designation have changed in such a manner as to warrant a revocation.

In 2022 following a thorough review, the Department of State revoked the FTO designations of Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), Aum Shinrikyo, Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC), Kahane Chai, and Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG). Revocation of these designations does not affect any prior law enforcement actions related to the groups’ past terrorist activities and does not allow any former members admissibility into the United States.

Legal Criteria for Designation Under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act as Amended

It must be a foreign organization. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)), or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)), or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism. The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.

U.S. Government-Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations in 2022

AFRICA Ansar al-Dine AAD Boko Haram BH ISIS-Democratic Republic of the Congo ISIS-DRC ISIS in the Greater Sahara ISIS-GS ISIS-Mozambique ISIS-M ISIS-West Africa ISIS-WA Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin JNIM Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan Ansaru al-Murabitoun al-Shabaab AS al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb AQIM EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC Abu Sayyaf Group ASG Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army CPP/NPA ISIS-Philippines ISIS-P Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid JAT Jemaah Islamiya JI EUROPE Continuity Irish Republican Army CIRA Real IRA RIRA Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front DHKP/C Revolutionary Struggle RS THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA Abdallah Azzam Brigades AAB al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade AAMB al-Ashtar Brigades AAB al-Nusrah Front ANF al-Qa’ida AQ al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula AQAP Ansar al-Islam AAI Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi AAS-B Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah AAS-D Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia AAS-T Army of Islam AOI Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq AAH Asbat al-Ansar AAA Hamas Harakat Sawa’d Misr HASM Hizballah Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps IRGC Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Libya ISIL-Libya ISIS-Sinai Province ISIS-SP Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi JRTN Kata’ib Hizballah KH Kurdistan Workers’ Party PKK Palestine Islamic Jihad PIJ Palestine Liberation Front-Abu Abbas Faction PLF Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command PFLP-GC SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent AQIS Haqqani Network HQN Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami HUJI Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh HUJI-B Harakat ul-Mujahideen HUM Hizbul Mujahideen HM Indian Mujahedeen IM Islamic Jihad Union IJU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan IMU ISIS-Bangladesh Islamic State’s Khorasan Province ISIS-K Jaish-e-Mohammed JeM Jaysh al-Adl Lashkar e-Tayyiba LeT Lashkar i Jhangvi LJ Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam LTTE Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan TTP WESTERN HEMISPHERE National Liberation Army ELN Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army FARC-EP Segunda Marquetalia Shining Path SL

AFRICA

Ansar al-Dine

Aka Ansar Dine; Ansar al-Din; Ancar Dine; Ansar ul-Din; Ansar Eddine; Defenders of the Faith.

Description: Ansar al-Dine (AAD) is now a component of JNIM. The group was designated as an FTO on March 22, 2013. AAD was created in 2011 after its leader Iyad ag Ghali failed in his attempt to take over another secular Tuareg organization. Following the 2012 coup that toppled the Malian government, AAD was among the organizations (which also included al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb [AQIM] and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa) to take over northern Mali, destroy UNESCO World Heritage Sites, and enforce a severe interpretation of Sharia on the civilian population living in the areas under its control.

Beginning in 2013, French and allied African forces conducted operations in northern Mali to counter AAD and other terrorist groups, eventually forcing AAD and its allies out of the population centers they had seized. Ghali, however, remained free and appeared in AAD videos in 2015 and 2016 threatening France and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

In 2017 the Sahara Branch of AQIM, AAD, al-Murabitoun, and the Macina Liberation Front came together to form Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).

Activities: In 2012, AAD received backing from AQIM in its fight against the Government of Mali, including for its capture of the Malian towns of Agulhok, Gao, Kidal, Tessalit, and Timbuktu. In 2013, AAD members were reportedly among the Tuareg rebels responsible for killing 82 Malian soldiers and kidnapping 30 others in an attack against Agulhok. Before the French intervention in 2013, Malian citizens in towns under AAD’s control allegedly faced harassment, torture, and death if they refused to comply with the group’s laws.

AAD was severely weakened by the 2013 French intervention, but it increased its activities between 2015 and 2017, conducting multiple attacks against UN, French, and Malian forces.

AAD did not separately claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Mali.

Funding and External Aid: AAD cooperates closely with and has received support from AQIM since its inception. AAD also is said to receive funds from foreign donors and through smuggling operations.

Boko Haram

Aka Nigerian Taliban; Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad; Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad; People Committed to the Prophet’s Teachings for Propagation and Jihad; Sunni Group for Preaching and Jihad.

Description: Boko Haram (BH) was designated as an FTO on November 14, 2013. The Nigeria-based group is responsible for numerous attacks in the northern and northeastern regions of the country as well as in the Lake Chad Basin in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger that have killed thousands of people since 2009.

In 2015, BH pledged allegiance to ISIS in an audiotape message. ISIS accepted the pledge, and BH began calling itself ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA). In 2016, ISIS announced that Abu Musab al-Barnawi was to replace Abubakar Shekau as the new leader of the group. Infighting then led BH to split. Shekau maintained a group of followers and affiliates concentrated primarily in the Sambisa Forest; this faction became known as BH, while al-Barnawi’s group separated and was designated as ISIS-WA. On May 19, 2021, Shekau was reportedly killed during a clash with ISIS-WA.

Activities: BH crosses porous Lake Chad-region borders to target civilians and military personnel in northeast Nigeria, the Far North Region of Cameroon, and parts of Chad and Niger. The group continued to evade pressure from Lake Chad country forces, including through the regional Multinational Joint Task Force.

In 2014, BH kidnapped 276 female students from a secondary school in Chibok, Borno State. Since then, BH has continued to abduct women and girls, some of whom are subjected to domestic servitude, other forms of forced labor, and sexual servitude, including through forced marriages to its members. Others have been ordered to carry out suicide attacks on civilians.

In 2020, suspected BH fighters attacked trucks carrying passengers along a military checkpoint in Nigeria, attacked villages in northeast Nigeria and killed hundreds of people, and claimed responsibility for the abduction of more than 330 students from an all-boys school in Nigeria’s northern Katsina State. In 2021, suspected BH fighters launched rocket-propelled grenades into densely populated areas from the outskirts of Maiduguri, Nigeria, killing at least 10 people; and hundreds of BH fighters attacked a military post in southern Niger, killing at least 16 soldiers.

In January, BH claimed responsibility for an attack on a village in northeast Nigeria and reportedly abducted 17 girls. In May, BH fighters reportedly killed at least 50 people around the town of Rann in Nigeria’s Borno State. In November, BH attacked an army position in western Chad, killing at least 10 Chadian soldiers.

Strength: BH is estimated to have several thousand fighters.

Location/Area of Operation: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria.

Funding and External Aid: BH largely self-finances through criminal activities such as looting, extortion, kidnapping for ransom, and bank robberies.

ISIS-Democratic Republic of the Congo

Aka ISIS-DRC; Allied Democratic Forces, Madina at Tauheed Wau Mujahedeen; City of Monotheism and Holy Warriors; Islamic State Central Africa Province; Wilayat Central Africa; Wilayah Central Africa Media Office; Wilayat Wasat Ifriqiyah; ISIS-Central Africa.

Description: ISIS-Democratic Republic of the Congo (ISIS-DRC) was designated as an FTO on March 11, 2021. ISIS publicly recognized the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) as an affiliate in late 2018 and claimed responsibility for ADF-attributed attacks starting in 2019 after an attack on an Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo base near Kamango. ISIS-DRC is responsible for many attacks across North Kivu and Ituri Provinces in eastern DRC. Under the leadership of Seka Musa Baluku, ISIS-DRC has been notorious in this region for its brutal violence against Congolese citizens and regional military forces.

Activities: In 2020, ISIS-DRC attacked the villages of Kamwiri, Kitsimba, and Lisasa in Beni, North Kivu Province, killing 21 people, abducting 20 others, and desecrating the Catholic Church in Lisasa. In 2021, ISIS-DRC attacked displacement camps near the towns of Boga and Tchabi in Ituri Province, killing 57 people and abducting 25 others. Also in 2021, ISIS-DRC conducted simultaneous suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda, that killed three persons and wounded 33 others.

In 2022, ISIS-DRC claimed responsibility for a bomb attack during a service at a Protestant church in Kasindi, North Kivu Province, killing at least 10 people and wounding 39 others. Also in 2022, ISIS-DRC reportedly attacked several villages in Beni, killing 26 people and abducting 12 others.

Strength: ISIS-DRC has between 500 to 1500 members.

Location/Area of Operation: Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Funding and External Aid: Although ISIS-DRC’s sources of funding remain largely unknown, the group probably does receive some support from ISIS. The group has seized weapons and ammunition from the Congolese military.

ISIS in the Greater Sahara

Aka ISIS-GS; Islamic State in the Greater Sahara; Islamic State of the Greater Sahel; ISIS in the Greater Sahel; ISIS-Sahel.

Description: ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) was designated as an FTO on May 23, 2018. ISIS-GS emerged when leader Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi and his followers split from al-Murabitoun. Al-Sahrawi first pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2015, which was acknowledged by ISIS in 2016. In 2022, ISIS-GS was elevated to a formal ISIS branch and changed its name to ISIS-Sahel (aka ISIS-Sahel Province).

Activities: Since 2017, ISIS-GS has been involved in numerous skirmishes and attacks in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, including the 2017 attack on a joint U.S.-Nigerien patrol that killed four U.S. soldiers and five Nigerien soldiers, as well as other attacks targeting or killing French, Malian, Nigerien, and Burkinabe soldiers and civilians. In 2020, ISIS-GS militants attacked a Nigerien military base on the border between Niger and Mali, killing 89 soldiers, and were suspected of killing 6 French NGO workers, their Nigerien guide and 1 other Nigerien citizen near Niamey, Niger. In 2021, French forces killed ISIS-GS leader Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi in southern Mali.

In September, ISIS-GS launched an attack on a northern Malian town that killed dozens of civilians. In the same month, ISIS-GS claimed responsibility for two attacks in northern Benin in July that killed six soldiers. In August, ISIS-GS was suspected of being responsible for an attack in central Mali that killed 42 soldiers.

Strength: ISIS-GS is estimated to have 400 to 1,000 fighters.

Location/Area of Operation: Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and to a lesser extent Benin.

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

ISIS-Mozambique

Aka Ansar al-Sunna; Helpers of Tradition; Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa; Adherents to the Traditions and the Community; al-Shabaab in Mozambique; Islamic State Central Africa province; Wilayah Central Africa; Ansaar Kalimat Allah; Supporters of the Word of Allah.

Description: ISIS-Mozambique was designated as an FTO on March 10, 2021. ISIS-Mozambique reportedly pledged allegiance to ISIS as early as 2018 and was acknowledged by ISIS as an affiliate in 2019. Since 2017, ISIS-Mozambique, led by Abu Yasir Hassan, has killed more than 1,300 civilians, and it is estimated that the terrorist group has killed more than 2,300 civilians, security force members, and suspected ISIS-Mozambique militants since it began its violent extremist insurgency.

Activities: In 2020, ISIS-Mozambique captured the strategic port of Mocímboa da Praia, Cabo Delgado Province, killing at least 55 soldiers. In 2021, ISIS-Mozambique attacked the town of Palma for four days, killing dozens of local civilians and foreign expatriate workers and looting about $1 million from banks. In 2022, ISIS-Mozambique attacked a Catholic mission in Chipene, killing an Italian nun and burning down several buildings. Also in 2022, ISIS-Mozambique fighters dressed in Mozambique Defense Armed Forces uniforms attacked multiple villages in Ancuabe District, killing at least four civilians.

Strength: ISIS-Mozambique is estimated to have up to 1,200 fighters.

Location/Area of Operation: Mozambique.

Funding and External Aid: Although sources of funding remain unclear, the group has targeted banks in previous operations. In addition, the group has taken control of food supplies in areas under its control and has captured weapons from government security forces.

ISIS-West Africa

Aka Islamic State West Africa Province; ISISWAP; Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-West Africa; ISIL-WA; Islamic State of Iraq and Syria West Africa Province; ISIS West Africa Province; ISIS West Africa; ISIS-WA.

Description: ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA) was designated as an FTO on February 28, 2018. In 2015 a faction of Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS in an audiotape message. ISIS accepted the group’s pledge, and the group began calling itself ISIS-West Africa. In 2016, ISIS announced that Abu Musab al-Barnawi was to become the new leader of ISIS-WA.

Activities: Since 2016, ISIS-WA has been responsible for numerous attacks in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region, including ones against Nigerian and Chadian military and security personnel. ISIS-WA has also attacked humanitarian aid workers, local officials, critical infrastructure, and other civilians including executing 11 reported Christians in 2019. ISIS-WA claimed the executions were revenge for the killing of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

In February, ISIS-WA claimed responsibility for several attacks in northeast Nigeria that killed or wounded at least 30 Nigerian soldiers. In May, ISIS-WA killed 30 civilians in northeast Nigeria in response to military air strikes that killed several ISIS-WA commanders. In July, ISIS-WA claimed responsibility for an attack on the Kuje prison in Nigeria that killed at least one guard and freed more than 800 inmates. In the same month, ISIS-WA fighters ambushed the convoy of a local official in northeast Nigeria, killing four persons. In October, ISIS-WA fighters attacked an army base in central Nigeria but were repelled.

Strength: ISIS-WA is estimated to have between 4,000 and 5,000 active fighters.

Location/Area of Operation: Nigeria and the greater Lake Chad region.

Funding and External Aid: ISIS-WA receives funding from local sources, taxes, the capture of military supplies, and kidnapping-for-ransom payments.

Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin

Aka Jamaat Nosrat al-Islam wal-Mouslimin; Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims; Group to Support Islam and Muslims; GSIM; GNIM; Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen.

Description: Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) was designated as an FTO on September 6, 2018. JNIM has described itself as al-Qa’ida’s official branch in Mali and has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks and kidnappings since its 2017 formation. That year the Sahara Branch of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Murabitoun, Ansar al-Dine, and the Macina Liberation Front came together to form JNIM. JNIM is led by Iyad ag Ghali. Multiple JNIM senior leaders have been killed in recent years, including JNIM’s former second in command, Ali Maychou, in 2019, senior JNIM commander Bah Ag Moussa in 2020, and senior leader Abdallaye Ag Albaka in 2021.

Activities: Since its formation in 2017, JNIM has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks, including a suicide attack against an African Defeat-ISIS Coalition base in Mali and a truck bomb in a residential complex in 2018; an attack against a UN base in northern Mali in 2019; attacks against Malian security and military personnel in 2020; and attacks against UN peacekeepers and Malian soldiers, as well as the abduction of a French reporter working in Mali in 2021.

In May, JNIM claimed responsibility for an attack on a Togolese military base that killed eight soldiers and wounded 13 others. In July, JNIM claimed responsibility for an attack on Mali’s main military base that killed at least one soldier and wounded six others. In October, JNIM claimed responsibility for an attack on a convoy in Burkina Faso that killed more than a dozen soldiers. In November, JNIM claimed responsibility for an attack on Togolese forces near the border of Benin and Burkina Faso that killed at least 17 soldiers.

Strength: JNIM is estimated to have about 2,000 fighters.

Location/Area of Operation: Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Togo, and Niger

Funding and External Aid: JNIM receives funding through kidnapping for ransom and extortion and from smugglers and traffickers who pay a tax in exchange for permission and safe transit through JNIM-controlled trafficking routes in Mali.

Jama’atu Ansarul Muslima Fi Biladis-Sudan

Aka Ansaru; Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan; Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa; JAMBS; Jama’atu Ansaril Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan.

Description: Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Ansaru) was designated as an FTO on November 14, 2013. Ansaru publicly splintered from Boko Haram (BH) in 2012. Since its inception, Ansaru has targeted civilians, including westerners, and Nigerian government and security officials. Ansaru purportedly aims to defend Muslims throughout Africa by fighting against the Nigerian government and international interests. Ansaru claims to identify with BH’s objectives and struggle, but it has criticized the group for killing fellow Muslims.

Activities: Since splintering from BH, Ansaru has kidnapped several civilians including a French engineer allegedly in response to French involvement in Mali in 2012 and seven international construction workers who were subsequently killed in 2013. In 2020, Ansaru claimed responsibility for attacking the convoy of the Emir of Potiskum in northern Nigeria, killing at least 30 Nigerian soldiers.

In January, Ansaru reconfirmed its allegiance to AQIM in a statement released online. Ansaru is suspected of having participated in an attack on a Nigerian passenger train in March from which more than 60 passengers were taken hostage. Ansaru also is suspected to have been behind an attack on a military base in Nigeria in April, which killed 17 soldiers and wounded 40 others. In July, Ansaru participated in an attack on the Kuje prison in Nigeria, killing at least one guard and freeing more than 800 inmates, including Ansaru leader Khalid al-Barnawi, and six of his close lieutenants. Al-Barnawi was originally captured by the Nigerian Army in 2016.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown; however, given its narrower scope of operations, Ansaru’s membership is estimated to be much smaller than that of Boko Haram.

Location/Area of Operation: Nigeria.

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

Al-Murabitoun

Aka al-Mulathamun Battalion; al-Mulathamun Brigade; al-Muwaqqi’un bil-Dima; Those Signed in Blood Battalion; Signatories in Blood; Those Who Sign in Blood; Witnesses in Blood; Signed-in-Blood Battalion; Masked Men Brigade; Khaled Abu al-Abbas Brigade; al-Mulathamun Masked Ones Brigade; the Sentinels.

Description: Al-Murabitoun is now a component of JNIM and was designated as an FTO on December 19, 2013, originally under the name al-Mulathamun Battalion. Al-Murabitoun was originally part of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) but became a separate organization in 2012 after its leader, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, split from AQIM. After the split, Belmokhtar threatened to fight against western interests and announced the creation of the al-Mulathamun Battalion. In 2013 the al-Mulathamun Battalion and the Mali-based Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (known as MUJAO) announced that the two organizations would merge under the name “al-Murabitoun.” In 2015, al-Murabitoun announced a re-merger with AQIM. In 2017 the Sahara Branch of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Murabitoun, Ansar al-Dine, and the Macina Liberation Front came together to form Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).

Activities: Since 2013, al-Murabitoun has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks involving civilians, including an attack against a gas facility in southeastern Algeria where more than 800 people were taken hostage during the four-day siege, resulting in the deaths of 39 civilians, including three U.S. citizens; and an attack at the La Terrasse restaurant in Bamako, Mali, that that killed a French national, a Belgian national, and three Malians in 2015. Al-Murabitoun also has been involved in attacks against military personnel, claiming responsibility for a 2017 suicide car bombing at a military camp in Mali that killed more than 47 people and fighting against French forces in Mali in 2018.

Between 2015 and 2016, al-Murabitoun was involved in a series of hotel attacks, claiming responsibility for a hotel siege in central Mali and participating in the strike against the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako in 2015. More than 170 people, including U.S. citizens, were taken hostage in the Radisson attack and at least 26 people were killed, among them a U.S. international development worker. Al-Murabitoun reportedly also was involved in the 2016 AQIM attack on a hotel in Burkina Faso that killed nearly 30, including a U.S. citizen.

In December, Fawaz Ould Ahmed was extradited to the United States to face charges including the murder of a U.S. citizen and conspiracy to provide material support to AQIM and al-Murabitoun. Ahmed admitted to a Malian court in 2020 to carrying out the La Terrasse restaurant attack and planning hotel attacks including the Raddison Blu Hotel attack in 2015. Al-Murabitoun did not separately claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, and Niger.

Funding and External Aid: In addition to the support it may receive through its connections to other terrorist organizations in the region, al-Murabitoun is likely funded through kidnapping for ransom and other criminal activities.

Al-Shabaab

Aka Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin; al-Shabab; Shabaab; Youth Wing; Mujahidin al-Shabaab Movement; Mujahideen Youth Movement; Mujahidin Youth Movement; al-Hijra; al Hijra; Muslim Youth Center; the Youth; MYC MYM; Pumwani Muslim Youth; Pumwani Islamist Muslim Youth Center; Hizbul Shabaab; Hisb’ul Shabaab; al-Shabaab al-Islamiya; al-Shabaab al-Islaam; al-Shabaab al-Jihaad; the Unity of Islamic Youth; Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin; Harakatul-Shabaab al Mujaahidiin; Mujaahidiin Youth Movement.

Description: Al-Shabaab was designated as an FTO on March 18, 2008. Al-Shabaab pledged allegiance to al-Qa’ida in 2012 and has ties to other al-Qa’ida affiliates, including al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb. Al-Shabaab formed originally as the militant wing of the former Somali Islamic Courts Council that took over parts of southern Somalia during the second half of 2006. Since the end of 2006, al-Shabaab and associated militias have engaged in violent insurgency using guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics against the transitional governments of Somalia.

Composed of Somali recruits and foreign terrorist fighters, al-Shabaab since 2011 has seen its military capacity and territorial control reduced owing to the efforts of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS; formerly African Union Mission in Somalia [AMISOM]) and Somali forces and to clashes within the group itself. Despite al-Shabaab’s loss of urban centers since 2012, the group has maintained its hold on large sections of rural areas throughout Somalia and has conducted attacks in Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, and Uganda.

Activities: Al-Shabaab has used intimidation and violence to exploit divisions in Somalia and undermine the Somali government, recruit new fighters, extort funding from local populations, and kill activists working to bring about peace through political dialogue. Al-Shabaab has murdered numerous civil society figures, government officials, journalists, international aid workers, and members of non-governmental organizations.

The group has claimed responsibility for numerous high-profile bombings and shootings throughout East Africa against civilians, AMISOM troops and other foreign forces, and Somali officials, including suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda, in 2010 — its first attacks outside of Somalia, killing 76 people, including a U.S. citizen. Other attacks include the 2013 multiday siege against the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, resulting in the deaths of at least 65 civilians, including foreign nationals from 13 countries as well as six soldiers and police officers; the 2015 raid on Kenya’s Garissa University College that killed 148 people; the 2016 attack against a Kenyan AMISOM base that killed more than 100 soldiers, one of the deadliest attacks against AMISOM troops in Somalia; the 2020 attack against U.S. and Kenyan personnel at the Manda Bay Airfield in Kenya, killing three U.S. citizens; and several attacks and bombings against civilians, as well as security and military personnel in 2021.

In 2022, al-Shabaab detonated two car bombs at a busy market intersection near the Ministry of Education in Mogadishu, killing at least 121 people and wounding at least 300. Al-Shabaab also continued to expand its cross-border attacks in 2022, sending hundreds of militants to infiltrate the Ethiopian border, killing 17 people including several Ethiopian soldiers.

Strength: Al-Shabaab is estimated to have between 7,000 and 12,000 members.

Location/Area of Operation: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Uganda.

Funding and External Aid: Al-Shabaab receives and generates enough income to launch attacks throughout East Africa, including against ATMIS bases and other civilian targets. Al-Shabaab obtains funds through illegal charcoal production and exports, “taxation” of local populations and businesses, and by means of remittances and other money transfers from the Somali diaspora (although these funds are not always intended to support al-Shabaab members).

Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb

Aka AQIM; GSPC; Le Groupe Salafiste Pour la Predication et le Combat; Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat; Salafist Group for Call and Combat; Tanzim al-Qa’ida fi Bilad al-Maghrib al-Islamiya.

Description: The Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) was designated as an FTO on March 27, 2002. The Department of State amended the GSPC designation in 2008, after the GSPC officially joined with al-Qa’ida in 2006 and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) became the primary name of the group. Although AQIM remains largely a regionally focused terrorist group, it has adopted a more anti-western rhetoric and ideology. The group aspires to overthrow “apostate” African regimes and create an Islamic state. Following the death of AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel, killed in 2020 by French forces, the group chose Abu Obaida Yusuf al-Annabi as Droukdel’s successor.

Activities: Since becoming an al-Qa’ida affiliate, AQIM has claimed responsibility for or was involved in numerous high-profile attacks including the 2007 bombing of the UN headquarters building and an Algerian government building in Algiers that killed 60 people. Terrorists with ties to AQIM were involved in the 2012 attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi that killed U.S. Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens and three other embassy staff members. AQIM also participated in a 2015 attack against the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, Mali. More than 170 people, including U.S. citizens, were taken hostage in the Radisson attack, and at least 26 people were killed, among them a U.S. international development worker.

Between 2016 and 2020, AQIM carried out several attacks against civilians, as well as security and military personnel, including 2016 attacks on a hotel in Burkina Faso that killed 28 people and a popular tourist beach resort in Côte d’Ivoire that killed more than 16 people; a 2018 vehicle suicide attack on an army patrol in Gao that killed four civilians and wounded 31 others, including four French soldiers; and a 2019 attack on a UN camp in northern Mali, killing 10 Peacekeepers and wounding 25 others.

In February 2022, French forces killed Yahia Djouadi, a senior AQIM official responsible for finance and logistics, in Mali. AQIM did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: AQIM has an estimated 1,000 fighters operating in the Sahel, including Algeria, northern Mali, southwest Libya, and Niger.

Location/Area of Operation: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Libya, Mali, Niger, and Tunisia

Funding and External Aid: AQIM members engage in kidnapping for ransom and other criminal activities to finance their operations. AQIM also successfully fundraises globally and receives limited financial and logistical assistance from supporters residing in Western Europe.

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Abu Sayyaf Group

Aka al Harakat al Islamiyya (the Islamic Movement).

Description: The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. ASG split from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the early 1990s and is one of the most violent terrorist groups in the Philippines. The group claims to promote an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. In 2014, an ASG faction pledged allegiance to ISIS and later formed ISIS’s Philippines branch in 2016.

Activities: Since 2015, ASG has committed kidnappings for ransom (KFR), bombings, ambushes of security personnel, public beheadings, assassinations, and extortion, including KFR operations targeting Canadian, Philippine, German, and Norwegian citizens in 2016 and 2017; a 2018 car bombing at a military checkpoint on Basilan Island, Philippines, killing 10 people, including a Philippine soldier and pro-government militiamen; and the 2019 kidnapping of two British nationals from a beach resort in the Zamboanga Peninsula region.

In 2021, Philippine authorities arrested several ASG members, including an ASG member involved in the abduction of two Canadians who were killed in 2016, an ASG bomb expert linked to the 2019 Jolo cathedral bombings, as well as an ASG member involved in a 2001 kidnapping on Basilan.

In January, ASG killed one Philippine soldier and wounded two in an attack on a Philippine Army truck.

Strength: ASG is assessed to have fewer than 200 armed fighters.

Location/Area of Operation: Philippines and Malaysia.

Funding and External Aid: ASG is funded primarily through its KFR operations and extortion. The group may also receive funding from external sources, including remittances from overseas Philippine workers and Middle East-based sympathizers. In the past, ASG also has received training and other assistance from regional terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiya.

Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army

Aka CPP/NPA; Communist Party of the Philippines; CPP; New People’s Army; NPA; NPP/CPP.

Description: The Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) was designated as an FTO on August 9, 2002. The military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) — the New People’s Army (NPA) — is a Maoist group formed in 1969 with the aim of overthrowing the government through protracted guerrilla warfare. Although primarily a rural-based guerrilla group, the CPP/NPA has an active urban infrastructure to support its terrorist activities and, at times, has used city-based assassination squads. In December the CPP/NPA’s founder, Jose Maria Sison, who reportedly directed CPP/NPA activity from the Netherlands, died in a hospital in Utrecht.

Activities: The CPP/NPA primarily targets Philippine security forces, government officials, local infrastructure, and businesses that refuse to pay extortion or “revolutionary taxes.” The CPP/NPA also has a history of attacking U.S. interests in the Philippines, including four separate 1987 attacks in Angeles that killed three U.S. soldiers, and claimed responsibility for the 1989 ambush and murder of Col. James Nicholas Rowe, chief of the Army division of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group.

Throughout 2016 and 2017, several attempts were made to establish a cease-fire and peace deal between the CPP/NPA and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Peace efforts ended in 2017 after reported violations, including reports of the CPP/NPA’s continued recruitment in the Philippines and attacks against government forces and civilians. In subsequent years, the CPP/NPA has continued to carry out killings, raids, kidnappings, acts of extortion, and other forms of violence primarily directed against Philippine security forces.

In December the CPP/NPA ambushed and wounded two civilians in a convoy of Philippine Army soldiers and civilians engaged in a preemptive evacuation because of Super Typhoon Odette.

Strength: The Philippine government estimates that the CPP/NPA has about 4,000 members. The group also retains a significant amount of support from communities in rural areas of the Philippines.

Location/Area of Operation: Philippines.

Funding and External Aid: The CPP/NPA raises funds through extortion and theft.

ISIS-Philippines

Aka ISIS in the Philippines; ISIL Philippines; ISIL in the Philippines; IS Philippines; ISP; Islamic State in the Philippines; Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in South-East Asia; Dawlatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masrik, DIWM; Dawlatul Islamiyyah Waliyatul Mashriq; IS East Asia Division; ISIS Branch in the Philippines; ISIS’ “Philippines province”; ISIS-East Asia.

Description: ISIS-Philippines (ISIS-P) was designated as an FTO on February 28, 2018. In 2014 a faction of ASG militants under the command of now-deceased leader Isnilon Hapilon pledged allegiance to ISIS and later formed the ISIS branch in 2016. Some Abu Sayyaf Group factions have been reported to interact and coordinate with ISIS-P, including participating in attacks that are claimed by ISIS in the Sulu archipelago.

Activities: Since 2016, ISIS-P has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against Philippine security forces, including 2017 fighting in Marawi that claimed more than 1,000 lives and forced more than 300,000 residents to flee the area; a 2018 suicide bomb attack on a military checkpoint in Basilan that killed at least 11 people; and several attacks in 2021.

ISIS-P also has claimed responsibility for attacks targeting civilians, including the 2019 Jolo cathedral bombing in Sulu, a complex suicide attack carried out by an Indonesian couple during mass, killing 23 people and wounding more than 100 others; and twin suicide bomb attacks in the Sulu province in 2020 that killed more than a dozen people and injured more than 70 others. In 2021, Philippine authorities arrested several ASG members, including an ASG bomb expert linked to the Jolo cathedral bombings. In November, ISIS-P was suspected of bombing a passenger bus in the southern Philippines that killed one and wounded 11.

Strength: ISIS-P is estimated to have a small cadre of fighters in the southern Philippines, but exact numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Philippines.

Funding and External Aid: ISIS-P receives some financial assistance from ISIS-core but relies mostly on criminal activities such as kidnappings for ransom and extortion. It maintains training camps in remote areas under its control and acquires weapons through smuggling and captured or black-market purchases of arms from the Philippine military.

Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid

Aka JAT; Jemmah Ansharut Tauhid; Jem’mah Ansharut Tauhid; Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid; Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid; Laskar 99.

Description: Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) was designated as an FTO on March 13, 2012. Formed in 2008, the Indonesia-based group seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia and has carried out numerous attacks on Indonesian government personnel, police, military, and civilians. In 2011, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the founder and leader of JAT, was sentenced to 15 years in prison for his role in organizing a militant training camp in Aceh, Indonesia. Ba’asyir is also the co-founder and former leader of Jemaah Islamiya (JI). JAT fractured when Ba’asyir pledged the group’s allegiance to ISIS in 2014. Some members who disagreed with the group’s realignment left to form Jemaah Anshorut Syariah, while most members joined various ISIS-inspired groups, including Jemaah Anshorut Daulah and Mujahidin Indonesia Timur.

Activities: JAT has conducted multiple attacks targeting civilians and Indonesian officials, resulting in the deaths of numerous Indonesian police and innocent civilians. In 2012, four police officers were killed and two wounded in an attack by suspected local JAT members in central Sulawesi. JAT has not claimed responsibility for any attacks since at least 2014. Former JAT members have been involved in ISIS-inspired attacks in Indonesia.

Strength: JAT is estimated to have fewer than 1,000 former members scattered among various other Indonesia-based groups.

Location/Area of Operation: Indonesia.

Funding and External Aid: JAT has raised funds through membership donations and legitimate business activities. JAT also has conducted cyber hacking, robbed banks, and carried out other illicit activities to fund the purchase of assault weapons, ammunition, explosives, and bomb making materials.

Jemaah Islamiya

Aka Jemaa Islamiya; Jema’a Islamiyah; Jemaa Islamiyya; Jema’a Islamiyya; Jemaa Islamiyyah; Jema’a Islamiyyah; Jemaah Islamiah; Jemaah Islamiyah; Jema’ah Islamiyah; Jemaah Islamiyyah; Jema’ah Islamiyyah; JI.

Description: Jemaah Islamiya (JI) was designated as an FTO on October 23, 2002. JI is a Southeast Asia-based terrorist group co-founded by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. The group seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate in the region.

Activities: Since 2002, JI has conducted numerous significant JI attacks, including the 2002 Bali bombings that killed more than 200 people, among them seven U.S. citizens; the 2003 bombing of the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta; the 2004 bombing outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta; the 2005 suicide bombing in Bali that killed 26 people; and the 2009 suicide attacks on the J.W. Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta, where a JI faction claimed responsibility, that killed seven persons and injured more than 50, including seven U.S. citizens. JI has kept to a self-imposed moratorium on attacks since 2009.

More than 400 JI operatives have been captured or killed since 2002, including its emir, Para Wijayanto, who was arrested in 2019. Indonesian police said that between 2013 and 2018, under Wijayanto’s leadership, JI sent at least six groups of individuals to Syria for military training or to participate in the fighting. In 2020, Indonesian authorities arrested a JI leader, Aris Sumarsono, who is suspected of being involved in the making of bombs used in the 2002 Bali bombings and the 2003 bombing of the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta. In 2021, Indonesian authorities sentenced JI member Taufiq Bulaga to life in prison after finding him guilty for his role in making bombs for a 2005 Bali bombing.

In 2021, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, JI’s leader at the time of his arrest in 2002, was released from prison after serving more than two thirds of a 15-year sentence for helping establish a terrorist training camp. In December, one of the 2002 Bali bombers, Umar Patek, was released from an Indonesian prison on parole.

Strength: Estimates of JI membership vary from 500 to several thousand members.

Location/Area of Operation: Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

Funding and External Aid: JI has raised funds through membership donations, criminal actions, and business activities. The group has received financial, ideological, and logistical support from Middle Eastern contacts and illegitimate charities and organizations.

EUROPE

Continuity Irish Republican Army

Aka CIRA; Continuity Army Council; Continuity IRA; Republican Sinn Fein.

Description: Designated as an FTO on July 13, 2004, the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) is a terrorist splinter group that became operational in 1986 as the clandestine armed wing of Republican Sinn Fein, following its split from Sinn Fein. “Continuity” refers to the group’s belief that it is carrying on the original goal of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), to force the British out of Northern Ireland. CIRA cooperates with the Real IRA (RIRA).

Activities: CIRA has been active in Belfast and the border areas of Northern Ireland, where it has carried out bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, extortion operations, and robberies. On occasion, it has provided advance warning to police of its attacks. Targets have included the British military, Northern Ireland security forces, and Loyalist paramilitary groups.

In 2019, CIRA members conducted an attack on the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), setting off a bomb near the border of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Also in 2019, CIRA claimed responsibility for a grenade attack in west Belfast on a PSNI vehicle. In 2020, CIRA claimed responsibility for attaching an IED to a truck destined for an unknown location in England; CIRA had allegedly planned for the bomb to go off on the day the United Kingdom left the European Union. In 2021, CIRA claimed responsibility for an attack on a police station in Fermanagh County, Northern Ireland. CIRA did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: CIRA’s membership is small, with possibly fewer than 50 members.

Location/Area of Operation: United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland.

Funding and External Aid: CIRA supports its activities through criminal activities, including smuggling.

Real IRA

Aka RIRA; Real Irish Republican Army; 32 County Sovereignty Committee; 32 County Sovereignty Movement; Irish Republican Prisoners Welfare Association; Real Oglaigh na hEireann.

Description: Description: The Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) was designated as an FTO on May 16, 2001. The group was formed in 1997 as the clandestine armed wing of the 32 County Sovereignty Movement, a “political pressure group” dedicated to removing British forces from Northern Ireland and unifying Ireland. The RIRA has historically sought to disrupt the Northern Ireland peace process and did not participate in the 2005 weapons decommissioning. Despite internal rifts and calls by some jailed members (including the group’s founder Michael “Mickey” McKevitt) for a cease-fire and disbandment, the RIRA has pledged additional violence and continued to conduct attacks. Many RIRA members are former Provisional Irish Republican Army members who left the organization after the group renewed its cease-fire in 1997. These members brought extensive experience in terrorist tactics and bomb making to the group. In June 2023, the Department of State amended its FTO designations of RIRA to reflect additional aliases including New IRA as its primary name. Although this amendment occurred outside of the reporting period for this report, it is included to highlight claimed activity under its new primary name through 2022.

Activities: Targets have included civilians (the most notorious example is the Omagh bombing in 1998), British security forces, and police officers in Northern Ireland. The Independent Monitoring Commission, which oversees the peace process, assessed that RIRA likely was responsible for most of the attacks that occurred after the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was decommissioned in Northern Ireland. In 2012, RIRA rebranded itself as the New Irish Republican Army (New IRA) when members of RIRA, Republican Action Against Drugs (RAAD), and several independent republicans came together. In 2016, the New IRA bombed the van of an Irish prison officer in east Belfast; the officer died from complications following the attack. Dublin police also linked the New IRA to a cache of explosives found in Dublin in 2016. In 2017, the New IRA claimed responsibility for a gun attack on police in north Belfast that injured an on-duty officer. In 2019, the New IRA claimed responsibility for four parcel bombs mailed to London and Glasgow and an attempt to murder a police officer in Northern Ireland using a car bomb. Also in 2019, the New IRA admitted responsibility and offered apologies for the shooting and killing of Lyra McKee, a journalist in Norther Ireland. In 2021, the New IRA claimed responsibility for an attempted bomb attack on a police officer in Northern Ireland. In November 2022, the New IRA claimed responsibility for a bomb attack on a police vehicle in Northern Ireland.

Strength: The Irish government reports that RIRA has roughly 100 active members. The organization may receive limited support from IRA hardliners and sympathizers who are dissatisfied with the IRA’s cease-fire and with Sinn Fein’s involvement in the peace process.

Location/Area of Operation: United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland.

Funding and External Aid: RIRA receives funds from money laundering, smuggling, and other criminal activities, is suspected of receiving funds from sympathizers in the United States, and has attempted to buy weapons from gun dealers in the United States and the Balkans.

Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front

Aka DHKP/C; Dev Sol; Dev Sol Armed Revolutionary Units; Dev Sol Silahli Devrimci Birlikleri; Dev Sol SDB; Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi; Devrimci Sol; Revolutionary Left.

Description: The Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. DHKP/C formed in 1978 as Devrimci Sol, or Dev Sol, a splinter faction of Dev Genc (Revolutionary Youth). It was renamed in 1994 after factional infighting. “Party” refers to the group’s political activities, and “Front” alludes to the group’s militant operations. The group advocates a Marxist-Leninist ideology and opposes the United States, NATO, and the Turkish establishment. It strives to establish a socialist state and to abolish Turkish prisons.

Activities: Since the late 1980s the group primarily has targeted current and retired Turkish security and military officials. In 1990 the group began conducting attacks against foreign interests, including U.S. military and diplomatic personnel and facilities. DHKP/C murdered two U.S. military contractors, wounded a U.S. Air Force officer, and bombed more than 20 U.S. and NATO military, diplomatic, commercial, and cultural facilities. In 2001, DHKP/C began conducting its first suicide bombing attacks against Turkish police. Since the end of 2001, DHKP/C has typically used IEDs against official Turkish and U.S. targets.

In 2015, DHKP/C claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing that killed one police officer and wounded another. That year, Turkish prosecutor Mehmet Selim Kiraz was taken hostage and died from multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by DHKP/C after police attempted to rescue him. Also that year, two women opened fire on the U.S. Consulate General in Istanbul; one woman was identified as a DHKP/C member. In mid-2019, two individuals linked to DHKP/C were arrested by Turkish security forces after they had entered the Turkish Parliament and taken a staff member hostage. There have been no known attacks by DHKP/C since mid-2019.

In May, German police arrested three senior members of DHKP/C for organizing the group’s propaganda, recruitment, and funding activities across Germany, and are believed to have supplied fake passports to DHKP/C members. In November, Turkish security forces arrested Gülten Matur, the DHKP/C leader responsible for Türkiye.

Strength: DHKP/C is estimated to have several dozen members inside Türkiye, with a support network throughout Europe.

Location/Area of Operation: Türkiye and Europe.

Funding and External Aid: DHKP/C finances its activities chiefly through donations and extortion. The group raises funds primarily in Europe.

Revolutionary Struggle

Aka Epanastatikos Aghonas

Description: Revolutionary Struggle (RS) was designated as an FTO on May 18, 2009. RS is a radical Marxist violent extremist group that has conducted attacks against both Greek and U.S. targets in Greece. RS emerged in 2003 following the arrests of members of two other Greek Marxist groups: 17 November and the Revolutionary People’s Struggle.

Activities: RS first gained notoriety in 2003 when it claimed responsibility for bombings at the Athens Courthouse protesting the trials of 17 November members. From 2004 to 2006, RS carried out IED attacks that included a 2004 attack outside a Citibank office in Athens. RS claimed responsibility for the 2007 rocket-propelled grenade attack on Embassy Athens, which damaged the building, and the 2009 bombing of a Citibank branch in Athens.

The Greek government has made significant strides in curtailing the group’s terrorist activity. In 2010, Greek police arrested six suspected RS members, including purported leader Nikos Maziotis, who later escaped. In 2013, five RS members were convicted by an Athens appeals court, three of them receiving maximum prison sentences. Maziotis and another accused RS conspirator, Paula Roupa, were convicted in absentia. Before Maziotis’s recapture, RS conducted a bomb attack outside a Bank of Greece office in Athens in 2014; the blast caused extensive damage to surrounding structures but no casualties. In 2016 a Greek court sentenced Maziotis to life in prison plus 129 years. In 2017, Roupa was arrested by Greek police in Athens and later sentenced to life and 25 years’ imprisonment. RS did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Greece.

Funding and External Aid: RS’s sources of funding are unknown, but the group most likely supports itself by means of criminal activities, including bank robbery.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Abdallah Azzam Brigades

Aka Abdullah Azzam Brigades; Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades; Yusuf al-’Uyayri Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades; Marwan Hadid Brigades; Marwan Hadid Brigade.

Description: Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) was designated as an FTO on May 30, 2012. AAB formally announced its establishment in a 2009 video statement claiming responsibility for a rocket attack against Israel earlier that year. The Lebanon-based group’s full name is Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades, named after Lebanese citizen Ziad al-Jarrah, one of the planners of and participants in the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.

Activities: After its initial formation, AAB relied primarily on rocket attacks against Israeli civilians. It is responsible for numerous rockets fired into Israeli territory from Lebanon, often targeting population centers. In 2017, AAB called for jihad by Muslims against the United States and Israel after the U.S. announcement recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.

Beginning in 2013, AAB began targeting Hizballah for the organization’s involvement in the Syrian conflict and support for Syrian regime forces. In subsequent years, AAB claimed responsibility for several suicide bombings, including the 2013 bombing outside the Iranian Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, that killed 23 people; the 2014 twin suicide bomb attacks against the Iranian cultural center in Beirut that killed four persons; and the 2014 AAB-blamed suicide bombing in Beirut that killed a security officer. From 2016 through 2018, AAB continued its involvement in the Syrian conflict and was active in Lebanon’s Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp.

AAB announced its dissolution in 2019 and did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Lebanon.

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade

Aka al-Aqsa Martyrs Battalion.

Description: Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB) was designated as an FTO on March 27, 2002. AAMB is composed of small cells of Fatah-affiliated activists who emerged at the outset of the al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000. AAMB strives to expel the Israeli military and settlers from the West Bank and establish a Palestinian state loyal to Fatah.

Activities: During the Second Palestinian Intifada in 2000, AAMB primarily carried out small-arms attacks against Israeli military personnel and settlers. By 2002 the group was striking at Israeli civilians inside Israel and claimed responsibility for the first female suicide bombing in the country. In 2015, AAMB declared open war against Israel and asked Iran to help fund its efforts in a televised broadcast. Since 2010, AAMB has claimed responsibility for multiple rocket attacks on Israel from the West Bank, including at least 36 rockets launched in 2021. In 2022, AAMB claimed responsibility for attacks that killed several Israeli security personnel.

Strength: AAMB is estimated to have a few hundred members.

Location/Area of Operation: Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank.

Funding and External Aid: Iran has provided AAMB with funds and guidance, primarily through Hizballah facilitators.

Al-Ashtar Brigades

Aka Saraya al-Ashtar; AAB.

Description: Al-Ashtar Brigades (AAB) was designated as an FTO on July 11, 2018. AAB is an Iran-backed terrorist organization established in 2013 with the goal of violently overthrowing the ruling family in Bahrain. In 2018, AAB adopted Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps branding and reaffirmed its loyalty to Tehran to reflect its role in an Iranian network of state and nonstate actors that operates against the United States and its allies in the region.

Activities: Since 2013, AAB has claimed responsibility for more than 20 terrorist attacks against police and security targets in Bahrain, including a 2014 bomb attack that killed two police officers and an officer from the United Arab Emirates and the 2017 killing of another local Bahraini officer. AAB also has promoted violent activity against the British, Saudi Arabian, and U.S. governments over social media. In 2019, AAB released a video statement promising more attacks in Bahrain to mark the anniversary of Bahrain’s Arab Uprising-inspired political uprising.

AAB did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Bahrain, Iran, and Iraq.

Funding and External Aid: AAB receives funding and support from the Government of Iran.

Al-Nusrah Front

Aka Jabhat al-Nusrah; Jabhet al-Nusrah; the Victory Front; al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant; al-Nusrah Front in Lebanon; Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham min Mujahedi al-Sham fi Sahat al-Jihad; Support Front for the People of the Levant; Jabhat Fath al-Sham; Jabhat Fath al Sham; Jabhat Fatah al-Sham; Jabhat Fateh al-Sham; Front for the Conquest of Syria; the Front for Liberation of al Sham; Front for the Conquest of Syria/the Levant; Front for the Liberation of the Levant; Conquest of the Levant Front; Fatah al-Sham Front; Fateh al-Sham Front; Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham; Hay’et Tahrir al-Sham; Hayat Tahrir al-Sham; HTS; Assembly for the Liberation of Syria; Assembly for Liberation of the Levant; Liberation of al-Sham Commission; Liberation of the Levant Organization; Tahrir al-Sham; Tahrir al-Sham Hay’at.

Description: Al-Nusrah Front (ANF) was designated as an FTO on May 15, 2014. It is led by Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani. The group formed in 2011 when then-al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) — now ISIS — then-leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi sent al-Jawlani to Syria to organize terrorist cells. In 2013 the group split from AQI and became an independent entity. ANF’s stated goal is to oust Syria’s Assad regime and replace it with a Sunni Islamic state. The group is concentrated in and controls a portion of territory in northwest Syria, where it is active as an opposition force and exerts varying degrees of influence over local governance and external plotting. In 2017, ANF joined with four smaller Syrian factions and created Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) as a vehicle to advance its position in the Syrian insurgency.

Activities: ANF has been active in operations against other factions in the Syrian conflict. In 2016 the group carried out attacks in Aleppo and other parts of Syria controlled by the Syrian Army, killing both military officials and civilians. ANF took control of significant portions of Idlib from 2017 to 2019, exerting severe military pressure over other local groups such as Ahrar al-Sham and Nur ad-Din al-Zinki as it fought against the regime and continued plotting against U.S. and allied interests. In 2019, ANF bombed the Syrian town of Kafr Takharim, using heavy weaponry and killing at least five persons. In 2020 an ANF member threw a grenade and opened fire into a group of civilians in Idlib city, Syria, killing two persons and injuring others.

In 2022, ANF remained the largest and most-dominant militant faction in northwest Syria’s Idlib province. In a mid-October offensive, ANF took full control of the strategic city of Afrin and at least 26 towns and villages to the southwest. After several days of fighting between ANF and Turkish-backed rebel groups, an intervention by Türkiye stopped ANF’s expansion and the group withdrew from the Afrin region. The clashes killed least 58 people, including 10 civilians, and forced thousands to flee homes or refugee camps.

Strength: ANF has as many as 15,000 fighters.

Location/Area of Operation: Syria, headquartered in Syria’s Idlib province; operationally active in northwest Syria.

Funding and External Aid: ANF receives funding from a variety of sources, including kidnapping-for-ransom payments, taxes and fees on border crossings it controls, and donations from external Persian Gulf-based donors. The group also generates revenue by collecting fees from commercial traffic entering and exiting Idlib.

Al-Qa’ida

Aka al-Qa’eda; al Qaida, al Qaeda, Islamic Army; Islamic Salvation Foundation; the Base; the Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites; the Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places; the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders; Usama Bin Laden Network; Usama Bin Laden Organization; al-Jihad; the Jihad Group; Egyptian al-Jihad; Egyptian Islamic Jihad; New Jihad; International Front for Fighting Jews and Crusades; Islamic Army for the Liberation of Holy Sites.

Description: Al-Qa’ida was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1999. Established in 1988, al-Qa’ida helped finance, recruit, transport, and train fighters for the Afghan resistance against the former Soviet Union. Al-Qa’ida strives to eliminate western influence from the Muslim world, topple “apostate” governments of Muslim countries, and establish a pan-Islamic caliphate governed by its own interpretation of Sharia that would ultimately be at the center of a new international order. These goals remain essentially unchanged since the group’s 1996 public declaration of war against the United States. Al-Qa’ida leaders issued a statement in 1998 under the banner of “The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens — civilian and military — and their allies everywhere. Al-Qa’ida merged with al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) in 2001. Although numerous al-Qa’ida leaders have been killed in recent years, including Usama bin Laden in 2011 and Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2022, al-Qa’ida’s likely acting leader remains at large in Iran.

Activities: In the 1990s, al-Qa’ida conducted three bombings targeting U.S. troops in Aden, Yemen; claimed responsibility for shooting down U.S. helicopters and killing U.S. soldiers in Somalia; and carried out the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing up to 300 people and injuring more than 5,000. Two of the individuals wanted for the embassy bombings, Sayf al-Adl and Abu Mohammed al-Masri, were released from Iranian custody in exchange for an Iranian diplomat who had been kidnapped in Yemen and held hostage since 2015. In 2000, al-Qa’ida conducted a suicide attack on the USS Cole in the Port of Aden with an explosive-laden boat, killing 17 U.S. Navy sailors and injuring 39 others.

On September 11, 2001, 19 al-Qa’ida members hijacked and crashed four U.S. commercial jets — two into the World Trade Center in New York City, one into the Pentagon, and the last into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Nearly 3,000 civilians, police, and first responders were killed. The dead included U.S. and foreign citizens from at least 77 countries.

In a 2011 video, al-Zawahiri claimed al-Qa’ida was behind the kidnapping of U.S. aid worker Warren Weinstein in Pakistan. Weinstein was held captive until his death in 2015. In 2017, al-Zawahiri released a video calling for jihadists around the world to conduct attacks against the United States. Al-Zawahiri also released multiple recordings and videos in 2018 in which he continued to call for jihad against the United States after the U.S. Embassy in Israel moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. In 2019, Zawahiri called for extremists in the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir to attack Indian forces and appealed to Muslims to attack U.S., European, Israeli, and Russian military targets in a video recording.

Several individuals supporting or inspired by al-Qa’ida have been convicted or arrested. In 2017 a U.S. citizen was convicted in New York of charges related to abetting al-Qa’ida’s 2009 attack on a U.S. military base in Afghanistan using two truck bombs. In 2019 a man from Cleveland, Ohio, was arrested for allegedly making plans for an al-Qa’ida-inspired bomb attack on the city’s downtown Independence Day parade.

In 2022 the United States conducted a counterterrorism operation in Kabul, Afghanistan, that killed Ayman al-Zawahiri. While al-Qa’ida did not claim responsibility for any attacks, it remained active in 2022.

Strength: Fewer than a dozen al-Qa’ida core members with legacy ties to the group remain in Afghanistan. The deaths or arrests of dozens of mid- and senior-level al-Qa’ida operatives, including Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, have disrupted communication, financial support, facilitation nodes, and several terrorist plots. Al-Qa’ida leaders, including those located in Iran, oversee a network of affiliated groups. In addition, supporters and associates worldwide who are motivated by the group’s ideology may operate without direction from al-Qa’ida central leadership.

Location/Area of Operation: Afghanistan, Iran, North Africa, West Africa, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, Yemen.

Funding and External Aid: Al-Qa’ida depends primarily on donations from likeminded supporters, and from individuals who believe that their money is supporting a humanitarian cause. Some funds are diverted from Islamic charitable organizations.

Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula

Aka al-Qa’ida in the South Arabian Peninsula; al-Qa’ida in Yemen; al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qa’ida Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Jazirat al-Arab; AQAP; AQY; Ansar al-Shari’a; Ansar al-Sharia; Ansar al-Shariah, Ansar al Shariah, Partisans of Islamic Law, Sons of Abyan; Sons of Hadramawt; Sons of Hadramawt Committee; Civil Council of Hadramawt; and National Hadramawt Council.

Description: Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was designated as an FTO on January 19, 2010. In 2009 the now-deceased leader of al-Qa’ida in Yemen, Nasir al-Wahishi, publicly announced that Yemeni and Saudi al-Qa’ida operatives were working together under the banner of AQAP. The announcement signaled the rebirth of an al-Qa’ida franchise that previously carried out attacks in Saudi Arabia. AQAP’s stated goals include establishing a caliphate and implementing Sharia in the Arabian Peninsula and the wider Middle East.

Activities: AQAP has claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist acts against both local and foreign targets since its inception in 2009, including a 2009 attempted attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan; a 2010 foiled plot to send explosive-laden packages to the United States on cargo planes; and the 2015 attack by brothers Cherif and Said Kouachi the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo in Paris, killing 12 people. One of the brothers, who had traveled to Yemen in 2011 and met with now-deceased Anwar al-Aulaqi, claimed responsibility for the attack on behalf of AQAP.

In 2017 a U.S. Navy SEAL was killed in a raid against AQAP leaders in Yemen. That same year, AQAP attacked a Yemeni Army camp, killing at least two soldiers. In 2019, Mohammed Saeed Alshamrani killed three persons and injured eight others in a shooting at Naval Air Station Pensacola. AQAP released a video claiming “full responsibility” for the shooting the following year. In 2021, AQAP killed eight Yemen soldiers and four civilians in an attack on a security forces checkpoint in Abyan governorate.

In 2022, AQAP claimed responsibility for several attacks throughout the year. In February, AQAP kidnapped five UN workers in Abyan governorate, and continues to hold them hostage. In June, AQAP carried out two attacks against pro-government forces in Abyan and Shabwah governorates in Yemen, killing 10 soldiers. In September, AQAP ambushed a security forces checkpoint in Abyan, killing at least 21 Yemeni soldiers — the group’s deadliest attack since 2019.

Strength: AQAP fighters are estimated to be in the low thousands.

Location/Area of Operation: Yemen.

Funding and External Aid: AQAP’s funding has historically come from theft, robberies, oil and gas revenue, kidnap-for-ransom operations, and donations from likeminded supporters.

Ansar al-Islam

Aka Ansar al-Sunna; Ansar al-Sunna Army; Devotees of Islam; Followers of Islam in Kurdistan; Helpers of Islam; Jaish Ansar al-Sunna; Jund al-Islam; Kurdish Taliban; Kurdistan Supporters of Islam; Partisans of Islam; Soldiers of God; Soldiers of Islam; Supporters of Islam in Kurdistan.

Description: Ansar al-Islam (AAI) was designated as an FTO on March 22, 2004. AAI was established in 2001 in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region through the merger of two Kurdish terrorist factions that traced their roots to the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan. AAI seeks to expel western interests from Iraq and establish an independent Iraqi state based on its interpretation of Sharia.

Activities: From 2003 to 2011, AAI conducted attacks against a wide range of targets including Iraqi government and security forces, and U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS forces. The group also carried out numerous kidnappings, murders, and assassinations of Iraqi citizens and politicians. In 2012, AAI claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Sons of Martyrs School in Damascus, which was occupied by Syrian security forces and pro-government militias; seven persons were wounded in the attack.

In 2014, parts of AAI issued a statement pledging allegiance to ISIS, although later reports suggest that a faction of AAI opposed joining ISIS. In 2019, AAI claimed its first attack in Iraq in five years, placing two IEDs in Iraq’s Diyala province. AAI did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022. However, it remained active in Syria.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Iraq and Syria.

Funding and External Aid: AAI receives assistance from a loose network of associates in Europe and the Middle East.

Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi

Aka Ansar al-Sharia in Libya; Ansar al-Shariah Brigade; Ansar al-Shari’a Brigade; Katibat Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi; Ansar al-Shariah-Benghazi; al-Raya Establishment for Media Production; Ansar al-Sharia; Soldiers of the Sharia; Ansar al-Shariah; Supporters of Islamic Law

Description: Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi (AAS-B) was designated as an FTO on January 13, 2014. AAS-B was created after the 2011 fall of the Qadhafi regime in Libya. The group has been involved in terrorist attacks against civilian targets as well as the assassination and attempted assassination of security officials and political actors in eastern Libya.

Activities: Members of AAS-B were involved in the 2012 attacks against the U.S. Special Mission and Annex in Benghazi, Libya. Four U.S. citizens were killed in the attack: Glen Doherty, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and U.S. Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens.

Throughout 2016, AAS-B continued its fight against the “Libyan National Army” in Benghazi, resulting in the deaths of numerous Libyan security personnel and civilians. Additionally, AAS-B controlled several terrorist training camps in Libya and trained members of other terrorist organizations operating in Iraq, Mali, and Syria.

AAS-B announced its formal dissolution in 2017 owing to suffering heavy losses, including the group’s senior leadership and defections to ISIS in Libya. AAS-B did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Benghazi, Libya

Funding and External Aid: AAS-B obtained funds from al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb as well as through charities, donations, and criminal activities.

Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah

Aka Supporters of Islamic Law; Ansar al-Sharia in Derna; Ansar al-Sharia in Libya; Ansar al-Sharia; Ansar al-Sharia Brigade in Darnah.

Description: Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah (AAS-D) was designated as an FTO on January 13, 2014. AAS-D was created after the 2011 fall of the Qadhafi regime in Libya. The group has been involved in terrorist attacks against civilian targets as well as the assassination and attempted assassination of security officials and political actors in eastern Libya.

Activities: Members of AAS-D were involved in the 2012 attacks against the U.S. Special Mission and Annex in Benghazi, Libya. Four U.S. citizens were killed in the attack: Glen Doherty, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and U.S. Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens.

Throughout 2013 and 2014, AAS-D was believed to have cooperated with Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi in multiple attacks and suicide bombings targeting Libyan security forces in that city. In 2016, AAS-D continued fighting in and around Darnah. Additionally, AAS-D maintained several terrorist training camps in Darnah and Jebel Akhdar, Libya, and trained members of other terrorist organizations operating in Iraq and Syria. In 2018 there were unconfirmed reports that AAS-D was involved in clashes with the Libyan National Army.

AAS-D did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Darnah, Libya.

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia

Aka al-Qayrawan Media Foundation; Supporters of Islamic Law; Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia; Ansar al-Shari’ah; Ansar al-Shari’ah in Tunisia; Ansar al-Sharia.

Description: Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia (AAS-T) was designated as an FTO on January 13, 2014. Founded in 2011 by Seif Allah Ben Hassine, AAS-T has been implicated in attacks against Tunisian security forces, assassinations of Tunisian political figures, and attempted suicide bombings of popular tourist locations. AAS-T has also recruited Tunisians to fight in Syria.

Activities: AAS-T was involved in the 2012 attack against Embassy Tunis and the American school in Tunis, which threatened the safety of more than 100 U.S. Embassy employees. In 2013, AAS-T members were implicated in the assassination of Tunisian politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi. Since 2016, Tunisian authorities have continued to confront and arrest AAS-T members.

AAS-T did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Libya and Tunisia.

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

Army of Islam

Aka Jaysh al-Islam; Jaish al-Islam.

Description: Army of Islam (AOI) was designated as an FTO on May 19, 2011. Founded in 2005, AOI is a Gaza-based terrorist organization responsible for numerous terrorist acts against the Israeli and Egyptian governments and British, New Zealander, and U.S. citizens. The group, led by Mumtaz Dughmush, subscribes to a violent Salafist ideology.

Note: AOI is a separate and distinct group from the Syria-based Jaysh al-Islam, which is not a designated FTO.

Activities: Since 2006, AOI has been responsible for kidnappings and terrorist attacks including kidnappings of civilians, including a U.S. journalist; 2009 attacks on Egyptian civilians in Cairo and Heliopolis, Egypt; the 2011 attack on a Coptic Christian church in Alexandria that killed 25 persons and wounded 100; and rocket attacks on Israel in a joint operation with the Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem in 2012.

In 2015, AOI reportedly released a statement pledging allegiance to ISIS. In a short post attributed to the group, AOI declared itself an inseparable part of ISIS-Sinai Province. Since then, AOI has continued to express support for ISIS. In 2017 the group released a video meant to encourage ISIS fighters defending Mosul. In 2019, AOI shared another video praising ISIS that included training information for individuals to conduct suicide attacks. In 2020, AOI published more than two dozen images of fighters conducting military training. AOI did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Egypt, Gaza, and Israel.

Funding and External Aid: AOI receives much of its funding from a variety of criminal activities in Gaza.

Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq

Aka: AAH; Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq min al-Iraq; Asaib al Haq; Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq; League of the Righteous; Khazali Network; Khazali Special Group; Qazali Network; the People of the Cave; Khazali Special Groups Network; al-Tayar al-Risali; the Missionary Current.

Description: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) was designated as an FTO on January 10, 2020. Led by Qays and Laith al-Khazali, AAH is an Iran-backed, militant organization that remains ideologically aligned with Iran and loyal to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The group seeks to promote Iran’s political and religious influence in Iraq, maintain Shia control over Iraq, and expel any remaining western military forces from the country.

Activities: Since its creation in 2006, AAH has claimed responsibility for more than 6,000 attacks against U.S. and Defeat-ISIS Coalition forces. The group has carried out highly sophisticated operations, including mortar attacks on an American base, the downing of a British helicopter, and an attack on the Karbala Provincial Headquarters that resulted in the capture and murder of five U.S. soldiers.

In 2019, two individuals assessed to be AAH members were arrested in connection to rockets fired at the Camp Taji military training complex, where U.S. personnel provide divisional training. Also in 2019, AAH members opened fire on a group of protestors trying to set fire to the group’s office in Nasiriya, killing at least six. AAH continued to be active in 2022, including through indirect fire attacks on U.S. facilities in Iraq, typically using front names or proxy groups.

Strength: AAH membership is estimated at 10,000.

Location/Area of Operation: Iraq, Syria.

Funding and External Aid: AAH receives funding, logistical support, training, and weapons from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and Hizballah. AAH also receives funding through illicit activities such as kidnapping for ransom, smuggling, and “taxing”/extortion of economic activities in areas where the group is dominant.

Asbat al-Ansar

Aka AAA; Band of Helpers; Band of Partisans; League of Partisans; League of the Followers; God’s Partisans; Gathering of Supporters; Partisan’s League; Esbat al-Ansar; Isbat al-Ansar; Osbat al-Ansar; Usbat al-Ansar; Usbat ul-Ansar.

Description: Designated as an FTO on March 27, 2002, Asbat al-Ansar (AAA) is a Lebanon-based Sunni terrorist group composed primarily of Palestinians that first emerged in the early 1990s. Linked to al-Qa’ida and other Sunni terrorist groups, AAA aims to thwart perceived anti-Islamic and pro-western influences in the country. AAA’s base is largely confined to Lebanon’s refugee camps.

Activities: Throughout the mid-1990s, AAA assassinated Lebanese religious leaders and bombed nightclubs, theaters, and liquor stores. The group also plotted against foreign diplomatic targets. Between 2005 and 2011, AAA members traveled to Iraq to fight Defeat-ISIS Coalition forces. AAA has been reluctant to involve itself in operations in Lebanon, in part because of concerns of losing its safe haven in the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp. The group remained active in Lebanon but did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: AAA membership is estimated in the low hundreds.

Location/Area of Operation: AAA’s primary base of operations is the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp in southern Lebanon.

Funding and External Aid: AAA likely receives money through international Sunni violent extremist networks.

Hamas

Aka the Islamic Resistance Movement; Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya; Izz al-Din al Qassam Battalions; Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades; Izz al-Din al-Qassam Forces; Students of Ayyash; Student of the Engineer; Yahya Ayyash Units.

Description: Hamas was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. Established in 1987 at the onset of the first Palestinian uprising, or First Intifada, Hamas is an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Its armed element, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, has conducted anti-Israeli attacks, including suicide bombings against civilian targets inside Israel. Hamas also manages a broad, mostly Gaza-based, network of Dawa or ministry activities that include charities, schools, clinics, youth camps, fundraising, and political activities. After winning Palestinian Legislative Council elections in 2006, Hamas gained control of significant Palestinian Authority (PA) ministries in Gaza, including the Ministry of Interior. In 2007, Hamas expelled the PA and Fatah from Gaza in a violent takeover. In 2017, Ismail Haniyeh was selected as Hamas’s new leader. Hamas remained in de facto control in Gaza in 2022.

Activities: Hamas has conducted numerous anti-Israeli attacks, including suicide bombings, rocket launches, IED attacks, and shootings. U.S. citizens have died and been injured in the group’s attacks. In 2012, Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad operatives coordinated and carried out a bus bombing in Tel Aviv that wounded 29 people. In 2014, Hamas kidnapped and murdered three Israeli teenagers, including 16-year-old U.S.-Israeli citizen Naftali Fraenkel. In 2016 a Hamas member carried out a suicide attack on a bus in Jerusalem, killing 20 people. Since 2018, Hamas has continued rocket attacks from Gaza into Israeli territory, including an 11-day escalation with Israel in 2021 during which Hamas and other militant groups launched more than 4,000 rockets into Israeli cities.

In May 2022, Israeli security forces thwarted an attack planned by a Hamas cell in Jerusalem. The cell planned to shoot Israeli public figures, launch bombing attacks, and kidnap soldiers.

Strength: Hamas comprises several thousand Gaza-based operatives.

Location/Area of Operation: Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon.

Funding and External Aid: Hamas has received funding, weapons, and training from Iran and raises funds in Persian Gulf countries. The group receives donations from some Palestinians and other expatriates as well as from its own charity organizations.

Harakat Sawa’d Misr

Aka HASM; Harakah Sawa’id Misr; Harikat Souaid Misr; HASM Movement; Hassam Movement; Arms of Egypt Movement; Movement of Egypt’s Arms; Movement of Egypt’s Forearms; Hassm; Hamms; Hassam; Hasam.

Description: Harakat Sawa’d Misr (HASM) was designated as an FTO on January 14, 2021. Formed in Egypt in 2015 with the goal of overthrowing the Egyptian government, HASM attacks Egyptian security officials and other government-affiliated targets.

Activities: Since 2016, HASM has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks, including the 2016 attempted assassination of Egypt’s former Grand Mufti Ali Gomaa, the 2017 assassination of Egyptian National Security Agency officer Ibrahim Azzazy; the 2017 attack on Burma’s embassy in Cairo; and the 2019 car bomb attack targeting security forces in Giza, killing or wounding 10 soldiers. HASM was responsible for a car bombing on a government health institute in Cairo, killing at least 20 people and injuring dozens.

HASM did not claim responsibility for any terrorist attacks in 2022.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Egypt.

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

Hizballah

Aka Party of God; Islamic Jihad; Islamic Jihad Organization; Revolutionary Justice Organization; Organization of the Oppressed on Earth; Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine; Organization of Right Against Wrong; Ansar Allah; Followers of the Prophet Muhammed; Lebanese Hizballah; Lebanese Hezbollah; LH; Foreign Relations Department; FRD; External Security Organization; ESO; Foreign Action Unit; Hizballah ESO; Hizballah International; Special Operations Branch; External Services Organization; External Security Organization of Hezbollah.

Description: Hizballah was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. Formed in 1982 following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Lebanon-based radical Shia group takes its ideological inspiration from the Iranian Revolution and the teachings of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. The group generally follows the religious guidance of the Iranian supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. Hizballah is closely allied with Iran, and the two often work together on shared initiatives, although Hizballah also occasionally acts independently. Hizballah continues to share a close relationship with the Syrian regime of Bashar Assad and, like Iran, provides assistance — including fighters — to Syrian regime forces in the Syrian conflict.

Activities: Hizballah is responsible for multiple large-scale terrorist attacks, including the 1983 suicide truck bombings of Embassy Beirut and the U.S. Marine barracks; the 1984 attack on the Embassy Beirut annex; and the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847, during which U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem was murdered. Hizballah also was implicated, along with Iran, in the 1992 attacks on the Israeli Embassy in Argentina and the 1994 bombing of the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association in Buenos Aires. Hizballah assisted Iraqi Shia militant and terrorist groups in Iraq who in 2007 attacked the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center, killing five American soldiers. In 2012, Hizballah was responsible for an attack on a passenger bus carrying 42 Israeli tourists at the Burgas Airport in Bulgaria, killing five Israelis and one Bulgarian.

Several Hizballah operatives have been arrested or tried around the world, including two Hizballah operatives arrested in the United States in 2017. One operative arrested in Michigan had identified the availability of explosives precursors in Panama in 2011 and surveilled U.S. and Israeli targets in Panama as well as the Panama Canal during 2011-12. Another operative arrested in New York had surveilled U.S. military and law enforcement facilities from 2003 to 2017. In 2018, Brazil arrested a Hizballah financier, extraditing him to Paraguay for prosecution two years later. In 2020, judges at the Netherlands-based Special Tribunal for Lebanon found Hizballah member Salim Ayyash guilty for his central role in the bomb attack in Beirut in 2005 that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri.

In June, appeals judges sentenced two other Hizballah members, Hassan Habib Merhi and Hussein Hassan Oneissi, to life imprisonment for their roles as accomplices in the assassination.

In 2022 the Israeli military shot down three Hizballah-launched drones heading toward one of Israel’s offshore rigs at the Karish gas field, located in disputed waters between Israel and Lebanon. Hizballah confirmed responsibility for the unarmed drones and noted they were intended to send a threatening message to Israel.

Strength: Hizballah has tens of thousands of supporters and members worldwide.

Location/Area of Operation: Lebanon and Syria.

Funding and External Aid: Iran continues to provide Hizballah with most of its funding, training, weapons, and explosives, as well as political, diplomatic, monetary, and organizational aid. Iran’s annual financial backing to Hizballah — which has been estimated to be hundreds of millions of dollars annually — accounts for the overwhelming majority of the group’s annual budget. The Assad regime in Syria has provided training, weapons, and diplomatic and political support. Hizballah also receives funding in the form of private donations from some Lebanese Shia diaspora communities worldwide, including profits from legal and illegal businesses. These include smuggling contraband goods, passport falsification, narcotics trafficking, money laundering, and credit card, immigration, and bank fraud.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

Aka IRGC; the Iranian Revolutionary Guards; IRG; the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution; AGIR; Pasdarn-e Enghelab-e Islami; Sepah-e Pasdaran Enghelab Islami; Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami; Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami; Pasdaran-e Inqilab; Revolutionary Guards; Revolutionary Guard; Sepah; Pasdaran; Sepah Pasdaran; Islamic Revolutionary Corps; Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps; Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps; Islamic Revolutionary Guards; Iran’s Revolutionary Guards; Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution.

Description: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was designated as an FTO on April 15, 2019. As part of Iran’s military, the IRGC has played a central role in Iran’s use of terrorism as a key tool of Iranian statecraft since its inception. The IRGC has been directly involved in terrorist plotting; its support for terrorism is foundational and institutional, and it has killed U.S. citizens.

Founded in 1979, the IRGC has since gained a substantial role in executing Iran’s foreign policy and wields control over vast segments of the economy. The organization’s ties to nonstate armed groups in the region, such as Hizballah in Lebanon, help Iran compensate for its relatively weak conventional military forces. Answering directly to the supreme leader, the IRGC also is influential in domestic politics, and many senior officials have passed through its ranks. The organization is composed of five primary branches: the IRGC Ground Forces, the IRGC Air Force, IRGC Navy, the Basij, and the IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF).

Activities: The IRGC — most prominently through its Qods Force — directs and carries out a global terrorist campaign. The IRGC in 2011 plotted a brazen attack against the Saudi ambassador to the United States on American soil. In 2012, IRGC-QF operatives were arrested in Türkiye and Kenya for plotting attacks. An IRGC operative was convicted in 2017 of espionage for a foreign intelligence service; he had been surveilling a German-Israeli group. In 2018, Germany uncovered 10 IRGC operatives involved in a terrorist plot in Germany. Also in 2018, a U.S. federal court found Iran and the IRGC liable for the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing that killed 19 U.S. citizens. In 2022 an IRGC member was charged for attempting to arrange the murder of a former U.S. National Security Advisor.

The IRGC is Iran’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorist groups abroad. The IRGC continues to provide financial and other material support, training, technology transfer, advanced conventional weapons, guidance, or direction to a broad range of terrorist organizations, including Hizballah, Kata’ib Hizballah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Harakat al-Nujaba in Iraq, al-Ashtar Brigades and Saraya al-Mukhtar in Bahrain, and other terrorist groups in Syria and around the Persian Gulf. Iran provides up to $100 million annually in combined support to Palestinian terrorist groups, including Hamas, Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. The IRGC also is active in Syria in support of the Assad regime.

Strength: The IRGC has upward of 125,000 members.

Location/Area of Operation: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Europe, and the Persian Gulf.

Funding and External Aid: The IRGC continues to engage in large-scale illicit financing schemes and money laundering to fund its malign activities. In 2022 the United States designated an international oil smuggling and money laundering network, led by previously U.S.-designated IRGC-QF official Behnam Shahriyari and former IRGC-QF official Rostam Ghasemi. This network facilitated the sale of hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of oil for the IRGC-QF and Hizballah, and it spans several jurisdictions, including Iran and Russia.

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

Aka al-Qa’ida in Iraq; al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida in Mesopotamia; al-Qa’ida in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Tawhid; Jam’at al-Tawhid Wa’al-Jihad; Tanzeem Qa’idat al Jihad/Bilad al Raafidaini; Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn; the Monotheism and Jihad Group; the Organization Base of Jihad/Country of the Two Rivers; the Organization Base of Jihad/Mesopotamia; the Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in Iraq; the Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in the Land of the Two Rivers; the Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in Iraq; the Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in the Land of the Two Rivers; the Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers; al-Zarqawi Network; Islamic State of Iraq; Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham; Islamic State of Iraq and Syria; ad-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-’Iraq wa-sh-Sham; Daesh; Dawla al Islamiya; al-Furqan Establishment for Media Production; Islamic State; ISIL; ISIS; Amaq News Agency; Al Hayat Media Center; al-Hayat Media Center; Al Hayat.

Description: Al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) was designated as an FTO on December 17, 2004. In the 1990s, Jordanian militant Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi organized a terrorist group called al-Tawhid wal-Jihad to oppose the presence of U.S. and western military forces in the Middle East as well as the West’s support for, and the existence of, Israel. In 2004, Zarqawi joined al-Qa’ida, pledged allegiance to Usama bin Laden, and his group became known as al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI). Zarqawi led AQI during Operation Iraqi Freedom to fight against U.S. and Defeat-ISIS Coalition forces in Iraq until he was killed in June 2006.

In 2006, AQI publicly renamed itself the Islamic State in Iraq before adopting the moniker of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2013 to express its regional ambitions as it expanded operations to include the Syrian conflict. ISIS was led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who declared an Islamic caliphate and separated this group from al-Qa’ida in 2014, before he was killed in 2019. In 2017 the U.S. military fighting with local Syrian allies announced the liberation of Raqqa, the self-declared capital of ISIS’s so-called caliphate. Also in 2017, then-Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced the territorial defeat of ISIS in Iraq. In 2018 the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with support from the Defeat-ISIS Coalition, began a final push to oust ISIS fighters from the lower Middle Euphrates River Valley in Syria. 2019 marked the full territorial defeat of ISIS’s so-called caliphate; however, ISIS remains a serious threat. The group benefits from instability, demonstrating intent to cause and inspire terrorist attacks around the world. This report refers to central ISIS leadership as ISIS-core.

Activities: ISIS has conducted numerous high-profile attacks, including IED attacks against U.S. military personnel and Iraqi infrastructure, videotaped beheadings of U.S. citizens, suicide bombings against both military and civilian targets, and rocket attacks. ISIS also was heavily involved in the fighting in Syria and participated in numerous kidnappings of civilians, including aid workers and journalists. ISIS was responsible for most of the 12,000 Iraqi civilian deaths in 2014 and claimed responsibility for several large-scale attacks in Iraq and Syria, including a 2016 car bombing at a shopping center in Baghdad that killed nearly 300 people — the deadliest bombing in the city since 2003. In 2018, ISIS conducted multiple suicide bombings and simultaneous raids in a brutal offensive in southwestern Syria, killing more than 200 people.

Since 2019, ISIS has claimed responsibility numerous attacks including the 2019 suicide bombing of a restaurant in Manbij, Syria, that killed 19 people, including four U.S. citizens; the 2019 killing of a U.S. servicemember while he was participating in a combat operation in Ninewa province, Iraq; the 2021 twin suicide bombings in a busy market in Tayaran Square in Baghdad that killed at least 32 people; and a 2021 suicide attack in a busy market in a predominantly Shia neighborhood in east Baghdad, Iraq, that killed 30 people.

ISIS also directs, enables, and inspires individuals to conduct attacks on behalf of the group around the world. In 2015, ISIS carried out a series of coordinated attacks in Paris, including at a rock concert at the Bataclan concert hall, killing about 130 people, including 23-year-old U.S. citizen Nohemi Gonzalez. In 2016, ISIS directed two simultaneous attacks in Brussels, Belgium — one at the Zaventem Airport and the other at a metro station, killing 32 people, including four U.S. citizens. In 2016 a gunman who pledged allegiance to ISIS killed 49 individuals at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida. ISIS also claimed responsibility for two attacks in 2016: one in which a terrorist driving a cargo truck attacked a crowd in Nice, France, during Bastille Day celebrations, resulting in 86 deaths, including three U.S. citizens; the second a truck attack on a crowded Christmas market in Berlin that killed 12 people and injured 48 others.

In 2017, ISIS claimed responsibility for two attacks in the United Kingdom: one a terrorist attack on London’s Westminster Bridge, when a man drove his car into pedestrians and stabbed others, killing five persons; the other a suicide bombing in Manchester, England, that killed 22 people outside of a live concert. That same year, a man claiming to be a member of ISIS drove a truck into a crowded shopping center in Stockholm, Sweden, killing five persons. In 2019, ISIS-inspired terrorists carried out coordinated suicide bombings at multiple churches and hotels, killing more than 250 people on Easter Sunday. Also in 2019, ISIS claimed responsibility for a stabbing attack near the London Bridge in which a man killed two persons.

In 2022, ISIS attacked Hasakah prison in Syria, triggering a 10-day battle that spilled over into the streets, killing at least 121 SDF soldiers, 374 suspected ISIS militants, and four civilians. Also in 2022, ISIS claimed responsibility for an attack at the Shāh Chérāgh shrine in Shiraz, Iran, killing at least 15 people.

Strength: Estimates suggest ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria number between 8,000 and 16,000, including several thousand foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). Since at least 2015, the group has integrated local children and children of FTFs into its forces and used them as executioners and suicide attackers. ISIS has systematically prepared child soldiers in Iraq and Syria using its education and religious infrastructure as part of its training and recruitment of members. ISIS also has abducted, raped, and abused thousands of women and children, some as young as 8 years old. Women and children were sold and enslaved, distributed to ISIS fighters as spoils of war, forced into marriage and domestic servitude, or otherwise subjected to physical and sexual abuse.

Location/Area of Operation: Iraq and Syria, with branches and networks around the world

Funding and External Aid: ISIS received most of its funding from a variety of criminal activities in Iraq and Syria. Criminal activities included extortion of civilian economies, smuggling oil, and robberies. The organization also maintains stockpiles of as much as hundreds of millions of dollars, scattered across Iraq and Syria, which it looted during its occupation of those countries in 2013 to 2019. ISIS continues to rely on trusted courier networks and money services businesses to move its financial resources within and outside of Iraq and Syria. The territorial defeat of ISIS that eliminated its control of territory in Syria in 2019 reduced ISIS’s ability to generate, hold, and transfer its financial assets. Despite this, ISIS continues to generate some revenue from criminal activities through its many clandestine networks and provides financial support and guidance to its network of global branches and affiliates.

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Libya

Aka Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Libya; Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in Libya; Wilayat Barqa; Wi

Warnings and insurance

This travel advice covers Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories ( OPTs ).

Your travel insurance could be invalidated if you travel against advice from the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO).

Areas where FCDO advises against travel

FCDO currently advises against all travel to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

Find out more about why FCDO advises against travel.

If you are already in Israel and the the Occupied Palestinian Territories follow local authorities’ advice.

Register your presence Let the UK government know you’re in Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territories, register your presence if you’re in Israel/the Occupied Palestinian Territories for further updates.

Risks of regional escalation Following Israeli strikes against targets in Iran, Iran has launched multiple rounds of missile and drone attacks against Israel. On 13 June a nationwide state of emergency was declared in Israel. Israeli airspace remains closed and Ben Gurion Airport is currently closed. This is a fast-moving situation that poses significant risks. The situation has the potential to deteriorate further, quickly and without warning. The current situation has disrupted air links out of the country and may disrupt road links. We encourage you to read the FCDO ’s advice on if you’re affected by a crisis abroad Family members of staff at the British Embassy in Tel Aviv and the British Consulate in Jerusalem have been temporarily withdrawn as a precautionary measure. The Embassy and Consulate continues with essential work including services to British nationals. Check local information Check Home Front Command for the latest guidance (available in Israel only) and follow instructions from the Israeli government. Restrictions may be put in place at short notice. Should you be in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and not have access to Home Front Command continue to follow local instructions including from Palestinian Civil Defence (Call 102, or see www.pcd.ps or الدفاع المدني الفلسطيني Facebook). The interception of missiles over Israel and the OPTs may result in falling fragments or debris. If you encounter any projectile debris or fragments you should move away from them immediately and contact local authorities. International land border crossings to Jordan and Egypt are open, but could close without notice and timings are subject to change. Before you travel check the travel advice for any neighbouring country that you are planning to travel to or through. Jordan-Israel border crossings (timings subject to change): Allenby/King Hussein Bridge: 8am to 2:30pm

The Northern (Jordan River/Sheikh Hussein) crossing: 8:30am to 2:30pm

The Southern (Yitzhak Rabin/Wadi Araba) crossing: 8am to 8pm Egypt-Israel border crossing (timings subject to change): Taba: Open 24 hours

Conflict with Lebanese Hizballah

Following the conflict between Israel and Lebanese Hizballah (LH), a ceasefire was agreed on 27 November.

There remains a risk that hostilities could reignite, and with little warning. Check Home Front Command for the latest guidance. Restrictions may be put in place at short notice.

Conflict with the Houthis (in Yemen)

Following the conflict between Israel and the Houthis (in Yemen), there continues to be a risk of missile and drone attacks throughout Israel. There is a risk of shrapnel from intercepted missiles falling across Israel and the OPTs and possible disruption at Ben Gurion airport.

Check Home Front Command for the latest guidance. Restrictions may be put in place at short notice.

Conflict in Israel and the OPTs

On 7 October 2023 there was a large-scale terrorist attack by Hamas in southern Israel. The frequency of attacks has significantly decreased but there is still a risk of rocket attacks throughout Israel.

There is an increased risk of political tension which can cause demonstrations and clashes around anniversaries and significant events.

If you are in Israel and the OPTs

If you are in Israel and the OPTs , keep up to date through local media and follow the instructions of Israeli Home Front Command. To find these:

visit the Israeli Home Front Command website (available in Israel only)

call 104 if you are in Israel

Before travelling within Israel or the OPTs , check the local measures in place, that roads are open and, where appropriate, that scheduled train and bus services are operating.

Monitor this travel advice and other media as the situation is changing fast.

Travel within or out of Israel or the OPTs is at your own risk. You are encouraged to follow the advice of local authorities, for example on which routes are open or when to take shelter.

Leaving Gaza

Border crossings out of Gaza have been closed to civilians and general traffic since the Israeli military took control of the Rafah crossing on 6 May 2024. Consular support is not available from within Gaza. If you are a British national in Gaza who wants to leave Gaza, you should make contact with us as soon as possible. There are currently no exit routes available for foreign nationals to depart Gaza independently. We are working with the Israeli, Palestinian and other authorities in the region to help British nationals leave via safe routes.

If you are a UK visa holder who meets all of the following criteria, you can contact us to request support to leave Gaza if:

you have a spouse/partner or a child aged 17 or under currently living in the UK, and

you hold valid permission to enter or remain in the UK for longer than 6 months

Help and support in Israel and the OPTs

Contact your travel provider and your insurer. They will tell you if they can help and what you need to do.

Help from FCDO in Israel and the OPTs

British nationals requiring urgent consular assistance can contact us 24/7 365 days a year by telephone or by using the online consular enquiry form

Consular support is severely limited where FCDO advises against travel.

If you need consular assistance call:

+44 176 766 7600 (UK number)

+972 (0)3 725 1222

+972 (0)2 541 4100

Send us an online enquiry

Help from other organisations

Keep up to date with local travel advice through local news outlets and international outlets like the Access Coordination Unit.

Concern for friends and family

If you are in the UK and concerned about a friend or family member who is in Israel or the OPTs call FCDO on 020 7008 5000.

Before you travel

No travel can be guaranteed safe. Read all the advice in this guide and any specific travel advice that applies to you:

Travel insurance

If you choose to travel, research your destinations and get appropriate travel insurance. Insurance should cover your itinerary, planned activities and expenses in an emergency.

About FCDO travel advice

FCDO provides advice about risks of travel to help British nationals make informed decisions. Find out more about FCDO travel advice.

Sign up to get email notifications when this travel advice is updated.