By all indications, the Middle East stands at an inflection point. For more than a decade, the US has tried to step back from its historical role as the region’s principal powerbroker, seeking to shift its strategic focus to Asia.

Since former President Barack Obama’s “pivot”, every administration has made gestures towards disengagement – only to be pulled back in by crises, some of which they neither initiated nor fully controlled.

But the beginning of President Donald Trump’s second term carried a real chance for strategic disengagement. The Trump administration’s purging of neoconservatives and doubling down on “America First” gave the Gulf states a clear signal: Washington was stepping aside.

For once, they had to step up – not just as financiers of regional order, but as strategic architects.

To their credit, the Gulf states – particularly Qatar, Oman and Saudi Arabia – rose to the occasion. In coordination with Trump’s Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, they worked steadily towards a new nuclear framework with Tehran.

New MEE newsletter: Jerusalem Dispatch Sign up to get the latest insights and analysis on Israel-Palestine, alongside Turkey Unpacked and other MEE newsletters

The outlines of a regional detente began to take shape. The Gulf states thought they were transitioning from sponsors to strategists, drawing up plans for economic entanglement and integration. This could have become the Middle East’s “end of history” moment – a soft-power-driven, non-hegemonic order rooted in interdependence.

But that vision failed to reckon with one crucial actor: Israel.

Dramatic escalation

Since the Hamas attack on 7 October 2023, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has reversed a long-standing strategic posture. From “mowing the lawn” with calculated, periodic strikes, Israel has transformed into a chainsaw operator: disruptive, maximalist and ideologically rigid.

While a decisive victory in Gaza remains elusive, Israel has successfully fought Hezbollah to a standstill and degraded its leadership structure. Flush with these tactical wins, Netanyahu has now escalated dramatically, initiating strikes deep inside Iran. His ambition: to force regime change and pre-empt a negotiated settlement between Washington and Tehran.

Netanyahu’s calculus is deeply personal and political. With Gulf-backed diplomacy gaining momentum and anti-Iran hawks pushed out of Washington, the Israeli prime minister feared that his influence was waning.

Israel, a destructive hegemon, is effective at degrading its foes, but lacks the will, legitimacy and capacity to build anything durable in their place

By initiating a high-stakes confrontation, he has not only reasserted his relevance, but also sought to corner Trump into a potentially long, destabilising conflict – thus killing the Iran deal before it could materialise.

At its core, strategy is about creating power or influence with the means available to you. It’s about reshaping your environment to reflect your interests. The Gulf states have both the means and the moment. But they are hesitating.

In many ways, the Gulf states find themselves in a situation reminiscent of the 1973 oil crisis, when Riyadh used oil as a geopolitical weapon to reshape American foreign policy. Today, the Gulf states enjoy far greater entanglements in the financial, energy and diplomatic realms.

But while they have succeeded in translating these entanglements into global influence, they remain reluctant to wield them to shape Washington’s regional posture.

Despite having substantial leverage – ranging from ties with Iran, to influence over actors like the Houthis or even Hamas – the Gulf states continue to prefer soft, transactional statecraft. Courting Trump with investment deals or energy alignment is no match for Israel’s coercive diplomacy and military brinkmanship.

Regional transformation

Israel, by contrast, has maximised the tools at its disposal – military technological superiority, an intelligence edge, and influence and information operations – to set the terms of Washington’s Middle East policy.

That these moves run counter to long-term US interests seems immaterial. Netanyahu, who since the 1980s has been a vocal neoconservative advocate for drawing the US into military interventions in Iraq and Iran, is not interested in inclusive regional stability.

He wants to dictate a regional transformation according to an Israeli interpretation of friend and foe. His regime change fantasies appear now finally within reach.

But Iran is not Iraq. Neither the US nor Israel is likely to put boots on the ground. Instead, what’s emerging is a long-term strategy of degradation – hollowing out the Islamic Republic, one missile and air strike at a time.

Assassinating Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would set in motion a potentially long and contested succession crisis. The endgame may be a military-industrial dictatorship dominated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), or a failed state where power remains concentrated in a besieged Tehran.

Israel could retreat behind its buffers in Jordan and Iraq, while the Gulf states would inherit the instability to come.

The Gulf would be left next to a broken neighbour with porous borders and contested sovereignty, and full of armed networks operating, as they have for decades, almost autonomously – networks that would not disappear, but reconstitute as fragmented nodes of resistance, trading arms and ideology in equal measure.

Indeed, the greatest irony may be that by trying to eliminate the state behind the IRGC, Israel will only make the IRGC more ungovernable.

Emerging order

The Shia Islamist militant networks predate the Islamic Republic, having operated in the Lebanese Civil War before the Iranian Revolution. Stripped of a central authority, these networks will adapt and mutate, becoming less accountable and less deterrable.

The emerging regional order will be one without balance. Israel, a destructive hegemon, is effective at degrading its foes, but lacks the will, legitimacy and capacity to build anything durable in their place. The Gulf, meanwhile, will remain surrounded by hostile non-state actors – Hezbollah, the Houthis and various Iranian paramilitary groups – now decoupled from Tehran, but no less lethal.

Occasional containment strikes by Israel may limit their capacity, but the region will be unlikely to reach an equilibrium of stability.

Worse still, Israel’s trajectory under Netanyahu is taking the state towards a Jewish fundamentalism that is increasingly isolationist, belligerent and indifferent to the interests of its Arab neighbours – let alone the Palestinians it occupies. Such a state is ill-suited to be a pillar of any consensual regional order. Instead, it acts as a strategic wrecking ball: shattering balances, but incapable of setting new ones.

Why Israel’s attacks are backfiring as Iranians rally around the flag Read More »

Amid this backdrop, the Gulf states must embrace their role as strategic players, not just financiers.

This means transforming their influence into leverage. They should not only rebuild the Gulf lobby in Washington to represent their interests, but also actively coordinate pressure on the Trump administration to re-engage with diplomacy, not escalation. A Qatari-Omani diplomatic bridge between the Trump administration and Tehran appears to be already in the making.

Secondly, they must draw on their diverse geopolitical partnerships. A multipolar world gives the Gulf states options outside of Washington. China and Russia may not replace the US, but their growing footprint allows for hedging strategies. Aligning more closely with Beijing on economic integration, or with Moscow on security dialogues, creates external pressure on the US to take Gulf concerns more seriously.

Finally, the Gulf states must recognise that they are indispensable not just financially or diplomatically, but also strategically. They sit at the centre of energy, trade, and the geo-strategic buffer zone between the Global East and West, as well as North and South. Their ability to mediate, to finance peace, to engage adversaries, and to balance great powers is unique. But they need to develop the confidence to use this power.

The Gulf has a choice. It can rise to shape the future of the Middle East – or be left cleaning up its ruins.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.

The US president has supported diplomacy, but recent statements suggest he may back military action as a form of coercion.

As the conflict between Iran and Israel escalates, United States President Donald Trump’s administration is offering mixed signals about whether it still backs a diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear programme.

Publicly, it has backed a negotiated agreement, and US and Iranian negotiators had planned to meet again this week. As recently as Thursday, Trump insisted in a Truth Social post: “We remain committed to a Diplomatic Resolution.”

But 14 hours later as Israel began its attacks on Iran, Trump posted that he had given Iran a 60-day deadline to reach an agreement – and that the deadline had passed. By Sunday, Trump was insisting that “Israel and Iran should make a deal” and they would with his help.

On Monday as Trump prepared to leave the Group of Seven summit in Canada early, his warnings grew more ominous: He posted that Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon and “Everyone should immediately evacuate Tehran!” The US president later denied speculation that he had returned to Washington, DC, early to negotiate a ceasefire, noting that it was for something “much bigger than that”.

Trump’s ambiguous statements have fuelled debate among analysts about the true extent of US involvement and intentions in the Israel-Iran conflict.

Debating Trump’s wink and a nod

Trump has denied any US involvement in the strikes. “The U.S. had nothing to do with the attack on Iran, tonight,” he wrote on Sunday.

Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy at the US-based Arms Control Association, said Trump’s messaging had been clear. “I think that President Trump has been very clear in his opposition to the use of military force against Iran while diplomacy was playing out. And reporting suggests that he pushed back against [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu,” she said.

Advertisement

What’s more likely, Davenport said, is that “Israel was worried that diplomacy would succeed, that it would mean a deal” and “that it did not view [this as] matching its interests and objectives regarding Iran”.

Richard Nephew, a professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, agreed, saying it was Trump’s consistent march towards a deal that troubled Israel.

“I think it is that consistency that’s actually been the thing that’s the problem,” said Nephew, who served as director for Iran at the US National Security Council from 2011 to 2013 under then-President Barack Obama.

But Ali Ansari, a professor of Iranian history at St Andrews University in Scotland, disagreed.

“The US was aware. … Even if the specific timing did surprise them, they must have been aware, so a wink is about right,” he told Al Jazeera.

“At the same time, the US view is that Israel must take the lead and should really do this on their own,” he said.

Could Trump get sucked into the conflict?

Israel is believed to have destroyed the above-ground section of Iran’s uranium enrichment facility at Natanz. The facility has enriched uranium to 60 percent purity – far above the 3.67 percent needed for nuclear power but below the 90 percent purity needed for an atomic bomb. Power loss at Natanz as a result of the Israeli strike may have also damaged the underground enrichment section at Natanz, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

But in the IAEA’s assessment, Israel did not damage Iran’s other uranium enrichment plant at Fordow, which is buried inside a mountain and also enriches uranium to 60 percent purity.

“It’s likely that Israel would need US support if it actually wanted to penetrate some of these underground facilities,” Davenport said, pointing to the largest US conventional bomb, the 13,600kg (30,000lb) Massive Ordnance Penetrator.

“[With] repeated strikes with that munition, you could likely damage or destroy some of these facilities,” Davenport said, noting that Washington “has not transferred that bomb to Israel”.

Barbara Slavin, a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center, a US-based think tank, also told Al Jazeera that Israel would need US weapons to complete its stated mission of destroying Iran’s nuclear programme.

Nephew, for one, did not discount the chances of that happening.

“We know that [Trump] likes to be on the side of winners. To the extent that he perceives the Israelis as winners right now, that is the reason why he is maintaining his position and why I think we have a wink [to Israel],” he said.

Advertisement

On Friday, the US flew a large number of midair-refuelling planes to the Middle East and ordered the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz to sail there. On Tuesday, it announced it was sending more warplanes to the region.

Ansari agreed that the initial success of Israel’s attacks could mean that “Trump is tempted to join in just to get some of the glory,” but he thinks this could force Iran to stand down.

“It may well be that the US does join in on an attack on Fordow although I think even the genuine threat of an American attack will bring the Iranians to the table,” Ansari said. “They can concede – with honour – to the United States; they can’t to Israel, though they may have no choice.”

Wary of American involvement, US Senator Tim Kaine introduced a war powers resolution on Monday that would require the US Congress to authorise any military action against Iran.

“It is not in our national security interest to get into a war with Iran unless that war is absolutely necessary to defend the United States,” Kaine said.

Diplomacy vs force

Obama did not believe a military solution was attractive or feasible for Iran’s nuclear programme, and he opted for a diplomatic process that resulted in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. That agreement called for the IAEA to monitor all of Iran’s nuclear activities to ensure that uranium enrichment only reached the levels required for energy production.

According to Nephew and Davenport, Trump indirectly fanned the flames of the military option when he pulled the US out of the JCPOA as president in 2018 at Israel’s behest.

Two years later, Iran said it would enrich uranium to 4.5 percent purity, and in 2021, it refined it to 20 percent purity. In 2023, the IAEA said it had found uranium particles at Fordow enriched to 83.7 percent purity.

Trump offered no alternative to the JCPOA during his first presidential term, nor did President Joe Biden after him.

“Setting [the JCPOA] on fire was a direct contribution to where we are today,” Nephew said. Seeking a military path instead of a diplomatic one to curtail a nuclear programme “contributes to a proliferation path”, he said, “because countries say, ‘The only way I can protect myself is if I go down this path.’”

Davenport, an expert on the nuclear and missile programmes of Iran and North Korea, said even the regime change in Tehran that Netanyahu has called for wouldn’t solve the problem.

“Regime change is not an assured nonproliferation strategy,” she said. “We don’t know what would come next in Iran if this regime were to fall. If it were the military seizing control, nuclear weapons might be more likely. But even if it were a more open democratic government, democracies choose to build nuclear weapons too.”

Trump has left the G7 early – what are his options for dealing with Iran?

5 days ago Share Save Tom Bateman State Department correspondent Share Save

Getty Images

President Trump’s comments on the Israel-Iran conflict have veered from full throated support for Israel’s strikes to strongly distancing himself from them, and back again. His ambiguity has added to the sense of uncertainty as the fighting itself escalates – as has his departure from the G7 in Canada. He simply said he had “big stuff” to return to in Washington. The White House said his departure was to do with “what’s going on in the Middle East”, while later on Truth Social he said it had “nothing to do with a Cease Fire”. Earlier, the Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the attacks were “fully coordinated” with the US. So what factors are weighing on Trump and, crucially, what are his options now? Follow live updates on Israel-Iran conflict here

1. Bowing to Netanyahu pressure and escalating

As Israeli missiles hit Tehran on Thursday, Trump threatened Iran’s leaders with “even more brutal” attacks from his Israeli ally armed with American bombs. We know Trump’s ultimate objective. He says, like Netanyahu, that Iran can’t have a nuclear bomb. Crucially, he has said his preferred option (unlike Netanyahu) is via a deal between the US and Iran (this route also reflects his self-described image as a world-class dealmaker). But he has equivocated over how to get there, sometimes leaning into the threat of force, other times pushing the diplomacy. Last week he even said in the same breath that an Israeli attack on Iran would help a deal or it would “blow it”. Where is Israel’s operation heading?

His unpredictability is sometimes portrayed by his supporters after the fact as strategic – the so-called “madman” theory of foreign relations. This theory is one that has previously been used to describe Trump’s negotiating tactics and suggests that deliberate uncertainty or unpredictability about escalation works to coerce adversaries (or even allies in Trump’s case) into complying. It was famously attributed to some of the Cold War practices of President Richard Nixon. Some of Trump’s advisers and supporters back the “maximum pressure” side of the madman theory when it comes to his approach to Iran. They think the threats will in the end prevail because, they argue, Iran is not serious about negotiating (even though in 2015 the country signed an Obama-led nuclear deal that Trump later pulled out of).

Getty Images Smoke rises from explosion at state broadcasting building in Tehran

Netanyahu has applied constant pressure on Trump to go down the military not diplomatic path, and the US president – despite his oft-stated desire to win the Nobel Peace Prize – may in the end see a need to deliver on his more belligerent threats to Tehran’s leadership Israel may also push harder behind the scenes for American involvement to, as it sees it, to finish the job. The US has bunker buster bombs Israel believes can destroy Iran’s underground uranium enrichment site at Fordow. As the fighting escalates, so does the pressure on Trump from the hawkish camp of Republicans in Congress who have long called for regime change in Iran. Trump will also see the argument that it could force the Iranians into negotiating with him with a now weaker hand. But the fact remains that the Iranians already were at that table, as a sixth round of talks due with Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff had been planned in Oman on Sunday. The talks are now abandoned.

2. The middle ground – holding the course

So far, Trump has reiterated that the US is not involved in Israel’s attacks. Escalation comes with significant and potentially legacy-defining risks for Trump. American naval destroyers and ground based missile batteries are already helping in Israel’s defence against the Iranian retaliation. Some of Trump’s advisers at the National Security Council are likely to be cautioning against him doing anything that could add to the intensity of Israel’s attacks on Iran in the immediate days, especially with some Iranian missiles breaching Israeli-US defences to deadly effect. ‘Don’t let beautiful Tehran become Gaza’

Israelis in neighbourhood struck by missile back war Netanyahu is now arguing that targeting Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would end, not escalate, the conflict. But an anonymous US official briefed to some news outlets at the weekend that Trump made clear he was against such a move.

Getty Images Iranian ballistic missiles hit buildings in Tel Aviv

3. Listening to the Maga voices and pulling back

One of the big political factors playing on Trump’s mind is his domestic support. Most Republicans in Congress still staunchly back Israel, including continued American arms supplies to the country. Many have vocally backed Israel’s attacks on Iran. But there are key voices within Trump’s Make America Great Again (Maga) movement who now outright reject this traditional “ironclad” support for Israel. Over the last few days they’ve asked why the US is risking being drawn into a Middle East war given Trump’s “America First” foreign policy promise. The pro-Trump journalist Tucker Carlson wrote a stinging criticism on Friday saying the administration’s claims not to be involved weren’t true, and that the US should “drop Israel”. He suggested Mr Netanyahu “and his war-hungry government” were acting in a way that would drag in US troops to fight on his behalf. Carlson wrote: “Engaging in it would be a middle finger in the faces of the millions of voters who cast their ballots in hopes of creating a government that would finally put the United States first.” Similarly, the staunch Trump loyalist US representative Marjorie Taylor Greene posted on X that: “Anyone slobbering for the US to become fully involved in the Israel/Iran war is not America First/MAGA”.

Joseph Capurso, head of international and sustainable economics at Commonwealth Bank, says the conflict in the Middle East is a “stagflation risk” to the world economy.

‘Stagflation’ is a situation in which you have stagnant or declining economic activity with high and rising inflation at the same time.

The global economy famously suffered from stagflation in the 1970s thanks to multiple oil crises in the Middle East, coupled with the Vietnam War, and US president Richard Nixon’s unilateral cancellation of US dollar convertibility to gold (the ‘Nixon Shock’) which brought the Bretton Woods system to an end.

Mr Capurso has circulated a detailed note that looks at the major issues facing the global economy at the moment.

He’s a summary of what it says.

Conflict in the Middle East:

Around 20% of global oil supply transit through the Straits of Hormuz. Iran’s navy has the capacity to close the Straits if it chooses. The oil market has started to price the risk of a cut to world oil supply. Lower oil supply and higher prices are a constraint on global economic activity. A supply-induced lift in oil prices is like a tax, particularly for net energy importers such as Japan and Europe, because oil is difficult to substitute in the short term. Sustained higher oil prices are likely to also dampen consumer and business confidence. Central banks typically ignore energy price spikes. Energy prices are not typically a major driver of intermediate input cost increases for US businesses. However, inflation has been too high for too long in many economies. Central banks will be concerned that another temporary increase in inflation could spill over to inflation expectations. High inflation expectations could embed high inflation outcomes if workers demand increased wages in compensation or businesses use energy prices as a reason to expand their profit margins.

US economy:

The Federal Reserve has been concerned for several years that inflation has been too far above its 2%/yr target for too long. The Federal Reserve worries that high inflation outcomes will spill over to high inflation expectations that in turn embed high inflation. Some measures of long run inflation expectations in the US are very high. So the concern is real. The conflict in the Middle East is a negative for US consumers that largely drive the US economy. The chance of a large increase in retail petrol (gasoline) prices is higher than normal because US inventories of oil and oil product are low. Another inflation spike is the last thing the Federal Reserve wants. A sustained increase in energy prices will discourage the Federal Reserve from cutting the Funds rate. We are comfortable with our view the FOMC will next cut the Funds rate in October rather than market pricing that favours September.

Australian economy:

The conflict in the Middle East impacts Australia and the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) in a more nuanced way. The RBA largely sees upside risks from inflation in the rear view mirror and the trade war as having a disinflationary pulse for Australia. Higher oil prices and eventually energy prices must be seen in this context. We expect the RBA to cut the cash rate in August, but the balance of risks has shifted towards July. Continued offshore uncertainty will also weigh on the RBA’s decision. A lift in oil prices will eventually lift gas prices too. Higher gas prices impact Australia in two ways. First, higher gas prices increase export revenue. LNG is a major Australian export. Second, higher gas prices increase electricity prices. Australia’s domestic gas prices are the marginal cost for electricity generation. Australia’s domestic gas prices are linked to global prices. Therefore, Australian electricity prices will in time be influenced by higher oil prices. But prices will need to be higher for a sustained period.

Chinese economy:

The Chinese economy continues to expand at a good but not great growth rate. Government incentives and the labour day holiday supported consumer spending in May. If the past is any guide to the future, growth in consumer spending will slow again after the end of the subsidies.

US tariff policy:

The strikes meant to prevent Iran from going nuclear may instead push it to build the bomb – and draw the region into wider conflict.

Historians may well mark June 13, 2025, as the day the world crossed a line it may not easily step back from. In a move that shocked the international community and sent global markets reeling, Israel launched a wide-scale military operation against Iran in the early hours of the morning, striking targets across at least 12 provinces, including the capital, Tehran, and the northwestern hub of Tabriz. Among the targets were suspected nuclear facilities, air defence systems, and the homes and offices of senior military personnel. Iranian state media confirmed the deaths of several top commanders in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The Israeli government officially confirmed responsibility for the attacks, naming the campaign Operation Raising Lion. Iranian officials described it as the most direct act of war in the countries’ decades-long shadow conflict.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appears to be pursuing two objectives. First, Israeli officials fear that Iran is nearing the technical capability to build a nuclear weapon – something Netanyahu has repeatedly promised to prevent, by force if necessary. Second, Israel hopes a dramatic escalation will pressure Tehran into accepting a new nuclear agreement more favourable to United States and Israeli interests, including the removal of its enriched uranium stockpiles. Just as Netanyahu has failed to destroy Hamas through military force, both goals may ultimately serve only to perpetuate a broader regional war.

Advertisement

While the prospect of all-out war between Iran and Israel has long loomed, Friday’s events feel dangerously different. The scale, audacity and implications of the attack – and the near-certain Iranian response – raise the spectre of a regional conflict spilling far beyond its traditional bounds.

Since the 2011 Arab Spring, a Saudi-Iranian cold war has played out across the region as each country has sought to expand its influence. That rivalry was paused through Chinese mediation in March 2023. But since October 2023, a war of attrition between Israel and Iran has unfolded through both conventional and asymmetrical means – a conflict that now threatens to define the trajectory of the Middle East for years to come.

Whether this confrontation escalates further now hinges largely on one man: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. If Iran’s supreme leader comes to view the survival of the Islamic Republic as fundamentally threatened, Tehran’s response could expand far beyond Israeli territory.

In recent months, Israeli leaders had issued repeated warnings that a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities was imminent. Intelligence assessments in Tel Aviv claimed Iran was only weeks away from acquiring the necessary components to build a nuclear weapon. Although this claim was disputed by other members of the international community, it nonetheless shaped Israel’s decision to act militarily.

At the same time, indirect negotiations between Iran and the US had been under way, focused on limiting Iran’s uranium enrichment and reducing tensions through a revised nuclear agreement. US President Donald Trump publicly supported these diplomatic efforts, describing them as preferable to what he called a potentially bloody war. However, the talks faltered when Iran refused to halt enrichment on its own soil.

The US administration, while officially opposing military escalation, reportedly gave tacit approval for a limited Israeli strike. Washington is said to have believed that such a strike could shift the balance in negotiations and send a message that Iran was not negotiating from a position of strength – similar to how Trump has framed Ukraine’s position in relation to Russia. Although US officials maintain they had advance knowledge of the attacks but did not participate operationally, both the aircraft and the bunker-busting bombs used were supplied by the US, the latter during Trump’s first term.

Initial reports from Iranian sources confirm that the strikes inflicted significant damage on centrifuge halls and enrichment pipelines at its Natanz facility. However, Iranian officials insist the nuclear programme remains intact. Iran’s nuclear infrastructure includes multiple deeply buried sites – some more than 500 metres (550 yards) underground and spread across distances exceeding 1,000km (620 miles). As a result, the total destruction of the programme by air strikes alone in this initial phase appears unlikely.

Advertisement

Iranian officials have long warned that any direct military aggression on their territory by Israel would cross a red line, and they have promised severe retaliation. Now, with blood spilled on its soil and key targets destroyed, Khamenei faces enormous internal and external pressure to respond. The elimination of multiple high-ranking military officials in a single night has further intensified the demand for a multifaceted response.

Iran’s reply so far has taken the form of another wave of drone attacks, similar to those launched in April and October – most of which were intercepted by Israeli and Jordanian defences.

If Iran does not engage with the US at the upcoming talks in Oman on Sunday regarding a possible nuclear deal, the failure of diplomacy could mark the start of a sustained campaign. The Iranian government has stated that it does not view the Israeli operation as an isolated incident, but rather as the beginning of a longer conflict. Referring to it as a “war of attrition” – a term also used to describe Iran’s drawn-out war with Iraq in the 1980s – officials have indicated the confrontation is likely to unfold over weeks or even months.

While retaliatory missile and drone strikes on Israeli targets are likely to continue, many now anticipate that Iran could also target US military bases in the Gulf, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and even Jordan. Such an escalation would likely draw US forces directly into the conflict, implicate critical regional infrastructure and disrupt global oil supplies, particularly through the Strait of Hormuz. That, in turn, could trigger a steep rise in energy prices and send global markets spiralling – dragging in the interests of nearly every major power.

Even if an immediate, proportionate military response proves difficult, Iran is expected to act across several domains, including cyberattacks, proxy warfare and political manoeuvring. Among the political options reportedly under consideration is a full withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Iran has long used the NPT framework to assert that its nuclear programme is peaceful. Exiting the treaty would signal a significant policy shift. Additionally, there is growing speculation within Iran’s political circles that the religious decree issued by Khamenei banning the development and use of nuclear weapons may be reconsidered. If that prohibition is lifted, Iran could pursue a nuclear deterrent openly for the first time.

Whether Israel’s strikes succeeded in delaying Iran’s nuclear ambitions – or instead provoked Tehran to accelerate them – remains uncertain. What is clear is that the confrontation has entered a new phase. Should Iran exit the NPT and begin advancing its nuclear programme without the constraints of international agreements, some may argue that Israel’s campaign – intended to stop a bomb – may instead end up accelerating its creation.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.