Exclusive: Iranian retaliation against US attack ‘most probably’ hours away
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Diverging Reports Breakdown
Where the U.S. Could Face More Retaliation From Iran
Iran fired 14 ballistic missiles at the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, one of the largest U.S. installations in the Middle East. The rapid escalation marks a dangerous new phase in the widening conflict. Analysts warn that Iran, armed with a deep arsenal and a regional web of proxy forces, is still weighing its next moves. Iran has threatened to choke off the vital Strait of Hormuz, a narrow maritime corridor between Iran and Oman through which nearly 20% of the world’s traded oil passes. The Iranian Parliament on Sunday approved a measure to close the strait, a move that would likely send global oil prices skyrocketing, shaking energy markets, and putting pressure on Washington from allies and consumers alike. The State Department has issued a series of warnings in recent days urging Americans abroad to exercise “increased caution” and ordering the departure of nonessential staff from diplomatic missions in Iraq and Lebanon. In Qatar, where the missiles were fired, embassy officials advised American citizens to shelter in place.
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President Donald Trump dismissed Tehran’s attack as a “very weak response,” saying the U.S. had been warned by Iran in advance. “Most importantly, they’ve gotten it all out of their ‘system,’ and there will, hopefully, be no further HATE,” he posted on Truth Social. Trump also suggested that Iran might now “proceed to Peace and Harmony” and said he would encourage Israel to do the same. But even as both Tehran and Washington signal interest in avoiding an all-out war, fears remain that the conflict is far from over. Analysts warn that Iran, armed with a deep arsenal and a regional web of proxy forces, is still weighing its next moves—ones that could target global energy supplies, U.S. military installations, or even escalate its nuclear program. Iran has threatened to choke off the vital Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly a quarter of the world’s oil supply flows, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has warned of the potential for Iranian-backed cyber attacks and terrorism on American soil.
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The rapid escalation marks a dangerous new phase in the widening conflict. The State Department has issued a series of warnings in recent days urging Americans abroad to exercise “increased caution” and ordering the departure of nonessential staff from diplomatic missions in Iraq and Lebanon. In Qatar, where the missiles were fired, embassy officials advised American citizens to shelter in place. Here’s a look at how Iran could retaliate after the U.S. strikes on its nuclear program. Targeting the Strait of Hormuz While there have been no major disruptions to the global oil supply so far, many fear that Iran could retaliate in part by disrupting shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow maritime corridor between Iran and Oman through which nearly 20% of the world’s traded oil passes. The strait is a vital artery for global energy markets—and a vulnerability that Iran has long threatened to exploit. The Iranian Parliament on Sunday approved a measure to close the Strait of Hormuz, a move that would likely send global oil prices skyrocketing, shaking energy markets, and putting pressure on Washington from allies and consumers alike.
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“EVERYONE, KEEP OIL PRICES DOWN. I’M WATCHING! YOU’RE PLAYING RIGHT INTO THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY. DON’T DO IT!,” Trump posted Monday on Truth Social. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Sunday urged China to intervene to prevent Iran from closing the Strait of Hormuz, which can handle the world’s largest crude oil tankers. Very few alternatives exist if the strait is closed, making it a critical choke point for oil shipments. Around 20 million barrels flowed through the strait in 2024. Attacks on U.S. military bases In addition to the strike on Al Udeid, Iran has indicated it could target other U.S. military installations across the region—many of them far closer than Israel and potentially more vulnerable to rapid missile or drone attacks. Abbas Araghchi, the Iranian foreign minister, posted on X that Iran had a legitimate right to respond to U.S. attacks on its nuclear facilities and warned that “Iran reserves all options to defend its sovereignty, interest, and people.” Trump previously warned that Iranian retaliation against U.S. assets “will be met with even greater force than what was unleashed” in Saturday’s strikes.
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The United States maintains tens of thousands of troops across the Middle East, including at permanent bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates. While these bases are outfitted with sophisticated air defense systems, Iran’s expanding arsenal of drones and short-range ballistic missiles could pose a threat. Just before the explosions at Al Udeid, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian framed Monday’s missile strike as a calibrated response: “We neither initiated the war nor wanted it,” he wrote on X in Persian. “But we will not leave the aggression against the great Iran unanswered.” In addition to potentially striking American military bases across the Middle East, Iran may also consider striking oil infrastructure in Gulf states allied with the United States.
Lon Tweeten for TIME (Source: Google Earth, AirbusData SIO, NOAA, U.S. Navy, NGA, GEBCOLandsat / Copernicus)
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American vessels in the Red sea Another way Iran may retaliate is by calling on its regional partners to target U.S. naval and commercial vessels in the Red Sea, a major artery for global trade and energy shipments. The Houthis, who are backed by Iran and control large parts of Yemen’s western coastline, have already shown their ability to strike vessels transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the narrow chokepoint connecting the Red Sea to the Arabian Sea. Earlier this year, the Houthis launched dozens of missile and drone attacks against American ships and commercial tankers, prompting shipping routes to be temporarily shut down. The Trump Administration reached a ceasefire with the Houthis in May, but the Houthis said at the time they would resume attacks in the Red Sea if the U.S. entered the war. Asymmetric attacks The U.S. intelligence community is also worried about the potential for asymmetric retaliation from Iran, which could involve cyberattacks on American infrastructure, terrorist plots against U.S. or allied targets overseas, or covert operations carried out through proxy groups.
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The Department of Homeland Security on Sunday issued a bulletin warning of a “heightened threat environment” within the U.S. linked to Iranian actors. The warning said that Iranian-backed hackers “routinely target poorly secured U.S. networks and Internet-connected devices for disruptive cyber attacks” and that “low-level cyber attacks” are likely as a response to the American bombing. DHS is also monitoring for signs of potential terrorist attacks orchestrated by Iranian operatives or their partners abroad. Iran has a long history of sponsoring or supporting bombings and assassinations far from its borders, and had plotted to assassinate Trump after he ordered the assassination of Gen. Qasem Soleimani, who led the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force. “Iran also has a long-standing commitment to target U.S. Government officials it views as responsible for the death of an Iranian military commander killed in January 2020,” the DHS bulletin warning reads. “The likelihood of violent extremists in the Homeland independently mobilizing to violence in response to the conflict would likely increase if Iranian leadership issued a religious ruling calling for retaliatory violence against targets in the Homeland. Multiple recent Homeland terrorist attacks have been motivated by anti-Semitic or anti-Israel sentiment, and the ongoing Israel-Iran conflict could contribute to US-based individuals plotting additional attacks.”
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—Brian Bennett contributed reporting
Iran cyberattacks against US more likely after air strikes
The US Department of Homeland Security has warned of a “heightened threat environment” in the United States. These threats include both physical and cyber attacks from Iran and “violent extremists in the Homeland” The latter would likely increase “if Iranian leadership issued a religious ruling calling for retaliatory violence” against American targets, the security alert said. “I expect the Iranian retaliation to come in the form of Iran launching destructive wiper and malware cyberattacks against US government websites,” said James Turgal, a 22-year FBI veteran and VP of global cyber risk at Optiv. “The impacts may still be very serious for individual enterprises, which can prepare by taking many of the same steps they would to prevent ransomware,” he added. “Iran already targets the US with cyberespionage which they use to directly and indirectly gather geopolitical insight and surveil persons of interest,” Hultquist said. The Iranian government has also targeted critics of its regime who are based in the U.S., including former National Security Advisor John Bolton.
In a Sunday terrorism advisory, the department warned of a “heightened threat environment in the United States” following the American airstrikes against Iranian nuclear facilities over the weekend. These threats include both physical and cyber attacks from Iran and “violent extremists in the Homeland,” according to DHS.
The latter would likely increase “if Iranian leadership issued a religious ruling calling for retaliatory violence” against American targets, the security alert said.
“Both hacktivists and Iranian government-affiliated actors routinely target poorly secured US networks and Internet-connected devices for disruptive cyber attacks,” it noted.
While Tehran has the capacity to carry out destructive cyberattacks, its success and technical sophistication have thus far proven to be limited.
In 2023, Iran’s CyberAv3ngers, which the feds have linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, broke into multiple US water systems using default passwords for internet-accessible programmable logic controllers. Later that year, in another round of attacks, the group used custom malware to remotely control US and Israel-based water and fuel management systems.
But despite gaining access to these critical systems, they didn’t do much other than posting bragging videos on their Telegram channels.
I expect the Iranian retaliation to come in the form of Iran launching destructive wiper and malware cyberattacks against US government websites, the financial services sector and critical infrastructure entities
“Iran has had mixed results with disruptive cyberattacks and they frequently fabricate and exaggerate their effects in an effort to boost their psychological impact.” John Hultquist, chief analyst at Google Threat Intelligence Group, said in an email to The Register.
“We should be careful not to overestimate these incidents and inadvertently assist the actors,” he added. “The impacts may still be very serious for individual enterprises, which can prepare by taking many of the same steps they would to prevent ransomware.”
In fact, Iran’s government-backed crews have dabbled in ransomware in recent years, too.
“From a strictly cyber point of view, I expect the Iranian retaliation to come in the form of Iran launching destructive wiper and malware cyberattacks against US government websites, the financial services sector, and critical infrastructure entities, such as power and water treatment facilities,” James Turgal, a 22-year FBI veteran and VP of global cyber risk at Optiv, told The Register.
“Another type of attack which has already been reported is DDoS [distributed denial of service] campaigns,” Turgal added. “The Iran-aligned hacking group 313 Team took credit for a DDoS attack on Truth Social within hours of US strikes on the three Iranian nuclear facilities.”
Turgal also anticipates disinformation and media attacks, including website defacement and deepfake propaganda videos along the lines of what we saw from Russian cyber operatives early on during that country’s Ukraine invasion.
There are indications that these types of incidents are already underway, as national security think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies on Friday said it uncovered Iranian accounts posing as Israelis on Telegram and X, and posting demoralizing messages in Hebrew. While this particular campaign targets the Israeli public, Turgal said Americans could be susceptible to similar psychological operations.
“Since a large number of Americans, approximately 62 percent, claim they get their news from social media platforms, such platforms will be bombarded with counter-narrative campaigns, misinformation and disinformation about the extent of the damage caused by the US strikes and other anti-American sentiment,” Turgal said.
Meanwhile, the IRGC’s cyber groups have been abusing network flaws and creating fake social media personas for spying and credential and sensitive info stealing for years.
“Iran already targets the US with cyberespionage which they use to directly and indirectly gather geopolitical insight and surveil persons of interest,” Hultquist said.
“Persons and individuals associated with Iran policy are frequently targeted through organizational and personal accounts and should be on the lookout for social engineering schemes,” he continued. “Individuals are also targeted indirectly by Iranian cyberespionage against telecoms, airlines, hospitality, and other organizations who have data that can be used to identify and track person.”
While the IRGC’s cyberspy arm is adept at spear phishing its way into US companies and federal government departments for espionage purposes, this Iranian military branch has previously conducted assassination attempts against Americans, including former National Security Advisor John Bolton. As such, physical violence against citizens also remains a risk.
“US law enforcement has disrupted multiple potentially lethal Iranian-backed plots in the United States since 2020,” according to DHS. “During this timeframe, the Iranian government has also unsuccessfully targeted critics of its regime who are based in the Homeland for lethal attack.” ®
Iran Update Special Report, June 23, 2025, Morning Edition
The Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted airstrikes on June 23 targeting roads leading to the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) in order to “disrupt” access to the site. Israeli strikes on access roads to Fordow may prevent Iran from being able to assess damage at Fordow or move materials from the site to another location. CTP-ISW is tracking early reports of Iranian missile attacks on US forces in Qatar and Iraq at the time of this publication. The IDF has continued to target Iranian internal security and social control institutions in Tehran. The Basij is a paramilitary organization that recruits and organizes regime loyalists and uses them to produce and disseminate propaganda, suppress internal dissent, and conduct civil defense operations. The US Treasury sanctioned IRIB and added it to the Specially Designated National (SDN) list in 2013. There are reports of Israeli airstrikes targeting the Tehran Power Company and a building at or near the Energy Ministry. Electricity disruptions, particularly during hot summer temperatures, could threaten regime stability.
Information Cutoff: 5:00 AM ET
The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) are publishing multiple updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on the exchange of fire between Iran and Israel. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.
Click here to see ISW-CTP’s interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.
NOTE: CTP-ISW is tracking early reports of Iranian missile attacks on US forces in Qatar and Iraq at the time of this publication. CTP-ISW will cover these events in our evening edition. We have published an assessment of Iran’s calculus and response options here.
Key Takeaways
The Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted airstrikes on June 23 targeting roads leading to the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) in order to “disrupt” access to the site. Israeli strikes on access roads to Fordow may prevent Iran from being able to assess damage at Fordow or move materials from the site to another location.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued to target Iranian internal security and social control institutions in Tehran. The IDF targeted the Basij headquarters in Tehran. The IDF also struck Evin Prison, which is Iran’s primary facility for holding regime dissidents. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF struck the prison’s entrances to facilitate the escape of regime dissidents.
The Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted airstrikes on June 23 targeting roads leading to the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) in order to “disrupt” access to the site.[6] These strikes mark the first time that CTP-ISW has recorded Israeli airstrikes targeting access roads to Fordow. The IDF struck air defenses that protected Fordow during the initial days of the Israeli air campaign.[7] The Israeli strikes on access roads come after the United States struck Fordow with bunker-buster bombs on June 21.[8] The chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that Fordow, Natanz, and an unspecified nuclear facility in Esfahan sustained “extreme damage” from the US strikes.[9] Israeli officials echoed this statement but noted that the Fordow nuclear facility was “not destroyed.”[10] Israeli strikes on access roads to Fordow may prevent Iran from being able to assess damage at Fordow or move materials from the site to another location. Israeli officials told the New York Times on June 22 that Iran may have moved materials and equipment from Fordow ahead of the US strikes.[11]
The IDF has continued to target Iranian internal security and social control institutions in Tehran. The IDF targeted the Basij headquarters in Tehran.[12] The Basij is a paramilitary organization that recruits and organizes regime loyalists and uses them to produce and disseminate propaganda, suppress internal dissent, and conduct civil defense operations.[13] The IDF previously targeted the Basij headquarters in Esfahan on June 17.[14] The IDF also struck Evin Prison, which is Iran’s primary facility for holding regime dissidents.[15] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF struck the prison’s entrances to facilitate the escape of regime dissidents.[16] Iranian media reported that Israeli airstrikes damaged a power feeder in Evin District, causing a power outage in the area.[17] An open-source watcher reported that the IDF targeted the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) headquarters, a state-controlled media outlet that the regime uses to disseminate propaganda.[18] The US Treasury sanctioned IRIB and added it to the Specially Designated National (SDN) list in 2013.[19] The IDF previously targeted the IRIB headquarters on June 16.[20]
There are unverified reports of Israeli airstrikes targeting the Tehran Power Distribution Company and a building at or near the Energy Ministry.[21] Electricity disruptions, particularly during hot summer temperatures, could fuel internal unrest and stoke protests, which could in turn threaten regime stability.
The IDF targeted the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Sarallah Operational Base and other IRGC headquarters in Tehran.[22] The Sarallah Operational Base is responsible for security in Tehran and oversees the 10th Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Division in Karaj, Alborz Province, and the 27th Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Operational Division in Tehran City.[23] The headquarters has historically played a significant role in suppressing internal dissent.[24] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF estimates that it killed many IRGC personnel in its recent strikes on IRGC facilities, given that the IDF did not issue evacuation warnings ahead of the strikes.[25]
The IDF struck military infrastructure in Tehran. The IDF struck a surface-to-air missile launcher in the “heart of Tehran.”[26] CTP-ISW is monitoring additional reports of IDF strikes in Tehran after its 5:00 AM ET data cutoff for this update. CTP-ISW will cover these strikes in its June 23 evening update.
The IDF conducted a series of airstrikes in western Iran on June 22 targeting missile launchers, missile storage facilities, and satellite and radar sites.[27] The IDF said that it struck positions in Kermanshah and Hamedan.[28]
Iran has conducted at least four ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff at 5:00 PM ET on June 22.[29] An Israeli military correspondent reported that Iran fired six or seven missiles across four waves of attacks, citing IDF assessments.[30] An Iranian missile impacted near a power station in Ashdod.[31] A missile or fragment fell near Safed and started a fire.[32] The attacks did not cause any injuries or casualties.
The IAF intercepted a drone near Eilat before it entered Israeli airspace.[33]
[1] https://amwaj.media/en/media-monitor/exclusive-iranian-retaliation-against-us-forces-most-probably-hours-away
[2] https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1937144830896877705
[3] https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/1937031939732668460
[4] https://x.com/mehrnews_ir/status/1936789878735282619
[5] https://www.nbcnews.com/nightly-news/video/u-s-officials-iran-threatened-terror-attacks-inside-u-s-242058821681
[6] https://x.com/IAFsite/status/1937100320556937347
[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-edition-israeli-strikes-iran-june-13-2025-200-pm-et
[8] https://www.axios.com/2025/06/21/us-strike-iran-nuclear-israel-trump
[9] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4222543/secretary-of-defense-pete-hegseth-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-gen/
[10] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/22/world/middleeast/iran-fordo-nuclear-damaged-not-destroyed.html?smid=url-share
[11] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/22/world/middleeast/iran-fordo-nuclear-damaged-not-destroyed.html?smid=url-sha
[13] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/explainer-the-iranian-armed-forces
[14] https://t.me/BenTzionM/5116
[15] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1937079090864865516
[16] https://t.me/moriahdoron/23581
[17] https://x.com/mehrnews_ir/status/1937073620213264455
[18] https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1937073822588362774
[19] https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20130206_33
[20] https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/1934648422738620897
[21] https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1937072736871797069 ; https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1937068784826937535
[22] https://t.me/moriahdoron/23585; https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/iran-news/article-858648
[23] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200121-Report-Iran%E2%80%99s-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf
[24] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/murmurs-second-cultural-revolution
[25] https://t.me/moriahdoron/23588
[26] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936885128245940475
[27] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936885128245940475
[28] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936885128245940475
[29] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936938282165862723 ;
[30] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1937062299233046772
[31] https://x.com/andynovy/status/1937057924381102573
[32] https://x.com/i24NEWS_EN/status/1937070603330056521
[33] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936977151988810014
Iranian Calculus and Response Options following the US strikes
The United States struck and severely damaged three Iranian nuclear sites on June 21. Israel has conducted its own strike campaign into Iran, targeting the nuclear program, military and security sites, energy infrastructure, and key leaders. The US and Israeli efforts combined amount to the most serious blow to the Islamic Republic since its war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in the 1980s. CTP-ISW is tracking early reports of Iranian missile attacks on US forces in Qatar and Iraq at the time of this publication. The following is an assessment that examines these factors and what key decisions Tehran is facing and how it will likely proceed. The assessment assumes that Khamenei will maintain his past calculus and decision-making tendencies. If Khamenei concludes that the Iranian nuclear program,. missile arsenal, and Axis of Resistance are no longer critical to regime survival, he may acquiesce to US demands. Khamenei may instead therefore, calculate that the best approach to preserving his regime, which is his foremost priority, is continuing to fight and resist.
June 23, 2025
NOTE: CTP-ISW is tracking early reports of Iranian missile attacks on US forces in Qatar and Iraq at the time of this publication. CTP-ISW will cover these events in our twice daily Iran Updates found here.
Iranian leaders are currently calibrating their response to the United States’ striking their nuclear program. How they ultimately respond will depend on what they conclude is necessary to preserve the Islamic Republic and ensure its longevity. That conclusion will, in turn, derive from how Iranian leaders understand their current situation and their risk tolerance. The following is an assessment that examines these factors and what key decisions Tehran is facing and how it will likely proceed.
Context
The United States struck and severely damaged three Iranian nuclear sites on June 21, using Massive Ordnance Penetrator bunker busters and Tomahawk cruise missiles.[1] The United States targeted the two primary Iranian enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow as well as a third site that stored processed uranium.[2] The US strikes likely destroyed a considerable portion of the Iranian enriched uranium stockpile and cascades of centrifuges. Though Iran appears to have moved some of its nuclear material and equipment to other undisclosed sites beforehand, the US strikes have likely disrupted the Iranian nuclear program considerably.[3] The US strikes came as Israel has conducted its own strike campaign into Iran, targeting the nuclear program, military and security sites, energy infrastructure, and key leaders. The US and Israeli efforts combined amount to the most serious blow to the Islamic Republic since its war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in the 1980s.
Senior Iranian officials have responded by vowing retaliation against the United States. Unspecified US officials have said that Iran could attack US forces in the Middle East in the coming days, while others have suggested that an attack could be imminent.[4]
Iranian Considerations
Iranian leaders have limited options in responding to the United States. They could, of course, grant concessions on their nuclear program as well as possibly on their missile capabilities and extraterritorial activities, as the United States has demanded. But Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would likely consider such concessions to be tantamount to surrender and another step toward the weakening of his regime. Khamenei has long relied on the Iranian nuclear program, missile arsenal, and so-called “Axis of Resistance” as his chief means of projecting power and threatening adversaries. Compromising on these fundamental tenets of Iranian strategy would substantially erode Iranian military power. Khamenei may be especially averse to such concessions now, while his regime faces the unprecedented challenge of simultaneous US and Israeli strikes. Some Iranian officials appear amenable to compromise with the United States, given that the nuclear program, missiles, and proxy and partner forces have demonstrably failed to deter attacks on Iran.[5] But Khamenei himself has shown no sign of considering such concessions at this time. Khamenei may instead therefore, calculate that the best approach to preserving his regime, which is his foremost priority, is continuing to fight and resist.
This assessment assumes that Khamenei will maintain his past calculus and decision-making tendencies. Khamenei faces an unprecedented circumstance, however, which could lead him to break from his past patterns of behavior. If Khamenei concludes that the Iranian nuclear program, missile arsenal, and Axis of Resistance are no longer critical to regime survival, he may acquiesce to US demands.
Assuming Khamenei decides to continue fighting, he will likely base his ultimate decision on several factors in mind. These factors include:
His desire to avoid further escalation with the United States. Khamenei seeks to rebuild deterrence vis-à-vis the United States and Israel but without inviting further escalation. Khamenei, therefore, needs to balance between using sufficient force to deter while also avoiding any attack that drives the United States and Israel to hit back harder. Striking this balance will be extremely difficult—if not impossible. The disruption to the military command. Khamenei will need to calibrate his response without the key generals on whom he has relied for decades for advice. The Israeli killing of senior Iranian military officers deprives Khamenei of these trusted subordinates and induces a temporary disruption to the chain of command.[6] Khamenei will likely face friction here, as he lacks the same personal rapport with the new cadre of commanders. The precarious domestic situation. Khamenei is considering a major military undertaking against the United States, while his regime is increasingly unstable domestically. Israeli strikes have targeted Iranian energy infrastructure and sites tied to domestic surveillance and social control.[7] These strikes have caused severe economic disruption and degraded the regime’s ability to repress its increasingly restive population. The overall degradation of Iranian Capabilities. Iran has lost many of its levers of power over the past 19 months. The Axis of Resistance is ill-positioned to fight a large-scale war against the United States, as it is exhausted from many months of fighting Israel.[8] Israeli strikes have, moreover, degraded Iranian air defenses and missile capabilities, making the regime more vulnerable than it has been in years to conventional attack.[9]
Key Decisions
Khamenei will face two key decisions as he contemplates how to respond to the United States. He must decide firstly how to retaliate (i.e., through what means). Khamenei has four real response options in this context.
Missile and drone strikes. Iran could fire a large volume of missiles and drones at US forces in the Middle East. Iranian missile forces are badly degraded, as already noted, as Israel has destroyed a significant number of the Iranian missile launchers.[10] But Iran still has enough capacity to summon a large volley of projectiles targeting US forces, especially in Iraq and around the Arabian Peninsula.[11] Militia attacks. Iran could order its proxy and partner militias to attack US forces across the region. Iran would likely look to its Iraqi militias to threaten US bases in Iraq and Syria, and look to the Houthis to threaten US naval assets around the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. These groups have previously performed these roles in support of Iranian objectives.[12] Iran has equipped both parties with advanced strike capabilities, such as missiles and drones, that they could use to target US forces.[13] Naval aggression. Iranian naval forces have emerged largely unscathed from the war with Israel. Iranian officials have openly threatened to “close the Strait of Hormuz” in recent days, which in practice would likely involve using naval assets and coastal systems to attack international shipping.[14] The Iranian Artesh and IRGC have prioritized developing their force projection capabilities in recent years in order to threaten commerce further abroad.[15] Terror operations. Iran and Hezbollah have spent years developing a network of covert cells abroad, possibly including in some Western and Latin American countries. Iranian officials have threatened explicitly to activate these cells to conduct terror attacks in the United States in retaliation for the US strikes.[16] There is precedent for Iran trying to use covert cells to conduct terror attacks on US soil.[17]
Khamenei must separately decide how much risk he is prepared to accept. Any attack against US interests and personnel will risk escalating the war further, regardless of how much force is used. Khamenei can mitigate that risk by opting for a less dramatic attack. He can alternatively decide to impose a high cost on the United States, which would carry a very high risk of escalation. Regardless of what decision he makes, any attack on US interests and personnel carries the risk of imposing serious losses, which Khamenei would accept beforehand.
Conclusion
The most likely Iranian response at this time is a tempered missile or militia attack on US forces in the Middle East. The most dangerous Iranian response would include a combination of the four options described above and seek to impose a serious cost on the United States. Even a tempered missile or militia attack would risk US casualties, which should be unacceptable for Washington. Regardless of which path Khamenei chooses, the United States must be prepared to defend its interests and personnel and take appropriate actions to deter Iranian attacks on the American people and homeland.
[1] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg9r4q99g4o
[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iaea-says-entrances-tunnels-irans-isfahan-site-hit-by-us-strike-2025-06-22/
[3] https://nypost.com/2025/06/23/world-news/satellite-images-show-trucks-lined-up-at-irans-fordo-nuclear-facility-before-us-air-strikes/
[4] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-retaliation-against-us-forces-could-come-soon-us-officials-say-2025-06-23/ ; https://amwaj.media/en/media-monitor/exclusive-iranian-retaliation-against-us-forces-most-probably-hours-away
[5] https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2025/06/inside-plot-push-khamenei-aside/683286/
[6] https://time.com/7293886/iranian-generals-scientists-targets-killed-by-israeli-strikes/
[7] https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/06/18/world/middleeast/israel-iran-strikes-facilities-map.html ; https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/israel-iran-attack-news/card/iran-s-revolutionary-guard-confirms-israel-killed-its-intelligence-chief-TyadaKWHo9IU3GPtFC1A?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAjghoFgco2hSNDK8aEfRAZUQHmwGqp9atgP5KttysE2glrZSdIJVTJ6I7grFhY%3D&gaa_ts=6859854d&gaa_sig=4XOguJMzmkYBqn95E6PrsD2pYce71BMdRt4_DtTzA3C2zafaYzo_p7eK27kAkXrtYf8crXrtZ8PLaNwJ5E8rDQ%3D%3D
[8] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-deafening-silence-of-irans-proxies
[9] https://www.axios.com/2025/06/22/trump-israel-iran-strikes-air-defenses ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/22/us/politics/iran-weapons-us-bases.html
[10] https://www.jns.org/israel-destroys-iranian-missile-launchers-used-in-morning-attack/
[11] https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2025/06/israels-attack-and-the-limits-of-irans-missile-strategy/
[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/cost-inaction-yemen; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-25-2023; https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/pivot-to-offense-how-iran-is-adapting-for-modern-conflict-and-warfare/
[13] https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/pivot-to-offense-how-iran-is-adapting-for-modern-conflict-and-warfare/; https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/yemens-houthis-and-the-expansion-of-irans-axis-of-resistance/
[14] https://www.cnbc.com/2025/06/23/irans-parliament-approves-blocking-strait-of-hormuz.html
[15] https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/pivot-to-offense-how-iran-is-adapting-for-modern-conflict-and-warfare/
[16] https://www.nbcnews.com/nightly-news/video/u-s-officials-iran-threatened-terror-attacks-inside-u-s-242058821681
[17] https://www.aipac.org/resources/26-years-since-amia-bombing-3zjsy-xzces-c9peh