Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 26, 2025 – Institute for the Study of War
How did your country report this? Share your view in the comments.
Diverging Reports Breakdown
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 22, 2025
This report includes ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool. Russia condemned the recent US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22 amid reports that Iran’s foreign minister will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on June 23. Russia is constrained in its ability to provide direct support to Iran due to its war in Ukraine and has likely resigned itself to providing diplomatic overtures for the time being. Iran’s possible decision to close the Strait of Hormuz will cause a significant spike in global oil prices, which would greatly economically and financially benefit Russia by reversing months of declining Russian oil revenue and allowing Russia to continue to finance its war against Ukraine in the medium term. Russia relies on the NWF and oil and gas revenues to finance the Russian government’s high expenditures in Ukraine, as well as the government’s allocation of 41 percent of Ukraine’s GDP to the war, according to the Russian Academy of National Economy.
June 22, 2025, 5:45 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15 am ET on June 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russia condemned the recent US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22 amid reports that Iran’s foreign minister will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on June 23. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) condemned the US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22, claiming that the US strikes are a violation of the UN Charter and that the UN Security Council is obliged to respond, while urging officials to return to diplomatic channels.[1] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that that the world will descend into chaos if countries are allowed to interpret the right to self-defense in the UN Charter as they wish.[2] Lavrov claimed that the US strikes marked a new, dangerous escalation during a phone call with Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó on June 22.[3] CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and Presidential Special Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Kirill Dmitriev claimed on June 22 that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is en route to Moscow and will meet with Putin on June 23.[4] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev responded to the US strike in social media posts, including on his English-language channels, on June 22 by claiming that US President Donald Trump has started a new war.[5] Medvedev also claimed that the United States failed to destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities, that Iran will continue to work towards the production of nuclear weapons, and that several unspecified countries are ready to “directly supply” Iran with nuclear warheads. The Kremlin typically leverages Medvedev to amplify narratives intended to stoke panic and fear among Western decisionmakers, particularly through nuclear saber rattling.[6] Medvedev’s veiled threats thus do not represent a significant rhetorical inflection. ISW continues to assess that Russia is constrained in its ability to provide direct support to Iran due to its war in Ukraine and has likely resigned itself to providing diplomatic overtures for the time being, showcasing the immediate limitations in the Russian-Iranian strategic relationship.[7]
Iran’s possible decision to close the Strait of Hormuz will cause a significant spike in global oil prices, which would greatly economically and financially benefit Russia by reversing months of declining Russian oil revenue and allowing Russia to continue to finance its war against Ukraine in the medium term. Brent crude oil futures prices closed at $77.27 on June 20, marking an 11.4 percent rise from June 12 just prior to the Israeli strikes against Iran.[8] Iran’s Parliament voted on June 22 to close the Strait, but the final decision remains with Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.[9] Oil prices will likely surge exponentially in the event that Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz, with varying reports predicting a spike to prices between $90 to $130 in a worst-case scenario.[10] Russia’s oil and gas revenue amounted to 11.1 trillion rubles ($120.3 billion) in 2024 and accounted for roughly 30 percent of Russia’s total federal revenues. Russian oil revenue has been steadily decreasing through 2025 however, with May 2025 revenues notably 34 percent lower than in 2024.[11] The Russian Finance Ministry more than tripled its budget deficit target for 2025 in May from 0.5 percent of Global Domestic Product (GDP) to 1.7 percent of GDP after several months of staggeringly low oil and gas profits.[12] The Moscow Times stated on June 9 that, according to economists from the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Russia’s high expenditures and low oil revenues could exhaust the National Wealth Fund (NWF) by 2026.[13] The Kremlin relies on the NWF and oil and gas revenues to finance its war in Ukraine, as the Russian government allocated 41 percent (roughly $178 billion) of Russia’s total 2025 federal budget towards National Security and Defense alone.[14] ISW previously assessed that Russia’s high losses on the battlefield and ongoing economic constraints could prevent Russia from continuing the war in Ukraine in the medium to long term, however a sustained surge in oil prices could keep Russia afloat economically.[15]
Russian forces have continued to pursue long-standing operational objectives on the battlefield in Ukraine throughout Spring and Summer 2025 and will likely remain committed to these objectives for the coming months. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi told journalists on June 22 that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and continued Ukrainian counterattacks in northern Sumy Oblast prevented the Russian military from redeploying 60,000 troops from Kursk Oblast to reinforce offensive operations in the Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson directions in Spring 2025.[16] Syrskyi noted that Ukraine prevented Russia from significantly intensifying offensive operations in these directions. A prominent Russian milblogger acknowledged on June 22 that Russia’s “summer offensive” has mainly consisted of the same grinding offensive operations that Russian forces began in late 2023.[17] The milblogger claimed that the situation along the frontline is unlikely to significantly change during Summer 2025 and noted that Ukrainian forces are conducting an organized defense throughout the frontline.
Russian forces are currently engaged in intense combat operations along most of the frontline in Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts and appear to be prioritizing offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast – as they have since October 2023.[18] Russian forces intensified the tempo of offensive operations in early 2025 as the United States began to engage in efforts to mediate a resolution to the war in Ukraine, and Russian forces have sustained this intensified tempo over the last five months.[19] Russian forces previously struggled to conduct simultaneous large-scale offensive operations and compensated by conducting pulsing, more limited, offensive operations along different sectors of the frontline with one sector decreasing in intensity as another sector increases.[20] Russian forces currently appear to be advancing as part of at least three simultaneous large-scale offensive operations in the Borova-Lyman, Kostyantynivka, and Novopavlivka directions, however. Russian forces also appear to be allocating significant manpower to offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast, although Ukrainian forces appear to be slowing Russian gains in that area.[21] Russian forces have failed to make significant gains during this period of intensified offensive operations, however, due in part to the fact that Russian forces are largely relying on poorly trained infantry to make gains in the face of Ukraine’s drone-based defense. The continuation of Russia’s intensified offensive operations likely represents the extent of Russia’s current offensive capacity, and Russia is unlikely to mount a distinct summer offensive operation.
Russia’s intensified force generation efforts appear to be generating a reserve force that Russia will be able to leverage in Ukraine or against NATO in the future, despite current limitations on Russia’s offensive capacity in Ukraine. Syrskyi stated on June 22 that the Russian military has approximately 695,000 troops stationed in Ukraine (including Russia’s operational reserves) and that Russia has 13 divisions and an unspecified number of regiments and brigades (totaling roughly 121,000 troops) in its strategic reserve.[22] ISW previously noted that recent Kremlin statements indicate that the Russian military may be generating enough forces to replace personnel losses and reinforce the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine despite taking significant casualties in Ukraine.[23] Syrskyi’s statements suggest that Russia is also recruiting enough forces to establish reserves not currently committed to combat, although it remains unclear if these forces are truly committable throughout the theater or if Russia intends to use the forces in a specific priority sector. Russian forces are unlikely to commit this entire reserve to the frontline in Ukraine in the near future, however. Russian forces already appear to have manpower advantage in their priority frontline areas and are mainly struggling with overcoming the 15-20 kilometer-wide contested “gray zone” that Russian and Ukrainian drone operations have created — something that a significant influx of manpower is unlikely to help address.
Russia may intend to withhold most of these forces from combat in Ukraine in preparation for a future war with a NATO member state. Syrskyi noted that Russia is preparing for a protracted war of attrition and that Russia will try to “exhaust” Ukraine with manpower advantage.[24] Syrskyi noted that Ukraine is maintaining defensive operations and conducting counterattacks in vulnerable areas of the frontline. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha reported on June 13 that Ukrainian intelligence suggests that Russia has started preparing strategic reserves, likely to use in combat operations “not only in Ukraine.”[25] ISW previously assessed that the Russian military may be prioritizing recruitment as part of longer-term efforts to build out a post-war strategic reserve for a potential future conflict with NATO.[26] The Russian military command will likely continue to build up this reserve to use in the future against Ukraine or NATO if Russia can maintain force generation rates sufficient to replace losses in Ukraine while also building out this reserve.[27]
The Kremlin continues to promote rhetoric designed to undermine Ukrainian legitimacy and sovereignty, demonstrating its steadfast commitment to the complete destruction of Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin implied on June 22 that Ukraine was merely a construct created by Vladimir Lenin and a continuation of the Bolshevik policy on “indigenization.”[28] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky echoed Putin’s sentiment by stating that the Soviet Union’s decision to transfer control of Crimea Oblast from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954 was not a “reunification,” as “there was no Ukraine, there was no statehood.”[29] These statements ignore the fact that Russia committed to respecting Ukraine’s territorial integrity, including by recognizing Crimea as part of Ukraine, in 1994 in exchange for Ukraine’s return of Soviet nuclear weapons remaining in Ukraine after the USSR’s collapse.[30] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to a question on June 22 as to why Putin often speaks about Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity as a “coup” by stating that this was the precursor to the war in Ukraine and that the West installed an illegitimate pro-Western government during this time.[31] Peskov underscored the claim that the resolution of the war in Ukraine must address the results of the “coup,” which Peskov characterized as a “root cause” of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Peskov notably ignores that then-President Viktor Yanukovych fled Ukraine during the revolution, the Ukrainian parliament legally voted to remove Yanukovych, and that Ukraine held free and fair presidential elections in mid-2014.[32] ISW has reported extensively on the Kremlin’s weaponization of the phrase “root cause” to allude to the unacceptable demands for regime change in Ukraine and altering of NATO’s open-door policy.[33] The Kremlin’s ongoing rhetorical campaign aimed at undermining Ukraine’s legitimacy and sovereignty while continuing to call for the replacement of the current Ukrainian government further emphasizes that Russia maintains its maximalist goal of conquering Ukraine.
Kremlin officials are leveraging the Russian education system to indoctrinate children into the mythos of the Soviet Union’s role in the Second World War and create a centralized state ideology that will shape generations in Russia and Russian-occupied Ukraine, likely to justify a protracted war in Ukraine and a future military conflict against the West. Putin met on June 22 with Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO) Rector Anatoly Torkunov, Scientific Director of the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences Aleksandr Chubaryan, and the Minister of Education Sergei Kravtsov, who act as the editors-in-chief of the Russian Ministry of Education history textbooks for the fifth through eleventh grades, and discussed the presentation of the Second World War (referred to as the Great Patriotic War in Russia) in Russian history textbooks.[34] Putin claimed that Russian textbooks in the 1990s presented incongruous and “Russophobic” historical narratives or denied historical fact, especially about the Great Patriotic War and Russia’s defeat of Nazism at significant national cost. Putin accused foreign governments of exploiting grant funding for textbooks to influence Russian historical narratives in the 1990s. Putin stated that Russia needs a unified history curriculum for children as young as preschool age. Kravtsov stated that all Russian state schools have adopted the unified history curriculum, which dedicates 30 percent of its content to the Great Patriotic War. Medinsky stated that the Ministry of Education edited the seventh-grade textbook to be “even more ideological” and reflect the fact that “there was no Ukraine, there was no statehood” before the Soviet Union. Kravtsov also stated that Russia will adopt a unified social studies textbook for the ninth through eleventh grades by September 2026. The Russian Ministry of Education will very likely distribute the new textbooks in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories, as it did in 2023 with the unified tenth- and eleventh-grade history textbooks.[35] These textbooks describe the Ukrainian government as a “neo-Nazi state” and include a chapter justifying Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The new textbooks will also support ongoing Russian efforts to leverage traditional school programs with extracurricular “military-patriotic” organizations to militarize Russian students and ensure long-term regime loyalty and stability.[36] ISW has long reported on the Kremlin’s efforts to centralize control over and expand youth educational and military patriotic programs, both in Russia and in occupied Ukraine, as part of Russia’s long-term force generation efforts and multi-pronged efforts to militarize Russian society.[37]
Key Takeaways:
Russia condemned the recent US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22 amid reports that Iran’s foreign minister will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on June 23.
Iran’s possible decision to close the Strait of Hormuz will cause a significant spike in global oil prices, which would greatly economically and financially benefit Russia by reversing months of declining Russian oil revenue and allowing Russia to continue to finance its war against Ukraine in the medium term .
. Russian forces have continued to pursue long-standing operational objectives on the battlefield in Ukraine throughout Spring and Summer 2025 and will likely remain committed to these objectives for the coming months.
Russia’s intensified force generation efforts appear to be generating a reserve force that Russia will be able to leverage in Ukraine or against NATO in the future, despite current limitations on Russia’s offensive capacity in Ukraine.
The Kremlin continues to promote rhetoric designed to undermine Ukrainian legitimacy and sovereignty, demonstrating its steadfast commitment to the complete destruction of Ukraine.
Kremlin officials are leveraging the Russian education system to indoctrinate children into the mythos of the Soviet Union’s role in the Second World War and create a centralized state ideology that will shape generations in Russia and Russian-occupied Ukraine, likely to justify a protracted war in Ukraine and a future military conflict against the West.
Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy oblast. Russian forces advanced near Novopavlivka.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 22 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 21 and 22.[38] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and in the general Glushkovo direction.[39]
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on June 22 that Ukrainian deep rear strikes on Russia have inflicted ten billion dollars of damage, including 1.3 billion dollars in direct damages and another 9.5 billion dollars in indirect losses from enterprise shutdowns and disruption of transport infrastructure.[40] Syrskyi stated that Ukraine’s deep rear strikes are intended to weaken Russia’s military and economic potential and added that Ukraine spends roughly one dollar for each 15 dollars inflicted on Russian damages.
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on June 22.
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[41]
Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Andriivka and Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka, Yunakivka, and Sadky on June 21 and 22.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka, Yablunivka, Yunakivka, Oleksiivka, Novomykolaivka (both north of Sumy City), Prokhody, and Marine (east of Sumy City just across the international border from Demidovka, Belgorod Oblast).[43]
An officer in a Ukrainian National Guard brigade operating in the Sumy direction reported that Russian forces are attempting to exploit the summer foliage in the area in order to conceal movements from Ukrainian drone operators and are not using armored vehicles.[44]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Pysarivka and Khotin (both north of Sumy City).[45]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 22 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on June 21 and 22.[46]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 22 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka, Krasne Pershe, Stroivka, Fyholivka, and Dovhenke; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on June 21 and 22.[47]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in the Kupyansk direction with drones equipped with Groza Lezka fiber-optic control systems.[48] Drone operators of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) are also reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kupyansk direction.[49]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 22 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed on June 22 that Russian forces seized Hrekivka (southeast of Borova).[50]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Zeleny Hai and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Cherneshchyna on June 21 and 22.[51]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 22 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Karpivka, Novyi Myr, Zelena Dolyna, and toward Olhivka and northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka and Torske on June 21 and 22.[52]
The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces continue to mainly rely on infantry assaults with drone support to advance in the Lyman direction while avoiding mechanized assaults.[53] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces continue to use anti-thermal cloaks in an effort to mask their heat signatures and evade Ukrainian drone strikes during both daytime and overnight missions.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in Novyi Myr and elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA) are reportedly operating near Karpivka.[54]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 22 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and toward Serebryanka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on June 21 and 22.[55]
An officer of a Ukrainian National Guard brigade operating in the Siversk direction stated that Russian forces recently intensified assaults and drone operations in the area.[56] The officer stated that Russian forces are attacking in small tactical infantry groups on motorcycles and light armored vehicles and using fiber-optic drones to strike Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 22 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the Shevchenko, Levanevsky, and Yuzhny microraions in southern and southwestern Chasiv Yar and near Ozaryanivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[57]
Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and Ozaryanivka and toward Bila Hora; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Predtechyne on June 21 and 22.[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stupochky and Ozaryanivka.[59]
A senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) in a Ukrainian artillery company operating in the Kramatorsk (Chasiv Yar) direction reported that Russian forces are concentrating manpower and intensifying assaults, including assaults with drone and artillery support, in this direction.[60] The NCO stated that Russian forces are struggling to resupply frontline positions and that Russian infantry in the Chasiv Yar direction often lacks adequate food, water, and equipment. The NCO stated that Russian infantry sometimes walk five to six days to reach forward Russian positions and, in some cases, have written notices of surrender due to a lack of water. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated that Russian forces are constantly transferring reinforcements to this direction due to high sustained casualty rates and that newly arrived Russian troops only receive a month of training.[61]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 217th and 331st VDV regiments, are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Chasiv Yar direction.[62]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on June 22 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced to central Yablunivka (west of Toretsk).[63] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced near Dyliivka (northeast of Toretsk) and toward Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[64]
Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Oleksandro-Kalynove, and Poltavka; west of Toretsk toward Yablunivka and Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Leonidivka and Nova Poltavka on June 21 and 22.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dyliivka.[66]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD), including drone elements of its 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, are reportedly operating near Katerynivka and Popiv Yar (northwest of Toretsk).[67] Elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet unit) are reportedly operating near Oleksandro-Kalynove and west of Yablunivka.[68]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 22 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked toward Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka, Myrne, Myrolyubivka, and Shevchenko Pershe and toward Shakhove; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Shevchenko and Zvirove on June 21 and 22.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Promin and Mykolaivka (east of Pokrovsk).[70]
Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reiterated on June 21 that there are no Russian forces present in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, despite Russian forces intensifying assaults in the Pokrovsk-Novopavlivka directions in attempts to break through to Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[71] Trehubov stated that Russian forces are incurring increasingly large personnel and vehicle losses in these assaults and are sustaining as many as 800 daily personnel casualties. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 22 that Russian forces sustained a total of 1,100 casualties over the last day – suggesting that Russian forces could be sustaining over 70 percent of their casualties in the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions.[72] A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to supply ammunition to forward Russian positions.[73] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Shevchenko Pershe is a contested “gray zone,” and that Russian forces are attacking with armored vehicle support into the settlement’s northern and eastern outskirts.[74] A milblogger also claimed that Russian forces complicated Ukrainian logistics in the area by destroying two bridges over the Kazenyi Torets River.[75]
Order of Battle: Drone elements of the Russian 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion (9th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Pokrovsk direction.[76] Elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in Myrne.[77]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 22 indicates that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) recently advanced in Komar and Perebudova (both south of Novopavlivka) and likely seized the settlements.[78] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces crossed the Mokry Yaly River and seized Perebudova.[79] Russian sources recently credited elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade with participating in the seizure of Komar.[80] Additional geolocated footage published on June 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[81]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Zelenyi Kut, and Oleksiivka; and south of Novopavlivka near Zirka, Yalka, and Piddubne and toward Myrne on June 21 and 22.[82]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 22 but did not advance.
Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole and toward Maliivka and Komyshuvakha and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on June 21 and 22.[83]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[84] Drone operators of the Russian “Adskyi Krik” (Hell Scream) group of the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Vremivka (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[85]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on June 22.
Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on June 22 that Russian forces are transferring personnel and equipment to the Hulyaipole direction and regrouping in order to intensify offensive operations near Malynivka and Poltavka (east of Hulyaipole) in the future.[86]
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 21 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske and toward Novoandriivka on June 21 and 22.[87]
Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on June 22 that the Orikhiv direction is the most active direction of the Southern Axis.[88] Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are trying to break through Ukrainian defenses near Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) and are constantly fighting toward Kamyanske and Novoandriivka and near Stepove and Lobkove (both southwest of Orikhiv) in order to establish conditions to attack Zaporizhzhia City.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian “893rd Regiment” (possibly a reconstituted Soviet unit) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhia direction.[89]
Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on June 22 that its agents conducted a successful drone strike against a Russian train transporting fuel in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[90] Geolocated footage indicates that the strike occurred near occupied Tokmak (south of Orikhiv).[91] A Ukrainian official reported that 18 to 20 fuel tanks are still burning as a result of the strike.[92]
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on June 21 and 22 but did not advance.[93]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on June 21 to 22. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M/Kn-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh and Rostov oblasts, one S-300 surface-to-air missile from occupied Donetsk Oblast, and 47 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[94] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian Forces downed 18 drones and that ten drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted Chernihiv Oblast and also struck Sumy and Odesa oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck medical, civilian, and residential infrastructure in Kharkiv and Odesa oblasts, and that Russian missiles struck residential infrastructure in Donetsk Oblast.[95]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/tass_agency/321786 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/321787 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/321788 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/321791 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/61505
[2] https://ria dot ru/20250622/lavrov-2024607230.html
[3] https://t.me/tass_agency/321834 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/61553
[4] https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/1936737059793719654
[5] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/592 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/24316275 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/592 ; https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1936725544017567860.html#google_vignette
[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925
[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-18-2025
[8] https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/BZ=F/
[9] https://www dot presstv.ir/Detail/2025/06/22/750031/iranian-parliament-moves-close-strait-hormuz-after-us-aggression-lawmaker ; https://english dot alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2025/06/22/iranian-parliament-reportedly-approves-closing-hormuz-strait-media- ; https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/1936772105506291832
[10] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-06-20/oil-could-spike-to-90-if-strait-of-hormuz-shut-citigroup-says ; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/oil-falls-investors-weigh-chance-us-intervention-iran-israel-conflict-2025-06-19/
[11] https://energyandcleanair.org/may-2025-monthly-analysis-of-russian-fossil-fuel-exports-and-sanctions/
[12] https://meduza dot io/news/2025/04/30/minfin-rf-povysil-ozhidaemyy-defitsit-byudzheta-na-fone-snizheniya-tsen-na-neft ; https://minfin dot gov.ru/ru/press-center/?id_4=39696-na_zasedanii_pravitelstva_rossii_odobreny_izmeneniya_v_pokazateli_federalnogo_byudzheta_na_2025_god
[13] https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/06/09/russias-national-welfare-fund-at-risk-of-depletion-by-2026-economists-warn-a89395
[14] https://meduza dot io/en/feature/2024/10/03/russia-s-2025-federal-budget-outlines-record-military-and-top-secret-spending-and-tax-hikes-for-ordinary-citizens
[15] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage
[16] https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/posts/pfbid02vPMxF6JNmPKJwprv3jPeXHzSEv7bCvAsceiwWAkhe6wnrR1TEPniBgoA59Gau86Wl ; https://suspilne dot media/1048573-sirskij-rosia-zminila-plani-nastupu/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/22/ukrayinski-vijskovi-kontrolyuyut-blyzko-90-kvadratnyh-kilometriv-na-kurshhyni/ ; https://tsn dot ua/ato/syrskyy-nazvav-holovnu-zahrozu-na-fronti-2854664.html
[17] https://t.me/dva_majors/73907
[18] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine
[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar013125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar05022025
[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042724
[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060225 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2025
[22] https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/posts/pfbid02vPMxF6JNmPKJwprv3jPeXHzSEv7bCvAsceiwWAkhe6wnrR1TEPniBgoA59Gau86Wl ; https://suspilne dot media/1048573-sirskij-rosia-zminila-plani-nastupu/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/22/ukrayinski-vijskovi-kontrolyuyut-blyzko-90-kvadratnyh-kilometriv-na-kurshhyni/ ; https://tsn dot ua/ato/syrskyy-nazvav-holovnu-zahrozu-na-fronti-2854664.html
[23] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2025
[24] https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/posts/pfbid02vPMxF6JNmPKJwprv3jPeXHzSEv7bCvAsceiwWAkhe6wnrR1TEPniBgoA59Gau86Wl ; https://suspilne dot media/1048573-sirskij-rosia-zminila-plani-nastupu/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/22/ukrayinski-vijskovi-kontrolyuyut-blyzko-90-kvadratnyh-kilometriv-na-kurshhyni/ ; https://tsn dot ua/ato/syrskyy-nazvav-holovnu-zahrozu-na-fronti-2854664.html
[25] https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-warns-russia-preparing-strategic-reserves-beyond-ukraine/ ; https://t.me/Ukraine_MFA/6022
[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051325
[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051325
[28] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77234
[29] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77234
[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2024
[31] https://t.me/zarubinreporter/4117 ; https://ria dot ru/20250622/ukraina-2024618290.html
[32] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ukraines-yanukovych-missing-as-protesters-take-control-of-presidential-residence-in-kiev/2014/02/22/802f7c6c-9bd2-11e3-ad71-e03637a299c0_story.html ; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/2/22/ukraine-president-yanukovich-impeached
[33] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525
[34] kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77234
[35] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/09/ukraine-russia-new-history-textbook-is-a-blatant-attempt-to-unlawfully-indoctrinate-school-children-in-russia-and-russian-occupied-ukrainian-territories/; https://www.voanews.com/a/7226178.html; https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/06/20/education-under-occupation/forced-russification-school-system-occupied-ukrainian ; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putin-weaponizes-history-with-new-textbook-justifying-ukraine-invasion/; https://meduza dot io/en/feature/2023/08/07/such-unique-times-are-rare-in-history
[36] https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/russian-schools-time-war-lesson-indoctrination ; https://en dot zona.media/article/2022/09/14/brainwashing-trl; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122124 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-14-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123124; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122124
[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-may-1-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052225 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25783 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25762 ;
[39] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30331 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27399 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/24294 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30331 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30309
[40] ttps://suspilne dot media/1048555-ukrainski-bpla-zavdali-rf-ponad-10-mlrd-zbitkiv-iz-pocatku-roku-sirskij/ ; https://t.me/sotaproject/99517
[41] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9437 ; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/22052 ; https://t.me/OSHP_225/5020
[42] https://t.me/rusich_army/24294 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30332
[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30324 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30332 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27399
[44] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/22/zalizty-v-nirku-i-prosto-vytrymuvaty-poblyzu-harkova-rosijski-pihotynczi-vykorystovuyut-myshynu-taktyku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6syAvRx0DdQ
[45] https://t.me/dva_majors/73937
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25783; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25762; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25759
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25783 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25762 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25759; https://t.me/rybar/71529
[48] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94212
[49] https://t.me/dva_majors/73921
[50] https://t.me/tass_agency/321769; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94258 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54028 ; https://t.me/sashakots/54454
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25783 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25762 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25759
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25783 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25762 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25759
[53] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/22/zyavyvsya-perelyak-vony-skupchylysya-poblyzu-lymanu-rozbyvayut-rosijski-nichni-shturmy/
[54] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37639
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25783; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25762; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25759
[56] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/21/na-siverskomu-napryamku-vorog-zbilshyv-vykorystannya-droniv-zhduniv/
[57] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65348; https://t.me/wargonzo/27399; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30337
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25783; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25762; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25759; https://t.me/dva_majors/73907; https://t.me/wargonzo/27399; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30337
[59] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65348; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30337
[60] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/22/pyshut-zapysky-shho-gotovi-zdatysya-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku-rosijski-pihotynczi-jdut-na-peredovu-tyzhnyamy/
[61] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6syAvRx0DdQ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1048673-rosijska-armia-atakue-casiv-ar-ale-ne-moze-zahopiti-misto-vijskovij-pro-boi-z-98-u-divizieu-rf/
[62] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30321; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6syAvRx0DdQ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1048673-rosijska-armia-atakue-casiv-ar-ale-ne-moze-zahopiti-misto-vijskovij-pro-boi-z-98-u-divizieu-rf/
[63] https://t.me/rybar/71529
[64] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65327
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25783; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25762; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25759; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30337
[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30337
[67] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65327
[68] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37669
[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25783; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25762; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25759; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30340; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65331; https://t.me/rybar/71537
[70] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65331
[71] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/21/osuv-hortyczya-namagannya-rosiyan-vyjty-na-adminkordony-dnipropetrovskoyi-oblasti-marni/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6syAvRx0DdQ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1048629-znovu-sim-pidbitih-tankiv-davno-ne-bulo-vijska-rf-pocali-zastosovuvati-vazku-tehniku-na-doneccini/
[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25762
[73] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/22/shturmovyky-myako-kazhuchy-ne-rozumiyut-sytuacziyu-poblyzu-pokrovska-tryvayut-ataky-dvijkamy-trijkamy-i-odynakamy/
[74] https://t.me/rybar/71537
[75] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30340
[76] https://t.me/wargonzo/27389
[77] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30340
[78] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9435; https://t.me/voin_dv/15613; https://t.me/voin_dv/15614; https://t.me/osintpen/1258; https://t.me/osintpen/1260; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1936717448109314552; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1936719043794546811; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1936730356864151857 ;
[79] https://t.me/tass_agency/321766; https://t.me/mod_russia/54029 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54036
; https://t.me/tass_agency/321784
[80] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2025
[81] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1936775452334387366; https://t.me/ssternenko/45380
[82] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25783 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25762 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25759 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23659 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65341
[83] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65341 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25783 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25762 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25759
[84] https://t.me/voin_dv/15609
[85] https://t.me/voin_dv/15615
[86] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/22/korsari-na-ostrovah-bajkery-poblyzu-gulyajpolya-na-pivdni-rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-marni-ataky/
[87] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25762; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25759
[88] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/22/korsari-na-ostrovah-bajkery-poblyzu-gulyajpolya-na-pivdni-rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-marni-ataky/
[89] https://t.me/dva_majors/73919
[90] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6225
[91] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1936493253336969376; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1936492748309229739; https://t.me/andriyshTime/39193
[92] https://t.me/andriyshTime/39210 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/39193
[93] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25762; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25759; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/22/korsari-na-ostrovah-bajkery-poblyzu-gulyajpolya-na-pivdni-rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-marni-ataky/; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94220
[94] https://t.me/kpszsu/36827
[95]https://x.com/MVS_UA/status/1936746081209008435 ; https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/9109 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15199 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12617 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1048561-cerez-ataku-rf-na-odesinu-poskodzena-stancia-svidkoi-dopomogi-zitlovij-budinok-avto/ ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/10174 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1048599-cerez-ataku-rf-na-odesini-znisena-stancia-ekstrenoi-medicnoi-dopomogi-ova/ ; https://od.gp.gov dot ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=392665 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1048587-droni-rf-atakuvali-bilgorod-dnistrovskij-rajon-prokuratura-vidkrila-spravu/
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 26, 2025
ISW has observed evidence of North Korean forces augmenting Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and North Korea supplying Russia with artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles. North Korea is likely receiving technical advice from Russia on satellite launches and missile guidance systems in return. US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met at the NATO summit on June 25 and discussed possible US sales of Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine and joint weapons production. ISW continues to assess that a strong Ukrainian military backed by Western guarantees remains the most vital component of a stable Western-backed Ukraine. The data cut-off for this product was 11:15am ET on June 26. IsW will cover subsequent reports in the June 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool. The map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. It will update this time-lapse map archive monthly with the latest Russian offensive campaign assessment.
Olivia Gibson, Christina Harward, Daria Novikov, Grace Mappes, Jessica Sobieski,
and Frederick W. Kagan
June 26, 2025, 5:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15am ET on June 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
South Korean intelligence suggests that North Korea may deploy North Korean troops to Ukrainian territory, which would represent a significant battlefield inflection. Reuters, citing a South Korean lawmaker privy to intelligence from South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS), reported on June 26 that North Korea may deploy an unspecified number of additional North Korean forces to Russia to fight against Ukraine as early as July or August 2025 and that North Korea continues to arm Russia with artillery ammunition and missiles.[1] The South Korean lawmaker told Reuters that the NIS assessed that Russia may be preparing to initiate a large-scale assault against Ukraine in July or August 2025 and that North Korea is likely receiving technical advice from Russia on satellite launches and missile guidance systems in return. ISW has observed evidence of North Korean forces augmenting Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and North Korea supplying Russia with artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles.[2] Ukrainian forces maintain a limited presence in Kursk Oblast, so North Korean personnel participating in combat operations would most likely be fighting in Ukrainian territory.[3] The North Korean and Russian military commands authorizing the deployment of North Korean forces to Ukrainian territory would mark a significant battlefield inflection that may improve Russian forces’ ability to sustain simultaneous offensive operations in multiple directions, which the Russian military has traditionally struggled to conduct.[4] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces compensated by conducting pulsing, more contained, offensive operations along different sectors of the frontline, but recent reporting indicates that Russian forces appear to be gradually advancing in at least three simultaneous large-scale offensive operations in the Borova-Lyman, Kostyantynivka, and Novopavlivka directions.[5] It is not possible to forecast the likely impact of North Korean support of this type without more information about the size and composition of the North Korean troop contingent that would be going to Ukraine, nor is it clear how rapidly new North Korean troops would become effective in operations alongside Russian troops in Ukraine.
US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met at the NATO summit on June 25 and discussed possible US sales of Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine and joint weapons production. Trump stated that he and Zelensky did not talk about a possible ceasefire in Ukraine during the meeting, but that Trump may talk to Russian President Vladimir Putin in the near future about a ceasefire.[6] Zelensky stated that he reiterated during the meeting that Ukraine supports the US position on a ceasefire.[7] Zelensky stated that he and Trump discussed the increase in the number of “massive” Russian strikes against Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure and people, and Trump stated that the United States “should consider” selling Patriot air defense systems and missiles to Ukraine as Ukraine’s supply is limited.[8] Trump and Zelensky agreed to continue talks about strengthening Ukraine’s air defense with European partners. Trump and Zelensky also discussed possible joint production of drones and electronic warfare (EW) equipment.[9] Zelensky stated in April 2025 that Ukraine proposed to the United States that Ukraine purchase “30 to 50 billion” (likely USD) worth of air defense and weapons systems from the United States and that Ukraine is prepared to purchase these systems itself — either through direct payment to the United States or through the fund established by the US-Ukrainian minerals deal.[10] Zelensky had stated that Ukraine will consider the provision of at least 10 air defense systems to Ukraine as a “security guarantee.” US Patriot air defense systems are vital to Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes and will become increasingly important as Russia is reportedly increasing its production and stockpile of ballistic missiles, which would enable larger and more frequent ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine.[11] ISW continues to assess that a strong Ukrainian military backed by Western security guarantees remains the most vital component of a stable post-war European security architecture, guaranteeing a sustainable peace in Ukraine and deterring future Russian aggression.[12]
Kremlin officials continue to platform bellicose rhetoric aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and to demonstrate Russia’s uncompromising position on Ukraine. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko claimed on June 25 at the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) conference that the West is adopting “hostile policies and military planning…that could explode from any spark.”[13] Glushko further claimed that new Western military aid packages “fuel” the war in Ukraine.[14] The Kremlin regularly promotes rhetoric that is designed to pressure the West into making decisions that benefit Russia, such as refraining from providing further assistance to Ukraine, in response to the fact that sustained Western aid has allowed Ukrainian forces to impose significant challenges on Russian forces in Ukraine and threatens Russia’s ability to achieve its war aims.[15]
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin reiterated on June 26 Russia’s long-standing demand that Ukraine commit to an official non-aligned status and claimed that NATO violated promises from the early 1990s to refrain from expanding eastward.[16] Russia has consistently demanded that Ukraine commit to a neutral, non-aligned status, which would require Ukraine to amend its constitution and NATO to fundamentally alter its open-door policy.[17] The Kremlin continues to signal its unyielding demands and disinterest in peace, further indicating that Russia will very likely continue to pursue efforts to prolong negotiations in an attempt to extract additional concessions and secure additional gains on the battlefield.[18] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin will continue to protract the negotiation process so long as Russian leadership maintains the position that Russian forces can outlast Ukraine’s defense capabilities and Western support for Ukraine.[19]
Satellite imagery of select armored vehicle repair plants in Russia indicates that Russia continues to rely on refurbishing its Soviet-era stores of armored vehicles. A social media source tracking equipment at Russian military depots and repair facilities via satellite imagery shared on June 26 an updated analysis of Russian Armor Repair Plants (BTRZs) that repair damaged armored vehicles and refurbish stored vehicles and stated that most armored fighting vehicle (AFVs) that Russia is taking from storage are no longer in good enough condition to immediately deploy to the front without refurbishment, as Russia was able to do at the start of the war.[20] The source estimated that the 81st BTRZ in Armavir, Krasnodar Krai, which repairs and modernizes stored BTR-70/80 armored personnel carriers (APCs) and likely also repairs damaged BTRs from the battlefield, has likely been refurbishing up to 200 BTR-70/80/82 APCs annually since 2023.[21] The source estimated that the 144th BTRZ in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast, which is the only BTRZ that refurbishes older BMD infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and also repairs BMP-2 and BMD-2 IFVs, has likely been annually refurbishing between 100 to 150 BMD-2 IFVs and BTR-D APCs since an unspecified year.[22]
The source estimated that the Arzamas Mechanical Plant in Arzamas, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, likely annually produces over 500 BTR-82 APCs but noted that satellite imagery showing a growing pile of hulls at the plant suggests that the plant is either increasing production rates or also does repairs of damaged BTRs.[23] The source noted that Arzamas’ production numbers are unclear but are likely high due to the high number of BTR-80/82s that Russian forces are losing in Ukraine and how quickly Russian forces are replenishing these vehicles.[24] The source also estimated that armored vehicle manufacturer Kurganmashzavod in Kurgan, Kurgan Oblast, likely annually produces 100 to 120 BMD-4M IFVs, roughly 360 BMP-3 IFVs, and 20 to 30 BTR-MDM APCs.[25]
Russia has maintained its offensive operations throughout the war by tapping into its Soviet-era stocks of armored vehicles to compensate for high loss rates, but this resource is finite and approaching a point of diminishing availability.[26] Russian forces have been increasingly using motorcycles and buggies in place of armored vehicles along the frontline in Ukraine due to high Russian vehicle losses in late 2023 and 2024.[27] The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated in February 2025 that Russian forces lost over 3,700 IFVs and APCs in 2024 alone.[28] It remains unclear whether Russia’s reliance on motorcycles and buggies will be sufficient to offset these losses in the medium- to long-term.
Ukraine and Russia conducted the seventh prisoner of war (POW) exchange, in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements. Ukrainian officials and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Ukraine and Russia exchanged an unspecified number of severely wounded and sick POWs as well as those under 25 years old on June 26.[29] Ukrainian officials reported that Russia captured a majority of the released Ukrainian POWs in 2022.
Key Takeaways:
South Korean intelligence suggests that North Korea may deploy North Korean troops to Ukrainian territory, which would represent a significant battlefield inflection.
US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met at the NATO summit on June 25 and discussed possible US sales of Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine and joint weapons production.
Kremlin officials continue to platform bellicose rhetoric aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and to demonstrate Russia’s uncompromising position on Ukraine.
Satellite imagery of select armored vehicle repair plants in Russia indicates that Russia continues to rely on refurbishing its Soviet-era stores of armored vehicles.
Ukraine and Russia conducted the seventh prisoner of war (POW) exchange, in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements.
Ukrainian forces advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on June 26.
Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 25 and 26.[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[31]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)
Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 26 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Andriivka (north of Sumy City) and advanced southeast of Oleksiivka (northeast of Sumy City).[32]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced near Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[33]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka and Yunakivka.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and Novomykolaivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, Yablunivka, and Sadky.[35]
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on June 26 that Ukrainian forces have repelled the Russian summer offensive in the Sumy Oblast border area and stabilized the frontline “as of this week.”[36] Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian offensive operations in Glushkovsky Raion, Kursk Oblast forced the Russian military command to divert forces that would otherwise take part in the Sumy Oblast offensive and that Ukrainian forces have pinned about 50,000 Russian military personnel total in the Kursk and North Slobozhansk (northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts) directions. ISW has observed geolocated evidence indicating that Ukrainian forces have regained territory north and northeast of Sumy City in recent weeks as the pace of Russian advances in the border area has slowed.[37]
Ukraine’s Siversk (Northern) Group of Forces Spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk stated on June 26 that Russian forces are most active in northern Sumy Oblast and have decreased their use of all-terrain vehicles (ATV)s in assaults and rely on infantry assaults.[38]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[39] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]), including its 382nd and elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade, and the 106th VDV Division are reportedly operating in northern Sumy Oblast.[40] Drone operators of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly conducting reconnaissance near Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[41]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 26 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Vovchanski Khutory (northeast of Kharkiv City).[42]
Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Zybyne on June 25 and 26.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces recently counterattacked in the Vovchansk and Lyptsi directions.[44]
A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction reported on June 26 that intense fighting continues in the Vovchansk direction and that Russian forces continue to conduct motorized assaults of three to five personnel on motorcycles.[45] The servicemember stated that Russian forces have recently begun operating “mother drones” – large drones that carry multiple smaller first-person-view (FPV) drones — to fly to positions in the Ukrainian rear and allow Russian forces to launch and conduct strikes with the smaller FPV drones out of range of Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Anvar” Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Sosnivka (north of Kharkiv City).[46]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 26 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted ground assaults north of Kupyansk near Holubivka, Mala Shapkivka, and Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on June 25 and 26.[47]
Ukrainian National Guard Spokesperson Colonel Ruslan Muzychuk stated on June 26 that Russian forces are attempting to expand a bridgehead on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River, especially near Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk), Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk), and “Kolisnyky” – likely meaning Kolisnykivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[48]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 26 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted ground operations northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya, Kopanky, and Zelenyi Hai; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Olhivka on June 25 and 26.[49]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 26 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked and seized western Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Hlushchenkove (north of Lyman) and reached the outskirts of the settlement, advanced south of Lypove (north of Lyman), and advanced north and southwest of Zelena Dolyna (north of Lyman).[51]
Russian forces conducted ground assaults north of Lyman near Novyi Myr and Ridkodub and toward Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman toward Torske on June 25 and 26.[52] A Russian source claimed on June 26 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zelena Dolyna and Kolodyazi.[53]
The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction reported on June 26 that Russian forces are using guided glide bombs and first-person view (FPV) drones to target Ukrainian logistics centers and drone pilots on the front lines as well as concentrations of personnel and recreation areas.[54]
A Russian milblogger claimed that commanders in the 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) continue to submit false reports exaggerating Russian successes in the area, a common complaint in this section of the front.[55]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating between Karpivka and Lypove (both north of Lyman).[56] Elements of the Russian 488th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 283rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both 144th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in Ridkodub.[57]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 26 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on June 25 and 26.[58]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 26 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Chasiv Yar.[59]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Chasiv Yar itself, north of Chasiv Yar toward Markove, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Bila Hora on June 25 and 26.[60]
Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Stupochky, and elements of the 98th VDV Division’s 217th and 331st VDV regiments are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[61]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 25 and 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Toretsk and northwest of Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk), respectively.[62]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[63]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and toward Oleksandro-Shultyne; and northwest of Toretsk near Nelipivka and toward Oleksandro-Kalynove, Yablunivka, Rusyn Yar, and Poltavka on June 25 and 26.[64]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 26 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 25 that Russian forces advanced east of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[65]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka, Myrne, and Shevchenko Pershe; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove and Udachne on June 25 and 26.[66]
The commander of a Ukrainian tank battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on June 26 that Russian forces continue assaults with small fireteams of one to two soldiers and sometimes operate on motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and buggies.[67] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are constantly attacking in the Pokrovsk direction and have adapted tactics to leverage increased cover from foliage.[68] An officer of a Ukrainian unmanned systems detachment operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces only field heavy equipment when attempting to advance in a specific area.[69]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 15th and 30th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Udachne.[70] Drone operators of the “Typhoon” detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[71] Elements of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[72]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Peredubova (south of Novopavlivka).[73]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Perebudova, north of Novoserhiivka, northeast of Novomykolaivka (both northeast of Novopavlivka), southwest of Horikhove, north of Yalta (both southeast of Novopavlivka, and southwest of Fedorivka (south of Novopavlivka).[74]
Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Novomykolaivka, and Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka, Novoukrainka, Horikhove, Bahatyr, and Odradne; south of Novopavlivka near Zirka, Yalta, Zaporizhzhia, Fedorivka, Perebudova, Myrne, and Piddubne and on June 25 and 26.[75]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 26 that Russian forces seized Novoserhiivka.[76] ISW assesses that Russian forces seized Novoserhiivka as of June 24.[77]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade are reportedly operating near Zirka.[78] Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) and 30th Separate Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Myrne.[79]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 26 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Shevchenko and northwest of Vilne Pole (both northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[80]
Russian forces continued ground assaults northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole and toward Voskresenka and Maliivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on June 25 and 26.[81]
The Russian MoD claimed on June 26 that Russian forces seized Shevchenko, which ISW assessed that Russian forces seized as of June 21.[82] Russian sources credited elements of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) with participating in the seizure of Shevchenko.[83] One Russian milblogger claimed on June 26 that Russian forces advanced within Shevchenko but have not yet seized the settlement.[84]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the “Gnom” (Gnome) squad of the Russian 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[85]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued limited assaults east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 26 but did not make any confirmed advances.[86]
Unconfirmed claims: Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on June 26 that Russian forces are advancing to central Malynivka.[87]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast southwest of Orikhiv toward Novoandriivka on June 26 but did not advance.[88]
A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported that Russian forces are conducting assaults during the day and night and that Russian commanders are ordering Russian forces to temporarily seize positions on the outskirts of settlements for footage of the soldiers planting flags rather than secure footholds and enduring positions.[89]
Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction on June 26 but did not advance.[90]
Ukrainian National Guard Spokesperson Colonel Ruslan Muzychuk reported on June 26 that Russian forces remain focused on conducting reconnaissance and controlling the Dnipro River Delta islands.[91]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 25 to 26. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 41 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[92] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down eight drones and that 16 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck Donetsk and Kharkiv oblasts.[93]
Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that Russian forces are first conducting strikes with swarms of Shahed drones before striking the area with ballistic missiles.[94]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/north-korea-may-send-more-troops-russia-july-or-august-ukraine-war-seoul-says-2025-06-26/ ; https://archive.ph/xSGXi
[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-16-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2025
[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325
[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825
[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062225
[6] https://suspilne dot media/1051589-zelenskij-rozpoviv-pro-detali-zustric-iz-trampom-pid-cas-samitu-nato/
[7] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/u-gaazi-volodimir-zelenskij-proviv-zustrich-iz-donaldom-tram-98653
[8] https://suspilne dot media/1051589-zelenskij-rozpoviv-pro-detali-zustric-iz-trampom-pid-cas-samitu-nato/
[9] https://suspilne dot media/1051589-zelenskij-rozpoviv-pro-detali-zustric-iz-trampom-pid-cas-samitu-nato/; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/u-gaazi-volodimir-zelenskij-proviv-zustrich-iz-donaldom-tram-98653
[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041025
[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025
[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031125
[13] https://ria dot ru/20250625/grushko-2025448197.html
[14] https://tass dot ru/politika/24356843
[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725
[16] https://iz dot ru/1910775/2025-06-26/v-mid-rf-nastaivaiut-na-iuridicheskoi-fiksatcii-vneblokovogo-statusa-ukrainy
[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125
[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052825
[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625
[20] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969796319961593; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969805581291862; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969809418772703
[21] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969835851309261; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969843124486214; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969846274179173;
[22] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969923776520358; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969863068156088
[23] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969857162568159; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969859943674130
[24] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969854948250011
[25] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969983537000573; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937970003619295446
[26] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage
[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061625
[28] https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2025/02/combat-losses-and-manpower-challenges-underscore-the-importance-of-mass-in-ukraine/
[29] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/prezydent-povidomyv-pro-novyj-obmin-bilshist-zvilnenyh-zahysnykiv-buly-u-poloni-z-2022-roku/ ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14871 ; https://t.me/Koord_shtab/13388 ; https://suspilne dot media/1048199-obmin-polonenimi-miz-ukrainou-ta-rf-vidbuvsa-novij-etap/ ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54179 ; https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/videos/702717725720789/?rdid=Ao1eRFbsDxHIQbFz#
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895
[31] https://t.me/dva_majors/74172; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37766; https://t.me/wargonzo/27506; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30458
[32] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9468; https://t.me/wild_hornets/3146; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30448; https://t.me/wargonzo/27506
[33] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37754; https://t.me/dva_majors/74172
[34] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37754
[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30448; https://t.me/dva_majors/74172
[36] https://t.me/osirskiy/1196 ; https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/posts/pfbid02YGoRCNXm2i2zWddYosSei5NGN7VHR5VCGu77gaMTzZKPB8ZzziyiJ7mcyBan1ajQl ; https://t.me/istories_media/9858; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-has-failed-break-ukraine
[37] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925
[38] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1052173-armia-rf-namagaetsa-prorvatisa-u-bik-sum-otuv-siversk/
[39] https://t.me/dva_majors/74195
[40] https://t.me/ua_dshv/6167 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1938184588737515919 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1938186659939455225; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94532; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30455
[41] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170337
[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30468
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/na-kytajskyh-motoczyklah-u-suprovodi-droniv-matok-taktyka-rosiyan-na-vovchanskomu-napryamku/
[44] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30468
[45] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/na-kytajskyh-motoczyklah-u-suprovodi-droniv-matok-taktyka-rosiyan-na-vovchanskomu-napryamku/
[46] https://t.me/epoddubny/23911
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895
[48] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/26/mriye-forsuvaty-oskil-ta-bigaye-lisamy-protyvnyk-demonstruye-vidnosnu-stabilnist/
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/27786
[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30476; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37767
[51] https://t.me/yurasumy/23719; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37758; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30476; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37756
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37758
[53] https://t.me/tass_agency/322543
[54] https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/06/26/pihotynecz-aktyvuye-tamaru-myhajlivnu-poblyzu-lymanu-rosijski-komandyry-bezzhalni-do-svoyih-soldativ/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qbwH1G_vZM0
[55] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-4-2025; https://t.me/yurasumy/23718
[56] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37756;
[57] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37767
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895
[59] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94538
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895; https://t.me/wargonzo/27506; https://t.me/dva_majors/74172
[61] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30455
[62] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1938096190987366812; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1938098278807310442; https://t.me/ASPIDGroup/172; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9469; https://t.me/b4_101/144
[63] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94538; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65445
[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65445; https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/06/26/dronova-poshta-praczyuye-na-toreczkomu-napryamku-vorog-bye-po-logistychnym-marshrutam/
[65] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37721; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37772
[66] https://t.me/dva_majors/74172 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23723; https://t.me/yurasumy/23724 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37772 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30463 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65444 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895 ;
[67] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1051737-maskuvanna-ratue-zitta-armia-rf-zastosovue-taktiku-malih-grup-i-fpv-droni-na-pokrovskomu-napramku-32-ombr/
[68] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/vyglyadalo-smishno-zaraz-vzhe-ne-do-smihu-poblyzu-pokrovska-postijnyj-ruh-rosijskyh-shturmovykiv/
[69] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/drony-gnuchkoyi-zbirky-yak-rozvidnyky-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-adaptuyut-bezpilotnyky/
[70] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37772
[71] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37735
[72] https://t.me/dva_majors/74180
[73] https://t.me/osintpen/1302; https://t.me/baykalkaspiy/296
[74] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37721; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37772; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30446; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65438
[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/6543; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37721; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1052009-jdut-aktivni-boi-situacia-v-novosergiivci-ta-sevcenku-dani-osuv-hortica/
[76] https://t.me/tass_agency/322569;https://t.me/mod_russia/54171 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54169
[77] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2025
[78] https://t.me/voin_dv/15687
[79] https://t.me/voin_dv/15688
[80] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65448; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65446; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37745
[81] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65448; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/258
[82] https://t.me/mod_russia/54174 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54170; https://t.me/tass_agency/322586 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54172; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2025
[83] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94552; https://t.me/voin_dv/15677; https://t.me/mod_russia/54174 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54170; https://t.me/tass_agency/322586 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54172; https://t.me/voin_dv/15681; https://t.me/voin_dv/15685
[84] https://t.me/wargonzo/27506
[85] https://t.me/voin_dv/15679
[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895 ;
[87] https://t.me/vrogov/20861
[88] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895
[89] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/rozkryty-prapor-pid-dron-na-zaporizhzhi-vorozhyh-shturmovykiv-vidpravlyayut-vmyraty-dlya-propagandy/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-mwW_smfVas
[90] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895
[91] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/mriye-forsuvaty-oskil-ta-bigaye-lisamy-protyvnyk-demonstruye-vidnosnu-stabilnist/
[92] https://t.me/kpszsu/37063;
[93] https://www.facebook.com/don.gp.gov.ua/posts/pfbid02kfBeR3u4AXtVD3932VytReEHaooCPrCFeQLfEr6PnNGAkhQavbo4aSsgc9qLoUENl; https://suspilne dot media/1051705-u-pare-pidpisali-stvorenna-spectribunalu-za-zlocini-rf-britania-nadast-ukraini-350-raket-dla-ppo-1219-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1750916242&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/synegubov/15280
[94] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9453; https://t.me/channel24_ua/178059
Ukraine News Today: Breaking Updates & Live Coverage
Ukraine War News Today is a daily look at what’s happening in the country. This page includes the latest news from Ukraine, as well as news from abroad.
Stay informed with the most important Ukraine breaking news today. This page compiles the top headlines and critical updates from across Ukraine, offering a real-time snapshot of key developments.
Whether it’s military updates, political changes, or international reactions — we bring you the latest Ukraine news as it happens. All reports are carefully curated from verified sources and KyivPost correspondents on the ground.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 23, 2025
Russian President Vladimir Putin met with graduates of Russia’s military academies on June 23. Putin acknowledged that NATO member states will likely announce a significant increase in defense spending and efforts to increase NATO military capabilities. Putin claimed that this meeting would clarify that NATO is the party provoking “global militarization” – not Russia. Russian officials are attempting to influence conversations about increasing NATO defense spending by misrepresenting Russia’s ongoing efforts to restructure and expand its military capabilities as a defensive reaction to NATO. ISW continues to assess that Russia is constrained in its ability to provide direct support to Iran due to its war in Ukraine and has likely resigned itself to providing diplomatic overtures for the time being. Russia is seeking “ironclad” guarantees that Ukraine will not join NATO, which Grushko stated includes repealing the 2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration that welcomed Ukraine’s and Georgia’s intention to join NATO. Russia considers the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO to be a “direct threat” to Russia’s security and stated that Russia will complete the formation of Moscow and Leningrad military districts in 2025.
June 23, 2025, 6:00 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11 am ET on June 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
The Kremlin continues to only diplomatically support Iran, showcasing the limitations in the Russian-Iranian strategic relationship. Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov, and Chief of the Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU) Igor Kostykov met with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi in Moscow on June 23.[1] Putin claimed that Russia’s position on the Israel-Iran conflict is well-known and that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has raised Russia’s concerns at the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Putin also claimed that recent Israeli and American strikes against Iran were unprovoked and unjustified and that Russia is making every effort to help the Iranian people. Araghchi thanked Russia for its strong condemnation of the strikes against Iran and claimed that Iran regularly consults with Russia on issues of global security, as Russia and Iran’s relations have become “strategic in nature.” Unspecified Iranian sources told Reuters on June 23 that Iran has not been impressed with Russia’s support so far and wants Putin to do more to back Iran against Israel and the United States.[2] Reuters reported that an Iranian source stated that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei sent Araghchi to Moscow to deliver a letter from Khamenei to Putin requesting more assistance from Russia. ISW continues to assess that Russia is constrained in its ability to provide direct support to Iran due to its war in Ukraine and has likely resigned itself to providing diplomatic overtures for the time being.[3]
Russian officials are attempting to influence conversations about increasing NATO defense spending by misrepresenting Russia’s ongoing efforts to restructure and expand Russia’s military capabilities as a defensive reaction to NATO. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with graduates of Russia’s military academies on June 23 and acknowledged that NATO member states will likely announce a significant increase in defense spending and efforts to increase NATO military capabilities at the upcoming summit on June 24 and 25.[4] Putin claimed that this meeting would clarify that NATO is the party provoking “global militarization” – not Russia. Putin stated that Russia will continue to take steps to strengthen Russia’s security and develop the Russian Armed Forces to guarantee Russia’s sovereignty. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko told the Russian state news agency RIA Novosti on June 23 in an article ahead of the upcoming NATO summit that the European Union (EU) is accelerating its militarization and that Russia will take all necessary measures and countermeasures, “including preemptive ones,” to ensure Russia’s security.[5] Grushko reiterated that Russia considers the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO to be a “direct threat” to Russia’s security and stated that Russia is seeking “ironclad” guarantees that Ukraine will not join NATO, which Grushko stated includes repealing the 2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration that welcomed Ukraine’s and Georgia’s intention to join NATO.[6] ISW has previously reported that Russian officials leverage escalatory rhetoric and threats during key moments of Western debates on military assistance for Ukraine in order to scare Western leaders into inaction, and Russian officials are likely again attempting to leverage threats to dissuade NATO member states from supporting increased defense spending.[7]
Putin announced during his speech to the graduates on June 23 that Russia will complete some of its ongoing force restructuring efforts in 2025.[8] Putin stated that Russia is urgently working to increase the Russian Armed Forces’ combat capabilities and reiterated that Russia is standing up the Unmanned Systems Forces as a new branch of the Russian military. Putin stated that Russia will complete the formation of the Moscow and Leningrad military districts (MMD/LMD) and will reorganize Russia’s naval infantry brigades into divisions in 2025. Putin stated that Russia is also undertaking a long-term technical modernization effort in the army and navy, modernizing its Strategic Missile Forces, beginning serial production of Oreshnik ballistic missiles, and producing new ships and submarines for the Russian Navy. Former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced Russia’s intention to form the MMD and LMD and reorganize Russia’s naval infantry brigades into divisions in the medium-term in December 2022.[9] Russian officials had not previously provided a firm date for the completion of these efforts. ISW continues to assess that Russia’s military reforms, particularly in the MMD and LMD in western Russia along its border with NATO, demonstrate Russia’s longer-term preparation for a possible future conflict with NATO.[10] These military reforms come after Kremlin officials have repeatedly threatened NATO states, including the Baltic states and Finland.[11]
Putin also acknowledged his ongoing efforts to empower Russia’s internal security services in order to safeguard regime stability and internal security. Putin stated during his speech to the graduates that the Russian government understands that protecting Russia from internal and external threats requires coordination between Russia’s law enforcement agencies, special services, and other security agencies.[12] ISW reported in 2023 and early 2024 that the Kremlin was working to expand Rosgvardia’s capabilities by allowing Rosgvardia to operate military equipment and subordinating special Russian units and some irregular units under Rosgvardia, particularly after the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion in June 2023.[13] The Kremlin has been similarly expanding the Federal Security Service (FSB) force generation capabilities.[14]
Russian forces conducted a large-scale combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of June 22 to 23 that largely targeted Kyiv City and killed at least seven people and injured 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 352 drones, including up to 160 Shaheds, from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[15] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 11 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Taganrog, Rostov Oblast, and Bryansk Oblast and five Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed all five Iskander-K missiles and seven Iskander-M/KN-23 missiles and that three Iskander-M missiles were “locally lost.” The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 146 drones and that 193 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[16] The strikes heavily targeted Kyiv City, with Ukrainian officials reporting that Russian forces struck residential buildings in the city and damaged the campus of the Ihor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute.[17] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky highlighted that Russia is targeting Ukrainian cities and civilians, noting that Russian forces damaged five apartment buildings in Kyiv City and hit a hospital in Bila Tserkva, Kyiv Oblast.[18] Russia has been increasingly targeting Kyiv City in its overnight drone and missile strikes.[19]
Ukraine’s Western partners continue to allocate military aid to Ukraine and collaborate with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB). Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on June 22 that Norway plans to allocate $400 million to purchase Ukrainian weapons for the Ukrainian military.[20] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 22 that Norway will focus on investing in drones.[21] Zelensky noted that Norwegian defense company Kongsberg Defense and Aerospace opened an office in Ukraine, and Umerov stated that Ukraine will collaborate with Kongsberg to develop joint projects related to air defense.[22] New Zealand announced on June 23 a package worth 16 million NZD (about $9.54 million) for Ukraine that allocates four million NZD (about $2.38 million) toward the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) fund, four million NZD toward the UK- and Latvia-led drone coalition, seven million NZD (about $4.17 million) worth of humanitarian aid, and one million NZD (about $596,500) for displaced Ukrainians.[23]
Key Takeaways:
The Kremlin continues to only diplomatically support Iran, showcasing the limitations in the Russian-Iranian strategic relationship.
Russian officials are attempting to influence conversations about increasing NATO defense spending by misrepresenting Russia’s ongoing efforts to restructure and expand Russia’s military capabilities as a defensive reaction to NATO.
Putin also acknowledged his ongoing efforts to empower Russia’s internal security services in order to safeguard regime stability and internal security.
Russian forces conducted a large-scale combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of June 22 to 23 that largely targeted Kyiv City and killed at least seven people and injured 28.
Ukraine’s Western partners continue to allocate military aid to Ukraine and collaborate with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).
Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Borova, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka and in Sumy Oblast.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 23 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 22 and 23.[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Kursk Oblast from Ryzhivka and Bezsalivka (south and east of Tetkino in Sumy Oblast) and toward Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), Glushkovo, and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[25]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)
Ukrainian forces liberated a village in the Sumy direction in mid-June 2025.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 20 and 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Kindrativka (north of Sumy City) and liberated Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[26] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on June 14 that Ukrainian forces liberated Andriivka, and a Russian milblogger acknowledged on June 21 that Russian forces withdrew from the settlement.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 23 that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) previously replaced elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) that were operating in Andriivka but that the naval infantry elements had to withdraw from the settlement.[28]
Russian forces attacked in northern Sumy Oblast, including north of Sumy City near Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on June 22 and 23.[29]
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on June 22 that Ukrainian forces are conducting assault operations toward Yunakivka and that Ukrainian forces likely advanced between 200 and 700 meters in the settlement over the course of a week.[30] Syrskyi characterized Yunakivka as a contested “gray zone” and stated that Russian forces’ reliance on small assault groups without armored support enabled Ukraine’s counterattacks. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are using Andriivka to develop attacks towards Kindrativka (northwest of Andriivka) and Oleksiivka (east of Andriivka), which are located roughly four kilometers from Andriivka.[31] Ukraine’s Siversk Group of Forces Spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk stated on June 22 that Russian forces are attempting to leverage superior manpower reserves with light vehicles to conduct infantry attacks in the North Slobozhansk direction (northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts) and that Russian forces are not using armored equipment within 10 to 15 kilometers of the frontline.[32] Mysnyk also stated that Russian forces in the area are struggling to maneuver across difficult terrain with ravines, small rivers, and forests with vehicles. Ukraine’s Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated on June 23 that Russian forces have reduced the tempo of their assaults in Sumy Oblast and hypothesized that Russian forces likely lack the personnel to maintain a higher operational tempo with greater assaults.[33]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade and drone and artillery elements of the 11th Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly operating near Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[34] Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction, including near Myropillia (northeast of Sumy City).[35] Elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade are reportedly operating in Oleksiivka.[36] Drone elements of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly coordinating Russian FAB-3000 air strikes against Ukrainian positions near Kindrativka.[37] Elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Kindrativka.[38]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 23 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the Vovchanski Khutory direction (northeast of Kharkiv City).[39]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on June 22 and 23.[40]
The commander of a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the Kharkiv direction stated on June 23 that Russian forces have become more active near Vovchansk.[41] The commander stated that Russian forces were deploying forces with 30 to 45 days of training in January 2025, but are now deploying forces with a maximum of 14 days of training in order to more quickly replenish losses. The commander stated that Russian forces are using lightly armored vehicles sporadically. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian border guards brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction stated on June 23 that Russian forces launch up to 10 assaults daily and have recently increased the number of personnel deployed in each assault to up to 25 personnel per assault, compared to previous assaults with three to 10 personnel.[42] The Ukrainian Border Guard Service reported on June 23 that Russian forces in the Vovchansk direction continue to attack using infantry on motorcycles.[43]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk).[44]
Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Dvorichna and toward Kutkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Stroivka and Fyholivka and toward Dvorichanske; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pischane on June 22 and 23.[45]
The commander of a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in Kharkiv Oblast stated on June 23 that Russian forces are intensifying efforts in the Kupyansk direction and supplementing efforts with untrained infantry units and small vehicles.[46]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[47]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 23 shows Russian forces raising a flag in central Hrekivka (southeast of Borova), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[48]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zeleny Hai and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Tverdokhlibove and toward Olhivka.[49]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 23 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Karpivka, and Zelena Dolyna, and toward Novyi Myr; and northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi on June 22 and 23.[50]
A Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction reported that Ukrainian drone operators struck a “Mur” surveillance system and a “Sylok-M1” electronic warfare (EW) system in the Lyman direction.[51]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 23 but did not make confirmed advances.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on June 22 and 23.[52]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Verkhnokamyanske.[53]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 23 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, north of Chasiv Yar toward Novomarkove, southeast of Chasiv Yar toward Mykolaivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Predtechnye and Bila Hora on June 22 and 23.[54]
A chief sergeant in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated that Russian forces learned during offensive operations against Pokrovsk that it is difficult to conduct frontal assaults on large settlements and are avoiding attacking Kostyantynivka. The chief sergeant stated that Russian forces are instead attempting to strike Ukrainian logistics and rear areas near Kramatorsk and Druzhkivka to disrupt Ukrainian logistics in the area.[55] The chief sergeant stated that the Russian military command has redeployed significant elements of “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies from the Pokrovsk direction to the Chasiv Yar direction. The chief sergeant suggested that these redeployments may indicate Russian prioritization of this sector of the front. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated that the Russian military command is actively committing elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division in hopes of seizing Chasiv Yar.[56] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces conduct small infantry assaults “almost continuously,” including with motorcycle support.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on June 23 but did not advance.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk toward Pleshchiivka; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka, Novospaske, Novoolenivka, Yablunivka, and Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Toretsk near Leonidivka on June 22 and 23.[57]
Geolocated footage published on June 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian vehicle storage facility of the 24th Spetsnaz Brigade (Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff [GRU]) in occupied Velyka Shyshivka (east of Donetsk City).[58]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[59]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces have established positions in Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) and advanced into Novotoretske (north of Novoekonomichne).[60]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrne and Malynivka and toward Volodymyrivka, Shakhove, Razine, and Novotoretske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and toward Molodetske on June 22 and 23.[61]
A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Pokrovsk direction noted that Russia’s use of motorcycles and buggies is relatively effective.[62] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces used Geran-2 drones (Russian-made analogues of the Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones) to strike Ukrainian positions near Razine and Sofiivka (further northeast of Pokrovsk and west of Toretsk).[63] ISW has observed recent reports that Russia is using Geran-2 drones for strikes along the frontline, marking a departure from Russia’s previous pattern of using long-range Shahed/Geran drones against Ukraine’s rear and deep rear and indicating Russia’s enhanced drone production capabilities.[64]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th “Sparta” Separate Mechanized Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novoekonomichne and Koptieve (northeast of Pokrovsk).[65] Drone operators of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[66]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Vesele (south of Novopavlivka).[67]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka), west of Dachne, southwest of Horikhove (both southeast of Novopavlivka), west of Komar, west and southwest of Fedorivka, and east of Yalta (all south of Novopavlivka).[68]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; south of Novopavlivka near Yalta; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka and Bahatyr on June 22 and 23.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Perebudova (south of Novopavlivka).[70]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhzhia (south of Novopavlivka).[71] Elements of the 1444th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[72]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 23 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole and toward Voskresenka and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on June 22 and 23.[73]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Shevchenko.[74]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 23 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 22 that Russian forces advanced toward Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[75]
Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 22 and 23.[76]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 1295th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (reportedly of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA]) are reportedly operating near Malynivka.[77]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 23 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and southwest of Orikhiv near Mali Shcherbaky and Stepove and toward Novoandriivka on June 22 and 23.[78]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the “Nemets” group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[79]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on June 23 but did not advance.[80]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[81]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
See topline text.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg acknowledged on June 23 that he led a US delegation to Belarus on June 21.[82] Kellogg stated that the US and Belarusian delegations discussed the war in Ukraine and US-Belarusian bilateral relations and that the parties negotiated the release of 14 political prisoners from Belarus, including prisoners from Japan, Poland, and four other countries. Belarusian opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya announced that Belarus had freed Belarusian opposition leader Sergey Tikhanovsky as part of the exchange.[83]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77237; https://t.me/MID_Russia/61646
[2] https://archive.ph/dh6OM; https://www.reuters.com/world/china/irans-supreme-leader-asks-putin-do-more-after-us-strikes-2025-06-23/
[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-18-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2025
[4] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77240
[5] https://ria dot ru/20250623/grushko-2024695639.html
[6] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm
[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/weakness-lethal-why-putin-invaded-ukraine-and-how-war-must-end
[8] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77240
[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-military-restructuring-and-expansion-hindered-ukraine-war ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21
[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020525
[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121723 ;
[12] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77240
[13] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-28-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010324
[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2023
[15] https://t.me/kpszsu/36914
[16] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/23/poshkodzheno-pyat-bagatokvartyrnyh-budynkiv-ye-zagybli-ta-poraneni-prezydent-pro-naslidky-udaru-po-kyyevu/; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14819?single; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25803; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1049301-klimenko-pro-ataku-rf-na-kiiv-u-sevcenkivskomu-rajoni-jmovirno-bulo-prame-vlucanna-fugasnoi-raketi/; https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/30725; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4877; https://t.me/andriyshTime/39230; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4878 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4888; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/23/u-kyyevi-vnaslidok-udaru-rf-zagynuly-try-lyudyny-shhe-13-postrazhdaly/; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4880; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4883; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1352; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/44862; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/14862; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/14861; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1048879-vijska-rf-atakuvali-ocakiv-na-mikolaivsini-poraneno-troe-ludej-sered-nih-diti/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/22/zagarbnyky-vdaryly-po-ochakovu-troye-poranenyh-zokrema-dity/; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02zwS3JNtXQFSEKyVHFLuaKT2Zjas9JWnBQsaWhrXqUPEudyKvwEoKBsB2meS1SWHcl; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12625; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1937136591568318559 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14829; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/23/pid-zavalamy-mozhut-buty-vykladachi-oleg-kiper-pro-udar-balistykoyu-po-navchalnomu-zakladu-na-odeshhyni/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/10192; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02zwS3JNtXQFSEKyVHFLuaKT2Zjas9JWnBQsaWhrXqUPEudyKvwEoKBsB2meS1SWHcl
[17] https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4877; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4883; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1352 ; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1049301-klimenko-pro-ataku-rf-na-kiiv-u-sevcenkivskomu-rajoni-jmovirno-bulo-prame-vlucanna-fugasnoi-raketi/; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4878 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4888; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/23/u-kyyevi-vnaslidok-udaru-rf-zagynuly-try-lyudyny-shhe-13-postrazhdaly/; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4880; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1362; https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/30725; https://t.me/presinfokpi/7922
[18] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14819
[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052425
[20] https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/12996
[21] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/zhodnogo-poshirennya-yadernoyi-zbroyi-v-suchasnomu-sviti-ne-98573
[22] https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/posts/pfbid02T3Qu9x3EyzZz7LgePAYhn5fwDfURVRKvy4z32sSJX1h5BqhxKbcevDYwHt947Pngl; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/zhodnogo-poshirennya-yadernoyi-zbroyi-v-suchasnomu-sviti-ne-98573
[23] https://www.beehive dot govt.nz/release/new-zealand-announces-further-aid-ukraine
[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785
[25] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30344; https://t.me/dva_majors/73968; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30367
[26] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1936781662026879313; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1936783135133544731; https://t.me/pentagonkh/277; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1937138889699033276; https://t.me/morpex_V/5044
[27] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1936783135133544731; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1936781662026879313; https://t.me/pentagonkh/277; https://suspilne dot media/1042467-na-sumskomu-napramku-perebuvaut-ponad-50-tisac-vijskovih-rf-zelenskij/; https://t.me/severnnyi/4392; https://t.me/yurasumy/23641
[28] https://t.me/severnnyi/4392; https://t.me/severnnyi/4409
[29] https://t.me/dva_majors/73968; https://t.me/wargonzo/27433; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812
[30] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/ukraine-launches-assault-near-yunakivka-after-recapturing-andriyivka/; https://t.me/osirskiy/1192
[31] https://t.me/severnnyi/4409
[32] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/22/sumskyj-relyef-proty-vorozhyh-mashyn-okupanty-zmusheni-minimalno-vykorystovuvaty-bronyu-ta-legku-tehniku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg
[33] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/23/napevno-syl-u-voroga-nedostatno-na-sumshhyni-rosiyany-znyzyly-aktyvnist-shturmiv/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg
[34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30354; https://t.me/rusich_army/24321
[35] https://t.me/c/1852634939/29405 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4392; https://t.me/dva_majors/74008
[36] https://t.me/severnnyi/4409
[37] https://t.me/dva_majors/74013
[38] https://t.me/severnnyi/4409
[39] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30371
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652
[41] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/23/shhob-ruhalysya-yak-strumochok-na-harkivshhyni-vorog-aktyvno-zaluchaye-svij-najdeshevshyj-resurs/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ScdUZNkwcYc
[42] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/23/mali-shturmovi-grupy-vyrosly-u-vovchansku-vorog-bezperestanku-shturmuye-i-kopaye-fortyfikacziyi/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kA5EvhyCugE
[43] https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1G2WtkkURo/
[44] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1937187909515506004; https://t.me/Ochi151/105
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13465; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1936817437682581972; https://t.me/operationall_space/4742
[46] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/23/shhob-ruhalysya-yak-strumochok-na-harkivshhyni-vorog-aktyvno-zaluchaye-svij-najdeshevshyj-resurs/
[47] https://t.me/dva_majors/73992
[48] https://x.com/creamy_caprice/status/1937075996928127375; https://t.me/mi_s_toboy_sp/3429; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9442; https://t.me/osintpen/1271
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652
[51] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/23/voroga-na-lymanshhyni-zalyshyly-bez-ochej-ta-vuh-znyshheno-kompleksy-murom-ta-reb-sylok/; https://t.me/umftteam/527
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652; https://t.me/dva_majors/73968
[53] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/20027
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652; https://t.me/wargonzo/27433
[55] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/23/chorni-vorony-proty-vorozhogo-rubikona-na-donechchyni-zhorstoki-bytvy-povitryanyh-asiv/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L35LL58ugFk
[56] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/23/bila-abo-chervona-plyama-na-misczi-budynkiv-u-chasovomu-yaru-pislya-boyiv-vid-kvartaliv-ne-zalyshylosya-j-stin/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L35LL58ugFk
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652
[58] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1936901117839122834; https://t.me/supernova_plus/40288?single
[59] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9444; https://t.me/spartan_ngu/2490
[60] https://t.me/basurin_e/19492
[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652
[62] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/22/smiyalys-ale-cze-diyevyj-metod-poblyzu-pokrovska-rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-tysk-na-syly-oborony/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg
[63] https://t.me/mod_russia/54078
[64] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2025
[65] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13953
[66] https://t.me/voin_dv/15637
[67] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1937119925421686807; https://t.me/ZSU_141OMBr/1149
[68] https://t.me/rybar/71570; https://t.me/wargonzo/27433; https://t.me/voin_dv/15621; https://t.me/rybar/71570
[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785; https://t.me/rybar/71570; https://t.me/rybar/71574
[70] https://t.me/voin_dv/15621
[71] https://t.me/rybar/71570; https://t.me/tass_agency/321899; https://t.me/mod_russia/54073
[72] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/20742
[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652
[74] https://t.me/voin_dv/15629
[75] https://t.me/voin_dv/15621
[76] https://t.me/wargonzo/27433; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1936826019065057737; https://t.me/voin_dv/15620
[77] https://t.me/voin_dv/15636 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1936826019065057737 https://t.me/voin_dv/15620
[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02zwS3JNtXQFSEKyVHFLuaKT2Zjas9JWnBQsaWhrXqUPEudyKvwEoKBsB2meS1SWHcl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30346; https://t.me/wargonzo/27433
[79] https://t.me/wargonzo/27423 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73957
[80] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788
[81] https://t.me/dva_majors/74015
[82] https://x.com/generalkellogg/status/1937140616757936336?s=46&t=oKaeT_EpUFQGPYnee_AK3w
[83] https://www.cnn.com/2025/06/21/europe/belarus-opposition-freed-us-intl
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 24, 2025
Russian forces are expanding their use of motorcycles along the frontline in Ukraine. Russia is preparing its military and society for a potential future war with NATO in the medium- to long-term. The Kremlin continues efforts to augment Russian combat power by setting conditions to subsume forces from Russia’s Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) allies under a Russian military command. The Russian State Duma ratified on June 24 a protocol that allows CSTO states to send their troops to other CSTO countries’ territory in the event of armed conflict, threats, crisis situations, and exercises. The protocol also introduces the concept of a “command of formations” that will command CSTO military forces sent to one CSTO state. The CSTO Collective Security Council approved the protocol in November 2024. Western assessments of Russia’s future combat power must take into account the forces of Russia’s CSTO allies that Russia may use in future operations — not only those of Russia. The data cut-off for this product was 11:45am ET on June 25. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 24, 2025
Angelica Evans, Anna Harvey, Christina Harward, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, and George Barros
June 24, 2025, 6:00pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45am ET on June 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte assessed that Russia is the largest existential threat to NATO members today and that Russia is preparing for a protracted war with NATO. Rutte stated on June 24 at the NATO summit at The Hague that Russia remains the most significant and direct threat to NATO, especially considering the support North Korea, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Iran, and Belarus provide Russia.[1] Rutte stated that Russia could attack NATO within three to seven years and is currently more prepared for a war than NATO. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview with Sky News on June 24 that Russia would not be ready to attack NATO in the immediate future but could be ready for a war with NATO by 2030.[2] Zelensky stated that the war in Ukraine is currently constraining Russia’s ability to train and reconstitute its forces and that any decrease in aid to Ukraine would benefit Russia. ISW continues to assess that Russia is preparing its military and society for a potential future war with NATO in the medium- to long-term.[3] Any future ceasefire or long-term pause in combat in Ukraine would free up Russian forces for redeployment to Russia’s eastern border with NATO and allow Russia to rearm and reconstitute, whereby Russia may be able to pose a significant threat to NATO earlier than 2030.
The Kremlin continues efforts to augment Russian combat power by setting conditions to subsume forces from Russia’s Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) allies under a Russian military command. The Russian State Duma ratified on June 24 a protocol that allows CSTO states to send their troops to other CSTO states’ territory in the event of armed conflict, threats, crisis situations, and exercises; to respond to the consequences of emergencies; and to provide humanitarian aid.[4] The protocol now allows for the CSTO to transport troops one day after a decision from the CSTO Council — as opposed to after 30 days as the protocol stated previously. The protocol also introduces the concept of a “command of formations” that will command CSTO military forces sent to one CSTO state. This “command of formations” will likely be a Russian-dominated command. The CSTO Collective Security Council approved the protocol in November 2024.[5] ISW has long assessed that the Kremlin has been trying to subordinate the militaries of former Soviet states to the Russian Armed Forces to recreate a multinational combined army in the former Soviet space.[6] Western assessments of Russia’s future combat power must take into account the forces of Russia’s CSTO allies that Russia may use in future operations — not only those of Russia.
Russian forces are expanding their use of motorcycles along the frontline in Ukraine — a tactic that the Russian military may leverage in future wars beyond Ukraine, possibly including operations against NATO states. A servicemember in a Ukrainian brigade reported on June 24 that the threat of Russian motorcycle assaults is increasing along the frontline as Russian forces increasingly integrate motorcycles into assault tactics.[7] The servicemember stated that Russian motorcycle forces are no longer attacking along roads but mainly attacking through open fields and trying to bypass Ukrainian engineering barriers along the frontline. Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight provided additional information on June 23 about the tactical doctrine the Russian military is establishing for motorcycle usage.[8] Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian forces are mainly using motorcycles as a form of transport for attacking infantry to support diversion, reconnaissance, infiltration, and flanking support missions. Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian motorcyclists operate in squads of six to eight motorcycles with one or two riders on each motorcycle (between six and 16 personnel in total). Each squad reportedly has two to four portable electronic warfare (EW) systems and one device scanning for Ukrainian drones. Frontelligence Insight reported Russian forces are also leveraging motorcycles for casualty evacuation and logistics support. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported in May 2025 that Russian forces were mainly using motorcycles in tandem with armored vehicles.[9] Russian forces appear to be increasingly relying on motorcycles as a method of transport and advancement independent from tanks and armored vehicles in recent weeks, however.[10]
Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian forces have been training troops on motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) at ad hoc motocross tracks in Russia and occupied Ukraine as of Spring 2025.[11] Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian forces are also conducting more advanced training programs, including for drone evasion, and that the length of these courses varies between 16 hours to over a month. Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian forces are mainly using foreign-made motorcycles, primarily those manufactured in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and that volunteer organizations in Russia provide most of the motorcycles for frontline Russian units. Frontelligence Insight reported, citing internal documents from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), that Russia intends to equip over half of its infantry forces with motorcycles, ATVs, and buggies in the future. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will likely increasingly depend on motorcycles and other quicker unarmored vehicles, as slower-moving vehicles have become a hazard on the more transparent battlefield of Ukraine.[12] Russian efforts to integrate tactical innovations, such as motorcycle usage, among frontline units indicates that the Russian military is learning modern ground warfare lessons that it intends to leverage beyond the war in Ukraine.[13]
NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte highlighted NATO’s plans to invest more in its own defense capabilities, including by investing in the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) — in line with US President Donald Trump’s initiative for Europe to shoulder more of the burden of collective security. Rutte called on NATO states to invest in Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB), which Rutte assessed has an untapped potential of about $35 billion, in order to prevent NATO states from reducing their own stockpiles and to allow NATO states and allies to buy weapons from Ukraine in the future.[14] Rutte stated that NATO states will agree to introduce a baseline of allocating five percent of GDP toward defense spending during the NATO summit.[15] Rutte stated that NATO’s new defense investment plan will include a five-fold increase in investments in NATO air defense capabilities and investments to produce “thousands” more tanks and armored vehicles and millions of artillery ammunition rounds.
Ukraine’s European partners allocated military aid to Ukraine and financial support for drone production during the NATO summit on June 24. Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans announced on June 24 that the Netherlands approved a new military aid package for Ukraine worth 175 million euros (about $203.4 million), which provides 100 drone detection radars and 20 Ermine partly unmanned vehicles for casualty evacuation and includes 80 million euros (about $93 million) toward the international drone coalition.[16] Brekelmans stated that the Netherlands also recently signed a contract worth 500 million euros (about $5.8 million) with Ukrainian drone manufacturers to fund the production of 600,000 drones.[17] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced on June 24 that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Keir Starmer agreed to launch a new joint drone production initiative.[18] Umerov stated that the UK will produce Ukrainian-designed drones in the UK for three years as part of a project to support integration between the British and Ukrainian defense industries. Umerov stated that the UK and Ukraine will share the produced drones after the war in Ukraine ends and that the project will enable British defense companies to rapidly design and produce state-of-the-art drones at scale. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister for Digital Development Kateryna Chernohorenko, NATO Digital Staff Deputy Director Marco Criscuolo, and NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) Director General Ludwig Descamps announced on June 24 that NATO will provide 37 million euros (about $43 million) for Ukrainian satellite communications, including satellite radio stations, trackers, and services.[19]
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 23 to 24 that resulted in over 100 civilian casualties. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 97 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[20] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 63 drones and that 15 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Dnipro City and Samara, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, damaging educational and medical facilities.[21] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported that Russian forces struck a passenger train in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, killing at least 17 people and injuring at least 279.[22] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City and Velykyi Bobryk, Sumy Oblast.[23] Russia’s ongoing strike campaign against Ukraine in recent months has increasingly impacted civilian areas and infrastructure and Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB) — underscoring the urgency of providing additional air support to Ukraine and strengthening Ukraine’s air defense umbrella.
Key Takeaways:
NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte assessed that Russia is the largest existential threat to NATO members today and that Russia is preparing for a protracted war with NATO.
The Kremlin continues efforts to augment Russian combat power by setting conditions to subsume forces from Russia’s Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) allies under a Russian military command.
Russian forces are expanding their use of motorcycles along the frontline in Ukraine — a tactic that the Russian military may leverage in future wars beyond Ukraine, possibly including operations against NATO states.
NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte highlighted NATO’s plans to invest more in its own defense capabilities, including by investing in the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) — in line with US President Donald Trump’s initiative for Europe to shoulder more of the burden of collective security.
Ukraine’s European partners allocated military aid to Ukraine and financial support for drone production during the NATO summit on June 24.
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 23 to 24 that resulted in over 100 civilian casualties.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Kherson City, and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian Supporting Effort — Northern Axis
Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on June 24.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 23 and 24.[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to attack toward Glushkovo, Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), Novyi Put (east of Tetkino), and Vesele (north of Novyi Put).[25]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Kursk direction.[26]
Russian Supporting Effort — Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)
Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 24 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[27]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Andriivka and in southern Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[28]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in unspecified areas in the Sumy direction.[30]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Andriivka is a “contested” gray zone.[31] Another milblogger claimed that personnel from the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade stated that Russian forces in the Sumy direction are using all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) with attached trailers to transport supplies, ammunition, and fuel to frontline positions.[32]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th and 83rd separate VDV brigades and 76th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[33]
Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 24 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on June 23 and 24.[34]
Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn stated that small Russian infantry groups with drone support are attacking in the Vovchansk and Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) directions daily.[35]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Anvar” Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in border areas of Kharkiv Oblast.[36]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 24 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west and southwest of Dovhenke (north of Kupyansk).[37]
Russian forces conducted assaults northwest of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; north of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and Dvorichna and toward Kurkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and Fyholivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane on June 23 and 24.[38]
Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn stated on June 24 that Russian forces are trying to expand their bridgehead near Dvorichna.[39]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 24 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova near Tverdokhlibove, and Hrekivka and toward Druzhelyubivka, Olhivka, and Cherneschyna on June 23 and 24.[40]
Ukrainian Borova City Military Administration Head Oleksandr Tertyshnyi reported that Russian forces conducted a glide bomb strike against Borova.[41]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 24 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[42]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Lyman near Karpivka, Novyi Myr, Zelena Dolyna, and Ridkodub and toward Shandryholove; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske on June 23 and 24.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked from Novyi Myr toward Ridkodub and Shandryholove.[44]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kolodyazi.[45]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 24 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) marginally advanced to the eastern outskirts of Serebryanka (northeast of Siversk).[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced north of Verknokamyanske (east of Siversk).[47]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on June 23 and 24.[48]
A senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported that Russian forces are changing as their capabilities fluctuate by conducting several mechanized assaults until they lose too much equipment and manpower and then switching to attacking in small infantry groups.[49]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southwestern Chasiv Yar.[50]
Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; northeast of Chasiv Yar toward Bondarne; north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove and toward Pryvillya; southeast of Chasiv Yar toward Mykolaivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Bila Hora on June 23 and 24.[51]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment, and 299th VDV Regiment (all of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[52]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Yablunivka (west of Toretsk).[53]
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) seized Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[54] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces may maintain positions on the northern outskirts of Dyliivka, however.[55] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are trying to enter Oleksandro-Kalynove (west of Toretsk) and that claims that Russian forces already seized the settlement are exaggerated.[56]
Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk near Popiv Yar and toward Poltavka and Pleshchiivka; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka, Yablunivka, Novospaske, and Rusyn Yar and toward Stepanivka; and south of Toretsk near Nelipivka on June 23 and 24.[57]
An officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported that Russian forces are using a significant number of drones to disrupt Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and to strike Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[58] The officer reported that Russian forces are using first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber optic cables in “ambush tactics,” using Mavic drones to strike Ukrainian infantry, and using other FPV drones to target Ukrainian military equipment. The officer added that Russian forces also use Molniya drones to strike in the Kostyantynivka direction because the drones are cheap and have a decent payload. A Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov previously reported that Molniya drone can carry several FPV drones but is not a full-fledged drone mothership.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are slowly advancing in Yablunivka house-by-house.[60]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 24 shows a Ukrainian drone striking a Russian servicemember in western Malynivka (northeast of Pokrovsk), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[61]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[62]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka; northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka and Myrne and toward Razine, Koptieve, Novoekonomichne, Volodymyrivka, and Shakhove; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Myrolubivka and Novotoretske and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Zviroveand toward Molodetske and Chuhuyeve on June 23 and 24.[63]
The deputy commander of a Ukrainian artillery battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on June 24 reported that Russian infantry are using light vehicles, such as scooters and motorcycles, to attack in groups of one or two and that Russian forces are not using heavy equipment.[64] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are launching Shahed drones against Ukrainian forces near Shakhove.[65]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[66]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 24 shows Russian forces raising a flag in central Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[67]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and northeast of Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka), west of Fedorivka, west of Vesele, and southwest of Komar (all south of Novopavlivka).[68]
Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Novomykolaivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka and Horikhove; and south of Novopavlivka near Dachne, Vesele, Komar, Perebudova, and Bahatyr on June 23 and 24.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Komar, Yalta, and Voskresenka (both southwest of Novopavlivka).[70]
Order of Battle: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Perebudova.[71] Elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in northern Yalta.[72] Elements of the 30th Separate Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA) are reportedly operating near Voskresenka.[73]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 24 but did not advance.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces only occupy northern Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and that Ukrainian drones are preventing Russian forces from seizing the settlement.[74]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on June 23 and 24.[75]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[76]
Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on June 24.
Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces reported on June 24 that Russian forces are accumulating personnel, replenishing forces, and increasing logistical support in the Hulyaipole and Orikhiv directions in order to prepare for future offensive operations.[77]
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 24 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske on June 24.[78]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 100th Separate Reconnaissance Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA), including the “Nemets” group of the division’s 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[79]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced during a likely raid in the Kherson direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Oleshky (southeast of Kherson City on the east [left] bank of the Dnipro River) near the Antonivsky Road Bridge, likely during a raid.[80]
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on June 23 and 24.[81]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) and 127th Separate Reconnaissance Brigade (22nd Army Corps [AC], Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[82]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
See topline text.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
See topline text.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_236418.htm
[2] https://news.sky.com/story/zelenskyy-says-putin-could-attack-a-nato-member-within-five-years-to-test-alliance-13387606?fbclid=PAQ0xDSwLHFG1leHRuA2FlbQIxMQABp_WkRt2GI4NhlM9l2Gajdcf9qKizOeu9JPrTTBXckgJCOtv8LQoHPRL_xHol_aem_k4_Vs8pG8ImgEqiHmGaKdw
[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325
[4] https://suspilne dot media/1050399-derzduma-rf-sprostila-perekidanna-vijsk-miz-derzavami-clenami-odkb/; https://www.pnp dot ru/politics/gosduma-ratificirovala-protokol-o-statuse-voennykh-formirovaniy-stran-odkb.html; https://t.me/sotaproject/99606
[5] https://tass dot ru/politika/24340843 ; https://en.odkb-csto dot org/news/news_odkb/v-astane-sostoyalas-sessiya-skb-odkb/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-unprecedentedly-expansive-military-exercises-fall-2020-seek-recreate-soviet
[7] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/24/rozbigayutsya-yak-targany-ta-imituyut-prysutnist-taktyka-rosiyan-na-kordoni-z-dnipropetrovshhynoyu/
[8] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1937204380740256083
[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051325
[10] https://t.me/immitis71/1061 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/24/ukrayinski-desantnyky-zirvaly-masovanyj-motoshturm-rosiyan/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2025
[11] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1937204380740256083
[12] https://isw.pub/RussianForceGen050725
[13] https://isw.pub/RussianForceGen050725
[14] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_236426.htm?selectedLocale=en
[15] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_236418.htm
[16] https://www.defensie dot nl/actueel/nieuws/2025/06/24/100-dronedetectieradars-in-nieuw-steunpakket-voor-oekraine; https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/posts/pfbid0yEbgmRPkVwXSFaDpPxwUWCkHjM5iCaQQw69Re5FGHgow8Wr36cyL95mvm3WnNxPNl?__cft__[0]=AZVcUKHdgywkUD83kaiRzK3bE6m6pz_GXDrS4s5Qov3MEZXIqiZc3r9fey2rtHbB5OpfvV55x4LcW1fpB936EY49sfK9nuAUkgpUslwwF5pdTJOfgIeiTBp3gEzZp5LV4Hj-UEYS_w0nqkiMmfTqvHE_AdSHtn8pdLPPL5vnl3ogGg&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
[17] https://x.com/DefensieMin/status/1937425090037375302; https://suspilne dot media/1050255-niderlandi-pidpisali-z-ukrainou-ugodi-na-virobnictvo-600-tisac-bpla/
[18] https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/posts/pfbid0iSD1MgpHMdEjf98ZoWKHNxrseX7nFbUh4YBdn3CnBP595hpcShTLdn4rCLZmwSZsl?__cft__[0]=AZVz7cCE2lxNNQ-LWHj2Xo2SgUzwhL_HLpWt_8tYZxozMdgQedKMuFIUYISsB5TC250i3CwtwWsl2Kz8Dy1YiHfu8Bwb6PRh1pJNTSdycj8ersIF636UZBdWf9PqS-qxPxOkHkKhm_LprBAAaKIuDQs-iXGtkL6DVx2YeQbV1YbOyw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/24/rustem-umyerov-brytaniya-finansuvatyme-zakupivlyu-ukrayinskyh-droniv/
[19] https://mod dot gov.ua/news/minoboroni-ta-nato-zaluchili-majzhe-37-miljoniv-yevro-na-suputnikovij-zv-yazok-dlya-sil-oboroni; https://suspilne dot media/1050203-niderlandi-ogolosili-pro-cergovij-paket-vijskovoi-dopomogi-dla-ukraini-na-majze-175-mln-evro/
[20] https://t.me/kpszsu/36958
[21] https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/7044; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/7045; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1050147-vijska-rf-atakuvali-dnipropetrovsinu-raketami-odna-z-nih-vlucila-v-potag-akij-kursuvav-z-odesi/ ; https://t.me/kpszsu/36969; https://t.me/borys_filatovv/2555; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22394; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1050089-vijska-rf-masovano-atakuvali-dnipropetrovsinu-poskodzenna-u-dnipri-ta-u-samaru-e-zagibli-ta-poraneni/ ; https://t.me/kpszsu/36969; https://t.me/borys_filatovv/2555; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22394; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1050089-vijska-rf-masovano-atakuvali-dnipropetrovsinu-poskodzenna-u-dnipri-ta-u-samaru-e-zagibli-ta-poraneni/ ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22394 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22408; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22409
[22] https://suspilne dot media/1049857-zsu-urazili-naftobazu-kombinat-atlas-u-rosii-finlandia-vidilae-novij-paket-vijskovoi-dopomogi-1217-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1750777572&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1937503898186436995 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14839 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22433 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22432
[23] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1049879-u-harkovi-vnoci-24-cervna-prolunali-vibuhi-nemislanskij-rajon-atakuvali-rosijski-bezpilotniki/; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2711; https://t.me/synegubov/15226; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2712 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2714; https://t.me/synegubov/15233 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1049881-dron-ne-zdetonuvav-stalo-vidomo-de-u-harkovi-vpav-sahed-so-ne-vibuhnuv/; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1049879-u-harkovi-vnoci-24-cervna-prolunali-vibuhi-nemislanskij-rajon-atakuvali-rosijski-bezpilotniki/; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1049885-sim-rosijskih-bezpilotnikiv-atakuvali-harkiv-protagom-pivtori-godini-vlucanna-na-troh-lokaciah/; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2722 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15230 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15237 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15237 ; https://t.me/grigorov_oleg/72; https://t.me/prokuraturasumy/4332?single; https://t.me/grigorov_oleg/73; https://t.me/prokuraturasumy/4332; https://t.me/grigorov_oleg/71; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/44939; https://t.me/UA_National_Police/42968; https://t.me/suspilnesumy/35238; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1049873-rosijska-armia-zavdala-masovanogo-udaru-po-verhnosirovatskij-gromadi/
[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25820; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25816
[25] https://t.me/dva_majors/74068; https://t.me/starshii_pogrannaryada/11302; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30382; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30399
[26] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170151
[27] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/29171; https://t.me/immitis71/1061
[28] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31896
[29] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30381
[30] https://t.me/wargonzo/27467
[31] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30381
[32] https://t.me/sashakots/54484
[33] https://t.me/dazbastadraw/8266 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27466 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30381 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30388
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25820; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25816; https://t.me/otukharkiv/6751
[35] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/24/perestupayut-cherez-trupy-svoyih-tovaryshiv-na-pivnochi-harkivshhyny-rosiyany-nastupayut-hvylyamy/
[36] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170153
[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30406
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25846 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25820 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25816 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12713
[39] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/24/perestupayut-cherez-trupy-svoyih-tovaryshiv-na-pivnochi-harkivshhyny-rosiyany-nastupayut-hvylyamy/
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25846 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25820 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25816 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12713
[41] https://t.me/DSNS_Kharkiv/15210; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1050131-rosiani-zavdali-aviaudaru-po-centru-borovoi-na-harkivsini-poskodzeni-do-30-budinkiv/
[42] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65395
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25846 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25820 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25816 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12713 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65395
[44] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65395
[45] https://t.me/tass_agency/322265
[46] https://t.me/wargonzo/27467 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170155 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/322176 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65396
[47] https://t.me/wargonzo/27467
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25846 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25820 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25816 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65396
[49] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L35LL58ugFk ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/24/vydavyty-na-pidkradulyah-sposterezhni-posty-shturmy-rosiyan-na-donechchyni-zalezhyt-vid-yihnih-spromozhnostej/
[50] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9457 ; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DLSBXZWipDa/?igsh=b3l0d2llaTB5dnE2
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25846 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25820 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25816 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27467
[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30388
[53] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1937377716929507589 ; https://t.me/gimbatov34/4899
[54] https://t.me/mod_russia/54104 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/23878 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54108 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37674 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65406
[55] https://t.me/rybar/71634
[56] https://t.me/yurasumy/23688
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25846 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25820 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25816 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12713
[58] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OIDpzZicuos ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/24/vono-desheve-jogo-bagato-vono-derevyane-na-toreczkomu-napryamku-masovo-vykorystovuyut-drony-bud-yakogo-typu/
[59] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-11-2025
[60] https://t.me/yurasumy/23688
[61] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9453; https://t.me/ChervonaKalynaBrigade/3130
[62] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65390
[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25846; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25820 https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25816; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12713; https://t.me/dva_majors/74060; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30382; https://t.me/yurasumy/23686; https://t.me/yurasumy/23683
[64] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/24/zadiyuyut-yihnij-nepotrib-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-ataky-z-samogo-ranku-i-do-vechora/
[65] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94440
[66] https://t.me/dva_ majors/74055; https://t.me/dva_majors/74069; https://t.me/dva_majors/74094
[67] https://t.me/blacksky_3brop/40; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9449; https://t.me/osintpen/1278
[68] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30378; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30382; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65392; https://t.me/dva_majors/74060; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170155; https://t.me/yurasumy/23682 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27467
[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25846; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25846; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25816; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12713
[70] https://t.me/voin_dv/15648
[71] https://t.me/mod_russia/54101
[72] https://t.me/voin_dv/15650
[73] https://t.me/voin_dv/15645
[74] https://t.me/yurasumy/23682
[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25846; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25820 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25816; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12713; https://t.me/dva_majors/74060; https://t.me/voin_dv/15648
[76] https://t.me/voin_dv/15644
[77] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12629; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1049983-armia-rf-provodit-aktivnu-pidgotovku-do-sturmovih-dij-na-orihivskomu-napramku-sili-oboroni-pivdna/
[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25846
[79] https://t.me/dva_majors/74082; https://t.me/dva_majors/74081; https://t.me/wargonzo/27482
[80] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1937314398000791959; https://t.me/svo_alfa/304
[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25846; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25820; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25816
[82] https://t.me/dva_majors/74091; https://t.me/dva_majors/74093