Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 27, 2025 – Institute for the Study of War

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Diverging Reports Breakdown

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 21, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s long-term demands for full Ukrainian capitulation remain unchanged. Putin told Sky News Arabia on June 20 that Ukraine needs to accept neutrality, reject foreign alliances, and agree to nuclear non-proliferation. Putin also claimed that Ukrainian leaders are being guided by the interests of “external parties” rather than national interest. ISW continues to assess that Russia is not interested in peace negotiations with Ukraine and remains committed to its pre-war demands, which amount essentially to the elimination of Ukraine as a sovereign country independent of Russian control. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated that Russian soldiers bring “only death, destruction, and devastation” wherever they step. Russian Security Council Deputy Chair Dmitry Medvedev claimed on June 21 that Russia would respond with a tactical bomb against Ukraine if a dirty bomb was used against the country. Russian officials have said that there is no evidence that Russia intends to use a nuclear weapon against Ukraine but noted that a response would be “catastrophic”

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Anna Harvey, Olivia Gibson, Jennie Olmsted, Angelica Evans, Jessica Sobieski, William Runkel, and Kateryna Stepanenko

June 21, 2025, 4:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on June 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s long-term demands for full Ukrainian capitulation remain unchanged. Putin told Sky News Arabia on June 20 that Ukraine needs to accept neutrality, reject foreign alliances, and agree to nuclear non-proliferation before Russia and Ukraine can establish long-term peace.[1] Putin insisted that Kyiv recognize Russian control over the illegally annexed, partially occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts or risk future Russian aggression. Putin also claimed that Ukrainian leaders are being guided by the interests of “external parties” rather than national interest, reiterating a long-term Russian narrative accusing Ukraine of being controlled by the West and denying the Ukrainian government agency to make its own decisions and defend itself.[2] Putin claimed that Ukraine deserves a “better fate” than to be used by other countries as a tool against Russia. Putin also stated that no future settlement can be reached unless Russia and Ukraine resolve “outstanding humanitarian issues.” Russian officials had repeatedly issued the same pre-war demands that Russian officials presented at negotiations in Istanbul in 2022, which included recognition of occupied Ukraine as Russian territory and the “demilitarization” of Ukraine.[3] ISW continues to assess that Russia is not interested in peace negotiations with Ukraine and remains committed to its pre-war demands, which amount essentially to the elimination of Ukraine as a sovereign country independent of Russian control.[4]

Ukrainian officials responded to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 20 statements at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) and urged the international community to take more decisive action against Russia.[5] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky responded to Putin’s statement that Russia owns everywhere a “Russian soldier steps” and emphasized that Putin clearly laid out Russia’s intention to seize all of Ukraine during this speech. Zelensky noted that this ideology implies that Russia could also lay claim to Belarus, the Baltic states, Moldova, the Caucasus, and Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan.[6] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated that Russian soldiers bring “only death, destruction, and devastation” wherever they step.[7] Sybiha stated that the only way that Putin will accept peace would be if the West forced his hand through increased support for Ukrainian defense, severe economic sanctions, the recognition of Russia as a terrorist state, and complete diplomatic isolation. Sybiha called on the international community to push back against Putin’s continued aspirations toward new territorial gains. ISW has previously noted that Putin’s theory of victory is based on the assumption that Russia can outlast Ukraine’s will to fight and the Western coalition supporting Ukraine, and that reducing US military aid to Ukraine will neither lead to a sustainable peace in Ukraine nor compel Putin to reassess his theory of victory.[8]

Kremlin officials appear to be reviving the false narrative that Ukraine intends to use a “dirty bomb” against Russia, likely in an attempt to influence Western discussions about providing additional military assistance to Ukraine. Putin responded to a question from the panel moderator at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 20 about if Ukraine will use a dirty bomb (a conventional explosive laced with radioactive material that is not a nuclear weapon) against Russia and stated that it would be a “colossal mistake” and that Russia will respond proportionately to all threats.[9] Putin underscored that Russia’s response to Ukraine using a dirty bomb would be “catastrophic” for Ukraine but noted that there is no evidence that Ukraine intends to use a dirty bomb. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev seized on Putin’s statement and claimed on June 21 that Russia would respond with a tactical nuclear weapon if Ukraine used a dirty bomb against Russia.[10] Russian officials previously intensified the “dirty bomb” narrative and nuclear blackmail in March and October 2022, and ISW assessed that Russian officials used this narrative to slow Western discussions of providing additional military assistance to Ukraine and to undermine Western resolve.[11] Russian officials are likely reintroducing this narrative amid ongoing debates in the United States and Europe about further aiding Ukraine.

US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk on June 21.[12] The two discussed international developments and bilateral relations.[13] US Deputy Special Envoy to Ukraine John Coale announced on June 21 that the United States brokered a deal with Belarus to free 14 Belarusian political prisoners.[14] The meeting marks the first high-profile public meeting between senior US and Belarusian officials since 2020.[15]

Russia continues to field modernized Shahed drones, expand domestic drone production capabilities, and innovate long-range strike tactics. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy Beskrestnov told Ukrainian news agency UNIAN on June 20 that he estimates that Russia has increased its Shahed production capabilities sevenfold.[16] Beskrestnov noted that Russia is attempting to reduce its dependency on Iran by producing modernized Shahed drones with mostly Russian- and Chinese-made components and that Russia is equipping newer Shahed models with antennas that are more resistant to electronic warfare (EW) interference. Beskrestnov stated that Russian forces are constantly innovating Shahed tactics to improve strike accuracy and evade Ukrainian air defense systems and units. Beskrestnov reported that Russia is preparing to build another Shahed production facility in an unspecified location and forecasted that Russian strike packages may soon incorporate up to 800 Shaheds, compared to the 300 to 400 that Russia typically launches in nightly strikes against Ukraine.

Head of the Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office Spartak Borisenko reported on June 20 that Russia is modernizing its Geran-2 drones (Russian-made analogue of the Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones).[17] Borisenko reported that Ukrainian authorities have observed downed Geran-2 drones with a modified four-cylinder two-stroke engine, increased warheads, and new antennas and fuel systems, which are different from the components that Russia used in Shahed drones as of April 2025. Borisenko noted that Russia now has two factories producing modernized Geran-2 drones that use both Russian and imported dual-purpose components. ISW has recently reported on data indicating that Russia is expanding its long-range drone production capabilities.[18]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and a Russian milblogger claimed on June 21 and 20 that Russian forces are increasingly utilizing Geran-2 drones for strikes along the frontline, marking a departure from the Russian forces’ previous pattern of using long-range Shahed/Geran drones against Ukraine’s rear and deep rear.[19] The milblogger noted that Russian forces are using Geran-2 drones to strike targets five to seven kilometers from the frontline, which Russian forces used to strike with glide bombs or missiles. Russian forces’ increased use of Shaheds to strike frontline and near-rear Ukrainian positions is another indicator of Russia’s enhanced drone production capabilities.

The Russian government formally announced its intention to reassess Russia’s territorial waters in the Baltic Sea over a year after the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published and subsequently deleted a similar proposal.[20] The Russian government published a list of coordinates on June 20 that Russian officials intend to reassess Russia’s territorial waters and suggested that Russia should adjust the maritime border coordinates in the Gulf of Finland in the zone of Jähi, Sommers, Gogland, Rodsher, Malyy Tyuters, and Vigrund islands, and near the northern delta of the Narva River. Sommers, Gogland, Rodsher, Malyy Tyuters, and Vigrund islands are under Russian control, while Russia and Finland share control over Jähi island. The northern delta of the Narva River is located between Russia and Estonia. The Russian MoD published a similar proposal on May 21, 2024, that suggested Russia reassess maritime border coordinates near Jähi, Sommers, Gogland, Rodsher, Malyy Tyuters, and Vigrund islands, the northern delta of the Narva River, and the islands and capes around Kaliningrad Oblast.[21] The Russian government’s June 2025 proposal does not include the islands and capes around Kaliningrad Oblast. Russian officials denied that Russia planned to change its maritime borders in late May 2024, but the Russian government’s June 2025 proposal suggests that Russia may attempt to reassess a smaller portion of its territorial waters, mainly in the Gulf of Finland.[22]

Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s long-term demands for full Ukrainian capitulation remain unchanged.

US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk on June 21.

Russia continues to field modernized Shahed drones, expand domestic drone production capabilities, and innovate long-range strike tactics.

Russian forces advanced near Novopavlivka and Velyka Novosilka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 20 and 21.[23] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and in the Glushkovo direction.[24]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on June 21.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on June 21 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces recaptured Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[25]

Russian forces attacked near Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka, Yunakivka, and Sadky on June 20 and 21.[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City), Andriivka, and Yunakivka.[27]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on June 21 that 52,000 Russian forces are attacking in the Sumy direction and that Russian forces are directing 23 percent of all strikes across the frontline in the Sumy direction.[28]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating south of Yunakivka.[29]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and Zelene and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on June 20 and 21.[30]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces attacked in the Kupyansk direction on June 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and Kamyanka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepove Novoselivka on June 20 and 21.[31]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove; and southeast of Borova near Hrekvivka, Olhivka, and toward Cherneshchyna on June 20 and 21.[32]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 21 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) advanced in central Novyi Myr (northeast of Lyman).[33]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Novyi Myr, and Zelena Dolyna and toward Karpivka and Hlushchenkove and east of Lyman near Torske on June 20 and 21.[34] Geolocated footage published on June 20 indicates that Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful assault with support from a tank and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) in northeastern Serebryanka (east of Lyman).[35]

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces are leveraging drone support in 80 percent of their operations in the Lyman direction.[36] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces operating in the Lyman direction have a numerical manpower advantage but are poorly trained and inexperienced in combat.[37]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA) are reportedly operating in Karpivka.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on June 20 and 21.[39]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar toward Predtechyne, Stupochky, and Bila Hora on June 20 and 21.[40]

A Ukrainian officer of a brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported on June 21 that Russian forces are trying to seize positions near Olkesiivka-Druzhivka (west of Chasiv Yar) in order to cut off Ukrainian forces in the area and bypass Toretsk.[41] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported that Russian forces are transferring forces to this direction, but are struggling to provide units with provisions and sufficient logistical support.[42]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion and 299th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on June 21 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Oleksandro-Kalynove and advanced in northeastern Yablunivka (both northwest of Toretsk).[44]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Dyliivka, northwest of Toretsk near Poltavka and Yablunivka, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on June 20 and 21.[45]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[46] Elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Oleksandro-Kalnyove.[47] Drone operators of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Poltavka.[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to northern Novoekonomichne, near Koptieve (both northeast of Pokrovsk), and toward Novotroitske and Molodatske (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[49]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Koptieve, Malynivka, Myrne, Shevchenko Pershe, Razine, and Myrolyubivka and toward Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Myrnohrad, and Yelyzavetivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Novopidhorodne, Shevchenko, Novotroitske, and Kotlyne on June 20 and 21.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kotlyne.[51]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhzhia (south of Novopavlivka) and likely seized the settlement.[52] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers credited elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) with seizing the settlement.[53]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing beyond Zaporizhzia toward Yalta (northwest of Zaporizhzhia) and Zirka (west of Zaporizhzhia) and that Russian forces advanced from Komar (south of Zaporizhzhia) toward Piddubne (just northwest of Komar).[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Novomykolaivka, and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka, Nadiivka, and Sribne; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Odradne, and Bahatyr; and south of Novopavlivka near Myrne, Yalta, Fedorivka, and Vesele on June 20 and 21.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Piddubne (south of Novopavlivka).[56]

The commander of a Ukrainian artillery brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported on June 21 that Russian forces are using electric scooters in assaults to try and rapidly advance through the contested “gray zone” that Russian and Ukrainian drones have created along the frontline.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Special Purpose Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating near Novoserhiivka.[58]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and likely seized the settlement.[59]

Unconfirmed claims: One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in northern Shevchenko.[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka toward Voskresenka and Maliivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and west of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Shevchenko on June 20 and 21.[61]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Hulyaipole direction on June 21 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on June 20 and 21 that Russian forces advanced east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka.[62]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself and east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 20 and 21.[63]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Poltavka (east of Hulyaipole).[64]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske and toward Novoandriivka on June 20 and 21.[65]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to Russian Airborne [VDV] Forces) and elements of the “Nemets” group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[66]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near the Antonivsky Bridge (east of Kherson City) on June 21 but did not advance. [67]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 20 to 21. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles from airspace over Tambov Oblast, four Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea, two Iskander-K cruise missiles from Belgorod Oblast, and 272 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[68] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed three Kalibr cruise missiles, one Kh-47M2 air-launched ballistic missile, and one Iskander-K cruise missile. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 140 drones and that 112 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes targeted Odesa, Kharkiv, and Poltava oblasts and damaged civilian and energy infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast and Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast.[69]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

See topline text.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.skynewsarabia dot com/world/1804376-بوتين-لسكاي-نيوز-عربية-أوكرانيا-تستحق-مصيرا-أفضل

[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030825; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/03/06/marko-rubio-zayavil-chto-ssha-pomogaya-ukraine-vedut-proksi-voynu-s-rossiey; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vYbwqRwNZGw; https://lenta dot ru/news/2024/08/12/putin-obvinil-zapad-v-proksi-voyne-s-rossiey-rukami-ukraintsev/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-invasion-update-25; https://www.npr.org/2022/12/22/1145004513/russia-ukraine-us-proxy-war-zelenskyy-visit; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62389537; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/26/russia-accuses-nato-of-proxy-war-in-ukraine-as-us-hosts-crucial-defence-summit; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/reframing-us-policy-debate-%E2%80%98long-war%E2%80%99-ukraine; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051525; https://kyivindependent dot com/russia-pushes-for-resuming-peace-talks-in-istanbul-based-on-2022-terms-situation-on-the-ground-ushakov/; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051525

[5] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/20/06/2025/685582719a79474b7e0ee61b ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025

[6] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14807 ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/koli-vbivcya-kazhe-sho-hoche-vbiti-mi-sprijmayemo-ce-vidpovi-98565

[7] https://x.com/andrii_sybiha/status/1936115377437606091?s=46&t=JHHzChDbvSf3JHpnTV6Hcg; https://suspilne dot media/1047955-odin-miljon-soldativ-dva-miljoni-nig-v-mzs-vidpovili-na-zaavi-putina/

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525

[9] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77222

[10] https://t.me/tass_agency/321588 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/591 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/80

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-23 ; https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Radiological%20Chemical%20False%20Flag%20Warning.pdf

[12] https://president.gov dot by/ru/events/vstreca-so-specposlannikom-prezidenta-ssa-kitom-kellogom ; https://t.me/pul_1/17259 ; https://belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-vstretilsja-so-spetsposlannikom-prezidenta-ssha-kitom-kellogom-722207-2025/ ; https://t.me/pul_1/17257; https://belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-vstretilsja-so-spetsposlannikom-prezidenta-ssha-kitom-kellogom-722207-2025/; https://suspilne dot media/1048295-kit-kellog-vidvidav-bilorus-ta-zustrivsa-z-lukasenkom/ ; https://t.me/tass_agency/321640

[13] https://t.me/belta_telegramm/318996 ;

[14] https://x.com/johnpcoale/status/1936415572511875439

[15] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/trumps-ukraine-envoy-meet-belarus-lukashenko-sources-say-2025-06-17/

[16] https://www.unian dot ua/weapons/shahedi-flesh-poyasniv-chogo-varto-boyatisya-ukrajincyam-13043865.html?fbclid=IwY2xjawLCS41leHRuA2FlbQIxMABicmlkETEwelp1SjhtSFduUU5WTHRIAR4ExaFHF65wLqRNeMe8MtCVzA-P9oV_yVrEZwUBA55z_fGmwK343klOfWUHSg_aem_uhBpFekZtpfod4L1XooAZw#goog_rewarded

[17] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1047615-rosiani-atakuvali-harkiv-bpla-z-bilsou-bojovou-castinou-i-potuznisim-dvigunom-so-znacat-ci-zmini/

[18] https://isw.pub/ForceGen061125 ; https://isw.pub/ForceGen061125 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-14-2025

[19] https://t.me/milinfolive/151274 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53971 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53959

[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2024 ; publication.pravo.gov dot ru/document/0001202506190024?index=2 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/321290

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2024

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2024

[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730

[24] https://t.me/dva_majors/73867 ; https://t.me/rybar/71533

[25] https://t.me/yurasumy/23641

[26] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65307 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73867 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23641 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/23976

[27] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65307 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/23976

[28] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14804

[29] https://t.me/sashakots/54438

[30]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73867

[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730

[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730

[33] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37639

[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730;

[35] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/29103; https://t.me/umftteam/524; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/dron-zaletiv-cherez-paradni-dveri-na-lymanshhyni-znyshheno-shturmovu-grupu-shho-shovalasya-v-hati/

[36] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/21/pochuly-dron-i-zgurtuvalysya-v-odnomu-misczi-rosiyany-sami-sproshhuyut-yihnye-znyshhennya/

[37] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/21/pochuly-dron-i-zgurtuvalysya-v-odnomu-misczi-rosiyany-sami-sproshhuyut-yihnye-znyshhennya/

[38] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37639

[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730; https://t.me/rybar/71533

[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730; https://t.me/wargonzo/27377

[41] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/21/taktyka-yak-u-bahmuti-rosiyany-namagayutsya-vidrizaty-kostyantynivku-vid-logistyky/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[42] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/21/yidut-na-tak-zvanyh-bronetaksi-speczyfika-shturmiv-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku/

[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30289

[44] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37669

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23640 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73867 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/24276 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65324

[46] https://t.me/dva_majors/73867

[47] https://t.me/yurasumy/23640

[48] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13947

[49] https://t.me/dva_majors/73867 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23636 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94210 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23635

[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730 ; https://t.me/rybar/71537 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73867 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94210 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65324

[51] https://t.me/wargonzo/27377

[52] https://t.me/osintpen/1250; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9432; https://t.me/voin_dv/15598; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1936348907002622296

[53] https://t.me/mod_russia/53978 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94204 ; https://t.me/vrogov/20827 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15598

[54] https://t.me/yurasumy/23632 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65309 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65309 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65319 ; https://t.me/rybar/71533 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27377

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65319 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73867 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23635

[56] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65309

[57] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/21/vorog-lize-navit-na-elektrosamokatah-vijskovi-pro-boyi-bilya-dnipropetrovshhyny/

[58] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13948

[59] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9431 ; https://t.me/BBS_110/391 ; https://www.facebook.com/31ombr/videos/739260038677333/

[60] https://t.me/yurasumy/23633

[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65319 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23633

[62]https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65311 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/169638 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73867 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27377

[63]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65311

[64] https://t.me/voin_dv/15587

[65]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730

[66] https://t.me/rogozin_do/7225 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73863 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73876

[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730

[68] https://t.me/kpszsu/36774

[69] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/21/pryame-vluchannya-vorog-atakuvav-energetychnu-infrastrukturu-poltavshhyny/; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/24005; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/24005; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1048209-na-odesini-ppo-zbila-ponad-20-bezpilotnikiv/; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1048041-v-odesi-prolunali-vibuhi-so-vidomo-35/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/21/vorog-ne-prypynyaye-teror-harkivshhyny-drony-rakety-ta-zrujnovana-infrastruktura/; https://t.me/synegubov/15195; https://t.me/synegubov/15193; https://t.me/synegubov/15192; https://t.me/synegubov/15193

Source: Understandingwar.org | View original article

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 27, 2025

This report is part of ISW’s annual Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool. Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly with new data. The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on June 27. The report will cover subsequent reports in the June 28 Russian offensive campaign assessment. The Russian military budget is currently 6.3 percent of its GDP, or 13.5 trillion rubles (roughly $172 billion) The Russian Finance Ministry more than tripled its budget deficit target for 2025 in May – from 0.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 1.7 percent of GDP – after several months of staggeringly low oil and gas profits. The Kremlin continues to downplay the social and economic costs of Russia’s war in Ukraine and inflated military spending.

Read full article ▼

Daria Novikov, Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, Angelica Evans, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, and Frederick W. Kagan

June 27, 2025, 7:20 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on June 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin continues to downplay the social and economic costs of Russia’s war in Ukraine and inflated military spending. Russian President Vladimir Putin told journalists on June 27, following the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) summit in Minsk, that sanctions cannot hurt Russia’s economy and that Russia’s economic indicators are “satisfactory.”[1] Putin acknowledged that Russia’s economy is still contending with high inflation and that Russia’s economic growth in 2025 will be “much more modest to combat inflation.” Putin also claimed that Russia’s military budget is currently 6.3 percent of its GDP, or 13.5 trillion rubles (roughly $172 billion), and that Russia plans to steadily decrease defense spending beginning in 2026. Russia notably increased its defense budget by 25 percent between the 2024 and 2025 federal budgets and has been increasing its investments in Russia’s defense industry throughout 2025.[2]

Putin’s statements likely seek to portray the Russian government as committed to social and civilian expenditures and to downplay recent indicators of the societal and economic toll of Russia’s war against Ukraine and corresponding prioritization of military-industrial sector investment. Russian officials previously claimed that the 2025-2027 federal budgets would prioritize civilian and social sector investments, despite the September 2024 draft budgets indicating Russia will spend roughly 41 percent of its annual expenditures in 2025 on national security and defense.[3] The Russian Finance Ministry more than tripled its budget deficit target for 2025 in May – from 0.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 1.7 percent of GDP – after several months of staggeringly low oil and gas profits.[4] Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina notably stated at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 19 that Russia has exhausted many of its “free resources“ since the start of Russia‘s full-scale war against Ukraine, including Russia’s workforce, production and import substitution capacities, and reserves of the National Welfare Fund and Russia’s banking sector.[5] Russia’s military force generation strategy currently hinges on large recruitment and pension payouts, and it remains unclear how the Kremlin intends to fund these payments in the medium- to long-term, as Russia reportedly depleted the entire 2025 federal recruitment budget fund between January and March 2025.[6] Russia is also making significant financial investments in its domestic drone production capacity and committed 243 billion rubles (about $3 billion) to Russian drone companies between 2023 and 2024.[7] Any sharp decrease in Russia’s defense spending will likely depress the Russian economy in the medium term, as Russia’s defense industrial base now accounts for a significant portion of overall Russian domestic production.

Putin also reiterated Kremlin narratives aimed at discrediting Ukraine and blaming the West and NATO for his decision to invade Ukraine. Putin claimed that Russia has agreed to conduct a third round of negotiations, is ready to meet with Ukraine in Istanbul, and has demonstrated its willingness to negotiate through prisoner of war (POW) and killed-in-action (KIA) exchanges.[8] Putin claimed that Ukraine is refusing to accept the bodies of some deceased servicemembers, an unsubstantiated claim that is part of an ongoing Russian information campaign depicting Ukraine as spoiling POW exchanges and KIA repatriations in order to provoke discontent and demoralize Ukrainian society and to discredit the Ukrainian government.[9] Putin reiterated Russia’s long-term claim that NATO promised Russia it would never expand east and claimed that Russia was “crudely deceived.”[10] Putin claimed that Western countries in opposition to Russia will “soon die” themselves. Putin also reiterated that Russia will only conclude its war against Ukraine on Russia’s terms and claimed that Russian defense spending is designed to achieve this goal. ISW has previously noted that Russia’s terms – the “denazification” and “demilitarization” of Ukraine, which Russia has demanded since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 – amount to demands for regime change, the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Ukraine, and significant limitations on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression.[11]

Open-source data suggests that Russia is increasingly investing in its defense industry and expanding its drone, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and aircraft production and shipbuilding capabilities – several of the key platforms that Russia would likely rely on in a future war with NATO. Data from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-affiliated Center of Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting published on June 26 indicates that Russia increased its industrial production by 2.6 percent between April and May 2025 and that the majority of this increase is due to a “sharp” increase in Russia’s defense industrial output.[12] The center reported that Russia’s monthly aircraft production rate increased by 16.9 percent in May 2025 compared to April 2025 and is 1.6 times greater than Russia’s 2024 monthly production rates. The center reported that Russia increased its naval and aircraft production capacity by 16 percent between February and May 2025. The center’s data suggests that Russia is attempting to expand its shipbuilding and aircraft production capacity, which are medium- to long-term efforts and likely part of Russia’s ongoing force restructuring and regeneration efforts in preparation for a longer-term conflict with NATO.

Satellite imagery of select armored vehicle repair plants in Russia provides further evidence that Russia is increasing its ability to produce IFVs. A social media source tracking equipment at Russian military depots and repair facilities via satellite imagery reported on June 26 that Russia is now able to refurbish and produce more BMPs than before an unspecified time and that Russia’s decreased use of armored vehicles and tanks since Winter 2024-2025 is allowing Russia to stockpile IFVs.[13] The source noted that the Kurganmashzavod remains the sole publicly known Russian facility capable of producing Soviet-era BMP-3 IFVs. The source stated that satellite imagery indicates that some Russian armor repair plants appear to have used most of their Soviet IFV stocks, although at least one production plant in Rubtsovsk, Altai Krai, appears to have dramatically improved its modernization capabilities. It remains unclear whether Russia is aiming to stockpile materiel in preparation for a larger offensive operation against Ukraine in the near to medium term or to reconstitute the Russian military in preparation for broader future conflict with NATO. Additional open-source intelligence indicates that Russia is successfully increasing its T-90M tank production capabilities, further underscoring Russia’s ongoing investment in long-term tank and armored vehicle production capacity.[14]

Russia’s ongoing efforts to expand drone production are having a more immediate impact on the frontline in Ukraine, although Russia will continue to benefit from enhanced drone production capabilities during any future conflict. Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov visited various Russian military industrial facilities in Novgorod Oblast on June 27, including a fiber-optic drone production site that produced Russia’s first model of fiber-optic “Prince Vandal Novgorodsky” drones[15] The Russian government’s press release of the visit reported that Russia is now capable of domestically producing hundreds of thousands of fiber-optic drones per month and fully satisfying the needs of the Russian Armed Forces. Manturov also visited a series of other defense companies in Novgorod Oblast, including companies that specialize in electronic components, and inspected the Intelligent Electronics-Valdai Innovative Scientific and Technological Center’s new semiconductor materials science laboratory.[16] Manturov instructed the Ministry of Industry and Trade to examine the possibility of recapitalizing Novgorod Oblast’s industrial development fund to support the production of high-tech products. ISW previously noted that Russian fiber optic production has allowed Russian forces to impose new battlefield dilemmas on Ukrainian forces starting in mid-2024 because these drones were resistant to electronic warfare (EW) interference, enable precision strikes on armored equipment, and are scalable due to their simplicity.[17]

Russian forces continue to implement tactical innovations that correspond with technological weapons system advancements. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 27 that Russian forces are increasingly utilizing Geran 2 and 3 drones – Russian analogues of the Iranian origin Shahed-136 – over guided glide bombs for short- to mid-range frontline strikes.[18] The milblogger noted that Russian forces began reprioritizing the use of Geran drones last winter when Russia began mass producing modernized Geran 2 drones with improved speed, range, and carrying capacities, and claimed that Russian forces are using these drones to target Ukrainian storage areas, command posts, and strongholds on the frontline and in the near rear. The milblogger noted that elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA] (formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) have pioneered mass frontline use of Geran drones and that Russia’s Central Grouping of Forces, operating largely in the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions, will reportedly soon adopt the use of Geran 2 drones once Russian manufacturers further increase production rates. The milblogger assessed that Russian forces may be able to replace 500- and 1000-kilogram KAB glide bombs with Geran 3 drones if Russian developers are willing to compromise on the drone’s range to account for an increased payload. The Russian milblogger’s analysis largely coheres with ISW’s observations that Russian forces are increasingly using Shahed-like drones to strike Ukrainian targets along the frontline.[19] Russia’s defense industrial base has thus far successfully increased Geran drone production rates and improved the Geran drone’s precision and operability, which have enabled Russian forces to more readily deploy such drones along the frontline.[20]

Russia continues to use chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces and civilians in direct violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory. The Ukrainian Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security reported on June 27 that Ukrainian forces recorded 888 cases of Russian forces using chemical weapons in May 2025, including in grenades.[21] The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) published a report on June 26 confirming that environmental sample testing indicates that Russian forces used a first-person view (FPV) drone equipped with grenades containing chlorobenzalmalonodinitrile (CS) gas, a riot control agent (RCA) banned in modern warfare under the CWC, against Ukrainian forces near the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary in June 2025.[22]

Key Takeaways:

The Kremlin continues to downplay the social and economic costs of Russia’s war in Ukraine and inflated military spending.

Putin also reiterated Kremlin narratives aimed at discrediting Ukraine and blaming the West and NATO for his decision to invade Ukraine .

. Open-source data suggests that Russia is increasingly investing in its defense industry and expanding its drone, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and aircraft production and shipbuilding capabilities – several of the key platforms that Russia would likely rely on in a future war with NATO.

Russian forces continue to implement tactical innovations that correspond with technological weapons system advancements.

Russia continues to use chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces and civilians in direct violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory.

Ukrainian forces advanced near Lyman. Russian forces advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast and near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on June 27.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 26 and 27.[23] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Glushkovo, Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[24]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 91st Sapper-Engineer Regiment (reportedly under the operational command of the Northern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[25]

Russian forces continued assaults in northern Sumy Oblast on June 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 26 that Russian forces advanced in Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[26]

Russian forces continued attacks in the Sumy Oblast border area, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka on June 26 and 27.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and toward Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka, Novomykolaivka, Yunakivka, and Sadky.[28]

Ukraine’s Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko reported on June 27 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are conducting fewer attacks in the Sumy Oblast international border area.[29] Demchenko assessed that Russian forces may be regrouping in the area. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian regiment operating in northern Sumy Oblast reported on June 27 that Russian forces continue to probe for weak spots in Ukrainian defenses in the area.[30] The deputy commander reported that neither Ukrainian nor Russian drone operators currently have drone superiority in the area.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Smuglyanka” Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Andriivka.[31] Drone operators of the “Tiger” drone detachment of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in northern Sumy Oblast.[32] Elements of the 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) reportedly continue operating in northern Sumy Oblast.[33]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces crossed the Vovcha River and advanced in western Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) on the southern bank of the river.[34]

Russian forces conducted ground assaults north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on June 26 and 27.[35]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction said that Russian forces are constantly attacking in small fireteams of two to three soldiers and are using motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) when the weather conditions are good, but leverage armored vehicles during rainy weather.[36] Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported on June 27 that Russian forces are constantly attacking near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[37]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 27 indicated that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Hlushkivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[38]

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and Krasne Pershe; east of Kupyansk towards Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on June 26 and 27.[39]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported on June 27 that Russian forces are constantly attacking along the Oskil River near Kupyansk and are trying to surround Kupyansk.[40] Shamshyn reported that Russian forces are trying to establish a river crossing over the Oskil River in order to transfer armored vehicles across the river, but are currently moving all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and motorcycles to the right (west) bank of the Oskil River on boats and rafts. A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Kharkiv direction reported that Russian forces are taking advantage of the good weather to optimize logistics and intensify assaults north and east of Kupyansk.[41] An officer in another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces are using artillery more conservatively and are increasingly relying on air strikes and glide bombs in the area.[42]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Nova Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova), but one milblogger claimed that the settlement remains a contested “gray zone.”[44]

Russian forces continued ground assaults north of Borova near Novoplatonivka; northeast of Borova toward Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Olhivka on June 26 and 27.[45]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Lozova (northeast of Borova).[46]

Ukrainian forces likely recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Ukrainian Advances: Russian milbloggers claimed on June 26 and 27 that Ukrainian forces conducted successful counterattacks and regained positions in northwestern Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[47] ISW is therefore expanding Ukrainian advances into Ridkodub.

Russian forces continued ground assaults north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Zelenya Dolnya, and Shandryholove and toward Novyi Myr and Serednie; northeast of Lyman toward Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske on June 26 and 27.[48]

A Ukrainian division commander operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are struggling with low-quality Russian- and North Korean-produced ammunition.[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground assaults northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on June 26 and 27.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Chasiv Yar and within central and southern Chasiv Yar, including in Shevchenko Microrain (southwestern Chasiv Yar).[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Bila Hora and the northern outskirts of Stupochky (both south of Chasiv Yar).[52]

Russian forces continued ground assaults in Chasiv Yar itself; northeast of Chasiv Yar near Bondarne; north of Chasiv Yar near Markove and Novomarkove; and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne, Stupochky, and toward Bila Hora on June 26 and 27.[53]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kramatorsk (Chasiv Yar) direction reported that Russian forces are sending reinforcements to the Kramatorsk direction and that the Russian servicemen often do not have any prior knowledge about where they are being sent.[54] The NCO reported that Russian forces are leveraging windy and rainy weather conditions to accumulate forces and conduct assaults on foot while the weather constrains Ukrainian drone operations. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones have low-altitude air superiority and are preventing Russian forces from completely seizing Chasiv Yar.[55]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (Chasiv Yar) direction.[56] Drone operators of the “Burevestnik” volunteer detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[57] Elements of the “Nevsky” Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Soledar-Bakhmut (Chasiv Yar) direction.[58]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 26 indicates that Russian forces advanced in northwestern Dyliivka (north of Toretsk) and likely seized the settlement.[59]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Oleksandro-Kalynove and Yablunivka (both northwest of Toretsk).[60]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northeast of Toretsk near Dachne; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka and Oleksandro-Kalynove and toward Poltavka, Pleshchiivka, Stepanivka, Rusyn Yar, and Katerynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Romanivka on June 26 and 27.[61]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA}, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[62] Elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[63] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[64]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Andriivka highway northeast of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).[65]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have advanced to within one kilometer of Molodetske (southwest of Pokrovsk) and are attempting to bypass Udachne (east of Molodetske).[66]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka, Myrne, and Shevchenko Pershe and toward Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Kotlyne and toward Novopidhorodne on June 26 and 27.[67]

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on June 27 that Russia has concentrated roughly 111,000 personnel in the Pokrovsk direction.[68] A communications officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are concentrating assaults south of Pokrovsk and are attacking with motorcycles from Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk) toward Shevchenko.[69] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position near Shakhove (northeast of Pokrovsk) with a Geran-2 (Russian-produced Shahed variant) drone.[70]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating near Pokrovsk.[71]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and east of Yalta (south of Novopavlivka) and north of Komar (south of Novopavlivka).[72]

Russian forces continued ground attacks toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Novomykolaivka, and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka and Troitske; southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka, Novoukrainka, Bahatyr, Odradne, and Zeleny Kut; and south of Novopavlivka near Zirka, Zaporizhzhia, Fedorivka, Myrne, and Komar and toward Yalta on June 26 and 27.[73]

Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian drone operators struck a North Korean-made artillery system in the Novopavlivka direction.[74]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly participated in the seizure of Yalta.[75]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 27 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Shevchenko, west of Vilne Pole (both northwest of Velyka Novosilka), and south of Novopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[76]

Russian forces continued ground assaults northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and toward Voskresenka and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole on June 26 and 27.[77]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced within southern and central Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[78]

Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 27.[79] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Malynivka.[80]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Hulyaipole.[81]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the E-105 Vasylivka-Kamyanske highway into central Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv).[82] Additional geolocated footage published on June 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into southeastern Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[83]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske on June 26 and 27.[84] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked southwest of Orikhiv near Robotyne.[85]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), including its 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment, are reportedly operating near Tokmachka and within Mala Tokmachka, respectively.[86] Elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 108th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[87]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on June 27 but did not advance.[88]

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) posted footage on June 26 and reported that GUR drone operators struck a Russian S-400 air defense system in an unspecified part of occupied Crimea, damaging the system’s missile launcher, two multi-functional 92N2E control radars, and two 91N6E detection radars.[89]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 26 to 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles from airspace over Ryazan Oblast, six Kalibr cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea, and 363 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Oryol, and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast, and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[90] The Ukrainian Air Forces reported that Ukrainian forces downed six Kalibr cruise missiles and 211 drones and that 148 drones were ”lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted Starokostyantyniv, Khmelnytskyi Oblast. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes targeted Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, and Kherson oblasts and damaged civilian and energy infrastructure in Kherson, Kyiv, and Kharkiv oblasts.[91]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russia and Belarus are leveraging the Union State framework to further militarize their societies and indoctrinate youth into an anti-Western ideology, likely in preparation for a future conflict with NATO. Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed the plenary session of the 12th annual Russian and Belarusian regions forum on June 27 and highlighted the importance of youth “military-patriotic” programs.[92] Putin stated that Russia and Belarus dedicated the 12th forum to policies aimed at encouraging youth to participate in “spiritual, moral… and traditional” values, patriotism, and military service. Putin stated that the Union State is implementing a specialized “road map” for youth policy through 2027 and is developing a medium-term strategy for the development of youth policy. Several organizations currently oversee Russia’s various youth military-patriotic programs, and the Russian federal government is attempting to centralize control over these efforts.[93]

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77316; https://eec.eaeunion dot org/en/comission/department/dep_razv_integr/strategicheskie-napravleniya-razvitiya.php

[2] https://meduza dot io/en/feature/2024/10/03/russia-s-2025-federal-budget-outlines-record-military-and-top-secret-spending-and-tax-hikes-for-ordinary-citizens; https://isw.pub/RussianForceGen050725; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-14-2025; https://isw.pub/ForceGen061125; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-30-2025

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar102824

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062225

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-18-2025

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-21-2025

[8] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77316

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061625; https://szru.gov dot ua/news-media/news/szru-poperedzhaie-rosiya-planuie-na-nastupnomu-tyzhni-kulminatsiyu-kampanii-z-dyskredytatsii-ukrainy-u-konteksti-obminiv-shcho-tryvayut; https://suspilne dot media/1043951-rf-prodovzit-namaganna-diskredituvati-ukrainu-sodo-obminiv-a-kulminacia-provokacij-zaplanovana-na-20-cervna-szr/

[10] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77316

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates

[12] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-06-27/russia-sharply-boosted-drone-output-in-may-think-tank-reports ; http://www.forecast dot ru/_ARCHIVE/Analitics/PROM/2025/PR-OTR_2025-06-26.pdf

[13] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1938330257863455203

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025

[15] http://government dot ru/news/55471/

[16] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/72316

[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/battlefield-ai-revolution-not-here-yet-status-current-russian-and-ukrainian-ai-drone

[18] https://t.me/yurasumy/23742

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062125 ; https://isw.pub/ForceGen052125 ;

[20] https://isw.pub/ForceGen061125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125

[21] https://suspilne dot media/1053313-armia-rf-u-travni-majze-900-raziv-vikoristovuvala-himicnu-zbrou-na-vijni-proti-ukraini/ ; https://www.facebook.com/StratcomCentreUA/posts/pfbid021GSNZ3Jya2H6dL5QGGt3J3H5oUDPTMGXW8EHLaNMM2zqHA8tWs6ZVQ5UupH5TUUxl

[22] https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2025/06/opcw-issues-report-third-technical-assistance-visit-ukraine-following; https://t.me/spravdi/47601

[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928;

[24] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30489; https://t.me/dva_majors/74241

[25] https://t.me/mod_russia/54204

[26] https://t.me/rybar/71701

[27] https://t.me/rybar/71701;

[28] https://t.me/dva_majors/74241

[29] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/ne-taki-i-myasni-vzhe-na-sumshhyni-suttyevo-vpala-aktyvnist-vorozhyh-dyversijnyh-grup/

[30] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/zmina-taktyky-ukrayinczi-gotuyut-fpv-drony-dlya-znyshhennya-shahediv/

[31] https://t.me/dva_majors/74229

[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30494

[33] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/ukrainian-armed-forces-take-15-russian-invaders-prisoner-in-the-sumy-region/; https://t.me/ua_dshv/6167; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/chornyj-den-dlya-morpihiv-rf-na-sumshhyni-rozgromyly-elitnyj-pidrozdil-shho-zahoplyuvav-krym/; https://youtu.be/Yun3_2xTdRc

[34] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65457

[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928

[36] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CSjUUAfd7Lo; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/buly-obbyti-zdorovymy-sarayamy-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-vorog-namagavsya-atakuvaty-vazhkoyu-tehnikoyu/

[37] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/pereprav-nemaye-ale-plany-nikudy-ne-dilysya-okupanty-ne-zalyshayut-sprob-otochyty-kupyansk/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[38] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9476; https://t.me/feniksdpsu/910

[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872

[40] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/pereprav-nemaye-ale-plany-nikudy-ne-dilysya-okupanty-ne-zalyshayut-sprob-otochyty-kupyansk/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[41] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ScdUZNkwcYc; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/27/epoha-koly-fpv-panuyut-u-povitri-vorog-prodovzhuye-bezperervno-atakuvaty-syly-oborony-na-richczi-oskil/

[42] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/vorog-uzhe-ne-syple-snaryadamy-yak-ranishe-zmina-taktyky-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku/

[43] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94566

[44] https://t.me/tass_agency/322753; https://t.me/dva_majors/74259 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54200 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54201 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/24058 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94603 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37814

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928

[46] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94603

[47] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30489 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37794

[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928

[49] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/bilshe-na-zaboronu-praczyuyut-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-tryvayut-artylerijski-poyedynky/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CSjUUAfd7Lo

[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928 ; https://t.me/rybar/71701

[51] https://t.me/rybar/71696 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/24379 ; https://t.me/rybar/71706

[52] https://t.me/wargonzo/27529

[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/24379 ; https://t.me/rybar/71706 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27529

[54] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-mwW_smfVas; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/chasto-ne-rozumiyut-kudy-jdut-na-kramatorskyj-napryamok-vorog-zavozyt-pihotu-zvidusil/

[55] https://t.me/rusich_army/24379

[56] https://t.me/russian_airborne/10607; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37809

[57] https://t.me/rybar/71706

[58] https://t.me/BTGR_NEVSKIY/2935 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/46354

[59] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1938351857476186231; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1938349962892288190; https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/688; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9472

[60] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170424; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37793

[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928

[62] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37793

[63] https://t.me/vanek_nikolaev/33987

[64] https://t.me/dva_majors/74231

[65] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9474; https://t.me/ombr_155/422;

[66] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65458

[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30489 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65458

[68] https://t.me/osirskiy/1198 ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1053063-blizko-111-tisac-vijskovih-rf-vouut-na-pokrovskomu-napramku-sirskij-pro-situaciu-na-fronti/

[69] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/27/sytuacziya-dosyt-pekelna-poblyzu-pokrovska-rosiyany-prosuvayutsya-na-mototehniczi-za-pidtrymky-artyleriyi/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CSjUUAfd7Lo

[70] https://t.me/mod_russia/54194 ; https://t.me/sashakots/54557

[71] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170416

[72] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170419 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37782

[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94571 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27529

[74] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/27/podarunok-vid-kim-chen-yna-ne-doyihav-ukrayinskyj-dron-spopelyv-ridkisnu-pivnichnokorejsku-rszv/ ; https://www.facebook.com/61563854736481/videos/697619009809671/ ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12877

[75] https://t.me/voin_dv/15696

[76] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30495; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37801 ; https://t.me/rybar/71696

[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872

[78] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30502; https://t.me/vrogov/20875

[79] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30502

[80] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30502

[81] https://t.me/voin_dv/15703

[82] https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1938559793943171316; https://t.me/proofs_dnepr/54965; https://x.com/UkraineDailyUpd/status/1938444339799031917

[83] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9470; https://t.me/Polk70/31562

[84] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37788; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94583; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94578

[85] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30502

[86] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94583; https://t.me/ZS42MSD/3589

[87] https://t.me/rogozin_do/7257

[88] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12637

[89] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6290 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/ochi-rosijskoyi-ppo-v-krymu-osliply-gur-zavdalo-udaru-po-kompleksah-s-400/

[90] https://t.me/kpszsu/37115

[91] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/raketnyj-udar-po-dnipropetrovshhyni-ye-zhertvy/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/rosijska-raketna-ataka-na-samar-5-zagyblyh-ponad-dva-desyatky-poranenyh/ ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/06/27/rossiyskie-voyska-nanesli-raketnyy-udar-po-gorodu-samar-v-dnepropetrovskoy-oblasti-est-pogibshie-i-ranenye ; https://t.me/istories_media/9864 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/82298; https://t.me/bbcrussian/82296; https://t.me/bbcrussian/82295; https://t.me/synegubov/15306; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2727; https://t.me/synegubov/15322; https://suspilne dot media/1052639-gur-atakuvalo-skladi-raketnogo-paliva-u-bransku-es-ne-zmig-uhvaliti-spilnu-zaavu-z-pidtrimki-ukraini-1220-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1751007074&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/6007; https://suspilne dot media/1052639-gur-atakuvalo-skladi-raketnogo-paliva-u-bransku-es-ne-zmig-uhvaliti-spilnu-zaavu-z-pidtrimki-ukraini-1220-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1751023120&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://www.facebook.com/alexandr.prokudin.7/posts/10021585731286434?ref=embed_post ; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/38252 ; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/9118

[92] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77312

[93] https://www.minobrnauki.gov dot ru/upload/2024/10/%D0%94%D0%BE%D0%BA%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B4_%D0%9F%D0%9C2023_%D0%AD%D0%A6%D0%9F_%D0%9F%D0%B5%D1%82%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B01.10.24.pdf ; https://ngkub dot ru/obshchestvo/shkolnikov-obuchat-upravleniyu-dronami-i-taktike-strelkovogo-boya ; www.dosaaf dot ru/upbringing/metodiceskie-rokomensacii-i-opit-peredovoj-raboti.php

Source: Understandingwar.org | View original article

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 26, 2025

ISW has observed evidence of North Korean forces augmenting Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and North Korea supplying Russia with artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles. North Korea is likely receiving technical advice from Russia on satellite launches and missile guidance systems in return. US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met at the NATO summit on June 25 and discussed possible US sales of Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine and joint weapons production. ISW continues to assess that a strong Ukrainian military backed by Western guarantees remains the most vital component of a stable Western-backed Ukraine. The data cut-off for this product was 11:15am ET on June 26. IsW will cover subsequent reports in the June 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool. The map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. It will update this time-lapse map archive monthly with the latest Russian offensive campaign assessment.

Read full article ▼

Olivia Gibson, Christina Harward, Daria Novikov, Grace Mappes, Jessica Sobieski,

and Frederick W. Kagan

June 26, 2025, 5:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15am ET on June 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

South Korean intelligence suggests that North Korea may deploy North Korean troops to Ukrainian territory, which would represent a significant battlefield inflection. Reuters, citing a South Korean lawmaker privy to intelligence from South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS), reported on June 26 that North Korea may deploy an unspecified number of additional North Korean forces to Russia to fight against Ukraine as early as July or August 2025 and that North Korea continues to arm Russia with artillery ammunition and missiles.[1] The South Korean lawmaker told Reuters that the NIS assessed that Russia may be preparing to initiate a large-scale assault against Ukraine in July or August 2025 and that North Korea is likely receiving technical advice from Russia on satellite launches and missile guidance systems in return. ISW has observed evidence of North Korean forces augmenting Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and North Korea supplying Russia with artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles.[2] Ukrainian forces maintain a limited presence in Kursk Oblast, so North Korean personnel participating in combat operations would most likely be fighting in Ukrainian territory.[3] The North Korean and Russian military commands authorizing the deployment of North Korean forces to Ukrainian territory would mark a significant battlefield inflection that may improve Russian forces’ ability to sustain simultaneous offensive operations in multiple directions, which the Russian military has traditionally struggled to conduct.[4] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces compensated by conducting pulsing, more contained, offensive operations along different sectors of the frontline, but recent reporting indicates that Russian forces appear to be gradually advancing in at least three simultaneous large-scale offensive operations in the Borova-Lyman, Kostyantynivka, and Novopavlivka directions.[5] It is not possible to forecast the likely impact of North Korean support of this type without more information about the size and composition of the North Korean troop contingent that would be going to Ukraine, nor is it clear how rapidly new North Korean troops would become effective in operations alongside Russian troops in Ukraine.

US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met at the NATO summit on June 25 and discussed possible US sales of Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine and joint weapons production. Trump stated that he and Zelensky did not talk about a possible ceasefire in Ukraine during the meeting, but that Trump may talk to Russian President Vladimir Putin in the near future about a ceasefire.[6] Zelensky stated that he reiterated during the meeting that Ukraine supports the US position on a ceasefire.[7] Zelensky stated that he and Trump discussed the increase in the number of “massive” Russian strikes against Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure and people, and Trump stated that the United States “should consider” selling Patriot air defense systems and missiles to Ukraine as Ukraine’s supply is limited.[8] Trump and Zelensky agreed to continue talks about strengthening Ukraine’s air defense with European partners. Trump and Zelensky also discussed possible joint production of drones and electronic warfare (EW) equipment.[9] Zelensky stated in April 2025 that Ukraine proposed to the United States that Ukraine purchase “30 to 50 billion” (likely USD) worth of air defense and weapons systems from the United States and that Ukraine is prepared to purchase these systems itself — either through direct payment to the United States or through the fund established by the US-Ukrainian minerals deal.[10] Zelensky had stated that Ukraine will consider the provision of at least 10 air defense systems to Ukraine as a “security guarantee.” US Patriot air defense systems are vital to Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes and will become increasingly important as Russia is reportedly increasing its production and stockpile of ballistic missiles, which would enable larger and more frequent ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine.[11] ISW continues to assess that a strong Ukrainian military backed by Western security guarantees remains the most vital component of a stable post-war European security architecture, guaranteeing a sustainable peace in Ukraine and deterring future Russian aggression.[12]

Kremlin officials continue to platform bellicose rhetoric aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and to demonstrate Russia’s uncompromising position on Ukraine. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko claimed on June 25 at the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) conference that the West is adopting “hostile policies and military planning…that could explode from any spark.”[13] Glushko further claimed that new Western military aid packages “fuel” the war in Ukraine.[14] The Kremlin regularly promotes rhetoric that is designed to pressure the West into making decisions that benefit Russia, such as refraining from providing further assistance to Ukraine, in response to the fact that sustained Western aid has allowed Ukrainian forces to impose significant challenges on Russian forces in Ukraine and threatens Russia’s ability to achieve its war aims.[15]

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin reiterated on June 26 Russia’s long-standing demand that Ukraine commit to an official non-aligned status and claimed that NATO violated promises from the early 1990s to refrain from expanding eastward.[16] Russia has consistently demanded that Ukraine commit to a neutral, non-aligned status, which would require Ukraine to amend its constitution and NATO to fundamentally alter its open-door policy.[17] The Kremlin continues to signal its unyielding demands and disinterest in peace, further indicating that Russia will very likely continue to pursue efforts to prolong negotiations in an attempt to extract additional concessions and secure additional gains on the battlefield.[18] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin will continue to protract the negotiation process so long as Russian leadership maintains the position that Russian forces can outlast Ukraine’s defense capabilities and Western support for Ukraine.[19]

Satellite imagery of select armored vehicle repair plants in Russia indicates that Russia continues to rely on refurbishing its Soviet-era stores of armored vehicles. A social media source tracking equipment at Russian military depots and repair facilities via satellite imagery shared on June 26 an updated analysis of Russian Armor Repair Plants (BTRZs) that repair damaged armored vehicles and refurbish stored vehicles and stated that most armored fighting vehicle (AFVs) that Russia is taking from storage are no longer in good enough condition to immediately deploy to the front without refurbishment, as Russia was able to do at the start of the war.[20] The source estimated that the 81st BTRZ in Armavir, Krasnodar Krai, which repairs and modernizes stored BTR-70/80 armored personnel carriers (APCs) and likely also repairs damaged BTRs from the battlefield, has likely been refurbishing up to 200 BTR-70/80/82 APCs annually since 2023.[21] The source estimated that the 144th BTRZ in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast, which is the only BTRZ that refurbishes older BMD infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and also repairs BMP-2 and BMD-2 IFVs, has likely been annually refurbishing between 100 to 150 BMD-2 IFVs and BTR-D APCs since an unspecified year.[22]

The source estimated that the Arzamas Mechanical Plant in Arzamas, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, likely annually produces over 500 BTR-82 APCs but noted that satellite imagery showing a growing pile of hulls at the plant suggests that the plant is either increasing production rates or also does repairs of damaged BTRs.[23] The source noted that Arzamas’ production numbers are unclear but are likely high due to the high number of BTR-80/82s that Russian forces are losing in Ukraine and how quickly Russian forces are replenishing these vehicles.[24] The source also estimated that armored vehicle manufacturer Kurganmashzavod in Kurgan, Kurgan Oblast, likely annually produces 100 to 120 BMD-4M IFVs, roughly 360 BMP-3 IFVs, and 20 to 30 BTR-MDM APCs.[25]

Russia has maintained its offensive operations throughout the war by tapping into its Soviet-era stocks of armored vehicles to compensate for high loss rates, but this resource is finite and approaching a point of diminishing availability.[26] Russian forces have been increasingly using motorcycles and buggies in place of armored vehicles along the frontline in Ukraine due to high Russian vehicle losses in late 2023 and 2024.[27] The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated in February 2025 that Russian forces lost over 3,700 IFVs and APCs in 2024 alone.[28] It remains unclear whether Russia’s reliance on motorcycles and buggies will be sufficient to offset these losses in the medium- to long-term.

Ukraine and Russia conducted the seventh prisoner of war (POW) exchange, in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements. Ukrainian officials and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Ukraine and Russia exchanged an unspecified number of severely wounded and sick POWs as well as those under 25 years old on June 26.[29] Ukrainian officials reported that Russia captured a majority of the released Ukrainian POWs in 2022.

Key Takeaways:

South Korean intelligence suggests that North Korea may deploy North Korean troops to Ukrainian territory, which would represent a significant battlefield inflection.

Kremlin officials continue to platform bellicose rhetoric aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and to demonstrate Russia’s uncompromising position on Ukraine.

Satellite imagery of select armored vehicle repair plants in Russia indicates that Russia continues to rely on refurbishing its Soviet-era stores of armored vehicles.

Ukraine and Russia conducted the seventh prisoner of war (POW) exchange, in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements.

Ukrainian forces advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on June 26.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 25 and 26.[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[31]

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 26 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Andriivka (north of Sumy City) and advanced southeast of Oleksiivka (northeast of Sumy City).[32]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced near Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[33]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka and Yunakivka.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and Novomykolaivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, Yablunivka, and Sadky.[35]

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on June 26 that Ukrainian forces have repelled the Russian summer offensive in the Sumy Oblast border area and stabilized the frontline “as of this week.”[36] Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian offensive operations in Glushkovsky Raion, Kursk Oblast forced the Russian military command to divert forces that would otherwise take part in the Sumy Oblast offensive and that Ukrainian forces have pinned about 50,000 Russian military personnel total in the Kursk and North Slobozhansk (northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts) directions. ISW has observed geolocated evidence indicating that Ukrainian forces have regained territory north and northeast of Sumy City in recent weeks as the pace of Russian advances in the border area has slowed.[37]

Ukraine’s Siversk (Northern) Group of Forces Spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk stated on June 26 that Russian forces are most active in northern Sumy Oblast and have decreased their use of all-terrain vehicles (ATV)s in assaults and rely on infantry assaults.[38]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[39] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]), including its 382nd and elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade, and the 106th VDV Division are reportedly operating in northern Sumy Oblast.[40] Drone operators of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly conducting reconnaissance near Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[41]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Vovchanski Khutory (northeast of Kharkiv City).[42]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Zybyne on June 25 and 26.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces recently counterattacked in the Vovchansk and Lyptsi directions.[44]

A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction reported on June 26 that intense fighting continues in the Vovchansk direction and that Russian forces continue to conduct motorized assaults of three to five personnel on motorcycles.[45] The servicemember stated that Russian forces have recently begun operating “mother drones” – large drones that carry multiple smaller first-person-view (FPV) drones — to fly to positions in the Ukrainian rear and allow Russian forces to launch and conduct strikes with the smaller FPV drones out of range of Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Anvar” Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Sosnivka (north of Kharkiv City).[46]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground assaults north of Kupyansk near Holubivka, Mala Shapkivka, and Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on June 25 and 26.[47]

Ukrainian National Guard Spokesperson Colonel Ruslan Muzychuk stated on June 26 that Russian forces are attempting to expand a bridgehead on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River, especially near Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk), Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk), and “Kolisnyky” – likely meaning Kolisnykivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground operations northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya, Kopanky, and Zelenyi Hai; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Olhivka on June 25 and 26.[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 26 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked and seized western Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Hlushchenkove (north of Lyman) and reached the outskirts of the settlement, advanced south of Lypove (north of Lyman), and advanced north and southwest of Zelena Dolyna (north of Lyman).[51]

Russian forces conducted ground assaults north of Lyman near Novyi Myr and Ridkodub and toward Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman toward Torske on June 25 and 26.[52] A Russian source claimed on June 26 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zelena Dolyna and Kolodyazi.[53]

The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction reported on June 26 that Russian forces are using guided glide bombs and first-person view (FPV) drones to target Ukrainian logistics centers and drone pilots on the front lines as well as concentrations of personnel and recreation areas.[54]

A Russian milblogger claimed that commanders in the 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) continue to submit false reports exaggerating Russian successes in the area, a common complaint in this section of the front.[55]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating between Karpivka and Lypove (both north of Lyman).[56] Elements of the Russian 488th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 283rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both 144th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in Ridkodub.[57]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on June 25 and 26.[58]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Chasiv Yar.[59]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Chasiv Yar itself, north of Chasiv Yar toward Markove, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Bila Hora on June 25 and 26.[60]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Stupochky, and elements of the 98th VDV Division’s 217th and 331st VDV regiments are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[61]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 25 and 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Toretsk and northwest of Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk), respectively.[62]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[63]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and toward Oleksandro-Shultyne; and northwest of Toretsk near Nelipivka and toward Oleksandro-Kalynove, Yablunivka, Rusyn Yar, and Poltavka on June 25 and 26.[64]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 26 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 25 that Russian forces advanced east of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[65]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka, Myrne, and Shevchenko Pershe; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove and Udachne on June 25 and 26.[66]

The commander of a Ukrainian tank battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on June 26 that Russian forces continue assaults with small fireteams of one to two soldiers and sometimes operate on motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and buggies.[67] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are constantly attacking in the Pokrovsk direction and have adapted tactics to leverage increased cover from foliage.[68] An officer of a Ukrainian unmanned systems detachment operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces only field heavy equipment when attempting to advance in a specific area.[69]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 15th and 30th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Udachne.[70] Drone operators of the “Typhoon” detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[71] Elements of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[72]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Peredubova (south of Novopavlivka).[73]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Perebudova, north of Novoserhiivka, northeast of Novomykolaivka (both northeast of Novopavlivka), southwest of Horikhove, north of Yalta (both southeast of Novopavlivka, and southwest of Fedorivka (south of Novopavlivka).[74]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Novomykolaivka, and Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka, Novoukrainka, Horikhove, Bahatyr, and Odradne; south of Novopavlivka near Zirka, Yalta, Zaporizhzhia, Fedorivka, Perebudova, Myrne, and Piddubne and on June 25 and 26.[75]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 26 that Russian forces seized Novoserhiivka.[76] ISW assesses that Russian forces seized Novoserhiivka as of June 24.[77]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade are reportedly operating near Zirka.[78] Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) and 30th Separate Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Myrne.[79]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Shevchenko and northwest of Vilne Pole (both northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[80]

Russian forces continued ground assaults northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole and toward Voskresenka and Maliivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on June 25 and 26.[81]

The Russian MoD claimed on June 26 that Russian forces seized Shevchenko, which ISW assessed that Russian forces seized as of June 21.[82] Russian sources credited elements of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) with participating in the seizure of Shevchenko.[83] One Russian milblogger claimed on June 26 that Russian forces advanced within Shevchenko but have not yet seized the settlement.[84]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the “Gnom” (Gnome) squad of the Russian 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[85]

Russian forces continued limited assaults east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 26 but did not make any confirmed advances.[86]

Unconfirmed claims: Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on June 26 that Russian forces are advancing to central Malynivka.[87]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast southwest of Orikhiv toward Novoandriivka on June 26 but did not advance.[88]

A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported that Russian forces are conducting assaults during the day and night and that Russian commanders are ordering Russian forces to temporarily seize positions on the outskirts of settlements for footage of the soldiers planting flags rather than secure footholds and enduring positions.[89]

Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction on June 26 but did not advance.[90]

Ukrainian National Guard Spokesperson Colonel Ruslan Muzychuk reported on June 26 that Russian forces remain focused on conducting reconnaissance and controlling the Dnipro River Delta islands.[91]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 25 to 26. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 41 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[92] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down eight drones and that 16 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck Donetsk and Kharkiv oblasts.[93]

Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that Russian forces are first conducting strikes with swarms of Shahed drones before striking the area with ballistic missiles.[94]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

[1] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/north-korea-may-send-more-troops-russia-july-or-august-ukraine-war-seoul-says-2025-06-26/ ; https://archive.ph/xSGXi

[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-16-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2025

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062225

[6] https://suspilne dot media/1051589-zelenskij-rozpoviv-pro-detali-zustric-iz-trampom-pid-cas-samitu-nato/

[7] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/u-gaazi-volodimir-zelenskij-proviv-zustrich-iz-donaldom-tram-98653

[8] https://suspilne dot media/1051589-zelenskij-rozpoviv-pro-detali-zustric-iz-trampom-pid-cas-samitu-nato/

[9] https://suspilne dot media/1051589-zelenskij-rozpoviv-pro-detali-zustric-iz-trampom-pid-cas-samitu-nato/; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/u-gaazi-volodimir-zelenskij-proviv-zustrich-iz-donaldom-tram-98653

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041025

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031125

[13] https://ria dot ru/20250625/grushko-2025448197.html

[14] https://tass dot ru/politika/24356843

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725

[16] https://iz dot ru/1910775/2025-06-26/v-mid-rf-nastaivaiut-na-iuridicheskoi-fiksatcii-vneblokovogo-statusa-ukrainy

[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125

[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052825

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625

[20] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969796319961593; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969805581291862; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969809418772703

[21] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969835851309261; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969843124486214; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969846274179173;

[22] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969923776520358; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969863068156088

[23] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969857162568159; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969859943674130

[24] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969854948250011

[25] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969983537000573; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937970003619295446

[26] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage

[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061625

[28] https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2025/02/combat-losses-and-manpower-challenges-underscore-the-importance-of-mass-in-ukraine/

[29] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/prezydent-povidomyv-pro-novyj-obmin-bilshist-zvilnenyh-zahysnykiv-buly-u-poloni-z-2022-roku/ ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14871 ; https://t.me/Koord_shtab/13388 ; https://suspilne dot media/1048199-obmin-polonenimi-miz-ukrainou-ta-rf-vidbuvsa-novij-etap/ ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54179 ; https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/videos/702717725720789/?rdid=Ao1eRFbsDxHIQbFz#

[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895

[31] https://t.me/dva_majors/74172; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37766; https://t.me/wargonzo/27506; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30458

[32] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9468; https://t.me/wild_hornets/3146; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30448; https://t.me/wargonzo/27506

[33] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37754; https://t.me/dva_majors/74172

[34] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37754

[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30448; https://t.me/dva_majors/74172

[36] https://t.me/osirskiy/1196 ; https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/posts/pfbid02YGoRCNXm2i2zWddYosSei5NGN7VHR5VCGu77gaMTzZKPB8ZzziyiJ7mcyBan1ajQl ; https://t.me/istories_media/9858; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-has-failed-break-ukraine

[37] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925

[38] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1052173-armia-rf-namagaetsa-prorvatisa-u-bik-sum-otuv-siversk/

[39] https://t.me/dva_majors/74195

[40] https://t.me/ua_dshv/6167 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1938184588737515919 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1938186659939455225; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94532; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30455

[41] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170337

[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30468

[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/na-kytajskyh-motoczyklah-u-suprovodi-droniv-matok-taktyka-rosiyan-na-vovchanskomu-napryamku/

[44] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30468

[45] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/na-kytajskyh-motoczyklah-u-suprovodi-droniv-matok-taktyka-rosiyan-na-vovchanskomu-napryamku/

[46] https://t.me/epoddubny/23911

[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895

[48] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/26/mriye-forsuvaty-oskil-ta-bigaye-lisamy-protyvnyk-demonstruye-vidnosnu-stabilnist/

[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/27786

[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30476; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37767

[51] https://t.me/yurasumy/23719; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37758; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30476; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37756

[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37758

[53] https://t.me/tass_agency/322543

[54] https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/06/26/pihotynecz-aktyvuye-tamaru-myhajlivnu-poblyzu-lymanu-rosijski-komandyry-bezzhalni-do-svoyih-soldativ/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qbwH1G_vZM0

[55] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-4-2025; https://t.me/yurasumy/23718

[56] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37756;

[57] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37767

[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895

[59] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94538

[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895; https://t.me/wargonzo/27506; https://t.me/dva_majors/74172

[61] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30455

[62] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1938096190987366812; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1938098278807310442; https://t.me/ASPIDGroup/172; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9469; https://t.me/b4_101/144

[63] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94538; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65445

[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65445; https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/06/26/dronova-poshta-praczyuye-na-toreczkomu-napryamku-vorog-bye-po-logistychnym-marshrutam/

[65] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37721; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37772

[66] https://t.me/dva_majors/74172 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23723; https://t.me/yurasumy/23724 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37772 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30463 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65444 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895 ;

[67] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1051737-maskuvanna-ratue-zitta-armia-rf-zastosovue-taktiku-malih-grup-i-fpv-droni-na-pokrovskomu-napramku-32-ombr/

[68] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/vyglyadalo-smishno-zaraz-vzhe-ne-do-smihu-poblyzu-pokrovska-postijnyj-ruh-rosijskyh-shturmovykiv/

[69] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/drony-gnuchkoyi-zbirky-yak-rozvidnyky-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-adaptuyut-bezpilotnyky/

[70] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37772

[71] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37735

[72] https://t.me/dva_majors/74180

[73] https://t.me/osintpen/1302; https://t.me/baykalkaspiy/296

[74] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37721; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37772; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30446; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65438

[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/6543; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37721; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1052009-jdut-aktivni-boi-situacia-v-novosergiivci-ta-sevcenku-dani-osuv-hortica/

[76] https://t.me/tass_agency/322569;https://t.me/mod_russia/54171 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54169

[77] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2025

[78] https://t.me/voin_dv/15687

[79] https://t.me/voin_dv/15688

[80] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65448; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65446; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37745

[81] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65448; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/258

[82] https://t.me/mod_russia/54174 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54170; https://t.me/tass_agency/322586 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54172; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2025

[83] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94552; https://t.me/voin_dv/15677; https://t.me/mod_russia/54174 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54170; https://t.me/tass_agency/322586 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54172; https://t.me/voin_dv/15681; https://t.me/voin_dv/15685

[84] https://t.me/wargonzo/27506

[85] https://t.me/voin_dv/15679

[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895 ;

[87] https://t.me/vrogov/20861

[88] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895

[89] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/rozkryty-prapor-pid-dron-na-zaporizhzhi-vorozhyh-shturmovykiv-vidpravlyayut-vmyraty-dlya-propagandy/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-mwW_smfVas

[90] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895

[91] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/mriye-forsuvaty-oskil-ta-bigaye-lisamy-protyvnyk-demonstruye-vidnosnu-stabilnist/

[92] https://t.me/kpszsu/37063;

[93] https://www.facebook.com/don.gp.gov.ua/posts/pfbid02kfBeR3u4AXtVD3932VytReEHaooCPrCFeQLfEr6PnNGAkhQavbo4aSsgc9qLoUENl; https://suspilne dot media/1051705-u-pare-pidpisali-stvorenna-spectribunalu-za-zlocini-rf-britania-nadast-ukraini-350-raket-dla-ppo-1219-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1750916242&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/synegubov/15280

[94] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9453; https://t.me/channel24_ua/178059

Source: Understandingwar.org | View original article

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 23, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin met with graduates of Russia’s military academies on June 23. Putin acknowledged that NATO member states will likely announce a significant increase in defense spending and efforts to increase NATO military capabilities. Putin claimed that this meeting would clarify that NATO is the party provoking “global militarization” – not Russia. Russian officials are attempting to influence conversations about increasing NATO defense spending by misrepresenting Russia’s ongoing efforts to restructure and expand its military capabilities as a defensive reaction to NATO. ISW continues to assess that Russia is constrained in its ability to provide direct support to Iran due to its war in Ukraine and has likely resigned itself to providing diplomatic overtures for the time being. Russia is seeking “ironclad” guarantees that Ukraine will not join NATO, which Grushko stated includes repealing the 2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration that welcomed Ukraine’s and Georgia’s intention to join NATO. Russia considers the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO to be a “direct threat” to Russia’s security and stated that Russia will complete the formation of Moscow and Leningrad military districts in 2025.

Read full article ▼

Angelica Evans, Daria Novikov, Christina Harward, Anna Harvey, Jessica Sobieski, and Kateryna Stepanenko

June 23, 2025, 6:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11 am ET on June 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin continues to only diplomatically support Iran, showcasing the limitations in the Russian-Iranian strategic relationship. Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov, and Chief of the Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU) Igor Kostykov met with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi in Moscow on June 23.[1] Putin claimed that Russia’s position on the Israel-Iran conflict is well-known and that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has raised Russia’s concerns at the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Putin also claimed that recent Israeli and American strikes against Iran were unprovoked and unjustified and that Russia is making every effort to help the Iranian people. Araghchi thanked Russia for its strong condemnation of the strikes against Iran and claimed that Iran regularly consults with Russia on issues of global security, as Russia and Iran’s relations have become “strategic in nature.” Unspecified Iranian sources told Reuters on June 23 that Iran has not been impressed with Russia’s support so far and wants Putin to do more to back Iran against Israel and the United States.[2] Reuters reported that an Iranian source stated that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei sent Araghchi to Moscow to deliver a letter from Khamenei to Putin requesting more assistance from Russia. ISW continues to assess that Russia is constrained in its ability to provide direct support to Iran due to its war in Ukraine and has likely resigned itself to providing diplomatic overtures for the time being.[3]

Russian officials are attempting to influence conversations about increasing NATO defense spending by misrepresenting Russia’s ongoing efforts to restructure and expand Russia’s military capabilities as a defensive reaction to NATO. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with graduates of Russia’s military academies on June 23 and acknowledged that NATO member states will likely announce a significant increase in defense spending and efforts to increase NATO military capabilities at the upcoming summit on June 24 and 25.[4] Putin claimed that this meeting would clarify that NATO is the party provoking “global militarization” – not Russia. Putin stated that Russia will continue to take steps to strengthen Russia’s security and develop the Russian Armed Forces to guarantee Russia’s sovereignty. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko told the Russian state news agency RIA Novosti on June 23 in an article ahead of the upcoming NATO summit that the European Union (EU) is accelerating its militarization and that Russia will take all necessary measures and countermeasures, “including preemptive ones,” to ensure Russia’s security.[5] Grushko reiterated that Russia considers the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO to be a “direct threat” to Russia’s security and stated that Russia is seeking “ironclad” guarantees that Ukraine will not join NATO, which Grushko stated includes repealing the 2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration that welcomed Ukraine’s and Georgia’s intention to join NATO.[6] ISW has previously reported that Russian officials leverage escalatory rhetoric and threats during key moments of Western debates on military assistance for Ukraine in order to scare Western leaders into inaction, and Russian officials are likely again attempting to leverage threats to dissuade NATO member states from supporting increased defense spending.[7]

Putin announced during his speech to the graduates on June 23 that Russia will complete some of its ongoing force restructuring efforts in 2025.[8] Putin stated that Russia is urgently working to increase the Russian Armed Forces’ combat capabilities and reiterated that Russia is standing up the Unmanned Systems Forces as a new branch of the Russian military. Putin stated that Russia will complete the formation of the Moscow and Leningrad military districts (MMD/LMD) and will reorganize Russia’s naval infantry brigades into divisions in 2025. Putin stated that Russia is also undertaking a long-term technical modernization effort in the army and navy, modernizing its Strategic Missile Forces, beginning serial production of Oreshnik ballistic missiles, and producing new ships and submarines for the Russian Navy. Former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced Russia’s intention to form the MMD and LMD and reorganize Russia’s naval infantry brigades into divisions in the medium-term in December 2022.[9] Russian officials had not previously provided a firm date for the completion of these efforts. ISW continues to assess that Russia’s military reforms, particularly in the MMD and LMD in western Russia along its border with NATO, demonstrate Russia’s longer-term preparation for a possible future conflict with NATO.[10] These military reforms come after Kremlin officials have repeatedly threatened NATO states, including the Baltic states and Finland.[11]

Putin also acknowledged his ongoing efforts to empower Russia’s internal security services in order to safeguard regime stability and internal security. Putin stated during his speech to the graduates that the Russian government understands that protecting Russia from internal and external threats requires coordination between Russia’s law enforcement agencies, special services, and other security agencies.[12] ISW reported in 2023 and early 2024 that the Kremlin was working to expand Rosgvardia’s capabilities by allowing Rosgvardia to operate military equipment and subordinating special Russian units and some irregular units under Rosgvardia, particularly after the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion in June 2023.[13] The Kremlin has been similarly expanding the Federal Security Service (FSB) force generation capabilities.[14]

Russian forces conducted a large-scale combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of June 22 to 23 that largely targeted Kyiv City and killed at least seven people and injured 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 352 drones, including up to 160 Shaheds, from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[15] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 11 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Taganrog, Rostov Oblast, and Bryansk Oblast and five Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed all five Iskander-K missiles and seven Iskander-M/KN-23 missiles and that three Iskander-M missiles were “locally lost.” The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 146 drones and that 193 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[16] The strikes heavily targeted Kyiv City, with Ukrainian officials reporting that Russian forces struck residential buildings in the city and damaged the campus of the Ihor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute.[17] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky highlighted that Russia is targeting Ukrainian cities and civilians, noting that Russian forces damaged five apartment buildings in Kyiv City and hit a hospital in Bila Tserkva, Kyiv Oblast.[18] Russia has been increasingly targeting Kyiv City in its overnight drone and missile strikes.[19]

Ukraine’s Western partners continue to allocate military aid to Ukraine and collaborate with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB). Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on June 22 that Norway plans to allocate $400 million to purchase Ukrainian weapons for the Ukrainian military.[20] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 22 that Norway will focus on investing in drones.[21] Zelensky noted that Norwegian defense company Kongsberg Defense and Aerospace opened an office in Ukraine, and Umerov stated that Ukraine will collaborate with Kongsberg to develop joint projects related to air defense.[22] New Zealand announced on June 23 a package worth 16 million NZD (about $9.54 million) for Ukraine that allocates four million NZD (about $2.38 million) toward the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) fund, four million NZD toward the UK- and Latvia-led drone coalition, seven million NZD (about $4.17 million) worth of humanitarian aid, and one million NZD (about $596,500) for displaced Ukrainians.[23]

Key Takeaways:

The Kremlin continues to only diplomatically support Iran, showcasing the limitations in the Russian-Iranian strategic relationship.

Putin also acknowledged his ongoing efforts to empower Russia’s internal security services in order to safeguard regime stability and internal security.

Russian forces conducted a large-scale combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of June 22 to 23 that largely targeted Kyiv City and killed at least seven people and injured 28.

Ukraine’s Western partners continue to allocate military aid to Ukraine and collaborate with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).

Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Borova, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka and in Sumy Oblast.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 22 and 23.[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Kursk Oblast from Ryzhivka and Bezsalivka (south and east of Tetkino in Sumy Oblast) and toward Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), Glushkovo, and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[25]

Ukrainian forces liberated a village in the Sumy direction in mid-June 2025.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 20 and 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Kindrativka (north of Sumy City) and liberated Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[26] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on June 14 that Ukrainian forces liberated Andriivka, and a Russian milblogger acknowledged on June 21 that Russian forces withdrew from the settlement.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 23 that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) previously replaced elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) that were operating in Andriivka but that the naval infantry elements had to withdraw from the settlement.[28]

Russian forces attacked in northern Sumy Oblast, including north of Sumy City near Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on June 22 and 23.[29]

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on June 22 that Ukrainian forces are conducting assault operations toward Yunakivka and that Ukrainian forces likely advanced between 200 and 700 meters in the settlement over the course of a week.[30] Syrskyi characterized Yunakivka as a contested “gray zone” and stated that Russian forces’ reliance on small assault groups without armored support enabled Ukraine’s counterattacks. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are using Andriivka to develop attacks towards Kindrativka (northwest of Andriivka) and Oleksiivka (east of Andriivka), which are located roughly four kilometers from Andriivka.[31] Ukraine’s Siversk Group of Forces Spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk stated on June 22 that Russian forces are attempting to leverage superior manpower reserves with light vehicles to conduct infantry attacks in the North Slobozhansk direction (northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts) and that Russian forces are not using armored equipment within 10 to 15 kilometers of the frontline.[32] Mysnyk also stated that Russian forces in the area are struggling to maneuver across difficult terrain with ravines, small rivers, and forests with vehicles. Ukraine’s Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated on June 23 that Russian forces have reduced the tempo of their assaults in Sumy Oblast and hypothesized that Russian forces likely lack the personnel to maintain a higher operational tempo with greater assaults.[33]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade and drone and artillery elements of the 11th Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly operating near Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[34] Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction, including near Myropillia (northeast of Sumy City).[35] Elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade are reportedly operating in Oleksiivka.[36] Drone elements of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly coordinating Russian FAB-3000 air strikes against Ukrainian positions near Kindrativka.[37] Elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Kindrativka.[38]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the Vovchanski Khutory direction (northeast of Kharkiv City).[39]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on June 22 and 23.[40]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the Kharkiv direction stated on June 23 that Russian forces have become more active near Vovchansk.[41] The commander stated that Russian forces were deploying forces with 30 to 45 days of training in January 2025, but are now deploying forces with a maximum of 14 days of training in order to more quickly replenish losses. The commander stated that Russian forces are using lightly armored vehicles sporadically. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian border guards brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction stated on June 23 that Russian forces launch up to 10 assaults daily and have recently increased the number of personnel deployed in each assault to up to 25 personnel per assault, compared to previous assaults with three to 10 personnel.[42] The Ukrainian Border Guard Service reported on June 23 that Russian forces in the Vovchansk direction continue to attack using infantry on motorcycles.[43]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk).[44]

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Dvorichna and toward Kutkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Stroivka and Fyholivka and toward Dvorichanske; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pischane on June 22 and 23.[45]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in Kharkiv Oblast stated on June 23 that Russian forces are intensifying efforts in the Kupyansk direction and supplementing efforts with untrained infantry units and small vehicles.[46]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[47]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 23 shows Russian forces raising a flag in central Hrekivka (southeast of Borova), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[48]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zeleny Hai and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Tverdokhlibove and toward Olhivka.[49]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Karpivka, and Zelena Dolyna, and toward Novyi Myr; and northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi on June 22 and 23.[50]

A Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction reported that Ukrainian drone operators struck a “Mur” surveillance system and a “Sylok-M1” electronic warfare (EW) system in the Lyman direction.[51]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on June 22 and 23.[52]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Verkhnokamyanske.[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, north of Chasiv Yar toward Novomarkove, southeast of Chasiv Yar toward Mykolaivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Predtechnye and Bila Hora on June 22 and 23.[54]

A chief sergeant in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated that Russian forces learned during offensive operations against Pokrovsk that it is difficult to conduct frontal assaults on large settlements and are avoiding attacking Kostyantynivka. The chief sergeant stated that Russian forces are instead attempting to strike Ukrainian logistics and rear areas near Kramatorsk and Druzhkivka to disrupt Ukrainian logistics in the area.[55] The chief sergeant stated that the Russian military command has redeployed significant elements of “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies from the Pokrovsk direction to the Chasiv Yar direction. The chief sergeant suggested that these redeployments may indicate Russian prioritization of this sector of the front. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated that the Russian military command is actively committing elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division in hopes of seizing Chasiv Yar.[56] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces conduct small infantry assaults “almost continuously,” including with motorcycle support.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on June 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk toward Pleshchiivka; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka, Novospaske, Novoolenivka, Yablunivka, and Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Toretsk near Leonidivka on June 22 and 23.[57]

Geolocated footage published on June 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian vehicle storage facility of the 24th Spetsnaz Brigade (Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff [GRU]) in occupied Velyka Shyshivka (east of Donetsk City).[58]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[59]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces have established positions in Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) and advanced into Novotoretske (north of Novoekonomichne).[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrne and Malynivka and toward Volodymyrivka, Shakhove, Razine, and Novotoretske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and toward Molodetske on June 22 and 23.[61]

A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Pokrovsk direction noted that Russia’s use of motorcycles and buggies is relatively effective.[62] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces used Geran-2 drones (Russian-made analogues of the Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones) to strike Ukrainian positions near Razine and Sofiivka (further northeast of Pokrovsk and west of Toretsk).[63] ISW has observed recent reports that Russia is using Geran-2 drones for strikes along the frontline, marking a departure from Russia’s previous pattern of using long-range Shahed/Geran drones against Ukraine’s rear and deep rear and indicating Russia’s enhanced drone production capabilities.[64]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th “Sparta” Separate Mechanized Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novoekonomichne and Koptieve (northeast of Pokrovsk).[65] Drone operators of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[66]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Vesele (south of Novopavlivka).[67]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka), west of Dachne, southwest of Horikhove (both southeast of Novopavlivka), west of Komar, west and southwest of Fedorivka, and east of Yalta (all south of Novopavlivka).[68]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; south of Novopavlivka near Yalta; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka and Bahatyr on June 22 and 23.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Perebudova (south of Novopavlivka).[70]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhzhia (south of Novopavlivka).[71] Elements of the 1444th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[72]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole and toward Voskresenka and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on June 22 and 23.[73]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Shevchenko.[74]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 22 that Russian forces advanced toward Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[75]

Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 22 and 23.[76]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 1295th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (reportedly of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA]) are reportedly operating near Malynivka.[77]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and southwest of Orikhiv near Mali Shcherbaky and Stepove and toward Novoandriivka on June 22 and 23.[78]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the “Nemets” group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[79]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on June 23 but did not advance.[80]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[81]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg acknowledged on June 23 that he led a US delegation to Belarus on June 21.[82] Kellogg stated that the US and Belarusian delegations discussed the war in Ukraine and US-Belarusian bilateral relations and that the parties negotiated the release of 14 political prisoners from Belarus, including prisoners from Japan, Poland, and four other countries. Belarusian opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya announced that Belarus had freed Belarusian opposition leader Sergey Tikhanovsky as part of the exchange.[83]

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77237; https://t.me/MID_Russia/61646

[2] https://archive.ph/dh6OM; https://www.reuters.com/world/china/irans-supreme-leader-asks-putin-do-more-after-us-strikes-2025-06-23/

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-18-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2025

[4] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77240

[5] https://ria dot ru/20250623/grushko-2024695639.html

[6] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/weakness-lethal-why-putin-invaded-ukraine-and-how-war-must-end

[8] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77240

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-military-restructuring-and-expansion-hindered-ukraine-war ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020525

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121723 ;

[12] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77240

[13] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-28-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010324

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2023

[15] https://t.me/kpszsu/36914

[16] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/23/poshkodzheno-pyat-bagatokvartyrnyh-budynkiv-ye-zagybli-ta-poraneni-prezydent-pro-naslidky-udaru-po-kyyevu/; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14819?single; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25803; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1049301-klimenko-pro-ataku-rf-na-kiiv-u-sevcenkivskomu-rajoni-jmovirno-bulo-prame-vlucanna-fugasnoi-raketi/; https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/30725; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4877; https://t.me/andriyshTime/39230; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4878 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4888; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/23/u-kyyevi-vnaslidok-udaru-rf-zagynuly-try-lyudyny-shhe-13-postrazhdaly/; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4880; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4883; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1352; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/44862; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/14862; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/14861; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1048879-vijska-rf-atakuvali-ocakiv-na-mikolaivsini-poraneno-troe-ludej-sered-nih-diti/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/22/zagarbnyky-vdaryly-po-ochakovu-troye-poranenyh-zokrema-dity/; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02zwS3JNtXQFSEKyVHFLuaKT2Zjas9JWnBQsaWhrXqUPEudyKvwEoKBsB2meS1SWHcl; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12625; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1937136591568318559 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14829; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/23/pid-zavalamy-mozhut-buty-vykladachi-oleg-kiper-pro-udar-balistykoyu-po-navchalnomu-zakladu-na-odeshhyni/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/10192; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02zwS3JNtXQFSEKyVHFLuaKT2Zjas9JWnBQsaWhrXqUPEudyKvwEoKBsB2meS1SWHcl

[17] https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4877; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4883; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1352 ; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1049301-klimenko-pro-ataku-rf-na-kiiv-u-sevcenkivskomu-rajoni-jmovirno-bulo-prame-vlucanna-fugasnoi-raketi/; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4878 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4888; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/23/u-kyyevi-vnaslidok-udaru-rf-zagynuly-try-lyudyny-shhe-13-postrazhdaly/; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4880; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1362; https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/30725; https://t.me/presinfokpi/7922

[18] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14819

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052425

[20] https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/12996

[21] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/zhodnogo-poshirennya-yadernoyi-zbroyi-v-suchasnomu-sviti-ne-98573

[22] https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/posts/pfbid02T3Qu9x3EyzZz7LgePAYhn5fwDfURVRKvy4z32sSJX1h5BqhxKbcevDYwHt947Pngl; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/zhodnogo-poshirennya-yadernoyi-zbroyi-v-suchasnomu-sviti-ne-98573

[23] https://www.beehive dot govt.nz/release/new-zealand-announces-further-aid-ukraine

[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785

[25] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30344; https://t.me/dva_majors/73968; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30367

[26] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1936781662026879313; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1936783135133544731; https://t.me/pentagonkh/277; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1937138889699033276; https://t.me/morpex_V/5044

[27] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1936783135133544731; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1936781662026879313; https://t.me/pentagonkh/277; https://suspilne dot media/1042467-na-sumskomu-napramku-perebuvaut-ponad-50-tisac-vijskovih-rf-zelenskij/; https://t.me/severnnyi/4392; https://t.me/yurasumy/23641

[28] https://t.me/severnnyi/4392; https://t.me/severnnyi/4409

[29] https://t.me/dva_majors/73968; https://t.me/wargonzo/27433; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812

[30] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/ukraine-launches-assault-near-yunakivka-after-recapturing-andriyivka/; https://t.me/osirskiy/1192

[31] https://t.me/severnnyi/4409

[32] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/22/sumskyj-relyef-proty-vorozhyh-mashyn-okupanty-zmusheni-minimalno-vykorystovuvaty-bronyu-ta-legku-tehniku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[33] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/23/napevno-syl-u-voroga-nedostatno-na-sumshhyni-rosiyany-znyzyly-aktyvnist-shturmiv/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30354; https://t.me/rusich_army/24321

[35] https://t.me/c/1852634939/29405 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4392; https://t.me/dva_majors/74008

[36] https://t.me/severnnyi/4409

[37] https://t.me/dva_majors/74013

[38] https://t.me/severnnyi/4409

[39] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30371

[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652

[41] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/23/shhob-ruhalysya-yak-strumochok-na-harkivshhyni-vorog-aktyvno-zaluchaye-svij-najdeshevshyj-resurs/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ScdUZNkwcYc

[42] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/23/mali-shturmovi-grupy-vyrosly-u-vovchansku-vorog-bezperestanku-shturmuye-i-kopaye-fortyfikacziyi/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kA5EvhyCugE

[43] https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1G2WtkkURo/

[44] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1937187909515506004; https://t.me/Ochi151/105

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13465; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1936817437682581972; https://t.me/operationall_space/4742

[46] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/23/shhob-ruhalysya-yak-strumochok-na-harkivshhyni-vorog-aktyvno-zaluchaye-svij-najdeshevshyj-resurs/

[47] https://t.me/dva_majors/73992

[48] https://x.com/creamy_caprice/status/1937075996928127375; https://t.me/mi_s_toboy_sp/3429; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9442; https://t.me/osintpen/1271

[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788

[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652

[51] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/23/voroga-na-lymanshhyni-zalyshyly-bez-ochej-ta-vuh-znyshheno-kompleksy-murom-ta-reb-sylok/; https://t.me/umftteam/527

[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652; https://t.me/dva_majors/73968

[53] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/20027

[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652; https://t.me/wargonzo/27433

[55] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/23/chorni-vorony-proty-vorozhogo-rubikona-na-donechchyni-zhorstoki-bytvy-povitryanyh-asiv/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L35LL58ugFk

[56] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/23/bila-abo-chervona-plyama-na-misczi-budynkiv-u-chasovomu-yaru-pislya-boyiv-vid-kvartaliv-ne-zalyshylosya-j-stin/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L35LL58ugFk

[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652

[58] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1936901117839122834; https://t.me/supernova_plus/40288?single

[59] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9444; https://t.me/spartan_ngu/2490

[60] https://t.me/basurin_e/19492

[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652

[62] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/22/smiyalys-ale-cze-diyevyj-metod-poblyzu-pokrovska-rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-tysk-na-syly-oborony/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[63] https://t.me/mod_russia/54078

[64] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2025

[65] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13953

[66] https://t.me/voin_dv/15637

[67] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1937119925421686807; https://t.me/ZSU_141OMBr/1149

[68] https://t.me/rybar/71570; https://t.me/wargonzo/27433; https://t.me/voin_dv/15621; https://t.me/rybar/71570

[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785; https://t.me/rybar/71570; https://t.me/rybar/71574

[70] https://t.me/voin_dv/15621

[71] https://t.me/rybar/71570; https://t.me/tass_agency/321899; https://t.me/mod_russia/54073

[72] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/20742

[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652

[74] https://t.me/voin_dv/15629

[75] https://t.me/voin_dv/15621

[76] https://t.me/wargonzo/27433; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1936826019065057737; https://t.me/voin_dv/15620

[77] https://t.me/voin_dv/15636 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1936826019065057737 https://t.me/voin_dv/15620

[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02zwS3JNtXQFSEKyVHFLuaKT2Zjas9JWnBQsaWhrXqUPEudyKvwEoKBsB2meS1SWHcl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30346; https://t.me/wargonzo/27433

[79] https://t.me/wargonzo/27423 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73957

[80] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788

[81] https://t.me/dva_majors/74015

[82] https://x.com/generalkellogg/status/1937140616757936336?s=46&t=oKaeT_EpUFQGPYnee_AK3w

[83] https://www.cnn.com/2025/06/21/europe/belarus-opposition-freed-us-intl

Source: Understandingwar.org | View original article

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 24, 2025

Russian forces are expanding their use of motorcycles along the frontline in Ukraine. Russia is preparing its military and society for a potential future war with NATO in the medium- to long-term. The Kremlin continues efforts to augment Russian combat power by setting conditions to subsume forces from Russia’s Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) allies under a Russian military command. The Russian State Duma ratified on June 24 a protocol that allows CSTO states to send their troops to other CSTO countries’ territory in the event of armed conflict, threats, crisis situations, and exercises. The protocol also introduces the concept of a “command of formations” that will command CSTO military forces sent to one CSTO state. The CSTO Collective Security Council approved the protocol in November 2024. Western assessments of Russia’s future combat power must take into account the forces of Russia’s CSTO allies that Russia may use in future operations — not only those of Russia. The data cut-off for this product was 11:45am ET on June 25. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Read full article ▼

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 24, 2025

Angelica Evans, Anna Harvey, Christina Harward, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, and George Barros

June 24, 2025, 6:00pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45am ET on June 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte assessed that Russia is the largest existential threat to NATO members today and that Russia is preparing for a protracted war with NATO. Rutte stated on June 24 at the NATO summit at The Hague that Russia remains the most significant and direct threat to NATO, especially considering the support North Korea, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Iran, and Belarus provide Russia.[1] Rutte stated that Russia could attack NATO within three to seven years and is currently more prepared for a war than NATO. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview with Sky News on June 24 that Russia would not be ready to attack NATO in the immediate future but could be ready for a war with NATO by 2030.[2] Zelensky stated that the war in Ukraine is currently constraining Russia’s ability to train and reconstitute its forces and that any decrease in aid to Ukraine would benefit Russia. ISW continues to assess that Russia is preparing its military and society for a potential future war with NATO in the medium- to long-term.[3] Any future ceasefire or long-term pause in combat in Ukraine would free up Russian forces for redeployment to Russia’s eastern border with NATO and allow Russia to rearm and reconstitute, whereby Russia may be able to pose a significant threat to NATO earlier than 2030.

The Kremlin continues efforts to augment Russian combat power by setting conditions to subsume forces from Russia’s Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) allies under a Russian military command. The Russian State Duma ratified on June 24 a protocol that allows CSTO states to send their troops to other CSTO states’ territory in the event of armed conflict, threats, crisis situations, and exercises; to respond to the consequences of emergencies; and to provide humanitarian aid.[4] The protocol now allows for the CSTO to transport troops one day after a decision from the CSTO Council — as opposed to after 30 days as the protocol stated previously. The protocol also introduces the concept of a “command of formations” that will command CSTO military forces sent to one CSTO state. This “command of formations” will likely be a Russian-dominated command. The CSTO Collective Security Council approved the protocol in November 2024.[5] ISW has long assessed that the Kremlin has been trying to subordinate the militaries of former Soviet states to the Russian Armed Forces to recreate a multinational combined army in the former Soviet space.[6] Western assessments of Russia’s future combat power must take into account the forces of Russia’s CSTO allies that Russia may use in future operations — not only those of Russia.

Russian forces are expanding their use of motorcycles along the frontline in Ukraine — a tactic that the Russian military may leverage in future wars beyond Ukraine, possibly including operations against NATO states. A servicemember in a Ukrainian brigade reported on June 24 that the threat of Russian motorcycle assaults is increasing along the frontline as Russian forces increasingly integrate motorcycles into assault tactics.[7] The servicemember stated that Russian motorcycle forces are no longer attacking along roads but mainly attacking through open fields and trying to bypass Ukrainian engineering barriers along the frontline. Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight provided additional information on June 23 about the tactical doctrine the Russian military is establishing for motorcycle usage.[8] Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian forces are mainly using motorcycles as a form of transport for attacking infantry to support diversion, reconnaissance, infiltration, and flanking support missions. Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian motorcyclists operate in squads of six to eight motorcycles with one or two riders on each motorcycle (between six and 16 personnel in total). Each squad reportedly has two to four portable electronic warfare (EW) systems and one device scanning for Ukrainian drones. Frontelligence Insight reported Russian forces are also leveraging motorcycles for casualty evacuation and logistics support. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported in May 2025 that Russian forces were mainly using motorcycles in tandem with armored vehicles.[9] Russian forces appear to be increasingly relying on motorcycles as a method of transport and advancement independent from tanks and armored vehicles in recent weeks, however.[10]

Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian forces have been training troops on motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) at ad hoc motocross tracks in Russia and occupied Ukraine as of Spring 2025.[11] Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian forces are also conducting more advanced training programs, including for drone evasion, and that the length of these courses varies between 16 hours to over a month. Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian forces are mainly using foreign-made motorcycles, primarily those manufactured in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and that volunteer organizations in Russia provide most of the motorcycles for frontline Russian units. Frontelligence Insight reported, citing internal documents from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), that Russia intends to equip over half of its infantry forces with motorcycles, ATVs, and buggies in the future. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will likely increasingly depend on motorcycles and other quicker unarmored vehicles, as slower-moving vehicles have become a hazard on the more transparent battlefield of Ukraine.[12] Russian efforts to integrate tactical innovations, such as motorcycle usage, among frontline units indicates that the Russian military is learning modern ground warfare lessons that it intends to leverage beyond the war in Ukraine.[13]

NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte highlighted NATO’s plans to invest more in its own defense capabilities, including by investing in the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) — in line with US President Donald Trump’s initiative for Europe to shoulder more of the burden of collective security. Rutte called on NATO states to invest in Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB), which Rutte assessed has an untapped potential of about $35 billion, in order to prevent NATO states from reducing their own stockpiles and to allow NATO states and allies to buy weapons from Ukraine in the future.[14] Rutte stated that NATO states will agree to introduce a baseline of allocating five percent of GDP toward defense spending during the NATO summit.[15] Rutte stated that NATO’s new defense investment plan will include a five-fold increase in investments in NATO air defense capabilities and investments to produce “thousands” more tanks and armored vehicles and millions of artillery ammunition rounds.

Ukraine’s European partners allocated military aid to Ukraine and financial support for drone production during the NATO summit on June 24. Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans announced on June 24 that the Netherlands approved a new military aid package for Ukraine worth 175 million euros (about $203.4 million), which provides 100 drone detection radars and 20 Ermine partly unmanned vehicles for casualty evacuation and includes 80 million euros (about $93 million) toward the international drone coalition.[16] Brekelmans stated that the Netherlands also recently signed a contract worth 500 million euros (about $5.8 million) with Ukrainian drone manufacturers to fund the production of 600,000 drones.[17] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced on June 24 that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Keir Starmer agreed to launch a new joint drone production initiative.[18] Umerov stated that the UK will produce Ukrainian-designed drones in the UK for three years as part of a project to support integration between the British and Ukrainian defense industries. Umerov stated that the UK and Ukraine will share the produced drones after the war in Ukraine ends and that the project will enable British defense companies to rapidly design and produce state-of-the-art drones at scale. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister for Digital Development Kateryna Chernohorenko, NATO Digital Staff Deputy Director Marco Criscuolo, and NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) Director General Ludwig Descamps announced on June 24 that NATO will provide 37 million euros (about $43 million) for Ukrainian satellite communications, including satellite radio stations, trackers, and services.[19]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 23 to 24 that resulted in over 100 civilian casualties. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 97 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[20] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 63 drones and that 15 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Dnipro City and Samara, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, damaging educational and medical facilities.[21] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported that Russian forces struck a passenger train in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, killing at least 17 people and injuring at least 279.[22] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City and Velykyi Bobryk, Sumy Oblast.[23] Russia’s ongoing strike campaign against Ukraine in recent months has increasingly impacted civilian areas and infrastructure and Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB) — underscoring the urgency of providing additional air support to Ukraine and strengthening Ukraine’s air defense umbrella.

Key Takeaways:

NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte assessed that Russia is the largest existential threat to NATO members today and that Russia is preparing for a protracted war with NATO.

Ukraine’s European partners allocated military aid to Ukraine and financial support for drone production during the NATO summit on June 24.

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 23 to 24 that resulted in over 100 civilian casualties.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Kherson City, and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort — Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on June 24.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 23 and 24.[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to attack toward Glushkovo, Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), Novyi Put (east of Tetkino), and Vesele (north of Novyi Put).[25]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Kursk direction.[26]

Russian Supporting Effort — Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 24 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[27]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Andriivka and in southern Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[28]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in unspecified areas in the Sumy direction.[30]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Andriivka is a “contested” gray zone.[31] Another milblogger claimed that personnel from the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade stated that Russian forces in the Sumy direction are using all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) with attached trailers to transport supplies, ammunition, and fuel to frontline positions.[32]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th and 83rd separate VDV brigades and 76th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[33]

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on June 23 and 24.[34]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn stated that small Russian infantry groups with drone support are attacking in the Vovchansk and Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) directions daily.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west and southwest of Dovhenke (north of Kupyansk).[37]

Russian forces conducted assaults northwest of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; north of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and Dvorichna and toward Kurkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and Fyholivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane on June 23 and 24.[38]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn stated on June 24 that Russian forces are trying to expand their bridgehead near Dvorichna.[39]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova near Tverdokhlibove, and Hrekivka and toward Druzhelyubivka, Olhivka, and Cherneschyna on June 23 and 24.[40]

Ukrainian Borova City Military Administration Head Oleksandr Tertyshnyi reported that Russian forces conducted a glide bomb strike against Borova.[41]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[42]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Lyman near Karpivka, Novyi Myr, Zelena Dolyna, and Ridkodub and toward Shandryholove; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske on June 23 and 24.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked from Novyi Myr toward Ridkodub and Shandryholove.[44]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kolodyazi.[45]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) marginally advanced to the eastern outskirts of Serebryanka (northeast of Siversk).[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced north of Verknokamyanske (east of Siversk).[47]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on June 23 and 24.[48]

A senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported that Russian forces are changing as their capabilities fluctuate by conducting several mechanized assaults until they lose too much equipment and manpower and then switching to attacking in small infantry groups.[49]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southwestern Chasiv Yar.[50]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; northeast of Chasiv Yar toward Bondarne; north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove and toward Pryvillya; southeast of Chasiv Yar toward Mykolaivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Bila Hora on June 23 and 24.[51]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment, and 299th VDV Regiment (all of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[52]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Yablunivka (west of Toretsk).[53]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) seized Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[54] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces may maintain positions on the northern outskirts of Dyliivka, however.[55] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are trying to enter Oleksandro-Kalynove (west of Toretsk) and that claims that Russian forces already seized the settlement are exaggerated.[56]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk near Popiv Yar and toward Poltavka and Pleshchiivka; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka, Yablunivka, Novospaske, and Rusyn Yar and toward Stepanivka; and south of Toretsk near Nelipivka on June 23 and 24.[57]

An officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported that Russian forces are using a significant number of drones to disrupt Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and to strike Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[58] The officer reported that Russian forces are using first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber optic cables in “ambush tactics,” using Mavic drones to strike Ukrainian infantry, and using other FPV drones to target Ukrainian military equipment. The officer added that Russian forces also use Molniya drones to strike in the Kostyantynivka direction because the drones are cheap and have a decent payload. A Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov previously reported that Molniya drone can carry several FPV drones but is not a full-fledged drone mothership.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are slowly advancing in Yablunivka house-by-house.[60]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 24 shows a Ukrainian drone striking a Russian servicemember in western Malynivka (northeast of Pokrovsk), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[61]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[62]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka; northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka and Myrne and toward Razine, Koptieve, Novoekonomichne, Volodymyrivka, and Shakhove; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Myrolubivka and Novotoretske and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Zviroveand toward Molodetske and Chuhuyeve on June 23 and 24.[63]

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian artillery battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on June 24 reported that Russian infantry are using light vehicles, such as scooters and motorcycles, to attack in groups of one or two and that Russian forces are not using heavy equipment.[64] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are launching Shahed drones against Ukrainian forces near Shakhove.[65]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[66]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 24 shows Russian forces raising a flag in central Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[67]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and northeast of Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka), west of Fedorivka, west of Vesele, and southwest of Komar (all south of Novopavlivka).[68]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Novomykolaivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka and Horikhove; and south of Novopavlivka near Dachne, Vesele, Komar, Perebudova, and Bahatyr on June 23 and 24.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Komar, Yalta, and Voskresenka (both southwest of Novopavlivka).[70]

Order of Battle: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Perebudova.[71] Elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in northern Yalta.[72] Elements of the 30th Separate Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA) are reportedly operating near Voskresenka.[73]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 24 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces only occupy northern Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and that Ukrainian drones are preventing Russian forces from seizing the settlement.[74]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on June 23 and 24.[75]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[76]

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on June 24.

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces reported on June 24 that Russian forces are accumulating personnel, replenishing forces, and increasing logistical support in the Hulyaipole and Orikhiv directions in order to prepare for future offensive operations.[77]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske on June 24.[78]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 100th Separate Reconnaissance Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA), including the “Nemets” group of the division’s 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[79]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced during a likely raid in the Kherson direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Oleshky (southeast of Kherson City on the east [left] bank of the Dnipro River) near the Antonivsky Road Bridge, likely during a raid.[80]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on June 23 and 24.[81]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) and 127th Separate Reconnaissance Brigade (22nd Army Corps [AC], Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[82]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

See topline text.

[1] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_236418.htm

[2] https://news.sky.com/story/zelenskyy-says-putin-could-attack-a-nato-member-within-five-years-to-test-alliance-13387606?fbclid=PAQ0xDSwLHFG1leHRuA2FlbQIxMQABp_WkRt2GI4NhlM9l2Gajdcf9qKizOeu9JPrTTBXckgJCOtv8LQoHPRL_xHol_aem_k4_Vs8pG8ImgEqiHmGaKdw

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325

[4] https://suspilne dot media/1050399-derzduma-rf-sprostila-perekidanna-vijsk-miz-derzavami-clenami-odkb/; https://www.pnp dot ru/politics/gosduma-ratificirovala-protokol-o-statuse-voennykh-formirovaniy-stran-odkb.html; https://t.me/sotaproject/99606

[5] https://tass dot ru/politika/24340843 ; https://en.odkb-csto dot org/news/news_odkb/v-astane-sostoyalas-sessiya-skb-odkb/

[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-unprecedentedly-expansive-military-exercises-fall-2020-seek-recreate-soviet

[7] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/24/rozbigayutsya-yak-targany-ta-imituyut-prysutnist-taktyka-rosiyan-na-kordoni-z-dnipropetrovshhynoyu/

[8] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1937204380740256083

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051325

[10] https://t.me/immitis71/1061 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/24/ukrayinski-desantnyky-zirvaly-masovanyj-motoshturm-rosiyan/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2025

[11] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1937204380740256083

[12] https://isw.pub/RussianForceGen050725

[13] https://isw.pub/RussianForceGen050725

[14] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_236426.htm?selectedLocale=en

[15] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_236418.htm

[16] https://www.defensie dot nl/actueel/nieuws/2025/06/24/100-dronedetectieradars-in-nieuw-steunpakket-voor-oekraine; https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/posts/pfbid0yEbgmRPkVwXSFaDpPxwUWCkHjM5iCaQQw69Re5FGHgow8Wr36cyL95mvm3WnNxPNl?__cft__[0]=AZVcUKHdgywkUD83kaiRzK3bE6m6pz_GXDrS4s5Qov3MEZXIqiZc3r9fey2rtHbB5OpfvV55x4LcW1fpB936EY49sfK9nuAUkgpUslwwF5pdTJOfgIeiTBp3gEzZp5LV4Hj-UEYS_w0nqkiMmfTqvHE_AdSHtn8pdLPPL5vnl3ogGg&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[17] https://x.com/DefensieMin/status/1937425090037375302; https://suspilne dot media/1050255-niderlandi-pidpisali-z-ukrainou-ugodi-na-virobnictvo-600-tisac-bpla/

[18] https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/posts/pfbid0iSD1MgpHMdEjf98ZoWKHNxrseX7nFbUh4YBdn3CnBP595hpcShTLdn4rCLZmwSZsl?__cft__[0]=AZVz7cCE2lxNNQ-LWHj2Xo2SgUzwhL_HLpWt_8tYZxozMdgQedKMuFIUYISsB5TC250i3CwtwWsl2Kz8Dy1YiHfu8Bwb6PRh1pJNTSdycj8ersIF636UZBdWf9PqS-qxPxOkHkKhm_LprBAAaKIuDQs-iXGtkL6DVx2YeQbV1YbOyw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/24/rustem-umyerov-brytaniya-finansuvatyme-zakupivlyu-ukrayinskyh-droniv/

[19] https://mod dot gov.ua/news/minoboroni-ta-nato-zaluchili-majzhe-37-miljoniv-yevro-na-suputnikovij-zv-yazok-dlya-sil-oboroni; https://suspilne dot media/1050203-niderlandi-ogolosili-pro-cergovij-paket-vijskovoi-dopomogi-dla-ukraini-na-majze-175-mln-evro/

[20] https://t.me/kpszsu/36958

[21] https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/7044; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/7045; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1050147-vijska-rf-atakuvali-dnipropetrovsinu-raketami-odna-z-nih-vlucila-v-potag-akij-kursuvav-z-odesi/ ; https://t.me/kpszsu/36969; https://t.me/borys_filatovv/2555; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22394; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1050089-vijska-rf-masovano-atakuvali-dnipropetrovsinu-poskodzenna-u-dnipri-ta-u-samaru-e-zagibli-ta-poraneni/ ; https://t.me/kpszsu/36969; https://t.me/borys_filatovv/2555; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22394; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1050089-vijska-rf-masovano-atakuvali-dnipropetrovsinu-poskodzenna-u-dnipri-ta-u-samaru-e-zagibli-ta-poraneni/ ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22394 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22408; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22409

[22] https://suspilne dot media/1049857-zsu-urazili-naftobazu-kombinat-atlas-u-rosii-finlandia-vidilae-novij-paket-vijskovoi-dopomogi-1217-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1750777572&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1937503898186436995 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14839 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22433 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22432

[23] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1049879-u-harkovi-vnoci-24-cervna-prolunali-vibuhi-nemislanskij-rajon-atakuvali-rosijski-bezpilotniki/; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2711; https://t.me/synegubov/15226; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2712 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2714; https://t.me/synegubov/15233 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1049881-dron-ne-zdetonuvav-stalo-vidomo-de-u-harkovi-vpav-sahed-so-ne-vibuhnuv/; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1049879-u-harkovi-vnoci-24-cervna-prolunali-vibuhi-nemislanskij-rajon-atakuvali-rosijski-bezpilotniki/; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1049885-sim-rosijskih-bezpilotnikiv-atakuvali-harkiv-protagom-pivtori-godini-vlucanna-na-troh-lokaciah/; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2722 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15230 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15237 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15237 ; https://t.me/grigorov_oleg/72; https://t.me/prokuraturasumy/4332?single; https://t.me/grigorov_oleg/73; https://t.me/prokuraturasumy/4332; https://t.me/grigorov_oleg/71; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/44939; https://t.me/UA_National_Police/42968; https://t.me/suspilnesumy/35238; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1049873-rosijska-armia-zavdala-masovanogo-udaru-po-verhnosirovatskij-gromadi/

[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25820; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25816

[25] https://t.me/dva_majors/74068; https://t.me/starshii_pogrannaryada/11302; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30382; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30399

[26] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170151

[27] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/29171; https://t.me/immitis71/1061

[28] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31896

[29] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30381

[30] https://t.me/wargonzo/27467

[31] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30381

[32] https://t.me/sashakots/54484

[33] https://t.me/dazbastadraw/8266 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27466 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30381 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30388

[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25820; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25816; https://t.me/otukharkiv/6751

[35] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/24/perestupayut-cherez-trupy-svoyih-tovaryshiv-na-pivnochi-harkivshhyny-rosiyany-nastupayut-hvylyamy/

[36] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170153

[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30406

[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25846 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25820 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25816 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12713

[39] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/24/perestupayut-cherez-trupy-svoyih-tovaryshiv-na-pivnochi-harkivshhyny-rosiyany-nastupayut-hvylyamy/

[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25846 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25820 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25816 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12713

[41] https://t.me/DSNS_Kharkiv/15210; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1050131-rosiani-zavdali-aviaudaru-po-centru-borovoi-na-harkivsini-poskodzeni-do-30-budinkiv/

[42] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65395

[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25846 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25820 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25816 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12713 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65395

[44] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65395

[45] https://t.me/tass_agency/322265

[46] https://t.me/wargonzo/27467 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170155 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/322176 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65396

[47] https://t.me/wargonzo/27467

[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25846 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25820 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25816 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65396

[49] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L35LL58ugFk ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/24/vydavyty-na-pidkradulyah-sposterezhni-posty-shturmy-rosiyan-na-donechchyni-zalezhyt-vid-yihnih-spromozhnostej/

[50] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9457 ; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DLSBXZWipDa/?igsh=b3l0d2llaTB5dnE2

[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25846 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25820 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25816 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27467

[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30388

[53] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1937377716929507589 ; https://t.me/gimbatov34/4899

[54] https://t.me/mod_russia/54104 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/23878 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54108 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37674 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65406

[55] https://t.me/rybar/71634

[56] https://t.me/yurasumy/23688

[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25846 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25820 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25816 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12713

[58] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OIDpzZicuos ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/24/vono-desheve-jogo-bagato-vono-derevyane-na-toreczkomu-napryamku-masovo-vykorystovuyut-drony-bud-yakogo-typu/

[59] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-11-2025

[60] https://t.me/yurasumy/23688

[61] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9453; https://t.me/ChervonaKalynaBrigade/3130

[62] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65390

[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25846; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25820 https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25816; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12713; https://t.me/dva_majors/74060; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30382; https://t.me/yurasumy/23686; https://t.me/yurasumy/23683

[64] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/24/zadiyuyut-yihnij-nepotrib-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-ataky-z-samogo-ranku-i-do-vechora/

[65] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94440

[66] https://t.me/dva_ majors/74055; https://t.me/dva_majors/74069; https://t.me/dva_majors/74094

[67] https://t.me/blacksky_3brop/40; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9449; https://t.me/osintpen/1278

[68] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30378; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30382; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65392; https://t.me/dva_majors/74060; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170155; https://t.me/yurasumy/23682 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27467

[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25846; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25846; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25816; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12713

[70] https://t.me/voin_dv/15648

[71] https://t.me/mod_russia/54101

[72] https://t.me/voin_dv/15650

[73] https://t.me/voin_dv/15645

[74] https://t.me/yurasumy/23682

[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25846; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25820 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25816; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12713; https://t.me/dva_majors/74060; https://t.me/voin_dv/15648

[76] https://t.me/voin_dv/15644

[77] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12629; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1049983-armia-rf-provodit-aktivnu-pidgotovku-do-sturmovih-dij-na-orihivskomu-napramku-sili-oboroni-pivdna/

[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25846

[79] https://t.me/dva_majors/74082; https://t.me/dva_majors/74081; https://t.me/wargonzo/27482

[80] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1937314398000791959; https://t.me/svo_alfa/304

[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25846; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25820; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25816

[82] https://t.me/dva_majors/74091; https://t.me/dva_majors/74093

Source: Understandingwar.org | View original article

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMinAFBVV95cUxNcURUNXVxQ0xHbjJ4Ym02ZnZTYWRFWmxTdjUyOU1xQVNDWHlyZHVQZXlvLWtJSjg1R012dHh1amF5SG5YQVE5dm9FUGZkTGRVMmFYc1dRUThRbU04UE43TVV6a0l3ZmJNbGp0S2ZSUUF0SnU4c2I2UFlsRTFOdjlpeEFneTZMeDhtbjVvMjVVWENsdW5IQmRjLUlSSkI?oc=5

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 27, 2025 – Institute for the Study of War

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 27, 2025 – Institute for the Study of War

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