CNN

By George Ramsay, CNN

(CNN) — Simone Inzaghi has only been head coach of Al-Hilal for a matter of weeks, but already he has led the Saudi Arabian side to the quarterfinals of the Club World Cup.

Al-Hilal secured a spot in the last eight of the tournament in sensational fashion with a dramatic 4-3 victory against Manchester City on Monday, scoring twice in extra-time to produce arguably the biggest shock of the Club World Cup so far.

Brazilian forward Marcos Leonardo scored the decisive goal in the 112th minute – his second of the game after Phil Foden had equalized for Man City.

Inzaghi, who only recently oversaw Inter Milan’s Champions League final defeat against Paris Saint-Germain, showered his players with praise after the match.

“The key to this result was the players, and the heart they put on the pitch tonight,” he said, per Reuters. “We had to do something extraordinary because we all know Manchester City, that team.

“We had to climb Mount Everest without oxygen and we made it. All the players were exceptional in everything, in the possession phase, the non-possession phase.”

Bernardo Silva bundled in the first goal of the game at Orlando’s Camping World Stadium inside 10 minutes, setting up what many expected to be a routine victory for the Premier League side.

But Leonardo leveled the match at the start of the second half when he headed in Rúben Dias’ block, before Malcom’s breakaway goal moments later gave Al-Hilal a 2-1 lead.

The advantage was short-lived with Erling Haaland scoring from a corner, and the game remained at 2-2 for the rest of the 90 minutes after Haaland had an attempt cleared off the line by Ali Lajami.

Kalidou Koulibaly’s header put Al-Hilal back into the lead in extra-time, but substitutes Rayan Cherki and Foden combined to send the match to a thrilling conclusion. And that came courtesy of Leonardo’s winner when Sergej Milinković-Savić’s header was saved by Ederson into his path.

Al-Hilal will now face Brazilian side Fluminese in the Club World Cup quarterfinals having ended a 20-game winless run for Asian teams against European opponents in FIFA club competitions.

“We knew that it would be a difficult game against one of the best teams in the world and we wanted to show our ideas, our talents and our power,” said Koulibaly, per FIFA.com.

“We made a very good game; we took our chances so we can be happy. We wanted to show that Al-Hilal have the power and the talent to be here and we showed a great mentality.”

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The Soft Power Playbook: Sports as a Global Stage

The Gulf’s masterstroke begins on the pitch. Qatar’s $6.5 billion investment in hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup—dubbed the “best in history” by FIFA’s president—did more than stage a tournament. It projected Qatar as a cultural hub, boosting its “cultural heritage” score by 16 points in Brand Finance’s rankings. Meanwhile, the UAE’s acquisition of European football clubs like Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) and AS Roma has turned soccer into a tool of diplomatic leverage. Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) isn’t lagging: its $300 million stake in Manchester City and plans to host the Formula 1 season finale underscore a strategy to turn its brand into a global sports powerhouse.

The payoff? surged from $19.2 billion to an estimated $32.5 billion, driven by post-World Cup interest. These investments aren’t just about spectacle; they’re about creating ecosystems of influence. Fans become ambassadors, stadiums become economic engines, and the world begins to see the Gulf as a place of modernity, not just oil.

Cultural Institutions and Academia: The Quiet Conquest

The Gulf’s soft power offensive extends beyond sports. The UAE’s Louvre Abu Dhabi—funded by its $1.4 trillion sovereign wealth fund—has become a beacon of cultural diplomacy, attracting 2.5 million visitors since 2017. Qatar’s Education City, home to branches of New York University and Georgetown, is training a generation of leaders with ties to global academia. Even Saudi Arabia, long criticized for cultural insularity, has launched NEOM, a $500 billion tech-focused megacity designed to rival Silicon Valley.

The data backs this shift: reveal jumps of 7, 5, and 3 spots respectively. These institutions aren’t just feel-good projects; they’re magnets for talent, foreign investment, and soft power prestige.

The Investment Case: Hospitality, Media, and Education as the New Oil

The Gulf’s diversification isn’t just about reducing reliance on oil—it’s about building economies with global pull. Investors should target three sectors:

Hospitality: With tourism revenues projected to hit $120 billion across the GCC by 2030, hotel chains like Dubai’s Armani Hotel or Qatar’s Four Seasons will capitalize on rising visitation. show a recovery from 35% to 72%, signaling pent-up demand. Media and Entertainment: Qatar’s BeIN Media Group and the UAE’s Dubai Media City are turning the region into a content powerhouse. As soft power grows, so does demand for platforms that reflect the Gulf’s modern identity. Education and Tech: Institutions like the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST) in Saudi Arabia are attracting global partnerships. Investors should look to ETFs tracking GCC tech stocks or education infrastructure funds.

Why Act Now? The Clock Is Ticking

Western investors often underestimate the Gulf’s strategic acumen. While Europe and the U.S. grapple with inflation and geopolitical fatigue, the Gulf’s sovereign wealth funds are deploying capital with laser focus. The Brand Finance rankings are not just metrics—they’re proof that this strategy is working.

The urgency lies in the accelerating post-oil shift. The Gulf’s 2024 soft power gains came amid a global downturn, suggesting resilience. Those who wait risk missing the next wave of growth as these nations transition from petrostates to postmodern powerhouses.

Final Call: Don’t Miss the Gulf’s Grand Strategy

The Gulf’s soft power play isn’t just about winning hearts and minds—it’s about building economies that outlast oil. With tourism, tech, and culture now driving growth, and sovereign wealth funds as patient capital, the region is poised to redefine global influence. For investors, the question isn’t whether to engage—it’s how quickly you can act before the rest of the world catches up.

The clock is ticking. The Gulf’s new economy is open for business.

While Saudi Arabia and Qatar share similarities — both are absolute monarchies with economies reliant on energy exports and foreign labour — their differences in demographics, economic challenges, and strategic motivations highlight the unique significance of this event for Saudi Arabia.

Unlike Qatar, whose population is just 3 million — of which over 300,000 are full-fledged citizens — Saudi Arabia is home to 33 million people, 19 million of whom hold its citizenship. With an unemployment rate of 5%[iii] compared to Qatar’s 0.13% in 2023[iv], Saudi Arabia faces more pressing challenges in creating jobs and diversifying its economy away from its decades-long oil dependency.

Therefore, hosting the World Cup aligns with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s ambitious Vision 2030, which is meant to broaden its economy by boosting tourism, attracting foreign investment, and developing new economic sectors.

Mega-events like the World Cup are potent tools for public diplomacy and economic growth, and the stakes are exceptionally high for the Gulf monarchy. The tournament is the world’s most-watched sporting event, with an estimated 5.4 billion viewers tuning in and 3.4 million attendees during Qatar’s 2022 edition.[v]

This represents a massive opportunity for Saudi Arabia to showcase its modernisation efforts, attract global attention, and promote its image as a forward-looking nation.

An ultimate test of bin Salman’s vision

One of the standout aspects of Saudi Arabia’s World Cup bid is the inclusion of Neom as a host city.[vi] Neom, an ambitious $500 billion megacity project built on the Red Sea[vii], is expected to house 300,000 residents by 2030.[viii]

Hosting matches in a city that still needs to be created symbolises the bold vision of bin Salman’s agenda but also raises questions about the feasibility and costs of such an undertaking.

Saudi Arabia promised 11 stadiums for the tournament, which “have not been built yet,” according to Riyadh.[ix] Compared to building a city from scratch and considering the investment the kingdom is ready to make, building 11 stadiums might not seem a big issue.

In a recent podcast interview[x], Kristian Ulrichsen, author of a book examining Saudi Arabia’s transformation into a football hub, discussed how bin Salman, better known for his interest in video gaming, became an enthusiastic supporter of football.

Ulrichsen attributed this shift to the efforts of bin Salman’s advisors, who effectively highlighted football’s potential to reshape global perceptions of the kingdom. Using Cristiano Ronaldo as an example, Ulrichsen emphasised the influence of the football star’s half a billion social media followers in enhancing Saudi Arabia’s soft power whenever he shares glimpses of his life in the country following his transfer to Riyadh’s Al-Nassr FC in 2023.

The long shadow of sportswashing

Critics, however, have raised significant concerns. Like previous Saudi sporting investments, such as acquiring Newcastle United[xi] or signing Cristiano Ronaldo[xii], hosting the World Cup is seen by many as another instance of “sportswashing” — meaning, using high-profile sporting events to improve a nation’s global reputation while deflecting attention from controversial domestic issues.

Moreover, questions about FIFA’s bidding process, which lacked transparency after Australia’s sudden withdrawal[xiii] left Saudi Arabia unopposed, have further fuelled scepticism.[xiv] Accusations that FIFA prioritises financial incentives and political alliances over ethical considerations remain prevalent.

The most contentious issues also includes the treatment of migrant workers, who will play a critical role in constructing the infrastructure needed for the tournament. Critics fear that labour protections will remain inadequate, exposing workers to exploitation and poor conditions.

In response, Saudi Arabia’s bid documents have pledged[xv] to uphold international labour standards and ensure safe working conditions, but whether these promises will be met remains to be determined.

Environmental concerns are also mounting, as hosting the tournament in Saudi Arabia’s desert climate will require energy-intensive cooling technologies, exacerbating global emissions amid the climate crisis.

To address this, Saudi officials have committed[xvi] to aligning the tournament with the Saudi Green Initiative and implementing measures to minimise environmental risks, including sustainable building practices and waste management programs.

Looking ahead

Supporters argue that hosting the World Cup could bring tangible benefits, including greater international engagement and the potential for gradual social reforms. However, sceptics warn that these events may serve as a veneer for systemic issues, masking ongoing repression and inequality.

As Saudi Arabia prepares for the 2034 World Cup, the global community will watch closely. Will the event catalyze genuine reform and progress or reinforce concerns about human rights and environmental issues?

The tournament’s legacy will ultimately depend on how Saudi Arabia balances its ambitious vision with the ethical and social responsibilities of hosting the world’s most celebrated sporting event.

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On June 21, 2023, the Anantara Eastern Mangroves Hotel in Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates played host to a carefully curated cast of martial arts icons. Their purpose? To unveil a brand new combat sports event: the Abu Dhabi Extreme Championships (ADXC).

Touted as Abu Dhabi’s contribution to the world of martial arts, ADXC is a cage-based event that combines Brazilian jiu-jitsu—a grappling system whereby competitors use various techniques to subvert attacks through chokes and joint locks—and other grappling arts into a single, competitive form.

However, there is more to this new organisation than meets the eye.

While officials from United Arab Emirates (UAE) have long argued that their advocacy and patronage for combat sports was about instilling discipline, fostering self-confidence and encouraging healthy lifestyles, there is a case to be made that the country’s commitment to martial arts—especially jiu-jitsu—is among UAE’s most successful examples of wielding soft power and political influence through sports.

Unlike other combat sports organisations such as the Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC), ADXC is owned and operated by the International Vision Investment, a private investment firm based in the UAE and operating in partnership with the Abu Dhabi government. The firm is chaired by Abdel Moneim Al Hashemi, who also happens to be chairman of the national jiu-jitsu federation, further underscoring the organisation’s alignment with the local government.

The championship is set to launch on October 20 as part of Abu Dhabi Showdown Week—a multi-day event organised by the Emirate’s Department of Culture and Tourism that also features an annual Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC) show.

“[ADXC] will once again attract enthusiasts from around the world to Abu Dhabi, the global capital of martial arts,” Al Hashemi said during the press conference that was streamed on YouTube. “This event reflects the UAE’s commitment to supporting sports and their top athletes globally.

“The championship aims to make an unprecedented impact on the sector, expanding horizons and solidifying Abu Dhabi’s leading position in combat sports.”

Over the past 25 years, the UAE capital has sought to establish itself as an innovator and leading hub for combat sports. Jiu-jitsu is the country’s national sport and is practiced in hundreds of schools. Military and police forces have also incorporated jiu-jitsu techniques in their training. Abu Dhabi is also home to some of jiu-jitsu’s most prestigious events and remains the only Arab nation to host a UFC event.

At the heart of this combat sports legacy lies a narrative that traces its roots to an Emirati royal—a story that helps reveal the true extent of their influence in the martial arts landscape.

The jiu-jitsu sheikh

In 1993, Sheikh Tahnoun Bin Zayed al Nahyan—the son of Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al Nahyan, the founder of the UAE—fell in love with combat sports after watching the inaugural UFC event.

The tournament marked the introduction of Brazilian jiu-jitsu to the wider martial arts landscape. Since then, it has become the fastest growing martial art in the world, attracting the likes of Sheikh Tahnoun, who began training jiu-jitsu while completing his university degree in San Diego, California.

Upon his return to the UAE, Sheikh Tahnoun founded the Abu Dhabi Combat Club (ADCC), a martial arts organisation that would serve as the foundation of the emirate’s combat sports aspirations. By 1998, the Emirati royal launched the ADCC Submission Fighting World Championships, a biannual international grappling competition that would grow to become the gold standard in modern submission grappling.

Gradually, Sheikh Tahnoun underwent the process of popularising jiu-jitsu in the UAE. He helped establish a national jiu jitsu federation, known as the UAEJJF, and encouraged the UAE government to invest in infrastructure such as training centres, academies, and jiu-jitsu-specific facilities.

His ambitions received a significant boost when Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al Nahyan, Sheikh Tahnoun’s brother and current UAE ruler, designated jiu-jitsu as the country’s national sport incorporating the sport into the local educational system in 2008. It is now mandatory in police forces, as well as in the military.

“I believe, myself, that jiu-jitsu is very important, and that is why my son is learning jiu-jitsu,” Sheikh Mohamed said to a Chinese television station during the inaugural World Professional Jiu-Jitsu Cup in 2009.

“I practice this, and I let my son [Sheikh Zayed bin Mohamed bin Zayed] practice it, and I noticed that after two years of practicing it, his personality changed. And if I invest it in my son, I will invest it in my country. Before the year 2015, we will have 500 schools in Abu Dhabi and every one of them will be learning jiu-jitsu.”

From spiritual father of combat sports to Deputy Ruler of Abu Dhabi

Sheikh Tahnoun’s ambitions for combat sports did not end with his investment in jiu-jitsu. He helped establish several other combat sports federations and helped facilitate a deal in 2010 that saw Flash Entertainment, an Abu Dhabi based sports promotion company purchase a minority stake in Zuffa LLC, the parent company of the UFC at the time. (Note: Flash Entertainment sold its share in the UFC to current owner Endeavor in 2018).

Yet over the next few years, Sheik Tahnoun’s influence would expand far beyond his combat sports patronage. He has served as national security advisor to the UAE since 2016 and holds senior positions in several high-profile ventures in the Emirates, including chairing Abu Dhabi’s state holding company ADQ and the country’s largest lender First Abu Dhabi Bank.

Earlier this year, Sheikh Tahnoun was elevated to Deputy Ruler of Abu Dhabi and was named chair of the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, the main sovereign wealth fund of the United Arab Emirates’ capital worth 790 billion USD —a sign of his growing influence as a key member of the UAE’s ruling family.

As a significant figure in Middle Eastern politics, Sheikh Tahnoun has been involved in various controversies. During the COVID-19 pandemic, he was involved in a botched deal to resell Russia’s vaccine to other countries at double its original market price. He is also known as the UAE’s ‘spy chief’ and is a key figure behind the country’s coordinated spyware attacks on dissidents and political targets.

Despite Sheikh Tahnoun’s extensive resume and influential roles in various sectors, he continues to be known as the spiritual father of combat sports in the UAE—a testament to the power of sports as a tool for soft power.

The strong jiu-jitsu link between Brazil and the UAE

Earlier this year, Renzo Gracie—a Brazilian jiu jitsu legend who coached Sheikh Tahnoun and built a subsequent relationship with UAE ruler Sheikh Mohamed—launched his first affiliate academy outside of the United States in Dubai.

Ahead of the grand opening, Gracie, a descendent of the sport’s founding father, was interviewed by the Emirates’ state-run newspaper, where he celebrated the ‘unforgettable’ investment that the UAE’s ruling family made in combat sports.

“This country makes me very proud,” Gracie told The National. “Because I’ve been inside the house of the royal family for 27 years, almost 28 years. I see their main concern is with their people, with their country, with making their country better, improving life around them for everyone. Also, to help other countries, to help other cultures. It’s an amazing people, an amazing family.”

Gracie later claimed that the UAE’s development of the sport of jiu-jitsu—from establishing professional leagues and rulesets to adopting jiu jitsu in the curricula of public schools in several Emirates—has influenced Brazil to consider implementing similar programs.

Although the interview aimed to promote the Renzo Gracie Academy in Dubai, it unexpectedly shed light on the significant political and social advantages the UAE has gained from its commitment to combat sports.

After dedicating many years, sometimes even decades, to coaching members of the Al Nahyan royal family, Gracie has now assumed the role of an official spokesperson for the family’s interests in jiu-jitsu. In this capacity, he highlights their accomplishments and portrays them as benevolent and disciplined statesmen rather than as leaders of an oppressive monarchy. This serves as a classic example of how sports can be employed to cleanse and manage a reputation, particularly for authoritarian governments.

Gracie further expanded on the UAE’s supposed use of sports to support other nations. He mentioned that the UAE is home to the largest community of expatriate Brazilian jiu-jitsu instructors, many of whom find employment in local gyms. Additionally, some of these instructors are enlisted to provide training to police and military personnel. This highlights the fact that Brazilian jiu jitsu serves not just as an element of the UAE’s soft power strategies but also plays a crucial role in its broader diplomatic endeavors.

The bonds fostered by Abu Dhabi with Brazil through jiu-jitsu have arguably contributed to the enhancement of trade relations and political connections between the two countries. This became particularly evident during the visit of Brazilian President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva to Abu Dhabi in April, where he received a warm welcome from Sheikh Mohamed.

“The partnership between us is supported by our splendid connections in many different fields, and is evident in the expressive numbers of our trade and cooperation in sports and artificial intelligence,” Lula in an official government statement.

UAE also exercises soft power through Manchester City

The UAE has a history of effectively using sports as a tool for diplomacy and soft power projection.

Arguably the most prominent example is Manchester City, an English Premier League football team that was initially purchased by the Abu Dhabi United Group (ADUG), a private equity firm owned by Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan. Sheikh Mansour is the younger brother of Sheikh Mohamed and Sheikh Tahnoun and serves as the vice-president of the UAE. City is now owned by Newton Investment and Development LLC, another investment company run by Sheikh Mansour.

Under Sheikh Mansour’s leadership, Manchester City has undergone a remarkable transformation, becoming one of the most successful teams in the world of sports. This achievement has been made possible through substantial investments and abundant resources, which have attracted top-tier players and coaches to the club.

In the last 12 years, City has secured seven Premier League titles, with five of them coming in the past six years, and finally clinched the coveted UEFA Champions League title earlier this year. Consequently, this sporting success has significantly bolstered Abu Dhabi’s geopolitical influence and enhanced its global reputation.

Rather than being viewed primarily as an absolute monarchy with a history of human rights issues, such as transnational repression, surveillance, and limitations on free expression and media, Abu Dhabi’s accomplishments in the realm of sports have played a significant role in rebranding the nation as an attractive destination for investments, business ventures, and tourism.

Combat sports as a tool for identity and hyper-masculinity

However, Manchester City’s role in the UAE’s soft power strategy is fundamentally distinct from the advantages gained through the Emirates’ investments in combat sports.

In the realm of combat sports like jiu-jitsu, figures such as Sheikh Tahnoon and other members of the royal family have been able to project notions of strength and hyper-masculinity in a society largely dominated by men. This approach bears resemblance to what Jair Bolsonaro, the former president of Brazil, accomplished in Brazil by aligning himself with legends of MMA and jiu-jitsu. It also aligns with the tactics of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has used combat sports such as judo and sambo to convey an aura of strength and stability on the global stage.

Former U.S. President Donald Trump, too, leveraged the UFC and its roster of macho fighters to set himself apart from his political adversaries.

The UAE, being a patriarchal society with nearly 50 per cent of its population falling within the 15 to 35 age group, has a significant demographic of young, impressionable men who can be influenced and moulded through combat sports and other officially endorsed activities.

Jiu-jitsu is an ideal platform for the UAE’s form of sports socialisation. The sport caters to a more traditional view of masculinity——one where men aim to gain physical dominance through chokes and submissions. It is also predominantly practised by men in the UAE, despite strides made towards gender equality in the country.

The UAE’s commitment to combat sports is not only a reflection of the country’s national policy but also an integral part of its identity. Among these combat sports, jiu-jitsu stands out as a shining example. It has seamlessly integrated into Emirati society and is proudly recognised as the nation’s official sport, with approximately 200,000 Emiratis actively participating in the discipline.

Furthermore, jiu-jitsu has become the sport of choice for Emirati royalty, spanning multiple generations, and they have received training from some of the world’s most esteemed coaches.

An important aspect of the competition with Saudi Arabia

This strategic investment in combat sports can also be understood within the context of the UAE’s ongoing regional competition with Saudi Arabia. While Saudi Arabia has successfully hosted some of the most significant heavyweight boxing events in recent history, including the highly acclaimed bout between Tyson Fury and Oleksandr Usyk, Abu Dhabi has garnered a distinct reputation as a global epicenter for combat sports.

It has proudly served as the exclusive home for the UFC in the Arab world for many years, has pioneered the launch of numerous local fight organisations, and remains a prominent hub for global jiu-jitsu competitions. In this sense, the UAE’s dedication to combat sports not only aligns with its national interests but also positions it as a formidable player in the ever-evolving landscape of combat sports on the global stage.

The UAE’s strategic utilisation of combat sports from jiu-jitsu to mixed martial arts underscores its multifaceted approach to diplomacy and soft power.

Beyond mere sport, jiu-jitsu has become a symbol of Emirati identity, with its integration into society and its recognition as the official national sport. This commitment, coupled with its appeal to Emirati royals, underscores the depth of the UAE’s investment in this discipline and exemplifies how a nation can skillfully wield the power of sports to shape its image, expand its influence, and craft its identity on the world stage.

First published in Play the Game in November 2023.

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As President Joe Biden prepares to fight for reelection this November across a contentious battleground of U.S. states, the White House also finds itself vying for influence among several increasingly critical players on the world stage, among them a long-standing partner in the midst of groundbreaking changes in its policies at home and abroad.

At just 38 years old, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia is one of the world’s youngest de facto heads of state and is the driving force behind a nationalist agenda that is taking hold in the kingdom. His father, 88-year-old King Salman, has led since 2015 but has increasingly handed over control to his seventh son since naming him next to rule in 2017 and prime minister in 2022, particularly amid growing concerns over the monarch’s health.

The transformation overseen by Crown Prince Mohammed, often referred to simply as MbS, has led to substantial shifts in the kingdom’s domestic outlook, which has embraced a more globalized character and a transition away from oil dependence, among other initiatives in line with the youngest-ever heir to the throne’s ambitious Vision 2030 plan. It’s also prompted a recalibration of foreign relations and the pursuit of more robust ties with other leading powers, including top U.S. rivals China and Russia.

Though officials in Riyadh and Washington continue to emphasize the importance of their partnership, recent rifts and painstaking negotiations currently taking place over the future of their cooperation have raised serious questions regarding the fate of one of the U.S.’ most strategic footholds in the Middle East.

A Newsweek graphic depicts U.S. President Joe Biden and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman alongside an image of the Saudi national flag and the skyline of Riyadh. A Newsweek graphic depicts U.S. President Joe Biden and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman alongside an image of the Saudi national flag and the skyline of Riyadh. Photo-illustration by Newsweek/Getty

Ali al-Shihabi, a Saudi political expert who founded the Arabia Foundation think tank and now serves on the advisory board of NEOM, one of several futuristic “megaprojects” outlined in Vision 2030, identified two primary factors behind the kingdom’s balancing act on international relations.

“One is the increasing importance of China as the single largest importer of Saudi oil and a partner that is willing to supply Saudi with arms and technology with no conditions attached,” Shihabi told Newsweek. “The second is the perceived unreliability of the relationship with the U.S. that can fluctuate dramatically depending on political currents in D.C., so Saudi feels it has to spread its chips.”

Kingmakers of the Middle East

The relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia dates back to the earliest years of the kingdom, whose founder and namesake, King Abdulaziz ibn Saud, led a three-decade series of conquests to unite much of the Arabian Peninsula by 1932. These ties expanded into a strategic partnership during World War II and further developed throughout the Cold War, with Riyadh serving as a key bulwark against Soviet influence in the region, even amid some major disputes such as the 1973 oil embargo over U.S. support for Israel in the Yom Kippur War.

Not even Saudi Arabia’s murky ties to the 9/11 attacks—in which 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi nationals—would prove a lasting setback as the relationship only further solidified throughout the 21st century war on terror. Saudi Arabia would also go on to become a central player in the U.S. effort to counter Iranian influence across the Middle East and is still viewed as a crucial partner in this endeavor.

But while the U.S. has long benefited from Saudi Arabia’s special influence as the world’s leading crude oil exporter and custodian of Islam’s holiest sites, and as the kingdom has enjoyed the Pentagon’s protection amid regional turbulence, interests have begun to diverge in recent years. The schism has grown particularly noticeable under the Biden administration.

U.S. President Joe Biden and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the Jeddah Security and Development Summit on July 16, 2022, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Recent rifts and negotiations have raised questions over the… U.S. President Joe Biden and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the Jeddah Security and Development Summit on July 16, 2022, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Recent rifts and negotiations have raised questions over the fate of one of the U.S.’ most strategic footholds in the Middle East. More MANDEL NGAN/POOL/AFP/Getty

Unlike Trump, under whom intimate ties with the rising crown prince were fostered, Biden has taken a harder line with Saudi Arabia and its star royal. On the campaign trail, the former vice president called Saudi Arabia a “pariah” over the killing of dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi, which U.S. intelligence linked directly to the crown prince, and he announced an end to offensive weapons sales over concerns of civilian casualties in the kingdom’s intervention in the Yemeni civil war as one of his earliest major Middle East foreign policy moves upon taking office in 2021.

The president’s July 2022 visit to Saudi Arabia appeared to do little to mend frayed ties. Riyadh went on to openly defy U.S. calls to ramp up oil production in concert with fellow members of the expanded Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC+) amid the soaring energy costs fueled by sanctions over Russia’s war in Ukraine.

In sharp contrast to Biden’s cold reception, Chinese President Xi Jinping received a warm welcome later that same year as he oversaw the first-ever China-Arab States Summit. Months later, Riyadh reestablished diplomatic ties with Tehran in a Beijing-brokered agreement, and both proceeded to integrate themselves into two multilateral blocs in which China and Russia hold considerable influence, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS.

Today, Biden is again looking to Riyadh for support amid the ongoing war in the Gaza Strip. The White House seeks to secure a so-called megadeal that would involve U.S. security guarantees, along with nuclear and technology-sharing initiatives against the backdrop of lingering worries over Iran’s nuclear program, Israeli-Saudi diplomatic normalization as an effective extension of the Trump-era Abraham Accords and, perhaps most challenging of all, a pathway toward Palestinian statehood.

Friends of murdered Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi at an event on October 2, 2020, in front of Saudi Arabia’s Istanbul Consulate, marking the second-year anniversary of his assassination. The same year, Biden called Saudi Arabia… Friends of murdered Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi at an event on October 2, 2020, in front of Saudi Arabia’s Istanbul Consulate, marking the second-year anniversary of his assassination. The same year, Biden called Saudi Arabia a “pariah” over Khashoggi’s killing, which U.S. intelligence linked directly to the crown prince. More Ozan KOSE/AFP/Getty

And yet the Biden administration has found Saudi Arabia to be driving a hard bargain as it utilizes its growing geopolitical clout to best serve Riyadh’s interests in dealing with both major and fellow emerging powers.

A Brave New Multipolar World

Riyadh is in a unique position to pursue this path given its already influential status as a leading member of OPEC+, the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) as well as one of the fastest-growing economies of the G20. But it’s not alone in going down this road.

Nations adopting similar courses include Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey, all of whom have sought to expand and diversify their international portfolios both East and West. Together, they form what experts at the German Marshall Fund (GMF) think tank have referred to as “global swing states.”

“As for many middle powers/swing states in the Global South, for Saudi Arabia, multi-alignment is the logical response to a more volatile, complex, multipolar world order,” Kristina Kausch, deputy managing director of GMF South who authored the report on Saudi Arabia’s position among these rising powers, told Newsweek. “Not marriage but a fluid set of relationships is the way Riyadh sees it can hedge against international instability and leverage its strengths and assets to greatest advantage.”

She argued that this strategy is especially essential for Saudi Arabia, “as the adaptation and sustainability of its geo-economic business model depends on good relations with the United States, China and Russia alike.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, greets Saudi Arabia’s King Salman at the Grand Kremlin Palace on October 5, 2017, in Moscow, Russia. As it stands, robust ties with Moscow are key for Riyadh to managing… Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, greets Saudi Arabia’s King Salman at the Grand Kremlin Palace on October 5, 2017, in Moscow, Russia. As it stands, robust ties with Moscow are key for Riyadh to managing global energy production and pricing through OPEC+. More Mikhail Svetlov/Getty

As it stands, Washington remains Riyadh’s top security partner, but Beijing has emerged as its leading trade partner and energy client, and robust ties with Moscow are key to managing global energy production and pricing through OPEC+. Kausch said that “this results in a position of permanent ambiguity, which naturally leads to friction with the U.S. government, which would like to see Riyadh positioned more firmly in its own geopolitical camp.”

While she noted that a breakthrough in the ongoing negotiations leading to U.S. security guarantees could provide valuable benefits for both sides, she also argued that an “adjustment of the traditional U.S. approach is needed in the sense that Washington will have to understand that Riyadh’s approach to the alliance is more transactional, and it will not align with U.S. preferences by default.”

“The U.S.’ narrowing approach to the Middle East in the past few years, seeing the region primarily through a lens of competition with China and Russia while countering Iran,” she added, “has not been conducive to this understanding.”

Bernard Haykel, professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, also observed the strategic adjustment in Riyadh’s standpoint.

“Saudi Arabia is aware that the world is no longer unipolar with just the United States dominating everything, and that it’s moving towards a multipolar world with other powers rising like China and India,” Haykel told Newsweek, “and that it has to maintain a relationship with as many of these countries, especially these rising powers, who are its major customers for oil and petrochemicals.”

A worker adjusts a valve at an oil refinery on March 2003 in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The nation has an influential status as a leading member of the OPEC+ group of oil-producing countries. A worker adjusts a valve at an oil refinery on March 2003 in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The nation has an influential status as a leading member of the OPEC+ group of oil-producing countries. Reza/Getty

Saudi Arabia First

Haykel maintains direct contacts with Crown Prince Mohammed and spoke to how the future monarch has reshaped the kingdom’s direction. He described the approach as a “Saudi First” policy, evoking the century-old “America First” doctrine more recently reinvigorated by Trump.

“The big difference is that Saudi Arabia is operating much more with nationalism in mind, rather than any other ideology,” Haykel said. “It’s putting its own self-interest before regional interests or, say, pan-Arab, pan-Islamic interests, which used to be important factors earlier, as well as American interests.”

“Given that it’s placing its own interests first and it’s desperately trying to transform itself and diversify its economy and become less dependent on oil revenues,” he added, “it is opting for policies that mean, for example, it has to keep excellent relations with China and America simultaneously.”

He argued that this policy of “Saudi-first is not intended to threaten the United States with a switch to China.” But, given the recent tensions in ties between Riyadh and Washington, he said it demonstrates the ability “to look at other options, to diversify relationships as much as possible.”

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, right, shakes hands with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud at a meeting of Arab and Muslim-majority nations on November 20, 2023, in Beijing. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, right, shakes hands with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud at a meeting of Arab and Muslim-majority nations on November 20, 2023, in Beijing. PEDRO PARDO/AFP/Getty Images

Haykel noted that the decision to clamp down on Islamist political activists and movements actually began under former King Abdullah, who led from 2005 to 2015, and “MbS basically put an end to these Islamists and instead has focused on a more traditional understanding of Islam that has to do with piety and belief and, when it comes to politics, more to do with nationalism as opposed to Islamism.”

The change has paved the way for more social reforms, including the lifting of a long-standing ban on women driving, easing the male guardianship system and establishing new entertainment centers. It’s also opened the door for attracting more foreign investment and campaigns to promote tourism, bringing high-profile concerts and sporting events, even the kingdom’s first women’s swimsuit fashion show and reports of a debut liquor store.

Both Haykel and Shihabi noted that there were risks to this endeavor, given the kingdom’s traditional ties to ultraconservative strains of Islam, which Shihabi pointed out “constitute a much smaller element of society than previously imagined.” These ideologies, most notably the state-backed school of Wahhabism, have long served as a cornerstone of the House of Saud’s legitimacy, but the most fundamentalist and sometimes violent interpretations of Islam have been decisively suppressed as the march toward Vision 2030 presses on.

What these reforms do not entail, however, are core compromises on broader concerns frequently raised by U.S. officials when it comes to democracy, freedom of expression and other human rights issues in the absolute monarchy. Whether Washington would accept this state of affairs moving forward is a matter of U.S. priorities, Haykel argued.

“I think it depends on what America wants from its relationship with Saudi Arabia,” Haykel said. “If it wants a responsible global producer of oil, a country that balances global oil markets through its production policies, then Saudi Arabia can do that quite well. But if it privileges human rights and values, then it’s going to be a tense relationship.”

Saudi women jog in the streets of historic al-Balad district on March 8, 2018, in Jeddah. A clampdown on Islamist movements has paved the way for social reforms including the lifting of a long-standing ban… Saudi women jog in the streets of historic al-Balad district on March 8, 2018, in Jeddah. A clampdown on Islamist movements has paved the way for social reforms including the lifting of a long-standing ban on women driving, as well as opening the door to foreign investment and campaigns to promote tourism, bringing concerts and even the kingdom’s first women’s swimsuit fashion show. More Amer HILABI/AFP/Getty

Reached for comment, Saudi Embassy to the U.S. spokesperson Fahad Nazer told Newsweek that “the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia enjoys excellent relations with the overwhelming majority of nations around the world” and “believes that it is uniquely positioned to bridge the differences between the global north and global south and east and west.”

“While Saudi Arabia has every reason to cultivate its newer relations with various countries, based on its economic interests in the context of Vision 2030,” Nazer added, “our relationship with the United States has not only endured for eight decades but it has also deepened and broadened to now include advanced technologies, supply chain resilience and space exploration.”

Today, he argued that “Saudi Vision 2030 is moving forward full steam ahead” and that “many of its objectives and goals have already been achieved and have been revised upwards.”

“We have empowered our youth, our women and our entrepreneurs. We have also revolutionized the delivery of government services,” Nazer said. “These measures have diversified the economy, generated thousands of jobs and improved the quality of life for Saudis and non-Saudis alike. All indicators suggest that there is very broad support among Saudis for Vision 2030 and its various programs.”

Newsweek has reached out to the U.S. State Department for comment.

General view of a square in Medina on October 26, 2023 in Medina, Saudi Arabia. The crown prince has “focused on a more traditional understanding of Islam that has to do with piety and belief,”… General view of a square in Medina on October 26, 2023 in Medina, Saudi Arabia. The crown prince has “focused on a more traditional understanding of Islam that has to do with piety and belief,” according to one expert. More Fadel Dawod/Getty

The Cost of Failure

Abdulaziz al-Khamis, a prominent Saudi journalist and researcher, offered a solution through which he felt the Biden administration could improve its troubled ties with Riyadh. This would be realized through “strengthening diplomatic dialogue, reducing public criticism and taking into account geopolitical differences and diverging interests” and “offering mutual concessions on economic and security issues.”

However, “if the United States fails to stabilize its relationship with the kingdom, many risks could ensue,” Khamis told Newsweek, including, “a weakening of American influence in the Middle East, strengthening the influence of competitors such as China and Russia, which seek to strengthen their relations with the kingdom” as well as a situation that “may negatively affect the stability of global energy markets.”

Even a successful effort by the Biden administration may not be enough to sway a deep-rooted Saudi shift toward embracing new foreign ties that may run contrary to U.S. interests.

Khamis noted that the benefits of forging stronger cooperation with other powers include “diversifying alliances, which strengthens the kingdom’s position on the international scene and reduces its dependence on one country, diversifying trade and investment partners, which strengthens the Saudi economy,” and “improving national security by establishing strong relations with several major powers, which contributes to achieving a regional balance of power.”

“I expect that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman will continue this path in building relations with other major powers when he assumes power in the future,” Khamis added, “given the strategic and economic benefits that these relations provide.”

The U.S. coming to terms with Saudi Arabia’s “swing state” status is key to stabilizing and building upon further relations, argued Mohammed Alhamed, a Saudi geopolitical analyst serving as president of the Saudi Elite consultancy.

“There is a real opportunity to achieve balance in Saudi-American relations—specifically with the Democratic Party and the Biden administration—by repairing what time has damaged from attempts to demonize relations with an important security ally of the United States,” Alhamed told Newsweek.

King Abdullah Financial District golden hour. King Abdullah Financial District golden hour. Ahmed Fahmi/iStock/Getty

Such attempts, Alhamed argued, “always fail due to a very simple reason, that the kingdom is in a huge stage of economic, cultural, artistic, scientific and political development and maturity in Saudi leadership towards the Arab world, the Middle East, and the Islamic world towards moderation.”

A breakthrough would be particularly crucial, according to Alhamed, at a time where Riyadh may have the capacity to effect real change during a period of substantial instability across the Middle East stemming from the war in Gaza.

“Saudi Arabia’s weight in economic and geopolitical spheres necessitates the U.S. to consider Saudi interests in negotiations,” Alhamed said. “Given Saudi’s strategic importance, the U.S. may need to balance its administration ideology agenda with the broader benefits of maintaining a strong relationship with Riyadh.”

“If the U.S. needs to keep its influence in the Middle East,” he added, “it should ensure collaboration on mutual interests such as regional stability, counterterrorism and security efforts and energy security.”

Update 05/28/2024, 11:34 a.m. ET: This article has been updated to include comments from a spokesperson for the Embassy of Saudi Arabia to the United States.