Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 2, 2025 – Institute for the Study of War
How did your country report this? Share your view in the comments.
Diverging Reports Breakdown
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 26, 2025
ISW has observed evidence of North Korean forces augmenting Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and North Korea supplying Russia with artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles. North Korea is likely receiving technical advice from Russia on satellite launches and missile guidance systems in return. US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met at the NATO summit on June 25 and discussed possible US sales of Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine and joint weapons production. ISW continues to assess that a strong Ukrainian military backed by Western guarantees remains the most vital component of a stable Western-backed Ukraine. The data cut-off for this product was 11:15am ET on June 26. IsW will cover subsequent reports in the June 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool. The map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. It will update this time-lapse map archive monthly with the latest Russian offensive campaign assessment.
Olivia Gibson, Christina Harward, Daria Novikov, Grace Mappes, Jessica Sobieski,
and Frederick W. Kagan
June 26, 2025, 5:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15am ET on June 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
South Korean intelligence suggests that North Korea may deploy North Korean troops to Ukrainian territory, which would represent a significant battlefield inflection. Reuters, citing a South Korean lawmaker privy to intelligence from South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS), reported on June 26 that North Korea may deploy an unspecified number of additional North Korean forces to Russia to fight against Ukraine as early as July or August 2025 and that North Korea continues to arm Russia with artillery ammunition and missiles.[1] The South Korean lawmaker told Reuters that the NIS assessed that Russia may be preparing to initiate a large-scale assault against Ukraine in July or August 2025 and that North Korea is likely receiving technical advice from Russia on satellite launches and missile guidance systems in return. ISW has observed evidence of North Korean forces augmenting Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and North Korea supplying Russia with artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles.[2] Ukrainian forces maintain a limited presence in Kursk Oblast, so North Korean personnel participating in combat operations would most likely be fighting in Ukrainian territory.[3] The North Korean and Russian military commands authorizing the deployment of North Korean forces to Ukrainian territory would mark a significant battlefield inflection that may improve Russian forces’ ability to sustain simultaneous offensive operations in multiple directions, which the Russian military has traditionally struggled to conduct.[4] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces compensated by conducting pulsing, more contained, offensive operations along different sectors of the frontline, but recent reporting indicates that Russian forces appear to be gradually advancing in at least three simultaneous large-scale offensive operations in the Borova-Lyman, Kostyantynivka, and Novopavlivka directions.[5] It is not possible to forecast the likely impact of North Korean support of this type without more information about the size and composition of the North Korean troop contingent that would be going to Ukraine, nor is it clear how rapidly new North Korean troops would become effective in operations alongside Russian troops in Ukraine.
US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met at the NATO summit on June 25 and discussed possible US sales of Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine and joint weapons production. Trump stated that he and Zelensky did not talk about a possible ceasefire in Ukraine during the meeting, but that Trump may talk to Russian President Vladimir Putin in the near future about a ceasefire.[6] Zelensky stated that he reiterated during the meeting that Ukraine supports the US position on a ceasefire.[7] Zelensky stated that he and Trump discussed the increase in the number of “massive” Russian strikes against Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure and people, and Trump stated that the United States “should consider” selling Patriot air defense systems and missiles to Ukraine as Ukraine’s supply is limited.[8] Trump and Zelensky agreed to continue talks about strengthening Ukraine’s air defense with European partners. Trump and Zelensky also discussed possible joint production of drones and electronic warfare (EW) equipment.[9] Zelensky stated in April 2025 that Ukraine proposed to the United States that Ukraine purchase “30 to 50 billion” (likely USD) worth of air defense and weapons systems from the United States and that Ukraine is prepared to purchase these systems itself — either through direct payment to the United States or through the fund established by the US-Ukrainian minerals deal.[10] Zelensky had stated that Ukraine will consider the provision of at least 10 air defense systems to Ukraine as a “security guarantee.” US Patriot air defense systems are vital to Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes and will become increasingly important as Russia is reportedly increasing its production and stockpile of ballistic missiles, which would enable larger and more frequent ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine.[11] ISW continues to assess that a strong Ukrainian military backed by Western security guarantees remains the most vital component of a stable post-war European security architecture, guaranteeing a sustainable peace in Ukraine and deterring future Russian aggression.[12]
Kremlin officials continue to platform bellicose rhetoric aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and to demonstrate Russia’s uncompromising position on Ukraine. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko claimed on June 25 at the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) conference that the West is adopting “hostile policies and military planning…that could explode from any spark.”[13] Glushko further claimed that new Western military aid packages “fuel” the war in Ukraine.[14] The Kremlin regularly promotes rhetoric that is designed to pressure the West into making decisions that benefit Russia, such as refraining from providing further assistance to Ukraine, in response to the fact that sustained Western aid has allowed Ukrainian forces to impose significant challenges on Russian forces in Ukraine and threatens Russia’s ability to achieve its war aims.[15]
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin reiterated on June 26 Russia’s long-standing demand that Ukraine commit to an official non-aligned status and claimed that NATO violated promises from the early 1990s to refrain from expanding eastward.[16] Russia has consistently demanded that Ukraine commit to a neutral, non-aligned status, which would require Ukraine to amend its constitution and NATO to fundamentally alter its open-door policy.[17] The Kremlin continues to signal its unyielding demands and disinterest in peace, further indicating that Russia will very likely continue to pursue efforts to prolong negotiations in an attempt to extract additional concessions and secure additional gains on the battlefield.[18] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin will continue to protract the negotiation process so long as Russian leadership maintains the position that Russian forces can outlast Ukraine’s defense capabilities and Western support for Ukraine.[19]
Satellite imagery of select armored vehicle repair plants in Russia indicates that Russia continues to rely on refurbishing its Soviet-era stores of armored vehicles. A social media source tracking equipment at Russian military depots and repair facilities via satellite imagery shared on June 26 an updated analysis of Russian Armor Repair Plants (BTRZs) that repair damaged armored vehicles and refurbish stored vehicles and stated that most armored fighting vehicle (AFVs) that Russia is taking from storage are no longer in good enough condition to immediately deploy to the front without refurbishment, as Russia was able to do at the start of the war.[20] The source estimated that the 81st BTRZ in Armavir, Krasnodar Krai, which repairs and modernizes stored BTR-70/80 armored personnel carriers (APCs) and likely also repairs damaged BTRs from the battlefield, has likely been refurbishing up to 200 BTR-70/80/82 APCs annually since 2023.[21] The source estimated that the 144th BTRZ in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast, which is the only BTRZ that refurbishes older BMD infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and also repairs BMP-2 and BMD-2 IFVs, has likely been annually refurbishing between 100 to 150 BMD-2 IFVs and BTR-D APCs since an unspecified year.[22]
The source estimated that the Arzamas Mechanical Plant in Arzamas, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, likely annually produces over 500 BTR-82 APCs but noted that satellite imagery showing a growing pile of hulls at the plant suggests that the plant is either increasing production rates or also does repairs of damaged BTRs.[23] The source noted that Arzamas’ production numbers are unclear but are likely high due to the high number of BTR-80/82s that Russian forces are losing in Ukraine and how quickly Russian forces are replenishing these vehicles.[24] The source also estimated that armored vehicle manufacturer Kurganmashzavod in Kurgan, Kurgan Oblast, likely annually produces 100 to 120 BMD-4M IFVs, roughly 360 BMP-3 IFVs, and 20 to 30 BTR-MDM APCs.[25]
Russia has maintained its offensive operations throughout the war by tapping into its Soviet-era stocks of armored vehicles to compensate for high loss rates, but this resource is finite and approaching a point of diminishing availability.[26] Russian forces have been increasingly using motorcycles and buggies in place of armored vehicles along the frontline in Ukraine due to high Russian vehicle losses in late 2023 and 2024.[27] The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated in February 2025 that Russian forces lost over 3,700 IFVs and APCs in 2024 alone.[28] It remains unclear whether Russia’s reliance on motorcycles and buggies will be sufficient to offset these losses in the medium- to long-term.
Ukraine and Russia conducted the seventh prisoner of war (POW) exchange, in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements. Ukrainian officials and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Ukraine and Russia exchanged an unspecified number of severely wounded and sick POWs as well as those under 25 years old on June 26.[29] Ukrainian officials reported that Russia captured a majority of the released Ukrainian POWs in 2022.
Key Takeaways:
South Korean intelligence suggests that North Korea may deploy North Korean troops to Ukrainian territory, which would represent a significant battlefield inflection.
US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met at the NATO summit on June 25 and discussed possible US sales of Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine and joint weapons production.
Kremlin officials continue to platform bellicose rhetoric aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and to demonstrate Russia’s uncompromising position on Ukraine.
Satellite imagery of select armored vehicle repair plants in Russia indicates that Russia continues to rely on refurbishing its Soviet-era stores of armored vehicles.
Ukraine and Russia conducted the seventh prisoner of war (POW) exchange, in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements.
Ukrainian forces advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on June 26.
Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 25 and 26.[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[31]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)
Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 26 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Andriivka (north of Sumy City) and advanced southeast of Oleksiivka (northeast of Sumy City).[32]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced near Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[33]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka and Yunakivka.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and Novomykolaivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, Yablunivka, and Sadky.[35]
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on June 26 that Ukrainian forces have repelled the Russian summer offensive in the Sumy Oblast border area and stabilized the frontline “as of this week.”[36] Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian offensive operations in Glushkovsky Raion, Kursk Oblast forced the Russian military command to divert forces that would otherwise take part in the Sumy Oblast offensive and that Ukrainian forces have pinned about 50,000 Russian military personnel total in the Kursk and North Slobozhansk (northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts) directions. ISW has observed geolocated evidence indicating that Ukrainian forces have regained territory north and northeast of Sumy City in recent weeks as the pace of Russian advances in the border area has slowed.[37]
Ukraine’s Siversk (Northern) Group of Forces Spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk stated on June 26 that Russian forces are most active in northern Sumy Oblast and have decreased their use of all-terrain vehicles (ATV)s in assaults and rely on infantry assaults.[38]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[39] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]), including its 382nd and elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade, and the 106th VDV Division are reportedly operating in northern Sumy Oblast.[40] Drone operators of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly conducting reconnaissance near Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[41]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 26 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Vovchanski Khutory (northeast of Kharkiv City).[42]
Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Zybyne on June 25 and 26.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces recently counterattacked in the Vovchansk and Lyptsi directions.[44]
A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction reported on June 26 that intense fighting continues in the Vovchansk direction and that Russian forces continue to conduct motorized assaults of three to five personnel on motorcycles.[45] The servicemember stated that Russian forces have recently begun operating “mother drones” – large drones that carry multiple smaller first-person-view (FPV) drones — to fly to positions in the Ukrainian rear and allow Russian forces to launch and conduct strikes with the smaller FPV drones out of range of Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Anvar” Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Sosnivka (north of Kharkiv City).[46]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 26 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted ground assaults north of Kupyansk near Holubivka, Mala Shapkivka, and Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on June 25 and 26.[47]
Ukrainian National Guard Spokesperson Colonel Ruslan Muzychuk stated on June 26 that Russian forces are attempting to expand a bridgehead on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River, especially near Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk), Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk), and “Kolisnyky” – likely meaning Kolisnykivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[48]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 26 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted ground operations northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya, Kopanky, and Zelenyi Hai; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Olhivka on June 25 and 26.[49]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 26 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked and seized western Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Hlushchenkove (north of Lyman) and reached the outskirts of the settlement, advanced south of Lypove (north of Lyman), and advanced north and southwest of Zelena Dolyna (north of Lyman).[51]
Russian forces conducted ground assaults north of Lyman near Novyi Myr and Ridkodub and toward Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman toward Torske on June 25 and 26.[52] A Russian source claimed on June 26 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zelena Dolyna and Kolodyazi.[53]
The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction reported on June 26 that Russian forces are using guided glide bombs and first-person view (FPV) drones to target Ukrainian logistics centers and drone pilots on the front lines as well as concentrations of personnel and recreation areas.[54]
A Russian milblogger claimed that commanders in the 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) continue to submit false reports exaggerating Russian successes in the area, a common complaint in this section of the front.[55]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating between Karpivka and Lypove (both north of Lyman).[56] Elements of the Russian 488th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 283rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both 144th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in Ridkodub.[57]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 26 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on June 25 and 26.[58]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 26 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Chasiv Yar.[59]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Chasiv Yar itself, north of Chasiv Yar toward Markove, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Bila Hora on June 25 and 26.[60]
Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Stupochky, and elements of the 98th VDV Division’s 217th and 331st VDV regiments are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[61]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 25 and 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Toretsk and northwest of Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk), respectively.[62]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[63]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and toward Oleksandro-Shultyne; and northwest of Toretsk near Nelipivka and toward Oleksandro-Kalynove, Yablunivka, Rusyn Yar, and Poltavka on June 25 and 26.[64]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 26 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 25 that Russian forces advanced east of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[65]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka, Myrne, and Shevchenko Pershe; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove and Udachne on June 25 and 26.[66]
The commander of a Ukrainian tank battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on June 26 that Russian forces continue assaults with small fireteams of one to two soldiers and sometimes operate on motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and buggies.[67] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are constantly attacking in the Pokrovsk direction and have adapted tactics to leverage increased cover from foliage.[68] An officer of a Ukrainian unmanned systems detachment operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces only field heavy equipment when attempting to advance in a specific area.[69]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 15th and 30th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Udachne.[70] Drone operators of the “Typhoon” detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[71] Elements of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[72]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Peredubova (south of Novopavlivka).[73]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Perebudova, north of Novoserhiivka, northeast of Novomykolaivka (both northeast of Novopavlivka), southwest of Horikhove, north of Yalta (both southeast of Novopavlivka, and southwest of Fedorivka (south of Novopavlivka).[74]
Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Novomykolaivka, and Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka, Novoukrainka, Horikhove, Bahatyr, and Odradne; south of Novopavlivka near Zirka, Yalta, Zaporizhzhia, Fedorivka, Perebudova, Myrne, and Piddubne and on June 25 and 26.[75]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 26 that Russian forces seized Novoserhiivka.[76] ISW assesses that Russian forces seized Novoserhiivka as of June 24.[77]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade are reportedly operating near Zirka.[78] Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) and 30th Separate Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Myrne.[79]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 26 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Shevchenko and northwest of Vilne Pole (both northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[80]
Russian forces continued ground assaults northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole and toward Voskresenka and Maliivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on June 25 and 26.[81]
The Russian MoD claimed on June 26 that Russian forces seized Shevchenko, which ISW assessed that Russian forces seized as of June 21.[82] Russian sources credited elements of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) with participating in the seizure of Shevchenko.[83] One Russian milblogger claimed on June 26 that Russian forces advanced within Shevchenko but have not yet seized the settlement.[84]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the “Gnom” (Gnome) squad of the Russian 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[85]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued limited assaults east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 26 but did not make any confirmed advances.[86]
Unconfirmed claims: Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on June 26 that Russian forces are advancing to central Malynivka.[87]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast southwest of Orikhiv toward Novoandriivka on June 26 but did not advance.[88]
A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported that Russian forces are conducting assaults during the day and night and that Russian commanders are ordering Russian forces to temporarily seize positions on the outskirts of settlements for footage of the soldiers planting flags rather than secure footholds and enduring positions.[89]
Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction on June 26 but did not advance.[90]
Ukrainian National Guard Spokesperson Colonel Ruslan Muzychuk reported on June 26 that Russian forces remain focused on conducting reconnaissance and controlling the Dnipro River Delta islands.[91]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 25 to 26. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 41 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[92] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down eight drones and that 16 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck Donetsk and Kharkiv oblasts.[93]
Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that Russian forces are first conducting strikes with swarms of Shahed drones before striking the area with ballistic missiles.[94]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/north-korea-may-send-more-troops-russia-july-or-august-ukraine-war-seoul-says-2025-06-26/ ; https://archive.ph/xSGXi
[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-16-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2025
[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325
[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825
[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062225
[6] https://suspilne dot media/1051589-zelenskij-rozpoviv-pro-detali-zustric-iz-trampom-pid-cas-samitu-nato/
[7] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/u-gaazi-volodimir-zelenskij-proviv-zustrich-iz-donaldom-tram-98653
[8] https://suspilne dot media/1051589-zelenskij-rozpoviv-pro-detali-zustric-iz-trampom-pid-cas-samitu-nato/
[9] https://suspilne dot media/1051589-zelenskij-rozpoviv-pro-detali-zustric-iz-trampom-pid-cas-samitu-nato/; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/u-gaazi-volodimir-zelenskij-proviv-zustrich-iz-donaldom-tram-98653
[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041025
[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025
[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031125
[13] https://ria dot ru/20250625/grushko-2025448197.html
[14] https://tass dot ru/politika/24356843
[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725
[16] https://iz dot ru/1910775/2025-06-26/v-mid-rf-nastaivaiut-na-iuridicheskoi-fiksatcii-vneblokovogo-statusa-ukrainy
[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125
[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052825
[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625
[20] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969796319961593; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969805581291862; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969809418772703
[21] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969835851309261; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969843124486214; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969846274179173;
[22] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969923776520358; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969863068156088
[23] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969857162568159; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969859943674130
[24] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969854948250011
[25] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937969983537000573; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1937970003619295446
[26] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage
[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061625
[28] https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2025/02/combat-losses-and-manpower-challenges-underscore-the-importance-of-mass-in-ukraine/
[29] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/prezydent-povidomyv-pro-novyj-obmin-bilshist-zvilnenyh-zahysnykiv-buly-u-poloni-z-2022-roku/ ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14871 ; https://t.me/Koord_shtab/13388 ; https://suspilne dot media/1048199-obmin-polonenimi-miz-ukrainou-ta-rf-vidbuvsa-novij-etap/ ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54179 ; https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/videos/702717725720789/?rdid=Ao1eRFbsDxHIQbFz#
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895
[31] https://t.me/dva_majors/74172; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37766; https://t.me/wargonzo/27506; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30458
[32] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9468; https://t.me/wild_hornets/3146; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30448; https://t.me/wargonzo/27506
[33] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37754; https://t.me/dva_majors/74172
[34] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37754
[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30448; https://t.me/dva_majors/74172
[36] https://t.me/osirskiy/1196 ; https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/posts/pfbid02YGoRCNXm2i2zWddYosSei5NGN7VHR5VCGu77gaMTzZKPB8ZzziyiJ7mcyBan1ajQl ; https://t.me/istories_media/9858; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-has-failed-break-ukraine
[37] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925
[38] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1052173-armia-rf-namagaetsa-prorvatisa-u-bik-sum-otuv-siversk/
[39] https://t.me/dva_majors/74195
[40] https://t.me/ua_dshv/6167 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1938184588737515919 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1938186659939455225; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94532; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30455
[41] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170337
[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30468
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/na-kytajskyh-motoczyklah-u-suprovodi-droniv-matok-taktyka-rosiyan-na-vovchanskomu-napryamku/
[44] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30468
[45] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/na-kytajskyh-motoczyklah-u-suprovodi-droniv-matok-taktyka-rosiyan-na-vovchanskomu-napryamku/
[46] https://t.me/epoddubny/23911
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895
[48] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/26/mriye-forsuvaty-oskil-ta-bigaye-lisamy-protyvnyk-demonstruye-vidnosnu-stabilnist/
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/27786
[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30476; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37767
[51] https://t.me/yurasumy/23719; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37758; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30476; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37756
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37758
[53] https://t.me/tass_agency/322543
[54] https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/06/26/pihotynecz-aktyvuye-tamaru-myhajlivnu-poblyzu-lymanu-rosijski-komandyry-bezzhalni-do-svoyih-soldativ/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qbwH1G_vZM0
[55] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-4-2025; https://t.me/yurasumy/23718
[56] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37756;
[57] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37767
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895
[59] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94538
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895; https://t.me/wargonzo/27506; https://t.me/dva_majors/74172
[61] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30455
[62] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1938096190987366812; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1938098278807310442; https://t.me/ASPIDGroup/172; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9469; https://t.me/b4_101/144
[63] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94538; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65445
[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65445; https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/06/26/dronova-poshta-praczyuye-na-toreczkomu-napryamku-vorog-bye-po-logistychnym-marshrutam/
[65] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37721; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37772
[66] https://t.me/dva_majors/74172 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23723; https://t.me/yurasumy/23724 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37772 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30463 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65444 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895 ;
[67] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1051737-maskuvanna-ratue-zitta-armia-rf-zastosovue-taktiku-malih-grup-i-fpv-droni-na-pokrovskomu-napramku-32-ombr/
[68] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/vyglyadalo-smishno-zaraz-vzhe-ne-do-smihu-poblyzu-pokrovska-postijnyj-ruh-rosijskyh-shturmovykiv/
[69] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/drony-gnuchkoyi-zbirky-yak-rozvidnyky-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-adaptuyut-bezpilotnyky/
[70] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37772
[71] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37735
[72] https://t.me/dva_majors/74180
[73] https://t.me/osintpen/1302; https://t.me/baykalkaspiy/296
[74] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37721; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37772; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30446; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65438
[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/6543; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37721; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1052009-jdut-aktivni-boi-situacia-v-novosergiivci-ta-sevcenku-dani-osuv-hortica/
[76] https://t.me/tass_agency/322569;https://t.me/mod_russia/54171 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54169
[77] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2025
[78] https://t.me/voin_dv/15687
[79] https://t.me/voin_dv/15688
[80] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65448; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65446; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37745
[81] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65448; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/258
[82] https://t.me/mod_russia/54174 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54170; https://t.me/tass_agency/322586 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54172; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2025
[83] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94552; https://t.me/voin_dv/15677; https://t.me/mod_russia/54174 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54170; https://t.me/tass_agency/322586 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54172; https://t.me/voin_dv/15681; https://t.me/voin_dv/15685
[84] https://t.me/wargonzo/27506
[85] https://t.me/voin_dv/15679
[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895 ;
[87] https://t.me/vrogov/20861
[88] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895
[89] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/rozkryty-prapor-pid-dron-na-zaporizhzhi-vorozhyh-shturmovykiv-vidpravlyayut-vmyraty-dlya-propagandy/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-mwW_smfVas
[90] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25915 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25898 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25895
[91] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/mriye-forsuvaty-oskil-ta-bigaye-lisamy-protyvnyk-demonstruye-vidnosnu-stabilnist/
[92] https://t.me/kpszsu/37063;
[93] https://www.facebook.com/don.gp.gov.ua/posts/pfbid02kfBeR3u4AXtVD3932VytReEHaooCPrCFeQLfEr6PnNGAkhQavbo4aSsgc9qLoUENl; https://suspilne dot media/1051705-u-pare-pidpisali-stvorenna-spectribunalu-za-zlocini-rf-britania-nadast-ukraini-350-raket-dla-ppo-1219-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1750916242&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/synegubov/15280
[94] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9453; https://t.me/channel24_ua/178059
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 2, 2025
Russian gains along the frontline have slowed over the last four months, but Russia continues to tolerate personnel losses comparable to the casualty rate Russian forces sustained during a period of intensified advances between September and December 2024. Russian gains have been 45 percent slower between January and April 2025 than in the period between September to December 2024, although Russian casualty rates have only decreased by 10 percent in that interval. Russian forces are currently sustaining a higher casualty rate per square kilometer gained than in Fall 2024. The Russian military command is prioritizing poorly trained recruits into highly attritional assaults to offset personnel losses in Ukraine. Russia does not have a reserve pool of well-trained troops who are not currently engaged in combat and can rapidly deploy to the frontline. Russia is generating enough forces to sustain these forces without having to deprioritize any frontline area. Russia’s decision to funnel poorly trained troops into the frontline in Ukraine is undermining Russia’s ability to create a pool of such forces to offset the current tempo of operations, possibly at the expense of Russia’s long-term war-fighting capabilities.
Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey, and Frederick W. Kagan with William Runkel
May 2, 2025, 9:45pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00 pm ET on May 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian gains along the frontline have slowed over the last four months, but Russia continues to tolerate personnel losses comparable to the casualty rate Russian forces sustained during a period of intensified advances between September and December 2024. ISW assesses that Russian forces gained a total of 1,627 square kilometers in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast in January, February, March, and April 2025, and daily Russian casualty reports from the Ukrainian General Staff indicate that Russian forces suffered 160,600 casualties during the last four months for an average of 99 casualties for every square kilometer taken over the last four months. ISW assesses that Russian forces seized an estimated 496 square kilometers in January 2025; an estimated 313 square kilometers in February 2025; an estimated 601 square kilometers in March 2025; and an estimated 217 square kilometers in April 2025. Ukrainian General Staff reports indicate that Russian forces lost an estimated 48,060 casualties in January 2025, 35,300 casualties in February 2025, 40,670 casualties in March 2025, and 36,570 casualties in April 2025.[1] Russian advances significantly increased in March 2025 due to the elimination of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, coinciding with the temporary cessation of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine, although Russian advances on average decreased between January, February, and April 2025. Russian gains have also slowed as Russian forces come up against more well-defended Ukrainian positions in and around larger towns such as Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk over the last four months.
Russian forces are currently sustaining a higher casualty rate per square kilometer gained than in Fall 2024. Russian forces gained an estimated 2,949 square kilometers at the cost of 174,935 casualties between September and December 2024 — an average of 59 casualties per square kilometer taken.[2] Russian casualty rates consistently increased throughout September, October, November, and December 2024 and peaked at an estimated 49,135 total monthly casualties in December 2024.[3] Monthly Russian rates of advance plateaued at 839 square kilometers in November 2024, however, and began to slow in December 2024 to an assessed 593 square kilometers and have continued to slow in 2025 (with the exception of the elimination of the Kursk salient). Russian gains have been 45 percent slower between January and April 2025 than in the period between September and December 2024, although Russian casualty rates have only decreased by 10 percent in that interval. The Russian military command thus appears to be tolerating similar personnel loss rates despite a significant decrease in the rate of territorial gains.
Russia has thus far sustained these casualties and the current tempo of offensive operations by rapidly deploying low quality troops to frontline units, although the reliance on such troops is also hindering Russia’s ability to conduct complex operations and make rapid advances in Ukraine. ISW has not observed a notable decrease in the tempo of Russian offensive operations along the frontline in recent months, despite the slowing rates of advance, suggesting that Russia is generating enough forces to sustain these casualties without having to deprioritize any frontline area. ISW has repeatedly observed reports that new Russian recruits only receive a month of training before deploying to Ukraine, and this limited training is likely constraining recruits’ combat capabilities and the Russian military’s overall capacity to successfully conduct complex operations.[4] The Russian military command is currently prioritizing funneling poorly trained recruits into highly attritional infantry assaults to offset personnel losses in Ukraine while sustaining the current tempo of operations, possibly at the expense of Russia’s long-term warfighting capabilities.[5] The Russian military does not have a reserve pool of well-trained troops who are not currently engaged in combat in Ukraine and can rapidly deploy along the frontline, and the Russian military command’s decision to funnel poorly trained troops to the frontline in Ukraine is undermining Russia’s ability to create a pool of such forces.[6]
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s commitment to maintaining the tempo of offensive operations despite diminishing returns underscores Putin’s ongoing efforts to leverage further battlefield gains to generate pressure on Ukraine in ceasefire and peace negotiations or otherwise to force Ukraine’s collapse. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to prolong negotiations to extract additional concessions from the United States and Ukraine and make additional battlefield gains.[7] Russian forces intensified offensive operations throughout the frontline in February and March 2025, including a limited offensive operation into northern Sumy Oblast, as part of an ongoing Russian effort to slowly degrade frontline Ukrainian positions and make opportunistic tactical advances. Putin may intend to leverage any gains over the last four months and in the near future to extract further Ukrainian and Western concessions during future peace negotiations. It remains unclear if Russia will maintain sufficient force generation rates to sustain offensive operations in Ukraine indefinitely, however, due to the rising economic cost of social benefits and one-time payments for Russian servicemembers.[8] ISW previously noted that Russia’s ongoing and forecasted economic struggles are closely tied to Russian losses on the battlefield and that it is not possible for the United States or the wider West to exert maximum pressure on Russia with economic tools alone.[9] The United States can better leverage Russian vulnerabilities and achieve a stronger negotiating position and more durable resolution to the war in Ukraine by forcing Putin to rethink his negotiation and battlefield strategies and empowering Ukrainian forces to continue inflicting significant manpower and materiel losses on Russia.
Western intelligence reportedly suggests that Putin may begin prioritizing short-term goals such as consolidating Russia’s gains in Ukraine and Russia’s immediate economic viability over seizing more territory, but Putin’s demonstrated commitment to maintaining the tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine despite continuing high casualty rates is a counter-indicator to this reported assessment. CNN reported on May 1 that new intelligence reviewed by US and Western officials suggests that Putin may be pivoting his immediate focus to shorter-term objectives of cementing Russian control over occupied Ukrainian territory and boosting Russia’s economy.[10] CNN reported that Putin may be concerned by the Trump administration’s threats to apply more sanctions on the struggling Russian economy. An unnamed official told CNN that Putin’s willingness to settle for more limited objectives in Ukraine depends on whether Putin can portray Russia’s gains in Ukraine as an acceptable victory domestically. The source insinuated that Putin likely remains committed to revisiting his longer-term goals of subjugating all of Ukraine and undermining NATO after taking a “significant pause,” however.
ISW has observed a variety of indicators suggesting that Putin is not reconsidering his short-term objectives in Ukraine, however. Russian forces have increased the intensity of offensive operations throughout the theater, particularly redoubling efforts to advance deeper in the Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka directions and launching a limited offensive operation in Sumy Oblast.[11] Russian forces are rapidly integrating tactical innovations to optimize timely gains in response to Ukrainian drone operators, including integrating motorcycles into offensive operations in Ukraine.[12] The Kremlin is also leveraging legal, financial, and socioeconomic measures to increase Russia’s force generation capabilities and boost Russia’s drone production capabilities to support the war in Ukraine.[13]
A future slowing of Russian offensive operations and/or transition to defensive operations in all or part of the theater would be indicators that Putin is shifting his short-term goals from seizing more territory to consolidating previously held territory. Putin could choose to pivot toward shorter-term objectives on account of mounting economic and manpower constraints that are increasingly hindering Russia’s ability to perpetuate its war in Ukraine.[14] Russian forces could slow the tempo of offensive operations and work to implement policies and tactics to mitigate casualties if Putin issues an order to prioritize consolidating Russia’s hold over occupied Ukraine instead of making further gains. Russian forces would likely shift to defensive operations with the aim of fortifying and consolidating current positions on the frontline, largely in an effort to safeguard battlefield gains and preserve increasingly limited manpower and materiel reserves, in response to such an order. Russian forces could begin constructing fortifications near frontline positions in response to such an order. ISW would observe such indicators and will continue to monitor Russian and Ukrainian reporting for these indicators.
ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains committed to his long-term military objectives of seizing all of Ukraine and undermining NATO. Senior US officials reportedly remain skeptical that Putin has eased his intransigence regarding a peace agreement and told CNN that Russia may resume the war and try to seize more Ukrainian territory even after agreeing to a US peace proposal.[15] CNN reported that unspecified officials maintain the belief that Russia will retain its aims of seizing the maximal amount of Ukrainian territory even if Putin signs a peace agreement. Ongoing Russian efforts to seize Lyman and Pokrovsk and advance north of Toretsk toward the southernmost point of Ukraine’s fortress belt in Kostyantynivka indicate that Putin maintains his long-standing goals of seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast.[16] The Russian government’s efforts to expand Russia’s force generation capabilities in the short- and long-term and Russia’s ongoing military restructuring efforts suggest that Russia is not only responding to a drawn-out conflict in Ukraine but also preparing for a future conflict on Russia’s western borders.[17] The Russian government also continues to prioritize long-term investment in Russia’s domestic industrial base (DIB), despite the significant economic cost of this wartime economy to Russia’s population.[18] These factors indicate that Putin is not abandoning his territorial ambitions in Ukraine but is in fact preparing for a long war of attrition against Ukraine and likely the collective West.
Russian officials are also continuing to condition Russian society to support a long-term war effort in Ukraine and against NATO. Russian officials, including Putin, have consistently leveraged false claims about the war in Ukraine to make maximalist territorial demands, including that Ukraine give up “Novorossiya” — an invented region of Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed includes all of southern and eastern Ukraine and is an “integral” part of Russia that Ukraine must concede for Russia to end the war.[19] Putin invoked the term “Novorossiya” as recently as April 21, indicating that the Kremlin has not abandoned this territorial objective.[20] Russian state media previously cautioned Russian domestic audiences in March 2025 against expecting “big agreements” from recent peace negotiations between Putin and US President Donald Trump.[21] A Verstka poll of 100 Russian military personnel published on April 29 indicates that only 18% of career Russian military personnel and officers, most of whom have been fighting in Ukraine for over two years, would support a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine prior to achieving Putin’s stated goals (likely referring to the demilitarization and “denazification” of Ukraine).[22] Only about a fifth of surveyed Russian military personnel and civilians indicated that they believe the war will end in the coming months. Verstka’s polling indicates that the Kremlin is not preparing the Russian information space for a peace agreement in the near future and that Russian forces and society do not anticipate an imminent end to the war. This pattern of Kremlin informational activity and the resonance it has achieved in Russian society will make it much harder for Putin to present any long-term ceasefire, let alone peace agreement, that falls far short of his stated aims as any kind of victory to his domestic audience.
Statements by US officials suggest that the Trump administration is considering stepping back from intensified mediation efforts to end the war in Ukraine. US Vice President JD Vance told Fox News on May 1 that the war in Ukraine will not end “any time soon” and that it is “up to the Russians and Ukrainians now that each side knows what the other’s terms are for peace.”[23] US Secretary of State and Acting National Security Advisor Marco Rubio told Fox News on May 1 that US President Donald Trump will need to prioritize other issues if Ukrainian and Russian negotiating positions remain too far apart for reconciliation but that the United States will continue “helping” wherever possible.[24] US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce echoed Rubio’s statements during a press briefing on May 1 and noted that the matter of resolving the conflict in Ukraine is “now“ between Russia and Ukraine, as the United States is changing its “style” and “methodology” and will no longer “fly around the world at the drop of a hat” to mediate negotiations.”[25] Bruce reiterated that the United States is “still committed” to a lasting peace in Ukraine
The US Department of State submitted a proposed license for defense exports to Ukraine to the US Congress on April 29.[26] The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is considering the proposal.
Key Takeaways:
Russian gains along the frontline have slowed over the last four months, but Russia continues to tolerate personnel losses comparable to the casualty rate Russian forces sustained during a period of intensified advances between September and December 2024.
Russian forces are currently sustaining a higher casualty rate per square kilometer gained than in Fall 2024.
Russia has thus far sustained these casualties and the current tempo of offensive operations by rapidly deploying low quality troops to frontline units, although the reliance on such troops is also hindering Russia’s ability to conduct complex operations and make rapid advances in Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s commitment to maintaining the tempo of offensive operations despite diminishing returns underscores Putin’s ongoing efforts to leverage further battlefield gains to generate pressure on Ukraine in ceasefire and peace negotiations or otherwise to force Ukraine’s collapse.
Western intelligence reportedly suggests that Putin may begin prioritizing short-term goals such as consolidating Russia’s gains in Ukraine and Russia’s immediate economic viability over seizing more territory, but Putin’s demonstrated commitment to maintaining the tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine despite continuing high casualty rates is a counter-indicator to this reported assessment.
A future slowing of Russian offensive operations and/or transition to defensive operations in all or part of the theater would be indicators that Putin is shifting his short-term goals from seizing more territory to consolidating previously held territory.
ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains committed to his long-term military objectives of seizing all of Ukraine and undermining NATO.
Statements by US officials suggest that the Trump administration is considering stepping back from intensified mediation efforts to end the war in Ukraine.
The US Department of State submitted a proposed license for defense exports to Ukraine to the US Congress on April 29.
Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Alleged Ceasefire Violation
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Significant Activity in Belarus
Alleged Ceasefire Violations
There are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Limited fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on May 2, but Russian forces did not advance.
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions in Gornal and the Gornal Monastery contrary to the Russian MoD’s April 26 claim that Russian forces seized the settlement.[27]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Gornal (southwest of Sudzha).[28]
Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that unattributed drones struck the Russian Zvezda military space intelligence facility in Stavropol Krai on May 2.[29] Kovalenko noted that facility is one of the Russian General Staff Main Directorate’s [GRU] main electronic intelligence system stations and specializes in detecting foreign intelligence communication systems and commercial electronic signatures in orbit. Kovalenko stated that Russia used the facility as a technical base to monitor Ukraine and conduct cyber intelligence operations. Stavropol Krai Governor Vladimir Vladimirov claimed that Ukrainian drone fragments fell in Moskovskoe village in Izobilnensky Raion but caused no damage or casualties.[30]
Fighting continued in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on May 2, but Russian forces did not advance.
A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting continued near Popovka and Demidovka (both northwest of Belgorod City) and that Russian forces are conducting drone operations in the area.[31]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 2, but did not advance.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Bilovody (northeast of Sumy City), while another milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized the majority of the settlement.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Loknya (southeast of Bilovody) toward Yablunivka (south of Bilovody).[33]
Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Volodymyrivka and Vodolahy and northeast of Sumy City near Zhuravka and Loknya on May 2.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked west of Loknya.[35]
The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces are creating a “security strip” along the border of Sumy Oblast, and a Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are shifting offensive operations towards Sumy Oblast.[36]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in Bilovody.[37] Elements of the Chechen “Akhmat-Russia” Regiment are reportedly operating near Seredina-Budy (on the international border northwest of Sumy City).[38] Drone operators of the “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets in Sumy Oblast.[39]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on May 2 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on May 1 and 2.[40]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Russian forces attacked southeast of Kupyansk near Novoosynove, Kolisnykivka, and Hlushkivka on May 1 and 2.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and advanced to the northern part of the settlement on May 2.[42]
The Ukrainian Border Service and Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on May 2 that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a Russian motorized assault of at least 10 motorcycles and two all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) in an unspecified area of the Kupyansk direction.[43] A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces are consolidating and reinforcing manpower and materiel resources to replenish losses from April 2025 before resuming assaults in this direction.[44] The servicemember also stated that Ukrainian forces observed Russian forces atypically modifying a tank by removing its turret and welding a “shed”-like structure on top of the tank to protect Russian infantry.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 2 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya, Serhiivka, and Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on May 1 and 2.[45]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on May 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced near Zelena Dolyna, into Ridkodub, and within central Lypove (all north of Lyman).[46]
Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Nove, Zelena Dolyna, and Lypove; northeast of Lyman near Novomykhailivka, Kolodyazi, Novyi Mir, Myrne, and Yampolivka; east of Lyman toward Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on May 1 and 2.[47]
A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on May 1 that Russian forces near the Serebryanske forest area unsuccessfully attempted to use anti thermal-imaging rain ponchos to evade Ukrainian drone operators.[48]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD), including its 283rd, 488th, and 1428th motorized rifle regiments, reportedly participated in the recent seizure of Nove.[49]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on May 2 but did not advance.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 2 that Russian forces advanced south of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[50]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and toward Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on May 1 and 2.[51]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka.[52]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove; and south of Chasiv Yar towards Bila Hora and near Stupochky on May 1 and 2.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stupochky.[54]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps), the 2nd Airborne (VDV) Battalion of the 98th VDV Division, and the “Burevestnik” detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[55] Elements of the Russian 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Stupochky.[56]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid an intensified effort to advance along and up to the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway and eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 1 indicates that Russian forces advanced into Novoolenivka (southwest of Toretsk).[57] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) with motorcycle support participated in the advance into Novoolenivka and seized half of the settlement.[58]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 10th Tank Regiment and 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division) are advancing near Oleksandropil (just southeast of Novoolenivka) and that additional elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division also recently advanced into Malynivka (southwest of Novoolenivka).[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are also advancing toward Romanivka (southwest of Toretsk).[60] Russian forces recently intensified attacks along the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk, and the Russian military command appears to be tasking the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th CAA) with eliminating the pocket.[61] Russian forces’ advance into Novoolenivka will help Russian forces advance further along the T-0504 highway, and Russian forces may intend to force Ukrainian troops to withdraw from the pocket under threat of envelopment if Russian forces can make further advances from Novoolenivka and Sukha Balka (southwest of Toretsk).
Russian forces continued assaults near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toresk near Druzhba; north of Toretsk toward Dyliivka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka, Romanivka, Stara Mykolaivka, Vodyane Druhe, Oleksandropil, Malynivka, and Nova Poltavka on May 1 and 2.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northwest of Vozdvyzhenka (southwest of Toretsk).[63]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA]) are reportedly operating near Druzhba.[64]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 1 and 2 that Russian forces advanced into the southern outskirts of Pokrovsk, two kilometers west of Novoukrainka (south of Pokrovsk), into the eastern outskirts of Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk), and southeast of Novooleksandrivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[65] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a reconnaissance-in-force mission into southern Pokrovsk but did not suggest that Russian forces maintain enduring positions in the southern outskirts of the settlement.[66] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Yelyzavetivka (east of Pokrovsk) and Zvirove (west of Pokrovsk).[67]
Russian forces attacked toward Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske; east of Pokrovsk near Malynivka and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka, Promin, and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, Dachenske, Chunyshyne, and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Zvirove on May 1 and 2.[68]
Ukrainian Commander in Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on May 1 that the Pokrovsk direction remains the most active section of the frontline.[69] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian infantry operating in this direction fear they will face retribution from frontline Russian commanders if they refuse to fight or attempt to retreat.[70]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian “Vega” Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate) and the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions near Pokrovsk and attacking Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[71]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on May 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 1 and 2 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Nadiivka (east of Novopavlivka).[72]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Novooleksandrivka; east of Novopavlivka near Nadiivka, Kotlyarivka, Troitske, and Preobrazhenka; and southeast near Bohdanivka on May 1 and 2.[73] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 2 that elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) recently retreated from Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka) after frontline Russian commanders deployed poorly trained troops to combat operations in the area.[74]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in Novooleksandrivka.[75] Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly clearing Nadiivka (east of Novopavlivka).[76] Elements of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly attacking eastern Kolyarivka (east of Pokrovsk).[77]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on May 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove toward Oleksiivka and near Andriivka, Kostyantynopil, Rozlyv, and Bahatyr on May 1 and 2.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 2 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr.[79]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 200th Artillery Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Bahatyr.[80]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on May 2 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Odradne, west of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil, and northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne.[81] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 2 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Vesele (north of Velyka Novosilka).[82]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[83]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations east of Hulyaipole near Chervone on May 2.[84]
Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 27 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northeast of Mali Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv).[85
Russian forces conducted ground attacks southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove and Lobkove; and west of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky and Kamyanske on May 1 and 2.[86]
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on May 1 and 2 but did not advance.[87]
Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on May 2 that Russian forces are intensifying offensive operations in the southern section of the Dnipro River Delta near Kizomys on the west (right) of the Dnipro River (southwest of Kherson City).[88] Voloshyn reported that Russian forces are attempting to create a bridgehead and cross the Dnipro River from the south.
Ukrainian forces conducted a series of overnight naval and aerial drone strikes targeting Russian military infrastructure objects in occupied Crimea on May 1 to 2. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces launched 30 naval drones and at least 100 aerial drones, and that Russian forces destroyed 10 Ukrainian naval drones and 100 aerial drones near occupied Sevastopol.[89] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian drones struck Russian airfields in occupied Kacha, Belbek, Hvardiiske, and Saky, and that a fire broke out in Uhlove, seven kilometers from the Russian military airfield in Kacha.[90] Russian forces typically station air defenses at the Belbek, Hvardiiske, and Saky airfields and leverage the airfields to launch Shahed drones against Ukraine.[91]
Russian and Ukrainian sources reported on May 2 that Ukrainian forces recently struck a Russian S-300 air defense system, a Kasta-2E2 mobile radar system, an Imbir long-range radar system, an Obzor-3 radar system, and a ST-68 radar station in occupied Crimea.[92]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces launched a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 1 to 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 150 strike and decoy drones from Bryansk City; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[93] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 64 Shahed and other drones over eastern, northern, and central Ukraine and that 62 decoy drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that drone strikes damaged civilian and commercial infrastructure in Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[94]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06W44ezsFpBSRJsouTmp812SQ22eLf3V1pzyMwF6YEE7koRcQq32JGzJ2HnzyWuvyl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20444 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031frKwcfzQKsFhG7kFj3hoVWG8FPvGbFatwKBLj8pEpH8CHiLWWGeHZCzPwjXpbzml ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22561 [Total losses generated from the Ukrainian General Staff’s daily 0800 SITREP between January 1 and April 30, 2025.]
[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2024
[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024
[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-4-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-has-failed-break-ukraine ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2024
[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2025
[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment
[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025
[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage
[9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage
[10] https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/01/politics/intelligence-putin-war-goals-shifted-ukraine
[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041425
[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042725
[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-15-2025
[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage
[15] https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/01/politics/intelligence-putin-war-goals-shifted-ukraine
[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825
[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-30-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-23-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-military-restructuring-and-expansion-hindered-ukraine-war; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2023; https://t.me/mod_russia/23498; https://telegra dot ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-na-tematicheskom-selektornom-soveshchanii-07-03.
[18] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage;
[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125
[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125
[21] https://tass dot ru/interviews/23001625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013025
[22] https://verstka dot media/chto-dumayut-rossiiskie-voennye-o-vozmozhnom-peremirii ; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/6761
[23] https://kyivindependent dot com/vance-says-ukraine-war-wont-end-any-time-soon-urges-sides-to-agree-on-peace-terms/; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/vance-does-not-see-russias-war-ukraine-ending-any-time-soon-fox-news-interview-2025-05-01/; https://archive.ph/zXyUf; https://www.foxnews.com/video/6372190741112; https://www.cnbc.com/2025/05/02/russia-war-in-ukraine-not-going-to-end-any-time-soon-jd-vance-says.html; https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/02/europe/vance-ukraine-war-not-ending-soon-intl
[24] https://www.foxnews.com/video/6372195430112
[25] https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-may-1-2025/
[26] https://www.congress.gov/senate-communication/119th-congress/executive-communication/859?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%22Ukraine%22%7D&s=4&r=1 ; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/01/trump-administration-readies-first-sale-of-military-equipment-to-ukraine
[27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27947 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35133 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35194 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26-2025
[28] https://t.me/epoddubny/23323
[29] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9183
[30] https://t.me/VVV5807/4024
[31] https://rutube dot ru/video/cdffbed33da010ec8b3b7441618ce473/; https://t.me/rybar/70069
[32] https://t.me/yurasumy/22698 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26282
[33] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63929 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70321
[34] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63929 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22698 ; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5688
[35] https://t.me/dva_majors/70321
[36] https://t.me/rybar/70072 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52033
[37] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63929
[38] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5688
[39] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90977
[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl
[42] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35175
[43] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9229; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/02/pozbavyly-okupantiv-10-motoczykliv-nashi-bijczi-znyshhyly-mobilni-shturmovi-grupy-rf-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku/; https://dpsu.gov dot ua/uk/news/47009-video-pomsta-znishuye-mobilni-shturmovi-grupi-voroga-na-kup-yanskomu-napryamku
[44] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/02/pryvaryly-saraj-na-tank-poblyzu-kupyanska-rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-vygaduvaty-bronovanyh-monstriv/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dGVneFXTZ7U
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27898;
[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27898
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27898; https://t.me/OMIBr_60/1015; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/deceptive-defense-russian-infantry-stormed-positions-wearing-anti-thermal-ponchos/
[48] https://t.me/OMIBr_60/1015; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/deceptive-defense-russian-infantry-stormed-positions-wearing-anti-thermal-ponchos/
[49] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27898
[50] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35188
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl
[52] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35188
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26282
[54] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35187
[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27910 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163254 ; https://t.me/rybar/70062
[56] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35187
[57] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1918014207036960908; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9041; https://t.me/dva_majors/70304
[58] https://t.me/dva_majors/70304 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35140 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90948 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22699 ;
[59] https://t.me/dva_majors/70303 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70321 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22704 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63935
[60] https://t.me/yurasumy/22704 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63935
[61] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041425
[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl
[63] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63925
[64] https://t.me/rybar/70069
[65] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163192; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90955; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163192; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35134; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35131; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35154; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35198
[66] https://t.me/yurasumy/22708
[67] https://t.me/yurasumy/22700; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35158
[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63924; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27895; https://t.me/wargonzo/26282; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63935
[69] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/mayemo-pershij-rezultat-vatikanskoyi-zustrichi-yakij-robit-y-97493
[70] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/02/odyn-ne-hotiv-jty-jomu-postrilyaly-po-nogah-pid-pokrovskom-rosiyany-zhenut-vpered-navit-svoyih-poranenyh/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dGVneFXTZ7U
[71] https://t.me/sashakots/53449; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90941 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90949; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90986
[72] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27897
[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl;
[74] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35165
[75] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35134
[76] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27897
[77] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27897
[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl ; https://t.me/rybar/70069; https://t.me/dva_majors/70321;
[79] https://t.me/voin_dv/14716
[80] https://t.me/voin_dv/14701; https://t.me/voin_dv/14710
[81] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63928; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789
[82] https://t.me/wargonzo/26282
[83] https://t.me/voin_dv/14700
[84] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789
[85] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27812; https://t.me/IIsb_128ogshb/10
[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70321
[87]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl
[88] https://www.pravda.com dot ua/eng/news/2025/05/1/7510060/
[89] https://t.me/andriyshTime/36717 ; https://t.me/razvozhaev/11523; https://t.me/razvozhaev/11526 ; https://t.me/rybar/70080 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/23327 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/23084 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/23103 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52052 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/313074 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/313074 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52035 ;
[90] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/836 ; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/839 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/78898 ; https://www dot idelreal.org/a/anneksirovannyy-krym-podvergsya-massirovannoy-atake-dronov/33402916.html ; https://t.me/astrapress/80242 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/36729 ; https://t.me/astrapress/80242 ; https://t.me/astrapress/80245
[91] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2025
[92] https://t.me/russianocontext/6658 ; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/prymary-strike-drones-flew-into-crimea-and-destroyed-air-defense-systems/ ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/19506
[93] https://t.me/kpszsu/33675
[94] https://t.me/synegubov/14102 ; https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/05/02/unaslidok-udariv-rf-na-harkivshhyni-zagynula-lyudyna-shhe-odna-postrazhdala/; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/22771 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/21298 ; https://x.com/SESU_UA/status/1918206863415316871 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/36722 ; https://t.me/severrealii/30348; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/02/vorog-zavdav-masovanogo-udaru-bpla-po-zaporizhzhyu-29-postrazhdalyh-poshkodzheni-bagatopoverhivky/; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18978 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/79742 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18929 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18930 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18939 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18937 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18938 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18973 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18965 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18957 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18947 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18941 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18977 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18981 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18997 ; https://t.me/severrealii/30351 ; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/6847 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27916
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 2, 2025
The United States paused weapons supplies to Ukraine, including critical air defense interceptors, artillery shells, missiles, and rockets. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on July 2. The decision to suspend military aid to Ukraine will likely force Ukrainian forces to continue to husband materiel, although the exact timing of the planned deliveries that the United States suspended remains unclear at this time. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated that continued deliveries of previously allocated US defense packages are critically important, particularly in order to strengthen Ukraine’s air defense. The MFA emphasized that any delay in supporting Ukraine’s defense capabilities will encourage Russia to continue its war — and not seek peace. The U.S. could extend the pause of military assistance to Ukraine even longer if the weapons are in short supply or if the US needs to supply them to other parts of the world.
July 2, 2025, 8:45pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on July 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
The United States paused weapons supplies to Ukraine, including critical air defense interceptors, artillery shells, missiles, and rockets. Western media outlets reported that sources stated on July 2 that the US pause on weapons supplies to Ukraine will affect dozens of PAC-3 interceptors for Patriot air defense systems, dozens of Stinger man-portable air defense systems, thousands of 155mm high explosive howitzer munitions, over 100 Hellfire air-to-ground missiles, over 250 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rockets, dozens of grenade launchers, and dozens of AIM air-to-air missiles.[1] Familiar sources told Politico on July 1 that the United States decided in early June 2025 to withhold some of the aid that the United States promised Ukraine under the Biden administration but that the decision is only now taking effect.[2] Politico reported that the halted weapons come from two different streams of Biden administration-era support — weapons from drawdowns of current US stockpiles that the US Department of Defense (DoD) received money to replenish, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, in which the United States funds the purchase of weapons for Ukraine from US defense firms. White House Deputy Press Secretary Anna Kelly stated on July 1 that US authorities made the decision following a DoD review of US military support to states around the world.[3] Six defense officials, congressional officials, and other sources told NBC that the Pentagon ordered the pause after a review of US munitions stockpiles.[4] NBC’s defense and congressional sources stated that the United States could hold up the weapons flow to Ukraine until the assessment of US stockpiles is complete but that the United States could extend the pause of military assistance to Ukraine even longer if the weapons are in short supply or if the United States needs to supply them to other parts of the world.
The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated on July 2 that continued deliveries of previously allocated US defense packages are critically important, particularly in order to strengthen Ukraine’s air defense.[5] The Ukrainian MFA emphasized that any delay in supporting Ukraine’s defense capabilities will encourage Russia to continue its war — and not seek peace. The Ukrainian MFA stated that US-Ukrainian consultations about defense supplies are ongoing at all levels and that Ukraine will speak with the United States about finding mutually beneficial solutions to strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities.
The decision to suspend military aid to Ukraine will likely force Ukrainian forces to continue to husband materiel, although the exact timing of the planned deliveries that the United States paused remains unclear at this time. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that Ukraine had not received any official notifications about any suspension or revision to the delivery schedules of the agreed US military aid prior to the US announcement.[6] The New York Times (NYT) reported that US officials stated that the United States had not scheduled to ship the affected munitions to Ukraine for several months, but the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that US weapons shipments already in Poland were halted as of July 1.[7] A Trump administration official told Politico that the administration had not requested any further aid but that there is enough aid left over from the Biden administration to last Ukraine “several more months.”[8] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion told the Washington Post in an article published on July 2, however, that Ukrainian forces already have to concentrate on holding positions and conserving resources rather than advancing.[9] Ukrainian forces have had to husband critical materiel, including air defense interceptors, GMLRS rockets, and artillery shells, during previous suspensions of US aid. Ukraine’s European partners are increasing their efforts to provide Ukraine with military assistance and the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues its efforts to become self-sufficient, but only the United States can provide certain weapons systems at scale and quickly.[10] Ukrainian forces very likely will have to conserve materiel again should the United States continue to suspend weapons deliveries.
The suspension of US aid to Ukraine will likely accelerate Russian gains on the battlefield, as previous US aid suspensions have in the past. Delays in US military aid in Fall 2023 and Winter-Spring 2024 set conditions for Russian forces to make more accelerated battlefield gains than Russian forces had previously been able to make.[11] Russian forces significantly intensified offensive operations near Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast in mid-January 2024 and concentrated significant manpower and materiel to their effort to seize the settlement in mid-February 2024 amid the protracted debate in the US (from October 2023 until April 2024) about passing supplemental aid for Ukraine. Ukrainian forces also faced significant artillery constraints during the Russian offensive against Avdiivka, allowing Russian forces to attack under less pressure from Ukrainian counterbattery fire. Russian forces sustained a high tempo of offensive operations after seizing Avdiivka in order to push as far west as possible, and Russian forces subsequently launched offensive operations in Spring 2024 intended to seize Pokrovsk when the suspension of US assistance was still greatly constraining Ukrainian materiel supplies.[12] ISW assesses that Russian forces advanced roughly three kilometers per day between the suspension of US aid to Ukraine on December 6, 2023 and the resumption of aid on April 24, 2024, much of which was in Donetsk Oblast — as compared to the six months prior to the December 2023 aid suspension when Russian forces actually lost a total of roughly 203 square kilometers at a rate of 1.1 square kilometers lost per day (due to Ukraine’s gains during the 2023 counteroffensive, which was enabled by the US and other allies surging military aid to Ukraine).
Russian forces also notably intensified offensive operations in Kursk Oblast following the suspension of US intelligence sharing in early March 2025.[13] Russian forces, augmented by North Korean forces, had been trying to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast through slow, grinding advances since the start of Ukraine’s incursion in August 2024. The Trump administration suspended US intelligence sharing with Ukraine on March 5, and Russian forces intensified offensive operations to expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast on March 6 and 7.[14] Ukrainian sources reportedly stated at the time that Russian forces started making more rapid advances in Kursk Oblast on March 5 and that the suspension of US intelligence sharing impacted Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast the most. Kremlin officials at the time announced their intention to take advantage of the suspension of US military aid and intelligence sharing to “inflict maximum damage” to Ukrainian forces “on the ground.”[15] Russian forces very likely exploited the US suspension of aid and intelligence sharing in March 2025 to accelerate Russia’s ongoing counteroffensive operation in Kursk Oblast. ISW assesses that Russian forces advanced at a rate of about 31 square kilometers per day in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast between the suspension of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine on March 3, 2025 and the resumption of intelligence sharing on March 11, 2025 — as opposed to a rate of advance of about 19 square kilometers per day in the six months prior to the intelligence sharing suspension.
The suspension of US aid to Ukraine will reinforce Russian President Vladimir Putin’s theory of victory that posits that Russia can win the war of attrition by making slow, creeping advances and outlasting Western support for Ukraine. Putin articulated a theory of victory in June 2024 — and has emphasized this same theory of victory since — that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual, creeping advances indefinitely and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces.[16] Putin’s theory assumes that Russia will be able to outlast pledged Western security assistance and that Ukraine will not acquire and sustain the manpower and materiel needed to prevent these gradual Russian gains or to contest the initiative and conduct counteroffensive operations to liberate Ukrainian territory. The latest US suspension of aid will strengthen Putin’s belief that time is on Russia’s side and his commitment to delaying negotiations toward a peace settlement and protracting the war.
Russia remains unlikely to make operational-level breakthroughs in the near future. Future Russian gains — even relatively accelerated advances following the suspension of US aid — will likely remain gradual and creeping and result in disproportionally high losses as Russian forces still have not restored operational maneuver to the increasingly transparent battlefield. ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces gained roughly 498 square kilometers in May 2025 and roughly 466 square kilometers in June 2025, and Russian gains in January to April 2025 ranged from roughly 175 to 590 square kilometers per month. These Russian gains are remarkably smaller than the 1,265 square kilometers per day that ISW assesses Russian forces were gaining at the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in March 2022.
Russia appears, however, to be preparing to undertake likely months- and years-long offensive campaigns — demonstrating the Russian military command’s acceptance of continued slow, gradual advances and Putin’s belief in his theory of victory. The Russian military command has recently prioritized efforts to attack Ukraine’s fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast, a campaign that is likely to take Russia years to achieve at Russian forces’ current tempo.[17] Russian forces may not be able to achieve these objectives by themselves. CNN reported on July 2 that a Ukrainian intelligence assessment stated that North Korea will likely send an additional 25,000 to 30,000 soldiers to Russia in the coming months and that there is a “great possibility” that the North Korean forces will augment Russian forces in Ukraine, including “during large-scale offensive operations.”[18]
Kremlin officials are responding to the US military aid suspension by publicly flouting Putin’s theory of military victory as successful — in direct opposition to US President Donald Trump’s stated goal of bringing Russia to the negotiating table and achieving a lasting and just peace. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on July 2 in response to the suspension of US military aid that the “fewer weapons that are supplied to Ukraine, the closer the end of the [Russian invasion of Ukraine] is.”[19] Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev, who has been heavily involved in diplomatic and rhetorical efforts vis-à-vis Ukraine and the United States, stated that the suspension “raises questions about the West’s ability to continue supporting Ukraine.”[20] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Zhuravlev suggested that the US military aid suspension will degrade Ukraine’s ability to “hold out” against Russian offensive operations and claimed that the United States will not be able to “hide” any future arms deliveries to Ukraine from Russia.[21] These Russian statements underscore how the Kremlin perceives Putin’s theory of victory as it relates to Western — particularly American — military assistance to Ukraine and flout the Kremlin’s goal of coercing the United States and other Western states into ceasing military assistance to Ukraine.[22] The Kremlin is capitalizing on the US aid suspension to intensify its messaging that Europe should also cease weapons supplies to Ukraine. Putin had a phone call with French President Emmanuel Macron on July 2, the first Putin-Macron call in nearly three years, and used the call to reiterate boilerplate Kremlin narratives aimed at discouraging further Western military assistance to Ukraine.[23] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova also criticized continued European military assistance to Ukraine.[24] The Kremlin’s messaging about the suspension of US military aid to Ukraine is yet another indicator that Russia remains committed to achieving its war goals by force and is uninterested in meaningful peace negotiations to end the war.[25] These senior Russian officials’ statements indicate that suspending US military aid to Ukraine very likely will not compel Russia to conduct meaningful negotiations with Ukraine as President Trump desires, but rather embolden Moscow to continue protracting Russia’s war.
The Kremlin is also using the US aid suspension as a basis to continue rhetorical attacks against European defensive efforts that are in line with Trump’s initiative for Europe to shoulder more of the burden for collective defense. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko claimed on July 2 that the European Union’s (EU) increased defense spending and development of its DIB show that the EU is becoming an “aggressive military bloc” that Russia will have to defend itself against.[26] Grushko claimed that the EU carries out NATO’s tasks and that the two organizations are deeply linked. Zakharova also claimed that the EU is turning into a military bloc and is “pumping” Ukraine with weapons.[27] Russian Ambassador to Norway Nikolay Korchunov told the Russian state news agency RIA Novosti in an interview published on June 30 that Norway is trying to benefit from the “militarization” of Europe and is “pumping up” the Ukrainian military.[28] Korchunov claimed that Norway is intensifying NATO military exercises on Norwegian territory near the Russian border and that Norway’s militarization will increase tension and escalation risks in the Arctic and destabilize European security. Russian officials continue to mischaracterize increased NATO defense spending that is aimed at deterring war in Europe by building defense capabilities in response to Russia’s ongoing efforts to restructure and expand Russia’s military capabilities.[29] The Kremlin’s efforts to deter Western military assistance to Ukraine and European rearmament efforts are part of its wider cognitive warfare efforts that aim to shape Western decision-making and erode the West’s will to act against Russian interests and resist Russia.[30]
The US decision to suspend military aid to Ukraine will particularly degrade Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russia’s enhanced long-range missile and drone strike capabilities that have inflicted significant civilian casualties — in sharp contrast to President Trump’s stated objective of stopping civilian casualties in Ukraine. US provisions of Patriot air defense systems and interceptors have been critical for Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russia’s missile strikes, particularly those with ballistic missiles.[31] Russia’s long-range strikes have increasingly targeted densely populated cities far from the frontline.[32] Russia has recently prioritized expanding its long-range drone and missile production and stockpiling its ballistic missiles, enabling Russia to conduct larger, more effective combined missile and drone strike series against Ukraine.[33] Russia has notably conducted five of its largest combined strikes against Ukraine throughout the full-scale invasion between March and June 2025 and is launching an increasingly high number of Shahed and decoy drones that overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses, allowing more Russian missiles to hit their targets.[34] Russia has also recently adapted its strike tactics to inflict maximum damage to civilians, including by deploying cluster munitions with delayed detonations, and Shahed drones equipped with capsules of chemical weapons and conducting “double tap” strikes that maximize casualties of civilian first responders.[35] Russia will very likely continue to increase the size of its combined strikes against Ukraine as Russia remains committed to accelerating its missile and drone production. The US suspension of critical Patriot interceptor supplies to Ukraine will likely impact Ukraine’s ability to protect its critical, industrial, and civilian infrastructure. Russian forces exploited pauses in US military aid to Ukraine in late 2023 and early 2024 to conduct large-scale combined strikes designed to exhaust Ukraine’s degraded air defense umbrella that was suffering from the lack of Western aid.[36] A dwindling supply of Patriot interceptors will force Ukraine to continue to make difficult defense prioritization decisions.
Key Takeaways:
The United States paused weapons supplies to Ukraine, including critical air defense interceptors, artillery shells, missiles, and rockets.
The decision to suspend military aid to Ukraine will likely force Ukrainian forces to continue to husband materiel, although the exact timing of the planned deliveries that the United States paused remains unclear at this time.
The suspension of US aid to Ukraine will likely accelerate Russian gains on the battlefield, as previous US aid suspensions have in the past.
The suspension of US aid to Ukraine will reinforce Russian President Vladimir Putin’s theory of victory that posits that Russia can win the war of attrition by making slow, creeping advances and outlasting Western support for Ukraine.
Kremlin officials are responding to the US military aid suspension by publicly flouting Putin’s theory of military victory as successful — in direct opposition to US President Donald Trump’s stated goal of bringing Russia to the negotiating table and achieving a lasting and just peace.
The Kremlin is also using the US aid suspension as a basis to continue rhetorical attacks against European defensive efforts that are in line with Trump’s initiative for Europe to shoulder more of the burden for collective defense.
The US decision to suspend military aid to Ukraine will particularly degrade Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russia’s enhanced long-range missile and drone strike capabilities that have inflicted significant civilian casualties — in sharp contrast to President Trump’s stated objective of stopping civilian casualties in Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Toretsk and Novopavlivka.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 2.
Russian forces continued attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 1 and 2.[37] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Glushkovo, Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), and Gornal (southeast of Tetkino).[38]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 91st Sapper-Engineer Regiment (reportedly under the operational command of the Northern Grouping of Forces) reportedly continue operating in Kursk Oblast.[39] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Darino (east of Tetkino).[40]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 1 that Ukrainian forces struck the Saratovorgsintez oil refinery in Saratov Oblast, causing a fire at the refinery and damaging a technological installation.[41] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the plant produces fuel and lubricants for the Russian military.
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[42]
Russian forces attacked in the Sumy Oblast border area on July 1 and 2.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near north of Sumy City near Andriivka and Novomykolaivka and northeast of Sumy City near Sadky and Yunakivka.[44]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 237th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating between Loknya and Yunakivka (both northeast of Sumy City).[45] Drone operators of the Russian 83rd Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly conducting reconnaissance missions near the Sumy-Kursk Oblast international border area, and other elements of the 83rd Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly fighting near Yunakivka.[46] Elements of the Russian 11th Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly operating along the H-07 Yunakivka-Sumy City highway near Yunakivka.[47] Fiber-optic drone operators of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and artillery elements of the Russian 106th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in northern Sumy Oblast.[48]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
Assessed Russian advances: Footage published on June 25 indicates that Russian forces advanced in western Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[49]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Vovchansk.[50]
Russian forces conducted ground operations north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and Zelene and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on July 1 and 2.[51]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on July 2 that Russian forces have recently changed tactics in northern Kharkiv Oblast and are now conducting infantry assaults in groups of up to 25 servicemen and are no longer attacking in small, two-to-three personnel fire teams.[52] The spokesperson reported Russian forces are using underground pipelines including sewage pipes to accumulate personnel for assaults as well as ammunition and supplies.[53] A spokesperson for another Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on July 2 that Russian forces somewhat intensified offensive operations in the area to take advantage of weather conditions and are increasing the use of fiber optic drones in an attempt to take forward positions.[54]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in unspecified areas of Kharkiv Oblast.[55]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued ground assaults in the Kupyansk direction on July 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced near Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk) and Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[56]
Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Radivka, and near the international border toward Milove, Mytrofanivka and Ambarne; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Novoosynove on July 1 and 2.[57]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[58]
Russian forces continued ground assaults in the Borova direction on July 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed Russian forces advanced near Hrekivka (southeast of Borova) and west of Stepy (formerly Pershotravneve, east of Borova).[59]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Kolisnykivka, east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai and Kopanky, and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka, Cherneschyna, and Novovodyane on July 1 and 2.[60] A Russian source claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Nadiya (east of Borova).[61]
Russian forces continued ground assaults in the Lyman direction on July 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to southern Karpivka, near Ridkodub, and west and east of Lypove.[62]
Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Serednye and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Novyi Myr, Myrne, and Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske on July 1 and 2.[63]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 2 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, Hryhorivka, and Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk toward Vyimka; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka and toward Bondrane on July 1 and 2.[64]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Mykolaivka (west of Chasiv Yar) and advanced to Chervone (southwest of Mykolaivka) and near Kurdyumivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) and Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[65]
Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself north of Chasiv Yar toward Markove, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on July 1 and 2.[66]
The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported that Russian first-person view (FPV) drones pose the biggest challenge for Ukrainian forces in the area.[67] The commander stated that Ukrainian forces use FPV drones to repel infrequent Russian mechanized assaults and that Russian forces are leveraging small teams of about two to three personnel on motorcycles.
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces occupy the dominant heights along the Toretsk-Kurdyumivka-Chasiv Yar line, complicating the Ukrainian defense of Kostyantynivka, which is located in lowlands.[68]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division and 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[69]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 2 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Toretsk.[70]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[71]
Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka, Popiv Yar, Poltavka, and Oleksandro-Kalynove and toward Rusyn Yar and Pleshchiivka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Novospaske; and southwest of Toretsk near Leonidivka on July 1 and 2.[72] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stepanivka (northwest of Toretsk).[73]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 2 that Russian forces conducted a Geran-2 drone strike (the Russian-made analogue of the Iranian-made Shahed-136 drone) against Ukrainian positions near Yablunivka.[74]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Rusyn Yar and Yablunivka.[75] Drone operators of the Russian “Typhoon” Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), the “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, and the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Stepanivka.[76]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Koptieve; northwest, west, and south of Myrne; north of Novoekonomichne; south and southeast of Razine; west and southwest of Malynivka; in western Mykolaivka; and to central Novotoretske (all northeast of Pokrovsk).[77]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrne and Malynivka and toward Novoekonomichne, Mykolaivka, Novotoretske, Razine, and Koptieve; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Myrolubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and toward Molodetske on July 1 and 2.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novoekonomichne.[79]
The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are leveraging summer foliage as concealment.[80] The commander stated that Russian forces temporarily decreased the tempo of their attacks before May 9, 2025, but that Russian forces are again trying to reach the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border in this direction. The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are no longer using heavy armored vehicles due to the terrain and that Russian forces are instead deploying fire teams of one to two personnel, sometimes on motorcycles, scooters, and bicycles.[81]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Bilytske, Novyi Donbas (both north of Pokrovsk), Koptieve, and Dobropillya (northeast of Pokrovsk).[82]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Piddubne (south of Novopavlivka).[83]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on July 1 and 2 that Russian forces advanced to Voskresenka and Piddubne and southwest of Zirka, northwest of Yalta, and southwest of Fedorivka (all south of Novopavlivka).[84]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Oleksiivka, and Dachne; and south of Novopavlivka near Piddubne, Myrne, Zaporizhzhia, Perebudova, Voskresenka, and Vesele on July 1 and 2.[85] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are increasing counterattacks near Zirka.[86]
Ukrainian military officials reported on July 2 that Russian forces have not consolidated in Dachne (south of Novopavlivka) and that fighting continues in the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border.[87] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Russian forces are attacking on the flanks of Novopavlivka in the north and south along the Solona River due to the lack of cover in the main Novopavlivka direction.[88]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Zirka.[89] Elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA formerly 1st DNR AC, SMD) are reportedly operating along the T-0428 Dachne-Novopavlivka highway.[90] Drone operators of the 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly remotely mining roads near Voskresenka.[91]
Russian force continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 2 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 1 that Russian forces advanced to Maliivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[92]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka toward Maliivka and Voskresenka and near Shevchenko and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on July 1 and 2.[93] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 1 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shevchenko and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole, Novodarivka, and Levadne.[94]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued ground assaults in the Hulyaipole direction on July 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole) and advanced north of Stepanivka (southeast of Hulyaipole).[95]
A Russian milblogger claimed on July 2 that Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole toward Olhivske.[96]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army (CAA), Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Chervone (east of Hulyaipole).[97]
Russian forces continued ground assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 2 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske on July 1 and 2.[98]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and 19th Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[99]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on July 2.
Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kherson Oblast.[100]
Ukrainian military intelligence reportedly assassinated the first deputy commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF). Ukrainian media sources amplified a claim from a private Russian Telegram account on July 2 that Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) assassinated BSF Chief of Staff — First Deputy Commander Vice Admiral Ildar Akhmerov in occupied Crimea.[101] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian officials have commented on Akhmerov’s unconfirmed assassination.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 1 to 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four S-300 air defense missiles from Kursk Oblast and 114 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[102] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 40 drones and that 39 drones were ”lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones and missiles struck civilian and residential infrastructure facilities in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Odesa oblasts.[103]
Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov reported that Russian forces attempted to strike, Yuzhe, Odesa Oblast with unmanned naval drones in early June 2025 but that Ukrainian forces repelled the drones.[104] Budanov reported that Russia is attempting to domestically produce naval drones but has not yet been successful.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated on July 1 that Belarus will reduce the number of military personnel set to participate in the September 2025 Zapad-2025 joint Russian-Belarusian military exercise by nearly half and reposition the main maneuver away from Belarus’ western borders.[105] It is unclear whether Lukashenko meant that the total number of Zapad participants is to be reduced in half, or whether the Belarusian contingent in the joint exercise is to be reduced by half.
Russia continues efforts to formalize Russian-Belarusian governmental integration. Russian state media outlet Parlamentskaya Gazeta reported on July 1 that Russian President Vladimir Putin submitted a bill to the Russian State Duma to ratify a protocol that would allow Belarusian citizens permanently residing in Russia to vote and run in local Russian elections.[106] Putin and Lukashenko signed the protocol on March 13, 2025, amending the 1998 Russian-Belarusian treaty on Equal Rights of Citizens. Lukashenko signed a similar protocol in January 2025.[107]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.ft.com/content/b69e327d-95a3-487d-a9b6-6a72ef48ba61; https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/pentagon-halts-weapons-shipment-ukraine-concerns-us-stockpile-rcna216358
[2] https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/01/pentagon-munitions-ukraine-halt-00436048?s=09
[3] https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/01/pentagon-munitions-ukraine-halt-00436048?s=09; https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/pentagon-halts-weapons-shipment-ukraine-concerns-us-stockpile-rcna216358
[4] https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/pentagon-halts-weapons-shipment-ukraine-concerns-us-stockpile-rcna216358
[5] https://mfa.gov dot ua/news/mzs-zaprosilo-timchasovogo-povirenogo-u-spravah-ssha-dlya-obgovorennya-pidtrimki-ukrayini-v-protidiyi-rosijskij-agresiyi
[6] https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/13066;
[7]
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/01/us/politics/trump-ukraine-weapons.html; https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/u-s-halts-key-weapons-for-ukraine-in-new-sign-of-weakening-support-for-kyiv-35d78cfc?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAgroeMA-XpoBkhywqAKIXyx10RmZXqsPeBWDKi-dnsMJFWvvKT-qx2a&gaa_ts=686575bf&gaa_sig=bb_7hoXRbQWpv0liIWv-c4kfg-BQAEfLDtEIrJ5HMFrlJy0zECN8-4uKj0FLJnFxGT8xVx7TbhfhTxh5iCcykw%3D%3D
[8] https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/01/pentagon-munitions-ukraine-halt-00436048?s=09
[9] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/07/02/russia-ukraine-war-offensives-ceasefire/2b29644c-570c-11f0-b45b-dc9aeb848c03_story.html
[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040725; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025;
[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv
[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine
[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030925
[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030925
[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030925
[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925
[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625
[18] https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/02/europe/north-korea-troops-russia-ukraine-intl-cmd
[19] https://www.interfax-russia dot ru/rossiya-i-mir/peskov-chem-menshe-oruzhiya-postavlyaetsya-ukraine-tem-blizhe-okonchanie-svo
[20] https://t.me/kadmitriev/149
[21] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/07/02/v-gosdume-nazvali-sroki-protivostoyaniya-vsu-bez-postavok-zapadnogo-oruzhiya/
[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425
[23] https://www.elysee dot fr/emmanuel-macron/2025/07/01/entretien-telephonique-avec-le-president-de-la-federation-de-russie-vladimir-poutine-1; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77337; https://t.me/tass_agency/323383
[24] https://t.me/tass_agency/323436 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/24407615; https://t.me/tass_agency/323446
[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060525
[26] https://tass dot ru/politika/24408985
[27] https://tass dot ru/politika/24412709
[28] https://ria dot ru/20250630/korchunov-2025829378.html ; https://norway dot mid.ru/ru/embassy/press-centre/news/intervyu_posla_rossii_v_norvegii_n_v_korchunova_agentstvu_ria_novosti_30_iyunya_2025_g_/ ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/62072
[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325
[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/primer-russian-cognitive-warfare
[31] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032725
[32] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062425 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061725 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040625; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325
[33] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040425
[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062925
[35] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025
[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl?__cft__[0]=AZWrKiNB8Vzer-mB-dZhqhOOjuM8uSFnMHxsO004PtDNanCXsm4xFvbC8jiX_hy3s1kWPNOlzGsRcx1QhLAEExKDug3_y8dVRzpDQzZbPPnIpZKAZQn_C9BBYT72Yp_l25KCpssCXBov0iQ75cSLdiahgM7T_Cy_-4QvBJNTRkTpQg&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144
[38] https://t.me/dva_majors/74509; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/9783; https://t.me/sashakots/54668; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171053; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30702
[39] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171030
[40] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30682; https://t.me/basurin_e/19655
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26143
[42] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1940092514884554825; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1939760514717855923; https://t.me/ua_regteam/340
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl?__cft__[0]=AZWrKiNB8Vzer-mB-dZhqhOOjuM8uSFnMHxsO004PtDNanCXsm4xFvbC8jiX_hy3s1kWPNOlzGsRcx1QhLAEExKDug3_y8dVRzpDQzZbPPnIpZKAZQn_C9BBYT72Yp_l25KCpssCXBov0iQ75cSLdiahgM7T_Cy_-4QvBJNTRkTpQg&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144
[44] https://t.me/dva_majors/74509
[45] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30682;
[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30682; https://t.me/epoddubny/23976; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38123
[47] https://t.me/rusich_army/24462
[48] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171007; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171015
[49] https://t.me/osirskiy/1195; https://x.com/LloydUkrYT/status/1940332907526283322;
[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30708
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144; https://t.me/otukharkiv/6830
[52] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1056619-do-25-vijskovosluzbovciv-u-grupi-prikordonna-brigada-gart-pro-zbilsenna-rosijskih-sturmiv-na-harkivsini/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/02/cze-vzhe-ne-mali-shturmovi-grupy-poblyzu-vovchanska-rosiyany-vtrachayut-do-100-lyudej-shhodnya/
[53] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1056657-u-vovcansku-vijskovi-rf-perehovuutsa-u-kanalizacii-ta-pidzemnih-komunikaciah-prikordonna-brigada-gart/
[54] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1056783-na-pivdenno-slobozanskomu-napramku-rosiani-namagautsa-zajnati-vigidni-pozicii-hartia/
[55] https://t.me/bella_Ciao44/9149; https://t.me/wargonzo/27643
[56] https://t.me/tass_agency/323427
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144 ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/6830
[58] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171033
[59] https://t.me/yurasumy/23860 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38130
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144
[61] https://t.me/tass_agency/323435
[62] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38114 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38105 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23860
[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23859
[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144
[65] https://t.me/rybar/71839; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170962; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38131; https://t.me/yurasumy/23858
[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144; https://t.me/wargonzo/27645; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170962
[67] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aEBreSv3UuQ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/02/zbyvayemo-starym-didivskym-metodom-u-sylah-oborony-nazvaly-najbilshu-problemu-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku/
[68] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170962
[69] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38131; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30682; https://t.me/mod_russia/54304
[70] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1940327598296633671; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/1261
[71] https://t.me/dva_majors/74509
[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144; https://t.me/rybar/71839; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170962; https://t.me/yurasumy/23857; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65578
[73] https://t.me/dva_majors/74541
[74] https://t.me/mod_russia/54317
[75] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13979
[76] https://t.me/dva_majors/74541
[77] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38113; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65578; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30673; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38131
[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144; https://t.me/rybar/71839; https://t.me/yurasumy/23856; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65578; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30706
[79] https://t.me/rybar/71839
[80] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/02/prykydayutsya-derevom-i-mriyut-pro-dnipropetrovshhynu-typova-povedinka-rosiyan-bilya-pokrovska/
[81] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnrp2S2L6qk ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/02/vorog-hoche-vyjty-na-nash-riven-za-den-pozycziyi-pid-pokrovskomu-atakuye-50-60-shturmovykiv/
[82] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13979
[83] https://www.facebook.com/37obrmp/videos/1680665412635223/; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9498
[84] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30673 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23852 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94907 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15774
[85] https://t.me/yurasumy/23852 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23854 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170988 ; https://t.me/rybar/71815 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144
[86] https://t.me/wargonzo/27645
[87] https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1056721-vijsk-rf-u-dacnomu-na-dnipropetrovsini-nemae-osuv-hortica/ ; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9477 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26178
[88] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1057059-e-kadri-de-vze-peretnuli-adminkordon-ale-ih-pidkiduvali-aka-situacia-na-novopavlivskomu-napramku/
[89] https://t.me/voin_dv/15774
[90] https://t.me/yurasumy/23854
[91] https://t.me/voin_dv/15787
[92] https://t.me/voin_dv/15774
[93] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144
[94] https://t.me/voin_dv/15774
[95] https://t.me/yurasumy/23851 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65582
[96] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65582
[97] https://t.me/voin_dv/15773
[98] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144
[99] https://t.me/wargonzo/27657 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54304 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74503; https://t.me/dva_majors/74518
[100] https://t.me/tass_agency/323430
[101] https://focus dot ua/voennye-novosti/712692-ildar-ahmerov-pogib-v-krymu-vse-podrobnosti; https://t.me/c/2059151819/1045; https://war.obozrevatel dot com/v-okkupirovannom-kryimu-likvidirovali-komanduyuschego-chernomorskim-flotom-rf-pervyie-podrobnosti.htm
[102] https://t.me/kpszsu/37488
[103] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22585 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/02/raketni-udary-ta-ataky-droniv-po-dnipropetrovshhyni-v-ova-pokazaly-naslidky-seriyi-obstriliv/ ; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1055689-vijska-rf-vdarili-raketou-po-kamanskomu-rajonu-stalasa-pozeza/; https://www.facebook.com/permalink.phpstory_fbid=pfbid02s9XT3KqE3ZsNkcs3QbVVqxiuaT3HpQ7v7a3hzCFiCRMSpsz5RSehhbMK2azuhjw5l&id=61558717479769 ;https://t.me/OP_UA/16107 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22569; https://suspilne dot media/1056303-na-vijni-zaginuv-komandir-110-i-ombr-sergij-zaharevic/; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/u-nas-ye-chitka-informaciya-i-partneri-ce-pidtverdzhuyut-sho-98781 ; https://t.me/kramatorsk_rada/23128 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/02/vorog-vdaryv-po-kramatorsku-geranyamy-ye-rujnuvannya-infrastruktury/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/15397 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/02/vorog-atakuvav-harkiv-dronamy-ta-aviabombamy-ye-postrazhdali/ ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1056495-po-odnopoverhovomu-budinku-v-novobavarskomu-rajoni-harkova-vdariv-sahed-foto-naslidkiv/; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2749 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15393 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15394 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15395 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2747 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15396 ; https://suspilne dot media/1056451-makron-pogovoriv-z-putinim-unaslidok-rosijskogo-udaru-zaginuv-komandir-110-brigadi-zaharevic-1225-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1751409233&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/IzmailRDA/36256
[104] https://suspilne dot media/1056451-makron-pogovoriv-z-putinim-unaslidok-rosijskogo-udaru-zaginuv-komandir-110-brigadi-zaharevic-1225-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1751461721&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[105] https://t.me/belta_telegramm/321007 ; http://belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-raskryl-prichiny-izmenenija-parametrov-uchenij-zapad-2025-724155-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2025
[106] https://www.pnp dot ru/politics/putin-vnes-na-ratifikaciyu-protokol-ob-uchastii-belorusov-v-rossiyskikh-vyborakh.html
[107] https://www.pnp dot ru/in-world/lukashenko-razreshil-belorusam-golosovat-na-mestnykh-vyborakh-v-rossii.html
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 1, 2025
A Russian occupation official claimed that Russian forces seized the entirety of Luhansk Oblast for the second time during Russia’s full-scale invasion, but Russian milbloggers denied this claim. The Russian military command is modernizing Russian training grounds to include motorcycle tracks and reportedly intends to purchase up to 200,000 Chinese-made motorcycles for the Russian military. Russian sources continue to speculate on the MoD’s ability to formalize and improve Russian military’s motorcycle training. ISW assessed in late November 2024 that Russian. forces had seized roughly 99 percent ofLuhansk. Oblast, and Russian forces have struggled in the seven months to seize the last. one percent of the territory. The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on July 1, and ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
July 1, 2025, 6:00 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on July 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
A Russian occupation official claimed that Russian forces seized the entirety of Luhansk Oblast for the second time during Russia’s full-scale invasion, but Russian milbloggers denied this claim. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on June 30 that Russian forces seized all of Luhansk Oblast.[1] Russian milbloggers denied Pasechnik’s claim, however, stating that Russian forces have not cleared Nadiya and Novoyehorivka (both east of Borova).[2] One milblogger claimed that some border areas are still contested “gray zones.”[3] Then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed on July 3, 2022, that Russian forces captured all of Luhansk Oblast, but Ukrainian forces were subsequently able to regain positions in Luhansk Oblast during the Fall 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive.[4] Ukrainian forces made advances in Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts during the Fall 2022 counteroffensive and disrupted Russian plans to resume efforts to drive on the northern edge of the “fortress belt” in Donetsk Oblast.[5] Russian forces have since failed to retake significant swathes of territory that Ukrainian forces liberated in the Kharkiv counteroffensive, including Kupyansk, Borova, Izyum, and Lyman. Russian forces intensified offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Borova, and Lyman directions in early 2024 and have continued attempts to advance toward these three settlements over the last one and a half years.[6] ISW assessed in late November 2024 that Russian forces had seized roughly 99 percent of Luhansk Oblast, and Russian forces have struggled in the seven months to seize the last one percent.[7]
The Russian military command is modernizing Russian training grounds to include motorcycle tracks and reportedly intends to purchase up to 200,000 Chinese-made motorcycles for the Russian military. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on June 27 and 28 showing Russian officials visiting the Novosibirsk Higher Military Command School and a new military training ground in Krasnodar Krai and highlighted that Russia is creating motorcycle training programs at these facilities.[8] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and Russian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev discussed improving Russia’s ability to train forces and generate new officers at the Novosibirsk Higher Military Command School, and Belousov ordered Mordvichev to equip the school with motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to help train cadets in modern tactics. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov stated that the Krasnodar Krai training ground has a modern driving range for motorcycles, ATVs, and quad bikes and noted that Russia has modernized over 200 training centers to account for the new tactics that Russian forces are using in Ukraine. The Russian military command has been working to formalize motorcycle tactics and training throughout the Russian military in recent months.[9]
Russian sources continue to speculate on the Russian MoD’s ability to formalize and further improve Russian motorcycle usage, however. A Russian Telegram channel claimed on June 13 that Mordvichev pioneered the use of motorcycles and ATVs in late 2024 in order to facilitate further Russian advances toward Pokrovsk.[10] The Telegram channel stated that the Russian force grouping in the Pokrovsk direction developed formal norms for using motorcycles by June 2025 and that the Russian military command is attempting to replicate these norms in other frontline areas. The Telegram channel reiterated that Russian servicemembers receive most of their motorcycles from volunteer organizations or purchase motorcycles independently, but noted that Mordvichev intends for the Russian MoD to centrally provide motorcycles for troops and establish a motorcycle stockpile. The Telegram channel, citing unspecified sources in the Russian military, stated that Russia purchased over 40,000 Chinese-made motorcycles in 2024 and that Russian forces have received 20,000 of these motorcycles. One Russian military source told the channel that the Russian MoD intends to purchase 120,000 motorcycles, 30,000 ATVs, and 12,000 buggies by the end of 2025. Another source in the Russian MoD stated that the MoD intends to purchase up to 200,000 motorcycles and 60,000 other types of light vehicles — likely in 2025. The Telegram channel stated that Mordvichev also intends to hire a group of instructors to teach troops how to best operate motorcycles and that some of these instructors may be former Wagner Group members.
A Russian milblogger and former Storm Z instructor complained on June 30 that Russian motorcycles and ATVs are vulnerable to Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drone strikes and that Russian motorcycle assaults result in higher killed-in-action (KIA) to wounded-in-action (WIA) ratios, however.[11] The milblogger noted that motorcycle assaults could be more successful should Russian forces use motorcycles in tandem with significant air, drone, and electronic warfare (EW) support. Motorcycle usage has allowed Russian forces to marginally improve their ability to dodge Ukrainian drones in contested “gray zones” along the frontline, but Russia’s rate of advance has yet to increase beyond a foot pace despite efforts to integrate faster-moving vehicles into assault tactics.
Ukrainian forces continue to strike defense industrial enterprises in Russia’s rear. Sources within Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on July 1 that SBU drones struck the “Kupol” Electromechanical Plant in Izhevsk, Republic of Udmurtia.[12] The SBU sources reported that the drones traveled 1,300 kilometers to the target and that at least two drones struck two factory buildings, causing a fire. The SBU sources reported that the plant produces Tor and Osa air defense systems and Garpiya long-range strike drones. Geolocated footage published on July 1 shows a drone striking the plant, causing an explosion.[13] Republic of Udmurtia Head Alexander Brechalov acknowledged on July 1 that Ukrainian drones struck an enterprise in Izhevsk, starting a fire.[14] Russian milbloggers largely responded to the strike by continuing to call for Russian authorities to strengthen air defenses to protect the defense industrial base in the Russian rear.[15]
The Ukrainian military command continues to transition to a corps structure and improve its training system. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on July 1 that the Ukrainian command will assign training battalions to the newly created army corps and that the training battalions will operate as part of unit training centers.[16] Syrskyi announced that Deputy Chief of Staff of the Ukrainian General Staff Major General Ihor Skybyuk will oversee the training. Syrskyi announced a prohibition on accumulations of Ukrainian forces and means and tent camps, likely in response to recent Russian strikes against Ukrainian concentrations in the Ukrainian rear.[17] Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian authorities are building structures to protect training areas from strikes. Syrskyi noted that Ukrainian forces will undergo more training to counter Russian strike drones.
Russian-Azerbaijani relations continue to deteriorate over a number of smaller-scale incidents in recent days, inflaming unresolved disputes over the December 2024 Russian shoot down of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) protested on July 1 against Azerbaijan’s “unfriendly actions” that the Russian MFA claimed are “deliberate” steps to dismantle bilateral relations.[18] The Russian MFA claimed that the recent detention of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg was lawful and that Baku’s accusations against Russian law enforcement agencies are an interference in Russia’s internal affairs. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov accused Baku of taking actions that are “not in line” with the “spirit and character” of Russian-Azerbaijani relations.[19] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev spoke on the phone on July 1 and discussed the detentions in Yekaterinburg.[20] Russian milbloggers largely criticized Azerbaijan for deliberately trying to undermine its relationship with Russia and claimed that Azerbaijani authorities and media are trying to play up the detention of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Russia to galvanize Azerbaijani society against Russia.[21] Azerbaijani-Russian relations deteriorated in late 2024 when Russia refused to take full responsibility for the December 25, 2024, downing of an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger plane, likely shot in mid-air by Russian air defense before crashing in Kazakhstan.[22]
An investigation by the Center for Human Rights in Armed Conflict found that Russian forces were responsible for a 2022 strike that killed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in occupied Donetsk Oblast, as ISW assessed at the time. The Center for Human Rights in Armed Conflict reported on June 26 that Russian forces conducted the July 28, 2022, strike against a barracks at the Volnovaska Penal Colony near Olenivka, Donetsk Oblast that killed Ukrainian POWs.[23] The Center for Human Rights in Armed Conflict reported that available evidence disproves the Russian claim that Ukrainian forces struck the barracks with HIMARS rockets. The report found that Lyubivka (roughly four kilometers east of Olenivka) was the likely launch site of the strike. The Center for Human Rights in Armed Conflict reported that the Russian military — likely a group affiliated with the Russian General Staff — planned and organized the strike and likely coordinated with the Federal Service in Executing Punishments (FSIN). ISW assessed at the time of the strike that Russian forces were responsible for the killing of 53 Ukrainian POWs at the Russian-controlled prison.[24]
Key Takeaways:
A Russian occupation official claimed that Russian forces seized the entirety of Luhansk Oblast for the second time during Russia’s full-scale invasion, but Russian milbloggers denied this claim.
The Russian military command is modernizing Russian training grounds to include motorcycle tracks and reportedly intends to purchase up to 200,000 Chinese-made motorcycles for the Russian military.
Ukrainian forces continue to strike defense industrial enterprises in Russia’s rear.
The Ukrainian military command continues to transition to a corps structure and improve its training system.
Russian-Azerbaijani relations continue to deteriorate over a number of smaller-scale incidents in recent days, inflaming unresolved disputes over the December 2024 Russian shoot down of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane.
An investigation by the Center for Human Rights in Armed Conflict found that Russian forces were responsible for a 2022 strike that killed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in occupied Donetsk Oblast, as ISW assessed at the time.
Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces advanced near Toretsk and Novopavlivka.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 1.
Russian forces conducted attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 30 and July 1.[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked in the Glushkovo and Tetkino (southeast of Glushkovo) directions.[26]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 91st Sapper-Engineer Regiment (reportedly under the operational command of the Northern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[27] Elements of the 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Tetkino and Novyi Put (southwest of Glushkovo).[28]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 1 but did not advance.
Russian forces continued attacks in the Sumy Oblast border area, including northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Sadky on June 30 and July 1.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yunakivka, Sadky, Novomykolaivka, Andriivka (all north of Sumy City), and Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[30]
The chief of staff of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Sumy direction reported on July 1 that Russian forces are moving on foot individually to avoid discovery by Ukrainian forces and have to walk 10 kilometers to reach the frontline before attacks.[31] The chief of staff reported that Russian forces are using motorcycles and quadbikes for logistics.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Smuglyanka” Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Andriivka and Khotin (north of Sumy City).[32] Drone operators of the “Anvar” Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Sadky.[33] Elements of the Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz “Aida” Detachment, drone operators of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade and “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, and artillery elements of the 106th VDV Division are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[34]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 1 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and Zelene and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on June 30 and July 1.[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchansk.[36]
The commander of a Ukrainian company operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on July 1 that Russian forces near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) are accumulating and attacking in small groups up to a detachment.[37] The commander noted that previous Russian armored vehicle attacks were unable to even pass the Russian second line of defense before Ukrainian forces struck the vehicles.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz “Bati” Detachment (204th “Akhmat” Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly operating in Kharkiv Oblast.[38]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 1 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Kupyansk near Milove, Dovhenke, Radkivka, and Holubivka and toward Petro-Ivanivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Novoosynove and Pishchane on June 30 and July 1.[39]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 1 but did not make confirmed advances.
See topline text for claims of Russian advances in Luhansk Oblast.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Borova near Kopanky and southeast of Borova near Novovodyane and toward Olhivka on June 30 and July 1.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova).[41]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attempting to advance west from Lozova (northeast of Borova) in order to envelop Bohuslavka (west of Lozova) from the south.[42] The milblogger claimed that part of Nova Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova) is a contested “gray zone.”
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 1 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Ridkodub (north of Lyman) and advanced north of the settlement.[43]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Lyman near Novyi Myr, Karpivka, and Ridkodub and toward Serednye and Shandryholove; northeast of Lyman near Myrne, Zelene Dolyna, and Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske on June 30 and July 1.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ridkodub.[45]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are using MT-LB armored fighting vehicles to transport infantry closer to Ukrainian positions.[46]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 283rd and 488th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in Karpivka.[47]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued assaults in the Siversk direction on July 1 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk) and are attacking into the eastern outskirts of Siversk.[48]
Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka, southeast of Siversk toward Vyimka, and south of Siversk toward Zvanivka on June 30 and July 1.[49]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 1 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division seized Shevchenko Microraion (southwestern Chasiv Yar) and advanced in eastern Mykolaivka (west of Chasiv Yar).[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest, west, and southwest of Chasiv Yar and into and near Bila Hora.[51]
Russian forces continued assaults in Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne and toward Bila Hora and Oleksandro-Shultyne on June 30 and July 1.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bila Hora.[53]
The commander of a Ukrainian drone company operating in the Kramatorsk (Chasiv Yar) direction reported that Russian forces are currently attacking less intensely than in late May and early June 2025.[54] The commander noted that Russian forces are leveraging motorcycles to transport infantry closer to Ukrainian positions.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Bila Hora.[55]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Toretsk, southeast of Poltavka, and northwest of Yablunivka (both northwest of Toretsk).[56]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk) and toward Nelipivka and Kleban-Byk (both northwest of Toretsk).[57]
Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka and Popiv Yar and toward Rusyn Yar; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Novospaske; and southwest of Toretsk near Leonidivka on June 30 and July 1.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dyliivka.[59]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian positions near Raiske (northwest of Toretsk in the Ukrainian near rear) with a Geran-2 drone (Russian-made analogue of the Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones).[60]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 944th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD), 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA), 221st Separate Engineer-Sapper Battalion, and 163rd Tank Regiment (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Poltavka.[61] Elements of the 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a reconstituted Soviet unit) are reportedly operating near Dyliivka.[62] Elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating in Dachne (northeast of Toretsk).[63]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk).[64]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Novoukrainka (south of Pokrovsk).[65]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrne and toward Razine, Koptieve, and Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Myrolubivka and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne on June 30 and July 1.[66]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces continue to deploy small infantry assault groups, sometimes with heavy armored vehicle support.[67] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces frequently attack at night and that Russian forces are increasingly using scooters, folding and carrying the scooters as soon as Russian forces reach impassable roads. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces have a quantitative drone advantage in the area.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian “Typhoon” Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Pokrovsk direction.[68] Drone operators of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Shakhove (northeast of Pokrovsk).[69]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 1 that Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike against the headquarters of the Russian 8th CAA (SMD) in occupied Donetsk City on June 30.[70] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that the strike killed the acting commander of the 8th CAA, Colonel Ruslan Goryachkin.[71]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Dachne (south of Novopavlivka in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast) and seized the settlement.[72]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Dachne.[73] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Shevchenko, west of Komar, west of Yalta, and southwest of Zirka (all south of Novopavlivka).[74]
Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Muravka, and Novomykolaivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Oleksiivka, Bahatyr, Zelenyi Kut, and Novoukrainka; and south of Novopavlivka near Piddubne, Zaporizhzhia, Fedorivka, Perebudova, Vesele, Komar, and Dachne on June 30 and July 1.[75] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kotylarivka (east of Novopavlivka), Muravka, Zirka, and Perebudova.[76]
A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction stated that Russian forces are no longer deploying columns of seven to eight motorcycles but are now deploying only two to three motorcycles at a time.[77] The servicemember stated that Russian forces are deploying small infantry groups of two to three personnel with infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) and motorcycle support. The servicemember stated that Russian forces are moving first on motorcycles — accumulating forces three to five kilometers from the frontline — and then moving in small groups on foot.
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces struck a bridge over the Vovcha River along the H-15 Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia City highway near Iskra (southwest of Novopavlivka in the Ukrainian near rear).[78]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in Dachne.[79] Elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia, Zirka, and Yalta.[80] Elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Horikhove.[81]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 1 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and south of Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), east of Maliivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast), and near Novopil (west of Velyka Novosilka).[82]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and toward Voskresenka, Komyshuvakha, and Maliivka and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on June 30 and July 1.[83]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[84]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued assaults in the Hulyaipole direction on July 1 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north and west of Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[85]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 30 and July 1.[86]
Russian forces continued assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 1 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted assaults southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske on June 30 and July 1.[87] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Kamyanske.[88]
Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on July 1 that Ukrainian partisans destroyed a railway track in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on June 26 and disabled a train on July 1 as part of ongoing efforts to complicate Russian military logistics in southern Ukraine.[89]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Smuglyanka” Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv and Stepnohirsk (north of Kamyanske).[90]
Russian forces continued assaults in unspecified areas of the Kherson direction on June 30 and July 1 but did not advance.[91]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 328th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (104th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in occupied Kherson Oblast.[92]
The GUR reported on July 1 that Ukrainian drones destroyed a Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense system and its crew, several radars, and an Su-30 aircraft at an airfield near occupied Saky, Crimea.[93]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 30 to July 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on July 1 that Russian forces launched 52 Shahed and decoy drones from Bryansk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[94] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 14 drones and that 33 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian drones struck three unspecified locations in Ukraine. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on July 1 that Russian forces conducted a ballistic missile strike against Hulyaipole, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the morning of July 1 and destroyed civilian infrastructure in the area.[95]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 2,453 Shahed drones, 14 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles, 27 Iskander-K cruise missiles, 8 Kh-47 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles, 93 Kh-101/Kh-55 cruise missiles, 12 Kalibr cruise missiles, and 13 Kh-59/69 guided aircraft missiles in June 2025.[96]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/tass_agency/323191;
[2] https://t.me/dva_majors/74441; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170901 ;
[3] https://t.me/wargonzo/27613
[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3
[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis
[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis
[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112624
[8] https://t.me/mod_russia/54205 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54209
[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062425 ; https://isw.pub/RussianForceGen050725
[10] https://t.me/volyamedia/1546
[11] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2646 ; https://t.me/kcpn2014/3194 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2647 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2648
[12] https://suspilne dot media/1055937-droni-sbu-vrazili-zavod-kupol-v-izevsku-akij-viroblae-zrk-i-bpla-dla-armii-rf-dzerela/
[13] https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1939950559227707403; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1939970377075081581; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1939965308489392186; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1939957556144644587
[14] https://t.me/brechalov/6830; https://t.me/brechalov/6835
[15] https://t.me/rybar/71805 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170930; https://t.me/rybar/71816
[16] https://t.me/osirskiy/1202
[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2025
[18] https://t.me/MID_Russia/62067
[19] https://tass dot ru/politika/24400355
[20] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/prezident-ukrayini-proviv-rozmovu-z-prezidentom-azerbajdzhan-98773; https://president dot az/en/articles/view/69287
[21] https://t.me/dva_majors/74464 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74463; https://t.me/dva_majors/74429; https://t.me/dva_majors/74458; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170887; https://t.me/rybar/71808; https://t.me/rybar/71817
[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122624
[23] https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/g3bqh1rvkko6x2rkqd0hi/Barracks-200-EN.pdf?rlkey=xm20hr1qa16b0k9k33touozq8&e=1&st=yzt9mcls&dl=0
[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1
[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dR4EFGYsSrPJSWkorDL8GPDkcYHSYUXymKm71dYVzWV76yHerYSNGq4ddkNXVnfPl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl
[26] https://t.me/dva_majors/74441; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30647
[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/54286
[28] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38051; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94850
[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dR4EFGYsSrPJSWkorDL8GPDkcYHSYUXymKm71dYVzWV76yHerYSNGq4ddkNXVnfPl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74441; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170938
[30] https://t.me/wargonzo/27613; https://t.me/smotri_z/45755; https://t.me/dva_majors/74441
[31] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/01/po-10-km-pishky-ta-povzkom-u-zsu-rozpovily-pro-taktyku-vorozhyh-shturmovykiv-na-sumshhyni/
[32] https://t.me/dva_majors/74428;
[33] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170938
[34] https://t.me/dva_majors/74459; https://t.me/iamsniper/14045; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30638; https://t.me/basurin_e/19615; https://t.me/tass_agency/323372;
[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dR4EFGYsSrPJSWkorDL8GPDkcYHSYUXymKm71dYVzWV76yHerYSNGq4ddkNXVnfPl?__cft__[0]=AZWqKZyHVHRbiaxmijAaLVMR-qx-0_Ei2MpjVxjH0fG2dpTs4NK13whZlNt9ui9thhxEn2ZJGVCeUu4-_RgntL4U58LAXaZALc19AhbDh8BfHDxJBYJJOdLvDgo0yTcNGYSOq5Yg8_9y6_WXYjhaT_Voq4X5llHFmiQW1IqBDpYznA&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal?__cft__[0]=AZXCXirJANzSg_3bmrRYbhIl0ihdf5QHBZRFdvtTDtJI4XLtYPlMZYVsb-L8usazTUXOFu0khEdWjHQcB80XFn6NpQP8vyU3aA_rViqLCA3NtK6jeGtlWzrBgBwPUsdHC2OkPyluXqqusdwvQqi66mwys3P1LWaUQR1GCdV9T6q5PQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0351L9wj9pvAzAK3fBypWmAeNUMxuLJxXpyrMBkaPnuujCnSL1tjDdXD1kHRzhB7Hil?__cft__[0]=AZUls_4THZIaALQgLRx5JMVtP6AMdGS1-jKyBIoBKJqcMzM_hC3yqdwZIEf4J4HidClCZg6Y5u-2c64ZvUo6ymdOovM3A7jCkfLKnH3q7uhktHW48fdVSGsLqPfW0duo3sLgMRVDBz-8ITsnSrunMBazPqqaWZQy9MHJgfgySo0YVA&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30644; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13508
[36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30644
[37] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/01/tam-obstrilyuyut-tam-kilzona-vyzhyty-nerealno-na-harkivshhyni-rosiyany-vidmovlyayutsya-ity-v-shturmy/
[38] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5812
[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dR4EFGYsSrPJSWkorDL8GPDkcYHSYUXymKm71dYVzWV76yHerYSNGq4ddkNXVnfPl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl
[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dR4EFGYsSrPJSWkorDL8GPDkcYHSYUXymKm71dYVzWV76yHerYSNGq4ddkNXVnfPl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl
[41] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30666
[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30666
[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37960; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30656
[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dR4EFGYsSrPJSWkorDL8GPDkcYHSYUXymKm71dYVzWV76yHerYSNGq4ddkNXVnfPl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30656
[45] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30656
[46] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1055643-rosijski-vijska-sturmuut-limanskij-napramok-malimi-grupami-dnami-zsu-znisili-mtlb-ta-pihotu-rf/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/01/pihotynczi-yaki-desantuvalysya-buly-znyshheni-poblyzu-lymanu-protyvnyk-ne-vstygaye-realizovuvaty-plany/
[47] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37960
[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30629
[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dR4EFGYsSrPJSWkorDL8GPDkcYHSYUXymKm71dYVzWV76yHerYSNGq4ddkNXVnfPl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl
[50] https://t.me/wargonzo/27613 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30655 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65557; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37991; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30669
[51] https://t.me/wargonzo/27613 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30655 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65557; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37991; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30669
[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dR4EFGYsSrPJSWkorDL8GPDkcYHSYUXymKm71dYVzWV76yHerYSNGq4ddkNXVnfPl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl
[53] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30669
[54] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/01/taktyka-shtovhannya-pryam-strashne-na-kramatorskomu-rosijski-shturmovyky-masovo-styrayutsya-ob-ukrayinsku-oboronu/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fo40sNBTM40
[55] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65557; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37991; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37995
[56] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1939822468060893335; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1939819664319660042; https://t.me/UA_Military_Police/766; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9492; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1939782682465992897; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1939783962097840387; https://t.me/ua_marines_36brigade/3244; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1939792509347008653
[57] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65557
[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dR4EFGYsSrPJSWkorDL8GPDkcYHSYUXymKm71dYVzWV76yHerYSNGq4ddkNXVnfPl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl; https://t.me/rusich_army/24451; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65557
[59] https://t.me/rusich_army/24451
[60] https://t.me/mod_russia/54296
[61] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13976; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13974
[62] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65557
[63] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37991; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37995
[64] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9496; https://t.me/lost_armour/5722
[65] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65559
[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dR4EFGYsSrPJSWkorDL8GPDkcYHSYUXymKm71dYVzWV76yHerYSNGq4ddkNXVnfPl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl;
[67] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/01/my-z-czogo-smiyalys-ale-vony-navchylys-poblyzu-pokrovska-rosijski-komandyry-hochut-hoch-yakus-peremogu/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnrp2S2L6qk
[68] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38066
[69] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170925
[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26140
[71] https://t.me/astrapress/85319; https://t.me/a_shtirlitz/31313; https://t.me/astrapress/85229
[72] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1939754443253457171; https://t.me/mo114rf/96; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9488; https://t.me/osintpen/1331
[73] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65559; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170931
[74] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65559; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94849; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37977; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65537
[75] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dR4EFGYsSrPJSWkorDL8GPDkcYHSYUXymKm71dYVzWV76yHerYSNGq4ddkNXVnfPl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl; https://t.me/rybar/71800; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65530; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65531; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65536; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65537; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65559; https://t.me/rybar/71815; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170858
[76] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65537; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65536; https://t.me/dva_majors/74441
[77] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/01/adminkordon-yim-yak-medom-namazanyj-rosiyany-poyednuyut-bmp-j-motoczykly-z-malymy-grupamy-pihoty/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fo40sNBTM40
[78] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94800
[79] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94824 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30668
[80] https://t.me/rybar/71800
[81] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65559
[82] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37977; https:// t me/voenkorKotenok/65537; https://t.me/wargonzo/27613; https://t.me/dva_majors/74441; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170858
[83] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dR4EFGYsSrPJSWkorDL8GPDkcYHSYUXymKm71dYVzWV76yHerYSNGq4ddkNXVnfPl; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65537; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170858; https://t.me/wargonzo/27613
[84] https://t.me/voin_dv/15763
[85] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38010
[86] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl
[87] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dR4EFGYsSrPJSWkorDL8GPDkcYHSYUXymKm71dYVzWV76yHerYSNGq4ddkNXVnfPl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl
[88] https://t.me/dva_majors/74441
[89] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/paralich-lohistyky-voroha-detali-hurkotu-na-zaliznytsi-u-zaporizkii-oblasti.html ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/01/paralich-logistyky-okupantiv-u-gur-rozkryly-detali-gurkotu-na-zaliznyczi-u-zaporizkij-oblasti/; https://t.me/DIUkraine/6319
[90] https://t.me/dva_majors/74428
[91] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl
[92] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/20926
[93] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/01/nyshhat-czili-uhylyayuchys-vid-raket-udarni-bobry-vrazyly-rls-ta-su-30-na-aerodromi-v-sakah/; https://t.me/DIUkraine/6316
[94] https://t.me/kpszsu/37451
[95] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12659
[96] https://t.me/kpszsu/37464
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 30, 2025
This report includes an interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool. The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) issued its December 2024-May 2025 report detailing Ukrainian civilian casualties. The UN OHCHR reported that 968 Ukrainian civilians died and sustained injuries from December, 2024, to May 31, 2025. The vast majority of casualties resulted from Russian operations to seize territory along the front, and the use of explosives in areas. The report stated that most of these executions occurred in areas where Russian forces were advancing in Donetsk and Kursk oblasts. It also reported that it had recorded credible allegations of the execution of 106 Ukrainian POWs by Russian forces between late August 2024 and late August 2025, with 35 of these likely occurring between December 2024 and May 2025. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. The map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
June 30, 2025 5:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on June 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
High-ranking Kremlin statements, including from Russian President Vladimir Putin, continue to demonstrate Russia’s wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond Crimea and the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting on June 30 on the socioeconomic development of occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts during which he frequently referred to occupied Ukraine as “Donbas and Novorossiya.”[1] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on June 30 to a June 27 statement by Odesa City Mayor Gennadiy Trukhanov that Odesa City is not a “Russian” city and has its own history, claiming that the history of Odesa City is “inextricably linked” with Russia.[2] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky claimed on June 30 that Russians and Ukrainians are “one people” with a “historical homeland” and referenced the “ancient Russian lands on both sides of the Dnipro (River), Novorossiya, and Crimea.”[3]
Putin’s, Peskov’s, and Medinsky’s June 30 statements are only the latest statements from high-ranking Kremlin officials indicating the extent of Russia’s territorial ambitions. Putin reiterated at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 20 that he considers the Russian and Ukrainian people to be “one people in reality” and that “Ukraine is [Russia’s].”[4] Kremlin officials have routinely labelled Odesa City as a “Russian” city, including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov most recently on June 9.[5] Kremlin officials have also repeatedly referenced “Novorossiya,” which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine.[6] Medinsky’s reference to the “ancient Russian” lands on “both sides of the Dnipro” also coheres with Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo’s April 2025 call for Russia to completely control the areas of the Dnipro River that pass through Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[7] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa stated in early June 2025 that Russia intends to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River and seize Odesa Oblast by the end of 2026.[8] Putin and other Kremlin officials have consistently indicated that they do not believe that Ukraine is an independent state with its own history, identity, and culture separate from Russia.[9] Russian officials’ ongoing commitment to these narratives demonstrates the Kremlin’s continued objective of destroying the Ukrainian state and subjugating the Ukrainian people.
The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) issued its December 2024-May 2025 report detailing Ukrainian civilian casualties, systemic Russian mistreatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), and limited Ukrainian mistreatment of Russian POWs. The UN OHCHR reported that 968 Ukrainian civilians died and 4,807 sustained injuries from conflict-related violence from December 1, 2024, to May 31, 2025 — a 37 percent increase compared to the same time period last year.[10] The UN OHCHR assessed that the vast majority of these civilian casualties resulted from Russian military operations to seize territory along the front, the use of explosives in urban areas, and the increased use of short-range combat drones. The UN OHCHR reported that it had recorded credible allegations of the execution of 106 Ukrainian POWs by Russian forces between late August 2024 and May 2025, with 35 of these executions likely occurring between December 2024 and May 2025. The report stated that most of these executions occurred in areas where Russian forces were advancing in Donetsk and Kursk oblasts. The UN OHCHR reported that interviews with Ukrainian POWs released from Russian captivity confirmed Russia’s “widespread and systematic” practices of torture. The report states that the UN verified the execution of one Russian soldier rendered hors de combat by a Ukrainian soldier in late 2024. The UN OHCHR stated that it has verified the execution of 26 persons hors de combat, including Russian POWs, by Ukrainian forces since February 2022, but that all but one of these executions occurred in 2022 or early 2023. The UN OHCHR stated that interviewed POWs held in Ukrainian captivity reported torture and ill-treatment, but noted that most of these acts occurred in transit places before arrival at official internment locations. Russian state media largely misrepresented the UN OHCHR report by ignoring assessments about Russia’s widespread execution and systemic mistreatment of Ukrainian POWs and reporting only on the assessments about Ukrainian mistreatment of Russian POWs.[11] Russian state media similarly misrepresented the UN OHCHR’s previous reports.[12]
The Kremlin is poised to launch a new “national messenger” application affiliated with Kremlin-controlled social media site VKontakte (VK) as part of ongoing efforts to censor Russian citizens and isolate them from the global internet. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on June 24 approving the creation of a national messenger application that will allow Russian citizens to virtually access government services and documents.[13] The decree orders that the application combine the functions of a social media messenger application with government services and documents and that it be available by Fall 2025. Russian citizens would not be able to have an anonymous social media presence on this national messenger application. VK announced its “Max” digital platform and messenger application in March 2025, and Russian officials have acknowledged that Max could serve as the basis for the new “national messenger” application.[14] The Kremlin has reportedly been planning to partner with VK to launch a national messenger since at least Fall 2024.[15] A source familiar with VK’s plans told Russian news organization Vedomosti in March 2025 that Max could become an analogue to the Chinese WeChat application.[16] A Max representative told Vedomosti on June 30 that one million users have registered with the beta-version of Max over the last “several weeks.”[17] Russian State Duma Information Technology (IT) Committee First Deputy Chairperson Anton Gorelkin claimed on June 5 that Russia will not ban Telegram in connection with the launch of Max, although the Kremlin may attempt to ban Telegram and other social media connected to the Western world in the medium- to long-term if the roll out of the new national messenger application is successful.[18]
Azerbaijani authorities raided the offices of Russian state-owned propaganda outlet Sputnik in Baku as Russian-Azerbaijani relations have deteriorated recently after a raid against ethnic Azerbaijanis in Russia. Azerbaijani outlet Qafqazinfo reported on June 30, citing the Azerbaijani Ministry of Internal Affairs, that local police raided the office of Sputnik in Baku.[19] Local Azerbaijani outlets claimed that Azerbaijani authorities detained two Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) agents during the raid on Sputnik’s Baku office.[20] The Azerbaijani Ministry of Internal Affairs stated that Sputnik had continued working in Azerbaijan via “illegal financing” despite the revocation of its official accreditation in February 2025.[21] The raid on the Sputnik office in Baku comes after a recent raid by Russian security forces in Yekaterinburg that resulted in the detention of nine Azerbaijani citizens accused of contract killings in the early 2000s and left two Azerbaijanis dead.[22] The Azerbaijani Ministry of Culture cancelled all cultural events that Russia organized in Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijani officials cancelled planned trips to Moscow in response to the Yekaterinburg raid.[23] Continued Azerbaijani restraints on Russian state media or cultural events in Azerbaijan would likely further deteriorate bilateral relations and undermine Russia’s influence in the south Caucasus, particularly as the Kremlin uses its media presence and cultural soft power abroad to further its objectives in the former Soviet space.[24]
Key Takeaways:
High-ranking Kremlin statements, including from Russian President Vladimir Putin, continue to demonstrate Russia’s wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond Crimea and the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed.
The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) issued its December 2024-May 2025 report detailing Ukrainian civilian casualties, systemic Russian mistreatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), and limited Ukrainian mistreatment of Russian POWs.
The Kremlin is poised to launch a new “national messenger” application affiliated with Kremlin-controlled social media site VKontakte (VK) as part of ongoing efforts to censor Russian citizens and isolate them from the global internet.
Azerbaijani authorities raided the offices of Russian state-owned propaganda outlet Sputnik in Baku as Russian-Azerbaijani relations have deteriorated recently after a raid against ethnic Azerbaijanis in Russia.
Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on June 30.
Russian forces conducted attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 29 and 30.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked in the Tetkino (southeast of Glushkovo) and Glushkovo directions.[26]
Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are operating near Tetkino.[27]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on June 30 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Sumy Oblast, including northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on June 29 and 30.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yablunivka, Oleksiivka, Andriivka (all north of Sumy City), Sadky (northeast of Sumy City), and Yunakivka.[29]
Ukraine’s Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated that the number of Russian attacks in the Sumy direction has decreased.[30] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Sumy direction stated that Russian forces are exclusively attacking with small groups of infantry and are not using any types of vehicles.[31] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces have a significant manpower advantage in the area. The commander of a Ukrainian special forces unit told the Wall Street Journal in an article published on June 29 that Russian forces in Sumy Oblast are bringing in reserves to replenish their roughly 300 to 400 daily losses.[32]
A source in Ukrainian law enforcement told Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda that Russian forces conducted a tube artillery strike against Pishchane (just north of Sumy City) on June 22 to 23 and that Russian forces likely launched the artillery strike from either near Kulbaki (north of the international Ukrainian-Russian border roughly 25 kilometers north of Pishchane) or from near Gornal (just north of the border roughly 28 kilometers northeast of Pishchane) or Guyevo (northeast of Gornal roughly 32 kilometers northeast of Pishchane).[33]
Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, LMD), and 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC, LMD) are trying to advance across the O-191505 Khotin-Yelizavetovka highway and near Oleksiivka.[34] Mashovets stated that elements of the 11th and 83rd separate airborne (VDV) brigades are attacking along the Novomykolaivka-Yablunivka line (north of Sumy City) and that the Russian military command reinforced this area with elements of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th AC, LMD) in the past week. Mashovets stated that elements of the 104th, 234th, and 237th VDV regiments (all part of the 76th VDV Division) are attacking near Yunakivka. Mashovets stated that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 106th VDV Division from Sumy Oblast to another unspecified sector of the front but that elements of the 106th VDV Division’s 51st and 137th VDV regiments continue to attack in the Sumy Oblast border area. Elements of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating near Kindrativka (north of Sumy City) and Andriivka.[35]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 30 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Vovchansk and toward Vovchanski Khutory (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[36]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on June 29 and 30.[37]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Anvar” Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv Oblast.[38]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west and northwest of Ivanivka (east of Kupyansk).[39]
Russian forces continued assaults near Kupyansk itself, north of Kupyansk near Petro-Ivanivka, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk toward Pishchane on June 29 and 30.[40]
Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on June 30 that elements of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are attacking in Kindrashivka and Holubivka and trying to seize Radkivka (all immediately north of Kupyansk).[41] Elements of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[42]
Russian forces continued assaults in the Borova direction on June 30 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Borova near Nadiya and Kopanky and southeast of Borova near Novovodyane and Hrekivka and toward Olhivka and Novoserhiivka on June 29 and 30.[43]
Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are unsuccessfully attacking toward Druzhelyubivka (southeast of Borova).[44]
Russian forces continued assaults in the Lyman direction on June 30 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub and toward Shandryholove, Serednye, and Novyi Myr, and east of Lyman near Torske and in the Serebryanske forest area on June 29 and 30.[45] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in Ridkodub and trying to push Russian forces from the settlement.[46]
A non-commissioned officer (NCO) in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on June 30 that Russian forces are accumulating between the Oskil and Zherebets rivers in the Lyman direction, but that it is unclear where Russian forces intend to concentrate their assaults in the future.[47]
Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA) and 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st GTA) are attacking toward Karpivka (northwest of Lyman) and in Ridkodub.[48] Mashovets stated that elements of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division, with support from the 164th and 169th separate motorized rifle brigades (all of the 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), are attacking near Yampolivka (northeast of Lyman) and Torske.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 30 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka, and southwest of Siversk near Vyimka on June 29 and 30.[49]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[50]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 30 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Bila Hora (south of Chasiv Yar).[51]
Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechnye and Stupochky and toward Bila Hora on June 29 and 30.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stupochky and in Chasiv Yar.[53]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating near Bila Hora.[54] Elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 331st VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[55]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on June 30 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of northwest of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[56]
Russian forces continued ground assaults near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northeast of Toretsk near Dachne; and northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka and Rusyn Yar on June 29 and 30.[57]
Order of Battle: Engineering-sapper elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD] are reportedly mining areas near Pleshchiivka (north of Toretsk).[58]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 30 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Novoukrainka (south of Pokrovsk) and advanced southwest of Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk), northwest and west of Hrodivka, northeast and west of Mykolaivka (both southeast of Pokrovsk), northeast of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk), and northeast of Pishchane (southwest of Pokrovsk).[59]
Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka and Myrne and toward Razine, Novotoretske, and Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne on June 29 and 30.[60]
Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction are focusing their attacks near the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway.[61] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that the Russian military command has likely redeployed a large part of the personnel in the battalion’s area of responsibility (AoR) to another direction where Russian forces are attacking with equipment and that Russian forces in the area are primarily conducting reconnaissance of Ukrainian positions.[62] The commander reported that Russian forces are more intensely remote-mining Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Pokrovsk direction and that Russian forces are using drones with tear gas. The commander reported that Russian forces are accumulating near Kurakhove and Selydove (both in the Russian near rear south of Pokrovsk). The commander of a Ukrainian drone crew operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are using drones to destroy Ukrainian communications and logistics to prevent Ukrainian forces from being able to move equipment or supplies to frontline positions or evacuate wounded.[63] A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian platoon operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are conducting guided glide bomb strikes against Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad to block Ukrainian logistics.[64]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian “Typhoon” Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[65]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 30 shows elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) raising a flag in Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[66]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka), west and south of Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka), near Hrushivske, and toward Piddubne, south of Zirka, west and northwest of Komar, west of Fedorivka, and south of Zirka (all south of Novopavlivka), and southeast of Voskresenka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[67]
Russian forces continued ground assaults toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Oleksiivka, and Bahatyr; south of Novopavlvika near, Piddubne, Zaporizhzhia, Fedorivka, Perebudova, Vesele, and Myrne on June 29 and 30.[68]
Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko and Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported that Russian forces do not occupy any territory in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast but that fighting is ongoing near the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[69]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) and 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Myrne.[70] Elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Novomykolaivka.[71]
Russian forces continued assaults in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 30 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 60th and 57th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) advanced northwest of Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[72]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko, west of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil on June 29 and 30.[73]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 30 that Russian forces trained with motorcycles and anti-drone ponchos ahead of the seizure of Shevchenko.[74]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[75]
Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 29 and 30.[76]
The commander of a Ukrainian drone company operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on June 30 that positions are constantly changing hands but that Russian forces have not seized Malynivka.[77]
Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv).[78]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv), in northern Kamyanske, and west of Stepove (east of Kamyanske).[79]
Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske on June 29 and 30.[80] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Kamyanske.[81]
Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on June 30 that Russian forces cannot conduct motorcycle assaults near Kamyanske as the settlement is on a dominant height and the terrain is marshy, so Russian forces are conducting infantry attacks.[82]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 108th and 247th airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Kamyanske.[83] Elements of the 629th Separate Engineer and Sapper Battalion (reportedly of the 7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[84] Elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Mala Tokmachka.[85] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Mala Tokmachka.[86]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kherson direction on June 29 and 30 but did not advance.[87]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 29 to 30. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 107 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[88] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 64 drones and that 10 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the Russian strikes primarily targeted Donetsk and Kharkiv oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes hit civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv and Odesa oblasts.[89]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77329
[2] https://t.me/xydessa/54561 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/24390329
[3] https://tass dot ru/politika/24387329
[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025
[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/14/12/2023/657acd6a9a79477cbd43f7d5; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2025
[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar05022025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225
[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2025
[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025
[9] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/66181 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2023; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025
[10] https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2025-06/2025-06-30-pr42-ukraine-en.pdf
[11] https://t.me/tass_agency/323167; https://ria dot ru/20250630/pytki-2026318316.html; https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/06/30/na-ukraine-kaznili-rossiyskih-soldat-i-pytali-zaklyuchennyh-za-sotrudnichestvo-s-moskvoy-v-oon-raskryli-podrobnosti/; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/24392767
[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar100124
[13] https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/685a9aec9a794732463a623d ; https://www.ixbt dot com/live/sw/v-rossii-poyavitsya-gosudarstvennyy-messendzher-zakon-o-cifrovoy-platforme-max-podpisan-prezidentom.html
[14] https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/6862733a9a79475982e933a8?from=short_news ; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/technology/articles/2025/03/25/1099980-vk-sozdaet-analog-kitaiskogo-messendzhera ; https://trends.rbc dot ru/trends/social/67e50e2a9a7947fa515bbe02 ; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/technology/news/2025/06/05/1115226-gorelkin-zapusk-natsionalnogo ; https://t.me/webstrangler/4228
[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2024
[16] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/technology/articles/2025/03/25/1099980-vk-sozdaet-analog-kitaiskogo-messendzhera
[17] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/technology/news/2025/06/30/1120952-v-messendzhere-max
[18] https://t.me/webstrangler/4228
[19] https://qafqazinfo dot az/news/detail/din-sputnik-azerbaycanda-emeliyyat-kecirir-yenilenib-475158; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/06/30/v-baku-prishli-s-obyskami-v-ofis-rossiyskogo-agentstva-sputnik-azerbaydzhan
[20] https://meduza dot io/news/2025/06/30/v-baku-prishli-s-obyskami-v-ofis-rossiyskogo-agentstva-sputnik-azerbaydzhan; https://vesti dot az/kriminal/arestovany-dva-agenta-fsb-rabotavsix-v-sputnik-azerbaidzan-foto-video-obnovleno-550402; https://ru.apa dot az/proisshestvie/zaderzany-dvoe-sotrudnikov-fsb-rossii-rabotavsix-v-sputnik-azerbaidzan-614816
[21] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/06/30/russia-azerbaijan-police-raid-baku/dc59b4e4-55c5-11f0-b45b-dc9aeb848c03_story.html
[22] https://newsukraine dot rbc.ua/news/azerbaijani-police-raid-sputnik-office-in-1751286398.html; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/06/30/russia-azerbaijan-police-raid-baku/dc59b4e4-55c5-11f0-b45b-dc9aeb848c03_story.html
[23] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/06/30/russia-azerbaijan-police-raid-baku/dc59b4e4-55c5-11f0-b45b-dc9aeb848c03_story.html
[24] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2024:
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26085; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26060 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26057
[26] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30592; https://t.me/dva_majors/74401
[27] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2829
[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26085; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26060 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26057; https://t.me/wargonzo/27591; https://t.me/dva_majors/74401
[29] https://t.me/dva_majors/74401
[30] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/30/sproby-znachno-zmenshylys-na-sumshhyni-katastrofichni-vtraty-u-vorozhyh-shturmovykiv/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA
[31] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/30/sumshhyna-ogolyla-problemu-voroga-boyi-na-pivnichnomu-prykordonni-kardynalno-zminylysya/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ScdUZNkwcYc
[32] https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/russia-ukraine-war-kursk-fba1185f?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAhS6yNX86rV8r2xwvd8-CKA9LZ0otwuYuA7iC5krEafvndUJOXpcdI1&gaa_ts=68629fba&gaa_sig=MMLAJA1WE0OIA0C3sHxWJjFvtQ7U_HmYgEqoeNL1_5JK2T0W4R5BNSO_0V1npY6vQad5qrFgU4p4kuZmP4b4MA%3D%3D
[33] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/news/2025/06/29/7519301/
[34] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2829
[35] https://t.me/dva_majors/74394; https://t.me/dva_majors/74409
[36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30582 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30592; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30621
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26085; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26060; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26057; https://t.me/otukharkiv/6803
[38] https://t.me/epoddubny/23959
[39] https://t.me/nebesnamara/206; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9484
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26085 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26060 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26057
[41] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2830
[42] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94747
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26085 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26060 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26057
[44] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2831yimka,
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26085 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26060 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26057
[46] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2831yimka,
[47] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/30/fiksuyemo-nakopychennya-poblyzu-lymanu-rosiyany-zbyrayut-pihotu-i-tehniku/
[48] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2831yimka,
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26085; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26060; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26057
[50] https://t.me/yurasumy/23806
[51] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37930; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170778; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170787; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170829
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26085; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26060; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26057; https://t.me/wargonzo/27591; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170787 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170829
[53] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170820
[54] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37930;
[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30598; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30598; https://t.me/mod_russia/54281
[56] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37930
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26085 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26060 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26057 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74401
[58] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13972
[59] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170829 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31935 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/323109
[60]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26085 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26060 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26057
[61] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8 ; https://suspilne dot media/1054587-kiiv-dolucivsa-do-sankcij-es-proti-rf-u-mzs-poasnili-vihid-z-konvencii-pro-zaboronu-protipihotnih-min-1223-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1751289105&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[62] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8 ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1054671-68-oebr-na-pokrovskomu-napramku-armia-rf-minue-logistiku-zsu-ta-gotue-obhid-pokrovska-cerez-mirnograd-ta-rodinske/
[63] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/29/pid-pokrovskom-rosiyany-kydayut-vsi-zusyllya-shhob-zrujnuvaty-zvyazok-ta-logistyku-syl-oborony/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JFvyCBahZ_k
[64] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/30/hochut-obijty-z-oboh-bokiv-nepodalik-pokrovska-rosijski-shturmovyky-jdut-i-vden-i-vnochi/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA
[65] https://t.me/dva_majors/74387 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74404 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74405
[66] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1939560731932057853 https://t.me/mod_russia/54271; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9485; https://t.me/osintpen/1323;
[67] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31922 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27591 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37946 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65508 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15755
[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26085 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26060 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26057 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65508 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23794
[69] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9468 ; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1039525-na-teritorii-dnipropetrovsini-zavilasa-sira-zona-deepstate/
[70] https://t.me/voin_dv/15753 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15747
[71] https://t.me/mod_russia/54271
[72] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65508 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74401 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23793
[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26085 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26060 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26057
[74] https://t.me/mod_russia/54274
[75] https://t.me/wargonzo/27591; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94770; https://t.me/dva_majors/74401
[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26085; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26060; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26057
[77] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/30/nas-minuyut-my-yih-minuyemo-nepodalik-gulyajpolya-vorog-atakuye-riznomanitnoyu-taktykoyu/
[78] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1095855779065339; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9487
[79] https://t.me/yurasumy/23792; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65510; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31928
[80] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26085; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26060; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26057
[81] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30626; https://t.me/rusich_army/24436; https://t.me/dva_majors/74426
[82] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/30/projty-cherez-plavni-cherez-komyshi-na-pivdni-okupanty-pragnut-prosunutysya-do-zaporizhzhya/
[83] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37936; https://t.me/levivera/9983; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94748; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94753; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30598; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170763; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65510
[84] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30598
[85] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65510
[86] https://t.me/dva_majors/74396
[87] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26085; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26060
[88] ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26057 ; https://t.me/kpszsu/37374
[89] https://t.me/synegubov/15355; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12654; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12654; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1054847-dron-cernika-vperse-zfiksuvali-u-harkovi-so-pro-nogo-vidomo/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/30/rosiya-vpershe-vdaryla-po-harkovu-dronom-novogo-typu-chernika-shho-vidomo/