The formal signing of the India-UK Free Trade Agreement during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to London this week marks a long-awaited turning point in bilateral relations. The early 1990s opened a new opportunity for Delhi and London to move beyond the bitter legacies of Partition and the Cold War and build on the fresh possibilities offered by India’s economic liberalisation.

Only after multiple twists and turns has the wide gap between promise and performance in the relationship begun to close. If Queen Elizabeth II’s 1997 visit to India — meant to commemorate the 50th anniversary of Independence — turned into a political fiasco, Modi’s meeting this week with King Charles III could mark the beginning of a new and more productive phase. And it comes at a particularly opportune moment.

Advertisement

The trade pact, along with expanding cooperation in technology, defence, and education, will help both countries navigate the turbulent effects of US President Donald Trump’s political upheaval — whether one sees it as a revolution or a counterrevolution — on American global engagement and the international order. London, the US’s closest and most enduring ally, and Delhi, which has built a new foundation for strategic cooperation with Washington, have both been significantly impacted by Trump’s policies.

Efforts to reboot India-UK ties began promisingly in the 1990s, when Conservative Prime Minister John Major strongly supported India’s economic reforms. But the momentum faltered in the early years of the Labour governments (1997-2010), which continued to view India through an outdated colonial lens. What should have been a celebratory and reflective moment during the Queen’s 1997 visit was marred by then Foreign Secretary Robin Cook’s gratuitous meddling in the Kashmir issue and Indo-Pakistani relations. The resulting outrage was memorably captured by Indian Prime Minister I K Gujral, who called Britain a “third-rate power”.

Gujral was right to object to British overreach, but his characterisation of Britain was far off the mark. In the mid-1990s, the UK ranked among the world’s top five economies, with a GDP exceeding the combined economic output of China, India, and Russia at the time. Britain had lost its empire but has remained a power of considerable global influence. Three decades later, it is still the world’s sixth-largest economy. Its per capita income — around $55,000—compares starkly with India’s $3,000, China’s $14,000, and Russia’s $15,000.

Advertisement

The perception in Delhi of Britain as a “diminished power” stands in sharp contrast to India’s enduring view of Russia as a “superpower”. This disconnect reflects a lingering anti-colonial mindset and a romanticised view of Russia in Delhi but has little grounding in present-day realities. It ignores the large interface between Indian and British societies that stands in contrast to a narrow government-to-government relationship with Moscow. One of the key drivers of the evolving India-UK relationship has been the effort to shed the lingering colonial condescension in London and entrenched anti-imperial resentment in Delhi. The focus has now shifted to building a pragmatic, forward-looking partnership based on shared interests.

It has also meant confronting Delhi’s own double standards. While the Indian elite never misses an opportunity to denounce British colonialism, it continues to seek validation from Britain and its institutions. Across the political spectrum, leaders denounce the English language but educate their children in English-medium schools, aspire for admissions to Oxbridge and the Ivy League, and dream of emigration to the Anglosphere. This is not even to mention the popular fascination with Britain in states like Bengal, Gujarat, and Punjab.

Overcoming this love-hate relationship was not easy. But the return of the Conservatives to power in 2010 saw an effort to transcend the old entanglements of Kashmir and Pakistan. Prime Minister David Cameron’s 2010 visit aimed to reboot bilateral ties. However, the British establishment was not fully prepared for a shift, and the UPA government in Delhi failed to seize the moment.

The arrival of the Modi government in 2014 brought a new readiness to reassess Britain. Successive Conservative Prime Ministers — especially Boris Johnson — actively worked with India to imagine a shared future, outlined in the “2030 Roadmap for India-UK Relations”. The free trade agreement being signed this week, the 2024 technology security initiative, and the joint defence industrial roadmap announced this year are all fruits of that vision.

Implementing the 2030 roadmap would not have been possible without greater responsiveness from the British establishment. Particularly significant in addressing Delhi’s concerns about anti-India extremism is Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s reining in the extremist factions within the Labour Party that had taken a hostile stance on India carrying forward the 2030 Roadmap initiated by the Tories.

Modi’s visit is also an opportunity to reflect on the deep economic and political turbulence within Britain. The Starmer government is struggling to revive a stagnating economy. It has abandoned the strategy of total reliance on services and launched an industrial policy aimed at innovation-led growth in eight key sectors, including advanced manufacturing, defence, clean energy, life sciences, and creative industries. This opens new possibilities for India-UK collaboration. Britain remains a global leader in higher education, scientific research, and technology — and Modi’s visit could help identify fresh avenues for partnership in these domains. It is also set to play a critical role in European security amid American retrenchment under Trump.

India should recognise the internal political fragmentation in Britain amid mounting pressures on the two-party system. Delhi should also be aware of the rising anti-immigration sentiment in a rapidly changing Britain. It should focus less on sending more students and workers to Britain. Instead, Delhi should be drawing British universities into India and building collaboration with British capital to expand opportunities at home.

For too long, Delhi and London have underestimated what they could do for each other. Briefly before Independence, some in both capitals imagined that a partnership between a free India and a post-imperial Britain could preserve London’s global stature, amid the rise of America and Soviet Russia, and facilitate India’s emergence as a dominant power in the Indian Ocean and beyond.

That bold vision was derailed by the trauma of Partition, the chaos of decolonisation, and the polarising currents of the Cold War. But eight decades later, India and Britain stand once again at an inflexion point. As middle powers, they are now better positioned to pursue a more modest, pragmatic goal: To act as force multipliers for each other in a world increasingly shaped by an assertive China and an unpredictable America.

The writer is contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express and distinguished fellow at the Council on Strategic and Defence Research