Washington DC – President Donald Trump reignited his trade war by threatening more than a dozen countries with higher tariffs Monday, but then said he may be flexible on his new August deadline to reach deals.

President Donald Trump announced a sweeping new tariff regime, but then immediately cast doubt over the date it is meant to take effect on. © REUTERS

Trump kicked a flurry of letters by informing key US allies Japan and South Korea that duties he had suspended in April would snap back even more steeply in three weeks.

Tokyo and Seoul would be hit with 25% tariffs on their goods, he wrote. Countries including Indonesia, Bangladesh, Thailand, South Africa, and Malaysia were slapped with duties ranging from 25% to 40%.

But in a move that will cause even more uncertainty in a global economy already unsettled by his tariffs, the 79-year-old once again left the countries room to negotiate a deal.

“I would say firm, but not 100% firm,” Trump told reporters at a dinner with visiting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu when asked if August 1 deadline was firm.

Pressed on whether the letters were his final offer, Trump replied: “I would say final – but if they call with a different offer, and I like it, then we’ll do it.”

The US president had unveiled sweeping tariffs on imports on what he called “Liberation Day” on April 2, including a 10% tariff on all countries, but then quickly suspended all levies above that baseline for 90 days following turmoil in the markets.

They were due to kick back in on Wednesday and Trump sent the letters in advance of that deadline.

The sun beats down on the sprawling port of Jakarta as dockworkers load containers marked for U.S. destinations. Starting next week, each will carry an invisible burden: a 19% tariff that represents the new price of admission to America’s consumer market.

President Donald Trump, wielding tariffs like chess pieces, has secured what the White House calls “historic” trade agreements with the Philippines and Indonesia this week, just days before his self-imposed August 1 deadline for implementing a sweeping tariff regime. The deals have sent ripples through global markets and rewritten the rules for two of Southeast Asia’s largest economies.

MAGA (truthsocial.com)

The agreements follow a strikingly similar template: both Southeast Asian nations will eliminate virtually all tariffs on American goods while facing a flat 19% duty on everything they ship to the United States.

“We’ve secured complete market access,” Trump declared from the Oval Office Tuesday, flanked by Treasury Secretary and trade officials. “No more one-sided deals where we get the short end. It’s reciprocity, pure and simple.”

But trade experts see something more complex—and potentially more disruptive—in the fine print.

“This isn’t reciprocity in any traditional sense,” says Dr. Amanda Chen, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. “It’s a fundamental power play that leverages market access against strategic concessions. The Philippines and Indonesia each export far more to the U.S. than they import, giving Washington enormous leverage.”

The numbers tell the story. In 2024, U.S. exports to Indonesia totaled just $10.2 billion while imports reached $28.1 billion. With the Philippines, American exports were $9.2 billion against $14.2 billion in imports.

For Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the negotiations involved delicate calculations that extend well beyond trade balances.

“Manila sees this as purchasing insurance,” explains former U.S. diplomat Richard Fontaine, now with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “The Philippine government is effectively trading economic concessions for stronger security guarantees in the South China Sea, where Chinese vessels have become increasingly assertive.”

A senior Philippine trade official, speaking on condition of anonymity because they weren’t authorized to discuss sensitive negotiations, confirmed this calculation: “We understand the economic costs, but we’re operating in a region where security partnerships have real value. Sometimes you have to make difficult choices.”

The Indonesian agreement reveals even more about Trump’s strategy. Beyond eliminating tariffs, Jakarta has committed to large-scale purchases of Boeing aircraft, American liquefied natural gas, and agricultural products—deals potentially worth tens of billions.

More significantly, Indonesia agreed to supply critical minerals to the United States under preferential terms, with a crucial caveat: materials containing more than 25% Chinese-origin components could face duties up to 40%.

“This is about battery supply chains, plain and simple,” says Michael Sullivan, chief commodities strategist at Morgan Stanley. “Indonesia controls about 42% of the global nickel market crucial for EV batteries. By securing preferential access while penalizing Chinese-processed materials, the U.S. is effectively inserting itself into a supply chain China has dominated.”

What happens in Manila and Jakarta may not stay there. Trade representatives from Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand are reportedly scrambling to assess their positions as the August 1 deadline approaches.

“These countries now face a stark choice,” says former U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwartz. “Either accept similar one-sided terms or risk facing the full force of Trump’s tariff regime—potentially up to 32% for nations without deals.”

The pressure extends beyond tariffs. Officials from Vietnam, which has emerged as a major manufacturing alternative to China, report intensified U.S. customs surveillance, including factory inspections aimed at preventing Chinese goods from being rerouted through Southeast Asian supply chains.

“What we’re witnessing is the active fragmentation of East Asian economic integration,” says Dr. Kishore Mahbubani, former Singaporean diplomat and dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. “Countries are being forced to choose sides in ways that undermine decades of careful balancing.”

China has responded with calculated restraint so far, though officials have warned of potential “countermeasures” if Chinese interests are directly threatened. The critical minerals provisions, which explicitly target Chinese processing capacity, may prove the most sensitive flashpoint.

“Beijing understands that a direct confrontation benefits nobody,” says Zhang Wei, economics professor at Peking University. “But there are real concerns about U.S. attempts to weaponize supply chains and fragment the regional trading architecture China has carefully cultivated through initiatives like RCEP.”

Some analysts see the potential for more subtle Chinese responses, including tightened inspection regimes for American goods entering through the back door of tariff-free Southeast Asian markets.

For investors navigating this shifting landscape, strategists outline three potential scenarios for the coming year:

In the base case (60% probability), the tariffs take effect as announced on August 1, with Southeast Asian partners largely complying despite some implementation delays. This scenario favors U.S. exporters while pressuring companies dependent on regional manufacturing.

An upside case envisions Indonesia striking follow-up joint ventures for mineral processing that qualify for tariff exemptions, potentially boosting companies like Vale Indonesia and Freeport-McMoRan while accelerating the energy transition supply chain.

The downside scenario involves Chinese retaliation, particularly targeting agricultural exports that might be trans-shipped through Singapore or other regional hubs. This could trigger broader market volatility and strengthen the dollar as safe-haven flows accelerate.

“The key for allocators is staying nimble,” advises Morgan Stanley’s global strategy team. “These agreements aren’t one-off events but rather Act I of a structurally different, bloc-based trade order that will continue to evolve.”

Critical milestones loom in the coming months. The tariffs formally enter force on August 1, offering the first concrete data on trade flows and potential demand destruction. The Philippine Senate must ratify key provisions this fall, with particular attention to whether the “zero tariff” pledge holds for sensitive sectors like automobiles and medical technology.

Indonesia’s parliament will consider an Omnibus Bill on Digital Trade in Q4 that could roll back data localization requirements—a development closely watched by cloud computing giants with regional expansion plans.

Perhaps most significantly, market participants should remain alert for potential Chinese retaliation, particularly targeting U.S. agricultural exports, energy shipments, or critical mineral flows.

“We’re entering uncharted territory,” notes veteran trade attorney James Morrison. “The WTO dispute resolution mechanism is all but certain to be engaged, but those processes move far too slowly to provide meaningful near-term clarity. For now, bilateral leverage and political calculations will drive outcomes.”

As container ships continue loading in Jakarta and Manila, one thing becomes clear: the rules-based trading system that governed global commerce for decades is being rapidly rewritten, with profound implications for companies, investors, and entire nations caught in the crosscurrents of great power competition.

Investment Thesis

Aspect Details Deal Structure – U.S. tariffs: 19% flat on all imports from Philippines & Indonesia.

– Partner tariffs: 0% on U.S. goods (Philippines fully, Indonesia >99%).

– Extras: Military basing rights (PH), mineral/MOUs (ID), strict rules-of-origin. Trade Impact (2024) – U.S. exports: $19.4bn (PH+ID).

– U.S. imports: $42.3bn (PH+ID).

– Balance: -$22.8bn combined. Strategic Sectors – Semiconductors: 30% U.S. imports from PH (back-end packaging).

– Nickel/Cobalt: 42% U.S. supply from ID (EV batteries).

– Apparel: 8% U.S. imports from ID (margin squeeze for Nike/Gap). Winners – U.S. exporters: Boeing (BA), agribusiness (ADM, BG), LNG (LNG, CVX).

– Mineral plays: Vale Indonesia (VLDNY), Freeport (FCX), Tesla/Ford (nickel access). Losers – U.S. retail: Nike (NKE), Gap (GPS) face 19% cost hike.

– Chinese-linked firms: Penalized up to 40% if >25% Chinese content. Macro Effects – Currencies: PHP/IDR expected to weaken (USD/PHP 63–65; USD/IDR 17,100).

– Commodities: Nickel prices may rise ($22–24k/t). Risks – WTO litigation: U.S. violates MFN rates (3.4% avg).

– Chinese retaliation: Possible tariffs on U.S. ag/LNG.

– Implementation gaps: PH auto quotas, ID data-localization delays. Investor Takeaways – Overweight: U.S. exporters, critical minerals.

– Underweight: ASEAN consumer exporters.

– Watch: China’s response, PH/ID currency moves.

This article represents analysis based on current market data and expert perspectives. Past performance doesn’t guarantee future results. Readers should consult financial advisors for personalized investment guidance.

A passionate cryptocurrency and blockchain author qualified to cover every event in the crypto space. Researching minute occurrences and bringing new insights lie within the prime focus of my task.

Story Highlights The July 09 deadline is expected to reignite global trade tensions if the US fails to finalise trade agreements

Bitcoin & other cryptos are showing strong bullish momentum ahead of the deadline, acting as a hedge against weakening USD

The crypto markets are expected to remain volatile, which may be extended to the traditional markets as well

The financial world is bracing for a pivotal moment on July 09, 2025, when the US’s temporary suspension of its new tariff regime expires. Initially dubbed ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs, announced by President Donald Trump, carry implications far beyond traditional trade routes. Soon after the announcement, the crypto markets and the traditional markets were disrupted, causing a major drop.

Now that the deadline is approaching, the question arises whether this deadline will reignite a global tariff war or it could unexpectedly serve as a bullish catalyst for the crypto market and Bitcoin price.

Understanding the July 09 Deadline

The July 09 deadline marks the end of a 90-day suspension on sweeping tariffs proposed by the US earlier in 2025. These tariffs were designed to punish countries with persistent trade imbalances or those seen as having unfair trade practices. The US government offered temporary relief in April, giving trade partners time to negotiate deals or face new levies. If the agreement is not reached by the deadline, the full weight of tariffs could take effect by early August, sparking fears of renewed global trade conflict.

Market Sentiment: Calm Before the Storm?

Interestingly, traditional markets have remained relatively stable in the lead-up to the July 09 deadline. The S&P 500 and NASDAQ have both shown resilience, while the U.S.Dollar Index (DXY) has slipped over 6% since April, which is believed to be the worst start to a year since 1973. Some analysts believe much of the tariff uncertainty is already priced into equities, though volatility is expected to spike if no trade resolutions are announced. Moreover, the safe-haven asset, Gold, has seen a rise in inflows, indicating that investors are preparing for a potential geopolitical fallout.

Crypto Markets Reacting Ahead of Time

Unlike traditional markets, the crypto markets appear to be thriving in this ocean of uncertainty. Bitcoin price has surged past $108,500, while Ethereum & other altcoins have posted significant gains. Several factors contribute to this bullish sentiment, including a weaker USD, decentralised hedge and rising market confidence. Therefore, the crypto markets are expected to face a short-term pullback if tensions escalate or if the countries reach out to make a deal, then the Bitcoin price is expected to experience a significant bullish push.

Scenario Analysis: Three Possible Outcomes

Firstly, if the US resumes tariffs without any new deals, global trade could deteriorate rapidly, stocks may plunge, inflation could spike, and crypto may initially fall in a risk-off panic. Besides, if the deadline is extended, which is expected to be more likely, risk appetite could return across all sectors. Stocks & crypto may rise if traders see this as a sign of market-friendly policy. On the other hand, if a comprehensive resolution is reached, it could lead to bullish sentiment across global markets. This may even cause a breakout, propelling the Bitcoin price towards new highs.

Wrapping it Up!

The July 09 tariff deadline is more than just a bureaucratic market, representing a turning point for the global economy and the evolving crypto ecosystem. Whether it triggers a new trade war or serves as a launchpad for crypto depends entirely on how global leaders navigate these final hours.

What is next after Washington exits the OECD global tax plan?

President Trump’s withdrawal from the global minimum corporate tax deal reignites sovereignty concerns.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent (center) and Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell (center right) flank OECD Secretary-General Mathias Cormann in a family photo at the meeting of G7 finance ministers and central bankers in Banff, Canada, on May 21, 2025. © Getty Images

× In a nutshell The U.S. exit undermines the OECD’s global tax goals and credibility

Geopolitical tensions are disrupting international tax alignment

Europe is pushing forward, but global tax fragmentation is likely

For comprehensive insights, tune into our AI-powered podcast here

The decision by the administration of United States President Donald Trump to formally withdraw the U.S. from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) global tax agreement marks a turning point in international tax coordination. The move, however, is not a surprise. Congressional Republicans and President Trump have never supported the OECD’s Inclusive Framework. They viewed a global minimum tax of 15 percent on entities with revenues of at least 750 million euros annually as European-led overreach that undermines U.S. sovereignty. Nevertheless, the American withdrawal will have far-reaching implications, adding new uncertainty to how multinational corporations are taxed and raising long overdue questions about the future of international tax cooperation.

While the U.S. exit from the OECD global tax deal garnered headlines, it has been overshadowed by the administration’s sweeping revival of tariffs as a tool of economic warfare. In a world where nationalism is regaining popularity, the technicalities of global tax governance may not be a priority, but they matter immensely to the rules of the global economy.

How the global tax was supposed to work

The OECD’s two-pillar framework was originally designed as a response to the perceived challenges of fairly taxing multinational companies in the digital age. Initially launched under the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project in 2013, the idea gained traction as governments around the world grew frustrated with tech giants earning income from digital services accessed in one territory and then shifting profits to other low-tax jurisdictions.

Pillar 1 of the framework proposes reallocating the right to tax hundreds of billions of dollars in multinational corporate profits from jurisdictions where the companies are formally based to the countries where their customers are actually located, even if the companies do not have physical presence in those states. The Pillar 1 multilateral treaty is intended to replace the various digital services taxes (DSTs) that have proliferated since 2018 – though it will likely not succeed in this goal.

Pillar 2 sets a global minimum effective tax rate of 15 percent on applicable multinationals, using a combination of complicated top-up taxes and extraterritorial enforcement rules to keep countries from competing on tax rates for global capital. The rules have the unintended consequence of moving competition for foreign investment from tax rate cuts to direct subsidies and refundable tax credits.

× Facts & figures Timeline of the OECD global minimum tax plan Multinational companies, especially digital services, have avoided taxation in their home countries by pushing activities abroad to low- or no-tax jurisdictions. The G20 asked the OECD to address this issue by creating an action plan to address tax-base erosion and profit shifting. © GIS

Under the administration of former President Joe Biden, the U.S. was a key architect of both pillars, working in coordination with the higher-tax European countries. But implementation was messy. Pillar 1 negotiations stalled as disputes over revenue allocation thresholds, scope and the treatment of digital services taxes proved hard to resolve. Frustrated by the slow pace of talks, more than a dozen countries, mostly in Europe and Asia, enacted unilateral DSTs targeting large U.S.-based firms like Amazon, Google and Meta.

Initially, Pillar 2 saw more success, particularly in Europe. The European Union adopted a directive mandating that all 27 member states implement the global minimum tax, and other OECD countries, including Japan, South Korea and Australia followed suit. However, outside of this relatively narrow coalition, support has been uneven. Major developing countries have been skeptical, China and India remain on the sidelines, and the U.S. has now made the inevitable clear: There is no viable political path for implementing Pillar 2 in the world’s largest economy.

In one of his initial executive orders on his first day back in the Oval Office, President Trump instructed government officials to “notify the OECD that any commitments made by the prior administration on behalf of the United States with respect to the Global Tax Deal have no force or effect within the United States.” A second order on “America First Trade Policy” also directs the Treasury Department to investigate discriminatory foreign tax regimes, invoking retaliatory action under Section 891 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code – a never-used provision that could double taxes on citizens of countries targeting American firms.

A problem of sovereignty, scope and focus

From the beginning, lawmakers outside the European policy bubble were uneasy with the plan’s heavy-handed centralization of taxing powers through opaque and unaccountable mechanisms. Pillar 2’s enforcement rules, particularly the Under-Taxed Profits Rule (UTPR), pose a direct challenge to national tax sovereignty. Pillar 1’s ambition to reallocate taxing rights without regard to the physical presence of a service provider is rooted in the same intrusive philosophy.

In the U.S., bipartisan concerns about the UTPR quickly hardened into opposition. Under this rule, foreign governments can impose top-up taxes on income earned in the U.S. if they believe the Americans are not taxing their own companies at the OECD’s determined 15 percent. This places U.S. tax policy, including congressionally enacted incentives like the research and development tax credit, under de facto international review. If those credits lower a company’s effective tax rate below the global threshold, it could still end up paying tax as if the domestic credits do not exist – the higher tax just gets paid to a foreign government instead of the U.S. Treasury.

Rather than building trust and coherence, the OECD has layered a brittle, enforcement-heavy system atop incompatible national regimes.

These concerns of Washington are not merely theoretical − U.S. companies are, in fact, the primary target. One estimate finds that nearly 40 percent of all income subject to Pillar 2 rules is earned by U.S. multinationals, roughly equal to the combined share of the next 10 countries. Since Mr. Trump’s executive order, Republican tax writers in the U.S. House of Representatives passed legislation to impose retaliatory taxes on individuals and businesses of nations that adopt digital taxes or apply rules on under-taxed profits to U.S. companies. The legislation is pending in the Senate.

While Washington’s position is clear in principle, its practical impact is more muddled. The Trump administration’s threats of retaliation risk being swept into the maelstrom of today’s U.S. trade policy dynamics. In a noisy environment of economic nationalism, where tariffs are increasingly used as bargaining chips across sectors, the OECD’s tax overreach may become just one of many competing grievances. That is a real risk for policymakers who want to send a clear signal about defending tax sovereignty. Even in calmer waters, retaliatory actions often result in higher costs for both parties and fail to resolve the underlying dispute.

But the OECD is largely reaping what it has sown. The Inclusive Framework abandoned a decades-old international consensus based on physical presence and value creation in favor of a half-built architecture with limited buy-in and constantly evolving definitions. The project has never been just about leveling the playing field. It is about increasing effective business taxes globally by coordinating standards from the top down.

Rather than building trust and coherence, the OECD has layered a brittle, enforcement-heavy system atop incompatible national regimes. The result is exactly what critics predicted: a mounting backlash, fragmented implementation and threats of trade and tax retaliation.

What this means for the rest of the world

The OECD’s vision for a global tax regime is deeply uncertain. As the U.S. and other countries back away, the EU is left with its consensus directive on Pillar 2, which requires member states to implement the rules. In 2025, only six of the 30 countries with active rules on under-taxed profits are outside the bloc. The paths forward are numerous and uncertain as countries wait to see how the Trump administration and Congress engage with the stalled OECD process.

Read more by tax policy expert Adam Michel

Pillar 1 has few viable trajectories, beyond any portions of the Amount B transfer pricing rules – a simplification of the “arm’s length principle” to baseline marketing and distribution activities − that countries can adopt unilaterally. For the most part, countries with an interest in digital services taxes have already implemented them. Additional DST proliferation will likely come, but will be moderated by aggressive U.S. retaliation.

× Scenarios Most likely: The global tax regime gets watered down and many opt out The U.S. remains nominally engaged with the OECD Inclusive Framework but does not implement Pillar 2. The longstanding design flaws and geopolitical tensions that have plagued the project since its inception remain unresolved. Given the unanimity requirement of the EU directive, a full repeal is unlikely, but a practical retreat is inevitable. Over time, Pillar 2 is functionally re-scoped as a European coordination mechanism for taxing foreign multinationals. U.S. firms are either explicitly exempted or shielded via permanent safe harbors. Other countries gradually abandon the Under-Taxed Profits Rules and begin reforming or repealing their domestic top-up tax regimes to reduce uncertainty and compliance burdens. Somewhat likely: Broader implementation of the global tax, but with caveats Continued negotiations between the U.S., OECD and EU produce meaningful concessions. The revised framework accepts key U.S. design elements, such as nonrefundable tax credits, and formally recognizes Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income (GILTI), a tax applied to the revenue of non-U.S. companies or foreign corporations that are controlled by American corporations and citizens, as equivalent to an income inclusion rule. To facilitate a compromise, the EU could also extend or codify the transitional safe harbor for American companies and may scale back or eliminate rules on under-taxed profits. These adjustments should ease Washington’s concerns over discriminatory treatment and lost revenue, allowing for accommodation, but not full implementation, of Pillar 2 by the U.S. Unlikely: The U.S., EU and world adopt the full global tax regime The U.S. reverses course and fully embraces Pillar 2, including formal legislative adoption as part of a broader tax reconciliation bill. Congress rewrites GILTI to comply with OECD rules, accepts country-by-country blending and agrees to apply UTPR-style enforcement. This capitulation, driven by domestic political incentives to raise revenue on America’s biggest firms or narrow revenue needs in the budget process, cedes meaningful tax sovereignty to Europe. This exceedingly unlikely path would mark a dramatic shift in posture and likely lead to further uncertainty in international tax policy, inviting additional rounds of tax harmonization and agitation among developing countries for further expansions.

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The recent return of Donald Trump’s tariff-first trade agenda has reignited global market tensions. From sweeping levies on Chinese goods to looming tariffs on electric vehicles and critical manufacturing inputs. The message is loud and clear: economic protectionism is in session.

As the US doubles down on trade barriers, the ripple effects are already being felt far beyond Washington. Earlier this quarter, The Wall Street Journal reported that China’s exports to the U.S. dropped by 21% in April 2025 alone, following a dramatic 145% increase in average U.S. tariffs during Trump’s first 100 days back in office. Facing higher barriers, Chinese exporters have been redirecting shipments toward Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa and the EU in an effort to offset declining US demand.

Countries like Vietnam and India are seizing the moment. Vietnam’s trade activity hit record highs this spring, with imports from China topping $15 billion, and exports to the U.S. seeing a 34% year-on-year increase. Meanwhile, India is positioning itself as a longer-term manufacturing hub, with major firms, including Apple, considering shifting US-bound production away from China.

As global manufacturing routes shift, supply chains are being rewired and margins are under pressure. Amid this global recalibration, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are feeling the sharpest edge of this policy shift. Tariffs aren’t just political instruments; they are direct threats to SME financial stability and overall operations.

From payment delays and currency shocks, to supply chain collapses and contract losses, tariffs inject volatility at every stage of financial operations. For SMEs already operating on thin margins, the impact can be substantial.

Not just a trade war, but a financial disruptor

While tariffs introduce an immediate spike in the cost of imports or exports, their ripple effects stretch far and wide. As margins are squeezed, businesses are forced to delay payments, renegotiate contracts and rethink supplier relationships. This uncertainty bleeds into financial operations, where delayed settlements and unplanned expenses disrupt the careful balance of working capital.

For SMEs that are locked into pre-tariff supplier agreements or depend on single-market sourcing, managing FX becomes even more challenging. Limited supplier flexibility often means transacting in the same currencies regardless of volatility, increasing an organisations exposure to unpredictable exchange rate shifts. Delayed payments or extended settlement timelines can further widen the FX risk window, making it harder to forecast costs or protect margins.

And, while multinationals may absorb shocks through diversification and scales, SMES are often at the mercy of single routes or partners, making trade policy shifts existential, not just inconvenient.

Rewiring the global supply map

Much of the focus has rightly been on China, the largest target of current tariffs, but the situation is more complex than a US-China standoff. China, which exports significantly more to the US than it imports, has limited means to retaliate through reciprocal tariffs. Instead, its exporters are being forced to find new markets, often selling raw materials or semi-finished goods at discounted prices.

This shift opens up opportunities for manufacturing hubs like Vietnam, India, Cambodia and South Korea. These economies, which are equipped with strong production capacity, are increasingly absorbing Chinese components and then re-exporting to the U.S.

From a financial infrastructure perspective, this re-routing adds a new layer of complexity. What was once a single US-China transaction may now involve five or more, for example, China to Vietnam for assembly, then Vietnam to the US, plus supporting payments across multiple vendors, currencies and jurisdictions.

In the short term, this creates friction, but in the long term, it’s an opportunity for adaptable SMEs and financial providers that support them.

Using global financial infrastructure as a strategic lever

SMEs need real-time visibility over their transactions, exposure to currency shifts and the ability to pivot payment flows as supply chains evolve. That means adopting platforms that enable flexible routing, automate foreign exchange (FX) decisions and support compliance across regions.

The current tariff regime may not be sustainable long-term, as negotiations and adjustments will inevitably follow. What’s clear is this, the financial aftershock for SMEs will persist well beyond any political cycle. SMEs caught in the crossfire must equip themselves with the tools and partnerships to weather uncertainty and unlock new paths to resilience.

In this environment, adaptability is currency, and the businesses that are best prepared to move money, manage volatility and re-route payments at a pace will be the ones that thrive.