Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey, and Frederick W. Kagan with William Runkel

May 2, 2025, 9:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00 pm ET on May 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian gains along the frontline have slowed over the last four months, but Russia continues to tolerate personnel losses comparable to the casualty rate Russian forces sustained during a period of intensified advances between September and December 2024. ISW assesses that Russian forces gained a total of 1,627 square kilometers in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast in January, February, March, and April 2025, and daily Russian casualty reports from the Ukrainian General Staff indicate that Russian forces suffered 160,600 casualties during the last four months for an average of 99 casualties for every square kilometer taken over the last four months. ISW assesses that Russian forces seized an estimated 496 square kilometers in January 2025; an estimated 313 square kilometers in February 2025; an estimated 601 square kilometers in March 2025; and an estimated 217 square kilometers in April 2025. Ukrainian General Staff reports indicate that Russian forces lost an estimated 48,060 casualties in January 2025, 35,300 casualties in February 2025, 40,670 casualties in March 2025, and 36,570 casualties in April 2025.[1] Russian advances significantly increased in March 2025 due to the elimination of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, coinciding with the temporary cessation of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine, although Russian advances on average decreased between January, February, and April 2025. Russian gains have also slowed as Russian forces come up against more well-defended Ukrainian positions in and around larger towns such as Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk over the last four months.

Russian forces are currently sustaining a higher casualty rate per square kilometer gained than in Fall 2024. Russian forces gained an estimated 2,949 square kilometers at the cost of 174,935 casualties between September and December 2024 — an average of 59 casualties per square kilometer taken.[2] Russian casualty rates consistently increased throughout September, October, November, and December 2024 and peaked at an estimated 49,135 total monthly casualties in December 2024.[3] Monthly Russian rates of advance plateaued at 839 square kilometers in November 2024, however, and began to slow in December 2024 to an assessed 593 square kilometers and have continued to slow in 2025 (with the exception of the elimination of the Kursk salient). Russian gains have been 45 percent slower between January and April 2025 than in the period between September and December 2024, although Russian casualty rates have only decreased by 10 percent in that interval. The Russian military command thus appears to be tolerating similar personnel loss rates despite a significant decrease in the rate of territorial gains.

Russia has thus far sustained these casualties and the current tempo of offensive operations by rapidly deploying low quality troops to frontline units, although the reliance on such troops is also hindering Russia’s ability to conduct complex operations and make rapid advances in Ukraine. ISW has not observed a notable decrease in the tempo of Russian offensive operations along the frontline in recent months, despite the slowing rates of advance, suggesting that Russia is generating enough forces to sustain these casualties without having to deprioritize any frontline area. ISW has repeatedly observed reports that new Russian recruits only receive a month of training before deploying to Ukraine, and this limited training is likely constraining recruits’ combat capabilities and the Russian military’s overall capacity to successfully conduct complex operations.[4] The Russian military command is currently prioritizing funneling poorly trained recruits into highly attritional infantry assaults to offset personnel losses in Ukraine while sustaining the current tempo of operations, possibly at the expense of Russia’s long-term warfighting capabilities.[5] The Russian military does not have a reserve pool of well-trained troops who are not currently engaged in combat in Ukraine and can rapidly deploy along the frontline, and the Russian military command’s decision to funnel poorly trained troops to the frontline in Ukraine is undermining Russia’s ability to create a pool of such forces.[6]

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s commitment to maintaining the tempo of offensive operations despite diminishing returns underscores Putin’s ongoing efforts to leverage further battlefield gains to generate pressure on Ukraine in ceasefire and peace negotiations or otherwise to force Ukraine’s collapse. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to prolong negotiations to extract additional concessions from the United States and Ukraine and make additional battlefield gains.[7] Russian forces intensified offensive operations throughout the frontline in February and March 2025, including a limited offensive operation into northern Sumy Oblast, as part of an ongoing Russian effort to slowly degrade frontline Ukrainian positions and make opportunistic tactical advances. Putin may intend to leverage any gains over the last four months and in the near future to extract further Ukrainian and Western concessions during future peace negotiations. It remains unclear if Russia will maintain sufficient force generation rates to sustain offensive operations in Ukraine indefinitely, however, due to the rising economic cost of social benefits and one-time payments for Russian servicemembers.[8] ISW previously noted that Russia’s ongoing and forecasted economic struggles are closely tied to Russian losses on the battlefield and that it is not possible for the United States or the wider West to exert maximum pressure on Russia with economic tools alone.[9] The United States can better leverage Russian vulnerabilities and achieve a stronger negotiating position and more durable resolution to the war in Ukraine by forcing Putin to rethink his negotiation and battlefield strategies and empowering Ukrainian forces to continue inflicting significant manpower and materiel losses on Russia.

Western intelligence reportedly suggests that Putin may begin prioritizing short-term goals such as consolidating Russia’s gains in Ukraine and Russia’s immediate economic viability over seizing more territory, but Putin’s demonstrated commitment to maintaining the tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine despite continuing high casualty rates is a counter-indicator to this reported assessment. CNN reported on May 1 that new intelligence reviewed by US and Western officials suggests that Putin may be pivoting his immediate focus to shorter-term objectives of cementing Russian control over occupied Ukrainian territory and boosting Russia’s economy.[10] CNN reported that Putin may be concerned by the Trump administration’s threats to apply more sanctions on the struggling Russian economy. An unnamed official told CNN that Putin’s willingness to settle for more limited objectives in Ukraine depends on whether Putin can portray Russia’s gains in Ukraine as an acceptable victory domestically. The source insinuated that Putin likely remains committed to revisiting his longer-term goals of subjugating all of Ukraine and undermining NATO after taking a “significant pause,” however.

ISW has observed a variety of indicators suggesting that Putin is not reconsidering his short-term objectives in Ukraine, however. Russian forces have increased the intensity of offensive operations throughout the theater, particularly redoubling efforts to advance deeper in the Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka directions and launching a limited offensive operation in Sumy Oblast.[11] Russian forces are rapidly integrating tactical innovations to optimize timely gains in response to Ukrainian drone operators, including integrating motorcycles into offensive operations in Ukraine.[12] The Kremlin is also leveraging legal, financial, and socioeconomic measures to increase Russia’s force generation capabilities and boost Russia’s drone production capabilities to support the war in Ukraine.[13]

A future slowing of Russian offensive operations and/or transition to defensive operations in all or part of the theater would be indicators that Putin is shifting his short-term goals from seizing more territory to consolidating previously held territory. Putin could choose to pivot toward shorter-term objectives on account of mounting economic and manpower constraints that are increasingly hindering Russia’s ability to perpetuate its war in Ukraine.[14] Russian forces could slow the tempo of offensive operations and work to implement policies and tactics to mitigate casualties if Putin issues an order to prioritize consolidating Russia’s hold over occupied Ukraine instead of making further gains. Russian forces would likely shift to defensive operations with the aim of fortifying and consolidating current positions on the frontline, largely in an effort to safeguard battlefield gains and preserve increasingly limited manpower and materiel reserves, in response to such an order. Russian forces could begin constructing fortifications near frontline positions in response to such an order. ISW would observe such indicators and will continue to monitor Russian and Ukrainian reporting for these indicators.

ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains committed to his long-term military objectives of seizing all of Ukraine and undermining NATO. Senior US officials reportedly remain skeptical that Putin has eased his intransigence regarding a peace agreement and told CNN that Russia may resume the war and try to seize more Ukrainian territory even after agreeing to a US peace proposal.[15] CNN reported that unspecified officials maintain the belief that Russia will retain its aims of seizing the maximal amount of Ukrainian territory even if Putin signs a peace agreement. Ongoing Russian efforts to seize Lyman and Pokrovsk and advance north of Toretsk toward the southernmost point of Ukraine’s fortress belt in Kostyantynivka indicate that Putin maintains his long-standing goals of seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast.[16] The Russian government’s efforts to expand Russia’s force generation capabilities in the short- and long-term and Russia’s ongoing military restructuring efforts suggest that Russia is not only responding to a drawn-out conflict in Ukraine but also preparing for a future conflict on Russia’s western borders.[17] The Russian government also continues to prioritize long-term investment in Russia’s domestic industrial base (DIB), despite the significant economic cost of this wartime economy to Russia’s population.[18] These factors indicate that Putin is not abandoning his territorial ambitions in Ukraine but is in fact preparing for a long war of attrition against Ukraine and likely the collective West.

Russian officials are also continuing to condition Russian society to support a long-term war effort in Ukraine and against NATO. Russian officials, including Putin, have consistently leveraged false claims about the war in Ukraine to make maximalist territorial demands, including that Ukraine give up “Novorossiya” — an invented region of Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed includes all of southern and eastern Ukraine and is an “integral” part of Russia that Ukraine must concede for Russia to end the war.[19] Putin invoked the term “Novorossiya” as recently as April 21, indicating that the Kremlin has not abandoned this territorial objective.[20] Russian state media previously cautioned Russian domestic audiences in March 2025 against expecting “big agreements” from recent peace negotiations between Putin and US President Donald Trump.[21] A Verstka poll of 100 Russian military personnel published on April 29 indicates that only 18% of career Russian military personnel and officers, most of whom have been fighting in Ukraine for over two years, would support a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine prior to achieving Putin’s stated goals (likely referring to the demilitarization and “denazification” of Ukraine).[22] Only about a fifth of surveyed Russian military personnel and civilians indicated that they believe the war will end in the coming months. Verstka’s polling indicates that the Kremlin is not preparing the Russian information space for a peace agreement in the near future and that Russian forces and society do not anticipate an imminent end to the war. This pattern of Kremlin informational activity and the resonance it has achieved in Russian society will make it much harder for Putin to present any long-term ceasefire, let alone peace agreement, that falls far short of his stated aims as any kind of victory to his domestic audience.

Statements by US officials suggest that the Trump administration is considering stepping back from intensified mediation efforts to end the war in Ukraine. US Vice President JD Vance told Fox News on May 1 that the war in Ukraine will not end “any time soon” and that it is “up to the Russians and Ukrainians now that each side knows what the other’s terms are for peace.”[23] US Secretary of State and Acting National Security Advisor Marco Rubio told Fox News on May 1 that US President Donald Trump will need to prioritize other issues if Ukrainian and Russian negotiating positions remain too far apart for reconciliation but that the United States will continue “helping” wherever possible.[24] US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce echoed Rubio’s statements during a press briefing on May 1 and noted that the matter of resolving the conflict in Ukraine is “now“ between Russia and Ukraine, as the United States is changing its “style” and “methodology” and will no longer “fly around the world at the drop of a hat” to mediate negotiations.”[25] Bruce reiterated that the United States is “still committed” to a lasting peace in Ukraine

The US Department of State submitted a proposed license for defense exports to Ukraine to the US Congress on April 29.[26] The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is considering the proposal.

Key Takeaways:

Russian gains along the frontline have slowed over the last four months, but Russia continues to tolerate personnel losses comparable to the casualty rate Russian forces sustained during a period of intensified advances between September and December 2024.

Russian forces are currently sustaining a higher casualty rate per square kilometer gained than in Fall 2024.

Russia has thus far sustained these casualties and the current tempo of offensive operations by rapidly deploying low quality troops to frontline units, although the reliance on such troops is also hindering Russia’s ability to conduct complex operations and make rapid advances in Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s commitment to maintaining the tempo of offensive operations despite diminishing returns underscores Putin’s ongoing efforts to leverage further battlefield gains to generate pressure on Ukraine in ceasefire and peace negotiations or otherwise to force Ukraine’s collapse.

Western intelligence reportedly suggests that Putin may begin prioritizing short-term goals such as consolidating Russia’s gains in Ukraine and Russia’s immediate economic viability over seizing more territory, but Putin’s demonstrated commitment to maintaining the tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine despite continuing high casualty rates is a counter-indicator to this reported assessment.

A future slowing of Russian offensive operations and/or transition to defensive operations in all or part of the theater would be indicators that Putin is shifting his short-term goals from seizing more territory to consolidating previously held territory.

ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains committed to his long-term military objectives of seizing all of Ukraine and undermining NATO.

Statements by US officials suggest that the Trump administration is considering stepping back from intensified mediation efforts to end the war in Ukraine.

The US Department of State submitted a proposed license for defense exports to Ukraine to the US Congress on April 29.

Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Alleged Ceasefire Violation

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

There are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Limited fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on May 2, but Russian forces did not advance.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions in Gornal and the Gornal Monastery contrary to the Russian MoD’s April 26 claim that Russian forces seized the settlement.[27]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Gornal (southwest of Sudzha).[28]

Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that unattributed drones struck the Russian Zvezda military space intelligence facility in Stavropol Krai on May 2.[29] Kovalenko noted that facility is one of the Russian General Staff Main Directorate’s [GRU] main electronic intelligence system stations and specializes in detecting foreign intelligence communication systems and commercial electronic signatures in orbit. Kovalenko stated that Russia used the facility as a technical base to monitor Ukraine and conduct cyber intelligence operations. Stavropol Krai Governor Vladimir Vladimirov claimed that Ukrainian drone fragments fell in Moskovskoe village in Izobilnensky Raion but caused no damage or casualties.[30]

Fighting continued in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on May 2, but Russian forces did not advance.

A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting continued near Popovka and Demidovka (both northwest of Belgorod City) and that Russian forces are conducting drone operations in the area.[31]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 2, but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Bilovody (northeast of Sumy City), while another milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized the majority of the settlement.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Loknya (southeast of Bilovody) toward Yablunivka (south of Bilovody).[33]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Volodymyrivka and Vodolahy and northeast of Sumy City near Zhuravka and Loknya on May 2.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked west of Loknya.[35]

The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces are creating a “security strip” along the border of Sumy Oblast, and a Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are shifting offensive operations towards Sumy Oblast.[36]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in Bilovody.[37] Elements of the Chechen “Akhmat-Russia” Regiment are reportedly operating near Seredina-Budy (on the international border northwest of Sumy City).[38] Drone operators of the “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets in Sumy Oblast.[39]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on May 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on May 1 and 2.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Kupyansk near Novoosynove, Kolisnykivka, and Hlushkivka on May 1 and 2.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and advanced to the northern part of the settlement on May 2.[42]

The Ukrainian Border Service and Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on May 2 that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a Russian motorized assault of at least 10 motorcycles and two all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) in an unspecified area of the Kupyansk direction.[43] A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces are consolidating and reinforcing manpower and materiel resources to replenish losses from April 2025 before resuming assaults in this direction.[44] The servicemember also stated that Ukrainian forces observed Russian forces atypically modifying a tank by removing its turret and welding a “shed”-like structure on top of the tank to protect Russian infantry.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya, Serhiivka, and Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on May 1 and 2.[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on May 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced near Zelena Dolyna, into Ridkodub, and within central Lypove (all north of Lyman).[46]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Nove, Zelena Dolyna, and Lypove; northeast of Lyman near Novomykhailivka, Kolodyazi, Novyi Mir, Myrne, and Yampolivka; east of Lyman toward Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on May 1 and 2.[47]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on May 1 that Russian forces near the Serebryanske forest area unsuccessfully attempted to use anti thermal-imaging rain ponchos to evade Ukrainian drone operators.[48]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD), including its 283rd, 488th, and 1428th motorized rifle regiments, reportedly participated in the recent seizure of Nove.[49]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on May 2 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 2 that Russian forces advanced south of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[50]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and toward Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on May 1 and 2.[51]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka.[52]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove; and south of Chasiv Yar towards Bila Hora and near Stupochky on May 1 and 2.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stupochky.[54]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps), the 2nd Airborne (VDV) Battalion of the 98th VDV Division, and the “Burevestnik” detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[55] Elements of the Russian 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Stupochky.[56]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid an intensified effort to advance along and up to the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway and eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 1 indicates that Russian forces advanced into Novoolenivka (southwest of Toretsk).[57] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) with motorcycle support participated in the advance into Novoolenivka and seized half of the settlement.[58]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 10th Tank Regiment and 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division) are advancing near Oleksandropil (just southeast of Novoolenivka) and that additional elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division also recently advanced into Malynivka (southwest of Novoolenivka).[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are also advancing toward Romanivka (southwest of Toretsk).[60] Russian forces recently intensified attacks along the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk, and the Russian military command appears to be tasking the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th CAA) with eliminating the pocket.[61] Russian forces’ advance into Novoolenivka will help Russian forces advance further along the T-0504 highway, and Russian forces may intend to force Ukrainian troops to withdraw from the pocket under threat of envelopment if Russian forces can make further advances from Novoolenivka and Sukha Balka (southwest of Toretsk).

Russian forces continued assaults near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toresk near Druzhba; north of Toretsk toward Dyliivka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka, Romanivka, Stara Mykolaivka, Vodyane Druhe, Oleksandropil, Malynivka, and Nova Poltavka on May 1 and 2.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northwest of Vozdvyzhenka (southwest of Toretsk).[63]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA]) are reportedly operating near Druzhba.[64]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 1 and 2 that Russian forces advanced into the southern outskirts of Pokrovsk, two kilometers west of Novoukrainka (south of Pokrovsk), into the eastern outskirts of Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk), and southeast of Novooleksandrivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[65] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a reconnaissance-in-force mission into southern Pokrovsk but did not suggest that Russian forces maintain enduring positions in the southern outskirts of the settlement.[66] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Yelyzavetivka (east of Pokrovsk) and Zvirove (west of Pokrovsk).[67]

Russian forces attacked toward Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske; east of Pokrovsk near Malynivka and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka, Promin, and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, Dachenske, Chunyshyne, and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Zvirove on May 1 and 2.[68]

Ukrainian Commander in Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on May 1 that the Pokrovsk direction remains the most active section of the frontline.[69] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian infantry operating in this direction fear they will face retribution from frontline Russian commanders if they refuse to fight or attempt to retreat.[70]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian “Vega” Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate) and the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions near Pokrovsk and attacking Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[71]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on May 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 1 and 2 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Nadiivka (east of Novopavlivka).[72]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Novooleksandrivka; east of Novopavlivka near Nadiivka, Kotlyarivka, Troitske, and Preobrazhenka; and southeast near Bohdanivka on May 1 and 2.[73] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 2 that elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) recently retreated from Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka) after frontline Russian commanders deployed poorly trained troops to combat operations in the area.[74]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in Novooleksandrivka.[75] Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly clearing Nadiivka (east of Novopavlivka).[76] Elements of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly attacking eastern Kolyarivka (east of Pokrovsk).[77]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on May 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove toward Oleksiivka and near Andriivka, Kostyantynopil, Rozlyv, and Bahatyr on May 1 and 2.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 2 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr.[79]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 200th Artillery Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Bahatyr.[80]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on May 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Odradne, west of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil, and northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne.[81] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 2 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Vesele (north of Velyka Novosilka).[82]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[83]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations east of Hulyaipole near Chervone on May 2.[84]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 27 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northeast of Mali Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv).[85

Russian forces conducted ground attacks southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove and Lobkove; and west of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky and Kamyanske on May 1 and 2.[86]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on May 1 and 2 but did not advance.[87]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on May 2 that Russian forces are intensifying offensive operations in the southern section of the Dnipro River Delta near Kizomys on the west (right) of the Dnipro River (southwest of Kherson City).[88] Voloshyn reported that Russian forces are attempting to create a bridgehead and cross the Dnipro River from the south.

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of overnight naval and aerial drone strikes targeting Russian military infrastructure objects in occupied Crimea on May 1 to 2. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces launched 30 naval drones and at least 100 aerial drones, and that Russian forces destroyed 10 Ukrainian naval drones and 100 aerial drones near occupied Sevastopol.[89] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian drones struck Russian airfields in occupied Kacha, Belbek, Hvardiiske, and Saky, and that a fire broke out in Uhlove, seven kilometers from the Russian military airfield in Kacha.[90] Russian forces typically station air defenses at the Belbek, Hvardiiske, and Saky airfields and leverage the airfields to launch Shahed drones against Ukraine.[91]

Russian and Ukrainian sources reported on May 2 that Ukrainian forces recently struck a Russian S-300 air defense system, a Kasta-2E2 mobile radar system, an Imbir long-range radar system, an Obzor-3 radar system, and a ST-68 radar station in occupied Crimea.[92]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces launched a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 1 to 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 150 strike and decoy drones from Bryansk City; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[93] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 64 Shahed and other drones over eastern, northern, and central Ukraine and that 62 decoy drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that drone strikes damaged civilian and commercial infrastructure in Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[94]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06W44ezsFpBSRJsouTmp812SQ22eLf3V1pzyMwF6YEE7koRcQq32JGzJ2HnzyWuvyl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20444 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031frKwcfzQKsFhG7kFj3hoVWG8FPvGbFatwKBLj8pEpH8CHiLWWGeHZCzPwjXpbzml ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22561 [Total losses generated from the Ukrainian General Staff’s daily 0800 SITREP between January 1 and April 30, 2025.]

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2024

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-4-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-has-failed-break-ukraine ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2024

[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2025

[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025

[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage

[9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage

[10] https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/01/politics/intelligence-putin-war-goals-shifted-ukraine

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041425

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042725

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-15-2025

[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage

[15] https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/01/politics/intelligence-putin-war-goals-shifted-ukraine

[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825

[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-30-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-23-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-military-restructuring-and-expansion-hindered-ukraine-war; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2023; https://t.me/mod_russia/23498; https://telegra dot ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-na-tematicheskom-selektornom-soveshchanii-07-03.

[18] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage;

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125

[21] https://tass dot ru/interviews/23001625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013025

[22] https://verstka dot media/chto-dumayut-rossiiskie-voennye-o-vozmozhnom-peremirii ; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/6761

[23] https://kyivindependent dot com/vance-says-ukraine-war-wont-end-any-time-soon-urges-sides-to-agree-on-peace-terms/; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/vance-does-not-see-russias-war-ukraine-ending-any-time-soon-fox-news-interview-2025-05-01/; https://archive.ph/zXyUf; https://www.foxnews.com/video/6372190741112; https://www.cnbc.com/2025/05/02/russia-war-in-ukraine-not-going-to-end-any-time-soon-jd-vance-says.html; https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/02/europe/vance-ukraine-war-not-ending-soon-intl

[24] https://www.foxnews.com/video/6372195430112

[25] https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-may-1-2025/

[26] https://www.congress.gov/senate-communication/119th-congress/executive-communication/859?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%22Ukraine%22%7D&s=4&r=1 ; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/01/trump-administration-readies-first-sale-of-military-equipment-to-ukraine

[27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27947 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35133 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35194 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26-2025

[28] https://t.me/epoddubny/23323

[29] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9183

[30] https://t.me/VVV5807/4024

[31] https://rutube dot ru/video/cdffbed33da010ec8b3b7441618ce473/; https://t.me/rybar/70069

[32] https://t.me/yurasumy/22698 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26282

[33] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63929 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70321

[34] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63929 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22698 ; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5688

[35] https://t.me/dva_majors/70321

[36] https://t.me/rybar/70072 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52033

[37] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63929

[38] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5688

[39] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90977

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789

[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl

[42] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35175

[43] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9229; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/02/pozbavyly-okupantiv-10-motoczykliv-nashi-bijczi-znyshhyly-mobilni-shturmovi-grupy-rf-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku/; https://dpsu.gov dot ua/uk/news/47009-video-pomsta-znishuye-mobilni-shturmovi-grupi-voroga-na-kup-yanskomu-napryamku

[44] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/02/pryvaryly-saraj-na-tank-poblyzu-kupyanska-rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-vygaduvaty-bronovanyh-monstriv/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dGVneFXTZ7U

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27898;

[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27898

[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27898; https://t.me/OMIBr_60/1015; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/deceptive-defense-russian-infantry-stormed-positions-wearing-anti-thermal-ponchos/

[48] https://t.me/OMIBr_60/1015; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/deceptive-defense-russian-infantry-stormed-positions-wearing-anti-thermal-ponchos/

[49] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27898

[50] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35188

[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl

[52] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35188

[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26282

[54] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35187

[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27910 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163254 ; https://t.me/rybar/70062

[56] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35187

[57] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1918014207036960908; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9041; https://t.me/dva_majors/70304

[58] https://t.me/dva_majors/70304 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35140 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90948 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22699 ;

[59] https://t.me/dva_majors/70303 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70321 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22704 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63935

[60] https://t.me/yurasumy/22704 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63935

[61] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041425

[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl

[63] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63925

[64] https://t.me/rybar/70069

[65] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163192; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90955; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163192; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35134; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35131; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35154; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35198

[66] https://t.me/yurasumy/22708

[67] https://t.me/yurasumy/22700; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35158

[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63924; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27895; https://t.me/wargonzo/26282; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63935

[69] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/mayemo-pershij-rezultat-vatikanskoyi-zustrichi-yakij-robit-y-97493

[70] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/02/odyn-ne-hotiv-jty-jomu-postrilyaly-po-nogah-pid-pokrovskom-rosiyany-zhenut-vpered-navit-svoyih-poranenyh/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dGVneFXTZ7U

[71] https://t.me/sashakots/53449; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90941 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90949; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90986

[72] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27897

[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl;

[74] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35165

[75] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35134

[76] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27897

[77] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27897

[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl ; https://t.me/rybar/70069; https://t.me/dva_majors/70321;

[79] https://t.me/voin_dv/14716

[80] https://t.me/voin_dv/14701; https://t.me/voin_dv/14710

[81] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63928; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789

[82] https://t.me/wargonzo/26282

[83] https://t.me/voin_dv/14700

[84] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789

[85] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27812; https://t.me/IIsb_128ogshb/10

[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70321

[87]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl

[88] https://www.pravda.com dot ua/eng/news/2025/05/1/7510060/

[89] https://t.me/andriyshTime/36717 ; https://t.me/razvozhaev/11523; https://t.me/razvozhaev/11526 ; https://t.me/rybar/70080 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/23327 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/23084 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/23103 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52052 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/313074 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/313074 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52035 ;

[90] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/836 ; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/839 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/78898 ; https://www dot idelreal.org/a/anneksirovannyy-krym-podvergsya-massirovannoy-atake-dronov/33402916.html ; https://t.me/astrapress/80242 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/36729 ; https://t.me/astrapress/80242 ; https://t.me/astrapress/80245

[91] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2025

[92] https://t.me/russianocontext/6658 ; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/prymary-strike-drones-flew-into-crimea-and-destroyed-air-defense-systems/ ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/19506

[93] https://t.me/kpszsu/33675

[94] https://t.me/synegubov/14102 ; https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/05/02/unaslidok-udariv-rf-na-harkivshhyni-zagynula-lyudyna-shhe-odna-postrazhdala/; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/22771 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/21298 ; https://x.com/SESU_UA/status/1918206863415316871 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/36722 ; https://t.me/severrealii/30348; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/02/vorog-zavdav-masovanogo-udaru-bpla-po-zaporizhzhyu-29-postrazhdalyh-poshkodzheni-bagatopoverhivky/; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18978 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/79742 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18929 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18930 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18939 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18937 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18938 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18973 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18965 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18957 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18947 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18941 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18977 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18981 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18997 ; https://t.me/severrealii/30351 ; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/6847 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27916

Britain appreciated Ukraine’s new achievement

According to British intelligence, Deputy Commander of the Russian Navy Mikhail Gudkov, who was killed by Ukrainian forces a few days ago, became at least the second high-ranking general to be killed since the beginning of 2025.

The aggressor country Russia cannot ignore the fact that in total, since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it has lost at least 16 generals.

The loss of so many senior officers is likely to have undermined the command and control system in some units of the Russian Armed Forces. This is likely to have led to tactical and operational difficulties for Russia during the war, the UK Ministry of Defence has announced. Share

As mentioned earlier, Major General Mikhail Gudkov was eliminated on July 2 in the Russian Kursk region.

What is important to understand is that he was appointed Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy at the end of March, and before that he commanded the 155th Marine Brigade, which is involved in the executions of Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers.

At the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. military launched a secret campaign to counter what it perceived as China’s growing influence in the Philippines, a nation hit especially hard by the deadly virus.

The clandestine operation has not been previously reported. It aimed to sow doubt about the safety and efficacy of vaccines and other life-saving aid that was being supplied by China, a Reuters investigation found. Through phony internet accounts meant to impersonate Filipinos, the military’s propaganda efforts morphed into an anti-vax campaign. Social media posts decried the quality of face masks, test kits and the first vaccine that would become available in the Philippines – China’s Sinovac inoculation.

Reuters identified at least 300 accounts on X, formerly Twitter, that matched descriptions shared by former U.S. military officials familiar with the Philippines operation. Almost all were created in the summer of 2020 and centered on the slogan #Chinaangvirus – Tagalog for China is the virus.

Translation from Tagalog #ChinaIsTheVirus Do you want that? COVID came from China and vaccines came from China (Beneath the message is a picture of then-Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte saying: “China! Prioritize us first please. I’ll give you more islands, POGO and black sand.” POGO refers to Philippine Offshore Gaming Operators, online gambling companies that boomed during Duterte’s administration. Black sand refers to a type of mining.)

“COVID came from China and the VACCINE also came from China, don’t trust China!” one typical tweet from July 2020 read in Tagalog. The words were next to a photo of a syringe beside a Chinese flag and a soaring chart of infections. Another post read: “From China – PPE, Face Mask, Vaccine: FAKE. But the Coronavirus is real.”

After Reuters asked X about the accounts, the social media company removed the profiles, determining they were part of a coordinated bot campaign based on activity patterns and internal data.

The U.S. military’s anti-vax effort began in the spring of 2020 and expanded beyond Southeast Asia before it was terminated in mid-2021, Reuters determined. Tailoring the propaganda campaign to local audiences across Central Asia and the Middle East, the Pentagon used a combination of fake social media accounts on multiple platforms to spread fear of China’s vaccines among Muslims at a time when the virus was killing tens of thousands of people each day. A key part of the strategy: amplify the disputed contention that, because vaccines sometimes contain pork gelatin, China’s shots could be considered forbidden under Islamic law.

The military program started under former President Donald Trump and continued months into Joe Biden’s presidency, Reuters found – even after alarmed social media executives warned the new administration that the Pentagon had been trafficking in COVID misinformation. The Biden White House issued an edict in spring 2021 banning the anti-vax effort, which also disparaged vaccines produced by other rivals, and the Pentagon initiated an internal review, Reuters found.

“I don’t think it’s defensible. I’m extremely dismayed, disappointed and disillusioned to hear that the U.S. government would do that.”

The U.S. military is prohibited from targeting Americans with propaganda, and Reuters found no evidence the Pentagon’s influence operation did so.

Spokespeople for Trump and Biden did not respond to requests for comment about the clandestine program.

A senior Defense Department official acknowledged the U.S. military engaged in secret propaganda to disparage China’s vaccine in the developing world, but the official declined to provide details.

A Pentagon spokeswoman said the U.S. military “uses a variety of platforms, including social media, to counter those malign influence attacks aimed at the U.S., allies, and partners.” She also noted that China had started a “disinformation campaign to falsely blame the United States for the spread of COVID-19.”

In an email, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that it has long maintained the U.S. government manipulates social media and spreads misinformation.

Manila’s embassy in Washington did not respond to Reuters inquiries, including whether it had been aware of the Pentagon operation. A spokesperson for the Philippines Department of Health, however, said the “findings by Reuters deserve to be investigated and heard by the appropriate authorities of the involved countries.” Some aid workers in the Philippines, when told of the U.S. military propaganda effort by Reuters, expressed outrage.

Briefed on the Pentagon’s secret anti-vax campaign by Reuters, some American public health experts also condemned the program, saying it put civilians in jeopardy for potential geopolitical gain. An operation meant to win hearts and minds endangered lives, they said.

“I don’t think it’s defensible,” said Daniel Lucey, an infectious disease specialist at Dartmouth’s Geisel School of Medicine. “I’m extremely dismayed, disappointed and disillusioned to hear that the U.S. government would do that,” said Lucey, a former military physician who assisted in the response to the 2001 anthrax attacks.

The effort to stoke fear about Chinese inoculations risked undermining overall public trust in government health initiatives, including U.S.-made vaccines that became available later, Lucey and others said. Although the Chinese vaccines were found to be less effective than the American-led shots by Pfizer and Moderna, all were approved by the World Health Organization. Sinovac did not respond to a Reuters request for comment.

Academic research published recently has shown that, when individuals develop skepticism toward a single vaccine, those doubts often lead to uncertainty about other inoculations. Lucey and other health experts say they saw such a scenario play out in Pakistan, where the Central Intelligence Agency used a fake hepatitis vaccination program in Abbottabad as cover to hunt for Osama bin Laden, the terrorist mastermind behind the attacks of September 11, 2001. Discovery of the ruse led to a backlash against an unrelated polio vaccination campaign, including attacks on healthcare workers, contributing to the reemergence of the deadly disease in the country.

“It should have been in our interest to get as much vaccine in people’s arms as possible,” said Greg Treverton, former chairman of the U.S. National Intelligence Council, which coordinates the analysis and strategy of Washington’s many spy agencies. What the Pentagon did, Treverton said, “crosses a line.”

‘We were desperate’

Together, the phony accounts used by the military had tens of thousands of followers during the program. Reuters could not determine how widely the anti-vax material and other Pentagon-planted disinformation was viewed, or to what extent the posts may have caused COVID deaths by dissuading people from getting vaccinated.

In the wake of the U.S. propaganda efforts, however, then-Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte had grown so dismayed by how few Filipinos were willing to be inoculated that he threatened to arrest people who refused vaccinations.

“You choose, vaccine or I will have you jailed,” a masked Duterte said in a televised address in June 2021. “There is a crisis in this country … I’m just exasperated by Filipinos not heeding the government.”

When he addressed the vaccination issue, the Philippines had among the worst inoculation rates in Southeast Asia. Only 2.1 million of its 114 million citizens were fully vaccinated – far short of the government’s target of 70 million. By the time Duterte spoke, COVID cases exceeded 1.3 million, and almost 24,000 Filipinos had died from the virus. The difficulty in vaccinating the population contributed to the worst death rate in the region.

A spokesperson for Duterte did not make the former president available for an interview.

Some Filipino healthcare professionals and former officials contacted by Reuters were shocked by the U.S. anti-vax effort, which they say exploited an already vulnerable citizenry. Public concerns about a Dengue fever vaccine, rolled out in the Philippines in 2016, had led to broad skepticism toward inoculations overall, said Lulu Bravo, executive director of the Philippine Foundation for Vaccination. The Pentagon campaign preyed on those fears.

“Why did you do it when people were dying? We were desperate,” said Dr. Nina Castillo-Carandang, a former adviser to the World Health Organization and Philippines government during the pandemic. “We don’t have our own vaccine capacity,” she noted, and the U.S. propaganda effort “contributed even more salt into the wound.”

The campaign also reinforced what one former health secretary called a longstanding suspicion of China, most recently because of aggressive behavior by Beijing in disputed areas of the South China Sea. Filipinos were unwilling to trust China’s Sinovac, which first became available in the country in March 2021, said Esperanza Cabral, who served as health secretary under President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Cabral said she had been unaware of the U.S. military’s secret operation.

“I’m sure that there are lots of people who died from COVID who did not need to die from COVID,” she said.

To implement the anti-vax campaign, the Defense Department overrode strong objections from top U.S. diplomats in Southeast Asia at the time, Reuters found. Sources involved in its planning and execution say the Pentagon, which ran the program through the military’s psychological operations center in Tampa, Florida, disregarded the collateral impact that such propaganda may have on innocent Filipinos.

“We weren’t looking at this from a public health perspective,” said a senior military officer involved in the program. “We were looking at how we could drag China through the mud.”

A new disinformation war

In uncovering the secret U.S. military operation, Reuters interviewed more than two dozen current and former U.S officials, military contractors, social media analysts and academic researchers. Reporters also reviewed Facebook, X and Instagram posts, technical data and documents about a set of fake social media accounts used by the U.S. military. Some were active for more than five years.

Clandestine psychological operations are among the government’s most highly sensitive programs. Knowledge of their existence is limited to a small group of people within U.S. intelligence and military agencies. Such programs are treated with special caution because their exposure could damage foreign alliances or escalate conflict with rivals.

Over the last decade, some U.S. national security officials have pushed for a return to the kind of aggressive clandestine propaganda operations against rivals that the United States’ wielded during the Cold War. Following the 2016 U.S. presidential election, in which Russia used a combination of hacks and leaks to influence voters, the calls to fight back grew louder inside Washington.

In 2019, Trump authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to launch a clandestine campaign on Chinese social media aimed at turning public opinion in China against its government, Reuters reported in March. As part of that effort, a small group of operatives used bogus online identities to spread disparaging narratives about Xi Jinping’s government.

COVID-19 galvanized the drive to wage psychological operations against China. One former senior Pentagon leader described the pandemic as a “bolt of energy” that finally ignited the long delayed counteroffensive against China’s influence war.

The Pentagon’s anti-vax propaganda came in response to China’s own efforts to spread false information about the origins of COVID. The virus first emerged in China in late 2019. But in March 2020, Chinese government officials claimed without evidence that the virus may have been first brought to China by an American service member who participated in an international military sports competition in Wuhan the previous year. Chinese officials also suggested that the virus may have originated in a U.S. Army research facility at Fort Detrick, Maryland. There’s no evidence for that assertion.

Mirroring Beijing’s public statements, Chinese intelligence operatives set up networks of fake social media accounts to promote the Fort Detrick conspiracy, according to a U.S. Justice Department complaint.

China’s messaging got Washington’s attention. Trump subsequently coined the term “China virus” as a response to Beijing’s accusation that the U.S. military exported COVID to Wuhan.

“That was false. And rather than having an argument, I said, ‘I have to call it where it came from,’” Trump said in a March 2020 news conference. “It did come from China.”

China’s Foreign Ministry said in an email that it opposed “actions to politicize the origins question and stigmatize China.” The ministry had no comment about the Justice Department’s complaint.

Beijing didn’t limit its global influence efforts to propaganda. It announced an ambitious COVID assistance program, which included sending masks, ventilators and its own vaccines – still being tested at the time – to struggling countries. In May 2020, Xi announced that the vaccine China was developing would be made available as a “global public good,” and would ensure “vaccine accessibility and affordability in developing countries.” Sinovac was the primary vaccine available in the Philippines for about a year until U.S.-made vaccines became more widely available there in early 2022.

Washington’s plan, called Operation Warp Speed, was different. It favored inoculating Americans first, and it placed no restrictions on what pharmaceutical companies could charge developing countries for the remaining vaccines not used by the United States. The deal allowed the companies to “play hardball” with developing countries, forcing them to accept high prices, said Lawrence Gostin, a professor of medicine at Georgetown University who has worked with the World Health Organization.

The deal “sucked most of the supply out of the global market,” Gostin said. “The United States took a very determined America First approach.”

To Washington’s alarm, China’s offers of assistance were tilting the geopolitical playing field across the developing world, including in the Philippines, where the government faced upwards of 100,000 infections in the early months of the pandemic.

The U.S. relationship with Manila had grown tense after the 2016 election of the bombastic Duterte. A staunch critic of the United States, he had threatened to cancel a key pact that allows the U.S. military to maintain legal jurisdiction over American troops stationed in the country.

Duterte said in a July 2020 speech he had made “a plea” to Xi that the Philippines be at the front of the line as China rolled out vaccines. He vowed in the same speech that the Philippines would no longer challenge Beijing’s aggressive expansion in the South China Sea, upending a key security understanding Manila had long held with Washington.

“China is claiming it. We are claiming it. China has the arms, we do not have it.” Duterte said. “So, it is simple as that.”

Days later, China’s foreign minister announced Beijing would grant Duterte’s plea for priority access to the vaccine, as part of a “new highlight in bilateral relations.”

China’s growing influence fueled efforts by U.S. military leaders to launch the secret propaganda operation Reuters uncovered.

“We didn’t do a good job sharing vaccines with partners,” a senior U.S. military officer directly involved in the campaign in Southeast Asia told Reuters. “So what was left to us was to throw shade on China’s.”

Translation from Tagalog Vaccine from China might be a rat killer. #ChinaIsTheVirus

Military trumped diplomats

U.S. military leaders feared that China’s COVID diplomacy and propaganda could draw other Southeast Asian countries, such as Cambodia and Malaysia, closer to Beijing, furthering its regional ambitions.

A senior U.S. military commander responsible for Southeast Asia, Special Operations Command Pacific General Jonathan Braga, pressed his bosses in Washington to fight back in the so-called information space, according to three former Pentagon officials.

The commander initially wanted to punch back at Beijing in Southeast Asia. The goal: to ensure the region understood the origin of COVID while promoting skepticism toward what were then still-untested vaccines offered by a country that they said had lied continually since the start of the pandemic.

A spokesperson for Special Operations Command declined to comment.

At least six senior State Department officials responsible for the region objected to this approach. A health crisis was the wrong time to instill fear or anger through a psychological operation, or psyop, they argued during Zoom calls with the Pentagon.

“We’re stooping lower than the Chinese and we should not be doing that,” said a former senior State Department official for the region who fought against the military operation.

While the Pentagon saw Washington’s rapidly diminishing influence in the Philippines as a call to action, the withering partnership led American diplomats to plead for caution.

Translation from Arabic This is what the #United_States is offering to help countries, including Arab countries, obtain #Coronavirus (#Covid_19) vaccines and mitigate the secondary effects of the pandemic. Compare this with #Russia and #China using the pandemic excuse to expand their influence and profit even though the Russian vaccine is ineffective and the Chinese vaccine contains pork gelatin

“The relationship is hanging from a thread,” another former senior U.S. diplomat recounted. “Is this the moment you want to do a psyop in the Philippines? Is it worth the risk?”

In the past, such opposition from the State Department might have proved fatal to the program. Previously in peacetime, the Pentagon needed approval of embassy officials before conducting psychological operations in a country, often hamstringing commanders seeking to quickly respond to Beijing’s messaging, three former Pentagon officials told Reuters.

But in 2019, before COVID surfaced in full force, then-Secretary of Defense Mark Esper signed a secret order that later paved the way for the launch of the U.S. military propaganda campaign. The order elevated the Pentagon’s competition with China and Russia to the priority of active combat, enabling commanders to sidestep the State Department when conducting psyops against those adversaries. The Pentagon spending bill passed by Congress that year also explicitly authorized the military to conduct clandestine influence operations against other countries, even “outside of areas of active hostilities.”

Esper, through a spokesperson, declined to comment. A State Department spokesperson referred questions to the Pentagon.

U.S. propaganda machine

In spring 2020, special-ops commander Braga turned to a cadre of psychological-warfare soldiers and contractors in Tampa to counter Beijing’s COVID efforts. Colleagues say Braga was a longtime advocate of increasing the use of propaganda operations in global competition. In trailers and squat buildings at a facility on Tampa’s MacDill Air Force Base, U.S. military personnel and contractors would use anonymous accounts on X, Facebook and other social media to spread what became an anti-vax message. The facility remains the Pentagon’s clandestine propaganda factory.

Psychological warfare has played a role in U.S. military operations for more than a hundred years, although it has changed in style and substance over time. So-called psyopers were best known following World War II for their supporting role in combat missions across Vietnam, Korea and Kuwait, often dropping leaflets to confuse the enemy or encourage their surrender.

After the al Qaeda attacks of 2001, the United States was fighting a borderless, shadowy enemy, and the Pentagon began to wage a more ambitious kind of psychological combat previously associated only with the CIA. The Pentagon set up front news outlets, paid off prominent local figures, and sometimes funded television soap operas in order to turn local populations against militant groups or Iranian-backed militias, former national security officials told Reuters.

Unlike earlier psyop missions, which sought specific tactical advantage on the battlefield, the post-9/11 operations hoped to create broader change in public opinion across entire regions.

Translation from Russian Can China be trusted if it tries to hide that its vaccine contains pork gelatin, and distributes it in Central Asia and other Muslim countries, where many people consider such a drug “haram”?

By 2010, the military began using social media tools, leveraging phony accounts to spread messages of sympathetic local voices – themselves often secretly paid by the United States government. As time passed, a growing web of military and intelligence contractors built online news websites to pump U.S.-approved narratives into foreign countries. Today, the military employs a sprawling ecosystem of social media influencers, front groups and covertly placed digital advertisements to influence overseas audiences, according to current and former military officials.

China’s efforts to gain geopolitical clout from the pandemic gave Braga justification to launch the propaganda campaign that Reuters uncovered, sources said.

Pork in the vaccine?

By summer 2020, the military’s propaganda campaign moved into new territory and darker messaging, ultimately drawing the attention of social media executives.

In regions beyond Southeast Asia, senior officers in the U.S. Central Command, which oversees military operations across the Middle East and Central Asia, launched their own version of the COVID psyop, three former military officials told Reuters.

Although the Chinese vaccines were still months from release, controversy roiled the Muslim world over whether the vaccines contained pork gelatin and could be considered “haram,” or forbidden under Islamic law. Sinovac has said that the vaccine was “ manufactured free of porcine materials.” Many Islamic religious authorities maintained that even if the vaccines did contain pork gelatin, they were still permissible since the treatments were being used to save human life.

The Pentagon campaign sought to intensify fears about injecting a pig derivative. As part of an internal investigation at X, the social media company used IP addresses and browser data to identify more than 150 phony accounts that were operated from Tampa by U.S. Central Command and its contractors, according to an internal X document reviewed by Reuters.

Translation from Russian Muslim scientists from the Raza Academy in Mumbai reported that the Chinese coronavirus vaccine contains gelatin from pork and recommended against vaccination with the haram vaccine. China hides what exactly this drug is made of, which causes mistrust among Muslims.

“Can you trust China, which tries to hide that its vaccine contains pork gelatin and distributes it in Central Asia and other Muslim countries where many people consider such a drug haram?” read an April 2021 tweet sent from a military-controlled account identified by X.

The Pentagon also covertly spread its messages on Facebook and Instagram, alarming executives at parent company Meta who had long been tracking the military accounts, according to former military officials.

One military-created meme targeting Central Asia showed a pig made out of syringes, according to two people who viewed the image. Reuters found similar posts that traced back to U.S. Central Command. One shows a Chinese flag as a curtain separating Muslim women in hijabs and pigs stuck with vaccine syringes. In the center is a man with syringes; on his back is the word “China.” It targeted Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, a country that distributed tens of millions of doses of China’s vaccines and participated in human trials. Translated into English, the X post reads: “China distributes a vaccine made of pork gelatin.”

Translation from Tagalog WE SHOULD NOT TRUST THOSE MED SUPPLIES BY CHINA REALLY. Everything is fake! Face mask, PPE, and test kits. There is a possibility that their vaccine is fake… COVID came from China. What if their vaccines are dangerous?? It’s normal for Filipinos not to trust China, given the number of problems they gave us??

Facebook executives had first approached the Pentagon in the summer of 2020, warning the military that Facebook workers had easily identified the military’s phony accounts, according to three former U.S. officials and another person familiar with the matter. The government, Facebook argued, was violating Facebook’s policies by operating the bogus accounts and by spreading COVID misinformation.

The military argued that many of its fake accounts were being used for counterterrorism and asked Facebook not to take down the content, according to two people familiar with the exchange. The Pentagon pledged to stop spreading COVID-related propaganda, and some of the accounts continued to remain active on Facebook.

Nonetheless, the anti-vax campaign continued into 2021 as Biden took office.

Translation from Russian Turkmenistan residents report that the Chinese vaccine causes severe side effects. Those vaccinated with the Chinese drug experience severe nausea, vomiting and diarrhea. Some called ambulance services and ended up in intensive care.

Angered that military officials had ignored their warning, Facebook officials arranged a Zoom meeting with Biden’s new National Security Council shortly after the inauguration, Reuters learned. The discussion quickly became tense.

“It was terrible,” said a senior administration official describing the reaction after learning of the campaign’s pig-related posts. “I was shocked. The administration was pro-vaccine and our concern was this could affect vaccine hesitancy, especially in developing countries.”

By spring 2021, the National Security Council ordered the military to stop all anti-vaccine messaging. “We were told we needed to be pro-vaccine, pro all vaccines,” said a former senior military officer who helped oversee the program. Even so, Reuters found some anti-vax posts that continued through April and other deceptive COVID-related messaging that extended into that summer. Reuters could not determine why the campaign didn’t end immediately with the NSC’s order. In response to questions from Reuters, the NSC declined to comment.

The senior Defense Department official said that those complaints led to an internal review in late 2021, which uncovered the anti-vaccine operation. The probe also turned up other social and political messaging that was “many, many leagues away” from any acceptable military objective. The official would not elaborate.

The review intensified the following year, the official said, after a group of academic researchers at Stanford University flagged some of the same accounts as pro-Western bots in a public report. The high-level Pentagon review was first reported by the Washington Post. which also reported that the military used fake social media accounts to counter China’s message that COVID came from the United States. But the Post report did not reveal that the program evolved into the anti-vax propaganda campaign uncovered by Reuters.

The senior defense official said the Pentagon has rescinded parts of Esper’s 2019 order that allowed military commanders to bypass the approval of U.S. ambassadors when waging psychological operations. The rules now mandate that military commanders work closely with U.S. diplomats in the country where they seek to have an impact. The policy also restricts psychological operations aimed at “broad population messaging,” such as those used to promote vaccine hesitancy during COVID.

The Pentagon’s audit concluded that the military’s primary contractor handling the campaign, General Dynamics IT, had employed sloppy tradecraft, taking inadequate steps to hide the origin of the fake accounts, said a person with direct knowledge of the review. The review also found that military leaders didn’t maintain enough control over its psyop contractors, the person said.

A spokesperson for General Dynamics IT declined to comment.

Nevertheless, the Pentagon’s clandestine propaganda efforts are set to continue. In an unclassified strategy document last year, top Pentagon generals wrote that the U.S. military could undermine adversaries such as China and Russia using “disinformation spread across social media, false narratives disguised as news, and similar subversive activities [to] weaken societal trust by undermining the foundations of government.”

And in February, the contractor that worked on the anti-vax campaign – General Dynamics IT – won a $493 million contract. Its mission: to continue providing clandestine influence services for the military.

War of Words By Chris Bing and Joel Schectman Additional reporting: Maria Tsvetkova in New York, Karen Lema in Manila, James Pearson in London and Andrew Silver in Shanghai Art direction: John Emerson Photo editing: Jeremy Schultz Edited by Blake Morrison

Source: UK Defence Intelligence update dated 21 November on X (Twitter), as reported by European Pravda

Details: UK intelligence noted that before the full-scale invasion, Russia sought to create modern, professional armed forces capable of conducting complex operations.

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UK Defence Intelligence added that after 1,000 days of war, Russia’s Ground Forces are fundamentally different from those that initially invaded Ukraine.

The update emphasised that the losses among Russian personnel, which amounted to more than 700,000 killed and wounded, have sharply undermined the quality of the Russian Armed Forces.

UK intelligence highlighted that most soldiers currently serving in the Russian Armed Forces have received minimal training. Despite their high casualty rate, Russian commanders continue to rely on basic tactics to achieve success.

The update noted that Russia has lost at least 3,500 main battle tanks and 7,500 armoured vehicles.

“Large stockpiles of tanks and armoured vehicles, a legacy of the Soviet Union, have been the only means for Russia to be able to replenish these major losses,” UK intelligence said.

The update explained that, despite significant losses among Russia’s Ground Forces, the pace of Russia’s territorial gains in Ukraine had increased by 2024.

“This has been underpinned by the Russian leadership’s tolerance for casualties, and Russia’s land forces quantitative overmatch relative to the Ukrainian Armed Forces,” UK intelligence noted.

The update also noted that the war zone is now more unstable than at any point since the war began.

Background:

Earlier, UK intelligence reported that Ukraine’s successful actions against the Russian Black Sea Fleet had led to the destruction of around a quarter of Russian large vessels, including the flagship. This forced the fleet to retreat to the eastern part of the sea, yet it continued to play a role in supporting ground operations.

A previous update explained that in October, Russia’s average daily casualties at the front reached a record high. UK intelligence also pointed to the increasing pressure exerted by Russian forces on the city of Kupiansk in Kharkiv Oblast.

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The UK Defense Ministry said this in an intelligence update published on X, Ukrinform reports.

The ministry stated that the loss of so many high-ranking officers is likely to have had the effect of undermining command and control in parts of the Russian Armed Forces. This has likely contributed to Russian tactical and operational difficulties during the conflict.

This assessment comes in the wake of the recent elimination of Major General Mikhail Gudkov, former commander of Russia’s 155th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Pacific Fleet.

“The Russian Ministry of Defense has confirmed that Major General Mikhail Gudkov was killed on July 2, 2025 in the Kursk oblast in western Russia. Gudkov, appointed as a Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy on March 28, 2025, was killed in a Ukrainian strike on a Russian command post. It is likely Gudkov was directing marine infantry units attempting to establish a buffer zone in the Ukrainian oblast of Sumy,” the report said.

Gudkov is reportedly the second senior Russian general to be killed in 2025, the fifth general killed in the last 12 months, and the sixteenth Russian general killed since Russia launched its illegal, full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The governor of Russia’s Primorsky Krai, Oleg Kozhemyako, recently confirmed that Gudkov had been killed in the Kursk region.