Zourabichvili warns of crisis in Georgia

Following her speech in the French Senate, Georgia’s fifth president, Salome Zourabichvili, wrote on X that the country is facing a triple crisis: democracy is weakening, sovereignty is shifting into Russia’s hands, and geopolitically, Georgia is drifting away from Europe toward Russia and China — “and no one seems able to stop it.”

According to Zourabichvili, political and civil freedoms in the country are being curtailed, the judiciary no longer functions independently, and prosecution has become a tool of political control.

What does Zourabichvili say?

“The political climate shifted sharply after the so-called “first Russian law” was introduced, withdrawn and then reintroduced. This triggered harsh rhetoric and direct attacks on European and American ambassadors-signaling rising tensions and the humiliation of Georgia’s partners

Despite the government’s turn away from EU path, 80% of Georgians still strongly support European integration. This public loyalty clashes with violations of constitutional commitments, sparking ongoing protests against the ruling party’s “Russian nightmare” approach.

The ruling regime in Georgia is actively contradicting European recommendations. Their actions and laws closely mirror Russia’s playbook used to suppress civil society and eliminate political opposition. This isn’t accidental – it’s a deliberate authoritarian shift.

Recent repressive laws now target social networks and NGOs indiscriminately, affecting groups beyond politics – including organizations supporting people with disabilities and other vulnerable sectors. Civil society as a whole is under threat.

Political and civil freedoms are shrinking faster than during Russia’s slow regression. Courts no longer act independently; verdicts are predetermined by prosecutors. Legal persecution has become the regime’s tool of political control.

60 young activists in Georgia remain in pre-trial detention, with harsh verdicts already handed down despite a lack of evidence. More verdicts are expected this summer, highlighting an intensifying political crackdown.

This crisis isn’t just internal – it’s part of a Russian strategy to undermine Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration, shifting from failed military interventions to hybrid tactics like propaganda and puppet regimes.

Georgia’s ruling party is deepening ties with Russia, Iran, and China, reversing earlier moves toward the EU and increasing economic and energy dependence – raising serious concerns about geopolitics and Black Sea security.

Georgia faces a triple crisis: Democracy is weakening, sovereignty is slipping into Russia’s hands, geopolitically, we’re drifting from Europe toward Russia and China — and no one seems able to stop it.”

CNN —

US President Donald Trump is finding out that getting through to Russian President Vladimir Putin is not as easy as he might have thought. But he’s only the latest US leader to fail at an attempt to get Russia and its longtime president on board.

The Trump administration’s attempts to reach a ceasefire agreement in Ukraine have largely stalled, despite a flurry of diplomatic activity.

Since returning to the White House, Trump has held at least two lengthy phone calls with Putin and has repeatedly sent his envoy Steve Witkoff to meet the Russian leader in person in Moscow, with the latest trip on Friday.

Unsurprisingly to many Kremlin-watchers, none of these meetings have led to an agreement. Not only did Witkoff come back empty-handed, he also repeated several key Kremlin talking points.

The latest US proposal includes recognizing Russian control of Crimea – a long-standing red line for Ukraine and its European allies, officials familiar with the details have told CNN.

“I would say the negotiations are going very well — from Putin’s point of view,” Angela Stent, a foreign policy expert and former national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council, told CNN.

“He has no intention of stopping the war, but what he wants, and what he’s getting, is a restoration of US-Russian diplomatic relations.”

In this photograph distributed by the Russian state agency Sputnik, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with US President Donald Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff during a meeting in Saint Petersburg on April 11. Gavriil Grigorov/Sputnik/Kremlin Pool/AP

“Putin is playing a waiting game because he believes that time is on his side and that he can force Ukraine into a more disadvantageous position and persuade Kyiv and its European allies with the help of Washington that there is no alternative to a peace settlement on Russian terms,” John Lough, the head of foreign policy at New Eurasian Strategies Centre, a think tank based in London and Washington, told CNN.

Stalling, haggling over every detail, or saying no without explicitly saying “no” is a classic Russian tactic, employed by Putin and his top negotiators on several occasions in the past, such as during the negotiations for a ceasefire in Syria.

It’s unclear whether the Trump administration didn’t see it coming because it doesn’t have the expertise that would have led it to expect such behavior, or if it has simply decided to play along.

Trump’s words since coming back into office indicate that he sees the world in a similar way to Putin, Stent said – as consisting of a handful of great powers to whom smaller countries should submit.

“Trump talks about great power competition (between China and the US), that he should be able to take over Canada and Greenland, and Panama, and from Putin’s point of view, that’s okay. Remember, he hasn’t criticized Trump for any of these things,” she said.

Ultimately, Trump has made it clear that he has little interest in the future of Ukraine – even suggesting Ukraine “might be Russia someday.”

So, if Putin continues to drag the process along, it may give Trump a way out.

Russian President Vladimir Putin hands US President Donald Trump a World Cup football on July 16, 2018 in Helsinki, Finland. Chris McGrath/Getty Images

Putin’s ‘art of manipulating’

Lough said that Putin’s KGB training has shaped the way he approaches negotiations.

“Putin famously described his job in the KGB as ‘work with people.’ He was trained in the art of manipulating interlocutors. He is known to prepare meticulously for negotiations and is a master of detail,” Lough told CNN, adding that the Russian leader is known to be “quick on his feet and can charm and intimidate in the same breath.”

Putin has employed this technique on Trump in the past, according to Kalina Zhekova, an associate professor at University College London (UCL) who specializes in Russian foreign policy.

When the two met in Helsinki in 2018, the Russian leader handed Trump a ball from the 2018 World Cup during the news conference, saying “now the ball is in your court,” in reference to efforts to improve the strained US-Russia relationship.

“This was indicative of Putin’s calculated ‘tit-for-tat’ approach that views diplomacy as a game with winners and losers. He was also likely aware that his counterpart is someone with a fragile ego who is easily impressed by theatrical gestures and gifts,” Zhekova said, adding that the summit was widely seen as a win for Putin, because Trump was reluctant to denounce Moscow’s interference in the 2016 US presidential election, contradicting US intelligence reports and effectively siding with the Kremlin.

Putin has many tricks in his diplomatic toolbox. He likes to keep his counterparts waiting by turning up late for meetings – sometimes by several hours. He often creates chaotic situations to get more options and can change his mind when it suits him, which makes it even more difficult to negotiate with him.

Russian President Vladimir Putin looks on as his dog Kuni approaches the Germany Chancellor Angela Merkel in Sochi in January 2007. Axel Schmidt/AFP via Getty Images

He is also known to use other ways to assert his power. In 2007, for example, “Putin allowed his Labrador to approach (German Chancellor) Merkel during a photo opportunity, although her fear of dogs was communicated to Russian officials prior to the meeting,” Zhekova said.

Witkoff, a real estate magnate with zero previous experience in politics or diplomacy, has been trying to strike a deal with a former KGB lieutenant colonel who has outlasted five US presidents, eight UK prime ministers, three Chinese leaders and six NATO chiefs, having personally negotiated with many of them.

Stent pointed to the fact that Gen. Keith Kellogg, officially Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, has been largely sidelined in the talks with Russia, despite, she said, having the most relevant experience. “Of course, he’s a general, he’s not a diplomat, but at least he has some experience with Russia and thinking about these things, but of course, he’s only dealing with Ukraine.”

The mismatch in expertise extends beyond Witkoff to the rest of the US negotiating team too.

Instead of Kellogg, Witkoff was accompanied on some of his trips by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and national security adviser Mike Waltz. Both are experienced politicians but have no proven track record when it comes to Russia.

Meanwhile, the Russian delegation included longtime Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, the former ambassador to Washington, Yuri Ushakov, and Kirill Dimitriev, the head of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund who studied at Stanford and Harvard. All three speak fluent English and are experienced diplomats who know how to deal with Americans.

US and Russian delegations met with Saudi representatives in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, February 18, 2025. Evelyn Hockstein/Pool/Reuters

US could ‘move on’ soon

Moscow might be dragging its feet in hopes that Trump will lose his patience and abandon his goal of ending the war.

Signs of that are already emerging: Rubio said last week that the US could walk away within “days” if there are no signs of progress. And CNN reported this week that Trump is getting frustrated with the lack of progress and privately told advisers that mediating a deal has been more difficult than he anticipated.

“(The Trump administration) are eager to have a deal, but unwilling to pay a high cost for that deal – so no US security guarantees, no boots on the ground (and) they’re unwilling to surge US aid to Ukraine as a stick to try to get Russia to make concessions,” said Jennifer Kavanagh, the director of military analysis at Defense Priorities, a think tank that advocates for more restrained US foreign policy.

She added that, for Trump, getting the US out of Ukraine and stabilizing relations with Russia are more important than achieving peace.

Putin knows this. Russia’s launch of several major attacks against Ukraine over the past few weeks, including on Kyiv, indicates the Kremlin’s belief that the leverage US has – or is willing to use – is limited.

Trump, of course, is not the first US president to believe he can build a good relationship with Russia.

“Every US administration in my memory has come in with some idea that they’re going to reset – they all use that word – the relationship with Russia, that they have an opportunity to turn the page and start again. And they have always been wrong,” Sam Greene, director for Democratic Resilience at the Center for European Policy Analysis, told CNN.

Greene, who is also a professor of Russian politics at King’s College London, said that this succession of failures has meant that Moscow “has come to see the United States as fundamentally inconsistent.”

Some former presidents tried to build personal relationships with Putin – George W. Bush invited the Russian leader to his ranch in Crawford, Texas, where he drove him around in a Ford pickup truck. Bush famously wrote later that he “looked the man in the eye” and “was able to get a sense of his soul.”

But while Putin was initially agreeable to cooperating with the Bush administration, being the first world leader to call Bush after the 9/11 attacks, their relationship soured fairly quickly.

“I think the real reason for the collapse of that reset was because Putin wanted the United States to treat Russia as an equal and to recognize that it has a right to a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet states. And that’s not what the Bush administration was prepared to do,” Stent said.

US President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin tour a canyon and waterfall at the Bush Ranch November 14, 2001 in Crawford, Texas. Eric Draper/White House/Getty Images

Other US administrations have tried a different approach, attempting to get Russia more interested in cooperation by welcoming the country into global institutions – such as the G7 in 1997 during Bill Clinton’s presidency, or the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2012 under the Obama administration.

“And that hasn’t worked either, largely because both sides, over time, underestimated the depth of the structural disconnect between the West and where Russia was headed,” Greene said.

America’s relationship with Russia did somewhat ease under the Obama administration – but mostly because Putin wasn’t officially in the top seat for some of that time. He stepped down in 2008 to become prime minister because of term limits. He returned as president in 2012 and has since changed the constitution.

The key problem, experts say, is that the US and Russia simply do not understand each other – now or in decades past.

“I don’t think that most US administrations have understood really the depth of Russia’s shift towards not just authoritarianism, but to a brand of authoritarianism that sees the existence of Western power and particularly sort of the unity of the transatlantic relationship as deeply threatening to Russia’s interests,” Greene said.

Thomas Graham, a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who was the senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff from 2004 to 2007, said that the key mistake American presidents made after the breakup of the Soviet Union was thinking that it was possible to develop a broad strategic partnership with Russia.

“I would argue that given Russian interest, given Russian history and Russian traditions, that was never really on the cards. And so we tended to exaggerate the possibilities for cooperation, and then were deeply disappointed when we didn’t get it,” he told CNN.

Russian President Vladimir Putin delivers a speech during a ceremony to receive diplomatic credentials from newly appointed foreign ambassadors at the Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow, Russia November 5, 2024. Yuri Kochetkov/Pool via Reuters

Graham, who served as a special assistant to Bush, said that the only way forward is to understand that Russia and the US will always have a complex, competitive relationship.

“It’s important to remember that there are different ways of rivalry. We could have the type of very profound adversarial relationship that we have at this point, with, I would say, an unacceptably high risk of military confrontation between Russia and the United States … or we could have something that I like to call competitive coexistence, where the competition is largely in an economic, commercial, cultural, ideological, diplomatic realm, and not so much in the military realm,” he said.

The point, Graham and others say, is that Russia will not disappear. It will continue to exist and have an interest in European security, in Ukraine and in competing with the Western world.

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Is China an “essential partner” to tackle the greatest challenges of our time or the “key enabler” behind the largest armed conflict on European soil since 1945?

At this stage, it just depends on who you ask.

The return of Donald Trump to the White House has unleashed seismic changes across the globe, forcing nations to re-evaluate their alliances and rivalries in desperate search of shelter against the president’s go-for-broke policies.

His sweeping tariffs, in particular, have deeply unsettled governments, which are now seriously contemplating if the trade flows and supply chains on which they have relied for the past decades are about to crumble overnight, wreaking untold havoc.

For the European Union, an export-oriented powerhouse and staunch advocate of free markets, the Trump tariffs have hit like a slap in the face. Despite the White House’s surprise reversal, the bloc will still be subject to the 10% baseline rate. Additionally, steel, aluminum and cars will be under a punishing 25% levy. Trump has threatened further duties on foreign-made pharmaceuticals, a precious sector for the Europeans.

With transatlantic relations plunging at a vertiginous pace and the American market becoming increasingly prohibitive, Brussels is on the hunt for economic opportunities that can offset, even if partially, the shockwaves unleashed by Trump.

China has quickly emerged as a prospective option.

Thanks to a vast middle class that is increasingly wealthier and, therefore, increasingly able to afford foreign-made goods, China represents a lucrative business partner that can provide European companies with new clients and fresh investment – exactly what they need at a time of stagnant growth at home and political turmoil abroad.

In 2023, the US was the top destination for EU-made goods (€501.9 billion) followed by China (€223.5 billion), according to Eurostat. However, China brought the largest share of goods into the bloc (€516.2 billion) after the US (€346.7 billion).

It was telling that a few days after Trump showed up at the Rose Garden and unveiled his self-styled “reciprocal tariffs”, Ursula von der Leyen held a phone call with Chinese Premier Li Qiang to discuss bilateral issues and the state of the global economy.

“In response to the widespread disruption caused by the US tariffs, President von der Leyen stressed the responsibility of Europe and China, as two of the world’s largest markets, to support a strong reformed trading system, free, fair and founded on a level playing field,” the European Commission said in its official read-out.

The version released by Beijing was notably more optimistic and highlighted a “momentum of steady growth” in ties. “China is ready to work with the European side to promote the sound and steady development of China-EU relations,” Li told von der Leyen.

The exchange, peppered with explicit criticism of Trump’s policies (Li called them “economic bullying”), immediately fuelled speculation that the leaders were carefully planting the seeds for a rapprochement.

Von der Leyen, who during her first mandate spearheaded a new policy to de-risk from China, has in recent months softened her tone. Now, the Commission chief prefers to speak about a “transactional” foreign policy to “engage constructively” with Beijing.

Pedro Sanchez and Xi Jinping. Huang Jingwen/Xinhua

The impression of a diplomatic thaw deepened a few days later when Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez flew to Beijing and met with President Xi Jinping. Sánchez described China as an “essential partner” in tackling modern-day challenges and made a plea to turn the page on the confrontational approach.

“Spain is in favour of more balanced relations between the European Union and China, of finding negotiated solutions to our differences, which we have, and of greater cooperation in areas of common interest,” Sánchez declared.

Then, on Friday, the Commission delivered more news: Brussels and Beijing have agreed to take a second look at the option of “price undertakings” (minimum prices) to resolve the long-running dispute on China-made electric vehicles. The option was repeatedly floated last year but quietly abandoned due to a lack of progress.

Diplomats from member states, which have been traditionally split on how to deal with China, have taken note of the developments, without rushing to issue a verdict.

“The EU wants and needs to be seen as a reliable partner in the world,” a diplomat said, speaking on condition of anonymity. “In that sense, the discussion with China is evolving because China is looking at us differently. I don’t think the European approach towards China has changed completely, but the winds are moving.”

Reality check

The geopolitical winds might be moving – but not all blow in China’s favour.

Earlier this week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced his army had captured two Chinese citizens fighting alongside Russia inside Ukrainian territory. He later said his government had collected “precise data” indicating that more than 150 Chinese nationals had joined the war on Moscow’s side.

Ukraine’s security services say the Chinese citizens were recruited by Russia through advertisements, including on social media, but have been unable to verify whether the central government in Beijing was aware or involved in the operation.

“I think the United States of America should pay attention to what is happening today. And we expect after this, that this is another country that militarily supports Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – on the side of Russia. This is another one after Iran and the North Korean military,” Zelenskyy said.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry struck back, saying the claims had “no basis in fact”.

“Let me stress that the Chinese government always asks Chinese nationals to stay away from areas of armed conflict,” said Lin Jian, the ministry’s spokesperson.

In Brussels, the news arrived just a few hours after von der Leyen spoke with Premier Li, almost like a reality check that dampened the fervor of a potential rapprochement.

For the past three years, the EU has been dismayed by Beijing’s hands-off position on the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which it consistently refers to as a “crisis”, and by the “no limits” partnership established between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. (Xi is expected to attend the 9 May celebrations in Moscow at Putin’s invitation. By contrast, he has refused to travel to Belgium for the EU-China summit in July.)

High Representative Kaja Kallas left no doubt of her frustration.

“What is clear is that China is the key enabler of Russia’s war. Without Chinese support, Russia wouldn’t be able to wage the war in the amount that they are waging it. We see that 80% of the dual-use goods are actually entering Russia via China,” Kallas said, referring to the circumvention of Western sanctions.

“If China would want to really stop the support then it would have an impact.”

Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. Liu Weibing/Xinhua

Beijing’s close-knit friendship with Moscow has added to a string of grievances and tensions that have plunged EU-China relations to an all-time low.

Other tensions involve the massive export of low-cost, made-in-China products, the heavy use of state subsidies to the detriment of foreign competitors, protectionist regulations that prevent European access to the Chinese market, surveillance of private citizens and companies, the management of the COVID-19 pandemic, aggressive behavior in the Taiwan Strait, the repression of the Uyghur minority in the Xinjiang region, violations of human rights, cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.

Any coordination between Brussels and Beijing to navigate the Trump tariffs is highly unlikely to deliver a resolution on this long – and unrelated – range of open fronts, all of which are complex and depend on factors that go well beyond the EU’s control.

Although some leaders like Spain’s Pedro Sánchez and Hungary’s Viktor Orbán advocate for a reset in relations, others remain profoundly skeptical. The coalition deal of the next German government, led by Friedrich Merz, reads: “We must recognise that the elements of systemic rivalry have now come to the fore as a result of China’s actions.”

The contradictions in public discourse – calls for closer cooperation next to stinging criticism – encapsulate the persistent difficulty in finding a common, uniform line of action on China among the 27 member states. The ambivalence has remained even as Beijing stood by the same country the bloc considers its main adversary – Russia – and is set to go on as the EU searches for new partners to face up to Trump’s disruption.

Whether those partnerships are forged on genuine shared values or opportunistic pragmatism is an entirely separate matter.

“Current trade talks with China are not necessarily about working closer with Beijing: they are rather about using this strategic moment of uncertainty to negotiate new conditions and a new framework for engagement with China,” said Alicja Bachulska, a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).

“It is not a return to ‘business as usual’. The EU would like to get some concessions from Beijing, such as enforceable rules on tech transfer from China or local content requirements, trying to ensure more value-added for the European economy. It remains unclear whether Beijing would be willing to do that.”

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COPENHAGEN — “One way or the other,” President Donald Trump has said, the United States needs to “get” Greenland. Not only to defend the homeland, but the “freedom of the world.” Denmark, he says, isn’t doing nearly enough to protect it. He has named two potential adversaries: China and Russia.

Its location, way out there, in a hostile ocean between North America, Western Europe and Russia, made Greenland strategically vital during the Cold War. After the Soviet Union collapsed, not so much.

But now, as tensions rise across a melting, militarizing Arctic, the world’s largest island is back on the map.

STEP 1: Current sea ice conditions in the Arctic March 3 sea-ice area March median (1981-2010) Moscow RUSSIA FIN. SWE. NOR. DEN. Svalbard (NOR.) North Pole Faroe I. (DEN.) GREENLAND Arctic Ocean (DENMARK) ICELAND Nuuk U.S. CANADA Ottawa Atlantic Ocean D.C. U.S. March 3 sea-ice area Moscow RUSSIA March median (1981-2010) FIN. SWE. NOR. DEN. Svalbard U.K. (NOR.) North Pole Faroe I. GREENLAND (DEN.) Arctic Ocean (DENMARK) ICELAND Nuuk Alaska U.S. Atlantic Ocean CANADA Ottawa D.C. U.S. Sea-ice area on March 3 Median sea-ice extent for March (1981-2010) Arctic Ocean North Pole Alaska U.S. Svalbard (NOR.) Qaanaaq FIN. GREENLAND DENMARK CANADA SWE. NOR. Faroe I. Nuuk ICELAND (DEN.) DEN. GER. U.K. CANADA FRANCE Ottawa Atlantic Ocean U.S. D.C. Sea-ice area on March 3 Median sea-ice extent for March (1981-2010) Arctic Ocean North Pole Alaska U.S. Svalbard (NOR.) Qaanaaq Moscow FIN. GREENLAND DENMARK CANADA SWE. NOR. Faroe I. Nuuk ICELAND DEN. (DEN.) GER. U.K. FRANCE U.S. Ottawa Atlantic Ocean D.C. Sea-ice area on March 3 Median sea-ice extent for March (1981-2010) Alaska Alaska Arctic Ocean North Pole U.S. RUSSIA Svalbard (NOR.) Qaanaaq Moscow FIN. GREENLAND DENMARK CANADA SWE. NOR. Faroe I. ICELAND DEN. Nuuk (DEN.) GER. U.K. FRANCE U.S. Ottawa Atlantic Ocean D.C. MEX. Arctic Ocean Sea-ice area on March 3 Alaska North Pole U.S. Median sea-ice extent for March (1981-2010) RUSSIA Svalbard (NOR.) Qaanaaq Moscow FIN. GREENLAND DENMARK CANADA SWE. NOR. Faroe I. DEN. Nuuk ICELAND (DEN.) GER. U.K. FRANCE U.S. Ottawa Atlantic Ocean D.C. MEX. STEP 2: Typical sea ice conditions in September in the Arctic Sept. 2024 sea-ice Sept. median (1981-2010) Moscow RUSSIA FIN. Northern Sea Route SWE. NOR. DEN. Svalbard (NOR.) North Pole Faroe I. (DEN.) GREENLAND Arctic Ocean (DENMARK) ICELAND Nuuk U.S. Northwest Passage CANADA Ottawa Atlantic Ocean D.C. U.S. Sept. 20 sea-ice area Moscow RUSSIA Sept. median (1981-2010) FIN. Northern Sea Route SWE. NOR. DEN. Svalbard U.K. (NOR.) North Pole Faroe I. GREENLAND (DEN.) Arctic Ocean (DENMARK) ICELAND Nuuk Alaska U.S. Northwest Passage Atlantic Ocean CANADA Ottawa D.C. U.S. Sea-ice area on Sept. 20, 2024 Median sea-ice extent for Sept. (1981-2010) Arctic Ocean North Pole Alaska U.S. Svalbard (NOR.) Qaanaaq FIN. GREENLAND DENMARK CANADA SWE. NOR. Faroe I. Nuuk ICELAND (DEN.) DEN. GER. Northern Sea Route U.K. CANADA FRANCE Northwest Passage Ottawa Atlantic Ocean U.S. D.C. Sea-ice area on Sept. 20, 2024 Median sea-ice extent for September (1981-2010) Arctic Ocean North Pole Alaska U.S. Svalbard (NOR.) Qaanaaq Moscow FIN. GREENLAND DENMARK CANADA SWE. NOR. Faroe I. Nuuk ICELAND DEN. (DEN.) GER. Northern Sea Route U.K. FRANCE Northwest Passage U.S. Ottawa Atlantic Ocean D.C. Sea-ice area on Sept. 20, 2024 Median sea-ice extent for September (1981-2010) Alaska Alaska Arctic Ocean North Pole U.S. RUSSIA Svalbard (NOR.) Qaanaaq Moscow FIN. GREENLAND DENMARK CANADA SWE. NOR. Faroe I. ICELAND DEN. Nuuk (DEN.) GER. Northern Sea Route U.K. FRANCE Northwest Passage U.S. Ottawa Atlantic Ocean D.C. MEX. Arctic Ocean Sea-ice area on September 24, 2024 Alaska North Pole U.S. Median sea-ice extent for September (1981-2010) RUSSIA Svalbard (NOR.) Qaanaaq Moscow FIN. GREENLAND DENMARK CANADA SWE. NOR. Faroe I. DEN. Nuuk ICELAND (DEN.) GER. Northern Sea Route U.K. Northwest Passage FRANCE U.S. Ottawa Atlantic Ocean D.C. MEX. Arctic sea ice typically reaches its greatest extent in March. It makes most of Greenland difficult to reach by ship. By September, the ice contracts to its smallest extent, opening passages that can shorten shipping routes. Greenland lies along what the old Cold Warriors dubbed the “GIUK Gap,” the pinch point between Greenland, Iceland and Britain that protects the North Atlantic from Russian ships and submarines. The island is also a waypoint for communication cables that cross the Atlantic — the kinds of cables that European defense officials say Russian “ghost ships” have been attacking by dropping and dragging their anchors across the seafloor.

Vice President JD Vance has praised Greenland’s “incredible natural resources.” Like Ukraine, the island possesses the critical and rare metals needed for the modern world — for electric vehicles, smartphones, medical imaging equipment, computer chips and wind turbines. Though mining Greenland has so far proved notoriously difficult, its leaders say the territory is open for business to U.S. companies with the money and guts to explore.

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But Trump’s comments have raised more questions than answers. What are the threats against Greenland, and the U.S.? How should they be met, by whom and with what level of force? Treaties? Dogsleds? F-35s? Nukes?

The president, who spoke of buying the territory from Denmark during his first term, revisited its strategic value hours after his inauguration. “You have Russian boats all over the place, you have China boats all over the place — warships.”

He suggested at one point that the U.S. itself could take Greenland by force. The White House and Pentagon hastened to explain that was not what he meant.

“We need Greenland for national security and even international security,” he told Congress this month. “And I think we’re going to get it one way or the other.” The chamber erupted in Republican applause and laughter — like, how might Greenland, population 57,751, stop us?

In an Oval Office meeting last week with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Trump was asked again about “annexing” Greenland. “I think it will happen,” he said.

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The new government elected by Greenlanders this month is expected to pursue a go-slow approach on independence from Denmark, and wariness about Trump’s pitch to make Greenland rich as a 51st state.

The joke among military planners over the past century was that any invasion of Greenland — by, say, Nazi Germany, or the Soviets — would quickly become a search-and-rescue mission. There’s little up there to sustain human life. No roads between settlements; skeletal infrastructure. It’s freezing and dark. It would be best if you brought your own food.

But now the joke is probably dated. The Arctic is warming; the ice is receding. And you don’t need to invade Greenland to control or threaten it.

The northern lights over Nuuk, Greenland’s capital. (Sebastien Van Malleghem/For The Washington Post))

About 80 percent of Greenland’s landmass is ice-covered, empty and wild — an island three times the size of Texas with a population equal to Galveston. Most inhabitants are Inuit, and everyone lives along the coast, not on the ice sheet. It’s also a welfare state: The economy is driven by fishing and subsidies from Denmark.

But Arctic seaways are becoming more navigable each year, and global powers are imagining a day when ships traveling between Asia, Europe and North America no longer need to head south to the Panama and Suez canals, or to round the capes, but can ply new polar routes.

Globe depicting shipping traffic in the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans

Ship traffic density Low High ASIA Northern Sea Route Northwest Passage NORTH AMERICA Suez Canal AFRICA Panama Canal SOUTH AMERICA Source: World Bank Group Ship traffic density Low High ASIA Northern Sea Route Northwest Passage NORTH AMERICA Suez Canal AFRICA Panama Canal SOUTH AMERICA Source: World Bank Group Ship traffic density Low High ASIA Northern Sea Route Northwest Passage NORTH AMERICA EUROPE Suez Canal AFRICA Panama Canal SOUTH AMERICA Source: World Bank Group

Trump is pushing Denmark to bolster its defenses in Greenland, as U.S. military assets on the island have degraded and the Russians are refurbishing their own Arctic ports.

He has also ordered the construction of a “Golden Dome,” a “next-generation missile defense shield for the United States against ballistic, hypersonic, advanced cruise missiles, and other next-generation aerial attacks,” similar to Israel’s Iron Dome system. This would bolster the decades-old NORAD defense system operated by Canada and the U.S. It is unclear what role Greenland would play.

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“Frankly, Denmark, which controls Greenland — it’s not doing its job, and it’s not being a good ally,” Vance recently told Fox News.

The remark shocked the Danes. Denmark was one of a handful of countries to send troops to fight with the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan — and suffered comparable casualties as a percentage of forces deployed.

A skier crosses the sea ice in Qaanaaq, Greenland, in May 2023. (Bonnie Jo Mount/The Washington Post)

“We have fought side by side with the Americans for many, many decades,” Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said. “We are one of the United States’ most important and best allies and that’s why I don’t want Denmark to be labeled a bad ally.”

Greenland once hosted dozens of U.S. military bases, outposts and depots. Today, there is just one. Pituffik Space Base, formerly Thule Air Base, operates a global network of early-warning radars, satellites and sensors to detect incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles. A U.S. force that once numbered 10,000 troops is now down to about 200.

They’re tended by Greenlanders and tech workers. Neither Greenland nor Denmark have ever charged the U.S., a NATO ally, rent for Pituffik.

Danish officials concede that they’ve been slow to replace assets to defend Greenland, mostly because they had other things to do with the money and they didn’t see a threat. Then tensions between China, Russia and the U.S. spilled into the Arctic.

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Now the Danes, too, are concerned. The Danish Defense Intelligence Service has concluded that the high north is “a priority for Russia, and it will demonstrate its power through aggressive and threatening behaviour, which will carry along with it a greater risk of escalation than ever before in the Arctic.”

“We have not invested enough in the Arctic for many years,” Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen has said. “Now we are planning a stronger presence.”

A Danish frigate is stationed in Nuuk’s harbor in January. (Sebastien Van Malleghem/For The Washington Post)

Whether or not Trump deserves the credit, the Danes have announced a new defense spending package, large for such a small country. They’re replacing aging “inspection vessels” with three modern warships, buying two long-range drones, and promising to deploy satellites and other surveillance assets. They’re also upgrading Kangerlussuaq Airport, a former U.S. air base, to handle F-35 supersonic fighters.

They have committed $2 billion. With other spending, Denmark’s NATO contribution is now more than 3 percent of GDP, one of the highest in Europe.

But building ships will take years.

The Danish Defense Ministry also plans to fund two more dogsled teams to protect the 375,000-square-mile Northeast Greenland National Park, the largest in the world. These would be the hardcore Sirius patrols, viewed by the Danes as the Navy SEALs of the Arctic, which began operations during World War II.

This, Trump mocked. “They put two dogsleds there two weeks ago. They thought that was protection,” he said.

Danish officials are uncertain what level of protection would make Trump happy and are struggling to understand what the Pentagon really wants.

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Russian vessels, observed and not, operate freely in the North Atlantic. Russia’s Northern Fleet and its main submarine base are headquartered on the Barents Sea near Murmansk. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union battled for control of the GIUK Gap.

A Danish official said Chinese assets have not been present around Greenland. But as a self-described “near-Arctic” power — in fact, Beijing is closer to the Equator than the North Pole — China has made clear its intention to be present at the top of the world. Last year, two Russian border service and two Chinese coast guard vessels were spotted in a joint exercise in the Bering Sea off Alaska. Russia and China also staged a patrol with bombers over international waters near the Alaska coast.

Under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which holds that an attack on one is an attack on all, the U.S. is bound to protect Greenland. A 1951 treaty between Denmark and the United States gives the U.S. military pretty much a free hand to locate bases in Greenland and protect itself against attack.

“The United States can basically do what it wants in Greenland,” said Kristian Soby Kristensen, head of the department for strategy and war studies at the Royal Danish Defense College in Copenhagen. “I don’t know of a U.S. demand that hasn’t been met. When President Trump says the U.S. needs military control — well, in a sense it already has it.”

A statue of Hans Egede, the Danish-Norwegian Lutheran missionary who founded Nuuk, overlooks the city. (Sebastien Van Malleghem/For The Washington Post)

About this story Minimum sea ice concentration data via the Institute of Environmental Physics at the University of Bremen. Arctic military bases via The Simons Foundation Canada. Subsea cable data via TeleGeography. Shipping traffic density via the World Bank Group.

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