Designations of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) expose and isolate the designated terrorist organizations, deny them access to the U.S. financial system, and create significant criminal and immigration consequences for their members and supporters. Moreover, designations can assist or complement the law enforcement actions of other U.S. agencies and governments. Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) mandates that the Department of State review FTO designations every five years to determine whether an FTO still meets the relevant criteria. The law requires that the Secretary of State revoke a designation if the Secretary finds that the circumstances that were the basis of the designation have changed in such a manner as to warrant a revocation.

In 2022 following a thorough review, the Department of State revoked the FTO designations of Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), Aum Shinrikyo, Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC), Kahane Chai, and Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG). Revocation of these designations does not affect any prior law enforcement actions related to the groups’ past terrorist activities and does not allow any former members admissibility into the United States.

Legal Criteria for Designation Under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act as Amended

It must be a foreign organization. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)), or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)), or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism. The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.

U.S. Government-Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations in 2022

AFRICA Ansar al-Dine AAD Boko Haram BH ISIS-Democratic Republic of the Congo ISIS-DRC ISIS in the Greater Sahara ISIS-GS ISIS-Mozambique ISIS-M ISIS-West Africa ISIS-WA Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin JNIM Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan Ansaru al-Murabitoun al-Shabaab AS al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb AQIM EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC Abu Sayyaf Group ASG Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army CPP/NPA ISIS-Philippines ISIS-P Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid JAT Jemaah Islamiya JI EUROPE Continuity Irish Republican Army CIRA Real IRA RIRA Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front DHKP/C Revolutionary Struggle RS THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA Abdallah Azzam Brigades AAB al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade AAMB al-Ashtar Brigades AAB al-Nusrah Front ANF al-Qa’ida AQ al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula AQAP Ansar al-Islam AAI Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi AAS-B Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah AAS-D Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia AAS-T Army of Islam AOI Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq AAH Asbat al-Ansar AAA Hamas Harakat Sawa’d Misr HASM Hizballah Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps IRGC Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Libya ISIL-Libya ISIS-Sinai Province ISIS-SP Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi JRTN Kata’ib Hizballah KH Kurdistan Workers’ Party PKK Palestine Islamic Jihad PIJ Palestine Liberation Front-Abu Abbas Faction PLF Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command PFLP-GC SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent AQIS Haqqani Network HQN Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami HUJI Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh HUJI-B Harakat ul-Mujahideen HUM Hizbul Mujahideen HM Indian Mujahedeen IM Islamic Jihad Union IJU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan IMU ISIS-Bangladesh Islamic State’s Khorasan Province ISIS-K Jaish-e-Mohammed JeM Jaysh al-Adl Lashkar e-Tayyiba LeT Lashkar i Jhangvi LJ Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam LTTE Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan TTP WESTERN HEMISPHERE National Liberation Army ELN Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army FARC-EP Segunda Marquetalia Shining Path SL

AFRICA

Ansar al-Dine

Aka Ansar Dine; Ansar al-Din; Ancar Dine; Ansar ul-Din; Ansar Eddine; Defenders of the Faith.

Description: Ansar al-Dine (AAD) is now a component of JNIM. The group was designated as an FTO on March 22, 2013. AAD was created in 2011 after its leader Iyad ag Ghali failed in his attempt to take over another secular Tuareg organization. Following the 2012 coup that toppled the Malian government, AAD was among the organizations (which also included al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb [AQIM] and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa) to take over northern Mali, destroy UNESCO World Heritage Sites, and enforce a severe interpretation of Sharia on the civilian population living in the areas under its control.

Beginning in 2013, French and allied African forces conducted operations in northern Mali to counter AAD and other terrorist groups, eventually forcing AAD and its allies out of the population centers they had seized. Ghali, however, remained free and appeared in AAD videos in 2015 and 2016 threatening France and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

In 2017 the Sahara Branch of AQIM, AAD, al-Murabitoun, and the Macina Liberation Front came together to form Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).

Activities: In 2012, AAD received backing from AQIM in its fight against the Government of Mali, including for its capture of the Malian towns of Agulhok, Gao, Kidal, Tessalit, and Timbuktu. In 2013, AAD members were reportedly among the Tuareg rebels responsible for killing 82 Malian soldiers and kidnapping 30 others in an attack against Agulhok. Before the French intervention in 2013, Malian citizens in towns under AAD’s control allegedly faced harassment, torture, and death if they refused to comply with the group’s laws.

AAD was severely weakened by the 2013 French intervention, but it increased its activities between 2015 and 2017, conducting multiple attacks against UN, French, and Malian forces.

AAD did not separately claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Mali.

Funding and External Aid: AAD cooperates closely with and has received support from AQIM since its inception. AAD also is said to receive funds from foreign donors and through smuggling operations.

Boko Haram

Aka Nigerian Taliban; Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad; Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad; People Committed to the Prophet’s Teachings for Propagation and Jihad; Sunni Group for Preaching and Jihad.

Description: Boko Haram (BH) was designated as an FTO on November 14, 2013. The Nigeria-based group is responsible for numerous attacks in the northern and northeastern regions of the country as well as in the Lake Chad Basin in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger that have killed thousands of people since 2009.

In 2015, BH pledged allegiance to ISIS in an audiotape message. ISIS accepted the pledge, and BH began calling itself ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA). In 2016, ISIS announced that Abu Musab al-Barnawi was to replace Abubakar Shekau as the new leader of the group. Infighting then led BH to split. Shekau maintained a group of followers and affiliates concentrated primarily in the Sambisa Forest; this faction became known as BH, while al-Barnawi’s group separated and was designated as ISIS-WA. On May 19, 2021, Shekau was reportedly killed during a clash with ISIS-WA.

Activities: BH crosses porous Lake Chad-region borders to target civilians and military personnel in northeast Nigeria, the Far North Region of Cameroon, and parts of Chad and Niger. The group continued to evade pressure from Lake Chad country forces, including through the regional Multinational Joint Task Force.

In 2014, BH kidnapped 276 female students from a secondary school in Chibok, Borno State. Since then, BH has continued to abduct women and girls, some of whom are subjected to domestic servitude, other forms of forced labor, and sexual servitude, including through forced marriages to its members. Others have been ordered to carry out suicide attacks on civilians.

In 2020, suspected BH fighters attacked trucks carrying passengers along a military checkpoint in Nigeria, attacked villages in northeast Nigeria and killed hundreds of people, and claimed responsibility for the abduction of more than 330 students from an all-boys school in Nigeria’s northern Katsina State. In 2021, suspected BH fighters launched rocket-propelled grenades into densely populated areas from the outskirts of Maiduguri, Nigeria, killing at least 10 people; and hundreds of BH fighters attacked a military post in southern Niger, killing at least 16 soldiers.

In January, BH claimed responsibility for an attack on a village in northeast Nigeria and reportedly abducted 17 girls. In May, BH fighters reportedly killed at least 50 people around the town of Rann in Nigeria’s Borno State. In November, BH attacked an army position in western Chad, killing at least 10 Chadian soldiers.

Strength: BH is estimated to have several thousand fighters.

Location/Area of Operation: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria.

Funding and External Aid: BH largely self-finances through criminal activities such as looting, extortion, kidnapping for ransom, and bank robberies.

ISIS-Democratic Republic of the Congo

Aka ISIS-DRC; Allied Democratic Forces, Madina at Tauheed Wau Mujahedeen; City of Monotheism and Holy Warriors; Islamic State Central Africa Province; Wilayat Central Africa; Wilayah Central Africa Media Office; Wilayat Wasat Ifriqiyah; ISIS-Central Africa.

Description: ISIS-Democratic Republic of the Congo (ISIS-DRC) was designated as an FTO on March 11, 2021. ISIS publicly recognized the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) as an affiliate in late 2018 and claimed responsibility for ADF-attributed attacks starting in 2019 after an attack on an Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo base near Kamango. ISIS-DRC is responsible for many attacks across North Kivu and Ituri Provinces in eastern DRC. Under the leadership of Seka Musa Baluku, ISIS-DRC has been notorious in this region for its brutal violence against Congolese citizens and regional military forces.

Activities: In 2020, ISIS-DRC attacked the villages of Kamwiri, Kitsimba, and Lisasa in Beni, North Kivu Province, killing 21 people, abducting 20 others, and desecrating the Catholic Church in Lisasa. In 2021, ISIS-DRC attacked displacement camps near the towns of Boga and Tchabi in Ituri Province, killing 57 people and abducting 25 others. Also in 2021, ISIS-DRC conducted simultaneous suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda, that killed three persons and wounded 33 others.

In 2022, ISIS-DRC claimed responsibility for a bomb attack during a service at a Protestant church in Kasindi, North Kivu Province, killing at least 10 people and wounding 39 others. Also in 2022, ISIS-DRC reportedly attacked several villages in Beni, killing 26 people and abducting 12 others.

Strength: ISIS-DRC has between 500 to 1500 members.

Location/Area of Operation: Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Funding and External Aid: Although ISIS-DRC’s sources of funding remain largely unknown, the group probably does receive some support from ISIS. The group has seized weapons and ammunition from the Congolese military.

ISIS in the Greater Sahara

Aka ISIS-GS; Islamic State in the Greater Sahara; Islamic State of the Greater Sahel; ISIS in the Greater Sahel; ISIS-Sahel.

Description: ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) was designated as an FTO on May 23, 2018. ISIS-GS emerged when leader Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi and his followers split from al-Murabitoun. Al-Sahrawi first pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2015, which was acknowledged by ISIS in 2016. In 2022, ISIS-GS was elevated to a formal ISIS branch and changed its name to ISIS-Sahel (aka ISIS-Sahel Province).

Activities: Since 2017, ISIS-GS has been involved in numerous skirmishes and attacks in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, including the 2017 attack on a joint U.S.-Nigerien patrol that killed four U.S. soldiers and five Nigerien soldiers, as well as other attacks targeting or killing French, Malian, Nigerien, and Burkinabe soldiers and civilians. In 2020, ISIS-GS militants attacked a Nigerien military base on the border between Niger and Mali, killing 89 soldiers, and were suspected of killing 6 French NGO workers, their Nigerien guide and 1 other Nigerien citizen near Niamey, Niger. In 2021, French forces killed ISIS-GS leader Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi in southern Mali.

In September, ISIS-GS launched an attack on a northern Malian town that killed dozens of civilians. In the same month, ISIS-GS claimed responsibility for two attacks in northern Benin in July that killed six soldiers. In August, ISIS-GS was suspected of being responsible for an attack in central Mali that killed 42 soldiers.

Strength: ISIS-GS is estimated to have 400 to 1,000 fighters.

Location/Area of Operation: Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and to a lesser extent Benin.

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

ISIS-Mozambique

Aka Ansar al-Sunna; Helpers of Tradition; Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa; Adherents to the Traditions and the Community; al-Shabaab in Mozambique; Islamic State Central Africa province; Wilayah Central Africa; Ansaar Kalimat Allah; Supporters of the Word of Allah.

Description: ISIS-Mozambique was designated as an FTO on March 10, 2021. ISIS-Mozambique reportedly pledged allegiance to ISIS as early as 2018 and was acknowledged by ISIS as an affiliate in 2019. Since 2017, ISIS-Mozambique, led by Abu Yasir Hassan, has killed more than 1,300 civilians, and it is estimated that the terrorist group has killed more than 2,300 civilians, security force members, and suspected ISIS-Mozambique militants since it began its violent extremist insurgency.

Activities: In 2020, ISIS-Mozambique captured the strategic port of Mocímboa da Praia, Cabo Delgado Province, killing at least 55 soldiers. In 2021, ISIS-Mozambique attacked the town of Palma for four days, killing dozens of local civilians and foreign expatriate workers and looting about $1 million from banks. In 2022, ISIS-Mozambique attacked a Catholic mission in Chipene, killing an Italian nun and burning down several buildings. Also in 2022, ISIS-Mozambique fighters dressed in Mozambique Defense Armed Forces uniforms attacked multiple villages in Ancuabe District, killing at least four civilians.

Strength: ISIS-Mozambique is estimated to have up to 1,200 fighters.

Location/Area of Operation: Mozambique.

Funding and External Aid: Although sources of funding remain unclear, the group has targeted banks in previous operations. In addition, the group has taken control of food supplies in areas under its control and has captured weapons from government security forces.

ISIS-West Africa

Aka Islamic State West Africa Province; ISISWAP; Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-West Africa; ISIL-WA; Islamic State of Iraq and Syria West Africa Province; ISIS West Africa Province; ISIS West Africa; ISIS-WA.

Description: ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA) was designated as an FTO on February 28, 2018. In 2015 a faction of Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS in an audiotape message. ISIS accepted the group’s pledge, and the group began calling itself ISIS-West Africa. In 2016, ISIS announced that Abu Musab al-Barnawi was to become the new leader of ISIS-WA.

Activities: Since 2016, ISIS-WA has been responsible for numerous attacks in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region, including ones against Nigerian and Chadian military and security personnel. ISIS-WA has also attacked humanitarian aid workers, local officials, critical infrastructure, and other civilians including executing 11 reported Christians in 2019. ISIS-WA claimed the executions were revenge for the killing of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

In February, ISIS-WA claimed responsibility for several attacks in northeast Nigeria that killed or wounded at least 30 Nigerian soldiers. In May, ISIS-WA killed 30 civilians in northeast Nigeria in response to military air strikes that killed several ISIS-WA commanders. In July, ISIS-WA claimed responsibility for an attack on the Kuje prison in Nigeria that killed at least one guard and freed more than 800 inmates. In the same month, ISIS-WA fighters ambushed the convoy of a local official in northeast Nigeria, killing four persons. In October, ISIS-WA fighters attacked an army base in central Nigeria but were repelled.

Strength: ISIS-WA is estimated to have between 4,000 and 5,000 active fighters.

Location/Area of Operation: Nigeria and the greater Lake Chad region.

Funding and External Aid: ISIS-WA receives funding from local sources, taxes, the capture of military supplies, and kidnapping-for-ransom payments.

Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin

Aka Jamaat Nosrat al-Islam wal-Mouslimin; Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims; Group to Support Islam and Muslims; GSIM; GNIM; Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen.

Description: Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) was designated as an FTO on September 6, 2018. JNIM has described itself as al-Qa’ida’s official branch in Mali and has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks and kidnappings since its 2017 formation. That year the Sahara Branch of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Murabitoun, Ansar al-Dine, and the Macina Liberation Front came together to form JNIM. JNIM is led by Iyad ag Ghali. Multiple JNIM senior leaders have been killed in recent years, including JNIM’s former second in command, Ali Maychou, in 2019, senior JNIM commander Bah Ag Moussa in 2020, and senior leader Abdallaye Ag Albaka in 2021.

Activities: Since its formation in 2017, JNIM has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks, including a suicide attack against an African Defeat-ISIS Coalition base in Mali and a truck bomb in a residential complex in 2018; an attack against a UN base in northern Mali in 2019; attacks against Malian security and military personnel in 2020; and attacks against UN peacekeepers and Malian soldiers, as well as the abduction of a French reporter working in Mali in 2021.

In May, JNIM claimed responsibility for an attack on a Togolese military base that killed eight soldiers and wounded 13 others. In July, JNIM claimed responsibility for an attack on Mali’s main military base that killed at least one soldier and wounded six others. In October, JNIM claimed responsibility for an attack on a convoy in Burkina Faso that killed more than a dozen soldiers. In November, JNIM claimed responsibility for an attack on Togolese forces near the border of Benin and Burkina Faso that killed at least 17 soldiers.

Strength: JNIM is estimated to have about 2,000 fighters.

Location/Area of Operation: Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Togo, and Niger

Funding and External Aid: JNIM receives funding through kidnapping for ransom and extortion and from smugglers and traffickers who pay a tax in exchange for permission and safe transit through JNIM-controlled trafficking routes in Mali.

Jama’atu Ansarul Muslima Fi Biladis-Sudan

Aka Ansaru; Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan; Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa; JAMBS; Jama’atu Ansaril Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan.

Description: Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Ansaru) was designated as an FTO on November 14, 2013. Ansaru publicly splintered from Boko Haram (BH) in 2012. Since its inception, Ansaru has targeted civilians, including westerners, and Nigerian government and security officials. Ansaru purportedly aims to defend Muslims throughout Africa by fighting against the Nigerian government and international interests. Ansaru claims to identify with BH’s objectives and struggle, but it has criticized the group for killing fellow Muslims.

Activities: Since splintering from BH, Ansaru has kidnapped several civilians including a French engineer allegedly in response to French involvement in Mali in 2012 and seven international construction workers who were subsequently killed in 2013. In 2020, Ansaru claimed responsibility for attacking the convoy of the Emir of Potiskum in northern Nigeria, killing at least 30 Nigerian soldiers.

In January, Ansaru reconfirmed its allegiance to AQIM in a statement released online. Ansaru is suspected of having participated in an attack on a Nigerian passenger train in March from which more than 60 passengers were taken hostage. Ansaru also is suspected to have been behind an attack on a military base in Nigeria in April, which killed 17 soldiers and wounded 40 others. In July, Ansaru participated in an attack on the Kuje prison in Nigeria, killing at least one guard and freeing more than 800 inmates, including Ansaru leader Khalid al-Barnawi, and six of his close lieutenants. Al-Barnawi was originally captured by the Nigerian Army in 2016.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown; however, given its narrower scope of operations, Ansaru’s membership is estimated to be much smaller than that of Boko Haram.

Location/Area of Operation: Nigeria.

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

Al-Murabitoun

Aka al-Mulathamun Battalion; al-Mulathamun Brigade; al-Muwaqqi’un bil-Dima; Those Signed in Blood Battalion; Signatories in Blood; Those Who Sign in Blood; Witnesses in Blood; Signed-in-Blood Battalion; Masked Men Brigade; Khaled Abu al-Abbas Brigade; al-Mulathamun Masked Ones Brigade; the Sentinels.

Description: Al-Murabitoun is now a component of JNIM and was designated as an FTO on December 19, 2013, originally under the name al-Mulathamun Battalion. Al-Murabitoun was originally part of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) but became a separate organization in 2012 after its leader, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, split from AQIM. After the split, Belmokhtar threatened to fight against western interests and announced the creation of the al-Mulathamun Battalion. In 2013 the al-Mulathamun Battalion and the Mali-based Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (known as MUJAO) announced that the two organizations would merge under the name “al-Murabitoun.” In 2015, al-Murabitoun announced a re-merger with AQIM. In 2017 the Sahara Branch of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Murabitoun, Ansar al-Dine, and the Macina Liberation Front came together to form Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).

Activities: Since 2013, al-Murabitoun has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks involving civilians, including an attack against a gas facility in southeastern Algeria where more than 800 people were taken hostage during the four-day siege, resulting in the deaths of 39 civilians, including three U.S. citizens; and an attack at the La Terrasse restaurant in Bamako, Mali, that that killed a French national, a Belgian national, and three Malians in 2015. Al-Murabitoun also has been involved in attacks against military personnel, claiming responsibility for a 2017 suicide car bombing at a military camp in Mali that killed more than 47 people and fighting against French forces in Mali in 2018.

Between 2015 and 2016, al-Murabitoun was involved in a series of hotel attacks, claiming responsibility for a hotel siege in central Mali and participating in the strike against the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako in 2015. More than 170 people, including U.S. citizens, were taken hostage in the Radisson attack and at least 26 people were killed, among them a U.S. international development worker. Al-Murabitoun reportedly also was involved in the 2016 AQIM attack on a hotel in Burkina Faso that killed nearly 30, including a U.S. citizen.

In December, Fawaz Ould Ahmed was extradited to the United States to face charges including the murder of a U.S. citizen and conspiracy to provide material support to AQIM and al-Murabitoun. Ahmed admitted to a Malian court in 2020 to carrying out the La Terrasse restaurant attack and planning hotel attacks including the Raddison Blu Hotel attack in 2015. Al-Murabitoun did not separately claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, and Niger.

Funding and External Aid: In addition to the support it may receive through its connections to other terrorist organizations in the region, al-Murabitoun is likely funded through kidnapping for ransom and other criminal activities.

Al-Shabaab

Aka Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin; al-Shabab; Shabaab; Youth Wing; Mujahidin al-Shabaab Movement; Mujahideen Youth Movement; Mujahidin Youth Movement; al-Hijra; al Hijra; Muslim Youth Center; the Youth; MYC MYM; Pumwani Muslim Youth; Pumwani Islamist Muslim Youth Center; Hizbul Shabaab; Hisb’ul Shabaab; al-Shabaab al-Islamiya; al-Shabaab al-Islaam; al-Shabaab al-Jihaad; the Unity of Islamic Youth; Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin; Harakatul-Shabaab al Mujaahidiin; Mujaahidiin Youth Movement.

Description: Al-Shabaab was designated as an FTO on March 18, 2008. Al-Shabaab pledged allegiance to al-Qa’ida in 2012 and has ties to other al-Qa’ida affiliates, including al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb. Al-Shabaab formed originally as the militant wing of the former Somali Islamic Courts Council that took over parts of southern Somalia during the second half of 2006. Since the end of 2006, al-Shabaab and associated militias have engaged in violent insurgency using guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics against the transitional governments of Somalia.

Composed of Somali recruits and foreign terrorist fighters, al-Shabaab since 2011 has seen its military capacity and territorial control reduced owing to the efforts of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS; formerly African Union Mission in Somalia [AMISOM]) and Somali forces and to clashes within the group itself. Despite al-Shabaab’s loss of urban centers since 2012, the group has maintained its hold on large sections of rural areas throughout Somalia and has conducted attacks in Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, and Uganda.

Activities: Al-Shabaab has used intimidation and violence to exploit divisions in Somalia and undermine the Somali government, recruit new fighters, extort funding from local populations, and kill activists working to bring about peace through political dialogue. Al-Shabaab has murdered numerous civil society figures, government officials, journalists, international aid workers, and members of non-governmental organizations.

The group has claimed responsibility for numerous high-profile bombings and shootings throughout East Africa against civilians, AMISOM troops and other foreign forces, and Somali officials, including suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda, in 2010 — its first attacks outside of Somalia, killing 76 people, including a U.S. citizen. Other attacks include the 2013 multiday siege against the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, resulting in the deaths of at least 65 civilians, including foreign nationals from 13 countries as well as six soldiers and police officers; the 2015 raid on Kenya’s Garissa University College that killed 148 people; the 2016 attack against a Kenyan AMISOM base that killed more than 100 soldiers, one of the deadliest attacks against AMISOM troops in Somalia; the 2020 attack against U.S. and Kenyan personnel at the Manda Bay Airfield in Kenya, killing three U.S. citizens; and several attacks and bombings against civilians, as well as security and military personnel in 2021.

In 2022, al-Shabaab detonated two car bombs at a busy market intersection near the Ministry of Education in Mogadishu, killing at least 121 people and wounding at least 300. Al-Shabaab also continued to expand its cross-border attacks in 2022, sending hundreds of militants to infiltrate the Ethiopian border, killing 17 people including several Ethiopian soldiers.

Strength: Al-Shabaab is estimated to have between 7,000 and 12,000 members.

Location/Area of Operation: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Uganda.

Funding and External Aid: Al-Shabaab receives and generates enough income to launch attacks throughout East Africa, including against ATMIS bases and other civilian targets. Al-Shabaab obtains funds through illegal charcoal production and exports, “taxation” of local populations and businesses, and by means of remittances and other money transfers from the Somali diaspora (although these funds are not always intended to support al-Shabaab members).

Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb

Aka AQIM; GSPC; Le Groupe Salafiste Pour la Predication et le Combat; Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat; Salafist Group for Call and Combat; Tanzim al-Qa’ida fi Bilad al-Maghrib al-Islamiya.

Description: The Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) was designated as an FTO on March 27, 2002. The Department of State amended the GSPC designation in 2008, after the GSPC officially joined with al-Qa’ida in 2006 and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) became the primary name of the group. Although AQIM remains largely a regionally focused terrorist group, it has adopted a more anti-western rhetoric and ideology. The group aspires to overthrow “apostate” African regimes and create an Islamic state. Following the death of AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel, killed in 2020 by French forces, the group chose Abu Obaida Yusuf al-Annabi as Droukdel’s successor.

Activities: Since becoming an al-Qa’ida affiliate, AQIM has claimed responsibility for or was involved in numerous high-profile attacks including the 2007 bombing of the UN headquarters building and an Algerian government building in Algiers that killed 60 people. Terrorists with ties to AQIM were involved in the 2012 attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi that killed U.S. Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens and three other embassy staff members. AQIM also participated in a 2015 attack against the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, Mali. More than 170 people, including U.S. citizens, were taken hostage in the Radisson attack, and at least 26 people were killed, among them a U.S. international development worker.

Between 2016 and 2020, AQIM carried out several attacks against civilians, as well as security and military personnel, including 2016 attacks on a hotel in Burkina Faso that killed 28 people and a popular tourist beach resort in Côte d’Ivoire that killed more than 16 people; a 2018 vehicle suicide attack on an army patrol in Gao that killed four civilians and wounded 31 others, including four French soldiers; and a 2019 attack on a UN camp in northern Mali, killing 10 Peacekeepers and wounding 25 others.

In February 2022, French forces killed Yahia Djouadi, a senior AQIM official responsible for finance and logistics, in Mali. AQIM did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: AQIM has an estimated 1,000 fighters operating in the Sahel, including Algeria, northern Mali, southwest Libya, and Niger.

Location/Area of Operation: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Libya, Mali, Niger, and Tunisia

Funding and External Aid: AQIM members engage in kidnapping for ransom and other criminal activities to finance their operations. AQIM also successfully fundraises globally and receives limited financial and logistical assistance from supporters residing in Western Europe.

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Abu Sayyaf Group

Aka al Harakat al Islamiyya (the Islamic Movement).

Description: The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. ASG split from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the early 1990s and is one of the most violent terrorist groups in the Philippines. The group claims to promote an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. In 2014, an ASG faction pledged allegiance to ISIS and later formed ISIS’s Philippines branch in 2016.

Activities: Since 2015, ASG has committed kidnappings for ransom (KFR), bombings, ambushes of security personnel, public beheadings, assassinations, and extortion, including KFR operations targeting Canadian, Philippine, German, and Norwegian citizens in 2016 and 2017; a 2018 car bombing at a military checkpoint on Basilan Island, Philippines, killing 10 people, including a Philippine soldier and pro-government militiamen; and the 2019 kidnapping of two British nationals from a beach resort in the Zamboanga Peninsula region.

In 2021, Philippine authorities arrested several ASG members, including an ASG member involved in the abduction of two Canadians who were killed in 2016, an ASG bomb expert linked to the 2019 Jolo cathedral bombings, as well as an ASG member involved in a 2001 kidnapping on Basilan.

In January, ASG killed one Philippine soldier and wounded two in an attack on a Philippine Army truck.

Strength: ASG is assessed to have fewer than 200 armed fighters.

Location/Area of Operation: Philippines and Malaysia.

Funding and External Aid: ASG is funded primarily through its KFR operations and extortion. The group may also receive funding from external sources, including remittances from overseas Philippine workers and Middle East-based sympathizers. In the past, ASG also has received training and other assistance from regional terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiya.

Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army

Aka CPP/NPA; Communist Party of the Philippines; CPP; New People’s Army; NPA; NPP/CPP.

Description: The Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) was designated as an FTO on August 9, 2002. The military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) — the New People’s Army (NPA) — is a Maoist group formed in 1969 with the aim of overthrowing the government through protracted guerrilla warfare. Although primarily a rural-based guerrilla group, the CPP/NPA has an active urban infrastructure to support its terrorist activities and, at times, has used city-based assassination squads. In December the CPP/NPA’s founder, Jose Maria Sison, who reportedly directed CPP/NPA activity from the Netherlands, died in a hospital in Utrecht.

Activities: The CPP/NPA primarily targets Philippine security forces, government officials, local infrastructure, and businesses that refuse to pay extortion or “revolutionary taxes.” The CPP/NPA also has a history of attacking U.S. interests in the Philippines, including four separate 1987 attacks in Angeles that killed three U.S. soldiers, and claimed responsibility for the 1989 ambush and murder of Col. James Nicholas Rowe, chief of the Army division of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group.

Throughout 2016 and 2017, several attempts were made to establish a cease-fire and peace deal between the CPP/NPA and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Peace efforts ended in 2017 after reported violations, including reports of the CPP/NPA’s continued recruitment in the Philippines and attacks against government forces and civilians. In subsequent years, the CPP/NPA has continued to carry out killings, raids, kidnappings, acts of extortion, and other forms of violence primarily directed against Philippine security forces.

In December the CPP/NPA ambushed and wounded two civilians in a convoy of Philippine Army soldiers and civilians engaged in a preemptive evacuation because of Super Typhoon Odette.

Strength: The Philippine government estimates that the CPP/NPA has about 4,000 members. The group also retains a significant amount of support from communities in rural areas of the Philippines.

Location/Area of Operation: Philippines.

Funding and External Aid: The CPP/NPA raises funds through extortion and theft.

ISIS-Philippines

Aka ISIS in the Philippines; ISIL Philippines; ISIL in the Philippines; IS Philippines; ISP; Islamic State in the Philippines; Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in South-East Asia; Dawlatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masrik, DIWM; Dawlatul Islamiyyah Waliyatul Mashriq; IS East Asia Division; ISIS Branch in the Philippines; ISIS’ “Philippines province”; ISIS-East Asia.

Description: ISIS-Philippines (ISIS-P) was designated as an FTO on February 28, 2018. In 2014 a faction of ASG militants under the command of now-deceased leader Isnilon Hapilon pledged allegiance to ISIS and later formed the ISIS branch in 2016. Some Abu Sayyaf Group factions have been reported to interact and coordinate with ISIS-P, including participating in attacks that are claimed by ISIS in the Sulu archipelago.

Activities: Since 2016, ISIS-P has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against Philippine security forces, including 2017 fighting in Marawi that claimed more than 1,000 lives and forced more than 300,000 residents to flee the area; a 2018 suicide bomb attack on a military checkpoint in Basilan that killed at least 11 people; and several attacks in 2021.

ISIS-P also has claimed responsibility for attacks targeting civilians, including the 2019 Jolo cathedral bombing in Sulu, a complex suicide attack carried out by an Indonesian couple during mass, killing 23 people and wounding more than 100 others; and twin suicide bomb attacks in the Sulu province in 2020 that killed more than a dozen people and injured more than 70 others. In 2021, Philippine authorities arrested several ASG members, including an ASG bomb expert linked to the Jolo cathedral bombings. In November, ISIS-P was suspected of bombing a passenger bus in the southern Philippines that killed one and wounded 11.

Strength: ISIS-P is estimated to have a small cadre of fighters in the southern Philippines, but exact numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Philippines.

Funding and External Aid: ISIS-P receives some financial assistance from ISIS-core but relies mostly on criminal activities such as kidnappings for ransom and extortion. It maintains training camps in remote areas under its control and acquires weapons through smuggling and captured or black-market purchases of arms from the Philippine military.

Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid

Aka JAT; Jemmah Ansharut Tauhid; Jem’mah Ansharut Tauhid; Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid; Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid; Laskar 99.

Description: Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) was designated as an FTO on March 13, 2012. Formed in 2008, the Indonesia-based group seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia and has carried out numerous attacks on Indonesian government personnel, police, military, and civilians. In 2011, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the founder and leader of JAT, was sentenced to 15 years in prison for his role in organizing a militant training camp in Aceh, Indonesia. Ba’asyir is also the co-founder and former leader of Jemaah Islamiya (JI). JAT fractured when Ba’asyir pledged the group’s allegiance to ISIS in 2014. Some members who disagreed with the group’s realignment left to form Jemaah Anshorut Syariah, while most members joined various ISIS-inspired groups, including Jemaah Anshorut Daulah and Mujahidin Indonesia Timur.

Activities: JAT has conducted multiple attacks targeting civilians and Indonesian officials, resulting in the deaths of numerous Indonesian police and innocent civilians. In 2012, four police officers were killed and two wounded in an attack by suspected local JAT members in central Sulawesi. JAT has not claimed responsibility for any attacks since at least 2014. Former JAT members have been involved in ISIS-inspired attacks in Indonesia.

Strength: JAT is estimated to have fewer than 1,000 former members scattered among various other Indonesia-based groups.

Location/Area of Operation: Indonesia.

Funding and External Aid: JAT has raised funds through membership donations and legitimate business activities. JAT also has conducted cyber hacking, robbed banks, and carried out other illicit activities to fund the purchase of assault weapons, ammunition, explosives, and bomb making materials.

Jemaah Islamiya

Aka Jemaa Islamiya; Jema’a Islamiyah; Jemaa Islamiyya; Jema’a Islamiyya; Jemaa Islamiyyah; Jema’a Islamiyyah; Jemaah Islamiah; Jemaah Islamiyah; Jema’ah Islamiyah; Jemaah Islamiyyah; Jema’ah Islamiyyah; JI.

Description: Jemaah Islamiya (JI) was designated as an FTO on October 23, 2002. JI is a Southeast Asia-based terrorist group co-founded by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. The group seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate in the region.

Activities: Since 2002, JI has conducted numerous significant JI attacks, including the 2002 Bali bombings that killed more than 200 people, among them seven U.S. citizens; the 2003 bombing of the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta; the 2004 bombing outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta; the 2005 suicide bombing in Bali that killed 26 people; and the 2009 suicide attacks on the J.W. Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta, where a JI faction claimed responsibility, that killed seven persons and injured more than 50, including seven U.S. citizens. JI has kept to a self-imposed moratorium on attacks since 2009.

More than 400 JI operatives have been captured or killed since 2002, including its emir, Para Wijayanto, who was arrested in 2019. Indonesian police said that between 2013 and 2018, under Wijayanto’s leadership, JI sent at least six groups of individuals to Syria for military training or to participate in the fighting. In 2020, Indonesian authorities arrested a JI leader, Aris Sumarsono, who is suspected of being involved in the making of bombs used in the 2002 Bali bombings and the 2003 bombing of the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta. In 2021, Indonesian authorities sentenced JI member Taufiq Bulaga to life in prison after finding him guilty for his role in making bombs for a 2005 Bali bombing.

In 2021, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, JI’s leader at the time of his arrest in 2002, was released from prison after serving more than two thirds of a 15-year sentence for helping establish a terrorist training camp. In December, one of the 2002 Bali bombers, Umar Patek, was released from an Indonesian prison on parole.

Strength: Estimates of JI membership vary from 500 to several thousand members.

Location/Area of Operation: Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

Funding and External Aid: JI has raised funds through membership donations, criminal actions, and business activities. The group has received financial, ideological, and logistical support from Middle Eastern contacts and illegitimate charities and organizations.

EUROPE

Continuity Irish Republican Army

Aka CIRA; Continuity Army Council; Continuity IRA; Republican Sinn Fein.

Description: Designated as an FTO on July 13, 2004, the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) is a terrorist splinter group that became operational in 1986 as the clandestine armed wing of Republican Sinn Fein, following its split from Sinn Fein. “Continuity” refers to the group’s belief that it is carrying on the original goal of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), to force the British out of Northern Ireland. CIRA cooperates with the Real IRA (RIRA).

Activities: CIRA has been active in Belfast and the border areas of Northern Ireland, where it has carried out bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, extortion operations, and robberies. On occasion, it has provided advance warning to police of its attacks. Targets have included the British military, Northern Ireland security forces, and Loyalist paramilitary groups.

In 2019, CIRA members conducted an attack on the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), setting off a bomb near the border of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Also in 2019, CIRA claimed responsibility for a grenade attack in west Belfast on a PSNI vehicle. In 2020, CIRA claimed responsibility for attaching an IED to a truck destined for an unknown location in England; CIRA had allegedly planned for the bomb to go off on the day the United Kingdom left the European Union. In 2021, CIRA claimed responsibility for an attack on a police station in Fermanagh County, Northern Ireland. CIRA did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: CIRA’s membership is small, with possibly fewer than 50 members.

Location/Area of Operation: United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland.

Funding and External Aid: CIRA supports its activities through criminal activities, including smuggling.

Real IRA

Aka RIRA; Real Irish Republican Army; 32 County Sovereignty Committee; 32 County Sovereignty Movement; Irish Republican Prisoners Welfare Association; Real Oglaigh na hEireann.

Description: Description: The Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) was designated as an FTO on May 16, 2001. The group was formed in 1997 as the clandestine armed wing of the 32 County Sovereignty Movement, a “political pressure group” dedicated to removing British forces from Northern Ireland and unifying Ireland. The RIRA has historically sought to disrupt the Northern Ireland peace process and did not participate in the 2005 weapons decommissioning. Despite internal rifts and calls by some jailed members (including the group’s founder Michael “Mickey” McKevitt) for a cease-fire and disbandment, the RIRA has pledged additional violence and continued to conduct attacks. Many RIRA members are former Provisional Irish Republican Army members who left the organization after the group renewed its cease-fire in 1997. These members brought extensive experience in terrorist tactics and bomb making to the group. In June 2023, the Department of State amended its FTO designations of RIRA to reflect additional aliases including New IRA as its primary name. Although this amendment occurred outside of the reporting period for this report, it is included to highlight claimed activity under its new primary name through 2022.

Activities: Targets have included civilians (the most notorious example is the Omagh bombing in 1998), British security forces, and police officers in Northern Ireland. The Independent Monitoring Commission, which oversees the peace process, assessed that RIRA likely was responsible for most of the attacks that occurred after the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was decommissioned in Northern Ireland. In 2012, RIRA rebranded itself as the New Irish Republican Army (New IRA) when members of RIRA, Republican Action Against Drugs (RAAD), and several independent republicans came together. In 2016, the New IRA bombed the van of an Irish prison officer in east Belfast; the officer died from complications following the attack. Dublin police also linked the New IRA to a cache of explosives found in Dublin in 2016. In 2017, the New IRA claimed responsibility for a gun attack on police in north Belfast that injured an on-duty officer. In 2019, the New IRA claimed responsibility for four parcel bombs mailed to London and Glasgow and an attempt to murder a police officer in Northern Ireland using a car bomb. Also in 2019, the New IRA admitted responsibility and offered apologies for the shooting and killing of Lyra McKee, a journalist in Norther Ireland. In 2021, the New IRA claimed responsibility for an attempted bomb attack on a police officer in Northern Ireland. In November 2022, the New IRA claimed responsibility for a bomb attack on a police vehicle in Northern Ireland.

Strength: The Irish government reports that RIRA has roughly 100 active members. The organization may receive limited support from IRA hardliners and sympathizers who are dissatisfied with the IRA’s cease-fire and with Sinn Fein’s involvement in the peace process.

Location/Area of Operation: United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland.

Funding and External Aid: RIRA receives funds from money laundering, smuggling, and other criminal activities, is suspected of receiving funds from sympathizers in the United States, and has attempted to buy weapons from gun dealers in the United States and the Balkans.

Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front

Aka DHKP/C; Dev Sol; Dev Sol Armed Revolutionary Units; Dev Sol Silahli Devrimci Birlikleri; Dev Sol SDB; Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi; Devrimci Sol; Revolutionary Left.

Description: The Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. DHKP/C formed in 1978 as Devrimci Sol, or Dev Sol, a splinter faction of Dev Genc (Revolutionary Youth). It was renamed in 1994 after factional infighting. “Party” refers to the group’s political activities, and “Front” alludes to the group’s militant operations. The group advocates a Marxist-Leninist ideology and opposes the United States, NATO, and the Turkish establishment. It strives to establish a socialist state and to abolish Turkish prisons.

Activities: Since the late 1980s the group primarily has targeted current and retired Turkish security and military officials. In 1990 the group began conducting attacks against foreign interests, including U.S. military and diplomatic personnel and facilities. DHKP/C murdered two U.S. military contractors, wounded a U.S. Air Force officer, and bombed more than 20 U.S. and NATO military, diplomatic, commercial, and cultural facilities. In 2001, DHKP/C began conducting its first suicide bombing attacks against Turkish police. Since the end of 2001, DHKP/C has typically used IEDs against official Turkish and U.S. targets.

In 2015, DHKP/C claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing that killed one police officer and wounded another. That year, Turkish prosecutor Mehmet Selim Kiraz was taken hostage and died from multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by DHKP/C after police attempted to rescue him. Also that year, two women opened fire on the U.S. Consulate General in Istanbul; one woman was identified as a DHKP/C member. In mid-2019, two individuals linked to DHKP/C were arrested by Turkish security forces after they had entered the Turkish Parliament and taken a staff member hostage. There have been no known attacks by DHKP/C since mid-2019.

In May, German police arrested three senior members of DHKP/C for organizing the group’s propaganda, recruitment, and funding activities across Germany, and are believed to have supplied fake passports to DHKP/C members. In November, Turkish security forces arrested Gülten Matur, the DHKP/C leader responsible for Türkiye.

Strength: DHKP/C is estimated to have several dozen members inside Türkiye, with a support network throughout Europe.

Location/Area of Operation: Türkiye and Europe.

Funding and External Aid: DHKP/C finances its activities chiefly through donations and extortion. The group raises funds primarily in Europe.

Revolutionary Struggle

Aka Epanastatikos Aghonas

Description: Revolutionary Struggle (RS) was designated as an FTO on May 18, 2009. RS is a radical Marxist violent extremist group that has conducted attacks against both Greek and U.S. targets in Greece. RS emerged in 2003 following the arrests of members of two other Greek Marxist groups: 17 November and the Revolutionary People’s Struggle.

Activities: RS first gained notoriety in 2003 when it claimed responsibility for bombings at the Athens Courthouse protesting the trials of 17 November members. From 2004 to 2006, RS carried out IED attacks that included a 2004 attack outside a Citibank office in Athens. RS claimed responsibility for the 2007 rocket-propelled grenade attack on Embassy Athens, which damaged the building, and the 2009 bombing of a Citibank branch in Athens.

The Greek government has made significant strides in curtailing the group’s terrorist activity. In 2010, Greek police arrested six suspected RS members, including purported leader Nikos Maziotis, who later escaped. In 2013, five RS members were convicted by an Athens appeals court, three of them receiving maximum prison sentences. Maziotis and another accused RS conspirator, Paula Roupa, were convicted in absentia. Before Maziotis’s recapture, RS conducted a bomb attack outside a Bank of Greece office in Athens in 2014; the blast caused extensive damage to surrounding structures but no casualties. In 2016 a Greek court sentenced Maziotis to life in prison plus 129 years. In 2017, Roupa was arrested by Greek police in Athens and later sentenced to life and 25 years’ imprisonment. RS did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Greece.

Funding and External Aid: RS’s sources of funding are unknown, but the group most likely supports itself by means of criminal activities, including bank robbery.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Abdallah Azzam Brigades

Aka Abdullah Azzam Brigades; Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades; Yusuf al-’Uyayri Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades; Marwan Hadid Brigades; Marwan Hadid Brigade.

Description: Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) was designated as an FTO on May 30, 2012. AAB formally announced its establishment in a 2009 video statement claiming responsibility for a rocket attack against Israel earlier that year. The Lebanon-based group’s full name is Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades, named after Lebanese citizen Ziad al-Jarrah, one of the planners of and participants in the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.

Activities: After its initial formation, AAB relied primarily on rocket attacks against Israeli civilians. It is responsible for numerous rockets fired into Israeli territory from Lebanon, often targeting population centers. In 2017, AAB called for jihad by Muslims against the United States and Israel after the U.S. announcement recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.

Beginning in 2013, AAB began targeting Hizballah for the organization’s involvement in the Syrian conflict and support for Syrian regime forces. In subsequent years, AAB claimed responsibility for several suicide bombings, including the 2013 bombing outside the Iranian Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, that killed 23 people; the 2014 twin suicide bomb attacks against the Iranian cultural center in Beirut that killed four persons; and the 2014 AAB-blamed suicide bombing in Beirut that killed a security officer. From 2016 through 2018, AAB continued its involvement in the Syrian conflict and was active in Lebanon’s Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp.

AAB announced its dissolution in 2019 and did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Lebanon.

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade

Aka al-Aqsa Martyrs Battalion.

Description: Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB) was designated as an FTO on March 27, 2002. AAMB is composed of small cells of Fatah-affiliated activists who emerged at the outset of the al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000. AAMB strives to expel the Israeli military and settlers from the West Bank and establish a Palestinian state loyal to Fatah.

Activities: During the Second Palestinian Intifada in 2000, AAMB primarily carried out small-arms attacks against Israeli military personnel and settlers. By 2002 the group was striking at Israeli civilians inside Israel and claimed responsibility for the first female suicide bombing in the country. In 2015, AAMB declared open war against Israel and asked Iran to help fund its efforts in a televised broadcast. Since 2010, AAMB has claimed responsibility for multiple rocket attacks on Israel from the West Bank, including at least 36 rockets launched in 2021. In 2022, AAMB claimed responsibility for attacks that killed several Israeli security personnel.

Strength: AAMB is estimated to have a few hundred members.

Location/Area of Operation: Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank.

Funding and External Aid: Iran has provided AAMB with funds and guidance, primarily through Hizballah facilitators.

Al-Ashtar Brigades

Aka Saraya al-Ashtar; AAB.

Description: Al-Ashtar Brigades (AAB) was designated as an FTO on July 11, 2018. AAB is an Iran-backed terrorist organization established in 2013 with the goal of violently overthrowing the ruling family in Bahrain. In 2018, AAB adopted Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps branding and reaffirmed its loyalty to Tehran to reflect its role in an Iranian network of state and nonstate actors that operates against the United States and its allies in the region.

Activities: Since 2013, AAB has claimed responsibility for more than 20 terrorist attacks against police and security targets in Bahrain, including a 2014 bomb attack that killed two police officers and an officer from the United Arab Emirates and the 2017 killing of another local Bahraini officer. AAB also has promoted violent activity against the British, Saudi Arabian, and U.S. governments over social media. In 2019, AAB released a video statement promising more attacks in Bahrain to mark the anniversary of Bahrain’s Arab Uprising-inspired political uprising.

AAB did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Bahrain, Iran, and Iraq.

Funding and External Aid: AAB receives funding and support from the Government of Iran.

Al-Nusrah Front

Aka Jabhat al-Nusrah; Jabhet al-Nusrah; the Victory Front; al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant; al-Nusrah Front in Lebanon; Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham min Mujahedi al-Sham fi Sahat al-Jihad; Support Front for the People of the Levant; Jabhat Fath al-Sham; Jabhat Fath al Sham; Jabhat Fatah al-Sham; Jabhat Fateh al-Sham; Front for the Conquest of Syria; the Front for Liberation of al Sham; Front for the Conquest of Syria/the Levant; Front for the Liberation of the Levant; Conquest of the Levant Front; Fatah al-Sham Front; Fateh al-Sham Front; Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham; Hay’et Tahrir al-Sham; Hayat Tahrir al-Sham; HTS; Assembly for the Liberation of Syria; Assembly for Liberation of the Levant; Liberation of al-Sham Commission; Liberation of the Levant Organization; Tahrir al-Sham; Tahrir al-Sham Hay’at.

Description: Al-Nusrah Front (ANF) was designated as an FTO on May 15, 2014. It is led by Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani. The group formed in 2011 when then-al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) — now ISIS — then-leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi sent al-Jawlani to Syria to organize terrorist cells. In 2013 the group split from AQI and became an independent entity. ANF’s stated goal is to oust Syria’s Assad regime and replace it with a Sunni Islamic state. The group is concentrated in and controls a portion of territory in northwest Syria, where it is active as an opposition force and exerts varying degrees of influence over local governance and external plotting. In 2017, ANF joined with four smaller Syrian factions and created Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) as a vehicle to advance its position in the Syrian insurgency.

Activities: ANF has been active in operations against other factions in the Syrian conflict. In 2016 the group carried out attacks in Aleppo and other parts of Syria controlled by the Syrian Army, killing both military officials and civilians. ANF took control of significant portions of Idlib from 2017 to 2019, exerting severe military pressure over other local groups such as Ahrar al-Sham and Nur ad-Din al-Zinki as it fought against the regime and continued plotting against U.S. and allied interests. In 2019, ANF bombed the Syrian town of Kafr Takharim, using heavy weaponry and killing at least five persons. In 2020 an ANF member threw a grenade and opened fire into a group of civilians in Idlib city, Syria, killing two persons and injuring others.

In 2022, ANF remained the largest and most-dominant militant faction in northwest Syria’s Idlib province. In a mid-October offensive, ANF took full control of the strategic city of Afrin and at least 26 towns and villages to the southwest. After several days of fighting between ANF and Turkish-backed rebel groups, an intervention by Türkiye stopped ANF’s expansion and the group withdrew from the Afrin region. The clashes killed least 58 people, including 10 civilians, and forced thousands to flee homes or refugee camps.

Strength: ANF has as many as 15,000 fighters.

Location/Area of Operation: Syria, headquartered in Syria’s Idlib province; operationally active in northwest Syria.

Funding and External Aid: ANF receives funding from a variety of sources, including kidnapping-for-ransom payments, taxes and fees on border crossings it controls, and donations from external Persian Gulf-based donors. The group also generates revenue by collecting fees from commercial traffic entering and exiting Idlib.

Al-Qa’ida

Aka al-Qa’eda; al Qaida, al Qaeda, Islamic Army; Islamic Salvation Foundation; the Base; the Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites; the Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places; the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders; Usama Bin Laden Network; Usama Bin Laden Organization; al-Jihad; the Jihad Group; Egyptian al-Jihad; Egyptian Islamic Jihad; New Jihad; International Front for Fighting Jews and Crusades; Islamic Army for the Liberation of Holy Sites.

Description: Al-Qa’ida was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1999. Established in 1988, al-Qa’ida helped finance, recruit, transport, and train fighters for the Afghan resistance against the former Soviet Union. Al-Qa’ida strives to eliminate western influence from the Muslim world, topple “apostate” governments of Muslim countries, and establish a pan-Islamic caliphate governed by its own interpretation of Sharia that would ultimately be at the center of a new international order. These goals remain essentially unchanged since the group’s 1996 public declaration of war against the United States. Al-Qa’ida leaders issued a statement in 1998 under the banner of “The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens — civilian and military — and their allies everywhere. Al-Qa’ida merged with al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) in 2001. Although numerous al-Qa’ida leaders have been killed in recent years, including Usama bin Laden in 2011 and Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2022, al-Qa’ida’s likely acting leader remains at large in Iran.

Activities: In the 1990s, al-Qa’ida conducted three bombings targeting U.S. troops in Aden, Yemen; claimed responsibility for shooting down U.S. helicopters and killing U.S. soldiers in Somalia; and carried out the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing up to 300 people and injuring more than 5,000. Two of the individuals wanted for the embassy bombings, Sayf al-Adl and Abu Mohammed al-Masri, were released from Iranian custody in exchange for an Iranian diplomat who had been kidnapped in Yemen and held hostage since 2015. In 2000, al-Qa’ida conducted a suicide attack on the USS Cole in the Port of Aden with an explosive-laden boat, killing 17 U.S. Navy sailors and injuring 39 others.

On September 11, 2001, 19 al-Qa’ida members hijacked and crashed four U.S. commercial jets — two into the World Trade Center in New York City, one into the Pentagon, and the last into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Nearly 3,000 civilians, police, and first responders were killed. The dead included U.S. and foreign citizens from at least 77 countries.

In a 2011 video, al-Zawahiri claimed al-Qa’ida was behind the kidnapping of U.S. aid worker Warren Weinstein in Pakistan. Weinstein was held captive until his death in 2015. In 2017, al-Zawahiri released a video calling for jihadists around the world to conduct attacks against the United States. Al-Zawahiri also released multiple recordings and videos in 2018 in which he continued to call for jihad against the United States after the U.S. Embassy in Israel moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. In 2019, Zawahiri called for extremists in the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir to attack Indian forces and appealed to Muslims to attack U.S., European, Israeli, and Russian military targets in a video recording.

Several individuals supporting or inspired by al-Qa’ida have been convicted or arrested. In 2017 a U.S. citizen was convicted in New York of charges related to abetting al-Qa’ida’s 2009 attack on a U.S. military base in Afghanistan using two truck bombs. In 2019 a man from Cleveland, Ohio, was arrested for allegedly making plans for an al-Qa’ida-inspired bomb attack on the city’s downtown Independence Day parade.

In 2022 the United States conducted a counterterrorism operation in Kabul, Afghanistan, that killed Ayman al-Zawahiri. While al-Qa’ida did not claim responsibility for any attacks, it remained active in 2022.

Strength: Fewer than a dozen al-Qa’ida core members with legacy ties to the group remain in Afghanistan. The deaths or arrests of dozens of mid- and senior-level al-Qa’ida operatives, including Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, have disrupted communication, financial support, facilitation nodes, and several terrorist plots. Al-Qa’ida leaders, including those located in Iran, oversee a network of affiliated groups. In addition, supporters and associates worldwide who are motivated by the group’s ideology may operate without direction from al-Qa’ida central leadership.

Location/Area of Operation: Afghanistan, Iran, North Africa, West Africa, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, Yemen.

Funding and External Aid: Al-Qa’ida depends primarily on donations from likeminded supporters, and from individuals who believe that their money is supporting a humanitarian cause. Some funds are diverted from Islamic charitable organizations.

Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula

Aka al-Qa’ida in the South Arabian Peninsula; al-Qa’ida in Yemen; al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qa’ida Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Jazirat al-Arab; AQAP; AQY; Ansar al-Shari’a; Ansar al-Sharia; Ansar al-Shariah, Ansar al Shariah, Partisans of Islamic Law, Sons of Abyan; Sons of Hadramawt; Sons of Hadramawt Committee; Civil Council of Hadramawt; and National Hadramawt Council.

Description: Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was designated as an FTO on January 19, 2010. In 2009 the now-deceased leader of al-Qa’ida in Yemen, Nasir al-Wahishi, publicly announced that Yemeni and Saudi al-Qa’ida operatives were working together under the banner of AQAP. The announcement signaled the rebirth of an al-Qa’ida franchise that previously carried out attacks in Saudi Arabia. AQAP’s stated goals include establishing a caliphate and implementing Sharia in the Arabian Peninsula and the wider Middle East.

Activities: AQAP has claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist acts against both local and foreign targets since its inception in 2009, including a 2009 attempted attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan; a 2010 foiled plot to send explosive-laden packages to the United States on cargo planes; and the 2015 attack by brothers Cherif and Said Kouachi the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo in Paris, killing 12 people. One of the brothers, who had traveled to Yemen in 2011 and met with now-deceased Anwar al-Aulaqi, claimed responsibility for the attack on behalf of AQAP.

In 2017 a U.S. Navy SEAL was killed in a raid against AQAP leaders in Yemen. That same year, AQAP attacked a Yemeni Army camp, killing at least two soldiers. In 2019, Mohammed Saeed Alshamrani killed three persons and injured eight others in a shooting at Naval Air Station Pensacola. AQAP released a video claiming “full responsibility” for the shooting the following year. In 2021, AQAP killed eight Yemen soldiers and four civilians in an attack on a security forces checkpoint in Abyan governorate.

In 2022, AQAP claimed responsibility for several attacks throughout the year. In February, AQAP kidnapped five UN workers in Abyan governorate, and continues to hold them hostage. In June, AQAP carried out two attacks against pro-government forces in Abyan and Shabwah governorates in Yemen, killing 10 soldiers. In September, AQAP ambushed a security forces checkpoint in Abyan, killing at least 21 Yemeni soldiers — the group’s deadliest attack since 2019.

Strength: AQAP fighters are estimated to be in the low thousands.

Location/Area of Operation: Yemen.

Funding and External Aid: AQAP’s funding has historically come from theft, robberies, oil and gas revenue, kidnap-for-ransom operations, and donations from likeminded supporters.

Ansar al-Islam

Aka Ansar al-Sunna; Ansar al-Sunna Army; Devotees of Islam; Followers of Islam in Kurdistan; Helpers of Islam; Jaish Ansar al-Sunna; Jund al-Islam; Kurdish Taliban; Kurdistan Supporters of Islam; Partisans of Islam; Soldiers of God; Soldiers of Islam; Supporters of Islam in Kurdistan.

Description: Ansar al-Islam (AAI) was designated as an FTO on March 22, 2004. AAI was established in 2001 in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region through the merger of two Kurdish terrorist factions that traced their roots to the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan. AAI seeks to expel western interests from Iraq and establish an independent Iraqi state based on its interpretation of Sharia.

Activities: From 2003 to 2011, AAI conducted attacks against a wide range of targets including Iraqi government and security forces, and U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS forces. The group also carried out numerous kidnappings, murders, and assassinations of Iraqi citizens and politicians. In 2012, AAI claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Sons of Martyrs School in Damascus, which was occupied by Syrian security forces and pro-government militias; seven persons were wounded in the attack.

In 2014, parts of AAI issued a statement pledging allegiance to ISIS, although later reports suggest that a faction of AAI opposed joining ISIS. In 2019, AAI claimed its first attack in Iraq in five years, placing two IEDs in Iraq’s Diyala province. AAI did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022. However, it remained active in Syria.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Iraq and Syria.

Funding and External Aid: AAI receives assistance from a loose network of associates in Europe and the Middle East.

Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi

Aka Ansar al-Sharia in Libya; Ansar al-Shariah Brigade; Ansar al-Shari’a Brigade; Katibat Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi; Ansar al-Shariah-Benghazi; al-Raya Establishment for Media Production; Ansar al-Sharia; Soldiers of the Sharia; Ansar al-Shariah; Supporters of Islamic Law

Description: Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi (AAS-B) was designated as an FTO on January 13, 2014. AAS-B was created after the 2011 fall of the Qadhafi regime in Libya. The group has been involved in terrorist attacks against civilian targets as well as the assassination and attempted assassination of security officials and political actors in eastern Libya.

Activities: Members of AAS-B were involved in the 2012 attacks against the U.S. Special Mission and Annex in Benghazi, Libya. Four U.S. citizens were killed in the attack: Glen Doherty, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and U.S. Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens.

Throughout 2016, AAS-B continued its fight against the “Libyan National Army” in Benghazi, resulting in the deaths of numerous Libyan security personnel and civilians. Additionally, AAS-B controlled several terrorist training camps in Libya and trained members of other terrorist organizations operating in Iraq, Mali, and Syria.

AAS-B announced its formal dissolution in 2017 owing to suffering heavy losses, including the group’s senior leadership and defections to ISIS in Libya. AAS-B did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Benghazi, Libya

Funding and External Aid: AAS-B obtained funds from al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb as well as through charities, donations, and criminal activities.

Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah

Aka Supporters of Islamic Law; Ansar al-Sharia in Derna; Ansar al-Sharia in Libya; Ansar al-Sharia; Ansar al-Sharia Brigade in Darnah.

Description: Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah (AAS-D) was designated as an FTO on January 13, 2014. AAS-D was created after the 2011 fall of the Qadhafi regime in Libya. The group has been involved in terrorist attacks against civilian targets as well as the assassination and attempted assassination of security officials and political actors in eastern Libya.

Activities: Members of AAS-D were involved in the 2012 attacks against the U.S. Special Mission and Annex in Benghazi, Libya. Four U.S. citizens were killed in the attack: Glen Doherty, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and U.S. Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens.

Throughout 2013 and 2014, AAS-D was believed to have cooperated with Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi in multiple attacks and suicide bombings targeting Libyan security forces in that city. In 2016, AAS-D continued fighting in and around Darnah. Additionally, AAS-D maintained several terrorist training camps in Darnah and Jebel Akhdar, Libya, and trained members of other terrorist organizations operating in Iraq and Syria. In 2018 there were unconfirmed reports that AAS-D was involved in clashes with the Libyan National Army.

AAS-D did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Darnah, Libya.

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia

Aka al-Qayrawan Media Foundation; Supporters of Islamic Law; Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia; Ansar al-Shari’ah; Ansar al-Shari’ah in Tunisia; Ansar al-Sharia.

Description: Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia (AAS-T) was designated as an FTO on January 13, 2014. Founded in 2011 by Seif Allah Ben Hassine, AAS-T has been implicated in attacks against Tunisian security forces, assassinations of Tunisian political figures, and attempted suicide bombings of popular tourist locations. AAS-T has also recruited Tunisians to fight in Syria.

Activities: AAS-T was involved in the 2012 attack against Embassy Tunis and the American school in Tunis, which threatened the safety of more than 100 U.S. Embassy employees. In 2013, AAS-T members were implicated in the assassination of Tunisian politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi. Since 2016, Tunisian authorities have continued to confront and arrest AAS-T members.

AAS-T did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Libya and Tunisia.

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

Army of Islam

Aka Jaysh al-Islam; Jaish al-Islam.

Description: Army of Islam (AOI) was designated as an FTO on May 19, 2011. Founded in 2005, AOI is a Gaza-based terrorist organization responsible for numerous terrorist acts against the Israeli and Egyptian governments and British, New Zealander, and U.S. citizens. The group, led by Mumtaz Dughmush, subscribes to a violent Salafist ideology.

Note: AOI is a separate and distinct group from the Syria-based Jaysh al-Islam, which is not a designated FTO.

Activities: Since 2006, AOI has been responsible for kidnappings and terrorist attacks including kidnappings of civilians, including a U.S. journalist; 2009 attacks on Egyptian civilians in Cairo and Heliopolis, Egypt; the 2011 attack on a Coptic Christian church in Alexandria that killed 25 persons and wounded 100; and rocket attacks on Israel in a joint operation with the Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem in 2012.

In 2015, AOI reportedly released a statement pledging allegiance to ISIS. In a short post attributed to the group, AOI declared itself an inseparable part of ISIS-Sinai Province. Since then, AOI has continued to express support for ISIS. In 2017 the group released a video meant to encourage ISIS fighters defending Mosul. In 2019, AOI shared another video praising ISIS that included training information for individuals to conduct suicide attacks. In 2020, AOI published more than two dozen images of fighters conducting military training. AOI did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Egypt, Gaza, and Israel.

Funding and External Aid: AOI receives much of its funding from a variety of criminal activities in Gaza.

Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq

Aka: AAH; Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq min al-Iraq; Asaib al Haq; Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq; League of the Righteous; Khazali Network; Khazali Special Group; Qazali Network; the People of the Cave; Khazali Special Groups Network; al-Tayar al-Risali; the Missionary Current.

Description: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) was designated as an FTO on January 10, 2020. Led by Qays and Laith al-Khazali, AAH is an Iran-backed, militant organization that remains ideologically aligned with Iran and loyal to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The group seeks to promote Iran’s political and religious influence in Iraq, maintain Shia control over Iraq, and expel any remaining western military forces from the country.

Activities: Since its creation in 2006, AAH has claimed responsibility for more than 6,000 attacks against U.S. and Defeat-ISIS Coalition forces. The group has carried out highly sophisticated operations, including mortar attacks on an American base, the downing of a British helicopter, and an attack on the Karbala Provincial Headquarters that resulted in the capture and murder of five U.S. soldiers.

In 2019, two individuals assessed to be AAH members were arrested in connection to rockets fired at the Camp Taji military training complex, where U.S. personnel provide divisional training. Also in 2019, AAH members opened fire on a group of protestors trying to set fire to the group’s office in Nasiriya, killing at least six. AAH continued to be active in 2022, including through indirect fire attacks on U.S. facilities in Iraq, typically using front names or proxy groups.

Strength: AAH membership is estimated at 10,000.

Location/Area of Operation: Iraq, Syria.

Funding and External Aid: AAH receives funding, logistical support, training, and weapons from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and Hizballah. AAH also receives funding through illicit activities such as kidnapping for ransom, smuggling, and “taxing”/extortion of economic activities in areas where the group is dominant.

Asbat al-Ansar

Aka AAA; Band of Helpers; Band of Partisans; League of Partisans; League of the Followers; God’s Partisans; Gathering of Supporters; Partisan’s League; Esbat al-Ansar; Isbat al-Ansar; Osbat al-Ansar; Usbat al-Ansar; Usbat ul-Ansar.

Description: Designated as an FTO on March 27, 2002, Asbat al-Ansar (AAA) is a Lebanon-based Sunni terrorist group composed primarily of Palestinians that first emerged in the early 1990s. Linked to al-Qa’ida and other Sunni terrorist groups, AAA aims to thwart perceived anti-Islamic and pro-western influences in the country. AAA’s base is largely confined to Lebanon’s refugee camps.

Activities: Throughout the mid-1990s, AAA assassinated Lebanese religious leaders and bombed nightclubs, theaters, and liquor stores. The group also plotted against foreign diplomatic targets. Between 2005 and 2011, AAA members traveled to Iraq to fight Defeat-ISIS Coalition forces. AAA has been reluctant to involve itself in operations in Lebanon, in part because of concerns of losing its safe haven in the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp. The group remained active in Lebanon but did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2022.

Strength: AAA membership is estimated in the low hundreds.

Location/Area of Operation: AAA’s primary base of operations is the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp in southern Lebanon.

Funding and External Aid: AAA likely receives money through international Sunni violent extremist networks.

Hamas

Aka the Islamic Resistance Movement; Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya; Izz al-Din al Qassam Battalions; Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades; Izz al-Din al-Qassam Forces; Students of Ayyash; Student of the Engineer; Yahya Ayyash Units.

Description: Hamas was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. Established in 1987 at the onset of the first Palestinian uprising, or First Intifada, Hamas is an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Its armed element, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, has conducted anti-Israeli attacks, including suicide bombings against civilian targets inside Israel. Hamas also manages a broad, mostly Gaza-based, network of Dawa or ministry activities that include charities, schools, clinics, youth camps, fundraising, and political activities. After winning Palestinian Legislative Council elections in 2006, Hamas gained control of significant Palestinian Authority (PA) ministries in Gaza, including the Ministry of Interior. In 2007, Hamas expelled the PA and Fatah from Gaza in a violent takeover. In 2017, Ismail Haniyeh was selected as Hamas’s new leader. Hamas remained in de facto control in Gaza in 2022.

Activities: Hamas has conducted numerous anti-Israeli attacks, including suicide bombings, rocket launches, IED attacks, and shootings. U.S. citizens have died and been injured in the group’s attacks. In 2012, Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad operatives coordinated and carried out a bus bombing in Tel Aviv that wounded 29 people. In 2014, Hamas kidnapped and murdered three Israeli teenagers, including 16-year-old U.S.-Israeli citizen Naftali Fraenkel. In 2016 a Hamas member carried out a suicide attack on a bus in Jerusalem, killing 20 people. Since 2018, Hamas has continued rocket attacks from Gaza into Israeli territory, including an 11-day escalation with Israel in 2021 during which Hamas and other militant groups launched more than 4,000 rockets into Israeli cities.

In May 2022, Israeli security forces thwarted an attack planned by a Hamas cell in Jerusalem. The cell planned to shoot Israeli public figures, launch bombing attacks, and kidnap soldiers.

Strength: Hamas comprises several thousand Gaza-based operatives.

Location/Area of Operation: Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon.

Funding and External Aid: Hamas has received funding, weapons, and training from Iran and raises funds in Persian Gulf countries. The group receives donations from some Palestinians and other expatriates as well as from its own charity organizations.

Harakat Sawa’d Misr

Aka HASM; Harakah Sawa’id Misr; Harikat Souaid Misr; HASM Movement; Hassam Movement; Arms of Egypt Movement; Movement of Egypt’s Arms; Movement of Egypt’s Forearms; Hassm; Hamms; Hassam; Hasam.

Description: Harakat Sawa’d Misr (HASM) was designated as an FTO on January 14, 2021. Formed in Egypt in 2015 with the goal of overthrowing the Egyptian government, HASM attacks Egyptian security officials and other government-affiliated targets.

Activities: Since 2016, HASM has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks, including the 2016 attempted assassination of Egypt’s former Grand Mufti Ali Gomaa, the 2017 assassination of Egyptian National Security Agency officer Ibrahim Azzazy; the 2017 attack on Burma’s embassy in Cairo; and the 2019 car bomb attack targeting security forces in Giza, killing or wounding 10 soldiers. HASM was responsible for a car bombing on a government health institute in Cairo, killing at least 20 people and injuring dozens.

HASM did not claim responsibility for any terrorist attacks in 2022.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Egypt.

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

Hizballah

Aka Party of God; Islamic Jihad; Islamic Jihad Organization; Revolutionary Justice Organization; Organization of the Oppressed on Earth; Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine; Organization of Right Against Wrong; Ansar Allah; Followers of the Prophet Muhammed; Lebanese Hizballah; Lebanese Hezbollah; LH; Foreign Relations Department; FRD; External Security Organization; ESO; Foreign Action Unit; Hizballah ESO; Hizballah International; Special Operations Branch; External Services Organization; External Security Organization of Hezbollah.

Description: Hizballah was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. Formed in 1982 following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Lebanon-based radical Shia group takes its ideological inspiration from the Iranian Revolution and the teachings of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. The group generally follows the religious guidance of the Iranian supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. Hizballah is closely allied with Iran, and the two often work together on shared initiatives, although Hizballah also occasionally acts independently. Hizballah continues to share a close relationship with the Syrian regime of Bashar Assad and, like Iran, provides assistance — including fighters — to Syrian regime forces in the Syrian conflict.

Activities: Hizballah is responsible for multiple large-scale terrorist attacks, including the 1983 suicide truck bombings of Embassy Beirut and the U.S. Marine barracks; the 1984 attack on the Embassy Beirut annex; and the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847, during which U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem was murdered. Hizballah also was implicated, along with Iran, in the 1992 attacks on the Israeli Embassy in Argentina and the 1994 bombing of the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association in Buenos Aires. Hizballah assisted Iraqi Shia militant and terrorist groups in Iraq who in 2007 attacked the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center, killing five American soldiers. In 2012, Hizballah was responsible for an attack on a passenger bus carrying 42 Israeli tourists at the Burgas Airport in Bulgaria, killing five Israelis and one Bulgarian.

Several Hizballah operatives have been arrested or tried around the world, including two Hizballah operatives arrested in the United States in 2017. One operative arrested in Michigan had identified the availability of explosives precursors in Panama in 2011 and surveilled U.S. and Israeli targets in Panama as well as the Panama Canal during 2011-12. Another operative arrested in New York had surveilled U.S. military and law enforcement facilities from 2003 to 2017. In 2018, Brazil arrested a Hizballah financier, extraditing him to Paraguay for prosecution two years later. In 2020, judges at the Netherlands-based Special Tribunal for Lebanon found Hizballah member Salim Ayyash guilty for his central role in the bomb attack in Beirut in 2005 that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri.

In June, appeals judges sentenced two other Hizballah members, Hassan Habib Merhi and Hussein Hassan Oneissi, to life imprisonment for their roles as accomplices in the assassination.

In 2022 the Israeli military shot down three Hizballah-launched drones heading toward one of Israel’s offshore rigs at the Karish gas field, located in disputed waters between Israel and Lebanon. Hizballah confirmed responsibility for the unarmed drones and noted they were intended to send a threatening message to Israel.

Strength: Hizballah has tens of thousands of supporters and members worldwide.

Location/Area of Operation: Lebanon and Syria.

Funding and External Aid: Iran continues to provide Hizballah with most of its funding, training, weapons, and explosives, as well as political, diplomatic, monetary, and organizational aid. Iran’s annual financial backing to Hizballah — which has been estimated to be hundreds of millions of dollars annually — accounts for the overwhelming majority of the group’s annual budget. The Assad regime in Syria has provided training, weapons, and diplomatic and political support. Hizballah also receives funding in the form of private donations from some Lebanese Shia diaspora communities worldwide, including profits from legal and illegal businesses. These include smuggling contraband goods, passport falsification, narcotics trafficking, money laundering, and credit card, immigration, and bank fraud.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

Aka IRGC; the Iranian Revolutionary Guards; IRG; the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution; AGIR; Pasdarn-e Enghelab-e Islami; Sepah-e Pasdaran Enghelab Islami; Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami; Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami; Pasdaran-e Inqilab; Revolutionary Guards; Revolutionary Guard; Sepah; Pasdaran; Sepah Pasdaran; Islamic Revolutionary Corps; Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps; Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps; Islamic Revolutionary Guards; Iran’s Revolutionary Guards; Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution.

Description: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was designated as an FTO on April 15, 2019. As part of Iran’s military, the IRGC has played a central role in Iran’s use of terrorism as a key tool of Iranian statecraft since its inception. The IRGC has been directly involved in terrorist plotting; its support for terrorism is foundational and institutional, and it has killed U.S. citizens.

Founded in 1979, the IRGC has since gained a substantial role in executing Iran’s foreign policy and wields control over vast segments of the economy. The organization’s ties to nonstate armed groups in the region, such as Hizballah in Lebanon, help Iran compensate for its relatively weak conventional military forces. Answering directly to the supreme leader, the IRGC also is influential in domestic politics, and many senior officials have passed through its ranks. The organization is composed of five primary branches: the IRGC Ground Forces, the IRGC Air Force, IRGC Navy, the Basij, and the IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF).

Activities: The IRGC — most prominently through its Qods Force — directs and carries out a global terrorist campaign. The IRGC in 2011 plotted a brazen attack against the Saudi ambassador to the United States on American soil. In 2012, IRGC-QF operatives were arrested in Türkiye and Kenya for plotting attacks. An IRGC operative was convicted in 2017 of espionage for a foreign intelligence service; he had been surveilling a German-Israeli group. In 2018, Germany uncovered 10 IRGC operatives involved in a terrorist plot in Germany. Also in 2018, a U.S. federal court found Iran and the IRGC liable for the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing that killed 19 U.S. citizens. In 2022 an IRGC member was charged for attempting to arrange the murder of a former U.S. National Security Advisor.

The IRGC is Iran’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorist groups abroad. The IRGC continues to provide financial and other material support, training, technology transfer, advanced conventional weapons, guidance, or direction to a broad range of terrorist organizations, including Hizballah, Kata’ib Hizballah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Harakat al-Nujaba in Iraq, al-Ashtar Brigades and Saraya al-Mukhtar in Bahrain, and other terrorist groups in Syria and around the Persian Gulf. Iran provides up to $100 million annually in combined support to Palestinian terrorist groups, including Hamas, Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. The IRGC also is active in Syria in support of the Assad regime.

Strength: The IRGC has upward of 125,000 members.

Location/Area of Operation: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Europe, and the Persian Gulf.

Funding and External Aid: The IRGC continues to engage in large-scale illicit financing schemes and money laundering to fund its malign activities. In 2022 the United States designated an international oil smuggling and money laundering network, led by previously U.S.-designated IRGC-QF official Behnam Shahriyari and former IRGC-QF official Rostam Ghasemi. This network facilitated the sale of hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of oil for the IRGC-QF and Hizballah, and it spans several jurisdictions, including Iran and Russia.

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

Aka al-Qa’ida in Iraq; al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida in Mesopotamia; al-Qa’ida in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Tawhid; Jam’at al-Tawhid Wa’al-Jihad; Tanzeem Qa’idat al Jihad/Bilad al Raafidaini; Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn; the Monotheism and Jihad Group; the Organization Base of Jihad/Country of the Two Rivers; the Organization Base of Jihad/Mesopotamia; the Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in Iraq; the Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in the Land of the Two Rivers; the Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in Iraq; the Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in the Land of the Two Rivers; the Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers; al-Zarqawi Network; Islamic State of Iraq; Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham; Islamic State of Iraq and Syria; ad-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-’Iraq wa-sh-Sham; Daesh; Dawla al Islamiya; al-Furqan Establishment for Media Production; Islamic State; ISIL; ISIS; Amaq News Agency; Al Hayat Media Center; al-Hayat Media Center; Al Hayat.

Description: Al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) was designated as an FTO on December 17, 2004. In the 1990s, Jordanian militant Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi organized a terrorist group called al-Tawhid wal-Jihad to oppose the presence of U.S. and western military forces in the Middle East as well as the West’s support for, and the existence of, Israel. In 2004, Zarqawi joined al-Qa’ida, pledged allegiance to Usama bin Laden, and his group became known as al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI). Zarqawi led AQI during Operation Iraqi Freedom to fight against U.S. and Defeat-ISIS Coalition forces in Iraq until he was killed in June 2006.

In 2006, AQI publicly renamed itself the Islamic State in Iraq before adopting the moniker of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2013 to express its regional ambitions as it expanded operations to include the Syrian conflict. ISIS was led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who declared an Islamic caliphate and separated this group from al-Qa’ida in 2014, before he was killed in 2019. In 2017 the U.S. military fighting with local Syrian allies announced the liberation of Raqqa, the self-declared capital of ISIS’s so-called caliphate. Also in 2017, then-Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced the territorial defeat of ISIS in Iraq. In 2018 the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with support from the Defeat-ISIS Coalition, began a final push to oust ISIS fighters from the lower Middle Euphrates River Valley in Syria. 2019 marked the full territorial defeat of ISIS’s so-called caliphate; however, ISIS remains a serious threat. The group benefits from instability, demonstrating intent to cause and inspire terrorist attacks around the world. This report refers to central ISIS leadership as ISIS-core.

Activities: ISIS has conducted numerous high-profile attacks, including IED attacks against U.S. military personnel and Iraqi infrastructure, videotaped beheadings of U.S. citizens, suicide bombings against both military and civilian targets, and rocket attacks. ISIS also was heavily involved in the fighting in Syria and participated in numerous kidnappings of civilians, including aid workers and journalists. ISIS was responsible for most of the 12,000 Iraqi civilian deaths in 2014 and claimed responsibility for several large-scale attacks in Iraq and Syria, including a 2016 car bombing at a shopping center in Baghdad that killed nearly 300 people — the deadliest bombing in the city since 2003. In 2018, ISIS conducted multiple suicide bombings and simultaneous raids in a brutal offensive in southwestern Syria, killing more than 200 people.

Since 2019, ISIS has claimed responsibility numerous attacks including the 2019 suicide bombing of a restaurant in Manbij, Syria, that killed 19 people, including four U.S. citizens; the 2019 killing of a U.S. servicemember while he was participating in a combat operation in Ninewa province, Iraq; the 2021 twin suicide bombings in a busy market in Tayaran Square in Baghdad that killed at least 32 people; and a 2021 suicide attack in a busy market in a predominantly Shia neighborhood in east Baghdad, Iraq, that killed 30 people.

ISIS also directs, enables, and inspires individuals to conduct attacks on behalf of the group around the world. In 2015, ISIS carried out a series of coordinated attacks in Paris, including at a rock concert at the Bataclan concert hall, killing about 130 people, including 23-year-old U.S. citizen Nohemi Gonzalez. In 2016, ISIS directed two simultaneous attacks in Brussels, Belgium — one at the Zaventem Airport and the other at a metro station, killing 32 people, including four U.S. citizens. In 2016 a gunman who pledged allegiance to ISIS killed 49 individuals at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida. ISIS also claimed responsibility for two attacks in 2016: one in which a terrorist driving a cargo truck attacked a crowd in Nice, France, during Bastille Day celebrations, resulting in 86 deaths, including three U.S. citizens; the second a truck attack on a crowded Christmas market in Berlin that killed 12 people and injured 48 others.

In 2017, ISIS claimed responsibility for two attacks in the United Kingdom: one a terrorist attack on London’s Westminster Bridge, when a man drove his car into pedestrians and stabbed others, killing five persons; the other a suicide bombing in Manchester, England, that killed 22 people outside of a live concert. That same year, a man claiming to be a member of ISIS drove a truck into a crowded shopping center in Stockholm, Sweden, killing five persons. In 2019, ISIS-inspired terrorists carried out coordinated suicide bombings at multiple churches and hotels, killing more than 250 people on Easter Sunday. Also in 2019, ISIS claimed responsibility for a stabbing attack near the London Bridge in which a man killed two persons.

In 2022, ISIS attacked Hasakah prison in Syria, triggering a 10-day battle that spilled over into the streets, killing at least 121 SDF soldiers, 374 suspected ISIS militants, and four civilians. Also in 2022, ISIS claimed responsibility for an attack at the Shāh Chérāgh shrine in Shiraz, Iran, killing at least 15 people.

Strength: Estimates suggest ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria number between 8,000 and 16,000, including several thousand foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). Since at least 2015, the group has integrated local children and children of FTFs into its forces and used them as executioners and suicide attackers. ISIS has systematically prepared child soldiers in Iraq and Syria using its education and religious infrastructure as part of its training and recruitment of members. ISIS also has abducted, raped, and abused thousands of women and children, some as young as 8 years old. Women and children were sold and enslaved, distributed to ISIS fighters as spoils of war, forced into marriage and domestic servitude, or otherwise subjected to physical and sexual abuse.

Location/Area of Operation: Iraq and Syria, with branches and networks around the world

Funding and External Aid: ISIS received most of its funding from a variety of criminal activities in Iraq and Syria. Criminal activities included extortion of civilian economies, smuggling oil, and robberies. The organization also maintains stockpiles of as much as hundreds of millions of dollars, scattered across Iraq and Syria, which it looted during its occupation of those countries in 2013 to 2019. ISIS continues to rely on trusted courier networks and money services businesses to move its financial resources within and outside of Iraq and Syria. The territorial defeat of ISIS that eliminated its control of territory in Syria in 2019 reduced ISIS’s ability to generate, hold, and transfer its financial assets. Despite this, ISIS continues to generate some revenue from criminal activities through its many clandestine networks and provides financial support and guidance to its network of global branches and affiliates.

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Libya

Aka Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Libya; Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in Libya; Wilayat Barqa; Wi

WASHINGTON — Earlier today, an indictment was unsealed in Central Islip, New York charging 14 of the world’s highest-ranking MS-13 leaders who are known today as the Ranfla Nacional, which operated as the organization’s Board of Directors, and directed MS-13’s violence and criminal activity around the world for almost two decades.

Specifically, the indictment charges the defendants with conspiracy to provide and conceal material support to terrorists, conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries, conspiracy to finance terrorism and narco-terrorism conspiracy in connection with the defendants’ leadership of the transnational criminal organization over the past two decades from El Salvador, the United States, Mexico and elsewhere.

Defendant Borromeo Enrique Henriquez, aka “Diablito de Hollywood,” is widely recognized as the most powerful member of the Ranfla Nacional. Three of the indicted defendants, Fredy Ivan Jandres-Parada, aka “Lucky de Park View” and “Lacky de Park View,” Cesar Humberto Lopez-Larios, aka “El Grenas de Stoners” and “Oso de Stoners,” and Hugo Armando Quinteros-Mineros, aka “Flaco de Francis,” remain at large and should be considered armed and dangerous.

Members of the public with information concerning their whereabouts are strongly encouraged to contact the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) toll-free MS-13 tip line, 1-866-STP-MS13 (1-866-787-6713), or U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) at (866) 347-2423 or ice.gov/tips.

Together, FBI and HSI have offered $20,000 in rewards for information leading to the arrest and conviction of each of the three fugitives. Henriquez and 10 other defendants are in custody in El Salvador. The United States will explore options for their extradition to the United States with the government of El Salvador.

Acting Attorney General Jeffrey A. Rosen, Acting U.S. Attorney Seth D. DuCharme for the Eastern District of New York (EDNY), Director of Joint Task Force Vulcan (JTFV) John J. Durham, FBI Director Christopher A. Wray, and Executive Associate Director Derek Benner of HSI, announced the unsealing of the indictment.

Acting Attorney General Rosen said, “The indictment announced today is the highest-reaching and most sweeping indictment targeting MS-13 and its command and control structure in U.S. history. When Attorney General Barr announced the creation of JTFV in August 2019, he envisioned a whole-of-government approach that would combine proven prosecution tools from the past with innovative strategies designed specifically to eliminate MS-13 leadership’s ability to operate the gang and direct its terrorist activity. This indictment reflects an important step toward achieving that goal. By working side-by-side with our U.S. law enforcement partners and with our partners in El Salvador, we have charged MS-13’s highest-ranking leaders with operating a transnational criminal organization that utilizes terror to impose their will on neighborhoods, businesses and innocent civilians across the United States and Central America.”

“MS-13 is responsible for a wave of death and violence that has terrorized communities, leaving neighborhoods on Long Island and throughout the Eastern District of New York awash in bloodshed,” said DuCharme. “Even when incarcerated, the Ranfla Nacional continued to direct MS-13’s global operations, recruit new members, including children, into MS-13, and orchestrate murder and mayhem around the world. Today’s ground-breaking indictment seeks to demolish MS-13 by targeting its command and control structure and holding MS-13’s Board of Directors accountable for their terroristic actions.”

“The FBI is committed to combatting all forms of terrorism that threaten the American people as well as our international partners,” said FBI Director Wray. “In collaboration with our federal, state, local and international partners, we took aggressive steps to target and pursue some of the highest levels of leadership of MS-13. This operation is a clear signal to others who engage in this type of transnational criminal activity: the FBI will work tirelessly to bring them to justice wherever they are based.”

“For over a decade, HSI has remained steadfast in our resolve to dismantle transnational gangs like MS-13,” said HSI’s Benner. “As one of the most violent and dangerous criminal enterprises, MS-13 and Ranfla Nacional were directly responsible for unthinkable violence and criminal activity in communities across the United States and throughout Central America. As a result of the hard work and substantial resources dedicated to Joint Task Force Vulcan by our domestic and international law enforcement partners, this indictment will have a lasting disruptive effect on the future global illicit activities of this transnational criminal organization.”

As alleged in the indictment, the Ranfla Nacional comprises the highest level of leadership of MS-13. In approximately 2002, the defendants and other MS-13 leaders began establishing a highly organized, hierarchical command and control structure as a means to effectuate their decisions and enforce their orders, even while in prison. They directed acts of violence and murder in El Salvador, the United States and elsewhere, established military-style training camps for its members and obtained military weapons such as rifles, handguns, grenades, improvised explosive devices (IED) and rocket launchers. As leaders of MS-13, the defendants controlled swaths of territory and engaged in public relations efforts on behalf of the transnational criminal organization. Further, the defendants used MS-13’s large membership in the United States to engage in criminal activities, such as drug trafficking and extortion to raise money to support MS-13’s terrorist activities in El Salvador and elsewhere, and directed members in the United States to commit acts of violence, including murders, to further its goals.

As further alleged in the indictment, a central theme of the rules implemented by the Ranfla Nacional was the requirement of loyalty to MS-13, or to the “barrio.” The requirement for loyalty was central to all aspects of life for MS-13 members. Members who disobeyed the rules, showed disloyalty to the gang or to its leaders, cooperated with law enforcement, or disrespected other members were subject to severe punishment, including death. The rules put in place by the Ranfla Nacional allowed the gang to flourish in parts of the United States, including within the EDNY where, under the defendants’ command, MS-13 has committed numerous acts of violence—including murders, attempted murders, assaults, kidnappings, drug trafficking, extortion of individuals and businesses, obstructed justice and sent dues and the proceeds of criminal activity by wire transfer to MS-13 leaders in El Salvador.

As further outlined in the indictment, the Ranfla Nacional has exercised its power over the government of El Salvador by committing acts of violence and intimidation over government officials, law enforcement and the population of El Salvador at large. In doing so the Ranfla Nacional has ordered the killing of law enforcement and government officials in El Salvador as well as ordering a “green light,” or killing, of an FBI Special Agent detailed to El Salvador investigating MS-13 and its members. Moreover, by controlling the level of MS-13’s violence, the Ranfla Nacional exercised leverage with the government of El Salvador. For example, as alleged in the indictment, from approximately 2012 until approximately 2015, the Ranfla Nacional entered into a “truce” with the then-government of El Salvador. As part of this agreement, the Ranfla Nacional directed MS-13 to reduce homicides in El Salvador in exchange for improved prison conditions, benefits and cash payments. In 2015, when this agreement collapsed, the Ranfla Nacional blamed the United States, believing that the U.S. government pressured the government of El Salvador to end the “truce” as a condition of receiving funds from the United States. Thereafter, in early 2016, the Ranfla Nacional began planning for a major campaign of coordinated violence in El Salvador in retaliation for the harsher measures imposed on its members after the end of the “truce.” As alleged in the indictment, the defendants ordered all cliques in El Salvador to create a specialized unit of MS-13 members to target police officers, military members, and government officials in El Salvador. These members underwent military training at MS-13 military training camps in El Salvador. The defendants also ordered all cliques, including those in the United States and in the EDNY, to provide profits from their MS-13-related criminal activity to be used to purchase weapons for the planned attacks on police in El Salvador. In total, the defendants collected over $600,000 for this fund which was used to purchase weapons, including M-16s and M-60 machine guns, grenades, IEDs and rocket launchers. Furthermore, the defendants ordered increased violence, including murders, in the EDNY and other parts of the United States, which saw a dramatic increase in MS-13 violence in 2016 and 2017.

Finally, as alleged in the indictment, the Ranfla Nacional directed the expansion of MS-13 activities around the world, most significantly into Mexico, where several high-ranking leaders were sent to organize operations there. In Mexico, MS-13 leaders made connections to obtain narcotics and firearms, conducted business with Mexican drug cartels such as the Zetas, Gulf Cartel, Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) and Sinaloa Cartel, and engaged in human trafficking and smuggling.

In August 2019, Attorney General William P. Barr created JTFV to carry out the recommendations of the MS-13 subcommittee formed under the Attorney General’s Transnational Organized Crime Task Force (TOC Task Force). The Attorney General’s TOC Task Force resulted from President Donald J. Trump’s February 2017 Executive Order directing the Departments of Justice, State, and Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to coordinate a whole-of-government approach to dismantle transnational criminal organizations, such as MS-13, and increase the safety of the American people.

Since its creation, JTFV has successfully implemented a whole-of-government approach to combating MS-13, including increasing coordination and collaboration with foreign law enforcement partners, including El Salvador, Mexico, Honduras and Guatemala; designating priority MS-13 programs, cliques and leaders, who have the most impact on the United States, for targeted prosecutions; and coordinating significant MS-13 indictments in U.S. Attorney’s Offices across the country, including the first use of national security charges against MS-13 leaders.

JTFV has been comprised of members from the Department of Justice’s National Security Division and the Criminal Division, as well as U.S. Attorney’s Offices across the country, including the EDNY; the District of New Jersey; the Northern District of Ohio; the District of Utah; the Eastern District of Virginia; the District of Massachusetts; the Eastern District of Texas; the Southern District of New York; the District of Alaska; the Southern District of Florida; the Southern District of California; the District of Nevada; and the District of Columbia. In addition, all Department of Justice law enforcement agencies are involved in the effort, including the FBI; the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the U.S. Marshals Service; and the U.S. Bureau of Prisons. In addition, HSI also plays a critical role in JTFV.

Acting Attorney General Rosen expressed his sincere thanks to Attorney General Raul Melara of El Salvador for the assistance of his office, as well as investigators from El Salvador’s Policía Nacional Civil, Centro Antipandilla Transnacional unit for their invaluable cooperation. Additionally, numerous Department of Justice components contributed to this indictment, including: the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section; the Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs; the Criminal Division’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training; and Organized Crime and Gang Section; and the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Executive Office. Finally, consistent with President Trump’s Executive Order and the Attorney General’s whole of government approach, the Department of State has provided critical support for JTFV’s mission.

The charges announced today are allegations, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law. If convicted, the defendants face a maximum sentence of life in prison.

The government’s case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys James Donnelly, Matthew Shepherd, and Stewart Young from JTFV, and Assistant U.S. Attorneys Paul G. Scotti, Justina L. Geraci, and Megan E. Farrell from the EDNY’s Long Island Criminal Division.

A copy of the indictment and wanted posters in English and Spanish can be downloaded by clicking on: indictment, Fredy Ivan Jandres-Parada Wanted poster in English and Spanish, Cesar Humberto Lopez-Larios Wanted poster in English and Spanish, and Hugo Armando Quinteros-Mineros Wanted poster in English and Spanish.

The defendants:

NEW YORK – Charges against former President of Venezuela Nicolás Maduro Moros, Venezuela’s Vice President for the Economy, Venezuela’s Minister of Defense and Venezuela’s Chief Supreme Court Justice, as well as two members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) were announced Thursday, following multiple investigations by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) New York’s El Dorado Task Force and HSI Miami, as well as investigations by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.

“The collaborative nature of this investigation is representative of the ongoing work HSI and international law enforcement agencies perform each day, often behind the scenes and unknown to the public, to make our communities safer and free from corruption,” said HSI’s Acting Executive Associate Director Alysa D. Erichs. “Today’s announcement highlights HSI’s global reach and commitment to aggressively identify, target and investigate individuals who violate U.S. laws, exploit financial systems, and hide behind cryptocurrency to further their illicit criminal activity. Let this indictment be a reminder that no one is above the law – not even powerful political officials.”

“The Venezuelan regime, once led by Nicolás Maduro Moros, remains plagued by criminality and corruption,” said Attorney General Barr. “For more than 20 years, Maduro and a number of high-ranking colleagues allegedly conspired with the FARC, causing tons of cocaine to enter and devastate American communities. Today’s announcement is focused on rooting out the extensive corruption within the Venezuelan government – a system constructed and controlled to enrich those at the highest levels of the government. The United States will not allow these corrupt Venezuelan officials to use the U.S. banking system to move their illicit proceeds from South America nor further their criminal schemes.”

“Today we announce criminal charges against Nicolás Maduro Moros for running, together with his top lieutenants, a narco-terrorism partnership with the FARC for the past 20 years,” said U.S. Attorney Geoffrey S. Berman. “The scope and magnitude of the drug trafficking alleged was made possible only because Maduro and others corrupted the institutions of Venezuela and provided political and military protection for the rampant narco-terrorism crimes described in our charges. As alleged, Maduro and the other defendants expressly intended to flood the United States with cocaine in order to undermine the health and wellbeing of our nation. Maduro very deliberately deployed cocaine as a weapon. While Maduro and other cartel members held lofty titles in Venezuela’s political and military leadership, the conduct described in the Indictment wasn’t statecraft or service to the Venezuelan people. As alleged, the defendants betrayed the Venezuelan people and corrupted Venezuelan institutions to line their pockets with drug money.”

HSI Miami

Maikel Jose Moreno Perez, 54, current Chief Justice of the Venezuelan Supreme Court, was charged via a criminal complaint in the Southern District of Florida with conspiracy to commit money laundering and money laundering in connection with the alleged corrupt receipt or intended receipt of tens of millions of dollars and bribes to illegally fix dozens of civil and criminal cases in Venezuela.

The complaint alleges, for example, that the defendant authorized a seizure and sale of a General Motors auto plant with an estimated value of $100 million in exchange for a personal percentage of the proceeds. Similarly, the complaint alleges that the defendant received bribes to authorize the dismissal of charges or release against Venezuelans, including one charged in a multibillion-dollar fraud scheme against the Venezuelan state-owned oil company.

According to the criminal complaint, in or around October 2014, Moreno Perez told U.S. authorities in a visa application that he earned the equivalent of about $12,000 per year from his work in Venezuela. From 2012 to 2016, the defendant’s U.S. bank records show approximately $3 million in inflows to the defendant’s accounts, primarily from large round-dollar transfers from shell corporations with foreign bank accounts linked to Co-Conspirator 1, who is a former criminal defense attorney in Venezuela that currently controls a media company in Venezuela.

As set out in the criminal complaint, the defendant’s bank records allegedly show that from 2012 to 2016, the defendant spent approximately $3 million, primarily in the geographical area of South Florida. For example, bank records allegedly show that Moreno Perez spent about $1 million for a private aircraft and private pilot, more than $600,000 in credit or debit card purchases at stores primarily in South Florida (including tens of thousands of dollars at luxury stores in Bal Harbor, such as Prada and Salvatore Ferragamo), about $50,000 in payments to a luxury watch repair store in Aventura, and approximately $40,000 in payments to a Venezuelan beauty pageant director.

HSI’s Miami Field Office conducted the investigation. Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael N. Berger of the Southern District of Florida is in charge of the prosecution.

HSI New York

A separate superseding indictment unsealed Thursday in the Southern District of New York charges Tareck Zaidan El Aissami Maddah, 45, Venezuela’s vice president for the economy, Joselit Ramirez Camacho, 33, Venezuela’s superintendent of cryptocurrency (Sunacrip), and Samark Lopez Bello, 45, a Venezuelan businessman, with a series of crimes relating to efforts to evade sanctions imposed by OFAC against Maduro Moros, El Aissami Maddah, and Lopez Bello.

The indictment alleges that from February 2017 until March 2019, El Aissami Maddah and Ramirez Camacho worked with U.S. persons and U.S.-based entities to provide private flight services for the benefit of Maduro’s 2018 presidential campaign, in violation of OFAC’s sanctions targeting Maduro after he organized elections for the illegitimate National Constituent Assembly that Cabello Rondon now leads.

ICE HSI added El Aissami and his associate Lopez to its Most Wanted list for international narcotics trafficking and money laundering in late 2019. The actions followed OFAC administrative sanctions that led to their special designations as narcotics traffickers in 2017, criminal charges filed by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York in early 2019, and an HSI New York El Dorado investigation.

As alleged in the indictment unsealed Thursday, Ramirez, working with El Aissami and Lopez, abused his power as Venezuela’s Superintendent of Cryptocurrency to violate U.S. sanctions and solidify Maduro’s illegal grip on Venezuela. All three individuals are currently fugitives from justice.

El Aissami, a citizen and national of Venezuela, is the former Executive Vice President of Venezuela and current Minister for National Industry and Production. He previously served as governor of Venezuela’s Aragua state from 2012 to 2017, as well as Venezuela’s minister of interior and justice starting in 2008.

According to the OFAC notices, El Aissami received payment for the facilitation of drug shipments belonging to Venezuelan drug kingpin Walid Makled Garcia. He is also linked to the coordination of drug shipments to Los Zetas, a violent Mexican drug cartel, as well as providing protection to Colombian drug lord Daniel Barrera Barrera and Venezuelan drug trafficker Hermagoras Gonzalez Polanco. Los Zetas, Barrera Barrera, and Gonzalez Polanco were previously named as specially designated narcotics traffickers (SDNTs) pursuant to the Kingpin Act by the President or the Secretary of the Treasury in April 2009, March 2010, and May 2008, respectively.

Lopez Bello is a Venezuelan businessman and key frontman for EI Aissami. Lopez has been the subject of a year-long manhunt following the takedown of a complex international sanctions-evasion and money laundering operation. For more than two years, Lopez and others defrauded the U.S. government by engaging in transactions prohibited by the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act and related regulations, in addition to evading sanctions imposed by OFAC pursuant to the Kingpin Act and related regulations.

OFAC further designated or identified as blocked property 13 companies owned or controlled by Lopez or other designated parties that comprise an international network of petroleum, distribution, engineering, telecommunications, and asset holding companies across the British Virgin Islands, Panama, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela.

Lopez, a former Venezuelan official, also owned or controlled five U.S.-based companies that were blocked pursuant to the OFAC sanctions, with assets valued at $511 million dollars.

OFAC designated El Aissami and associate Lopez as SDNTs pursuant to the Kingpin Act in February 2017 for playing a significant role in international narcotics trafficking. Following the imposed sanctions, El Aissami and Lopez were charged March 8, 2019 in Manhattan federal court with criminal violations of the Kingpin Act. Later that year, HSI New York’s El Dorado Financial Crimes Task Force (El Dorado) began its own investigation and both individuals were added to HSI’s Most Wanted list.

Joselit Ramirez Camacho is a Government of Venezuela (GoV) official with deep political, social, and economic ties to multiple identified narcotics kingpins, including EI Aissami. Ramirez currently serves as Venezuela’s Superintendent of Cryptocurrency (Sunacrip). Previously, he served as the General Director of the Vice Presidency of the Venezuelan Republic under El Aissami when, in 2017, OFAC designated El Aissami as an SDNT.

As a result of OFAC’s SDNT designations, U.S. persons were prohibited from engaging in any transactions involving funds or property in which El Aissami had an interest. This prohibition barred U.S. persons from accepting payments from SDNTs. The prohibition also applied more broadly to preclude U.S. persons from providing services to SDNTs; the pertinent regulations specifically prohibit transportation services. The Kingpin Act and related OFAC regulations also prohibited individuals from evading and attempting to evade the blocking effect of the SDNT designations.

The superseding indictment unsealed in the Southern District of New York today alleges that, from February 2017 until March 2019, El Aissami and Ramirez worked with U.S. persons and U.S.-based entities to charter private jets for travel services for the benefit of Maduro’s 2018 presidential campaign, in violation of OFAC’s sanctions.

The U.S. Department of State, through its Narcotics Rewards Program, is offering a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of El Aissami Maddah.

HSI’s New York Field Office conducted the investigation. This case is being handled by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York’s Terrorism and International Narcotics

An indictment is merely an allegation and all defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

About HSI New York’s El Dorado Financial Crimes Task Force

El Dorado is the premier financial enforcement and investigative task force in the world, responsible for detecting, disrupting and dismantling transnational criminal financial networks by preventing their access to U.S. financial systems and stemming the flow of their illicit funds through indictments, arrests, and seizures. Within El Dorado, the Foreign Corruption and Sanctions Group consists of special agents, task force officers and intelligence analysts that aggressively target and investigate organizations and individuals that threaten the national security, economy, and policies of the U.S. These investigations, executed in conjunction with other U.S. government agencies such as OFAC, FinCEN, the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, along with foreign law enforcement partners, are founded on a comprehensive analysis of all available holdings, sanction identifications and special designations that provides HSI investigators with a pathway to attack the illicit financial flows that support and sustain criminal individuals and organizations around the world. HSI then employs a multi-faceted investigative approach that includes international undercover operations, judicially authorized wiretaps, and other sensitive investigative techniques to target these state/non-state actors that seek to exploit the national economic security of the U.S.

About ICE Homeland Security Investigations

ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) is a critical investigative arm of the Department of Homeland Security and a vital U.S. asset in combating criminal organizations illegally exploiting America’s travel, trade, financial and immigration systems. It investigates more than 400 violations of federal law, including all types of cross-border criminal activities involving child exploitation, commercial trade, fraud, financial crimes, human rights violations and human smuggling, national security and public safety threats, terrorism, narcotics and weapons smuggling, and other types of contraband. ICE HSI special agents also conduct investigations aimed at protecting critical infrastructure industries that are vulnerable to sabotage, attack or exploitation.

With more than 8,500 special agents and intelligence analysts assigned to more than 200 cities throughout the U.S. and more than 60 offices in more than 50 countries around the globe, ICE HSI works many of its cases alongside investigators from the FBI, Europol, INTERPOL, along with other local, state, federal, and foreign law enforcement agencies.

ICE warns the public to not attempt apprehending the subject. If you have information about the whereabouts of this fugitive, please contact tareck.tips@ice.dhs.gov.

Note: The Department of Justice’s official court documents, defendants chart, wanted posters, map of drug routes, and other materials can be found here.

Designations of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) expose and isolate the designated terrorist organizations, deny them access to the U.S. financial system, and create significant criminal and immigration consequences for their members and supporters. Moreover, designations can assist or complement the law enforcement actions of other U.S. agencies and governments.

In 2019, the Department of State designated Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including its Qods Force (IRGC-QF), as an FTO. The State Department also amended the designation of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to include the aliases Amaq News Agency and Al Hayat Media Center. The State Department amended the designation of Jundallah to add Jaysh al-Adl (and variants thereof) as the group’s primary name. In the course of reviewing and maintaining the designation of the al-Mulathamun Battalion, the State Department concluded that the pre-existing alias al-Murabitoun should be used as the group’s primary name.

Legal Criteria for Designation under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as Amended:

It must be a foreign organization.

The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)), or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)), or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.

The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.

U.S. Government Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB)

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB)

Al-Ashtar Brigades (AAB)

Ansar al-Dine (AAD)

Ansar al-Islam (AAI)

Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi (AAS-B)

Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah (AAS-D)

Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia (AAS-T)

Army of Islam (AOI)

Asbat al-Ansar (AAA)

Aum Shinrikyo (AUM)

Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)

Boko Haram (BH)

Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA)

Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)

Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG)

Hamas

Haqqani Network (HQN)

Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI)

Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)

Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM)

Hizballah

Hizbul Mujahedeen (HM)

Indian Mujahedeen (IM)

Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)

ISIS-Bangladesh

ISIS-Greater Sahara

Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISIS-K)

ISIL-Libya

ISIS-Philippines

ISIS Sinai Province (ISIS-SP)

ISIS-West Africa

Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)

Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Ansaru)

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)

Jaysh Rijal Al-Tariq Al-Naqshabandi (JRTN)

Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)

Jemaah Islamiya (JI)

Jaysh al-Adl

Kahane Chai

Kata’ib Hizballah (KH)

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)

Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT)

Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ)

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC)

Al-Murabitoun

National Liberation Army (ELN)

Al-Nusrah Front (ANF)

Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

Palestine Liberation Front–Abu Abbas Faction (PLF)

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)

Al-Qa’ida (AQ)

Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

Al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)

Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

Real IRA (RIRA)

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)

Revolutionary Struggle (RS)

Al-Shabaab (AS)

Shining Path (SL)

Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

ABDALLAH AZZAM BRIGADES

Also known as (aka) Abdullah Azzam Brigades; Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades; Yusuf al-‘Uyayri Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades; Marwan Hadid Brigades; Marwan Hadid Brigade

Description: Designated as an FTO on May 30, 2012, the Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) formally announced its establishment in a July 2009 video statement claiming responsibility for a February 2009 rocket attack against Israel. The Lebanon-based group’s full name is Ziyad al‑Jarrah Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades, named after Lebanese citizen Ziad al Jarrah, one of the planners of and participants in the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.

Activities: After its initial formation, AAB relied primarily on rocket attacks against Israeli civilians. It is responsible for numerous rockets fired into Israeli territory from Lebanon, often targeting population centers.

In 2013, AAB began targeting Hizballah for the organization’s involvement in the Syrian conflict and support for Syrian regime forces. In November 2013, AAB claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing outside the Iranian Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, which killed 23 people and wounded more than 140. In February 2014, AAB claimed twin suicide bomb attacks against the Iranian cultural center in Beirut that killed four people. In June 2014, AAB was blamed for a suicide bombing in the Beirut neighborhood of Tayyouneh, which killed a security officer and wounded 25 people.

In June 2015, the group released photos of a training camp for its “Marwan Hadid Brigade” camp in Syria, likely located in Homs province. From 2016 – 2018, AAB continued its involvement in the Syrian conflict and was active in Lebanon’s Ain al-Hilwah refugee camp.

In December 2017, AAB called for violent jihad by Muslims against the United States and Israel after the U.S. announcement recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. AAB did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2018 or 2019, but announced its full dissolution in Syria in November 2019.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Lebanon

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

ABU SAYYAF GROUP

Aka al Harakat al Islamiyya (the Islamic Movement)

Description: The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. ASG split from the Moro National Liberation Front in the early 1990s and is one of the most violent terrorist groups in the Philippines. The group claims to promote an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, and elements of the group have ties to ISIS’s regional affiliate ISIS-Philippines.

Activities: ASG has committed kidnappings-for-ransom, bombings, ambushes of security personnel, public beheadings, assassinations, and extortion.

Throughout 2015, ASG was responsible for multiple attacks, kidnappings, and the killing of hostages. In 2016 and 2017, the group conducted kidnapping-for-ransom operations targeting Canadian, Norwegian, German, and Filipino citizens. In August 2017, ASG members killed nine people and injured others in an attack on Basilan Island. In July 2018, ASG detonated a car bomb at a military checkpoint on Basilan Island, killing 10 people, including a Philippine soldier and pro-government militiamen.

ASG continued conducting terrorist attacks and kidnappings in 2019. In May, ASG militants attacked Philippine soldiers on Jolo, resulting in the deaths of two children. In October, ASG kidnapped two British nationals from a beach resort in the Zamboanga region, but they were recovered on Jolo in November.

Strength: ASG is estimated to have hundreds of members.

Location/Area of Operation: Philippines and Malaysia

Funding and External Aid: ASG is primarily funded through its kidnapping-for-ransom operations and extortion. The group may also receive funding from external sources, including remittances from overseas Philippine workers and Middle East-based sympathizers. In the past, ASG has also received training and other assistance from regional terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiya.

AL-AQSA MARTYRS BRIGADE

Aka al-Aqsa Martyrs Battalion

Description: Designated as an FTO on March 27, 2002, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB) is composed of small cells of Fatah-affiliated activists that emerged at the outset of the al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000. AAMB strives to expel the Israeli military and settlers from the West Bank in order to establish a Palestinian state loyal to Fatah.

Activities: During the 2000 Intifada, AAMB primarily carried out small-arms attacks against Israeli military personnel and settlers. By 2002, the group was striking at Israeli civilians inside Israel, and claimed responsibility for the first female suicide bombing in Israel. In 2010 and 2011, the group launched numerous rocket attacks on Israeli communities. In November 2012, AAMB claimed that it had fired more than 500 rockets and missiles into Israel during an Israel Defense Forces operation in Gaza.

In 2015, AAMB declared open war against Israel and asked Iran to help fund its efforts in a televised broadcast. Throughout 2015, AAMB continued attacking Israeli soldiers and civilians.

In March 2016, armed confrontation broke out in Nablus between Palestinian youths and Palestinian security officials following the arrest of an AAMB associate on murder charges; seven youths and six Palestinian security officials were injured in the unrest. AAMB claimed responsibility for two rockets fired at Israel from the Gaza Strip in March 2017 and six rockets in June 2018, although these did not cause any casualties. AAMB did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2019.

Strength: AAMB is estimated to have a few hundred members.

Location/Area of Operation: Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank

Funding and External Aid: Iran has provided AAMB with funds and guidance, primarily through Hizballah facilitators.

AL-ASHTAR BRIGADES

Aka Saraya al-Ashtar; AAB

Description: Al-Ashtar Brigades (AAB) was designated as an FTO on July 11, 2018. AAB is an Iran-backed terrorist organization established in 2013 with the goal of violently overthrowing the ruling family in Bahrain. In January 2018, AAB formally adopted Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps branding and reaffirmed its loyalty to Tehran to reflect its role in an Iranian network of state and nonstate actors that operates against the United States and its allies in the region.

Activities: Since 2013, AAB has claimed responsibility for more than 20 terrorist attacks against police and security targets in Bahrain. In March 2014, AAB conducted a bomb attack that killed two police officers and an officer from the United Arab Emirates. In January 2017, AAB shot and killed another local Bahrain officer. AAB has also promoted violent activity against the British, Saudi Arabian, and U.S. governments over social media. In February 2019, AAB released a video statement promising more attacks in Bahrain to mark the anniversary of Bahrain’s Arab Spring-inspired political uprising; however, the group did not claim responsibility for any terrorist attacks in 2019.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Bahrain, Iran, and Iraq

Funding and External Aid: AAB receives funding and support from the Government of Iran.

ANSAR AL-DINE

Aka Ansar Dine; Ansar al-Din; Ancar Dine; Ansar ul-Din; Ansar Eddine; Defenders of the Faith

Description: The Mali-based group Ansar al-Dine (AAD) was designated as an FTO on March 22, 2013. AAD was created in late 2011 after its leader Iyad ag Ghali failed in his attempt to take over another secular Tuareg organization. Following the March 2012 coup that toppled the Malian government, AAD was among the organizations (which also included al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb [AQIM] and Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa) to take over northern Mali, destroy UNESCO World Heritage sites, and enforce a severe interpretation of Sharia law upon the civilian population living in the areas under its control.

Beginning in January 2013, French and allied African forces conducted operations in northern Mali to counter AAD and other terrorist groups, eventually forcing AAD and its allies out of the population centers they had seized. Ghali, however, remained free and appeared in AAD videos in 2015 and 2016 threatening France and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

In 2017, the Sahara Branch of AQIM, AAD, al-Murabitoun, and the Macina Liberation Front came together to form Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).

Activities: In early 2012, AAD received backing from AQIM in its fight against the Government of Mali, including for its capture of the Malian towns of Agulhok, Gao, Kidal, Tessalit, and Timbuktu. In March 2013, AAD members were reportedly among the Tuareg rebels responsible for killing 82 Malian soldiers and kidnapping 30 others in an attack against Agulhok. Before the French intervention in January 2013, Malian citizens in towns under AAD’s control allegedly faced harassment, torture, and death if they refused to comply with the group’s laws.

AAD was severely weakened by the 2013 French intervention, but increased its activities in 2015 and 2016. In 2016, AAD claimed responsibility for attacks targeting the Malian army and MINUSMA. In July 2016, AAD attacked an army base, leaving 17 soldiers dead and six missing. The following month, the group claimed three attacks: two IED attacks on French forces and a rocket or mortar attack on a joint UN-French base near Tessalit. In October and November 2016, AAD claimed responsibility for a series of attacks on UN and French forces. In February 2017, AAD claimed responsibility for an attack on the Malian Gendarmerie in Tenenkou, Mali. AAD did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2018 and 2019.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Mali

Funding and External Aid: AAD cooperates closely with and has received support from AQIM since its inception. AAD is also said to receive funds from foreign donors and through smuggling operations.

ANSAR AL-ISLAM

Aka Ansar al-Sunna; Ansar al-Sunna Army; Devotees of Islam; Followers of Islam in Kurdistan; Helpers of Islam; Jaish Ansar al-Sunna; Jund al-Islam; Kurdish Taliban; Kurdistan Supporters of Islam; Partisans of Islam; Soldiers of God; Soldiers of Islam; Supporters of Islam in Kurdistan

Description: Ansar al-Islam (AAI) was designated as an FTO on March 22, 2004. AAI was established in 2001 in the Iraqi Kurdistan region through the merger of two Kurdish terrorist factions that traced their roots to the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan. AAI seeks to expel western interests from Iraq and establish an independent Iraqi state based on its interpretation of Sharia law.

Activities: From 2003 to 2011, AAI conducted attacks against a wide range of targets including Iraqi government and security forces, and U.S. and Coalition forces. The group also carried out numerous kidnappings, murders, and assassinations of Iraqi citizens and politicians. In 2012, AAI claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Sons of Martyrs School in Damascus, which was occupied by Syrian security forces and progovernment militias; seven people were wounded in the attack.

During summer 2014, part of AAI issued a statement pledging allegiance to ISIS, although later reports suggest that a faction of AAI opposed joining ISIS. In October 2019, AAI claimed its first attack in Iraq in five years, placing two IEDs in Iraq’s Diyala province.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Iraq and Syria

Funding and External Aid: AAI receives assistance from a loose network of associates in Europe and the Middle East.

ANSAR AL-SHARI’A IN BENGHAZI

Aka Ansar al-Sharia in Libya; Ansar al-Shariah Brigade; Ansar al-Shari’a Brigade; Katibat Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi; Ansar al-Shariah-Benghazi; Al-Raya Establishment for Media Production; Ansar al-Sharia; Soldiers of the Sharia; Ansar al-Shariah; Supporters of Islamic Law

Description: Designated as an FTO on January 13, 2014, Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi (AAS‑B) was created after the 2011 fall of the Qadhafi regime in Libya. The group has been involved in terrorist attacks against civilian targets as well as the assassination and attempted assassination of security officials and political actors in eastern Libya.

Activities: Members of AAS-B were involved in the September 11, 2012, attacks against the U.S. Special Mission and Annex in Benghazi, Libya. Four U.S. citizens were killed in the attack: Glen Doherty, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and U.S. Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens.

Throughout 2016, AAS-B continued its fight against the “Libyan National Army” in Benghazi, resulting in the deaths of numerous Libyan security personnel and civilians. Additionally, AASB controlled several terrorist training camps in Libya and trained members of other terrorist organizations operating in Syria, Iraq, and Mali.

In May 2017, AAS-B announced its formal dissolution due to suffering heavy losses, including the group’s senior leadership, as well as defections to ISIS in Libya. AAS-B has not claimed responsibility for any attacks since 2016.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Benghazi, Libya

Funding and External Aid: AAS-B obtained funds from al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb as well as through charities, donations, and criminal activities.

ANSAR AL-SHARI’A IN DARNAH

Aka Supporters of Islamic Law; Ansar al-Sharia in Derna; Ansar al-Sharia in Libya; Ansar alSharia; Ansar al-Sharia Brigade in Darnah

Description: Designated as an FTO on January 13, 2014, Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah (AAS-D) was created after the 2011 fall of the Qadhafi regime in Libya. The group has been involved in terrorist attacks against civilian targets as well as the assassination and attempted assassination of security officials and political actors in eastern Libya.

Activities: Members of AAS-D were involved in the September 11, 2012, attacks against the U.S. Special Mission and Annex in Benghazi, Libya. Four U.S. citizens were killed in the attack: Glen Doherty, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and U.S. Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens.

Throughout 2013 and 2014, AAS-D is believed to have cooperated with Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi in multiple attacks and suicide bombings targeting Libyan security forces in Benghazi. In 2016, AAS-D continued fighting in and around Darnah. Additionally, AAS-D maintained several terrorist training camps in Darnah and Jebel Akhdar, Libya, and trained members of other terrorist organizations operating in Syria and Iraq.

In 2018, there were unconfirmed reports that AAS-D was involved in clashes with the “Libyan National Army.” AAS-D did not claim any attacks in 2019.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Darnah, Libya

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

ANSAR AL-SHARI’A IN TUNISIA

Aka Al-Qayrawan Media Foundation; Supporters of Islamic Law; Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia; Ansar al-Shari’ah; Ansar al-Shari’ah in Tunisia; Ansar al-Sharia

Description: Designated as an FTO on January 13, 2014, Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia (AAS-T) was founded in 2011 by Seif Allah Ben Hassine. AAS-T has been implicated in attacks against Tunisian security forces, assassinations of Tunisian political figures, and attempted suicide bombings of popular tourist locations. AAS-T has also recruited Tunisians to fight in Syria.

Activities: AAS-T was involved in the September 14, 2012, attack against the U.S. embassy and American school in Tunis, which threatened the safety of more than 100 U.S. embassy employees. In February and July 2013, AAS-T members were implicated in the assassination of Tunisian politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi.

Since 2016, Tunisian authorities have continued to confront and arrest AAS-T members. AAS‑T did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2019.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Tunisia and Libya

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

ARMY OF ISLAM

Aka Jaysh al-Islam; Jaish al-Islam

Description: Designated as an FTO on May 19, 2011, the Army of Islam (AOI), founded in late 2005, is a Gaza-based terrorist organization responsible for numerous terrorist acts against the Israeli and Egyptian governments and British, New Zealand, and U.S. citizens. The group, led by Mumtaz Dughmush, subscribes to a violent Salafist ideology.

Note: AOI is a separate and distinct group from the Syria-based Jaysh al-Islam, which is not a designated FTO.

Activities: AOI is responsible for the 2006 and 2007 kidnappings of civilians, including a U.S. journalist. AOI also carried out the early 2009 attacks on Egyptian civilians in Cairo and Heliopolis, Egypt, and planned the January 1, 2011, attack on a Coptic Christian church in Alexandria that killed 25 and wounded 100. In November 2012, AOI announced that it had launched rocket attacks on Israel in a joint operation with the Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem. In August 2013, an Israeli official reported that AOI leader Dughmush was running training camps in Gaza.

In September 2015, AOI reportedly released a statement pledging allegiance to ISIS. In a short post attributed to the group, AOI declared itself an inseparable part of ISIS-Sinai Province. Since then, AOI has continued to express support for ISIS. In October 2017, the group released a video in an effort to encourage ISIS fighters defending Mosul. In August 2019, AOI shared another video praising ISIS that included training information for individuals to conduct suicide attacks.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Egypt, Gaza, and Israel

Funding and External Aid: AOI receives much of its funding from a variety of criminal activities in Gaza.

ASBAT AL-ANSAR

Aka AAA; Band of Helpers; Band of Partisans; League of Partisans; League of the Followers; God’s Partisans; Gathering of Supporters; Partisan’s League; Esbat al-Ansar; Isbat al-Ansar; Osbat al-Ansar; Usbat al-Ansar; Usbat ul-Ansar

Description: Designated as an FTO on March 27, 2002, Asbat al-Ansar (AAA) is a Lebanon‑based Sunni terrorist group composed primarily of Palestinians that first emerged in the early 1990s. Linked to al-Qa’ida and other Sunni terrorist groups, AAA aims to thwart perceived anti-Islamic and pro-Western influences in the country. AAA’s base is largely confined to Lebanon’s refugee camps.

Activities: Throughout the mid-1990s, AAA assassinated Lebanese religious leaders and bombed nightclubs, theaters, and liquor stores. The group also plotted against foreign diplomatic targets. Between 2005 and 2011, AAA members traveled to Iraq to fight Coalition Forces. AAA has been reluctant to involve itself in operations in Lebanon, in part because of concerns of losing its safe haven in the Ain al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee camp. AAA remained active in Lebanon but has not claimed responsibility for any attacks since 2018.

Strength: AAA membership is estimated in the low hundreds.

Location/Area of Operation: AAA’s primary base of operations is the Ain al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee camp in southern Lebanon.

Funding and External Aid: AAA likely receives money through international Sunni extremist networks.

AUM SHINRIKYO

Aka A.I.C. Comprehensive Research Institute; A.I.C. Sogo Kenkyusho; Aleph; Aum Supreme Truth

Description: Aum Shinrikyo (AUM) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. It was established in 1987 by leader Shoko Asahara and gained legal status in Japan as a religious entity in 1989. The Japanese government revoked its recognition of AUM as a religious organization following the group’s deadly 1995 sarin attack in Tokyo. Despite claims that the group has renounced violence and Asahara’s teachings, members of AUM continue to adhere to the violent and apocalyptic teachings of its founder.

Activities: In March 1995, AUM members simultaneously released the chemical nerve agent sarin on several Tokyo subway trains, killing 13 and causing up to 6,000 people to seek medical treatment. Subsequent investigations by the Japanese government revealed that AUM was responsible for other chemical incidents in Japan in 1994, including a sarin attack on a residential neighborhood in Matsumoto that killed seven and injured approximately 500. Japanese police arrested Asahara in May 1995; in February 2004, authorities sentenced him to death for his role in the 1995 attacks.

Although AUM has not conducted a terrorist attack since 1995, concerns remain regarding its continued adherence to the violent teachings of Asahara. The group now consists of two factions, both of which have recruited new members, engaged in commercial enterprises, and acquired property. In July 2000, Russian authorities arrested a group of Russian AUM followers who planned to detonate bombs in Japan as part of an operation to free Asahara from prison. In August 2012, a Japan Airlines flight to the United States turned back after receiving a bomb threat demanding the release of Asahara.

In March 2016, Montenegro expelled 58 people associated with AUM found holding a conference at a hotel in Danilovgrad. One month later, Russian authorities carried out raids on 25 AUM properties and opened a criminal investigation into an AUM cell. In November 2017, Japanese police raided the offices of a “successor” group to AUM.

On July 6, 2018, AUM leader Shoko Asahara was executed. AUM did not claim any attacks in 2019.

Strength: AUM is estimated to have around 1,500 followers.

Location/Area of Operation: Japan and Russia

Funding and External Aid: AUM’s funding comes primarily from member contributions and group-run businesses.

BASQUE FATHERLAND AND LIBERTY

Aka ETA; Askatasuna; Batasuna; Ekin; Euskal Herritarrok; Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna; Herri Batasuna; Jarrai-Haika-Segi; K.A.S.; XAKI; Epanastatiki Pirines; Popular Revolutionary Struggl

Description: Designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997, Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) was founded in 1959 with the aim of establishing an independent homeland based on Marxist principles in the Spanish Basque provinces of Alava, Guipuzcoa, and Viscaya; the autonomous region of Navarre; and the southwestern French territories of Labourd, Lower-Navarre, and Soule.

Activities: ETA has primarily conducted bombings and assassinations against Spanish government officials, businessmen, politicians, judicial figures, and security and military forces; however, the group has also targeted journalists and major tourist areas. ETA is responsible for killing more than 800 civilians and members of the armed forces and police as well as injuring thousands since it formally began its campaign of violence in 1968.

In December 2006, ETA exploded a massive car bomb, destroying much of the covered parking garage at Madrid’s Barajas International Airport. ETA marked its fiftieth anniversary in 2009 with a series of high profile and deadly bombings, including the July 2009 attack on a Civil Guard barracks that injured more than 60 people, including children.

ETA has not conducted any attacks since it announced a “definitive cessation of armed activity” in October 2011.

In 2016, authorities seized ETA weapons, including a cache found in a forest north of Paris, and captured the top ETA leader. In April 2017, ETA reported that it had relinquished its last caches of weapons. In May 2018, ETA released a letter announcing the dissolution of its organizational structures. In a September 2019 mass trial, a Spanish court accepted a plea deal for 47 ETA members to avoid prison sentences for membership in the group.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Spain and France

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

BOKO HARAM

aka Nigerian Taliban; Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad; Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad; People Committed to the Prophet’s Teachings for Propagation and Jihad; Sunni Group for Preaching and Jihad

Description: Boko Haram (BH) was designated as an FTO on November 14, 2013. The Nigeria-based group is responsible for numerous attacks in northern and northeastern regions of the country as well as in the Lake Chad Basin in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger that have killed thousands of people since 2009.

In March 2015, BH pledged allegiance to ISIS in an audiotape message. ISIS accepted the pledge, and BH began calling itself ISIS-West Africa. In August 2016, ISIS announced that Abu Musab al-Barnawi was to replace Abubakar Shekau as the new leader of the group. Infighting then led BH to split. Shekau maintains a group of followers and affiliates concentrated primarily in the Sambisa Forest; this faction is known as Boko Haram, while al‑Barnawi’s group is now separated and designated as ISIS-West Africa.

Activities: BH crosses porous Lake Chad region borders to target civilians and military personnel in northeast Nigeria, the Far North Region of Cameroon, and parts of Chad and Niger. The group continued to evade pressure from Lake Chad country forces, including through the regional Multinational Joint Task Force.

Throughout 2014, BH killed about 5,000 Nigerian civilians in various attacks. In April 2014, the group kidnapped 276 female students from a secondary school in Chibok, Borno State. BH has continued to abduct women and girls in the northern region of Nigeria and the Lake Chad region, some of whom are subjected to domestic servitude, other forms of forced labor, and sexual servitude, including through forced marriages to its members. For further information, refer to the 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report .

In January 2015, BH carried out a massacre in Baga, Borno State; reported casualties ranged from 150 to more than 2,000 killed, injured, or disappeared. The January 2015 attacks and other BH operations in surrounding smaller villages in 2015 displaced an estimated 35,000 people and allowed BH to gain control of Borno State.

Between 2017 and 2018, BH increased its forced abduction of women and girls and ordered them to carry out suicide attacks on civilians, including the January 2017 attack against the University of Maiduguri in Borno State, and twin attacks against a mosque and market in Adamawa State, Nigeria, in May 2018, killing 86.

BH continued its terrorist attacks in 2018 and 2019. Between January and November 2019, BH reportedly killed at least 275 people, mostly civilians, and displaced thousands in the Far North Region of Cameroon. In February, the group killed at least 60 people in a renewed assault on the northeast Nigerian town of Rann. In July, at least 65 people were killed and 10 others injured in an attack by suspected BH fighters on a funeral in Borno State.

Strength: BH is estimated to have several thousand fighters.

Location/Area of Operation: Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad

Funding and External Aid: BH largely self-finances through criminal activities such as looting, extortion, kidnapping-for-ransom, and bank robberies.

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES/NEW PEOPLE’S ARMY

Aka CPP/NPA; Communist Party of the Philippines; CPP; New People’s Army; NPA; NPP/CPP

Description: The Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) was designated as an FTO on August 9, 2002. The military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) – the New People’s Army (NPA) – is a Maoist group formed in March 1969 with the aim of overthrowing the government through protracted guerrilla warfare. NPA’s founder, Jose Maria Sison, reportedly directs CPP/NPA activity from the Netherlands, where he lives in self-imposed exile. Luis Jalandoni, a fellow Central Committee member and director of the CPP’s overt political wing, the National Democratic Front, also lives in the Netherlands. Although primarily a rural-based guerrilla group, the CPP/NPA has an active urban infrastructure to support its terrorist activities and, at times, has used city-based assassination squads.

Activities: The CPP/NPA primarily targets Philippine security forces, government officials, local infrastructure, and businesses that refuse to pay extortion, or “revolutionary taxes.” The CPP/NPA also has a history of attacking U.S. interests in the Philippines. In 1987, for example, the group killed three U.S. soldiers in four separate attacks in Angeles City. In 1989, the CPP/NPA issued a press statement claiming responsibility for the ambush and murder of Colonel James Nicholas Rowe, chief of the Ground Forces Division of the Joint U.S.-Military Advisory Group.

Over the past several years, the CPP/NPA has continued to carry out killings, raids, kidnappings, acts of extortion, and other forms of violence primarily directed against Philippine security forces.

Throughout 2016 and 2017, several attempts were made to establish a cease-fire and peace deal between the CPP/NPA and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Reported violations from both sides, however – including reports of the CPP/NPA’s continued recruitment in the Philippines and attacks against government forces and civilians – stalled peace efforts through 2019.

In August 2018, seven suspected members of the CPP/NPA were killed in a shootout with Philippine police in the town of Antique; authorities found a cache of cellphones, laptops, firearms, and explosives at the site. In December 2018, CPP/NPA members attacked a military patrol in the city of Catarman using an anti-personnel mine. The attack killed four soldiers and two civilians.

In 2019, the CPP/NPA continued attacks on security forces and civilians. Their most deadly was in April, when they detonated bombs by an improvised land mine in a surprise early morning attack clash in Samar, killing six Philippine troops.

Strength: The Philippine government estimates that the CPP/NPA has about 4,000 members. The group also retains a significant amount of support from communities in rural areas of the Philippines.

Location/Area of Operation: The Philippines

Funding and External Aid: The CPP/NPA raises funds through extortion and theft.

CONTINUITY IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY

Aka CIRA; Continuity Army Council; Continuity IRA; Republican Sinn Fein

Description: Designated as an FTO on July 13, 2004, the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) is a terrorist splinter group that became operational in 1986 as the clandestine armed wing of Republican Sinn Fein, following its split from Sinn Fein. “Continuity” refers to the group’s belief that it is carrying on the original goal of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), to force the British out of Northern Ireland. CIRA cooperates with the larger Real IRA (RIRA).

Activities: CIRA has been active in Belfast and the border areas of Northern Ireland, where it has carried out bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, extortion operations, and robberies. On occasion, it has provided advance warning to police of its attacks. Targets have included the British military, Northern Ireland security forces, and Loyalist paramilitary groups.

In February 2016, CIRA claimed responsibility for a shooting at a boxing event in Dublin that left one dead. In June 2017, CIRA released a statement claiming it would disband and decommission some of its arms over the following three months, describing the conflict as a “futile war.”

In August 2019, CIRA members conducted an attack on the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), setting off a bomb near the border of North Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. In December 2019, CIRA claimed responsibility for a grenade attack in west Belfast on a PSNI vehicle.

Strength: CIRA’s membership is small, with possibly fewer than 50 members.

Location/Area of Operation: Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland

Funding and External Aid: CIRA supports its activities through criminal activities, including smuggling.

GAMA’A AL-ISLAMIYYA

Aka al-Gama’at; Egyptian al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya; GI; Islamic Gama’at; IG; Islamic Group

Description: Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. Formed in the 1970s, IG was once Egypt’s largest terrorist group. The group’s external wing, composed mainly of exiled members residing in several countries, maintained that its primary goal was to replace the Egyptian government with an Islamist state. IG’s “spiritual” leader Omar Abd al-Rahman, or the “blind Sheikh,” served a life sentence in a U.S. prison for his involvement in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and died in prison in February 2017.

Activities: During the 1990s, IG conducted armed attacks against Egyptian security, other government officials, and Coptic Christians. IG claimed responsibility for the June 1995 attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The group also launched attacks on tourists in Egypt, most notably the 1997 Luxor attack. In 1999, part of the group publicly renounced violence. IG is not known to have committed a terrorist attack in recent years; the group remained dormant in 2019.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Egypt

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

HAMAS

Aka the Islamic Resistance Movement; Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya; Izz al-Din al Qassam Battalions; Izz al-Din al Qassam Brigades; Izz al-Din al Qassam Forces; Students of Ayyash; Student of the Engineer; Yahya Ayyash Units; Izz al-Din al-Qassim Brigades; Izz al-Din alQassim Forces; Izz al-Din al-Qassim Battalions; Izz al-Din al Qassam Battalions; Izz al-Din al Qassam Brigades; Izz al-Din al Qassam Forces

Description: Designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997, Hamas was established in 1987 at the onset of the first Palestinian uprising, or First Intifada, as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. The armed element, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, has conducted anti-Israeli attacks, including suicide bombings against civilian targets inside Israel. Hamas also manages a broad, mostly Gaza-based, network of Dawa or ministry activities that include charities, schools, clinics, youth camps, fundraising, and political activities. After winning Palestinian Legislative Council elections in January 2006, Hamas gained control of significant Palestinian Authority (PA) ministries in Gaza, including the Ministry of Interior. In 2007, Hamas expelled the PA and Fatah from Gaza in a violent takeover. In 2017, the group selected a new leader, Ismail Haniyeh, who is based in Gaza. Hamas remained the de facto ruler in Gaza in 2019.

Activities: Before 2005, Hamas conducted numerous anti-Israeli attacks, including suicide bombings, rocket launches, IED attacks, and shootings. U.S. citizens have died and been injured in the group’s attacks. In June 2007, after Hamas took control of Gaza from the PA and Fatah, the Gaza borders were closed, and Hamas increased its use of tunnels to smuggle weapons into Gaza through the Sinai and maritime routes.

Hamas fought a 23-day war with Israel from late December 2008 to January 2009. From November 14-21, 2012, Hamas fought another war with Israel during which it claims to have launched more than 1,400 rockets into Israel. Despite the Egypt-mediated cease-fire between Israel and Hamas in 2012, operatives from Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) coordinated and carried out a November bus bombing in Tel Aviv that wounded 29 people. On July 8, 2014, Israel launched Operation Protective Edge in Gaza with the intent of preventing rocket fire into Israel; the rocket fire from Gaza had increased following earlier Israeli military operations that targeted Hamas for the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers in June 2014, including 16-year-old U.S.-Israeli citizen Naftali Fraenkel.

In April 2016, a Hamas member carried out a suicide attack on a bus in Jerusalem, killing 20. The group was also held responsible for several Gaza-based rocket attacks, including a July strike in Sderot that hit a kindergarten and damaged several buildings.

Hamas-organized protests at the border between Gaza and Israel continued throughout much of 2019, resulting in clashes that killed Hamas members, Palestinian protestors, and Israeli soldiers. Hamas claimed responsibility for numerous rocket attacks from Gaza into Israeli territory throughout 2018, and the Israeli military reported that some rocket attacks in 2019 came from Hamas launchers.

Strength: Hamas comprises several thousand Gaza-based operatives.

Location/Area of Operation: Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon

Funding and External Aid: Hamas has received funding, weapons, and training from Iran and raises funds in Gulf countries. The group receives donations from some Palestinian and other expatriates as well as from its own charity organizations.

HAQQANI NETWORK

Aka HQN

Description: Designated as an FTO on September 19, 2012, the Haqqani Network (HQN) was formed in the late 1980s, around the time of the then-Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. HQN’s founder Jalaluddin Haqqani established a relationship with Usama bin Laden in the mid‑1980s, and joined the Taliban in 1995. After the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, Jalaluddin retreated to Pakistan where, under the leadership of his son Sirajuddin Haqqani, HQN continued to direct and conduct terrorist activity in Afghanistan. In July 2015, Sirajuddin Haqqani was appointed Deputy Leader of the Taliban.

Activities: HQN has planned and carried out numerous significant kidnappings and attacks against U.S. and Coalition Forces in Afghanistan, the Afghan government, and civilian targets. In September 2011, HQN wounded 77 U.S. soldiers in a truck bombing in Wardak province and conducted a 19-hour attack on the U.S. Embassy and International Security Assistance Force headquarters in Kabul, killing 16 Afghans. In June 2012, an HQN suicide bomb attack against Forward Operating Base Salerno killed two U.S. soldiers and wounded more than 100 others.

In April 2016, HQN was blamed for an attack in Kabul against a government security agency tasked with providing protection to senior government officials. This attack was the deadliest in Kabul in 15 years, killing 64 people and injuring more than 300. Afghan officials also blamed HQN for a June 2016 double suicide attack outside of Kabul against Afghan police cadets and first responders; 30 people were killed.

On May 31, 2017, a truck bomb exploded in Kabul, killing more than 150 people. Afghan officials blamed HQN for the attack. In October, an American woman and her family were recovered after five years of HQN captivity.

HQN was believed to be responsible for a January 2018 ambulance bombing in Kabul that killed more than 100 people. Afghan officials blamed HQN for a January 2018 attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul that killed 22 people, including Americans. HQN was also blamed for a May 2018 attack on the Afghan interior ministry that resulted in the death of a police officer.

In November 2019, the HQN released two hostages, including a U.S. citizen, who were kidnapped at gunpoint in August 2016. Afghan authorities also released Anas Haqqani, a leading figure and fund-raiser for HQN.

Strength: HQN is estimated to have between 3,000 and 5,000 fighters.

Location/Area of Operation: Afghanistan and Pakistan

Funding and External Aid: HQN is primarily funded from taxing local commerce, extortion, smuggling, and other licit and illicit business ventures. In addition to the funding it receives as part of the broader Afghan Taliban, the group receives some funds from donors in Pakistan and the Gulf.

HARAKAT-UL JIHAD ISLAMI

Aka HUJI; Movement of Islamic Holy War; Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami; Harkat-al-Jihad-ul Islami; Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami; Harakat ul Jihad-e-Islami

Description: Designated as an FTO on August 6, 2010, Harakat-ul Jihad Islami (HUJI) was formed in 1980 in Afghanistan to fight against the former Soviet Union. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the group redirected its efforts towards India. HUJI seeks the annexation of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir into Pakistan and the expulsion of Coalition Forces from Afghanistan, and has supplied fighters to the Taliban in Afghanistan.

HUJI historically focused its activities on the Afghanistan-Pakistan front, and was composed of Pakistani terrorists and veterans of the Soviet-Afghan war. HUJI experienced internal splits, and a portion of the group has aligned with al-Qa’ida.

Activities: HUJI claimed responsibility for the September 7, 2011, bombing of the New Delhi High Court, which left at least 11 dead and an estimated 76 wounded. The group sent an email to the press stating that the bomb was intended to force India to repeal a death sentence of a HUJI member. HUJI did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2019.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

HARAKAT UL-JIHAD-I-ISLAMI/BANGLADESH

Aka HUJI-B; Harakat ul Jihad e Islami Bangladesh; Harkatul Jihad al Islam; Harkatul Jihad; Harakat ul Jihad al Islami; Harkat ul Jihad al Islami; Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami; Harakat ul Jihad Islami Bangladesh; Islami Dawat-e-Kafela; IDEK

Description: Designated as an FTO on March 5, 2008, Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) was formed in April 1992 by a group of former Bangladeshi Afghan veterans seeking to establish Islamist rule in Bangladesh. In October 2005, Bangladeshi authorities banned the group. The leaders of HUJI-B signed the February 1998 fatwa sponsored by Usama bin Laden that declared U.S. civilians legitimate targets. HUJI-B has connections to al-Qa’ida and Pakistani terrorist groups advocating similar objectives, including HUJI and Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT).

Activities: In December 2008, three HUJI-B members, including HUJI-B leader Mufti Abdul Hannan, were convicted for the May 2004 grenade attack that wounded the British High Commissioner in Sylhet, Bangladesh. In 2011, Bangladeshi authorities formally charged multiple suspects, including Hannan, with the killing of former Finance Minister Shah AMS Kibria in a grenade attack on January 27, 2005. In 2013, Bangladeshi police arrested a group of terrorists, including HUJI-B members, who were preparing attacks on public gatherings and prominent individuals. In 2014, HUJI-B continued its operations; reports at the time suggested that some HUJI-B members may have traveled to Pakistan to receive military training from LeT.

On April 12, 2017, Bangladeshi authorities executed HUJI-B leader Hannan and two associates for the May 2004 grenade attack. In October 2019, Dhaka police arrested three HUJI-B operatives reportedly attempting to revive the group’s operations.

Strength: HUJI-B leaders claim that up to 400 of its members are Afghan war veterans; its total membership is unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Bangladesh and India

Funding and External Aid: HUJI-B funding comes from a variety of sources. Several international NGOs may have funneled money to HUJI-B.

HARAKAT UL-MUJAHIDEEN

Aka HUM; Harakat ul-Ansar; HUA; Jamiat ul-Ansar; JUA; al-Faran; al-Hadid; al-Hadith; Harakat ul-Mujahidin; Ansar ul Ummah

Description: Designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997, Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM) seeks the annexation of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir into Pakistan and the expulsion of Coalition Forces from Afghanistan. In January 2005, HUM’s long-time leader Fazlur Rehman Khalil stepped down and was replaced by Dr. Badr Munir. HUM operated terrorist training camps in eastern Afghanistan until Coalition air strikes destroyed them in 2001. In 2003, HUM began using the name Jamiat ul-Ansar; Pakistan banned the group in November 2003.

Activities: HUM has conducted numerous operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, as well as in India’s northeastern states. In December 1999, HUM hijacked an Indian airliner, which led to the release of Masood Azhar, an important leader who later founded Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). India also released Ahmed Omar Sheikh as a result of the hijacking. Sheikh was later convicted of the 2002 abduction and murder of U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl.

HUM has conducted attacks targeting Indian interests including the late December 2015 strikes in Handwor and Poonch, which resulted in the deaths of five Indian army personnel. HUM did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2019.

Strength: After 2000, a significant portion of HUM’s membership defected to JeM, and only a small number of cadres are reported to still be active.

Location/Area of Operation: HUM conducts operations primarily in Afghanistan and in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. It operates from Muzaffarabad in Azad Kashmir, and in other cities in Pakistan.

Funding and External Aid: HUM collects donations from wealthy donors in Pakistan.

HIZBALLAH

Aka the Party of God; Islamic Jihad; Islamic Jihad Organization; Revolutionary Justice Organization; Organization of the Oppressed on Earth; Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine; Organization of Right Against Wrong; Ansar Allah; Followers of the Prophet Muhammed; Lebanese Hizballah; Lebanese Hezbollah; LH; Foreign Relations Department; FRD; External Security Organization; ESO; Foreign Action Unit; Hizballah ESO: Hizballah International; Special Operations Branch; External Services Organization; External Security Organization of Hizballah

Description: Hizballah was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. Formed in 1982 following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Lebanon-based radical Shia group takes its ideological inspiration from the Iranian revolution and the teachings of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. The group generally follows the religious guidance of the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. Hizballah is closely allied with Iran and the two often work together on shared initiatives, although Hizballah also occasionally acts independently. Hizballah shares a close relationship with the Syrian regime of Bashar Assad, and like Iran, provides assistance – including fighters – to Syrian regime forces in the Syrian conflict.

Activities: Hizballah is responsible for multiple large-scale terrorist attacks, including the 1983 suicide truck bombings of U.S. Embassy Beiruit and the U.S. Marine barracks; the 1984 attack on the U.S. Embassy Beirut annex; and the 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847, during which U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem was murdered. Hizballah was also implicated, along with Iran, in the 1992 attacks on the Israeli embassy in Argentina and the 1994 bombing of the Argentine‑Israelite Mutual Association in Buenos Aires.

Hizballah assisted Iraq Shia militant and terrorist groups in Iraq, and in January 2007, attacked the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center, killing five American soldiers.

In July 2012, a suspected Hizballah operative was detained by Cypriot authorities for allegedly helping plan an attack against Israeli tourists on the island. On March 21, 2013, a Cyprus court found the operative guilty of charges based on his surveillance activities of Israeli tourists. The group was also responsible for the July 2012 attack on a passenger bus carrying 42 Israeli tourists at the Sarafovo Airport in Bulgaria, near the city of Burgas. The explosion killed five Israelis and one Bulgarian, and injured 32 others.

In May 2013, Hizballah publicly admitted to playing a significant role in the ongoing conflict in Syria, rallying support for the Syrian regime of Bashar Assad. Hizballah’s support for Syria’s Assad regime continued into 2019.

In May 2013, Nigerian authorities arrested three Hizballah operatives who had stored weapons and a large quantity of ammunition and explosives. In October 2014, Peruvian authorities arrested a Hizballah operative who had been planning to carry out attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets. In May 2015, Cypriot authorities arrested and convicted a Hizballah member after finding 8.2 tons of liquid ammonium nitrate in the basement of a residence in Larnaca. In August 2015, Kuwaiti authorities arrested three Hizballah operatives who had stored weapons and explosives under a residential house.

In June 2017, two Hizballah operatives were arrested in the United States. One operative arrested in Michigan had identified the availability of explosives precursors in Panama in 2011 and surveilled U.S. and Israeli targets in Panama as well as the Panama Canal from 2011-2012. Another operative arrested in New York had surveilled U.S. military and law enforcement facilities from 2003-2017.

In September 2018, Brazil arrested a Hizballah financier, and in December 2018, tunnels reportedly built by the group were discovered on Israeli territory along the boundary with Lebanon. In September 2019, Hizballah launched attacks directly on the Israeli military, firing anti-tank missiles targeting an army base and vehicles near the border.

Strength: Hizballah has tens of thousands of supporters and members worldwide.

Location/Area of Operation: Lebanon and Syria

Funding and External Aid: Iran continues to provide Hizballah with most of its funding, training, weapons, and explosives, as well as political, diplomatic, monetary, and organizational aid. Iran’s annual financial backing to Hizballah – which in recent years has been estimated at $700 million – accounts for the overwhelming majority of the group’s annual budget. The Assad regime has provided training, weapons, and diplomatic and political support. Hizballah also receives funding in the form of private donations from some Lebanese Shia diaspora communities worldwide, including profits from legal and illegal businesses. These include smuggling contraband goods, passport falsification, narcotics trafficking, money laundering, and credit card, immigration, and bank fraud.

HIZBUL MUJAHIDEEN

Aka HM, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen

Description: Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) was designated as an FTO on August 17, 2017. The group was formed in 1989 and is one of the largest and oldest militant groups operating in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. HM is led by Mohammad Yusuf Shah, also known as Syed Salahuddin, and officially supports the liberation of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir from Indian control and its accession to Pakistan, although some cadres are pro-independence. The group focuses its attacks on Indian security forces and politicians in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and has conducted operations jointly with other Kashmiri militants. The group is made up primarily of ethnic Kashmiris.

Activities: HM has claimed responsibility for several attacks in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. In May 2015, HM claimed an attack on Indian security forces in Kupwara that killed three Indian troops, according to the targeted forces. HM launched additional attacks against Indian security forces in 2015 and 2016. On May 1, 2017, HM killed seven people – including five policemen – when it attacked a bank van carrying cash in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. On August 29, 2018, HM reportedly killed four policemen in Shopian district in the Indian state Jammu and Kashmir. On September 21, 2018, HM claimed responsibility for abducting and killing three police officials in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.

In March 2019, Indian officials accused HM of being behind a grenade attack on a Jammu bus stand that killed a teenager and injured 32 others. In June, two Indian soldiers were killed and six others injured when an alleged HM militant attacked their patrol with a VBIED. HM has also reportedly been specifically targeting non-locals in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir and is suspected by police of having killed five Bengali laborers and a truck driver in October 2019.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Jammu and Kashmir

Funding and External Aid: Sources of support are unknown, but HM is suspected to receive some funding from sources in Pakistan as well as from local fundraising.

INDIAN MUJAHEDEEN

Aka Indian Mujahedeen; Indian Mujahidin; Islamic Security Force-Indian Mujahideen (ISF-IM)

Description: The Indian Mujahedeen (IM) was designated as an FTO on September 19, 2011. The India-based terrorist group is responsible for dozens of bomb attacks throughout India since 2005 and has caused the deaths of hundreds of civilians. IM maintains ties to other terrorist entities including ISIS and Pakistan-based Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Harakat ul-Jihad Islami. IM’s stated goal is to carry out terrorist actions against Indians for their oppression of Muslims.

Activities: IM is known for carrying out multiple coordinated bombings in crowded areas against economic and civilian targets to maximize terror and casualties. In 2008, IM was responsible for 16 synchronized bomb blasts in crowded urban centers, including an attack in Delhi that killed 30 people and an attack at a local hospital in Ahmedabad that killed 38. In 2010, IM bombed a popular German bakery frequented by tourists in Pune, India; 17 people were killed, and more than 60 people were injured in the attack.

In January 2015, the arrest of three IM militants linked the group to the December 2014 low‑intensity blast near a restaurant in Bangalore that killed one woman and injured three others. The arrest also uncovered that the group planned to carry out attacks on India’s Republic Day and had provided explosives for attacks in other parts of the country.

In 2016, IM was increasingly linked to ISIS. In May, six IM operatives were identified in an ISIS propaganda video threatening attacks on India. A month later, it was reported that an IM cell linked to ISIS was plotting attacks on multiple targets in Hyderabad and had purchased chemicals to make high-grade explosives for the planned operations. In September 2017, Indian law enforcement uncovered the plans of an IM militant in custody to conduct attacks in India, including targeted killings and bombing a temple in Gaya. IM did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2019.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: India

Funding and External Aid: IM is suspected to obtain funding and support from other terrorist organizations, as well as from sources in Pakistan and the Middle East.

ISLAMIC JIHAD UNION

Aka Islamic Jihad Group; Islomiy Jihod Ittihodi; al-Djihad al-Islami; Dzhamaat Modzhakhedov; Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan; Jamiat al-Jihad al-Islami; Jamiyat; The Jamaat Mojahedin; The Kazakh Jama’at; The Libyan Society

Description: The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) was designated as an FTO on June 17, 2005. The group splintered from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in the early 2000s. Najmiddin Jalolov founded the organization as the Islamic Jihad Group in March 2002, but the group was renamed Islamic Jihad Union in May 2005. Although IJU remains committed to overthrowing the Government of Uzbekistan, today it is active primarily in Afghanistan and, more recently, in Syria, where a number of its members relocated from Afghanistan.

Activities: IJU primarily operates against international forces in Afghanistan and remains a threat to Central Asia. IJU claimed responsibility for attacks in 2004 in Uzbekistan, which targeted police at several roadway checkpoints and at a popular bazaar, killing approximately 47 people, including 33 IJU members, some of whom were suicide bombers. In July 2004, the group carried out near-simultaneous suicide bombings of the Uzbek Prosecutor General’s office and the U.S. and Israeli Embassies in Tashkent.

In September 2007, German authorities detained three IJU operatives, including two German converts, disrupting the group’s plans to attack targets in Germany – including Ramstein Airbase where the primary targets would be U.S. diplomats, soldiers, and civilians.

In 2013, two IJU videos showed attacks against an American military base in Afghanistan and an IJU sniper shooting an Afghan soldier.

According to statements and photos released by the group, IJU participated in the five-month long 2015 Taliban siege of Kunduz city. At least 13 police officers were killed in the attacks, and hundreds of civilians were killed. In August 2015, IJU pledged allegiance to the then newly appointed Taliban leader Mullah Mansour.

In 2017, IJU released a video showing its militants using assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades to fight Afghan troops in late 2016. IJU released a second video in April 2018 showing a joint raid with the Taliban in northern Afghanistan. The video, dated October 2017, shows a night clash with Afghan forces. In 2019, the United Nations confirmed that IJU was operating inside Syria under control of al-Nusra Front.

Strength: IJU consists of 100 to 200 members.

Location/Area of Operation: Afghanistan, Syria, Uzbekistan, Turkey, and Europe

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF UZBEKISTAN

Aka IMU

Description: Designated as an FTO on September 25, 2000, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) seeks to overthrow the Uzbek government and establish an Islamic state. For most of the past decade, however, the group has recruited members from other Central Asian states and Europe. Despite its stated objective to set up an Islamic state in Uzbekistan, the group primarily operates along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and in northern Afghanistan, where it fights against international forces. Several IMU members are also suspected of having traveled to Syria to fight with terrorist groups.

The IMU has had a decade-long relationship with al-Qa’ida (AQ), the Taliban, and Tehrik‑e Taliban Pakistan. Top IMU leaders have integrated themselves into the Taliban’s shadow government in Afghanistan’s northern provinces.

In August 2015, IMU leader Usman Ghazi publicly announced the group’s shift of allegiance to ISIS. Numerous IMU members, including possibly Ghazi himself, were subsequently reported to have been killed as a result of hostilities between ISIS and the IMU’s former Taliban allies.

Activities: Since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, the IMU has been predominantly focused on attacking international forces in Afghanistan. In late 2009, NATO forces reported an increase in IMU-affiliated FTFs in Afghanistan. In 2010, the IMU claimed responsibility for the September 19 ambush that killed 25 Tajik troops in Tajikistan. On June 8, 2014, IMU claimed responsibility for an attack on Karachi’s international airport that resulted in the deaths of at least 39 people.

Throughout 2015, the IMU actively threatened the Afghan government, primarily in the northern part of the country. In April 2015, the group released a video showing IMU members beheading an individual they claimed to be an Afghan soldier and threatened to behead Hazara (a historically persecuted ethnic group in Afghanistan) hostages, in supposed retaliation for the Afghan security forces capture of several female IMU members. In 2016, Uzbek refugee Fazliddin Kurbanov was sentenced by a U.S. federal court to 25 years in prison for planning a bomb attack in Idaho. Kurbanov had been in online contact with members of IMU, seeking advice on how to make explosives and discussing attacking U.S. military bases.

In June 2016, a faction of the IMU announced its continued commitment to the Taliban and AQ, marking a split with its leader Ghazi and the rest of the group, which announced its loyalty to ISIS in 2015 and has since cooperated with Islamic State’s Khorasan Province. IMU did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2019.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Central Asia, and Turkey

Funding and External Aid: The IMU receives support from a large Uzbek diaspora, terrorist organizations, and donors from Europe, Central and South Asia, and the Middle East.

ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS

Aka IRGC; The Iranian Revolutionary Guards; IRG; The Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution; AGIR; Pasdarn-e Enghelab-e Islami; Sepah-e Pasdaran Enghelab Islami; Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami; Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami; Pasdaran-e Inqilab; Revolutionary Guards; Revolutionary Guard; Sepah; Pasdaran; Sepah Pasdaran; Islamic Revolutionary Corps; Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps; Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps; Islamic Revolutionary Guards; Iran’s Revolutionary Guards; Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution.

Description: Designated as an FTO on April 15, 2019, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), part of Iran’s official military, has played a central role in Iran’s use of terrorism as a key tool of Iranian statecraft since its inception 40 years ago. The IRGC has been directly involved in terrorist plotting; its support for terrorism is foundational and institutional, and it has killed U.S. citizens.

The IRGC was founded in 1979 and since then has gained a substantial role in executing Iran’s foreign policy and wields control over vast segments of the economy. The IRGC’s ties to nonstate armed groups in the region, such as Hizballah in Lebanon, help Iran compensate for its relatively weak conventional military forces. Answering directly to the supreme leader, the corps is also influential in domestic politics, and many senior officials have passed through its ranks.

The IRGC is composed of five primary branches: the IRGC Ground Forces, IRGC Air Force, IRGC Navy, the Basij, and the IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF).

Activities: The IRGC – most prominently through its Qods Force (QF) – directs and carries out a global terrorist campaign. The IRGC-QF in 2011 plotted a brazen terrorist attack against the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. on American soil. In 2012, IRGC-QF operatives were arrested in Turkey and Kenya for plotting attacks. An IRGC operative was convicted in March 2017 of espionage for a foreign intelligence service; he had been surveilling a German‑Israeli group. In January 2018, Germany uncovered ten IRGC operatives involved in a terrorist plot in Germany. In September 2018, a U.S. federal court found Iran and the IRGC liable for the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing which killed 19 Americans. The QF is active in Syria in support of the Assad regime.

The IRGC-QF is Iran’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorist groups abroad. The IRGC continues to provide financial and other material support, training, technology transfer, advanced conventional weapons, guidance, or direction to a broad range of terrorist organizations, including Hizballah, Kata’ib Hizballah in Iraq, al-Ashtar Brigades in Bahrain, and other terrorist groups in Syria and around the Gulf. Iran also provides up to $100 million annually in combined support to Palestinian terrorist groups, including Hamas, PIJ, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command.

Strength: The IRGC has upwards of 125,000 troops under its command.

Location/Area of Operation: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Europe, and the Gulf

Funding and External Aid: The IRGC-QF continues to engage in large-scale illicit financing schemes and money laundering to fund its malign activities. In 2017, the IRGC-QF engineered a plot to produce counterfeit currency by deceiving European suppliers to procure advanced printing machinery and other necessary materials. It then printed counterfeit Yemeni bank notes, which were used to support its destabilizing activities in Yemen.

ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA

Aka al-Qa’ida in Iraq; al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida in Mesopotamia; al-Qa’ida in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Tawhid; Jam’at al-Tawhid Wa’al-Jihad; Tanzeem Qa’idat al Jihad/Bilad al Raafidaini; Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn; The Monotheism and Jihad Group; The Organization Base of Jihad/Country of the Two Rivers; The Organization Base of Jihad/Mesopotamia; The Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in Iraq; The Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in the Land of the Two Rivers; The Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in Iraq; The Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in the Land of the Two Rivers; The Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers; al-Zarqawi Network; Islamic State of Iraq; Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham; Islamic State of Iraq and Syria; ad-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-’Iraq wa-sh-Sham; Daesh; Dawla al Islamiya; Al-Furqan Establishment for Media Production; Islamic State; ISIL; ISIS; Amaq News Agency; Al Hayat Media Center; Al-Hayat Media Center; Al Hayat

Description: Al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) was designated as an FTO on December 17, 2004. In the 1990s, Jordanian militant Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi organized a terrorist group called al‑Tawhid wal-Jihad to oppose the presence of U.S. and western military forces in the Middle East as well as the West’s support for, and the existence of, Israel. In late 2004, Zarqawi joined al-Qa’ida (AQ) and pledged allegiance to Usama bin Laden. At that time, his group became known as al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI). Zarqawi led the group in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom to fight against U.S. and Coalition Forces until his death in June 2006.

In October 2006, AQI publicly renamed itself the Islamic State in Iraq. In 2013, it adopted the moniker ISIS to express its regional ambitions as it expanded operations to include the Syrian conflict. ISIS was led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who declared an Islamic caliphate in June 2014, until he was killed on October 27, 2019. In October 2017, the U.S. military fighting with local Syrian allies announced the liberation of Raqqa, the self-declared capital of ISIS’s so‑called “caliphate.” In December 2017, then Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced the territorial defeat of ISIS in Iraq. In September 2018, the Syrian Democratic Forces, with support from the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS began a final push to oust ISIS fighters from the lower Middle Euphrates River Valley in Syria. March 2019 marked the full territorial defeat of ISIS’s so-called caliphate.

Activities: ISIS has conducted numerous high-profile attacks, including IED attacks against U.S. military personnel and Iraqi infrastructure, videotaped beheadings of U.S. citizens, suicide bombings against both military and civilian targets, and rocket attacks. ISIS perpetrated these attacks using foreign, Iraqi, and Syrian operatives. In 2014, ISIS was responsible for most of the 12,000 Iraqi civilian deaths that year. ISIS is heavily involved in the fighting in Syria, and has participated in numerous kidnappings of civilians, including aid workers and journalists. In 2015 and 2016, ISIS claimed responsibility for several large-scale attacks in Iraq and Syria. In July 2016, ISIS claimed responsibility for a car bombing at a popular shopping center in Baghdad that killed nearly 300 people, making it the single deadliest bombing in Iraq’s capital city since 2003.

ISIS continued its attacks throughout 2017. In February 2017, ISIS killed 56 people in a series of attacks in Baghdad. In early April, the group killed 33 Syrians in eastern Syria, and on the same day, killed another 22 people in Tikrit, Iraq. In June, ISIS gunmen and suicide bombers killed more than a dozen people in two separate attacks in Tehran, including an attack inside the Parliament building. In September, ISIS killed over 80 people in Nasiriyah, Iraq, an area frequented by Shia Muslims on pilgrimage.

Since at least 2015, the group has integrated local children and children of FTFs into its forces and used them as executioners and suicide attackers. ISIS has systematically prepared child soldiers in Iraq and Syria using its education and religious infrastructure as part of its training and recruitment of members. Further, since 2015, ISIS abducted, raped, and abused thousands of women and children, some as young as eight years old. Women and children were sold and enslaved, distributed to ISIS fighters as spoils of war, forced into marriage and domestic servitude, or subjected to physical and sexual abuse. For further information, refer to the 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report .

ISIS also directs, enables, and inspires individuals to conduct attacks on behalf of the group around the world, including in the United States and Europe. In November 2015, ISIS carried out a series of coordinated attacks in Paris, France, including at a rock concert at the Bataclan concert hall, killing about 130 people and injuring more than 350 others; 23 year-old U.S. citizen Nohemi Gonzalez was among the dead. In March 2016, ISIS directed two simultaneous attacks in Brussels, Belgium – one at the Zaventem Airport and the other at a metro station. The attacks killed 32 people, including four U.S. citizens, and injured more than 250 people. In June 2016, a gunman who pledged allegiance to ISIS killed 49 individuals and injured 53 others at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida. In July 2016, ISIS claimed an attack in which a terrorist driving a cargo truck attacked a crowd in Nice, France, during Bastille Day celebrations, resulting in 86 deaths, including three U.S. citizens. In December 2016, ISIS claimed responsibility for a truck attack on a crowded Christmas market in Berlin, Germany, that killed 12 people and injured 48 others.

In March 2017, ISIS claimed responsibility for a terrorist attack on London’s Westminster Bridge when a man drove his car into pedestrians and stabbed others, killing five people. In early April 2017, a man who claimed to be a member of ISIS drove a truck into a crowded shopping center in Stockholm, Sweden, killing five and injuring many more. In May 2017, ISIS claimed a suicide bombing in Manchester, England, that killed 22 people outside of a live concert.

In July 2018, ISIS attacked the city of Suweida and nearby towns and villages in southwestern Syria, conducting multiple suicide bombings and simultaneous raids in a brutal offensive, killing more than 200 people.

In January 2019, ISIS claimed responsibility for the suicide bombing of a restaurant in Manbij, Syria that killed 19 people, including four Americans. That same month, ISIS reportedly launched a missile attack that seriously wounded two British commandos in eastern Syria. On Easter Sunday 2019, over 250 people were killed in Sri Lanka when ISIS inspired terrorists carried out coordinated suicide bombings at multiple churches and hotels. In August, ISIS claimed responsibility for killing a U.S. service member while he was participating in a combat operation in Ninawa Province, Iraq. In November, ISIS claimed responsibility for a stabbing attack near the London Bridge in which a man killed two people and injured three others. Also in November, ISIS claimed responsibility for a November 6 attack on a border post in Tajikistan that killed four Tajik service members and 15 militants.

Strength: Estimates suggest ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria number between 11,000 and 18,000, including several thousand FTFs.

Location/Area of Operation: Iraq and Syria, with branches and networks around the world.

Funding and External Aid: ISIS received most of its funding from a variety of criminal activities in Iraq and Syria. Criminal activities included extortion of civilian economies, smuggling oil, and robberies. ISIS also maintains stockpiles of as much as hundreds of millions of dollars scattered across Iraq and Syria it looted during its occupation of those countries in 2013 to 2019. ISIS continues to rely on trusted courier networks and money services businesses to move its financial resources within and outside of Iraq and Syria. Before ISIS’s territorial defeat, targeted counterterrorism operations and airstrikes served to sever critical financial networks, reduce the group’s cash reserves in Iraq and Syria, and degrade ISIS’s ability to exploit local resources such as oil. The territorial defeat of ISIS which eliminated its control of territory in Syria in 2019 reduced ISIS’s ability to generate, hold, and transfer its financial assets. Despite this, ISIS continues to generate revenue from criminal activities through its many clandestine networks in Iraq and Syria, and provides significant financial support and guidance to its network of global branches and affiliates.

ISIS has increased its presence outside the conflict zone in Iraq and Syria. In particular, ISIS core creates financial and logistical hubs in Central and East Africa, North Africa, and West Africa. ISIS also announced that the group had established two new branches in Pakistan and India.

ISIS–BANGLADESH

Aka Caliphate in Bangladesh, Caliphate’s Soldiers in Bangladesh, Soldiers of the Caliphate in Bangladesh, Khalifa’s Soldiers in Bengal, Islamic State Bangladesh, Islamic State in Bangladesh, ISB, ISISB, Abu Jandal al-Bangali, Neo-JMB, New JMB, Neo-Jammat-ul Mujahadeen-Bangladesh

Description: ISIS-Bangladesh was designated as an FTO on February 28, 2018. Created in 2014, ISIS-Bangladesh has described itself as ISIS’s official branch in Bangladesh and was born out of ISIS’s desire to expand its campaign to the Indian Subcontinent. Coinciding with the announcement of the caliphate in Iraq and Syria, a group of Bangladeshi nationals pledged allegiance to ISIS and vowed to organize Bengali Muslims under the leadership of then-ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Activities: In September 2015, gunmen belonging to ISIS-Bangladesh shot and killed an Italian aid worker in Dhaka. In December 2015, ISIS-Bangladesh claimed responsibility for injuring 10 people during a Christmas Day suicide attack at a mosque packed with Ahmadi Muslims. In July 2016, the group claimed responsibility for an assault on the Holey Artisan Bakery in Dhaka that killed 22 people, including one American. In March 2017, ISIS-Bangladesh claimed responsibility for twin explosions that targeted a crowd in Sylhet, Bangladesh, killing six people.

In April and May 2019, ISIS-Bangladesh claimed responsibility for two explosions in Dhaka that injured four police officers and two civilians. In August, ISIS-Bangladesh claimed responsibility for a small bomb thrown at a Bangladeshi minister in Dhaka, which injured two police officers. In September, the group claimed responsibility for an explosion outside Awami League office in Khulna.

Strength: ISIS-Bangladesh has several hundred armed supporters.

Location/Area of Operation: Bangladesh

Funding and External Aid: Although ISIS-Bangladesh’s sources of funding are largely unknown, the group does receive some support from ISIS.

ISIS-GREATER SAHARA

Aka ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS); Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (ISGS); Islamic State in the Greater Sahara; Islamic State of the Greater Sahel; ISIS in the Greater Sahel; ISIS in the Islamic Sahel

Description: ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) was designated as an FTO on May 23, 2018. ISIS-GS emerged when leader Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi and his followers split from al‑Murabitoun. Al-Sahrawi first pledged allegiance to ISIS in May 2015, which was acknowledged by ISIS in October 2016.

Activities: In September 2016, ISIS-GS claimed responsibility for an attack on a gendarmerie post in Markoye, Burkina Faso, that killed two people. In October 2016, ISIS-GS claimed responsibility for an attack on a military post in Intangom, Burkina Faso, that killed three Burkinabe soldiers.

In October 2017, ISIS-GS claimed responsibility for an attack on a joint U.S.-Nigerien patrol in the region of Tongo, Niger, which killed four U.S. soldiers and five Nigerien soldiers. In 2018, ISIS-GS was reportedly involved in numerous skirmishes and attacks in Mali and Niger, including those in May that targeted French troops and civilians. In 2019, ISIS-GS continued to intensify their rate of attacks, including an attack in November on a Malian military base that killed 54 soldiers.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

ISLAMIC STATE’S KHORASAN PROVINCE

Aka Islamic State’s Khorasan Province; ISIS Wilayat Khorasan; ISIL’s South Asia Branch; South Asian Chapter of ISIL

Description: Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) was designated as an FTO on January 14, 2016. The group is based in Afghanistan, conducts operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and is composed primarily of former members of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. ISIS-K’s senior leadership has pledged allegiance to then-ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, which was accepted in late January 2015. The group has carried out suicide bombings, small arms attacks, and kidnappings in Afghanistan against civilians and Afghan National Security and Defense Forces. ISIS-K has also claimed responsibility for attacks on civilians and government officials in Pakistan.

Activities: In January 2016, ISIS-K claimed a strike on a Pakistani consulate in Afghanistan, resulting in the deaths of seven Afghan security personnel. In July 2016, the group conducted a bomb attack at a peaceful protest in Kabul, Afghanistan, that killed an estimated 80 people and wounded another 230. In August 2016, ISIS-K claimed a shooting and suicide bombing at a hospital in Quetta, Pakistan, targeting lawyers, which killed 94. The group also claimed responsibility for a November 2016 suicide bombing at the Shah Noorani Shrine in Balochistan province, Pakistan, killing more than 50 people.

In July 2017, ISIS-K attacked the Iraqi Embassy in Kabul, killing two people, and bombed a mosque in western Afghanistan, killing 29 people and injuring 60 others. Between October and December of 2017, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for several deadly attacks in Kabul, including those targeting a television station, a Shia cultural center, and an Afghan intelligence office near the U.S. embassy.

ISIS-K also claimed multiple attacks in Pakistan in 2017, including an attack on a Sufi shrine in Sindh province in February that killed at least 88 people, an attack on a church in Quetta that killed at least nine people, and a July attack on an election rally in Balochistan province that killed 149 people. In September 2018, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for a double suicide bombing in a Shiite majority neighborhood in Kabul, leaving more than 20 dead and 70 injured.

In April 2019, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for an attack at the Ministry of Communications in Kabul, killing seven people. In August 2019, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing at a wedding hall in a Shiite minority neighborhood in Kabul, killing 80 people and injuring 154 others. In October 2019, an ISIS-K bombing of a mosque in Nangarhar province killed at least 70 people. In November 2019, ISIS-K suffered a series of major defeats and lost much of its territory in Nangahar in the face of attacks by both the coalition and Taliban forces.

Strength: ISIS-K is estimated to have approximately 1,000 fighters.

Location/Area of Operation: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia

Funding and External Aid: ISIS-K receives some funding from ISIS. Additional funds come from illicit criminal commerce, taxes, and extortion on the local population and businesses.

ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT-LIBYA

Aka Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Libya; Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in Libya; Wilayat Barqa; Wilayat Fezzan; Wilayat Tripolitania; Wilayat Tarablus; Wilayat al-Tarabulus

Description: The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Libya (ISIL-Libya) was designated as an FTO on May 20, 2016. In 2014, then-ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi dispatched a group of ISIS operatives from Syria to Libya to establish a branch of the terrorist group. In October 2014, several hundred operatives set up a base in Darnah, and the following month, Baghdadi formally established the branch after announcing he had accepted oaths of allegiance from fighters in Libya.

Activities: Since becoming established, ISIS-Libya has carried out multiple attacks throughout Libya and has threatened to expand ISIS’s presence into other countries in Africa. In January 2015, ISIL-Libya claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on a luxury hotel in Tripoli, Libya, that killed eight people, including a U.S. contractor.

In February 2015, ISIL-Libya released a propaganda video showing the murder of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians who had been kidnapped from Sirte, Libya, in two separate incidents in December 2014 and January 2015. That same month, ISIL-Libya claimed responsibility for bomb attacks against a petrol station, a police station, and the home of parliamentary speaker Agila Salah in the town of al-Qubbah. These attacks killed more than 40 people and wounded dozens of others.

In 2016, ISIL-Libya expanded operations into Libya’s oil crescent, launching attacks on some of the country’s largest oil installations: burning oil tanks, killing dozens, and forcing facilities to shut down operations. In December, Libyan forces drove ISIL-Libya from its main stronghold in Sirte and into the desert areas and neighboring cities.

In May 2018, ISIL-Libya claimed responsibility for an attack on Libya’s electoral commission headquarters in Tripoli that killed 14 people. In September, ISIL-Libya claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on Libya’s National Oil Company headquarters that left two dead and 10 others wounded. In October, ISIL-Libya was implicated in an attack on a town in central Libya that resulted in five people killed and 10 others kidnapped. In December, ISIL-Libya claimed responsibility for an attack on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that killed three people.

In May 2019, ISIL-Libya claimed responsibility for a number of attacks on the Libyan National Army (LNA). These included a dawn assault on a military training camp in the southern city of Sebha which killed at least nine soldiers and an attack on the town of Zillah in which three soldiers were killed and four captured.

Strength: ISIL-Libya is estimated to have fewer than 500 fighters.

Location/Area of Operation: Libya

Funding and External Aid: ISIL-Libya’s funding comes from a variety of sources, including criminal activity, such as smuggling and extortion, and external funding. The group also receives support from ISIS.

ISIS-PHILIPPINES

Aka ISIS in the Philippines; ISIL Philippines; ISIL in the Philippines; IS Philippines; ISP; Islamic State in the Philippines; Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in South-east Asia; Dawlatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masrik (DIWM); Dawlatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Mashriq; IS East Asia Division; ISIS Branch in the Philippines; ISIS’ Philippines province

Description: ISIS-Philippines (ISIS-P) was designated as an FTO on February 28, 2018. In July 2014, militants in the Philippines pledged allegiance to ISIS in support of ISIS’s efforts in the region under the command of now-deceased leader Isnilon Hapilon. Hatib Hajan Sawadjaan is the current leader of ISIS-P, and the organization has ties to elements of the Abu Sayyaf Group.

Activities: In May 2016, ISIS-P claimed responsibility for an attack on Basilan Island, which killed one solider and injured another. In 2017, ISIS-P participated in five months of fighting in Marawi that claimed more than 1,000 lives and forced more than 300,000 residents to flee the area. In July 2018, ISIS-P claimed responsibility for a suicide bomb attack on a military checkpoint in Basilan that killed 10 people. In January 2019, ISIS-P claimed responsibility for the Jolo cathedral bombing in Sulu, a complex suicide attack carried out by an Indonesian couple during mass, killing 23 people and wounding more than100 others.

Strength: ISIS-P is estimated to have a small cadre of fighters in the southern Philippines, but exact numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: The Philippines

Funding and External Aid: ISIS-P receives financial assistance from ISIS in Syria and receives funds from local extortion and kidnapping-for-ransom groups.

ISLAMIC STATE-SINAI PROVINCE

Aka Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis; Ansar Jerusalem; Supporters of Jerusalem; Ansar Bayt al-Maqdes; Ansar Beit al-Maqdis; Islamic State-Sinai Province; Islamic State in the Sinai; Jamaat Ansar Beit al-Maqdis fi Sinaa; Sinai Province; Supporters of the Holy Place; The State of Sinai; Wilayat Sinai

Description: Originally designated as an FTO on April 9, 2014, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM, as it was known then) rose to prominence in 2011 following the uprisings in Egypt. In November 2014, ABM officially declared allegiance to ISIS. In September 2015, the Department of State amended ABM’s designation to add the aliases ISIL Sinai Province and Islamic State-Sinai Province (ISIS-SP), among others.

Activities: Prior to pledging allegiance to ISIS, ABM claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against Israeli and Egyptian interests from 2012 through 2014, including attacks on Israeli economic and military assets, as well as attacks on the Egyptian military and tourist sectors. On November 4, 2015, ISIS-SP released an audio recording in which it claimed responsibility for the October 31 bombing of a Russian passenger plane carrying 231 people from the Egyptian resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh to St. Petersburg, Russia. All 224 passengers and seven crew members were killed.

On August 5, 2015, ISIS-SP claimed responsibility for the July 22 abduction and killing of Croatian citizen Tomislav Salopek.

Throughout 2016, ISIS-SP carried out numerous attacks in the Sinai, including a January double bombing that killed two Egyptian policemen and two military officers. The group was responsible for a July 2016 wide-scale coordinated attack on several military checkpoints that reportedly killed more than 50 people. On December 11, 2016, an attack on St. Mark’s Cathedral, a Coptic Christian church in Cairo, killed 29 people.

In 2017, ISIS-SP attacked two Coptic Christian churches on Palm Sunday (April 9), killing 30 people at St. George’s Church in Tanta and killing 17 people at St. Mark’s Church in Alexandria. In May 2017, the group’s attack on a bus of pilgrims en route to St. Samuel the Confessor, a Coptic monastery near Minya, killed 29 people. In September 2017, ISIS-SP attacked an Egyptian police convoy in an ambush that killed 18 soldiers. In November 2017, an attack on the al-Rawda mosque in North Sinai – Egypt’s deadliest in modern history – killed more than 300 individuals at prayer. While the attack was unclaimed, press reported the Egyptian Prosecutor General’s office as attributing the attack to ISIS-SP and alleging that attackers carried an ISIS flag. The group’s December 2017 attack on St. Mina, a Coptic Christian church near Cairo, killed 11 people.

ISIS-SP attacked an Egyptian army base in April 2018 and attacked an Egyptian police checkpoint in December 2018, killing 15 soldiers in each attack. On November 2, 2018, the group’s attack on a bus of pilgrims traveling from St. Samuel the Confessor killed seven and wounded 14 others.

In 2019, ISIS-SP claimed responsibility for multiple attacks on Egyptian police and army checkpoints in the Sinai. In February, ISIS-SP killed 15 Egyptian soldiers and killed eight Egyptian policemen in June. In July, ISIS-SP claimed responsibility for beheading four civilians and for a suicide bombing in North Sinai that killed a civilian and a member of the security forces.

Strength: ISIS-SP is estimated to have between 800 and 1,200 fighters in the Sinai Peninsula and affiliated cells in the Nile Valley.

Location/Area of Operation: Egypt

Funding and External Aid: Although the sources of ISIS-SP’s funding are largely unknown, there are indications that it may receive funding from ISIS in Syria.

ISIS-WEST AFRICA

Aka Islamic State West Africa Province; ISISWAP; Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-West Africa; ISIL-WA; Islamic State of Iraq and Syria West Africa Province; ISIS West Africa Province; ISIS West Africa; ISIS-WA

Description: ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA) was designated as an FTO on February 28, 2018. In March 2015, a faction of Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS in an audiotape message. ISIS accepted the group’s pledge and the group began calling itself ISIS-West Africa. In August 2016, ISIS announced that Abu Musab al-Barnawi was to become the new leader of ISIS-WA.

Activities: ISIS-WA has been responsible for numerous attacks in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region since 2016. In January 2017, ISIS-WA conducted a midnight attack against Nigerian troops in the village of Kamuya, killing three Nigerian soldiers.

In February 2018, ISIS-WA abducted a Christian student in Nigeria and in March 2018, the group kidnapped three aid workers during an attack that killed dozens of other people. ISIS-WA killed one of the three aid workers in September 2018 and another in October. In November 2018, ISIS-WA claimed responsibility for five attacks in Chad and Nigeria that resulted in 118 deaths.

In February 2019, ISIS-WA attacked the convoy of the then-Governor of Borno State as it drove from the capital of Maiduguri to a town near Nigeria’s border with Cameroon, killing as many as 10. In May 2019, ISIS-WA claimed responsibility for two attacks in western Niger, ambushing Niger Army soldiers in Tongo resulting in 28 deaths, while also attacking Niger security forces near the Koutoukale prison that killed one soldier.

In July 2019, ISIS-WA fighters launched an attack against a military base near Baga in the Lake Chad area, killing 20 Nigerian and five Chadian soldiers. Also in July, ISIS-WA attacked a convoy of Action Against Hunger (AAH) and Nigerian health ministry employees in Borno. One AAH driver was killed, while one AAH staff member, two drivers, and three health ministry workers remained missing, reportedly taken as hostages. On September 25, media reported ISIS-WA said it executed one of the missing aid workers. On December 13, ISIS-WA said it killed four of the five remaining hostages. On December 26, ISIS-WA released a video showing the execution of 11 reported Christians and claimed the killings were revenge for the killing of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Strength: ISIS-WA has an estimated 3,500 members.

Location/Area of Operation: Nigeria and the greater Lake Chad region

Funding and External Aid: ISIS-WA receives funding from local sources, the capture of military supplies, taxes, and kidnapping-for-ransom payments.

JAMA’AT NUSRAT AL-ISLAM WAL-MUSLIMIN

Aka Jamaat Nosrat al-Islam wal-Mouslimin; Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims; Group to Support Islam and Muslims; GSIM; GNIM; Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen

Description: Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) was designated as an FTO on September 6, 2018. JNIM has described itself as al-Qa’ida’s official branch in Mali and has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks and kidnappings since its formation in March 2017. In 2017, the Sahara Branch of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Murabitoun, Ansar al-Dine, and the Macina Liberation Front came together to form JNIM. JNIM is led by Iyad ag Ghali. JNIM’s second in command, Ali Maychou, was killed in October 2019.

Activities: In June 2017, JNIM carried out an attack at a resort frequented by Westerners outside of Bamako, Mali, and was responsible for the large-scale coordinated attacks in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, on March 2, 2018.

In June 2018, JNIM claimed responsibility for a suicide attack against an African Coalition base in Mali that killed at least six people. In July 2018, JNIM claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in Gao, Mali, which targeted a French military patrol and killed several civilians. In November 2018, JNIM claimed responsibility for the detonation of a truck bomb in a residential complex in Gao, killing three and injuring 30.

In January 2019, JNIM claimed responsibility for an attack against a UN base in Northern Mali, killing 10 Chadian peacekeepers and wounding 25 others. In April, JNIM claimed responsibility for an assault on a Malian military base, killing 11 soldiers. In September, JNIM detonated a landmine under a passenger bus in central Mali, killing 14 civilians and injuring another 24.

Strength: JNIM is estimated to have between 1,000 and 2,000 fighters.

Location/Area of Operation: Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger

Funding and External Aid: JNIM receives funding through kidnapping-for-ransom and extortion and from smugglers and traffickers who pay a tax in exchange for permission and safe transit through JNIM-controlled trafficking routes in Mali.

JAMA’ATU ANSARUL MUSLIMINA FI BILADIS-SUDAN

Aka Ansaru; Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan; Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa; JAMBS; Jama’atu Ansaril Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan

Description: Designated as an FTO on November 14, 2013, Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Ansaru) publicly splintered from Boko Haram in January 2012. Since its inception, Ansaru has targeted civilians, including Westerners, and Nigerian government and security officials. Ansaru purportedly aims to defend Muslims throughout Africa by fighting against the Nigerian government and international interests. Ansaru claims to identify with Boko Haram’s objectives and struggle, but has criticized the group for killing fellow Muslims.

Activities: In November 2012, Ansaru raided a police station in Abuja, killing Nigerian police officers and freeing detained terrorists from prison. Ansaru has also carried out multiple kidnapping operations targeting civilians. In late 2012, Ansaru kidnapped a French engineer allegedly in response to French involvement in Mali. In early 2013, Ansaru kidnapped and subsequently killed seven international construction workers.

On April 4, 2016, the Nigerian army announced the capture of Ansaru leader Khalid al-Barnawi. Ansaru did not publicly claim responsibility any attacks in 2019, but in October 2019, Ansaru announced the creation of a new media outlet for the group.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown; however, given its narrower scope of operations, Ansaru’s membership is estimated to be much smaller than that of Boko Haram.

Location/Area of Operation: Nigeria

Funding and External Aid: Sources of funding are unknown.

JAISH-E-MOHAMMED

Aka Army of Mohammed; Mohammed’s Army; Tehrik ul-Furqaan; Khuddam-ul-Islam; Khudamul Islam; Kuddam e Islami; Jaish-i-Mohammed

Description: Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) was designated as an FTO on December 26, 2001. JeM was founded in early 2000 by former senior Harakat ul-Mujahideen leader Masood Azhar. The group aims to annex the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan and expel international forces from Afghanistan. JeM has openly declared war against the United States.

Activities: JeM continues to operate openly in parts of Pakistan, conducting fatal attacks in the region, despite the country’s 2002 ban on its activities. JeM has claimed responsibility for several suicide car bombings in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, including an October 2001 suicide attack on the Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly building in Srinagar that killed more than 30 people. The Indian government publicly implicated JeM, along with Lashkar e-Tayyiba, in the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament that killed nine people and injured 18 others.

In 2002, Pakistani authorities arrested and convicted a JeM member for the abduction and murder of U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl. In December 2003, Pakistan implicated JeM members in two assassination attempts against then-President Pervez Musharraf.

In 2016, Indi