On 7 October 2023, Yasser abu Shabab was languishing in a Hamas-run jail in Gaza on charges of drug trafficking. With the outbreak of the conflict, the Palestinian from Rafah managed to leave prison, though the circumstances of his release remain unclear to this day.

For a while, Abu Shabab vanished from sight. That changed last week when Israeli defence officials acknowledged they had begun arming a clan that calls itself the Anti-Terror Service. It consists of about 100 armed men who operate in eastern Rafah under the command of Abu Shabab, whose nickname is “the Israeli agent” and who is described as a “traitor” on social media in the territory.

The officials said the Israel Defense Forces’ goal was “reducing Israeli military casualties” while systematically undermining Hamas. But critics have warned that the Israeli-backed criminal gang could push Gaza to the brink of civil war.

Abu Shabab, 32, has emerged as a powerful figure, exerting control over aid routes near the strategically vital Kerem Shalom crossing, while members of his group are accused of looting trucks carrying food, and of having ties to jihadist groups.

Last month Jonathan Whittall, the head of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in occupied Palestinian territories, said: “Theft of aid since the beginning of the war has been carried out by criminal gangs, under the watch of Israeli forces, and they were allowed to operate in proximity to the Kerem Shalom crossing point into Gaza.”

When contacted by the Guardian, Whittall said he was “referring to gangs such as Abu Shabab”.

In a written interview with the Guardian, Abu Shabab blamed Hamas for the war in Gaza, defended himself from the accusations of looting and insisted his clan was providing security to aid trucks passing from the Kerem Shalom crossing into Gaza.

“My activities are humanitarian and it’s for my people only,” Abu Shabab said. “We are providing security in areas controlled by our national forces and providing support to hundreds of families, with hundreds of people flocking to our areas every day.”

View image in fullscreen Trucks waiting at the Kerem Shalom crossing between southern Israel and the Gaza Strip. Photograph: Jack Guez/AFP/Getty Images

Several videos circulating on social media in Gaza from his Facebook profile, verified by the Guardian with his associates, show members of Abu Shabab’s group operating alongside Israeli soldiers in IDF-controlled areas in southern Gaza.

Asked if his group was acting in coordination with Israeli forces, Abu Shabab said: “We do not work directly with the Israeli army.”

The Times of Israel cited defence sources who said Israel had provided members of Abu Shabab’s faction with Kalashnikov assault rifles, including some weapons seized from Hamas.

Since Israel eased its blockade on aid to Gaza, dozens of lorries carrying food have been entering the territory each day, crossing through Kerem Shalom and moving towards Rafah, where Abu Shabab has set up a series of checkpoints.

A diplomatic official told CNN that the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), the new US-backed organisation tasked by Israel with distributing supplies in the territory, had contact with Abu Shabab, “whether directly or indirectly”.

Asked if he had a collaboration with the GHF, which is distributing food at three sites in Rafah, Abu Shabab declined to comment.

Reached by the Guardian, a spokesperson for GHF said: “We provide our own security and do not have any local security. Our trucks have never been protected by Abu Shabab or anyone else.”

Without providing any evidence supporting his claims, Abu Shabab – whose responses appeared contradictory and were often undermined by his previous statements or by verifiable evidence – blamed Hamas for looting trucks carrying food into Gaza.

“We do not take anything from the aid trucks,” said Abu Shabab, who did not respond to calls or texts but corresponded through an email address provided to international news outlets and confirmed by his associates. “Aid is stolen in areas controlled by Hamas.”

However, in an interview in November 2024 with the New York Times, Abu Shabab admitted that his men had raided half a dozen aid trucks since the start of the war. “We are taking trucks so we can eat, not so we can sell,” he told the paper, saying he was feeding his family.

Q&A Why is it so difficult to report on Gaza? Show Coverage of the war in Gaza is constrained by Israeli attacks on Palestinian journalists and a bar on international reporters entering the Gaza Strip to report independently on the war. Israel has not allowed foreign reporters to enter Gaza since 7 October 2023, unless they are under Israeli military escort. Reporters who join these trips have no control over where they go, and other restrictions include a bar on speaking to Palestinians in Gaza. Palestinian journalists and media workers inside Gaza have paid a heavy price for their work reporting on the war, with over 180 killed since the conflict began. The committee to protect journalists has determined that at least 19 of them “were directly targeted by Israeli forces in killings which CPJ classifies as murders”. Foreign reporters based in Israel filed a legal petition seeking access to Gaza, but it was rejected by the supreme court on security grounds. Private lobbying by diplomats and public appeals by prominent journalists and media outlets have been ignored by the Israeli government. To ensure accurate reporting from Gaza given these restrictions, the Guardian works with trusted journalists on the ground; our visual​​ teams verif​y photo and videos from third parties; and we use clearly sourced data from organisations that have a track record of providing accurate information in Gaza during past conflicts, or during other conflicts or humanitarian crises. Emma Graham-Harrison, chief Middle East correspondent Was this helpful? Thank you for your feedback.

Since Abu Shabab’s name began appearing in the media, Hamas has publicly declared it is intent on killing him. Abu Shabab has reasons to loathe Hamas. The militant group killed his brother last year and has already tried to kill Abu Shabab at least twice.

“The war will not end as long as Hamas insists on its position,” Abu Shabab said.

On Wednesday the Israeli news channel i24 reported that Israeli soldiers clashed with Hamas members in order to protect Abu Shabab from being killed, which resulted in deaths on both sides.

Although the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, did not name Abu Shabab, he has admitted to having “activated” clans in Gaza that he says oppose Hamas.

Netanyahu’s comments sparked a row in Israel, with opposition leaders accusing the government of transferring weapons to a group of thugs and criminals “who identify with [Islamic State]”.

Abu Shabab’s links with Israeli forces were confirmed by his family, which issued a statement last week formally disowning him. “We will not accept Yasser’s return to the family. We have no objection to those around him liquidating him immediately,” they said.

The rise of Abu Shabab as the first openly acknowledged Palestinian collaborator with Israeli forces since the start of the Gaza war could, according to many analysts, ignite a dangerous new phase of the conflict.

In addition to clashes with Hamas, his clan may soon face violent confrontations with rival gangs and members of Gaza’s popular committees, Israeli media report.

They say it is the kind of environment where civil wars often take root – and where civilians, once again, are likely to bear the heaviest cost.

Image Smoke rising from the site of an Israeli bombing in Gaza City on Tuesday morning. Credit… Hosam Salem for The New York Times

The worst Israeli-Palestinian fighting in years spilled into a ninth day on Tuesday as the Israeli military bombarded Gaza and southern Lebanon and Hamas militants fired rockets into southern Israeli towns, hours after President Biden expressed support for a cease-fire during a call with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel.

Mr. Biden’s carefully worded statement fell short of an immediate demand for an end to Israel’s bombing campaign in Gaza, which showed little sign of ending after Mr. Netanyahu said on Monday that his country’s armed forces would “continue striking at the terrorist targets.”

Despite growing concern in foreign capitals over the violence — and among some of Israel’s staunchest defenders in Washington — the region’s heaviest clashes since a 2014 war threatened to escalate. Late Monday, the Israeli military fired artillery shells into Lebanon for the first time since the hostilities began, striking what it said were Palestinian militants who had attempted to fire rockets into Israel.

The Israeli Army said it believed that a small Palestinian faction in Lebanon — and not the militant group Hezbollah — had fired the rockets, most of which failed to reach Israeli territory. The United Nations peacekeeping mission in southern Lebanon tweeted that it had intensified patrols in the area and that the situation on Tuesday morning was calm.

But the toll on civilians continued to grow. By late Monday, the Israeli bombardment had killed 212 people in Gaza, including dozens of children, and Hamas rockets had killed at least 10 in Israel.

The Israeli Army said that Hamas had fired almost as many rockets in eight days — 3,350 — as it did in the 50-day war the two sides fought in 2014. About 90 percent of them were destroyed in midair by the Iron Dome, an antimissile defense system partly financed by the United States, the Israeli Army said.

The fighting has been focused on the Gaza Strip, the crowded coastal enclave ruled by Hamas, as the Israeli Army bombards infrastructure and underground tunnels that it says Hamas uses to support its military operations. But protests and violence have also erupted in the West Bank and Israel, where Arabs have clashed with the Israeli police and Jewish residents.

The Biden administration has stepped up its diplomatic engagement, dispatching an envoy to the region last week. In a readout of Mr. Biden’s call with Mr. Netanyahu, White House officials said the president had “expressed his support for a cease-fire and discussed U.S. engagement with Egypt and other partners towards that end.” But Mr. Biden had “reiterated his firm support for Israel’s right to defend itself against indiscriminate rocket attacks,” the statement added.

The Biden administration previously avoided the use of the term “cease-fire,” with top officials like Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken talking instead about the need for a “sustainable calm” and others referring to the need for “restraint.”

Hamas has killed 50 Palestinian fighters armed by Israel in Gaza, faction’s associates say

Hamas has killed 50 Palestinian fighters armed by Israel in Gaza, faction’s associates say

Militia led by Yasser abu Shabab says Israeli troops stepped in to defend the militia gang backed by its forces

Hamas has killed 50 fighters in recent months from a Palestinian gang armed by Israel in Gaza, according to a statement released amid reports that Israeli troops directly intervened this week to protect the faction.

According to media reports in Israel, clashes between Hamas fighters and members of a militia led by Yasser abu Shabab, known locally for his involvement in criminal activity, erupted early on Tuesday in Rafah.

The Israeli news channel i24 reported that Israeli soldiers had clashed with Hamas members in order to protect Abu Shabab from being killed, which resulted in deaths on both sides.

Israeli defence officials acknowledged last week that they had been arming the group, with the aim of undermining Hamas. Aid workers said the group had a long history of looting from UN trucks.

This week, an Israeli air force drone struck four Hamas militants in what i24 described as “the first Israeli strike on Gaza whose sole objective was to assist the Abu Shabab militia”, which it claimed was providing security to aid trucks passing from the Kerem Shalom crossing into Gaza.

On Tuesday, in a long statement released to the press, Abu Shabab’s militia, named the Anti-Terror Service or Popular Forces, said: “Hamas has killed over 50 of our volunteers, including relatives of our leader, Yasser, as we guarded aid convoys and redistributed supplies that were otherwise destined for corrupt entities linked to Hamas.

‘‘We’ve also cleared explosive remnants from the area – losing members in the process.”

The Israeli news outlet Ynet said Abu Shabab’s militia had also ambushed Hamas members from the “Arrow” unit, which is responsible for targeting collaborators with Israel, killing six of them.

On 7 October 2023, during Hamas’s attack in Israel that ignited the war, Abu Shabab was languishing in a Hamas-run jail in Gaza on charges of drug trafficking. With the outbreak of the conflict, the Palestinian from Rafah managed to leave prison, though the circumstances of his release remain unclear.

His Israeli-armed gang now consists of more than 100 men who operate in eastern Rafah.

Abu Shabab has been nicknamed “the Israeli agent” and described as a traitor on social media in Gaza. Hamas has publicly declared its intent to kill him.

“Had it not been for the intervention of the Zionist air force to protect the traitor Yasser Abu Shabab … he would have been in the grip of the resistance today,” it said in a statement.

“We will pursue the traitors no matter how long it takes and we affirm that the occupation’s protection of him will not last, and we will reach him sooner or later.”

Israeli analysts have warned that the move by Israel to arm Abu Shabab could push Gaza to the brink of a civil war.

THIS ARTICLE WILL BE REGULARLY UPDATED.

THE MOST RECENT UPDATES WILL BE AT THE TOP.

BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 2,215, 21 May, 2025

“We cannot always prevent the murder of workers in an orchard or sleeping families, but we can set a high price for our blood. A price too high for the Arab settlement, the Arab army and the Arab government to pay. … [Retaliation operations] are not for vengeance. It is an act of punishment and warning, that if that state does not control its population and does not prevent them attacking us – the Israeli forces will cause havoc in its land.“

IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan,

Lecture to IDF officers: “Retaliation Operations as a Means of Ensuring Peace”, July 1955

(Published in IDF monthly journal Skira Hodsheet, August 1955).

****

12 April – 18 May 2025

Gaza:

Negotiations have continued since the last update with no result. Hamas is still refusing to relinquish its hold on Gaza and demanding that a ceasefire include its continued governance, the total withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, and the rebuilding of Gaza at the expense of the international community. Israel is demanding the return of all the remaining kidnappees, both alive (currently estimated at 23) and dead (currently estimated at 35), the removal of Hamas from Gaza, and the complete demilitarization of the area. The Israelis offered a partial agreement that Hamas refused.

In a gesture to President Trump, Hamas released a kidnappee who has dual American and Israeli citizenship.

On 18 May, after several weeks of gradually taking more ground and intensifying aerial operations against Hamas and other terrorist personnel, especially commanders, in areas where its ground forces were not operating, Israel declared the beginning of a new escalated ground operation. Five divisions are now simultaneously attacking different localities in Gaza. The official objective is to capture most if not all the territory of Gaza.

Detonation of a tunnel: The red line emphasizes its route – the red plumes are from ventilation shafts

In the run-up to the ground operation, the Israeli air force intensified its airstrikes on commanders, command centers and Hamas fighting positions. Many of these strikes required pinpoint accuracy, with small bombs or missiles sent into specific rooms Hamas had commandeered inside hospitals and schools. Others required heavier bombs to penetrate underground facilities. Among the targets was the current Hamas chief, Mahmoud Sinwar (who replaced his brother Yahya Sinwar, killed in October 2024), and one, perhaps two, Hamas brigade commanders (those of the Rafah and Khan Yunis brigades) and several of Sinwar’s staff. It is unclear whether or not they were killed. A Saudi report claims that the bodies of Sinwar and at least 10 of his assistants were recovered, but Hamas has not officially admitted this.

Publicized details of the IDF’s new offensive show a different approach from previous operations. This time, there will be a simultaneous offensive throughout Gaza rather than a sequential one. The territory taken will be held and cleared.

Also, a different approach is planned for managing the civilian population. Previously, civilians were ordered to evacuate each area where the Israelis were operating and told to stay outside that area until the Israelis had withdrawn. This time, the plan is to set up humanitarian enclaves in areas taken by the Israeli forces, and supplies entering Gaza will be sent exclusively to those locations. The population will then be instructed to move to those enclaves via filtration points to ensure that Hamas and other terrorist personnel do not join them. The civilian and humanitarian management of the enclaves will be in the hands of a new international organization, the US-based Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, set up specifically for this purpose. The UN, UNRWA and other pro-Hamas NGOs will not be involved. To no one’s surprise, the UN establishment is criticizing this approach.

The situation in Gaza prior to the new Israeli offensive

The location of an attacked Hamas post (marked in red) inside the compound of al-Ahali hospital (the white boundary)

More and more people in Gaza are allowing themselves to openly criticize Hamas, though the wave of public demonstrations appears to have abated after several participants were killed by Hamas. There have also been many more posts by Gazans who say they would leave Gaza permanently if they were allowed to do so. While the number of such posts is increasing, it is still relatively small, and we don’t know how deep this sentiment is – are these people exceptions, or do they represent a much larger portion of the population? On several occasions, crowds have broken into storage sites where Hamas has been hoarding humanitarian aid. In one case, a local merchant’s warehouse was ransacked after it was published that he was hoarding food rather than selling it in anticipation of higher prices.

The Hamas Ministry of Health’s latest casualty update (17 May) claims approximately 54,000 killed and 120,000 wounded. Hamas still does not differentiate between combatants and non-combatants. According to the IDF, in January 2025 these included a verified total of more than 20,000 Hamas personnel and at least 3,000 personnel of other terrorist organizations. Since the resumption of fighting in March, many more terrorists have been killed, but no specific number has been provided. The number of wounded terrorists is not known but is probably at least similar to the number killed.

Nine Israeli soldiers have been killed in the fighting in Gaza since the last update and more have been wounded, but the exact numbers have not been published.

Location of a tunnel (red) under the European Hospital (white boundary)

Judea and Samaria (a.k.a. the West Bank):

Israeli offensive operations continue, though their intensity has diminished. Resistance to Israeli operations is also waning, with more preferring to surrender rather than fight. Those killed are usually commanders who refuse to surrender or who are in the middle of conducting attacks on the Israelis.

Hamas has attempted to galvanize the population to join the fighting against the IDF, but with virtually no response so far. In fact, the frequency of terrorist attacks against Israelis has gone down considerably. Since the last update, it has reached one of its lowest levels in many years.

Since the beginning of the operation on 21 January 2025, approximately 110 terrorists have been killed (seven more since my last update) and approximately 1,500 captured (approximately 300 more since my last update). Among the killed and captured are people who were released from incarceration in return for kidnappees in Gaza and resumed terrorist activities.

The Fatah-controlled security forces of the Palestinian Authority have continued their operations against their Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad rivals in areas where the Israelis are not operating. They have arrested several hundred.

Israeli casualties in or from Judea and Samaria since 7 October 2023 are 42 Israeli civilians killed (one more since my last update), 31 soldiers/police killed (0 more since my last update), and 509 wounded (six more since my last update). Most of the wounded are civilians.

Total Palestinian fatalities since 7 October 2023 are about 1,000 and more than 7,000 have been arrested (with hundreds subsequently released in exchanges for Israeli kidnappees). The number of wounded is not known. The Palestinians claim that more than 17,000 Palestinians were arrested during this period, but they count people temporarily detained for questioning and immediately released.

Israel:

A wave of brush and forest fires, including one of the largest if not the largest ever in Israel, swept through broad areas of the country, mostly around Jerusalem. A number of villages were evacuated until the fires were put out. Most of the fires seem to have begun accidentally, but at least a few appear to have been deliberate arson attacks by Palestinians or Israeli-Arabs.

This is a particularly dry period in the region. Within every ten years in Israel, there are about four years of drought. Israel solved its fresh water problem by building a large desalination industry that covers its entire consumption and even enables the refilling of depleted natural reservoirs, as well as the provision of large amounts of fresh water to the neighboring water-parched Arab state of Jordan. The peace agreement signed with Jordan in 1994 requires Israel to provide Jordan with a certain amount of water per year. Since completing its desalination program, Israel has more than doubled that supply.

However, Israel’s ability to provide desalinated sea water to homes, industry and agriculture does not protect natural vegetation in parks and other open areas from the threat of fire. Whenever there are years of little rain, these areas are prone to ignite. This vulnerability is sometimes exploited through deliberate arson attacks, another form of terrorism.

Syria:

Israeli troops are still holding a buffer zone inside Syria. In addition to holding several key points, they are also conducting patrols and searching for local weapons stores. Most of the local population prefers not to interfere with the IDF and to hand over weapons when called upon to do so.

In the last week of April, the Druze minority were attacked by radical Sunni groups affiliated with the new regime. Israel responded by attacking regime positions, including a site only 400 meters from the presidential palace. At least 100 Druze were killed before the attacks were halted by the regime. In the biggest single incident, a convoy of Druze from the southern villages of Jabal Druze who were driving to support their compatriots near Damascus were ambushed by Sunni Bedouins who killed 25 to 30 of them. A few months ago, more than a thousand members of the Alawite minority (some sources even claim a few thousand, though there is no proof of these numbers) were massacred in similar attacks.

Israel continues to supply humanitarian aid to the Druze, including the evacuation of dozens of wounded Druze to Israeli hospitals. Also, a delegation of Syrian Druze religious leaders were brought to Israel to participate in the ceremonies of the Nabi Shooayb – the original prophet of the Druze religion – at his purported grave site in northern Israel.

Following the incidents with the Druze and the Israeli response, the Syrian government agreed to conduct indirect negotiations with Israel.

In a covert operation, the Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, found and recovered the body of an Israeli soldier killed in combat with the Syrian army in Lebanon in 1982. The body had been taken and buried in Syria but no details were provided by the Syrians as to its location. New intelligence, acquired over recent weeks, enabled locating the body and sending a covert team to recover it. The exact location was not specified, only that it was “deep in Syria” (in other words, not in the area of the buffer zone), so a covert special forces operation was required to recover the body.

Lebanon:

Israel continues to attack Hezbollah storage sites and personnel in Lebanon as well as weapons smuggling operations along the border with Syria at an average rate of two or three attacks per day. On some days the number of strikes increases considerably. On 8 May, for example, the Lebanese media reported 30 Israeli airstrikes.

Though it has repeatedly threatened to retaliate, Hezbollah has not responded to these attacks despite suffering hundreds of casualties (at least 200 have been killed, perhaps more, and at least a similar number wounded). This is probably because Hezbollah’s political situation in Lebanon is now quite weak, both in general vis-à-vis the government and other ethnic groups and among its own Shiite population base. This weak position increases Hezbollah’s fears of a massive Israeli response. Because of the change in Syria to a hostile regime, Hezbollah can no longer receive support from its Iranian patron through Syrian territory.

The biggest threat currently facing Hezbollah may be not Israel but its loss of standing among the Shiites and attacks from other Lebanese factions and the official army. Hezbollah’s political rivals in Lebanon make public statements regularly demanding that it relinquish all its weapons and cease provoking Israel. They are refusing to sanction welfare relief for Lebanese Shiites who have lost their homes and livelihoods until Hezbollah obeys these commands.

Hezbollah’s activities are still focused on salvaging undamaged weapons and equipment from bombed storage sites or sites the Israelis did not know to bomb all over Lebanon. The group is also trying to infiltrate personnel into southern Lebanon, especially villages close to the border that were Hezbollah’s main positions from which to attack Israel, to conduct salvage and intelligence operations. All these activities violate the ceasefire agreement, which requires Hezbollah to disarm. The violations give Israel the right to act.

The Lebanese army, aided by UNIFIL forces, has gradually taken over almost all the territory of southern Lebanon and has conducted intensive clearing operations of 225 Hezbollah weapons storage sites.

As noted in the last update, on 22 March six rockets were fired from Lebanon at the Israeli border village of Metulla. There were no casualties. In late April, the Lebanese army arrested a number of Palestinians it claims were the perpetrators of this attack. In northern Lebanon, the Lebanese army confiscated 800 rockets from a Palestinian storage site. It is apparently conducting sweeps of Palestinian residential areas and military camps.

Yemen:

The US halted its aerial offensive against the Houthis after about a month during which it bombed more than 1,000 targets and killed a few hundred military Houthi personnel. Officially it was stated that the Houthis had promised to desist from their attacks on merchant shipping traveling through the Bab al-Mandab Straits and the Red Sea, thus reopening the shorter and more economical route through the Red Sea to the Suez Canal to international shipping. Before the Houthis began attacking passing vessels in late 2023, about 20,000 ships used the route every year. In 2024, the number dropped to about 7,000 (the Chinese, Russians, Iranians and a few others reached immunity agreements with the Houthis). If the Houthis do indeed stop their attacks on ships, the operation (notwithstanding American media attempts to denigrate it) will have achieved its goal.

The American-Houthi ceasefire does not include Israel, so the drizzle of missiles from Yemen to Israel continues at an average rate of one per day. The Houthis temporarily shifted their targets from central to northern Israel and then back again. So far, since the end of the ceasefire in Gaza, about 35 missiles and exploding drones have been launched, with only one reaching Israeli territory. About a third crashed enroute and the others were intercepted before reaching Israel. No Israelis have been killed, though some have been injured by tripping while rushing to shelters.

The missile that managed to penetrate Israel’s defenses landed in an open field within the boundaries of Israel’s Ben Gurion International Airport, prompting a series of international airlines to suspend travel to Israel. Israel responded to this Houthi success by bombing the international airport at Saana and several industrial sites, including a concrete manufacturing plant and electricity generation plants. Flights into and out of Saana halted for a month for repairs.

Following the cessation of American attacks on the Houthis, Israel responded to the continued firing of missiles towards it by attacking two Houthi sea ports and warning that it would attack a third.

Iran:

Negotiations continue between Iran and the US. The Iranians say their red line is they must be allowed to continue the low-grade enrichment of uranium that is not enough to create nuclear weapons. However, any ability to enrich to even at a low grade means they will be able to enrich to a high grade if they choose to do so.

Over the past month, several Iranian military industries have suffered explosions and fires. Each time, the authorities claimed the cause was accidental. Opposition groups say they were actually deliberate attacks by unnamed parties. The incidents began with a huge explosion at the main Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. The explosion was preceded by small fires that reached and detonated an improperly stored concentration of raw materials used for rocket fuel. At least 35 people were killed and 1,130 injured in this incident alone.

The Iranians also reported thwarting a “massive” cyber-attack – allegedly one of the widest and most complex ever conducted against them.

Egypt and Jordan:

The Israelis thwarted a number of attempts to smuggle weapons to the Palestinians via Egypt and Jordan. These attempts included ground infiltrations and drones carrying weapons that were shot down. It is not known how many such attempts were successful.

The Jordanians discovered “activity threatening the well-being of the kingdom and its citizens” by members of the Muslim Brotherhood and initiated a crackdown on all people and organizations affiliated with that movement, of which Hamas is the Palestinian branch. This is considered a major shift in official policy.

Israeli casualties:

The total number of Israeli fatalities since the war began at approximately 06:30 on 7 October 2023 is now 1,016 civilians (one more since my last update) and 856 soldiers (nine killed in Gaza since my last update). Approximately 10,300 Israeli civilians and 16,500 soldiers have been wounded (this number is an update that includes 7,000 psychiatric casualties). There are still 58 Israelis held captive in Gaza – 23 alive and 35 dead.

WHAT NEXT?

Israel is renewing its major ground operations in Gaza under the name “Gideon’s Chariots”. However, the door is still open to an agreement if Hamas agrees to Israel’s basic terms: returning all the kidnappees, handing over governance of Gaza to somebody else, and either disarming or leaving Gaza. According to statements by Israel’s political and military leaders, the object this time is to occupy all the territory of Gaza, separate the population from Hamas, and complete the organization’s defeat. Hamas continues to fight, but it is focused more on survival than anything else. It still hopes to defeat Israel at the negotiating table by playing the kidnappee card and exploiting propaganda about the suffering of the civilian population (suffering that is largely created by Hamas itself, which does not allow the complete and free distribution of humanitarian aid that enters Gaza).

The issue of Iran is still not finished either. Negotiations between Iran and the US have begun, but there are no results so far. Meanwhile, following the ceasefire with the Houthis, the US is reducing its military forces in the Middle East. This means that at least for the immediate future, military action by American forces – though purportedly still on the table – is not likely.

Small-scale exchanges between Israel and the Houthis will likely continue. The Houthis say they will stop firing at Israel only after the war in Gaza is over. Israel can inflict significant damage on the Houthis, but not enough to compel them to cease fire. They will do so only if they decide the cost is not worth continuing the exchange.

****

19 March – 11 April 2025

Gaza:

While the fighting in Gaza has been renewed, diplomatic efforts to end the war have not abated. The Egyptians and the Emiratis in particular are trying to work out options for ending the war. The Emirati direction is closer to that taken by President Trump and Israel (the removal of Hamas from Gaza plus the evacuation of a portion of the Gaza population, at least temporarily), while the Egyptians are attempting to find a solution that is closer (though not identical) to the demands of Hamas (a non-Hamas government, but with Hamas remaining present in the Strip). The first Egyptian proposal was apparently dismissed out of hand by the US.

The official Hamas red line is its disarmament. Whether it directly governs Gaza or controls it from behind a front of supposedly independent technocrats seems, at present, to be less important to the group.

Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fired 20-25 rockets at southern Tel Aviv, Ashkelon and Beersheva from locations across the Gaza Strip (the exact number of rockets is not clear because there were some false alarms). At least one rocket fell inside the Strip. One salvo of 10 rockets aimed at Ashkelon injured nine people. Put together, the salvos wounded about 30 people, almost all through falls they suffered while rushing to shelter.

The rockets were fired from different areas. In one case, the launchers were placed right next to a humanitarian safe zone in Beyt Lahia. After each launch, the population of the area from which the rockets were launched received orders from the IDF (leaflets, social media messages, etc.) to evacuate. The messages included maps showing which areas to leave and where to go. This was in addition to evacuation orders from areas the IDF ground forces were reentering. UNRWA claims that about 400,000 Palestinians have evacuated the areas as ordered by the IDF.

Example of evacuation map sent by the IDF to the local population

This map shows the northern portion of the city of Khan Yunis

Israeli airstrikes on identified targets and Hamas senior and mid-level officials and military commanders continue, with more than a dozen killed so far. Among those killed were the Hamas prime minister (he was hiding in a hospital, and a small guided munition was fired into the room) and Hamas’s equivalent of a defense minister.

Israeli ground troops entered the Strip in various locations, increasing the depth of the 1-kilometer perimeter Israel has held since withdrawing during the ceasefire to several kilometers:

From the northern border, Israeli forces are moving closer to Gaza City, especially along the coast (the same direction they originally entered Gaza in late October 2023)

South of the city of Gaza, the IDF returned to the Netzarim Corridor, which separates northern and central Gaza. The IDF has not yet completely blocked the corridor. The coastal area is still open for travel

In the south, the IDF moved back into two areas around the city of Rafah from which it had withdrawn. Another force advanced north along the coast, closer to the al-Muwasi humanitarian area declared by the IDF last year

A new corridor, called Morag, is being taken north of Rafah, separating it from the rest of the Gaza Strip

The Hamas Ministry of Health, which had published numbers of killed including the missing, has gone back to its previous pattern of not including the missing. Its latest casualty update (24 March) is 50,810 killed and 115,700 wounded. Hamas still does not differentiate between combatants and non-combatants. According to the IDF, the killed include a verified total of more than 20,000 Hamas personnel and at least 3,000 personnel of other terrorist organizations. The number of wounded terrorists is not known but is probably at least similar to the number killed.

Whereas most western countries have denounced Israel’s renewed offensive, the US government has declared unqualified support.

The humanitarian issue is again being trumpeted by Hamas, which claims that the stopping of supply convoys is threatening the population of Gaza with starvation and a lack of medical supplies. Israel responded that about 25,000 truckloads (enough for 50 days) entered Gaza during the ceasefire and Hamas is hoarding most of their contents – including supplies that arrived prior to the ceasefire – in its own warehouses and is selling them to the population at exorbitant prices to fund its activities.

An Egyptian aid worker giving an aid box to a local Gazan (downloaded from a Gazan newsperson’s social media by Israeli blogger Abu Ali Express)

In Gaza there have been increasing protests demanding that Hamas surrender and leave the Strip and complaining about Hamas not distributing the supplies that have arrived. These protests have been small in scale so far, but the number of participants is gradually increasing as is the spread. Initially, the protests were occurring only in northern Gaza, but they have taken place in central Gaza as well and have recently spread to southern Gaza.

It is still too early to tell if these protests are harbingers of change or just the expressions of a small minority. At first, Hamas did not respond with violence, instead trying to pass off the protests as directed against Israel. Hamas media and Al-Jazeera ignored the statements being made against Hamas and quoted only the demands that the ceasefire be renewed. But after a few days, Hamas began to capture and even kill some of the protesters. This diminished the number of protests but did not halt them entirely. In one case, the clan of a protester killed by Hamas security forces retaliated by killing the Hamas police officer who had shot their family member. There have been a few other skirmishes between clans and Hamas security forces.

There have also been many more posts on social media by Gazans saying they would leave Gaza permanently if only they were allowed to do so. While these posts are increasing in number, they are still relatively rare, and we cannot know how deep this sentiment really is – are they exceptions, or do they represent the feelings of a much larger proportion of the population?

Anti-Hamas protest (from Palestinian social media by Israeli blogger Abu Ali Express)

Late at night on 23 March 2025, a Red Cross convoy of paramedics was fired on by Israeli soldiers in southern Gaza. The Israelis were lying in ambush along a road used by Hamas. They had engaged a group of Hamas terrorists in a firefight shortly beforehand, killing one and capturing two. Soon after the firefight, the troops was informed that a convoy of vehicles was driving in their direction. The convoy stopped near the site of the previous skirmish and the occupants rapidly dismounted. The soldiers assumed that this was another Hamas force coming to reinforce the previous group and opened fire. Fifteen were killed.

The soldiers reported that they did not see the ambulance’s emergency lights flashing, but a video from the telephone of one of the killed shows the convoy driving with flashing lights. Hamas often uses ambulances and other supposedly innocent and protected vehicles to transport personnel and military equipment, so whether or not the soldiers saw the lights is less relevant (though it still requires an answer). The way the convoy sped into the area next to the soldiers and quickly dismounted in the same place where a skirmish had just occurred created the perception of a threat. A list of the killed showed that six of them were indeed Hamas personnel.

The bodies were buried on the spot. This was reported as an attempted cover-up, but it is standard procedure. The IDF does not collect bodies. They are buried on site (to prevent animals approaching them) and the UN is informed where to pick them up.

There were also claims that the soldiers had captured, bound, and then executed the paramedics. This is denied by the IDF. The soldiers approached the bodies only after the shooting had ended in order to bury them.

Judea and Samaria (a.k.a. the West Bank):

In Judea and Samaria, Israel’s Operation Iron Wall continues. Israeli forces are gradually operating in new areas.

Since the beginning of the operation, more than 100 terrorists have been killed and approximately 1,200 captured. In each area of the operation, the local population is first told to move to other towns or villages. All buildings where weapons stores or weapons manufacturing equipment is found are demolished. These number in the hundreds.

The Fatah-controlled security forces of the Palestinian Authority have also conducted operations against their Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad rivals in areas where the IDF is not operating. They have arrested several hundred terrorists.

Hamas has attempted to galvanize the population to join the fighting against the IDF, but so far with virtually no response. In fact, the frequency of terrorist attacks against Israelis has gone down considerably. During the first three months of 2024 there were approximately 535 terrorist attacks in or from Judea and Samaria. In the last three months of 2024 there were approximately 420, and in the first three months of 2025 the total is approximately 320.

Conversely, there has been an escalation over the past month in attacks by Israeli civilians on Palestinian villages. Each such incident involves mutual accusations of who started it. The Palestinians claim that the actions are initiated by the Israeli civilians without provocation, while the Israelis claim they are immediate retaliations for attacks by Palestinians on Israeli civilians passing or working near the villages. The Palestinian attacks usually involve the throwing of stones (not included in the above figures on attacks on Israelis; there are usually 300-500 stoning incidents per month) or petrol bombs thrown at passing cars. In one case, an attempt was made to steal a flock of sheep from an Israeli herder who phoned for help. Each time these clashes occur, the IDF and the Israeli police are called in to separate the belligerents.

Israeli casualties in or from Judea and Samaria since 7 October 2023 are 41 Israeli civilians killed (one more since my last update), 31 soldiers/police killed (no more since my last update during Operation Iron Wall), and 503 wounded (six more since my last update). Most are civilians.

Total Palestinian fatalities since 7 October 2023 are about 1,000 and more than 7,000 have been arrested (though hundreds were subsequently released in exchanges for Israeli kidnappees). The number of wounded is not known. The Palestinians claim that more than 15,000 Palestinians were arrested during this period, but they are counting persons temporarily detained for questioning and released immediately after.

Syria:

Israeli troops are still holding a buffer zone inside Syria. In addition to holding various key points, they are conducting patrols and searching for local weapons stores. The majority of the local population prefers not to interfere with the IDF’s activities and to hand over weapons when called upon to do so.

There has been a third incident in which Israeli troops were fired upon (no Israeli casualties) by several dozen armed men when they approached a village in the southern area of the Syrian Golan Heights. During the civil war, this area was dominated by ISIS supporters, which might explain the aggressiveness against Israel. Israeli forces returned fire with tanks and an armed drone, killing nine of the attackers and wounding 20. The rest of the attackers retreated. Subsequently, fearing a larger Israeli reaction, the population of the village began to evacuate. The Israelis continued their patrol and did not conduct any more retaliatory actions. It is not clear if the population has returned. Over the following week, several factions of Islamist organizations said they would send fighters to southern Syria to attack Israel. Since then there have been no more reports of similar incidents or threats.

Meanwhile, Israel’s relations with the Syrian Druze community are developing positively. The Israelis are supplying the Druze with humanitarian aid and have said they will assist them militarily if the new radical Sunni regime, which sees the Druze as heretics, attacks them.

Israel continues to occasionally bomb Syrian army bases containing weapons and equipment belonging to the former regime to prevent their being incorporated into the army of the new regime.

Turkey and the new Syrian regime are signing a mutual defense pact. The new regime is also permitting the Turks to convert two Syrian air bases, one in northern Syria and one near the border with Iraq. The latter base was used by the Iranians and Iraqi militias serving Iran over the past decade. They withdrew from it after the fall of the Assad regime.

A couple of days after it was reported that Syria intended to hand the base over to the Turks, the Israeli air force bombed it to destroy its equipment and facilities. It should be noted that Turkey is a major supporter of Hamas, which maintains a political and military/terrorist presence there, and the Erdogan regime has been publicly threatening military action against Israel for a decade. Erdogan’s threatening rhetoric has increased over the past year.

An Arab internet news site has reported that Turkey and Israel are negotiating a means of preventing direct confrontation during their military operations in Syria. Over the past decade, Israel and Russia had a similar agreement that enabled them to conduct military operations in Syria without confronting one another.

Lebanon:

Hezbollah’s activities are still focused on trying to salvage undamaged weapons and equipment from bombed storage sites or from sites the Israelis did not know to bomb all over Lebanon. In southern Lebanon they are trying to infiltrate personnel into the border areas, especially the villages near the Israeli border that were its main locations from which to attack Israel, to conduct both salvage and intelligence operations. These activities violate the ceasefire agreement, giving Israel the right to retaliate.

Israel continues to attack Hezbollah storage sites and personnel in Lebanon and along the border with Syria (weapons smuggling operations) at an average rate of two or three strikes per day. In one case, Israel responded with a strike in the Dahya quarter of Beirut after warning the population to evacuate. The target was a drone storage site Hezbollah was trying to rebuild. This was the first Israeli attack in Beirut since the beginning of the ceasefire. A second strike in the Dahya killed a Hamas commander in an apartment building with a small warhead fired into his room.

There have been at least two Israeli ground raids into Lebanese villages from which it had withdrawn. In at least one raid, the Israeli troops left a letter stating that the raid had been conducted because of Hezbollah activity and telling local residents to not risk their lives and property by allowing Hezbollah access to their homes.

Despite repeatedly threatening to respond, Hezbollah has not done so except perhaps on one occasion (see below).

Now that the land route from Iran through Syria and the direct aerial route to Lebanon are blocked for transfer of supplies and money to Hezbollah (the land route by the new Syrian regime and the aerial route by the new Lebanese government and Israel), Iran is trying to send equipment and funds to Hezbollah by the much longer maritime route on supposedly innocent merchant ships.

On 22 March, six rockets were fired from Lebanon at the Israeli border village of Metulla. There were no casualties. It is not known who fired the rockets. Hezbollah denied responsibility, and there are at least a dozen other groups in Lebanon, including Hamas and other Palestinian groups, who may be the culprits. Regardless of Hezbollah’s denial, Israel responded with artillery fire and airstrikes on 50 Hezbollah targets all over Lebanon, including along the border with Syria. This was the first major incident since the ceasefire began.

Over the past decade, Hezbollah has occasionally allowed other groups to fire at Israel so it could deny involvement. Two more rocket attacks have occurred since the 22 March attack, but these do not appear to have been by Hezbollah. They were probably committed by Palestinian organizations in Lebanon, with or without the assistance and approval of Hezbollah.

The Lebanese government has ordered its army to increase activities in southern Lebanon to ensure that this kind of action is not repeated. The object is to prevent Israel from being provoked into a major retaliation. The Lebanese army also arrested several people in connection with the aforementioned rocket launches.

Skirmishes on the border between Lebanon and Syria have continued intermittently but seem to have diminished with the help of mediation by Saudi Arabia.

Hezbollah’s political rivals in Lebanon are repeatedly making public statements demanding that it relinquish all its weapons and cease provoking Israel.

Yemen:

The drizzle of missiles from Yemen to Israel continues at a rate of one or two per day. About 20 missiles and exploding drones have been launched so far. None has reached Israeli territory, about half crashed enroute, and the others were intercepted before reaching Israel, though in two cases debris had enough momentum to land inside Israel. The issue of debris is why Israelis are told to stay in shelters for about ten minutes after the missiles are intercepted.

The Houthis say they are targeting Israel’s international airport in an attempt to blockade Israel’s international air traffic, similar to the blockade on Israel’s Red Sea port of Eilat. In each attack, Israeli air traffic controllers tell incoming aircraft to circle temporarily before allowing them to land a few minutes after the incoming missile is intercepted.

In every case, the Houthis claim their attacks were successful.

Several Israelis have been wounded in falls as they rush to shelter. These have all been superficial or light injuries up to this point.

It was reported that the US has asked Israel not to respond to the attacks from Yemen, as the US is taking responsibility for that front.

American airstrikes continue on Houthi targets in Yemen. Targets include larger radar, command and launcher sites in towns as well as other Houthi sites. The Americans also seem to be hunting down Houthi senior officers and officials. These moves contrast with those of the previous White House, which limited its strikes to isolated rural facilities that were usually small weapons depots or minor command and sensor nodes. Over the past month, there have been more US strikes on the Houthis than over the previous year and a half. At least 150 Houthi personnel have been killed and an undisclosed number wounded. These include a number of senior personnel. The US is not disclosing exact details of the attacks.

The Houthis claim to be retaliating by firing missiles at US ships, especially the aircraft carrier from which the American aircraft are launched. How real these counter-strikes are is not clear, but apparently none have hit. The Houthis also claim to have shot down some American drones.

Meanwhile, another American aircraft carrier has arrived in the region as well as B2 heavy bombers deploying to the American Diego Garcia base in the southern Indian Ocean. From that location, they can reach Yemen and Iran with a full bomb-load. The bombers have already conducted strikes in Yemen.

President Trump has stated that the attacks on the Houthis will not cease until they are eradicated and has demanded that Iran cease supplying them with weapons. The Houthis receive Iranian weaponry via three routes: by air, through Sana’a International Airport; by sea, through the Port of Hodeidah or nearby smaller ports; and by land, through the sparsely populated desert routes via Oman and eastern Yemen (the Houthis control northwestern Yemen). The aerial route is the easiest to block but the least important of the three. To halt the use of the ports requires either a full blockade or complete destruction of the port facilities. Either method would also halt entry of food and medical supplies into the Houthi-controlled areas and is therefore considered politically problematic. Cutting the overland route would require convincing the Omani government to cooperate – not easy, as Oman has a longstanding relationship with the Houthis because of its bitter history with the southern Yemenis (who supported a communist rebellion against the Omani regime). Oman has a good relationship with the US and has been used by the Americans as an intermediary, but it is continuing to support the Houthis.

Iran:

It was reported that President Trump has given Iran an ultimatum to reach a no-nuclear weapons agreement by the end of April or the beginning of May.

Iran immediately responded by refusing to negotiate, showing off its military might and threatening retaliation if attacked. The military display included a televised visit to an underground missile storage facility. The tunnel’s width was equivalent to a four-lane highway and it was taller than it was wide. Trucks parked on either side of the tunnel stood loaded with missiles, leaving room for two lanes of trucks to drive between them. The commander of Iran’s air defenses said Iran has fully recovered from Israel’s airstrikes of last summer and now has new systems available.

The Iranians threatened that any attack on them would prompt a retaliation on American and British military personnel in the Middle East and Indian Ocean. Their statement said there are approximately 50,000 such personnel within reach of their missiles. The commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy said they would attack Israel’s maritime commerce and turn the sea into a “hell for Israel”. They also threatened that any Arab state allowing military activity against Iran from its territory would suffer retaliation.

After a few weeks of threats, the Iranians then said they are willing to conduct indirect negotiations. The general consensus among Iran analysts is that the Iranians are playing for time. This may be a response to the reinforcement of American forces in the region. This consists of anti-missile batteries, another aircraft carrier, B2 bombers, and more. The B2 bombers can carry large ground-penetrating bombs (the biggest non-nuclear bombs in the world) that can presumably be used in an attack on Iran’s underground nuclear weapons industry.

An Iranian opposition news site (funded by Saudi Arabia) reported that the Iranians have asked their Iraqi proxies not to provoke Israel by attacking it in retaliation for Israel’s new offensive in Gaza and continued attacks on Hezbollah. Given the source, this should be viewed with caution, but these proxy organizations have not in fact attacked Israel and some have even approached the Iraqi government to negotiate a rapprochement.

Israeli casualties:

The total number of Israeli fatalities since the war began at approximately 6:30 am on 7 October 2023 is now 1,015 civilians (one more since my last update – killed by an Israeli Arab terrorist inside Israel) and 847 soldiers (update of one for a soldier recently confirmed to have been killed on 7 October 2023). Approximately 10,300 Israeli civilians and 15,000 soldiers have been wounded (this includes physical and psychiatric casualties). There are still 60 Israelis held captive in Gaza, some of whom (approximately 30, perhaps more) are dead. This figure includes the body of an Israeli soldier killed in 2014.

Wikipedia:

A large part of the current conflict is occurring online and in the media, and a number of studies have revealed bias against Israel in many media organizations. A recent study of Wikipedia’s editorial activity revealed that some editors have exploited their position to deliberately distort entries to make them anti-Israeli. Examples of two such studies can be found at:

This of course raises the question of the degree to which Wikipedia and similar organizations can be trusted as information sources on any controversial topic.

Thailand:

On a completely different note, an Israeli rescue team was sent to Thailand, following an earthquake there, to assist in rescue operations.

The International Happiness Index:

See: https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/happiest-countries-in-the-world#title

Another interesting issue is an international poll purporting to measure the happiness of the world’s population by country. The poll studies quality of life and asks questions about respondents’ lives and what they expect in the future. Israel has usually placed in the top 10 countries in this poll, showing it to have an optimistic outlook. Despite the war, Israel’s score has dipped only slightly. In other words, most of the Israeli respondents still see the future optimistically despite the casualties, economic damage, and other costs inflicted on Israel during this war.

WHAT NEXT?

In my last update I asked two questions that remained to be answered about the Israeli operations in Gaza: 1) are they just a pressure tactic or do they indicate a change in strategy? and 2) will the operations remain aerial only, or will ground forces also be used? Since then, Israeli ground forces have reentered Gaza. The goal is apparently to gradually increase pressure on Hamas by taking ground and re-cutting the Gaza Strip into separate areas with travel between them controlled by the IDF. Ultimately, some of these areas will likely have their entire civilian populations completely evacuated to enable maximum freedom of action of the Israeli military.

The next question needing an answer is whether the Israeli military will continue the gradual reconquest of specific areas or will at some point maximize the number of units in Gaza (there are currently only three divisions operating there, each at only partial strength) and conduct a simultaneous multi-sector attack to take the majority of the territory.

The issue of Iran also remains open. Iran is likely considering, or perhaps already implementing, an escalated pace of development of nuclear weapons. Both Israel and the current American administration have declared that they will not allow this to happen. Negotiations are supposed to begin between the US and Iran on this issue, but many Iran analysts see the Iranians as merely stalling. Meanwhile, the American buildup of forces in the Middle East is continuing and has already reached a fairly strong concentration. It seems that the Americans will be ready for a military operation against Iran towards the end of April. At that point, it will be a matter of whether President Trump decides to initiate it and when.

In Judea and Samaria, Israel’s Operation Iron Wall will likely continue to evolve, with the IDF conducting operations against concentrations of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in more towns and villages.

In Syria, after the new regime’s massacre of Alawite civilians in response to skirmishes with Alawite militias, resistance to the new regime seems to have diminished considerably in that area of Syria. It should be noted that historically, ever since they split from Islam in the 9th century, the Alawite minority (about 10% of Syria’s population) has been persecuted by the Sunni majority – except for the past nearly 60 years, during which the Assad family (who are themselves Alawite) ruled Syria. Syria is likely to become somewhat more confrontational in the Israeli buffer zone, but the new regime is unlikely to want to test Israeli resolve in the near future even with Turkish backing. The regime has not yet completed its takeover of power and has not fully stabilized (as shown by the events in the Alawite areas, the skirmishes with Hezbollah on the border with Lebanon, and other less publicized events elsewhere in Syria). The new regime (and its Turkish backers) need time to organize, stabilize their authority, and build their economic and military strength. An escalation of fighting in the near future with Israel would threaten all of that.

In Lebanon, pressure is mounting on Hezbollah to disarm. It is unlikely that Israel will desist from its continued campaign of attacking Hezbollah military activity anywhere in Lebanon, as such activity is contrary to the ceasefire agreement even when it does not include a direct attack on Israel. The agreement states that Lebanon is required to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006 but was never implemented. This resolution mandates “full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of July 27, 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese state.”

There are more and more demands from non-Shiite Lebanese leaders to compel Hezbollah’s disarmament. Hezbollah is still the strongest military force in Lebanon, but losses among its leadership, personnel and equipment and the constraints placed on its recovery through the loss of direct contact with Iran and constant Israeli attacks have made it much more vulnerable when facing the official Lebanese army. It is also grappling with the problem that its promise to rebuild the damage to its own population is impossible because of its loss of funding.

****

16 February – 18 March 2025

ESCALATION

My last update began with the subhead “Winding down but not yet done”. This report begins with an escalation in the fighting, though it is not yet anywhere near the intensity of the fighting that occurred during the peak months in Gaza or Lebanon.

Over the past month, President Donald Trump revoked all the weapons supply delays that had been imposed on Israel by the Biden administration. These include large supplies of bombs (the first shipment contained at least 1,800 900-kilogram bombs). Other equipment, including armored bulldozers, has also been released for delivery.

Judea and Samaria (a.k.a. the West Bank):

In Judea and Samaria, Israel’s Operation Iron Wall continues with a widened scope. The operation has involved several dozen airstrikes, mostly with small bombs, against teams of terrorists on foot or in vehicles, as well as ground raids of various sizes and methods (large forces in armored vehicles or on foot conducting large area sweeps, or covert operations by camouflaged teams infiltrating to capture or kill specific terrorists). For the first time in two decades, tanks are being used in these operations.

Since the beginning of the operation, more than 100 terrorists have been killed and close to 1,000 captured. In each area during the operation, the local population is told ahead of time to move to other towns or villages. All buildings where weapons stores or weapons manufacturing equipment are found are demolished. These number in the hundreds.

The Fatah-controlled security forces of the Palestinian Authority have also conducted operations against their Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad rivals in areas where the Israelis are not operating. They have arrested several hundred of them.

Hamas has attempted to galvanize the population to join the fighting against the IDF, but so far there has been almost no response.

In mid-February, bombs exploded on three Israeli buses parked at a terminal. A quick analysis showed that the bombs had been mistimed – they were supposed to explode not in the evening when they were empty, but at 9:00 am the following morning, when they would have been full. The individual who prepared the bombs mistakenly set the time to 9:00 pm instead.

After the explosions, buses at terminals across all of central Israel were checked, and more bombs were found in several of them that were set to explode at the correct time. Had the bombs exploded the following morning as intended, the number of casualties on the commuter-packed buses would have numbered in the hundreds.

Israeli casualties in or from Judea and Samaria since 7 October 2023 are 40 Israeli civilians killed (four more since my last update) and 31 soldiers/police killed (four more since my last update during Operation Iron Wall), and approximately 497 wounded (57 more since my last update). Most of these casualties were civilians.

Total Palestinian fatalities since 7 October 2023 are about 1,000, and more than 7,000 have been arrested (though hundreds were released in exchange for Israeli kidnappees). The number of wounded is not known.

Gaza:

In the first phase of the ceasefire, 25 living Israelis and eight bodies of Israelis were returned by Hamas in return for the release by Israel of 1,777 prisoners. This left 59 Israeli kidnappees (about half of them dead) in Gaza and about 9,500 Palestinian terrorists incarcerated in Israel.

Negotiations on the second phase of the ceasefire, which was to have involved further exchanges of kidnapped Israelis for Palestinian terrorists incarcerated in Israel, have failed. Hamas has continued to demand that Israel withdraw completely from the Philadephi Corridor separating Gaza from Egypt as well as the 1 kilometer-deep security perimeter along the Israeli border – demands which, if agreed to, would permit Hamas to continue ruling Gaza with open borders and thus enable it to recover. Israel refused and continues to demand an end to Hamas governance and armed presence in Gaza.

Since the war began, Hamas has inducted thousands of new personnel and is now estimated to have 20,000 troops. It has been busy training the new recruits and planning for new operations, both defensive and offensive, against Israel. Hamas has also attempted to smuggle more weapons into Gaza from Egyptian Sinai via small drones. It is not clear how many of these drones have gotten through, but at least three were intercepted by Israel. In two cases, the Israelis let the drones fly into Gaza and then bombed the people collecting them.

It is likely that at least some of the humanitarian supplies sent into Gaza have contained hidden weapons or parts. Some such attempts have been intercepted in the past, and there is no reason to suppose that all were intercepted. However, it is unlikely that they have included major weapons systems, given the small size of the pieces into which they would need to be broken up in order to smuggle them in successfully.

With that said, it is likely that Hamas has managed to restore to operation some of the local rocket manufacturing machines that the IDF did not locate and destroy prior to the ceasefire. Hamas has also been collecting explosives from aerial bombs and artillery shells fired by the Israelis that did not explode. A single unexploded aerial bomb can provide enough material for dozens of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Also, at least some of the Hamas personnel released by Israel in exchange for Israelis held by Hamas have rejoined the group’s combat ranks.

On 2 March, Israel reclosed the borders to the entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza, and a week later shut down electricity and water transfers from Israel to Gaza (Israel provides about half the electricity used in Gaza and a large proportion of the fresh water). Hamas claims these actions have caused shortages, but given the amounts of food and other materials that entered Gaza during the ceasefire – which was, per day, double to treble the amounts that entered prior to the ceasefire – this claim is almost certainly false, as stocks have grown considerably. As it was, the average amount entering Gaza prior to the ceasefire was more than enough, had it been distributed properly – but large amounts were appropriated by Hamas and stockpiled, either for its own use or for resale to the population for whom it was originally intended.

Over the same period, Israel has also gradually increased its aggressive response to Hamas’s intelligence probing of Israeli positions, attempts to emplace bombs near Israeli positions, and attempts to rebuild its forces. Every day, one to three Israeli airstrikes have been conducted on such activity, and ground forces have fired at Hamas personnel approaching them on occasion. In some cases, Hamas personnel have attempted to disguise themselves as journalists or other “innocent” civilians. At least one of those killed had just been released from detention in Israel in exchange for Israeli kidnappees.

On 17 March, there were Palestinian reports of Israeli tanks and naval ships firing at various targets.

At about 2:00 am on 18 March, the Israeli air force launched a large-scale airstrike that killed at least eight senior Hamas officials and perhaps one senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad official. According to Hamas reports, the strike killed at least 340 and wounded more than 500. The attacks were aimed at particular individuals, command posts, combat posts, and weapons storage sites.

The IDF spokesperson in Arabic told the population of Gaza to move towards the seashore, and the IDF dropped leaflets with maps explaining where to evacuate.

The Hamas Ministry of Health has updated the number of Palestinian casualties since the beginning of the war to 62,200, including 13,600 it claims are still missing under the rubble, and nearly 112,400 wounded. Even if these figures are close to accurate, according to the IDF they include a verified total of more than 20,000 Hamas personnel and at least 3,000 personnel of other terrorist organizations. The number of wounded terrorists is not known but is probably similar to the number killed.

Syria:

Israeli troops are still holding a buffer zone inside Syria. There has been a second incident in which they were fired at (no casualties) and a few small non-violent protests, but the majority of the local population prefers not to interfere with the IDF’s activities and to hand over weapons when called upon to do so.

Israel continues to occasionally bomb army bases containing weapons and equipment belonging to the former regime’s army to prevent their being incorporated into the army of the new regime.

After several ambushes were conducted by resisters of the new regime forces in Alawite-populated areas in northwest Syria, the regime retaliated with a series of massacres. Low estimates are that at least 1,000 Alawites were rounded up and shot. Many more were arrested and mistreated (beatings in public, perhaps worse in prisons).

Meanwhile, in southern Syria, the Druze population, some of whom live adjacent to the border with Israel and some about 60-100 kilometers from the border, have declared that they will not allow the new regime access to their areas. They have been conducting talks with Israel, and Israel’s prime minister has declared that any attack on them will be responded to by Israel. Israel has sent trucks loaded with humanitarian aid to these areas.

Lebanon:

Israeli forces withdrew from almost all Lebanese territory except five points near the border where the Lebanese side overlooks Israeli villages at short range. Lebanese army forces have moved into the areas Israeli forces evacuated.

In addition to the five points it is holding, Israel has built ground obstacles along the border at a number of sites several hundred meters inside Lebanon. These obstacles are deep ditches backed by earth berms to prevent vehicles approaching the border. They were placed in the eastern section of the border – a seven kilometer-wide valley – rather than in the hilly terrain along most of the border.

Hezbollah’s activities are now focused on trying to salvage undamaged weapons and equipment from bombed storage sites and sites the Israelis did not know to bomb all over Lebanon. They are also trying to infiltrate personnel to the border areas in southern Lebanon – especially Lebanese villages near the border that contained Hezbollah’s main positions from which to attack Israel – to conduct both salvage and intelligence operations. In addition, they are trying to learn lessons from the war in order to understand how the Israelis managed to locate all the sites they attacked.

Israeli airstrikes continue on Hezbollah storage sites and personnel in Lebanon and along the border with Syria (weapons smuggling operations). Despite repeatedly making threats, Hezbollah has not responded. During Nasrallah’s funeral in Beirut, Israeli jets flew over the site at a fairly low altitude in a show of force. On the same day, several Hezbollah sites were attacked across southern Lebanon.

Among other Hezbollah activities was the sending of five reconnaissance drones towards Israel. Israel responded by killing a senior officer of Hezbollah’s drone force.

Over the past week, Israeli ground forces have conducted two raids into Lebanese villages from which they had earlier withdrawn to prevent Hezbollah from returning.

Lebanese anti-Hezbollah politicians (mostly Christians and Sunnis) are making more and more statements against Hezbollah activities. Lebanon closed its airspace to direct flights from Iran to prevent the Iranians from smuggling weapons and funds to Hezbollah.

Fighting has erupted between Hezbollah and the new Syrian regime along the common border, and there have been a few dozen casualties on both sides. The Lebanese army sent units to the border and according to one report even attacked a Syrian rocket launcher with an aircraft. If true, this would be the first use of aircraft in combat by the Lebanese military in decades.

Yemen:

On 12 March, a Houthi aerial surveillance radar was bombed, probably by the Americans.

During the night of 15-16 March, the US conducted dozens of airstrikes against the Houthis (47 separate strikes, according to the Houthis). Casualties numbered in the low hundreds, and as usual, the Houthis claimed that many were civilians. Several high-ranking Houthi officials were among those killed. Since this major strike, there have been more strikes of lesser intensity. President Trump stated that any Houthi response will be met by a larger attack and that because Iran is behind the Houthis, it too should expect to pay a price. Three more US aircraft carriers are now sailing to the Middle East. The US also has aerial bases across the Middle East, but there have been no reports to date of their being reinforced.

The Houthis responded by launching missiles at American naval ships, including an aircraft carrier, but none hit. The Houthi leadership answered Trump’s and other American senior officials’ statements by saying it would continue to fight for Gaza. One of them stated, in Hebrew, that “Trump and Netanyahu are digging a grave for the Zionists.”

On 17 March there was a report of a Houthi missile flying into Sinai, but it is not clear what the target was. In the past, some Houthi exploding drones launched against Israel have flown through Sinai. On 18 March the Houthis fired a ballistic missile towards southern Israel that was intercepted by Israel’s anti-missile defenses. The Houthis announced that they would continue to fire at Israel.

President Sisi of Egypt stated that the Houthi blockade of the Bab al-Mandeb Straits is costing Egypt $800 million per month because of the reduction in traffic through the Suez Canal. The rerouting of ships around southern Africa probably costs the merchant shipping companies and their clients much more.

Iran:

Iran claimed that an American drone attempted to enter Iranian air space but withdrew after Iranian jets flew towards it.

UN report slandering Israel:

The United Nations Human Rights Commission published a report attacking Israel that would make Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels proud. It contains the usual baseless nonsense about Israel conducting deliberate sexual abuse of Palestinians, preventing births to conduct genocide, etc. The report closely resembles Nazi propaganda about Jews defiling pure Aryan women.

From 2006 to the end of 2024, the United Nations Human Rights Commission condemned Israel 108 times, compared with 44 times against Syria, 15 against Iran, eight against Russia and three against Venezuela, plus a few more against others.

Up to the end of 2024, the General Assembly had adopted 164 resolutions criticizing Israel. Over the same period, it passed 84 resolutions against all other countries put together.

Saudi Arabia, China, Lebanon, Turkey, Venezuela and Qatar, which have poor human rights records or have been involved in regional conflicts, were not criticized in any resolutions.

Israeli casualties:

The total number of Israeli fatalities since the war began at approximately 6:30 am on 7 October 2023 is now 1,014 civilians and 846 soldiers. Approximately 10,300 Israeli civilians and 15,000 soldiers have been wounded (this includes both physical and psychiatric casualties). There are still 59 kidnappees in Gaza, approximately 30 and perhaps more of whom are dead, as well as the body of an Israeli soldier killed in 2014.

WHAT NEXT?

My last update began with the subhead “the war is winding down but is not yet done”. This one begins with the subhead “escalation”. Following ceasefires in Lebanon and Gaza, Israel has escalated its operations in Judea and Samaria and responded aggressively with fire to every infringement of the ceasefire agreements. On the whole, however, the intensity of fighting across the board is less than it was earlier in the war.

Over the past few days, a new phase has apparently begun:

First, the US initiated an aggressive aerial campaign against the Houthis in Yemen and warned Iran that it might be next; and then

Israel began an aerial campaign in Gaza.

If the statements by the US president, secretary of defense and secretary of state are indicators, the operation against the Houthis is likely to continue and even escalate as more US forces arrive in the Middle East.

Two questions need answering vis-à-vis Israel’s operation in Gaza:

Is it a change of strategy or merely an operation to pressure Hamas in the negotiations?

Will Israel make do with an aerial campaign or will it also attack on the ground? If it does attack on the ground, will it be a major operation to retake territory or raids along the lines of those conducted before the ceasefire?

The issue of Iran is still open as well. Iran is likely considering, or perhaps already implementing, an escalated pace of development of nuclear weapons. Both Israel and the current American administration have declared they will not allow this to happen. Since it is unlikely that Iran will back down willingly from its pursuit of these weapons – especially now, with the defeat of virtually all its other tools – it is highly likely that Israel, with or without American participation, will attempt to physically reduce Iran’s nuclear program with an aerial campaign. (At least in public statements, the US leadership is saying it prefers diplomacy but will act militarily against Iran if necessary.) An aerial campaign on its own will not be sufficient to completely eradicate the Iranian nuclear program, but could push it back for years. If the US participates, the campaign will be much more effective than if Israel operates on its own.

The new Syrian regime is embroiled in a host of conflicts to establish its dominance and is not likely to test Israel’s resolve in the near future.

****

16 January – 15 February 2025

WINDING DOWN, BUT NOT YET DONE

The Iron Swords/Al-Aqsa Flood War (each side uses a different name) that began on 7 October 2023 is not over, but – barring a dramatic U-turn – it is winding down.

At its height, the war was conducted on seven fronts: Gaza, Lebanon, Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Iran. The intensity and method of fighting was different on each front and varied over time.

Though the war was initiated by Hamas from Gaza, it was no less a war between Israel and the Iranian axis than a war between Israel and Hamas. For now, that war is ended. Iran, its proxies and its allies, not including its Palestinian allies, decided that continuing the hostilities was costing more than it was worth. An agreement was reached between Israel and Hezbollah, and the others, though not part of that agreement, ceased action.

The war between Israel and the Palestinians continues, albeit differently. There is an almost complete ceasefire in Gaza that may or may not continue, and Israel has escalated its operations against Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Judea and Samaria.

The war between Israel and the Iranian axis:

The Iranian axis is headed, of course, by Iran itself, which has planned and worked for decades to destroy Israel.

AP photograph of a banner declaring Iran’s goal vis-à-vis Israel from a ceremony in support of Palestine about two decades ago

Initially, following the deposing of the Shah of Iran and his replacement by the Islamic Regime, this was only one aspect of the new rulers’ concept of “exporting the Islamic revolution” across the entire Muslim world. Over the past decade, as Iran’s position in the Middle East became stronger, it became a central pillar of its policies. After the 2015 signing of the agreement with the US and various European states to temporarily close Iran’s program for developing nuclear weapons, Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamanei said in a speech, “Some Zionists have said that due to the outcome of the nuclear negotiations, we have been relieved from worry about Iran for [the next] 25 years. But we say to them, you will essentially not see [what will happen in] the next 25 years, and with the grace of God, something by the name of the Zionist regime will no longer exist in the region.”

Iranian statements that Israel should be annihilated are hardly new. Khamanei’s predecessor and the first leader of Islamic Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, made them too. But this was the first time an Iranian leader provided an actual timeline for that annihilation. From that point on, Iranian political and military leaders publicly repeated this timeline. On 25 June 2017, a digital clock was unveiled in a public square in Tehran counting the days until Israel would be destroyed.

Unveiling ceremony of the clock counting the days “left before the destruction of Israel”—8,411 days from the unveiling, meaning early July 2040

Obviously, the exact date is less important than the principle – that by that day, Israel will have ceased to exist. The Iranians developed a program to achieve that ultimate goal, with the understanding that building up the capability to achieve it would take time. Delaying the nuclear program does not change the goal. Indeed, the nuclear delay incurred by the agreement provided Iran, through the release of frozen funds (the exact sum is in dispute) and a reduction in economic sanctions, with a means to accelerate its plan of “exporting the revolution” and targeting Israel.

The financial windfall the agreement provided Iran enabled it to boost its subsidies to Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Furthermore, Iran cheated on the terms to which it had agreed to reduce its nuclear capabilities. It reduced some of them as a façade while increasing others at secret locations that it kept off-limits to the International Atomic Energy Authority inspection teams.

Iran’s plan to annihilate Israel required constructing a “ring of fire” around Israel. This would include proxies and allies located in the countries surrounding Israel – especially those with direct territorial access to Israel’s borders. Initially, this meant Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria as well as the Islamist Palestinian organizations Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. It also involved constructing an Iraqi Hezbollah and building roads through Iraq to Syria.

Political work had also been underway for some time against the Hashemite regime in Jordan in the hope of eventually replacing it with a religious regime allied to Iran. (Jordanians, like the Palestinians, are Sunni Muslims who will not accept Iranian suzerainty, but they will ally against a non-Muslim common enemy.) Jordanian territory has been used by Iran to smuggle weapons to its proxy organizations in Judea and Samaria, and Egyptian territory has been used to smuggle weapons to Gaza. (Some of these shipments are intercepted by Israeli security forces, but not all.) Iran’s assistance to the Houthis in Yemen was originally meant to strengthen the Yemenite Shiites against the Sunnis, but it turned out to provide a means of attacking Israel’s economy as well by blockading the Bab al-Mandeb Straits, which connect Israel’s port of Eilat with central and eastern Asia and eastern Africa. When the technology became available, Iran also provided the Houthis with long-range missiles and exploding drones with which to attack Israel directly.

Creating nuclear weapons is part of Iran’s plan to surround and destroy Israel, though probably less for immediate use and more as a backup should its non-nuclear offensive fail to deter or reduce Israel’s likely response against Iran itself.

By the end of 2024, 15 months after the Hamas attack on 7 October 2023, Iran’s entire program had been completely up-ended by Israel’s response to the Hamas offensive. Hamas leader Yahye Sinwar jumped the gun by at least a decade. It is difficult to assess what exactly he was thinking, but apparently he did not appreciate the necessity for a long wait. He also apparently believed that if he initiated the war, he would force Iran’s hand and it, as well as Iran’s other proxies and allies, would join Hamas in full force against Israel.

Sinwar’s appreciation of the strategic capabilities of the Iranian axis vis-à-vis Israel was obviously exaggerated. Iran was forced into a war its leaders believed they were not ready for, but in which they had no choice but to participate, at least for show – providing Israel with the opportunity to reduce Iran’s existing capabilities. Apart from Israel, it is likely that no one was more angry at Sinwar than Iran’s leaders. After decades of painstaking effort, most of their preparations for the war of annihilation to be unleashed by Iran on Israel were destroyed or dismantled:

Hezbollah has not been destroyed, but it has been significantly diminished. Because of the situation in Lebanon, where the group’s local rivals are exploiting Hezbollah’s defeat to try to reduce it even further, and in Syria, where a revolution brought an anti-Shiite coalition to power resulting in the blocking of Iran’s land and aerial access to Lebanon, rebuilding Hezbollah will take a long time—perhaps so long that it will never return to its previous strength.

Forty-eight Israeli civilians and 84 soldiers were killed and a few thousand wounded, directly or indirectly (through injuries incurred while rushing to shelters, with people falling down stairs or in the streets).

Approximately 4,185 Lebanese were killed, of whom at least 3,500 were members of Hezbollah or other terrorist organizations. More bodies of Hezbollah personnel are being collected from villages from which the IDF has withdrawn, so these numbers are probably not final. The dead include most of Hezbollah’s senior commanders and staff officers. Thousands more Hezbollah personnel were wounded. Huge stores of weapons were destroyed, as were secret storage sites and command posts.

The defeat and new weakness of Hezbollah is visible in its almost complete non-response to Israeli actions ever since the ceasefire began. Israel has conducted dozens of airstrikes on Hezbollah personnel attempting to recover equipment from damaged storage sites, smuggle new equipment in from Syria, or infiltrate personnel back into southern Lebanon. All these Hezbollah actions are infringements of the ceasefire. Apart from three or four weak actions that failed, Hezbollah has not reacted to the killing of about 60 of its personnel in these actions and the wounding of dozens more. Furthermore, in late January 2025 Israel demanded that the conditions of the ceasefire be amended in its favor, lengthening the time provided for it to withdraw from southern Lebanon. The Lebanese government agreed to this demand. Hezbollah threatened to renew attacks on Israel if this occurred, but so far it has done nothing.

Hezbollah has attempted to pressure Israel by sending its personnel into southern Lebanon posing as civilians, but the Israeli military blocked them aggressively. According to the Lebanese government, more than 20 were killed and more than 120 wounded, though they did not provide a breakdown of who were Hezbollah and who were Hezbollah-supporting civilians. Again, Hezbollah did nothing in response.

Furthermore, a new president and government of Lebanon were elected without asking Hezbollah’s approval. It did receive two ministerial posts in the government despite an American demand that it be completely excluded.

Hezbollah has given notice that compensation to its supporters for injuries and property incurred during the war will be delayed. This suggests a problem of liquidity in its finances. Attempts by Iran to send money via civilian flights have been blocked by Israel demanding that the aircraft not be allowed to land in Lebanon. This has sparked riots of Hezbollah supporters near the Beirut airport, which included an attack on a UNIFIL convoy and the wounding of the deputy commander of UNIFIL. The Lebanese government sent the military to suppress these riots, resulting in wounded on both sides.

The situation in Syria was not directly Israel’s doing, but the rebels exploited Israel’s successes against Hezbollah, which had provided military forces for the Assad regime. The rebels attacked the pro-regime Iranian proxies in Syria that had both supported the Assad regime and shot at Israel. After a decade of failure in which they barely survived, the rebels deposed the Assad regime within days. Iran has thus lost all access to Syrian territory, including all the bases and supplies it accumulated in Syria over the past decade. This means Iran can no longer transport equipment and personnel through Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon, further weakening Hezbollah’s ability to recover its losses.

was not directly Israel’s doing, but the rebels exploited Israel’s successes against Hezbollah, which had provided military forces for the Assad regime. The rebels attacked the pro-regime Iranian proxies in Syria that had both supported the Assad regime and shot at Israel. After a decade of failure in which they barely survived, the rebels deposed the Assad regime within days. Iran has thus lost all access to Syrian territory, including all the bases and supplies it accumulated in Syria over the past decade. This means Iran can no longer transport equipment and personnel through Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon, further weakening Hezbollah’s ability to recover its losses. In Iraq , Iran’s proxies seem to have severely weakened their resolve, though again not as a direct consequence of Israeli military actions. There was perhaps at least one Israeli attack directed at the local Iranian proxies, but the groups appear to have been demoralized primarily by the defeat of Lebanese Hezbollah and the humiliation of Iran in its own territory. Generally termed Iraqi Hezbollah for the sake of brevity, several different organizations are in fact involved. Negotiations have begun between at least some of them and the incumbent Iraqi government on “coming back to the fold”– in other words, returning to being Iraqis first and Shiites friendly to Iran only second, or perhaps not at all. The Iraqi Hezbollah organizations released the names of 26 members killed in the war, but it is not clear if they include only members killed in Syria during exchanges with Israel or also those killed in Iraq when US forces responded to attacks on them during the same period. Since 7 October 2023, Iraqi Hezbollah fired more than 300 missiles and exploding drones into Israel. These killed two Israelis and wounded more.

, Iran’s proxies seem to have severely weakened their resolve, though again not as a direct consequence of Israeli military actions. There was perhaps at least one Israeli attack directed at the local Iranian proxies, but the groups appear to have been demoralized primarily by the defeat of Lebanese Hezbollah and the humiliation of Iran in its own territory. Generally termed Iraqi Hezbollah for the sake of brevity, several different organizations are in fact involved. Negotiations have begun between at least some of them and the incumbent Iraqi government on “coming back to the fold”– in other words, returning to being Iraqis first and Shiites friendly to Iran only second, or perhaps not at all. The Iraqi Hezbollah organizations released the names of 26 members killed in the war, but it is not clear if they include only members killed in Syria during exchanges with Israel or also those killed in Iraq when US forces responded to attacks on them during the same period. Since 7 October 2023, Iraqi Hezbollah fired more than 300 missiles and exploding drones into Israel. These killed two Israelis and wounded more. Iran itself has been directly humiliated three times: through the killing on Iranian soil of Hamas supreme political leader Ismail Haniyeh by a bomb placed in his room in a building in the center of a highly guarded Iranian Revolutionary Guard residential area; through the destruction of an anti-aircraft battery protecting one of Iran’s most important nuclear weapons development sites – hinting that Israel can attack the site itself whenever it chooses;

has been directly humiliated three times:

and finally,

through the destruction of anti-aircraft systems and a factory near Tehran that were critical to Iran’s long-range surface-to-surface missile production. This was actually three blows in one. It proved once again that Iran’s air defenses cannot defeat Israel’s air force; it halted production of Iran’s main direct weapon for attacking Israel for an extended period of time (though of course it has a large arsenal already accumulated); and it levied an implicit threat to Iran’s center of government and industry in its capital Tehran, which apparently can be attacked whenever Israel decides to do so.

Iran’s continuing ability to harm its neighbors in the Middle East should not be underestimated, but the limits of those capabilities have been exposed and Iran has unquestionably been weakened. The Iranians are now going back to the drawing board to rethink their options and programs. One option is to speed up their nuclear weapons program in order to create deterrence from the one thing they truly fear – an attempt to topple the regime itself. Instead of a tool to enable the destruction of Israel and instill fear in the region’s other states so as to limit responses to Iranian non-nuclear aggression, it will now become a tool to deter attacks on Iran itself.

The situation in Yemen is completely different. The Houthis, unlike the Lebanese and Iraqi Hezbollah organizations, are an ally, not a proxy. For them, this war, though it caused them economic and military damage (including, according to their reports, 106 killed and 328 wounded), has provided it with more gains than losses. They fired approximately 370 missiles and exploding drones at Israel, but Israel’s few responses caused economic damage that they can afford. They also attacked some 400 ships, sinking a few and capturing one. The military response of the US and European states was weak and ineffectual and did nothing to cause the Houthis to desist.

The Houthis still hold an entire global supply route via the Red Sea hostage. They managed to face off with the US and its allies, inflicted economic damage on Egypt and Israel and to a degree all the European states that had to divert their merchant shipping to the longer and more costly route around the southern tip of Africa. They are now a force to be reckoned with in the calculations of local and European powers that had previously ignored them. China and Russia preferred paying them off to fighting with them, enriching their coffers, and there are reports that Russia has negotiated with them for support in its war against the West in return for Russian weapons.

Following the ceasefire in Gaza, the Houthis ceased firing at Israel, not because they were compelled to so but because they saw no purpose in continuing. Should fighting be renewed in Gaza, they will be able to freely decide whether to renew their attacks on Israel or not. During the recent crisis in the ceasefire in Gaza (see below), they said they would renew their attacks if the fighting in Gaza resumes. However, if they do renew attacks on Israel, they are likely to face a much more intensive Israeli response – one no longer hampered by an American administration demanding that Israel temper its response.

Judea and Samaria (a.k.a. the West Bank)

As the fighting on all the other fronts abated, Israel transferred forces and equipment to Judea and Samaria. On 21 January 2025, the IDF initiated an offensive operation, Iron Wall, against the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad units operating there.

Operation Iron Wall is actually a continuation of Israeli operations that were being conducted in Judea and Samaria from before the onset of the Iron Swords War.

The average number of Palestinian attacks on Israelis in and from Judea and Samaria during the years 2016-2020 varied from approximately 1,300 to 1,600 per year.

In 2021, there was an escalation to 2,135, in 2022 to 2,613, and in 2023 to 3,436 (of which 2,374 occurred before 7 October 2023, so, based on the monthly average before the Hamas terror offensive, we can estimate that it would have been at least 3,000 if the war had not broken out). In 2024 there were approximately 2,665 attacks.

This escalation of attacks required Israel to transfer forces from other fronts to reinforce Judea and Samaria and the pre-67 border. This operation, named Breakwater, was one of the reasons for the reduction of forces along the border with Gaza and elsewhere in the Negev. Had these forces not been reduced, they could have arrived more quickly to the Gaza border on 7 October 2023. It is not clear if the escalation in Judea and Samaria was a deliberate Hamas-directed operation to achieve a force reduction in the south or whether the escalation was unconnected to the Hamas plan to attack Israel.

The Hamas attack on 7 October 2023 and threat of a follow-on Hezbollah attack redirected the focus of IDF operations to Gaza and the Lebanese border. Forces were reinforced in Judea and Samaria too, with reservists replacing the regular forces, but the focus of their operations was defensive, with occasional small-scale offensive raids.

Israel does not have enough regular forces to conduct major combat operations on all its fronts simultaneously. The Iron Swords war was conducted on seven fronts, of which three required major ground forces participation. One of the mistakes made by the IDF over the past three decades was a drastic reduction in its ground forces, on the belief that a major ground war was no longer likely and that modern hi-tech capabilities enabled replacing “old-style” ground forces with precision fire from aircraft and fewer “modern” ground-launched fire capabilities. The government and the IDF had to decide on a clear set of priorities for allocating ground forces: first Gaza and then Lebanon, with Judea and Samaria as only the third priority. These priorities were determined by the relative danger from each front. Now, the main direction is Judea and Samaria because the ending of operations that required large forces in Gaza and Lebanon enables the diverting of forces and resources to that area.

After 48 days of Fatah-controlled security forces of the Palestinian Authority operating in the Jenin area (northern Samaria) against the same groups, the Palestinian Authority forces withdrew and the IDF moved in. The Palestinian Authority claimed that it had arrested approximately 250 Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad personnel, removed 245 IEDs, stopped 17 cars carrying bombs from the streets, and seized large amounts of weapons. There is no way to confirm these numbers. In these confrontations, about 12 people were reported killed – half from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and half from the Palestinian Authority forces.

In the four weeks of the subsequent IDF operation in the Jenin area, some 65 terrorists were killed and some 500 captured. In addition, some terrorists fleeing from the IDF were apprehended by Palestinian Authority forces.

Gradually the IDF operation was expanded to other areas of Samaria as well, particularly the town of Tulkarem.

Hamas has attempted to galvanize the population to join the fighting against the IDF, but this demand has been met so far with almost no response.

Israeli casualties in or from Judea and Samaria since 7 October 2023 are 36 Israeli civilians killed (0 more since my last update) and 27 soldiers/police killed (four more since my last update during Operation Iron Wall), and approximately 440 wounded (28 more since my last update) – most of them civilians.

Total Palestinian fatalities since 7 October 2023 are approximately 925 and more than 6,000 have been arrested. The number of wounded is not known.

Gaza:

On 17 January, a ceasefire agreement was signed that included a phased release of the Israeli kidnappees in return for Israel’s release of imprisoned Palestinian terrorists. At the time of the signing of the agreement, 94 kidnappees of the original 251 were still in Gaza (not all in the hands of Hamas; some are held by other organizations). Hamas promised to provide information about which kidnappees are alive and which are not, but has still not given a full tally.

It is currently assumed that about 35 hostages are dead (most of them killed on 7 October and their bodies abducted, though a few died while captive in Gaza). In addition, there are the bodies of two Israeli soldiers who were killed in 2014 as well as two living Israeli civilians who crossed the border into Gaza while suffering from mental illness (one in autumn 2014 and one in spring 2015) and have been held there ever since.

The number of terrorists incarcerated in Israel is approximately 10,220, including 3,464 captured during the war in Gaza and approximately 5,500 in Judea and Samaria. Of these, Israel agreed to release 1,904 in return for 25 living and eight dead Israelis and five Thai migrant workers held in Gaza.

The release began on 19 January 2025 in weekly installments of three or four Israelis for 90 to 370 Palestinians (the price per Israeli varies depending on whether they are civilians or soldiers). By 16 February, 19 living Israelis and the five Thais had been released in exchange for approximately 1,135 Palestinian terrorists. The body of one of the soldiers killed in 2014 was discovered and recovered by the IDF.

One clause of the agreement stated that the population of Gaza would be allowed to return to northern Gaza through specific filtration points. Initially, this was to be accomplished through the Netzarim corridor while it was still held by Israel. At a later stage, Israeli troops would withdraw completely from the corridor, but movement would still be limited to the specified routes.

During the first few weeks, Hamas tried to play with the details of the agreement. It did not provide a full list of living and dead hostages; civilians were supposed to be released first, but in the second exchange, Hamas released soldiers instead; attempts were made to bypass the filtration passages to infiltrate combat personnel into northern Gaza; and there were delays in releasing the kidnappees. Israel responded aggressively to these violations by halting the movement of Palestinians heading to northern Gaza until Hamas released the civilians it had promised and shooting near or at vehicles or people attempting to bypass the filtration passages. After Hamas began to follow the terms of the agreement, Israel opened the passages, and at least half a million Palestinians returned to the northern Gaza Strip.

On 9 February, the IDF withdrew its forces from the Netzarim Corridor (captured in the first couple of weeks of the Israeli offensive from the end of October 2023) separating northern Gaza from the rest of the strip. The following day, 10 February, Hamas declared that it was not going to continue to release kidnappees, claiming that Israel had not conducted some of the requirements of the agreement. Israel responded with a reinforcement of IDF units around Gaza, including recalling reserves, and stating that not releasing the three hostages who were supposed to be released on 15 February would result in a renewal of the Israeli offensive into Gaza. This time, Israel had the full backing by the new US president, Donald Trump, who also ordered the immediate supply to Israel of all the weapons delayed by the previous president, Joe Biden. Hamas backed down and the hostages were released, followed by the release of Palestinian prisoners.

During the temporary impasse, a rocket was launched from central Gaza towards Israel. The launch was a failure and fell in a Palestinian residential area not far from the launch site, apparently killing a Palestinian teenager.

Negotiations have begun on the second phase of the ceasefire and exchange of more kidnapped Israelis for more Palestinian terrorists incarcerated in Israel. During this phase, another 59 Israeli kidnappees are to be released. Thirty of them are known to be dead, but the number of dead may be higher. The number of Palestinians released in return has not yet been determined.

The Hamas Ministry of Health has updated the number of Palestinian casualties since the beginning of the war to 61,709 dead, including the 14,222 it claims are missing under the rubble, and nearly 111,600 wounded. Even assuming the numbers are close to accurate, according to the IDF, these include more than 20,000 Hamas personnel and at least 3,000 personnel of other terrorist organizations. The number of wounded terrorists is not known but is probably similar to the number killed. Hamas claims that approximately 80% of the residential buildings in Gaza have been damaged or destroyed.

Since the war began, Hamas has inducted thousands of new personnel (a US intelligence report estimates 10,000-15,000 new militants), so numerically it has compensated for 50-75% of its killed personnel. However, the new personnel have much less training and are therefore much less competent. There are also thousands of wounded who cannot return to service because of the extent of their injuries.

The number of trucks carrying humanitarian aid entering Gaza has more than doubled to 600-915 per day. However, there are repeated complaints on Palestinian social media that the cargo is not reaching the markets and is not being supplied to the population. Hamas is hoarding and selling part of the food and other produce at exorbitant rates. It is doing this in order to maintain its grip on the population and fund salaries to entice new recruits.

Syria:

Israeli troops are still holding a buffer zone inside Syria. There has been one incident in which they were fired at (no casualties) and two or three small non-violent protests, but the majority of the local population prefers not to interfere with the IDF’s activities and to hand over weapons when called upon to do so.

Meanwhile, the new regime is negotiating a defense treaty with Turkey. There are still fighting incidents across Syria, cases of abuse by the victors against non-Sunni Muslims, and skirmishes on the Syrian-Lebanese border between the new regime’s forces and the Lebanese army or Hezbollah forces.

Israel bombed a Hezbollah storage facility in Syria near the Lebanese border as Hezbollah personnel were attempting to transfer equipment from it to Lebanon.

Lebanon:

So far, the ceasefire that began at 4:00 a.m. on 27 November 2024 is holding – at least in Middle East terms. Israel is continuing its aggressive enforcement of the agreement, striking Hezbollah sites in which infractions are observed. Hezbollah personnel attempting to operate in southern Lebanon are also being attacked. Israeli troops are continuing to comb the territory they control and are locating more hidden weapons storage sites. The weapons are either taken to Israel or destroyed on site and the sites exploded.

The ceasefire was supposed to end on 26tJanuary 2025 with Israeli forces withdrawing from Lebanon and Lebanese army forces replacing them. However, Israel halted its withdrawal when the Lebanese army forces did not meet the required activities or numbers. Israel demanded a delay until 18 February, and the Lebanese government agreed to the delay.

Hezbollah attempted to send the Lebanese population that had been evacuated back into Israeli-held territory prematurely, a violation of the ceasefire agreement, and the IDF responded aggressively. The Lebanese government claimed that more than 20 were killed and about 125 wounded. Israel claimed that the casualties were Hezbollah personnel or affiliates attempting to use the civilians as cover to approach IDF positions. After a few days, the attempts to move civilians south halted. A senior Lebanese army officer provided Hezbollah with information from the ceasefire committee overseeing the implementation of the ceasefire by both sides.

There is now a report circulating that Israel has asked for another deferment of its withdrawal in certain areas.

Israeli casualties:

The total number of Israeli fatalities since the war began at approximately 06:30 a.m. on 7 October 2023 is now 1,004 civilians and 846 soldiers. Approximately 10,300 Israeli civilians and 15,000 soldiers have been wounded (this number includes both physical and psychiatric casualties). There are still 70 hostages in Gaza, some of whom – at least 35, probably more – are dead. Also, there are the two mentally ill civilians who crossed on their own volition into Gaza and the body of the second Israeli soldier killed in 2014.

WHAT NEXT?

As written in the opening – the war is winding down but is not yet done.

Currently, Judea and Samaria is the only active front in this war. Officially the Lebanese and Gaza fronts are no longer active, but the IDF is responding aggressively with fire to every infringement of the ceasefire agreements.

The IDF’s Operation Iron Wall in Judea and Samaria will probably continue and new areas will be added as the IDF methodically goes through each town and village from which there are indications of terrorist activity, weapons storage sites and weapons manufacturing sites (mostly bombs, submachineguns and ammunition). Iran is trying to provide more weapons to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad through Jordan and Egypt. Some of these smuggling attempts have been intercepted, but it is likely that some were not.

The situation in Gaza is tense. Hamas’s attempts to change the agreement and gain more advantages will continue, and Israel will probably continue to react aggressively each time.

The second agreement, for the remaining Israelis in Gaza, is likely to be difficult. Hamas will demand clear-cut guarantees that after the last kidnappees are returned Israel will not renew its offensive. Israel, backed by the US, is not likely to agree to this. Both Jerusalem and Washington have stated clearly that Hamas cannot remain in power in Gaza. President Trump’s suggestion that most of the population be transferred to other locations to enable the rebuilding of Gaza has been met with angry refusal by the Palestinian leadership and the leaders of various Arab states (not all) and also some European leaders. However, on social media in Gaza, some Palestinians have responded positively to the idea. As one person put it, if you just open the gates, we will leave of our own accord.

The issue of Hezbollah is not yet over. Hezbollah’s enemies in Lebanon are attempting to exploit its defeat politically, but are still not willing t