The distinction between megaregions development in China and the West

Megaregions, as a high-level spatial manifestation of urbanization and regional economic development, have garnered widespread scholarly and policy attention across countries. These variations stem from differences in national institutions, economic structures, and academic traditions, resulting in diverse forms of megaregions globally. Notably, megaregions in China and Western countries exhibit significant distinctions in theoretical origins, development motivations, governance models, and spatial structures (see Table 1). The emergence of megaregion theory in the West is largely grounded in concepts such as spatial economics and new regionalism. Hall and Pain (2006), in their study of European polycentric metropolitan regions, defined megaregions as spontaneously formed urban network systems driven by market mechanisms in highly open and mobile regions, characterized by inter-city functional specialization and transportation connectivity. Scott and Storper (2003) further argued that urban agglomerations arise from intensifying economic linkages among cities, with their formation fundamentally shaped by the reorganization of capital, talent, and information in the context of globalization. In contrast, China’s conceptualization of megaregions primarily originates from state-led spatial governance strategies. As early as 2014, the “National New Urbanization Plan (2014–2020)” explicitly identified urban agglomerations as “the basic unit for promoting regional coordinated development.” Drawing on the “growth pole theory” and “national spatial strategy,” Chinese scholars regard megaregions as platforms for regional integration facilitated by state intervention (Ye, 2014).

Table 1 The distinction between megaregions development in China and the West. Full size table

The formation of megaregions in Western countries is primarily driven by market forces and relies on negotiated governance mechanisms involving local governments. Rodríguez-Pose (2008) emphasized that urban agglomerations are “economic functional regions” formed among cities based on their respective comparative advantages, with a governance structure anchored in a multi-centered, multi-actor network system. In contrast, the development of megaregions in China has exhibited characteristics of “state-led, planning-guided, and hierarchical promotion.” Ye (2014), using the Pearl River Delta as a case, proposed that China’s megaregional governance constitutes a hybrid model combining “top-down dominance with local collaborative supplementation,” emphasizing policy integration and the realization of strategic objectives over local autonomous coordination. Western megaregions typically exhibit a “multi-center-network structure” that highlights functional complementarity among cities. For instance, within the Randstad urban agglomeration in the Netherlands, Amsterdam serves as the finance hub, Rotterdam specializes in port logistics, and The Hague functions primarily as a political center (Faludi, 2002). China’s megaregions emphasize the “axis-belt development” model characterized by a “core city leading and surrounding cities supporting” framework. For example, within the Yangtze River Delta urban agglomeration, Shanghai, as a global city, plays a hub-driven role, guiding peripheral cities such as Suzhou and Nantong to accommodate industrial expansion and population redistribution. Furthermore, while Western megaregions prioritize efficiency maximization and global competitiveness, Chinese megaregions are tasked with fulfilling broader national strategic objectives, including regional balanced development, ecological protection, and the advancement of new urbanization initiatives.

State-led megaregion policies in China: formation and development

Joint development among cities can generate economies of scale, promote industrial agglomeration, and reduce transaction costs. Moreover, when different regions face shared public problems, they must coordinate government resource allocation, which is manifested in the collaborative governance of megaregions. However, due to China’s vertically structured administrative system, intergovernmental linkages between local jurisdictions remain relatively weak. The decentralization of economic authority has further intensified intergovernmental tension among Chinese cities, which are engaged in increasingly fierce competition in attracting foreign investment, domestic capital, and fostering economic growth. The central government needs to introduce new institutional arrangements to alleviate inter-city tensions and coordinate collaborative efforts among neighboring cities, thereby enhancing their competitiveness in the global market (Zhang, 2006). The central government in China has adopted a regional integration strategy aimed at encouraging cities to collaborate in formulating cross-regional urban agglomeration development plans, thereby promoting coordinated economic, public service, and ecological development across municipalities (Vogel et al., 2010). Since 2015, the Chinese central government has successively approved the establishment of 10 national-level urban agglomerations, marking the initial formation of an urban agglomeration pattern in the country.

Compared with mandated collaboration that emphasizes enforced compromise under institutional pressure (Rodriguez et al., 2007), state-led megaregions in China are characterized not only by the central government’s use of top-down political authority and financial support to promote megaregions’ development, but also by local governments’ heightened emphasis on securing high-level governmental involvement in intergovernmental cooperation.

(1) The central government exerts strong top-down authority intervention and provides significant economic incentives (Ye, 2013). Firstly, it supervises megaregions’ development through coordination with national agencies such as the National Development and Reform Commission (Su et al., 2017). Secondly, the central government has introduced proactive economic policies, including offering preferential land, fiscal, and industrial measures to encourage cross-administrative boundary cooperation among local governments (Ye, 2014; Wu, 2016). When local governments actively implement megaregion policies, they are rewarded with increased land use rights and financial resources from the central government (Liu et al., 2012). (2) Local governments have also gradually recognized the importance of national-level strategic planning in facilitating urban cooperation. Consequently, they proactively seek central government involvement in regional collaboration from the bottom up to secure both administrative authority and financial benefits. For instance, during the annual joint meeting of the Guanzhong Plain Urban Agglomeration, provincial authorities frequently invite senior officials from relevant central ministries to attend, aiming to expedite intergovernmental coordination.

Moreover, local governments can attract additional financial support through demonstrable policy performance. A notable example is the co-established ecological compensation funds between central and local authorities, which alleviates the financial pressure on local governments for environmental protection expenditures. According to ICA theory, local governments’ cooperation models can be categorized into three types based on the degree of local autonomy: informal network relationships, formal binding contracts, and “government authority,” wherein higher-level governments participate in local intergovernmental cooperation (Feiock, 2013). Because of the strong interaction between the central and local governments, Given the strong vertical interaction between central and local governments in China, local governments tend to adopt the more authoritative “government authority” model for intergovernmental collaboration.

The central government’s intervention and incentives have effectively facilitated communication and cooperation among local governments. Existing research shows that urban agglomeration planning provides top-level guidance for regional coordination in China and plays a positive role in enhancing both the physical and functional integration among cities. The connections between cities have become increasingly robust (Su et al., 2017). China’s regional integration policy guides both formal and informal cooperative mechanisms. As the frequency of regional cooperation continues to rise, the level of intergovernmental trust is also evolving in a positive direction (Yi et al., 2018).

Environmental governance in China

In addition to economic regulatory instruments such as environmental protection taxes (Wang and Ye, 2024), the environmental governance framework in China primarily encompasses the following three approaches.

Decentralized governance

The central government has delegated decision-making authority to local governments regarding the delineation of pollution agglomeration areas and the establishment of pollution standards, a governance approach commonly referred to as decentralized governance. In China, this model combines fiscal decentralization with political centralization—a governance structure that has significantly contributed to economic growth over the past few decades. However, the expansion of administrative autonomy in environmental governance has also exposed limitations in the administrative division system. In the context of pollution control, the tension between promoting economic development and achieving environmental performance often leads to a misalignment between the objectives of the central government and the actions of local authorities, a phenomenon known as “adverse selection.” This term describes the strategic use of asymmetric information to secure unfair advantages (Baron and Myerson, 1982). To maximize economic gains while minimizing environmental regulatory costs within their jurisdictions, local governments may exploit informational asymmetries by designating neighboring regions as preferred “pollution refuges” and locating polluting industries along administrative boundaries. These industries may further utilize prevailing wind patterns to disperse atmospheric pollutants beyond their jurisdictional limits (Zhao and Haruyama, 2017).

Central environmental protection inspection

To address the issue of “adverse selection” in decentralized environmental governance, China launched its first round of central environmental protection inspections in 2016. By enhancing its control over personnel and financial resources, the central government directly intervened in local environmental governance, which has been shown to effectively reduce pollution levels (Jia and Chen, 2019). However, some scholars argue that such direct intervention lacks long-term effectiveness, as polluting enterprises often only temporarily suspend operations during inspections without making fundamental improvements to their production cleanliness standards (Nie et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2021). The pollution reduction effects may therefore diminish once central inspectors complete their missions and leave the region (Lu, 2022).

Regional joint prevention of pollution

With the acceleration of regional integration, China has begun to explore regional joint prevention of pollution, which represents a practical application of collaborative governance theory. Research by Schleicher et al. (2012) indicates that the regional joint prevention measures for air pollution implemented during the 2008 Beijing Olympics effectively reduced fine particulate matter (PM2.5) concentrations. Using the joint prevention actions taken during the 2014 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit as a case, Wang et al. (2016) demonstrate that defining the scope of cities involved in collaborative governance plays a crucial role in reducing PM2.5 levels. Collaborative governance can significantly enhance environmental performance; however, local governments in China tend to passively accept such collaboration only during major national events and under direct guidance from the central government. Without vertical intervention from higher-level authorities, regional joint prevention efforts are often discontinued.

The impact of megaregions on environmental performance

Megaregions are increasingly regarded as a promising strategy for enhancing environmental sustainability. Compared to non-megaregion areas (European NUTS3 regions), urban networks that incorporate megaregions have the potential to concentrate economic activities and knowledge, thereby improving resource consumption efficiency, boosting productivity, and reducing carbon dioxide emissions (Marull et al., 2013). However, a study by Veneri and Burgalassi (2012), based on data from Italian NUTS-2 regions, found no consistent correlation between polycentricity and greenhouse gas emissions.

Moreover, there are divergent perspectives in the literature. For example, Jiang and Jiang (2024) argue that megaregions can significantly enhance economic resilience without exerting a clear impact on ecological resilience. Conversely, establishing megaregions solely for the purpose of infrastructure development or promoting economic growth through globalization may lead to adverse consequences (Wheeler, 2009), such as uncontrolled urban sprawl that increases ecological complexity (Zhang et al., 2024) and threatens ecosystem health (Chen et al., 2023). Ye (2014) contended that state-led megaregion initiatives in developing countries, primarily aimed at economic expansion, tend to intensify conflicts between urban development and environmental conservation.

Su et al. (2017) conducted a performance evaluation of the Hangzhou Bay megaregion in China, focusing on four key dimensions: rational urban growth, economic development, social equity, and environmental protection. Their findings indicate that China’s megaregion policies have achieved only limited success, with the Hangzhou Bay megaregion meeting its economic targets while falling short in areas such as environmental protection and social equity. The effects of megaregions on local environmental performance vary across countries and cities, highlighting the need for comparative analysis.

Based on the literature reviewed, pollution control measures in China have not fundamentally strengthened the incentives for local governments to reduce pollution emissions. Therefore, it is crucial for China to urgently explore innovative approaches to environmental governance that are more effectively aligned with the administrative management system. The development of state-led megaregions has promoted improved coordination between the central and local governments, as well as among local governments themselves. However, whether state-led megaregions contribute to a reduction in urban pollution remains unverified, particularly when assessed using nationwide data samples.