THIS ARTICLE WILL BE REGULARLY UPDATED.

THE MOST RECENT UPDATES WILL BE AT THE TOP.

BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 2,215, 23 June, 2025

“We cannot always prevent the murder of workers in an orchard or sleeping families, but we can set a high price for our blood. A price too high for the Arab settlement, the Arab army and the Arab government to pay. … [Retaliation operations] are not for vengeance. It is an act of punishment and warning, that if that state does not control its population and does not prevent them attacking us – the Israeli forces will cause havoc in its land.“

IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan,

Lecture to IDF officers: “Retaliation Operations as a Means of Ensuring Peace”, July 1955

(Published in IDF monthly journal Skira Hodsheet, August 1955).

****

14 – 22 June 2025

Iran:

Khamenei’s statement was made during the JCPOA negotiations that Iran, the United States and a number of European states signed in 2015.

Iran’s original plan was to develop a ‘circle of fire’ around Israel – Lebanese Hizbullah, Iranian forces and Iraqi Hizbullah in Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, Judea and Samaria and lastly to topple the Jordanian regime and replace it with the local Moslem Brotherhood. They expected it would take till the 2030s before they entire program would be ready. The nuclear weapons program was to be used as a backing force to deter Israel from using its alleged nuclear weapons to defend itself against the planned regular warfare offensive (see 7th October 2023, but on all Israel’s borders, except perhaps Egypt, simultaneously). That is one of the reasons they were not in a hurry to complete the nuclear weapons program and that they had no problem signing the JCPOA IN 2015. That agreement would end in December 2030… and in the meantime they would cheat at a pace they could hide from the supervision operations. Meanwhile Iran received assets previously frozen and a reprieve on sanctions that would supply it with several hundreds of billions of dollars to fund its activities (funding the proxies and allies, funding its own general weapons manufacturing and the nuclear program itself). In other words, waiting the 15 years would have been irrelevant to their progress and the gains were tangible.

Hamas leader Sinwar ‘jumped the gun’. According to documents captured by the Israelis during the war, he believed Israel was already ripe to fall and did not want to wait. He therefore initiated the 7th October 2023 attack, being fairly certain that this would compel the other members of the alliance against Israel would join him. The opposite happened – the Iranians and their other proxies held back, believing he was wrong. Israel recovered its balance and initiated a counter-offensive that gradually, over the past 20 months gradually destroyed Iran’s entire program except its nuclear component. One point should be made clear – the program was destroyed, but most of the various military components still exist:

Iran’s presence and capabilities in Syria have been lost in totality. A few storage sites remain hidden but so far all known attempts to access them and send the weapons and equipment stored in them to Lebanon have failed. Of course, we cannot know if there were also successful attempts that evaded Israel’s intelligence and the that of the new regime.

Lebanese Hizbullah was severely degraded but is still has a strong military capability. It is currently dealing with an internal Lebanese political ‘offensive’ to compel it to completely disarm and is thus less ready to face Israel Ever since the ceasefire Israel has continued to conduct daily attacks on Hizbullah attempts to restore its capabilities and has killed more than 210 Hizbullah personnel and destroyed more storage sites and a few weapons manufacturing sites that Hizbullah attempted to reactivate. Hizbullah has not responded – probably fearing an all-out Israeli offensive as well as one by the Lebanese army. During the current Israeli offensive on Iran Hizbullah’s leaders have made statements of encouragement but have so far refrained from taking actual action. The loss of access to Syrian territory and all the assets there has severely degraded Iran’s ability to help Hizbullah recuperate.

Iraqi Hizbullah has not been scratched and is still capable of conducting all the operations it was designed for. It has however conducted only a very few exploding-drone attacks in support of Iran, though a few were also fired at the American bases in Iraq.

The Houthis stated they are participating in the Iranian counter-offensive against Israel, but in fact the number of Houthi attacks against Israel has diminished. One possible reason is that Israel bombed a meeting of senior officers headed by the Houthi supreme military commander. He was wounded and others were killed or wounded too. Either they have decided that the cost of continuing is too high or the loss of these senior personnel has disrupted their ability to make decisions. This after the United States and Israel bombed and diminished their storage sites and the ports necessary for transporting new supplies from Iran to the Houthis. There has also been a stream of reports over the past couple of months of preparations by the other Yemenite factions to conduct a ground offensive, so perhaps they are focused on preparing to face that threat.

In Jordan the current regime declared the Moslem Brotherhood an illegal organization and conducted mass arrests of its leadership as well as locating and dismantling various weapons stores belonging to the organization.

In two exchanges of strikes by Israel and Iran, in spring 2024 and summer 2024, Israel first proved it could conduct air strikes in Iran despite Iran’s anti-aircraft defenses and also hit part of the missile fuel production industry

One of the Iranian responses was to speed up its nuclear weapons development program as well as its surface-to-surface missile manufacturing program – on the eve of the Israeli offensive they had approximately 2,500 missiles in their arsenals. It also began constructing more sites to increase and disperse its manufacturing base in order to make it harder to destroy.

President Trump gave Iran a 2 week deadline to surrender unconditionally, creating the deception that the United States would not intervene in the war until the end of June at the earliest. In fact, during the night of 21st-22nd June, the Americans dropped a number of the huge ground penetrating bombs only they have on the site of Fordow and on the site of Natanz. 30 Tomahawk cruise missiles were also fired, but these have no ground penetrating capabilities, so they were aimed at above-ground infrastructure. At time of writing the final damage assessment is still not completed. Furthermore, about half a ton of 60% enriched material was transferred from the known sites to hidden sites. This is not enough to create nuclear bombs (though they could be used to create ‘dirty bombs – i.e., ordinary explosive bombs that scatter fatally radioactive dust in the target area), but requires fewer centrifuges to survive to complete the process. So if there are any surviving centrifuges and the material is not destroyed too that would shorten the recovery time for the Iranians.

So far, the Israelis have hit approximately 1,200 different targets, most from the air, but some with Mossad special forces operating on the ground inside Iran. The targets include nuclear program sites, surface-to-surface missile manufacturing sites, missile launchers and missile storage sites, as well as anti-aircraft radars and missile launchers. Additional targets include senior military personnel and, more importantly, senior scientists and administrators of the nuclear program. All these personnel are replaceable in principle (especially the military – most of which have already had replacements named and at least two of these replacements have already been killed too), but only by personnel less experienced (most of the killed have been in office for many years, some for a few decades) and perhaps also less qualified.

Iranians claim Khamanei’s political adviser, the supreme administrator of the nuclear weapons program, who had been reported to have been killed on the first night, was only wounded and is alive in hospital. They published a photograph to prove the point, but quick research by bloggers showed the photograph to be an old one – taken when he underwent a medical procedure in March 2024. He has since published a number of written posts, but not been seen in public, so it is not clear if it is he that is writing them or someone is doing so in his name to hide his demise or serious injury.

The Iranians had approximately 360 surface-to-surface missile launchers before the Israeli offensive and about 240 have been destroyed. Various pro-Iranian elements are claiming that some were decoys and others were ordinary civilian trucks. Possibly a handful more may have been manufactured. In any case the daily rate of Iran’s missile fire at Israel has decreased (see below).

At least 80 anti-aircraft defense radars and missile-launchers have been destroyed. So that large areas of Iran are devoid of them, allowing Israeli aircraft to roam freely and perhaps even to conduct aerial refueling over Iran (at least 2 of the targets were hit 2,300 kilometers from Israel). The Iranians have attempted to move radars and launchers from quiet areas to the targeted areas, but so far all have been destroyed enroute or just as they have arrived at their new sites.

Israel has also attacked some economic targets – gas and oil stores and refining and processing plants.

Since the morning 15th June Israel has ordered the evacuation of various areas in Tehran in which the Iranian military industry sites are located. Adding new areas every day. From afternoon 15th June photographs and video clips of traffic jams on the roads exiting Tehran began appearing on Iranian social media. Tehran (population approximately 9 million of Iran’s approximately 86 million), in addition to being the political capital it is also the economic and industrial hub of Iran. Thus, the exodus, if it continues, could achieve a partial freeze of administrative and economic activity in Iran. The last time such an exodus occurred was in spring 1988, when Iraq fired a couple of hundred surface-to-surface missiles into the city. It compelled the Iranian leadership to request a ceasefire in the latest round of what was called ‘the war of the cities’ – Iranians and Iraqis firing missiles into each other’s cities, sub-chapter in the ongoing Iran-Iraq war of the time.

The Iranians claim that 5 hand-placed or vehicle-mounted bombs exploded in Tehran. They have not stated what the targets were or what the results were. No mention has been made by the IDF of such attacks. Attacks by internal anti-regime groups have occurred quite often over the years and these could also be one of these groups exploiting the situation.

The Iranians claim Israel attacked a hospital and showed photographs of damage to it. Iranian opposition bloggers refuted the claim, saying the hospital was not hit by Israeli bombs or damaged by them, but rather by secondary explosions of an Iranian ammunition arsenal located a few blocks distant from the hospital. Apparently the Iranians did not bother to maintain a safe distance between the two – the arsenal was located in an industrial zone a couple of blocks from the hospital and adjacent to a residential area.

The Iranian opposition response downloaded by Israeli blogger Abu Ali Express

Since then, following the direct hit of an Iranian missile on an Israeli hospital, the Iranians have claimed that five hospitals have been deliberately targeted by Israel.

This issue of false information backed by fake photography has sky-rocketed (pun intended) during this war – lots of photographs from past and even non-Middle-Eastern wars are being changed with advanced computer programs to fit the narrative of the distributor of the photograph or video. This includes photographs and videos purporting to show damage in Israel, a number of destroyed Israeli aircraft and an Israeli female pilot captured by the Iranians after her plane was shot down… Some of the photographs of damage in Israel occurred in other events and some is not from Israel, no manned Israeli aircraft has been reported lost yet (only one remotely-piloted aircraft) and the supposedly captured female pilot is Chilean the photograph is from some years ago, she is definitely not in Iran…

Israel ordered the evacuation of a government television and radio station then bombed it. The damage was focused, though a fire broke out and increased the damaged area. The IDF spokesperson stated that the part of the station hit was cover for a Pasdaran military site. The strike occurred mid-broadcast and the recording studio and the people inside were shaken but not harmed. The female broadcaster, caught in the middle of an anti-Israel rant, has since had posters of her published and put in the streets as a symbol of Iranian resilience.

The Iranian cyber directorate claims that an Israeli cyber attack shut down all the automatic bank tellers in Iran. An Iranian opposition source claimed that in fact the shut down was conducted by order of the government fearing a rush that could empty the banks’ reserves. A cyber-attack, claimed to have been perpetrated by a pro-Israeli hacker group, ‘The Predatory Sparrow’, has severely damaged the Iranian Crypto-currency exchange, Nobitex. One report claims that approximately 1.7 billion dollar worth of the 1.8 billion dollar worth holdings of the currency were erased.

The Iranian government has also almost completely shutdown access to the internet in Iran. They have apparently also begun to disrupt the navigation systems of the shipping crossing through the Hormuz straits.

The number of Iranians reported killed so far is approximately 640 and the number of wounded is approximately three times more (there are a wide variety of very different competing numbers so this data should be treated with caution). These include at least 11 nuclear scientists (perhaps 15) and at least 25 senior commanders. Some of the commanders killed are the replacements of those killed on the first night. As per form the Iranians are claiming that most of the casualties are civilians, however, even if that is technically correct – civilians working on military projects (weapons manufacture for example) are legitimate targets. Israeli strikes are on specific targets. The cases when perhaps ordinary civilians are killed or wounded are perhaps collateral damage from strikes on the residences of the senior commanders and nuclear scientists. However, those strikes deliberately used small munitions so that damage was virtually only inside their apartments.

On 20th June IDF claimed that approximately two-thirds of Iran’s long range surface-to-surface missile launchers had been destroyed.

By noon of 22nd June the Iranians had fired approximately 600 surface-to-surface missiles (500 kilogram warheads) of their initial store of approximately 2,500 (several hundreds more have been destroyed by the Israeli strikes) and more than 1,100 exploding-drones (approximately 50 kilogram warheads).

The missile fire is conducted in three or four salvos per day, initially only at night, but over the past few days there were also a few salvos in daylight. Though the number of salvos remains the same, the number of missiles per salvo has dropped. The immediate response of the Iranian high command on the first night of the war failed to generate any missile fire as all the launchers had been targeted. On the second night they fired approximately 150 missiles in three 50-missile salvos, then on the third night about 120 missiles in three 40-missile salvos, over the next few nights the salvos became smaller and inconsistent – each night one big salvo of 20 to 30 missiles and the others only 5 to 10 missiles each, and finally over the past couple of nights the small salvos were only 1 to 5 missiles each. In at least once case, they prepared 5 launchers, but 4 were destroyed just before they launched. To explain this reduction an Iranian official told CNN that they had decided to change tactics – instead of firing a lot of missiles they would fire superior models of missiles that can penetrate the Israeli defences and hit their targets more precisely. However, this supposed change has not been seen in the statistics of penetrations and targets hit.

Except for the first night in which approximately 100 exploding-drones were fired in a single salvo, all the drone attacks are scattered throughout the day and night in small numbers from one to a dozen.

So far, approximately 60 missiles penetrated Israel’s anti-missile defenses but only a handful of the exploding-drones penetrated and hit any target – most were intercepted outside Israel’s territory and some within Israel. About half the missiles and exploding-drones that penetrated landed hit something – almost all of them civilian residences, but also a hospital and other public sites (an oil refining iste, shopping centers etc). A handful caused some damage to military sites. The others landed in open ground causing no damage or superficial damage to infrastructure only. Some of the missiles and drones fell enroute because of technical malfunctions causing a few casualties in Iraq, Syria and Jordan. The Jordanian air force is participating in the drone-hunt when these enter eastern Jordan from Iraq and the Israeli air force is conducting its hunt also in Jordan (coordinated with the Jordanians) and in Syria (without asking for permission – Syria’s air defenses were almost completely destroyed during the civil war and what was left was destroyed by the Israelis during the months following the collapse of the Assad regime).

So far 26 civilians have been killed in Israel – 21 Israelis and 5 members of a family of Ukrainian refugees who came to Israel to provide medical treatment for the daughter (leukemia). About 2,700 civilians have been wounded, though only a few suffered serious wounds. 24 of the 26 killed and almost all the wounded were people who did not reach shelter in time. One shelter suffered a direct hit and the wall was penetrated killing two people inside. A handful of soldiers have also been wounded. Iranian missiles strikes have been focused on the greater Tel-Aviv metropolis, the Haifa and Haifa bay metropolis and the southern town of Beer-Sheva. About 10,630 Israelis have lost their homes. The hit on the hospital in Beer-Sheva was fortunately on a wing that had been evacuated the previous day. The Iranians then invented the ludicrous story that the hospital was attacked because there is a tank unit parking site underneath it… later they changed their story to state they had attacked a military wing of the hospital that catered to IDF wounded… (there is no ‘military wing’ in any Israeli hospital, soldiers are treated like and with everyone else).

The Palestinian front:

Fighting on this front, in Gaza, Judea and Samaria continues as before the Israeli offensive on Iran began.

There are still 20 living Israeli kidnappees and the bodies of 33 dead in the hands of the Palestinians – not all are in the hands of Hamas, some are in the hands of other factions. The Hamas leadership gave an order to kill any living kidnappee if Israeli forces approach their location.

Intensely worried by the success of the new organization, Gaza Humanitarian Fund (GHF), providing food to the Gazans from behind Israeli forces, Hamas continues to report fake massacres by the IDF on the people coming to receive the food and these reports continue to receive credence from the UN and various western media (the latter sometimes are compelled to retract the reports, however, Wikipedia forinstance states them as if factual without even a qualification). It itself conducted some shooting at the crowds walking in the designated safe-route and ambushed a bus carrying Gaza employees of the NGO. Initial procedural problems in the managing of the food distribution by GHF are gradually being worked out, enabling it to increase its flow. The system is that a number of distribution sites have been located in areas controlled by the IDF. Gazan civilians are allowed to reach these sites on specifically designated routes – first they reach a security-filtration point to ensure none are armed, then allowed to continue to the sites themselves, where they receive boxes of products. Each box is enough for a number of people for a few days. If on the first days the number of meals distributed in this manner was a few hundred thousand per day, on 19th June they reported supplying more than 2.8 million meals in three sites and all together about 33.4 million meals since they began operations on 26th May 2025.

After Israel halted the ship carrying pro-Hamas protesters heading to Gaza, a land convoy set off from Algeria, traveling through Tunisia and Libya till it reached the border with Egypt. The goal was to cross also Egypt to reach Egypt’s border with Gaza and ‘break the siege’ of Gaza. The Egyptian authorities refused to allow the convoy to enter. A smaller group flew to Egypt with tourist visas, but were halted in the airport and sent back on the next flights to the countries of their origin. A number of similar attempts to use tourist visas to enter Israel by air or from Jordan were halted by Israeli authorities and the people involved sent back too.

WHAT NEXT

After the successful first strike, Israel’s Prime Minister Nethanyahu and IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir, stated that this was only the opening round and that the war would take a few weeks at best and would include also “difficult and painful days”. This is indeed what has been happening. The IDF and Mossad are working gradually through the list of targets collected over the past years. There are still quite a few relevant targets (the nuclear program and the missile program) to destroy. These are the main targets, but only a small proportion of the attacks are conducted at them – the others are aimed at enabling the attacks on the targets by destroying air defenses and Iranian attempts to resurrect them and a larger proportion of the attacks are aimed at Iran’s missile capabilities in order to reduce the damage being caused to Israel itself by the Iranian attacks.

Currently the overall trend of the war is positive for Israel, despite, indeed bad and painful events too. There is currently no indication that Israel wants or needs to desist – though a variety of people are repeatedly describing the weakening of Israel’s interceptor arsenal that is supposedly threatening to become critical. Originally Israel’s Prime Minister and IDF Chief of Staff stated the war would last a number of weeks at least, so it is clear that this factor was taken into account and we are not yet nearing the end of Israel’s operations. The American strike assists by destroying specifically difficult sites that need the use of specific weapons only the Untied States has, but it has not changed the general calculus of what Israel still needs to destroy before the operation can be deemed over: a list of nuclear sites that do not require American assistance to destroy, a list of military industry sites (especially the long-range surface-to-surface missiles production sites) and existing missile launchers and missile stores.

It should be remembered that the rate of depletion of that arsenal depends very much on the intensity of Iranian attacks and these are less than they were in the first few days. A large part of Israel’s offensive operations is aimed at depleting the Iranian ability to launch missiles and this is reducing the rate of depletion of interceptor missiles.

Following the American intervention in the war there are two major issues to be resolved:

What was the level of success of the first strike and if it is deemed insufficient will the Americans strike again?

In theory this is only a technical issue – there is no doubt the Americans can do it again if they wish to. In fact it is also a political question – whether President Trump, facing a mix of internal and external opposition versus support for his action, feels politically capable of doing it again.

Acquiring the results could take time. Furthermore there is the issue of the already enriched material apparently removed in advance from the enrichment sites to another hidden location. This material is currently not ready for arming a bomb (at least as far as is currently known), but will shorten the time needed for Iran to recover its bomb making capability in the future. Therefore finding it and destroying it is a priority.

How will Iran and its allies respond to the American attack?

A major response could hit both American and Arab gulf state targets. These are closer to Iran and therefore increase the size of the Iranian arsenal of missiles able to reach them, well beyond the number able to reach Israel. The Iranians can also attempt to block the Hormuz straits through which about 20% of the world’s oil supplies are shipped.

A different response could be terrorist attacks across the globe on American interests and targets.

In any case completely stopping the program, as opposed to merely delaying it for X years (how many years depends on the success of the Israeli and American offensive), requires changing the regime in Iran. Many are fearful of such a commitment, citing the Iraq and Afghanistan debacles. However, toppling a regime and trying to impose a new one are two different things. The former can be done with less physical presence of forces in the country in question, the latter requires a major insertion of ground forces. Toppling the regime in Iran is sufficient – what happens afterwards can be left to the Iranians themselves to sort out.

****

14 – 15 June 2025

Iran:

Despite repeated reports in the media about Trump being against an Israeli attack, his response has been to support it and at least one US anti-missile defense ship has been sent closer to Israel to assist in its defense. Apparently the “rift” reported between Trump and Nethanyahu was part of a deception plan. That being said, the American Administration is taking pains to make clear it is not directly involved in this war except to aid Israel’s anti-missile defence. However, it adds that if Americans are targeted, the United States will join the offensive, adding an order of magnitude greater strength and intensity to the attack on Iran.

Trump has called the Iranians to continue negotiations and reminded them that he had given them a 60 day window to accept his demand that they dismantle their entire uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons programs or it would be taken from them by force – the Israeli offensive began at the end of that ultimatum’s timeline.

According to all the more credible reports (there is of course also a lot of propaganda) Israel’s offensive against Iran’s nuclear capabilities included three separate forces working in coordination:

A cyber-offensive which has not been published explicitly but has been alluded to in various reports, which was used to disrupt various Iranian defensive capabilities.

A Mossad special operation which over the past months gradually infiltrated and stored a variety of shorter-ranged guided weapons into Iran. These included both advanced guided anti-tank missiles and explosive-carrying quadcopters. The anti-tank missiles carry more powerful warheads than the quadcopters but are bulkier and are less maneuverable than the quadcopters. These were used to attack a variety of Iranian air defense capabilities, thus opening the way for the Israeli aircraft conducting the main strike and against Iranian surface-to-surface missile launchers waiting in readiness to retaliate. They were also used in precision strikes against the commanders and nuclear scientists, thus reducing collateral damage.

200 combat aircraft (of 250 to 285 available according different publications) attacked approximately 100 targets with 330 bombs and missiles. These focused on the moveable targets, completing destruction of air defences in the areas to be attacked and began the process of destroying the nuclear enrichment and nuclear weapons development facilities, as well as more surface-to-surface missile launchers and underground storage sites, and finally various headquarters and command posts.

The initial results of Israel’s offensive against Iran’s nuclear capabilities:

At least 20 Iranian senior officers killed:

A political advisor to the Iranian Supreme Leader Khamanei – formerly a navy officer and secretary of the Iranian National Security Council) and the person in charge of the nuclear program.

Iran has two parallel military organizations – the Artesh (Regular Army) and the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guard). They are equivalent except that the latter is also responsible for Iran’s surface-to-surface missile forces and international operations and the nuclear weapons program. The killed senior officers include: Pasdaran: the Pasdaran overall commander / the Air force commander plus a number of his senior staff were killed while meeting in a headquarters bunker / the Surface to Surface Missile Force commander / the Anti-Aircraft Defense Force commander / the Quds Force (international covert and military aid operations) commander / the Navy commander / the Ground Forces commander / the Emergency Operations Headquarters commander / the Basij (militia) commander / perhaps also the commander and deputy of the intelligence service plus a number of the senior staff. There were more that have not yet been named. Artesh: the Artesh overall commander / the Navy commander, the Ground Forces commander, the Air force commander / Chief of Intelligence / Deputy Chief of Operations. There were more that have not yet been named.

(One report claims the Pasdaran Air Force commanders were lured to stay in their headquarters bunker by providing them with false information to debate), thus giving the Israelis time to launch their attack.

9 (possibly up to 14) leading scientists from the nuclear weapons program.

When asked if Israel would attempt to kill Iran’s supreme leader, Khamanei, the IDF spokesperson refused to answer. Meanwhile, Reuters published a report claiming that President Trump had ordered Israel not to kill him, to which Israeli Prime Minister Nethanyahu responded – that this was incorrect. At least officially, Israel has not yet attempted to kill Khamanei – whether this is being considered or the reports are merely psychological warfare waits to be seen.

As of afternoon 15th June the Iranians have stated that their casualties number 406 killed and 654 wounded.

Immediately after the attack began Israel’s civilian and military leadership stated that the attack was not a one-off act, but only the beginning of what is expected to be a long war lasting weeks at least. They also warned Israel’s population that there were going to be difficult and painful days ahead, it would not be a one-sided war.

Since the first strike the Israeli Air force and the Mossad have continued attacking targets across Iran, repeat attacks on the nuclear weapons facilities (the claim that a nuclear reactor was bombed causing radiation to spread is Iranian propaganda), military air fields and surface-to-surface missile launchers and storage sites to reduce the Iranian ability to fire at Israel (though of course reaching a zero capability will take time). On 14th June, in addition to purely military targets the Israelis began to attack also economic targets – the gas and oil fields that are the basis of Iran’s economy. The furtherst target, near the city of Mashad in eastern Iran, is approximately 2,300 kilometers in a straight line from Israel.

Israeli aircraft are flying over Syria, Jordan and Iraq to reach Iran. Israeli refueling aircraft are operating freely over Syria, because over the past half year they have completely destroyed the former regime’s anti-aircraft system and if anything is left from it the new regime does not want to insert itself into the war – especially not to support Iran, which supported the previous, Assad, regime, against them.

The Iranian first response was supposed to include about 1,000 surface-to-surface missiles and exploding-drones. These had been prepared and were standing at the ready over the past months as the ‘war of words’ escalated. That missile salvo did not occur and only approximately 100 exploding-drones were launched. All were shot down over the eastern desert of Jordan by Israeli and Jordanian combat aircraft.

During the night following the Israeli attack (13th – 14th June) the Iranians recovered enough to fire about 150 missiles in three salvos. About ten managed to penetrate Israel’s anti-missile defenses. These are not the Iron Dome – that system is designed against small shorter ranged and slower rockets. Intercepting long-range ballistic missiles requires completely different capabilities and is more difficult because of the altitude and speed these missiles fly at. The Israeli system designed to face them is called Arrow. The Americans are assisting with a THAADS unit (their equivalent to Arrow) stationed in Israel and US Navy ships using equivalent missiles.

The Iranian ballistic missiles carry much larger warheads than the rockets and missiles used by Hizbullah and Hamas, so each missile that manages to hit causes much more damage and casualties. Since the first Iranian response, they have fired another 100 plus missiles spread out over a number of salvos, none of which included more than a few dozen missiles. So far all missile attacks have been at night. Iranian officials have stated publicly that they are preparing a salvo of 2,000 missiles – though according to some sources this is more or less their entire inventory, so perhaps they do not mean in a single salvo. In between the missile salvos they have continued firing small numbers of exploding-drones, none of which (correct to afternoon 15th June) managed to penetrate. In one case it seems the drone attack was timed with a missile salvo, perhaps to engage Israel’s defences so as to clear the way for the missiles (a tactics used by Russia in Ukraine) – though Israel’s layered defences treat each threat separately with different responses, so this has very little effect (in Ukraine the Russians are sending low flying missiles, so this tactic is more useful). The most successful Iranian attacks occurred on the night of 14th-15th June – one landed in an Israeli Arab village, demolishing a house and killing 4 women living there and wounding the other family members; two more landed inside the greater Tel-Aviv area (Bat-Yam and Rehovot), one completely demolishing one high-rise building and damaging an adjacent one killing six and wounding approximately 180 people.

The latest salvo was fired during the afternoon of 15th June. No missiles penetrated.

At time of writing (afternoon 15th June), all the Iranian attacks together have killed 13 Israeli civilians and wounded approximately 310 (including 3 foreign diplomats and 7 soldiers), there are still 3 persons missing (either they are still buried in the demolished buildings or were taken to hospitals and have not yet been identified or were not at home and have not yet been contacted). One thing is clear – none of the fatalities or major injuries occurred to people who were inside the bomb shelters. Among the few who were injured while in bomb-shelters – the injuries are light only. Unfortunately, buildings from before 1995 do not have bomb shelters on each floor, only in the basement which means it takes time and effort to reach them, and buildings from the mid-1950s or older do not have any shelters at all. However, part of the problem is also the behaviour of people who ignore the alerts, banking only on the low probability their location would be hit. The Israeli Home Defence sends alerts via cellular phones, radio and television (keeping these open can be done on a quiet channel for those who do not want to see or hear programs).

Exploding drones were launched also from Iraqi territory by local militias working for Iran. A few of them were aimed at American bases (apparently all were shot down), but the majority were fired towards Israel.

The Iranians claim to have shot down at least one Israeli aircraft. However, the video they showed of a Russian aircraft (perhaps from Ukraine) reworked with AI to seem to be Israeli. Israel has denied any of its aircraft have been shot down so far. Also, a drone that they showed to have been shot-down claiming it is Israeli, is probably an Iranian drone.

The Iranians also claim to have captured a number of Mossad agents, vehicles and locating one of the Mossad hide-outs that were used prior to the attack.

Yemen:

The Houthis have stated that they are firing missiles towards Israel in coordination with the Iranian missile salvos.

On 14th June the Israeli air force bombed a meeting of senior Houthi officers, including their chief of staff. The exact number and identity of the casualties is not yet known.

Other fronts:

The escalation with Iran has not abated the fighting on all the other fronts, but there have been no major changes there either, so I will not write about them in this update.

****

19 May – 13 June 2025

Iran:

Negotiations between Iran and the United States reached an impasse – the United States demands that no nuclear material enrichment remain in Iran whereas Iran categorically refuses to this demand.

Meanwhile, over the past few weeks, reports of the advancement of Iran’s nuclear weapons program have peaked. Essentially the gist is that the Iranians are rushing to complete the program, they already have enough fissile material to create 15 small bombs and have conducted simulation tests for these bombs. They are apparently hoping that they could stretch the negotiations to the point when they already had bombs available.

Israel’s intelligence reported these developments to the government and late at night of 12th – 13th June the Israeli air force launched a massed attack on Iran’s nuclear industry as well as dozens of other targets relevant to this program – missile storage sites etc. Also attacked were a number of anti-aircraft defence systems, to enable freer access in the next waves. Another target were surface-to-surface missile batteries – reducing their ability to fire at Israel. A second wave of strikes was indeed reported early in the morning. One target was the residential area of the Iranian military high command and there are reports that a number of the most senior commanders, including the supreme commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (the organization that controls the nuclear program and the surface-to-surface missile forces) and the Chief of Staff of the Iranian army are among those killed as a are a senior adviser to the Supreme Leader Khamanei (he himself was not targeted) and a number of the leading nuclear scientists working on the weapons program.

The first Israeli missiles and bombs began dropping on their targets shortly after 02:30 AM and at approximately 02:55 AM Israel’s Home-Front published an all country warning to Israel’s population to be prepared to absorb the probable Iranian missile and exploding-drone counter-attack. Sirens were sounded across the entire country and warnings were also sent to mobile phones (text messages with loud siren sounds and flashing the phone lights – you don’t have to open the message to receive them, the phone begins blaring and flashing automatically). All public activities have been ordered to stop and the population was told to remain near bomb-shelters (most Israeli houses have building-shelters and those built since the mid-90s have a bomb-shelter room in each apartment). Public shelters have been opened by the municipalities.

The Prime Minister, Defence Minister and IDF Spokesperson published general details of the initial strike and its goals, stated that the public must be prepared for at least several days of Iranian missile bombardments, as well as resumption of fighting with Hizbullah and an escalation of the Houthi bombardment.

Thousands of reservists of the Air Force, the Home Front Command and border defence units facing Lebanon have received emergency call-up notices. Also an alert has been raised in case the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria re-escalate their attacks.

The United States government has officially stated that it is not participating in the Israeli offensive. However, they have been preparing for it for several days – ordering non-essential personnel in various Arab countries around Iran to leave and more or less emptying the American embassy in Iraq (Iran has a large proxy army, organized in a number of separate militias, of approximately 100,000 Iraqi Shiites in its service in Iraq). At approximately the same time the Israeli attack began, the American ambassador to Israel published a tweet stating that it was monitoring the situation and that everyone should “…Pray for the peace of Jerusalem!” So clearly Israel informed the United States government of its intention.

Shortly after 09:30 on 13th June the first Iranian response began – a wave of exploding-drones was reported to be flying towards Israel. Given the distance these should arrive towards noon. In Jordan, located between Israel and Iran, sirens warned the population to begin taking cover. Jordan is not as well prepared as Israeli to absorb strikes (significant lack of bomb shelters and relevant defensive weapons) so they need more time for the population to take cover. Jordan is not the target, but past experience is that some of the drones and missiles flying to Israel fell short in Iraq and Jordan. At approximately 10:00 AM the first drones reached eastern Jordan and Israeli and Jordanian combat aircraft began to hunt them in order to shoot them down.

Gaza:

Since the last update negotiations continued with no result – Hamas is refusing to relinquish its hold on Gaza and demanding that a ceasefire include its continued governance, the total withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and the rebuilding of Gaza at the expense of the international community. Israel is demanding the return of all the remaining kidnappees, alive (currently estimated at 20) and dead (currently estimated at 32 – the bodies of 3 dead kidnappees were recovered by the IDF over the past few days, two Israeli civilians and one Thai civilian who was working as an agricultural labourer in one of the villages near the border), the removal of Hamas from Gaza and the complete demilitarization of the area. The Israelis offered a partial agreement which Hamas refused.

Since the last update Israeli forces have continued to gradually take and clear more territory inside Gaza. Before entering each area the population is ordered to evacuate to areas the IDF has not yet entered.

Behind the IDF security the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) has gradually set up a number of food distribution sites. The GHF is an American run foundation organized and operating with consent of Israel. Its method of operation is to bring packages of food, each package with enough food for a family for a few days, to the distribution sites. The population is then told to send representatives to pick up packages. In first couple of weeks of its operation it has already handed out more than 2 million meals.

Hamas and the United Nations are against this operation. Hamas fears that it will lose control over the humanitarian supplies and therefore over the population. The United Nations backs Hamas and has its failure in distribution of supplies during the war highlighted.

To prevent this program Hamas at first conducted propaganda against surrendering to the Zionist plot, then when despite this tens of thousands of Gazans went to pick up the packages, Hamas published claims that the IDF was conducting massacres among those people and when that too failed (the claims were, as usual, trumpeted in the international media, but the locals realized the lies) began shooting at the procession of people heading to the sites and on 12th June ambushed a bus carrying locals employed by the GHF enroute to the sites before it reached the IDF forward security positions – so far at least 10 perhaps 15 Gazans have been killed by Hamas in these attacks. The IDF has fired on a number of Hamas personnel operating near the procession – whether planning to attack it or to exploit it to infiltrate through the IDF security. The sites themselves have no Israelis in them – only the foreign organizers and local population employed by them.

Another interesting development is the establishment of a local anti-Hamas militia based on the Bedouin Tarbin tribe living in southern Gaza, mostly in the area already taken by the IDF. The same tribe has a larger presence in Sinai and there is helping the Egyptian army in its fight against the local ISIS organization.

The final goal is for the IDF to take and clear enough territory to set up humanitarian tent cities behind its lines and then invite the population now in Hamas controlled territory to cross through filtration points to live in these tent cities which will be administered directly by them and the humanitarian organization with the IDF handling security with a minimal presence near the civilians (to prevent Hamas following them there).

Gaza civilians ransacked Hamas warehouses where supplies provided during the ceasefire in February were hoarded instead of being distributed. In addition dozens of trucks entering Gaza via the usual UN/NGO operations were also ransacked by crowds of Gazans.

The Hamas Ministry of Health latest update of casualties (17 May) is approximately 55,150 killed and 127,000 wounded. It still does not separate combatants from non-combatants. According to the IDF in January 2025 these included a verified total of more than 20,000 Hamas personnel and at least 3,000 personnel of other terrorist organizations. Since resumption of fighting in March at least 500 more terrorists have been killed, perhaps as many as 1,000 – however the information is sketchy. The number of wounded terrorists is not known but is probably at least similar to the number killed.

The body of Mahmood Sinyar, who replaced his brother as the Hamas political leader and Muhammad Def as the military commander in Gaza, plus the bodies of ten other senior officers and assistants were found by the IDF in a tunnel complex in which he had been hiding and was meeting a number of subordinates including the commander of Hamas’ Rafah brigade (originally it was thought that another brigade commander had been killed too, but apparently he survived) under the European hospital. Hamas continued to deny his death from an IDF air strike till the IDF found the body.

The tunnels under the European Hospital

Hamas is emplaced in and under most of the hospitals, schools and mosques using them to shield itself from IDF operations. However, the IDF has learned to gradually locate them precisely (down to the room they have co-opted for their use) and strike them with various types of munitions and methods.

10 Israeli soldiers and one Israeli civilian contractor (operating heavy mechanical equipment) have been killed in the fighting in Gaza since the last update and more have been wounded but the exact numbers have not been published.

On the propaganda front two anti-Israel/pro-Hamas operations were initiated during this period:

A ship with protesters coming to breach the Israeli naval blockade of Gaza. The ship included a number of celebrities including the Swede Greta Thunberg and a European Parliament member. The ship was captured by the Israeli navy, towed to Israel’s Ashdod port and most of the people on board sent home by airplanes. A few refused to leave and have been incarcerated in Israeli prisons till a judge orders them to be sent abroad.

A convoy of buses coming from Tunisia through Libya and Egypt in order to cross the border from Egypt into Gaza. In addition to the convoy which is still in Libya, some dozens of people from Europe and Turkey and other Arab countries flew to Egypt to join it when it arrived there. However, the latter were all taken by the Egyptian police, mounted on buses and ordered to fly back home. A senior Egyptian official stated that entering Egypt required certain bureaucratic paperwork which the people in the convoy had not conducted and therefore would not be allowed to cross the border from Libya.

Greta Thunberg receiving a sandwich from an Israel soldier

The Propaganda Competition:

As a rule I do not mention the Israeli political debate. However, this debate has now reached a level of toxicity that led a number of anti-government leaders to make irresponsible false statements that played to Hamas and international anti-Israeli propaganda: a former Prime-Minister, a number of former generals and one former general who is now a politician, made public statements that Israel was operating in contravention of international law. So I have no choice but to respond – they are talking nonsense. Israel is acting scrupulously in accordance with international law, and in many cases it is acting well above and beyond the requirements of international law. Other politicians also opposed to the current government have criticized these false and irresponsible statements. This does not mean that here or there some individual does not behave according to the accepted norms of the IDF, but these are a miniscule number of cases. They are reviewed and investigated by the military police and if necessary they face court proceedings.

The claims of famine in Gaza because Israel is preventing the entry of food are fabrications – the problem is not the amount of food entering Gaza but rather the deliberate hoarding of this food by Hamas instead of distributing it. Hamas uses the food to maintain control of the population – giving it first to its people and using it as a tool to gain new recruits for its military forces, reward loyalty and selling it in the market to acquire funds for its operations. The UN and international NGOs who are supposed to distribute the food are slow in collecting it from the border crossings – often dozens to hundreds of trucks authorized entry by Israel wait for days before being collected and often, after they have been collected the food waits for long periods in storehouses inside Gaza. Israel’s new policy of organizing a new method of distributing the food to the population, still in its first steps, is anathema to Hamas, the UN and the international NGOs because within days of beginning to operate, and despite various teething problems, it has already proved more effective than the UN and NGOs and is threatening Hamas’ control over the population – so much so that Hamas has added another condition for a ceasefire: that this new organization be dismantled and all food distribution be conducted by the UN and existing NGOs, which it dominates and essentially controls. The Hamas tactic of fake deprivation is not new, they have being doing it for years with fake electricity blackouts, stories of famished families, photographs of “dead” children, etc.

The repeated claims that Israeli forces are massacring civilians and committing genocide are also complete nonsense. Time and time again international media quote massacre stories invented by Hamas without bothering to check the facts and time and time again when refuted they provide a muted withdrawal of the original story. The fact is that in comparison to wars conducted in similar circumstances Israel’s achievements in reducing the total number of civilians killed and especially reducing the ratio between civilians and combatants killed are among the best ever achieved. The claim of genocide is even more ludicrous when compared to real genocides – for example: in Rwanda in 1994 some 500,000 (perhaps more) civilians were killed in 3.5 months with machetes, knives and axes – currently Hamas claims 55,000 Gazans killed in 18.5 months, so that even if all were civilians (and at least 23,000 were not) the discrepancy is enormous. Either the Israelis are extremely incompetent in conducting genocides or they are trying very hard to not conduct one.

Judea and Samaria (a.k.a. the West Bank):

Israeli offensive operations continue, though the intensity has been reduced. Resistance to Israeli operations is also diminishing – more are preferring to surrender rather than to fight. Those killed are usually commanders who refuse to surrender or those attempting attacks against the Israeli soldiers and civilians when killed.

Since the beginning of the operation on 21st January 2025 approximately 130 terrorists have been killed (approximately 20 more since my last update) and almost approximately 2,000 captured (approximately 500 more since my last update though some were released after questioning). Among the killed and captured are persons who were released from incarceration in return for kidnappees in Gaza during previous ceasefires and exchanges and resumed terrorist activities.

The Fatah controlled security forces of the Palestinian Authority have also continued their operations against their Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad rivals in areas the Israelis are not operating. They arrested several hundred of them.

Israeli casualties in or from Judea and Samaria since 7th October 2023 are 42 Israeli civilians killed (0 more since my last update) and 31 soldiers/police killed (0 more since my last update) and 515 wounded (6 more since my last update) – most of the wounded are civilians.

Total Palestinian fatalities in Judea and Samaria since 7th October 2023 are about 1,000 (numerical information is sketchy) and more than 7,300 have been arrested (but hundreds were released in the exchange with Israeli kidnappees). The number of wounded is not known. The Palestinians claim that more than 17,000 Palestinians were arrested during this period, however they are counting also persons temporarily detained for questioning and released immediately after.

Syria:

Israeli troops are still holding a buffer zone inside Syria. In addition to holding various key points they are also conducting patrols and searching for local weapons’ stores. The majority of the local population prefers to not interfere with the IDF’s activities and to hand over weapons when called upon to do so.

Following the incidents with the Druze and the Israeli response, the Syrian government agreed to conduct indirect negotiations with Israel. The attacks on the Druze were also halted.

A number of Israeli air strikes hit various Hizbullah weapons stores still in Syria. Also the Syrian regime attacked and destroyed a couple of attempts by Hizbullah to smuggle weapons from Syrian territory to Lebanon.

The Syrian regime also ordered Palestinian armed groups to hand over their weapons and deported some of their leaders. During the Syrian civil war some Palestinian factions supported the Assad regime whereas others (Hamas included) supported the rebels.

An unknown group, presumed to be Palestinians, fired 3 rockets from Syria into Israel. The IDF conducted a raid into a Syrian village outside the buffer zone and captured a number of Hamas personnel stationed there. One was killed in the initial firefight before the others surrendered.

Lebanon:

Israel continues to attack Hizbullah storage sites and personnel in Lebanon and along the border with Syria (weapons smuggling operations) at an average rate of two or three air strikes per day – mostly with drones dropping small precise bombs, occasionally with manned aircraft dropping large bombs when the target is a large infrastructure site – usually underground. On some days the number of strikes increases considerably. On 6th June, about 12 hours after the IDF published a warning to the population in Beirut to move away from a number of buildings, the Israeli air force attacked a number of underground sites beneath these buildings. The sites were being used to manufacture military drones and quadcopters.

In addition IDF ground forces have conducted a number of armed patrols into villages near the border. The patrols often leave flyers warning the locals not to let Hizbullah return and use their houses or they will have to leave their villages again as the IDF will destroy any house used for military purposes.

Hizbullah has not responded to these attacks despite the hundreds of casualties it has suffered (at least 220 killed – at least 20 since my last update, probably more, and at least a similar number wounded) and repeated threats it would respond. The primary reason for this is probably that Hizbullah’s political situation in Lebanon is currently weak, both in general versus the government and other ethnic groups and also among its own population base (the Shiites) and it fears a massive Israeli response. Because of the change in Syria to a hostile regime, they will not be able to receive support from Iran, their patron, and perhaps feel that their biggest threat currently is not Israel but losing their standing among the Shiites and being attacked by the other Lebanese factions and the official army. Hizbullah’s political rivals in Lebanon are repeatedly making public statements demanding it relinquish all its weapons and cease provoking Israel and refusing to sanction welfare relief for the Shiites who lost their homes and livelihoods until Hizbullah obeys.

The other reason is that Hizbullah has been focusing on trying to salvage weapons and equipment that were not damaged from bombed storage sites or those that the Israelis did not know to bomb all over Lebanon. In southern Lebanon they are also trying to infiltrate personnel to the border areas, especially Lebanese villages near the border which were the locations of their main positions to attack Israel, to conduct both salvage and intelligence operations. All these activities are against the ceasefire agreement which requires Hizbullah to disarm – giving Israel the right to act.

Given the Israeli attack on Iran it is very likely that Hizbullah will attempt to support its patron by conducting some sort of fire operations against Israel.

Yemen:

The dribble of missiles and exploding drones from Yemen continues – usually one per day, sometimes two per day. However,

Israeli has responded by twice attacking the Houthi international air port and a few more times various ports and their facilities. The last attack on a port was conducted by ships firing long range missiles instead of by aircraft.

Jordan:

In my last update I reported the Jordanian crackdown on the Moslem Brotherhood movement in Jordan for planning a coup against the king. Apparently this activity was funded by Iran as part of its plan to surround Israel with proxy forces in preparation for a future offensive to destroy the “Zionist entity”.

Israeli Casualties:

The total number of Israeli fatalities since the war began at approximately 06:30 on 7th October 2023, is now 1,020 civilians (4 more since my last update – this because of updated information of the killed on 7th October 2023) and 866 soldiers and 1 civilian contractor (11 killed in Gaza since my last update). Approximately 10,300 Israeli civilians and 16,500 soldiers have been wounded (including 7,000 psychiatric casualties). There are still 53 Israelis held captive in Gaza – 20 alive (4 previously thought to be alive were confirmed to be dead) and 33 dead.

WHAT NEXT?

The current escalation with Iran will not be a brief one as were the previous ones. Israel still has more targets to hit and given the damage inflicted on them the Iranians will not make do with a single retaliation salvo.

The big question is whether the Iranians will keep their promise to attack American and Sunni Arab states friendly to Israel, especially the Emirates and Saudia. If so the war could escalate to another level – adding American numbers to Israel’s would massively increase the size of the attacks on Iran.

Meanwhile, in Gaza the fighting will continue as before. However, Israel is preparing for a resumption of fire from Lebanon by Hizbullah and perhaps an arousal of fervour in Judea and Samaria.

One thing should be clear: Israel’s military capabilities cannot achieve an all-out defeat of Iran, the goal is limited – destroy sufficient infrastructure and resources to set back Iran’s military nuclear program by many years. The only way to achieve a total halt of the program would be to overthrow the current regime. That cannot be done by Israel alone, it can, perhaps, be done by the Iranians themselves if Israel creates a perception of sufficient weakness of the regime to arouse its internal enemies. Even if Israel begins killing the leaders of the current regime, it is robust enough to replace them. Barring that, the regime will attempt to rebuild what it has lost and the situation will return in a few years time – how many years depends on the extent of the damage Israel succeeds to inflict.

****

12 April – 18 May 2025

Gaza:

Negotiations have continued since the last update with no result. Hamas is still refusing to relinquish its hold on Gaza and demanding that a ceasefire include its continued governance, the total withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, and the rebuilding of Gaza at the expense of the international community. Israel is demanding the return of all the remaining kidnappees, both alive (currently estimated at 23) and dead (currently estimated at 35), the removal of Hamas from Gaza, and the complete demilitarization of the area. The Israelis offered a partial agreement that Hamas refused.

In a gesture to President Trump, Hamas released a kidnappee who has dual American and Israeli citizenship.

On 18 May, after several weeks of gradually taking more ground and intensifying aerial operations against Hamas and other terrorist personnel, especially commanders, in areas where its ground forces were not operating, Israel declared the beginning of a new escalated ground operation. Five divisions are now simultaneously attacking different localities in Gaza. The official objective is to capture most if not all the territory of Gaza.

Detonation of a tunnel: The red line emphasizes its route – the red plumes are from ventilation shafts

In the run-up to the ground operation, the Israeli air force intensified its airstrikes on commanders, command centers and Hamas fighting positions. Many of these strikes required pinpoint accuracy, with small bombs or missiles sent into specific rooms Hamas had commandeered inside hospitals and schools. Others required heavier bombs to penetrate underground facilities. Among the targets was the current Hamas chief, Mahmoud Sinwar (who replaced his brother Yahya Sinwar, killed in October 2024), and one, perhaps two, Hamas brigade commanders (those of the Rafah and Khan Yunis brigades) and several of Sinwar’s staff. It is unclear whether or not they were killed. A Saudi report claims that the bodies of Sinwar and at least 10 of his assistants were recovered, but Hamas has not officially admitted this.

Publicized details of the IDF’s new offensive show a different approach from previous operations. This time, there will be a simultaneous offensive throughout Gaza rather than a sequential one. The territory taken will be held and cleared.

Also, a different approach is planned for managing the civilian population. Previously, civilians were ordered to evacuate each area where the Israelis were operating and told to stay outside that area until the Israelis had withdrawn. This time, the plan is to set up humanitarian enclaves in areas taken by the Israeli forces, and supplies entering Gaza will be sent exclusively to those locations. The population will then be instructed to move to those enclaves via filtration points to ensure that Hamas and other terrorist personnel do not join them. The civilian and humanitarian management of the enclaves will be in the hands of a new international organization, the US-based Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, set up specifically for this purpose. The UN, UNRWA and other pro-Hamas NGOs will not be involved. To no one’s surprise, the UN establishment is criticizing this approach.

The situation in Gaza prior to the new Israeli offensive

The location of an attacked Hamas post (marked in red) inside the compound of al-Ahali hospital (the white boundary)

More and more people in Gaza are allowing themselves to openly criticize Hamas, though the wave of public demonstrations appears to have abated after several participants were killed by Hamas. There have also been many more posts by Gazans who say they would leave Gaza permanently if they were allowed to do so. While the number of such posts is increasing, it is still relatively small, and we don’t know how deep this sentiment is – are these people exceptions, or do they represent a much larger portion of the population? On several occasions, crowds have broken into storage sites where Hamas has been hoarding humanitarian aid. In one case, a local merchant’s warehouse was ransacked after it was published that he was hoarding food rather than selling it in anticipation of higher prices.

The Hamas Ministry of Health’s latest casualty update (17 May) claims approximately 54,000 killed and 120,000 wounded. Hamas still does not differentiate between combatants and non-combatants. According to the IDF, in January 2025 these included a verified total of more than 20,000 Hamas personnel and at least 3,000 personnel of other terrorist organizations. Since the resumption of fighting in March, many more terrorists have been killed, but no specific number has been provided. The number of wounded terrorists is not known but is probably at least similar to the number killed.

Nine Israeli soldiers have been killed in the fighting in Gaza since the last update and more have been wounded, but the exact numbers have not been published.

Location of a tunnel (red) under the European Hospital (white boundary)

Judea and Samaria (a.k.a. the West Bank):

Israeli offensive operations continue, though their intensity has diminished. Resistance to Israeli operations is also waning, with more preferring to surrender rather than fight. Those killed are usually commanders who refuse to surrender or who are in the middle of conducting attacks on the Israelis.

Hamas has attempted to galvanize the population to join the fighting against the IDF, but with virtually no response so far. In fact, the frequency of terrorist attacks against Israelis has gone down considerably. Since the last update, it has reached one of its lowest levels in many years.

Since the beginning of the operation on 21 January 2025, approximately 110 terrorists have been killed (seven more since my last update) and approximately 1,500 captured (approximately 300 more since my last update). Among the killed and captured are people who were released from incarceration in return for kidnappees in Gaza and resumed terrorist activities.

The Fatah-controlled security forces of the Palestinian Authority have continued their operations against their Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad rivals in areas where the Israelis are not operating. They have arrested several hundred.

Israeli casualties in or from Judea and Samaria since 7 October 2023 are 42 Israeli civilians killed (one more since my last update), 31 soldiers/police killed (0 more since my last update), and 509 wounded (six more since my last update). Most of the wounded are civilians.

Total Palestinian fatalities since 7 October 2023 are about 1,000 and more than 7,000 have been arrested (with hundreds subsequently released in exchanges for Israeli kidnappees). The number of wounded is not known. The Palestinians claim that more than 17,000 Palestinians were arrested during this period, but they count people temporarily detained for questioning and immediately released.

Israel:

A wave of brush and forest fires, including one of the largest if not the largest ever in Israel, swept through broad areas of the country, mostly around Jerusalem. A number of villages were evacuated until the fires were put out. Most of the fires seem to have begun accidentally, but at least a few appear to have been deliberate arson attacks by Palestinians or Israeli-Arabs.

This is a particularly dry period in the region. Within every ten years in Israel, there are about four years of drought. Israel solved its fresh water problem by building a large desalination industry that covers its entire consumption and even enables the refilling of depleted natural reservoirs, as well as the provision of large amounts of fresh water to the neighboring water-parched Arab state of Jordan. The peace agreement signed with Jordan in 1994 requires Israel to provide Jordan with a certain amount of water per year. Since completing its desalination program, Israel has more than doubled that supply.

However, Israel’s ability to provide desalinated sea water to homes, industry and agriculture does not protect natural vegetation in parks and other open areas from the threat of fire. Whenever there are years of little rain, these areas are prone to ignite. This vulnerability is sometimes exploited through deliberate arson attacks, another form of terrorism.

Syria:

Israeli troops are still holding a buffer zone inside Syria. In addition to holding several key points, they are also conducting patrols and searching for local weapons stores. Most of the local population prefers not to interfere with the IDF and to hand over weapons when called upon to do so.

In the last week of April, the Druze minority were attacked by radical Sunni groups affiliated with the new regime. Israel responded by attacking regime positions, including a site only 400 meters from the presidential palace. At least 100 Druze were killed before the attacks were halted by the regime. In the biggest single incident, a convoy of Druze from the southern villages of Jabal Druze who were driving to support their compatriots near Damascus were ambushed by Sunni Bedouins who killed 25 to 30 of them. A few months ago, more than a thousand members of the Alawite minority (some sources even claim a few thousand, though there is no proof of these numbers) were massacred in similar attacks.

Israel continues to supply humanitarian aid to the Druze, including the evacuation of dozens of wounded Druze to Israeli hospitals. Also, a delegation of Syrian Druze religious leaders were brought to Israel to participate in the ceremonies of the Nabi Shooayb – the original prophet of the Druze religion – at his purported grave site in northern Israel.

Following the incidents with the Druze and the Israeli response, the Syrian government agreed to conduct indirect negotiations with Israel.

In a covert operation, the Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, found and recovered the body of an Israeli soldier killed in combat with the Syrian army in Lebanon in 1982. The body had been taken and buried in Syria but no details were provided by the Syrians as to its location. New intelligence, acquired over recent weeks, enabled locating the body and sending a covert team to recover it. The exact location was not specified, only that it was “deep in Syria” (in other words, not in the area of the buffer zone), so a covert special forces operation was required to recover the body.

Lebanon:

Israel continues to attack Hezbollah storage sites and personnel in Lebanon as well as weapons smuggling operations along the border with Syria at an average rate of two or three attacks per day. On some days the number of strikes increases considerably. On 8 May, for example, the Lebanese media reported 30 Israeli airstrikes.

Though it has repeatedly threatened to retaliate, Hezbollah has not responded to these attacks despite suffering hundreds of casualties (at least 200 have been killed, perhaps more, and at least a similar number wounded). This is probably because Hezbollah’s political situation in Lebanon is now quite weak, both in general vis-à-vis the government and other ethnic groups and among its own Shiite population base. This weak position increases Hezbollah’s fears of a massive Israeli response. Because of the change in Syria to a hostile regime, Hezbollah can no longer receive support from its Iranian patron through Syrian territory.

The biggest threat currently facing Hezbollah may be not Israel but its loss of standing among the Shiites and attacks from other Lebanese factions and the official army. Hezbollah’s political rivals in Lebanon make public statements regularly demanding that it relinquish all its weapons and cease provoking Israel. They are refusing to sanction welfare relief for Lebanese Shiites who have lost their homes and livelihoods until Hezbollah obeys these commands.

Hezbollah’s activities are still focused on salvaging undamaged weapons and equipment from bombed storage sites or sites the Israelis did not know to bomb all over Lebanon. The group is also trying to infiltrate personnel into southern Lebanon, especially villages close to the border that were Hezbollah’s main positions from which to attack Israel, to conduct salvage and intelligence operations. All these activities violate the ceasefire agreement, which requires Hezbollah to disarm. The violations give Israel the right to act.

The Lebanese army, aided by UNIFIL forces, has gradually taken over almost all the territory of southern Lebanon and has conducted intensive clearing operations of 225 Hezbollah weapons storage sites.

As noted in the last update, on 22 March six rockets were fired from Lebanon at the Israeli border village of Metulla. There were no casualties. In late April, the Lebanese army arrested a number of Palestinians it claims were the perpetrators of this attack. In northern Lebanon, the Lebanese army confiscated 800 rockets from a Palestinian storage site. It is apparently conducting sweeps of Palestinian residential areas and military camps.

Yemen:

The US halted its aerial offensive against the Houthis after about a month during which it bombed more than 1,000 targets and killed a few hundred military Houthi personnel. Officially it was stated that the Houthis had promised to desist from their attacks on merchant shipping traveling through the Bab al-Mandab Straits and the Red Sea, thus reopening the shorter and more economical route through the Red Sea to the Suez Canal to international shipping. Before the Houthis began attacking passing vessels in late 2023, about 20,000 ships used the route every year. In 2024, the number dropped to about 7,000 (the Chinese, Russians, Iranians and a few others reached immunity agreements with the Houthis). If the Houthis do indeed stop their attacks on ships, the operation (notwithstanding American media attempts to denigrate it) will have achieved its goal.

The American-Houthi ceasefire does not include Israel, so the drizzle of missiles from Yemen to Israel continues at an average rate of one per day. The Houthis temporarily shifted their targets from central to northern Israel and then back again. So far, since the end of the ceasefire in Gaza, about 35 missiles and exploding drones have been launched, with only one reaching Israeli territory. About a third crashed enroute and the others were intercepted before reaching Israel. No Israelis have been killed, though some have been injured by tripping while rushing to shelters.

The missile that managed to penetrate Israel’s defenses landed in an open field within the boundaries of Israel’s Ben Gurion International Airport, prompting a series of international airlines to suspend travel to Israel. Israel responded to this Houthi success by bombing the international airport at Saana and several industrial sites, including a concrete manufacturing plant and electricity generation plants. Flights into and out of Saana halted for a month for repairs.

Following the cessation of American attacks on the Houthis, Israel responded to the continued firing of missiles towards it by attacking two Houthi sea ports and warning that it would attack a third.

Iran:

Negotiations continue between Iran and the US. The Iranians say their red line is they must be allowed to continue the low-grade enrichment of uranium that is not enough to create nuclear weapons. However, any ability to enrich to even at a low grade means they will be able to enrich to a high grade if they choose to do so.

Over the past month, several Iranian military industries have suffered explosions and fires. Each time, the authorities claimed the cause was accidental. Opposition groups say they were actually deliberate attacks by unnamed parties. The incidents began with a huge explosion at the main Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. The explosion was preceded by small fires that reached and detonated an improperly stored concentration of raw materials used for rocket fuel. At least 35 people were killed and 1,130 injured in this incident alone.

The Iranians also reported thwarting a “massive” cyber-attack – allegedly one of the widest and most complex ever conducted against them.

Egypt and Jordan:

The Israelis thwarted a number of attempts to smuggle weapons to the Palestinians via Egypt and Jordan. These attempts included ground infiltrations and drones carrying weapons that were shot down. It is not known how many such attempts were successful.

The Jordanians discovered “activity threatening the well-being of the kingdom and its citizens” by members of the Muslim Brotherhood and initiated a crackdown on all people and organizations affiliated with that movement, of which Hamas is the Palestinian branch. This is considered a major shift in official policy.

Israeli casualties:

The total number of Israeli fatalities since the war began at approximately 06:30 on 7 October 2023 is now 1,016 civilians (one more since my last update) and 856 soldiers (nine killed in Gaza since my last update). Approximately 10,300 Israeli civilians and 16,500 soldiers have been wounded (this number is an update that includes 7,000 psychiatric casualties). There are still 58 Israelis held captive in Gaza – 23 alive and 35 dead.

WHAT NEXT?

Israel is renewing its major ground operations in Gaza under the name “Gideon’s Chariots”. However, the door is still open to an agreement if Hamas agrees to Israel’s basic terms: returning all the kidnappees, handing over governance of Gaza to somebody else, and either disarming or leaving Gaza. According to statements by Israel’s political and military leaders, the object this time is to occupy all the territory of Gaza, separate the population from Hamas, and complete the organization’s defeat. Hamas continues to fight, but it is focused more on survival than anything else. It still hopes to defeat Israel at the negotiating table by playing the kidnappee card and exploiting propaganda about the suffering of the civilian population (suffering that is largely created by Hamas itself, which does not allow the complete and free distribution of humanitarian aid that enters Gaza).

The issue of Iran is still not finished either. Negotiations between Iran and the US have begun, but there are no results so far. Meanwhile, following the ceasefire with the Houthis, the US is reducing its military forces in the Middle East. This means that at least for the immediate future, military action by American forces – though purportedly still on the table – is not likely.

Small-scale exchanges between Israel and the Houthis will likely continue. The Houthis say they will stop firing at Israel only after the war in Gaza is over. Israel can inflict significant damage on the Houthis, but not enough to compel them to cease fire. They will do so only if they decide the cost is not worth continuing the exchange.

****

19 March – 11 April 2025

Gaza:

While the fighting in Gaza has been renewed, diplomatic efforts to end the war have not abated. The Egyptians and the Emiratis in particular are trying to work out options for ending the war. The Emirati direction is closer to that taken by President Trump and Israel (the removal of Hamas from Gaza plus the evacuation of a portion of the Gaza population, at least temporarily), while the Egyptians are attempting to find a solution that is closer (though not identical) to the demands of Hamas (a non-Hamas government, but with Hamas remaining present in the Strip). The first Egyptian proposal was apparently dismissed out of hand by the US.

The official Hamas red line is its disarmament. Whether it directly governs Gaza or controls it from behind a front of supposedly independent technocrats seems, at present, to be less important to the group.

Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fired 20-25 rockets at southern Tel Aviv, Ashkelon and Beersheva from locations across the Gaza Strip (the exact number of rockets is not clear because there were some false alarms). At least one rocket fell inside the Strip. One salvo of 10 rockets aimed at Ashkelon injured nine people. Put together, the salvos wounded about 30 people, almost all through falls they suffered while rushing to shelter.

The rockets were fired from different areas. In one case, the launchers were placed right next to a humanitarian safe zone in Beyt Lahia. After each launch, the population of the area from which the rockets were launched received orders from the IDF (leaflets, social media messages, etc.) to evacuate. The messages included maps showing which areas to leave and where to go. This was in addition to evacuation orders from areas the IDF ground forces were reentering. UNRWA claims that about 400,000 Palestinians have evacuated the areas as ordered by the IDF.

Example of evacuation map sent by the IDF to the local population

This map shows the northern portion of the city of Khan Yunis

Israeli airstrikes on identified targets and Hamas senior and mid-level officials and military commanders continue, with more than a dozen killed so far. Among those killed were the Hamas prime minister (he was hiding in a hospital, and a small guided munition was fired into the room) and Hamas’s equivalent of a defense minister.

Israeli ground troops entered the Strip in various locations, increasing the depth of the 1-kilometer perimeter Israel has held since withdrawing during the ceasefire to several kilometers:

From the northern border, Israeli forces are moving closer to Gaza City, especially along the coast (the same direction they originally entered Gaza in late October 2023)

South of the city of Gaza, the IDF returned to the Netzarim Corridor, which separates northern and central Gaza. The IDF has not yet completely blocked the corridor. The coastal area is still open for travel

In the south, the IDF moved back into two areas around the city of Rafah from which it had withdrawn. Another force advanced north along the coast, closer to the al-Muwasi humanitarian area declared by the IDF last year

A new corridor, called Morag, is being taken north of Rafah, separating it from the rest of the Gaza Strip

The Hamas Ministry of Health, which had published numbers of killed including the missing, has gone back to its previous pattern of not including the missing. Its latest casualty update (24 March) is 50,810 killed and 115,700 wounded. Hamas still does not differentiate between combatants and non-combatants. According to the IDF, the killed include a verified total of more than 20,000 Hamas personnel and at least 3,000 personnel of other terrorist organizations. The number of wounded terrorists is not known but is probably at least similar to the number killed.

Whereas most western countries have denounced Israel’s renewed offensive, the US government has declared unqualified support.

The humanitarian issue is again being trumpeted by Hamas, which claims that the stopping of supply convoys is threatening the population of Gaza with starvation and a lack of medical supplies. Israel responded that about 25,000 truckloads (enough for 50 days) entered Gaza during the ceasefire and Hamas is hoarding most of their contents – including supplies that arrived prior to the ceasefire – in its own warehouses and is selling them to the population at exorbitant prices to fund its activities.

An Egyptian aid worker giving an aid box to a local Gazan (downloaded from a Gazan newsperson’s social media by Israeli blogger Abu Ali Express)

In Gaza there have been increasing protests demanding that Hamas surrender and leave the Strip and complaining about Hamas not distributing the supplies that have arrived. These protests have been small in scale so far, but the number of participants is gradually increasing as is the spread. Initially, the protests were occurring only in northern Gaza, but they have taken place in central Gaza as well and have recently spread to southern Gaza.

It is still too early to tell if these protests are harbingers of change or just the expressions of a small minority. At first, Hamas did not respond with violence, instead trying to pass off the protests as directed against Israel. Hamas media and Al-Jazeera ignored the statements being made against Hamas and quoted only the demands that the ceasefire be renewed. But after a few days, Hamas began to capture and even kill some of the protesters. This diminished the number of protests but did not halt them entirely. In one case, the clan of a protester killed by Hamas security forces retaliated by killing the Hamas police officer who had shot their family member. There have been a few other skirmishes between clans and Hamas security forces.

There have also been many more posts on social media by Gazans saying they would leave Gaza permanently if only they were allowed to do so. While these posts are increasing in number, they are still relatively rare, and we cannot know how deep this sentiment really is – are they exceptions, or do they represent the feelings of a much larger proportion of the population?

Anti-Hamas protest (from Palestinian social media by Israeli blogger Abu Ali Express)

Late at night on 23 March 2025, a Red Cross convoy of paramedics was fired on by Israeli soldiers in southern Gaza. The Israelis were lying in ambush along a road used by Hamas. They had engaged a group of Hamas terrorists in a firefight shortly beforehand, killing one and capturing two. Soon after the firefight, the troops was informed that a convoy of vehicles was driving in their direction. The convoy stopped near the site of the previous skirmish and the occupants rapidly dismounted. The soldiers assumed that this was another Hamas force coming to reinforce the previous group and opened fire. Fifteen were killed.

The soldiers reported that they did not see the ambulance’s emergency lights flashing, but a video from the telephone of one of the killed shows the convoy driving with flashing lights. Hamas often uses ambulances and other supposedly innocent and protected vehicles to transport personnel and military equipment, so whether or not the soldiers saw the lights is less relevant (though it still requires an answer). The way the convoy sped into the area next to the soldiers and quickly dismounted in the same place where a skirmish had just occurred created the perception of a threat. A list of the killed showed that six of them were indeed Hamas personnel.

The bodies were buried on the spot. This was reported as an attempted cover-up, but it is standard procedure. The IDF does not collect bodies. They are buried on site (to prevent animals approaching them) and the UN is informed where to pick them up.

There were also claims that the soldiers had captured, bound, and then executed the paramedics. This is denied by the IDF. The soldiers approached the bodies only after the shooting had ended in order to bury them.

Judea and Samaria (a.k.a. the West Bank):

In Judea and Samaria, Israel’s Operation Iron Wall continues. Israeli forces are gradually operating in new areas.

Since the beginning of the operation, more than 100 terrorists have been killed and approximately 1,200 captured. In each area of the operation, the local population is first told to move to other towns or villages. All buildings where weapons stores or weapons manufacturing equipment is found are demolished. These number in the hundreds.

The Fatah-controlled security forces of the Palestinian Authority have also conducted operations against their Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad rivals in areas where the IDF is not operating. They have arrested several hundred terrorists.

Hamas has attempted to galvanize the population to join the fighting against the IDF, but so far with virtually no response. In fact, the frequency of terrorist attacks against Israelis has gone down considerably. During the first three months of 2024 there were approximately 535 terrorist attacks in or from Judea and Samaria. In the last three months of 2024 there were approximately 420, and in the first three months of 2025 the total is approximately 320.

Conversely, there has been an escalation over the past month in attacks by Israeli civilians on Palestinian villages. Each such incident involves mutual accusations of who started it. The Palestinians claim that the actions are initiated by the Israeli civilians without provocation, while the Israelis claim they are immediate retaliations for attacks by Palestinians on Israeli civilians passing or working near the villages. The Palestinian attacks usually involve the throwing of stones (not included in the above figures on attacks on Israelis; there are usually 300-500 stoning incidents per month) or petrol bombs thrown at passing cars. In one case, an attempt was made to steal a flock of sheep from an Israeli herder who phoned for help. Each time these clashes occur, the IDF and the Israeli police are called in to separate the belligerents.

Israeli casualties in or from Judea and Samaria since 7 October 2023 are 41 Israeli civilians killed (one more since my last update), 31 soldiers/police killed (no more since my last update during Operation Iron Wall), and 503 wounded (six more since my last update). Most are civilians.

Total Palestinian fatalities since 7 October 2023 are about 1,000 and more than 7,000 have been arrested (though hundreds were subsequently released in exchanges for Israeli kidnappees). The number of wounded is not known. The Palestinians claim that more than 15,000 Palestinians were arrested during this period, but they are counting persons temporarily detained for questioning and released immediately after.

Syria:

Israeli troops are still holding a buffer zone inside Syria. In addition to holding various key points, they are conducting patrols and searching for local weapons stores. The majority of the local population prefers not to interfere with the IDF’s activities and to hand over weapons when called upon to do so.

There has been a third incident in which Israeli troops were fired upon (no Israeli casualties) by several dozen armed men when they approached a village in the southern area of the Syrian Golan Heights. During the civil war, this area was dominated by ISIS supporters, which might explain the aggressiveness against Israel. Israeli forces returned fire with tanks and an armed drone, killing nine of the attackers and wounding 20. The rest of the attackers retreated. Subsequently, fearing a larger Israeli reaction, the population of the village began to evacuate. The Israelis continued their patrol and did not conduct any more retaliatory actions. It is not clear if the population has returned. Over the following week, several factions of Islamist organizations said they would send fighters to southern Syria to attack Israel. Since then there have been no more reports of similar incidents or threats.

Meanwhile, Israel’s relations with the Syrian Druze community are developing positively. The Israelis are supplying the Druze with humanitarian aid and have said they will assist them militarily if the new radical Sunni regime, which sees the Druze as heretics, attacks them.

Israel continues to occasionally bomb Syrian army bases containing weapons and equipment belonging to the former regime to prevent their being incorporated into the army of the new regime.

Turkey and the new Syrian regime are signing a mutual defense pact. The new regime is also permitting the Turks to convert two Syrian air bases, one in northern Syria and one near the border with Iraq. The latter base was used by the Iranians and Iraqi militias serving Iran over the past decade. They withdrew from it after the fall of the Assad regime.

A couple of days after it was reported that Syria intended to hand the base over to the Turks, the Israeli air force bombed it to destroy its equipment and facilities. It should be noted that Turkey is a major supporter of Hamas, which maintains a political and military/terrorist presence there, and the Erdogan regime has been publicly threatening military action against Israel for a decade. Erdogan’s threatening rhetoric has increased over the past year.

An Arab internet news site has reported that Turkey and Israel are negotiating a means of preventing direct confrontation during their military operations in Syria. Over the past decade, Israel and Russia had a similar agreement that enabled them to conduct military operations in Syria without confronting one another.

Lebanon:

Hezbollah’s activities are still focused on trying to salvage undamaged weapons and equipment from bombed storage sites or from sites the Israelis did not know to bomb all over Lebanon. In southern Lebanon they are trying to infiltrate personnel into the border areas, especially the villages near the Israeli border that were its main locations from which to attack Israel, to conduct both salvage and intelligence operations. These activities violate the ceasefire agreement, giving Israel the right to retaliate.

Israel continues to attack Hezbollah storage sites and personnel in Lebanon and along the border with Syria (weapons smuggling operations) at an average rate of two or three strikes per day. In one case, Israel responded with a strike in the Dahya quarter of Beirut after warning the population to evacuate. The target was a drone storage site Hezbollah was trying to rebuild. This was the first Israeli attack in Beirut since the beginning of the ceasefire. A second strike in the Dahya killed a Hamas commander in an apartment building with a small warhead fired into his room.

There have been at least two Israeli ground raids into Lebanese villages from which it had withdrawn. In at least one raid, the Israeli troops left a letter stating that the raid had been conducted because of Hezbollah activity and telling local residents to not risk their lives and property by allowing Hezbollah access to their homes.

Despite repeatedly threatening to respond, Hezbollah has not done so except perhaps on one occasion (see below).

Now that the land route from Iran through Syria and the direct aerial route to Lebanon are blocked for transfer of supplies and money to Hezbollah (the land route by the new Syrian regime and the aerial route by the new Lebanese government and Israel), Iran is trying to send equipment and funds to Hezbollah by the much longer maritime route on supposedly innocent merchant ships.

On 22 March, six rockets were fired from Lebanon at the Israeli border village of Metulla. There were no casualties. It is not known who fired the rockets. Hezbollah denied responsibility, and there are at least a dozen other groups in Lebanon, including Hamas and other Palestinian groups, who may be the culprits. Regardless of Hezbollah’s denial, Israel responded with artillery fire and airstrikes on 50 Hezbollah targets all over Lebanon, including along the border with Syria. This was the first major incident since the ceasefire began.

Over the past decade, Hezbollah has occasionally allowed other groups to fire at Israel so it could deny involvement. Two more rocket attacks have occurred since the 22 March attack, but these do not appear to have been by Hezbollah. They were probably committed by Palestinian organizations in Lebanon, with or without the assistance and approval of Hezbollah.

The Lebanese government has ordered its army to increase activities in southern Lebanon to ensure that this kind of action is not repeated. The object is to prevent Israel from being provoked into a major retaliation. The Lebanese army also arrested several people in connection with the aforementioned rocket launches.

Skirmishes on the border between Lebanon and Syria have continued intermittently but seem to have diminished with the help of mediation by Saudi Arabia.

Hezbollah’s political rivals in Lebanon are repeatedly making public statements demanding that it relinquish all its weapons and cease provoking Israel.

Yemen:

The drizzle of missiles from Yemen to Israel continues at a rate of one or two per day. About 20 missiles and exploding drones have been launched so far. None has reached Israeli territory, about half crashed enroute, and the others were intercepted before reaching Israel, though in two cases debris had enough momentum to land inside Israel. The issue of debris is why Israelis are told to stay in shelters for about ten minutes after the missiles are intercepted.

The Houthis say they are targeting Israel’s international airport in an attempt to blockade Israel’s international air traffic, similar to the blockade on Israel’s Red Sea port of Eilat. In each attack, Israeli air traffic controllers tell incoming aircraft to circle temporarily before allowing them to land a few minutes after the incoming missile is intercepted.

In every case, the Houthis claim their attacks were successful.

Several Israelis have been wounded in falls as they rush to shelter. These have all been superficial or light injuries up to this point.

It was reported that the US has asked Israel not to respond to the attacks from Yemen, as the US is taking responsibility for that front.

American airstrikes continue on Houthi targets in Yemen. Targets include larger radar, command and launcher sites in towns as well as other Houthi sites. The Americans also seem to be hunting down Houthi senior officers and officials. These moves contrast with those of the previous White House, which limited its strikes to isolated rural facilities that were usually small weapons depots or minor command and sensor nodes. Over the past month, there have been more US strikes on the Houthis than over the previous year and a half. At least 150 Houthi personnel have been killed and an undisclosed number wounded. These include a number of senior personnel. The US is not disclosing exact details of the attacks.

The Houthis claim to be retaliating by firing missiles at US ships, especially the aircraft carrier from which the American aircraft are launched. How real these counter-strikes are is not clear, but apparently none have hit. The Houthis also claim to have shot down some American drones.

Meanwhile, another American aircraft carrier has arrived in the region as well as B2 heavy bombers deploying to the American Diego Garcia base in the southern Indian Ocean. From that location, they can reach Yemen and Iran with a full bomb-load. The bombers have already conducted strikes in Yemen.

President Trump has stated that the attacks on the Houthis will not cease until they ar

Based on facts, either observed and verified firsthand by the reporter, or reported and verified from knowledgeable sources.

Newsweek AI is in beta. Translations may contain inaccuracies—please refer to the original content.

A spokesperson for Hezbollah told Newsweek that the Iran-aligned Lebanese militant group did not have immediate plans to retaliate against Israel and the United States after President Donald Trump ordered direct U.S. strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities.

“Iran is a strong country capable of defending itself, logic dictates that it can confront America and Israel,” a Hezbollah spokesperson said in a message to Newsweek late Saturday. “Hezbollah remains committed to all matters agreed upon since the ceasefire.”

Hezbollah signed a ceasefire with Israel last November, just over a year after the Palestinian Hamas movement launched a surprise attack against Israel, sparking a regional conflict that drew in the Iran-led Axis of Resistance coalition.

Israel and Hezbollah have since continued to accuse one another of violating the truce. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) carried out strikes in recent days against the group’s leadership, special forces and military infrastructure in Lebanon, citing “intelligence indicating Hezbollah’s attempts to rebuild its capabilities.”

“Despite the attacks carried out by the Israeli enemy,” the Hezbollah spokesperson added, “the party has remained committed to the agreement.”

Hezbollah had previously indicated to Newsweek that the group would not intervene directly in support of Tehran after Israel launched a sweeping series of strikes against Iran last week, setting off daily exchanges of fire between the longtime foes.

Yet Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned Friday that Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem “hasn’t learned from his predecessors and is threatening to act against Israel.” He urged that “the Lebanese proxy be careful and understand that Israel has lost patience with the terrorists who threaten it.”

The Hezbollah spokesperson with whom Newsweek spoke the following day emphasized that Qassem, who assumed the helm after Israel killed longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah last September, has “supported” Iran through his statements, and that future actions may affect the group’s calculus.

“Therefore, the issue remains subject to developments,” the Hezbollah spokesperson said. “However, Iran certainly has its own military capabilities.”

Demonstrators wave Hezbollah flags and cheer during a protest against Israeli attacks on Iran, after the Friday prayer ceremonies on June 20, 2025, in central Tehran, Iran. Demonstrators wave Hezbollah flags and cheer during a protest against Israeli attacks on Iran, after the Friday prayer ceremonies on June 20, 2025, in central Tehran, Iran. Majid Saeedi/Getty Images

Trump first announced via Truth Social late Saturday, early Sunday local time in Iran, that the U.S. had completed a “very successful attack on the three Nuclear sites in Iran, including Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan.”

The strikes came after more than a week of speculation of forthcoming U.S. military intervention, fueled by aircraft movements, the evacuation of nonessential staff and U.S. citizens in the region as well as Trump’s own threats to the Islamic Republic and its leadership, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

The Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant had particularly been in focus given that current and former Israeli officials had long assessed only the U.S. military’s Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) “bunker buster” bombs would be capable of destroying the heavily fortified underground facility located beneath a mountain around 20 miles from the city of Qom.

Addressing the nation from the East Room late Saturday, Trump said that “Iran’s key nuclear enrichment facilities have been completely and totally obliterated.” He indicated that he was not immediately planning to pursue further military action against Iran but threatened to do so “if peace does not come quickly.”

Iran has always denied seeking a nuclear weapon, but the country has substantially ramped up uranium enrichment since Trump abandoned a multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran and major powers during his first administration in 2018.

Since Trump assumed office again in January, Tehran and Washington have engaged in five rounds of talks toward securing a new agreement through which Iran’s nuclear program would be subject to restriction in exchange for sanctions relief.

A sixth round of negotiations had been scheduled for last Sunday, but was canceled after Israel launched its unprecedented series of attacks against Iran, killing senior commanders and nuclear scientists as well as targeting military sites and nuclear facilities. Shortly after the Israeli campaign began, Israeli officials alleged that Iran had obtained enough nuclear material to produce 15 nuclear bombs.

Iran has responded to Israeli attacks by launching hundreds of missiles and drones against Israel over the past week. Iranian officials had warned that U.S. bases in the region could be subject to retaliatory action as well if the U.S. became directly involved in the conflict.

Other Axis of Resistance groups in the Middle East, including Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah and Yemen’s Ansar Allah, also known as the Houthi movement, have also warned of potential attacks against U.S. positions in the region in the event of a U.S. strike against Iran.

About an hour after Trump announced the U.S. operation against Iran on social media, the IDF issued a heightened state of alert for Israel, restricting the public from engaging in all but “Essential Activity.”

Iran later conducted a new around of missile strikes against Israel, followed by an IDF report of Israeli strikes being conducted in western Iran.

Reached for comment, the Iranian Mission to the United Nations shared with Newsweek a social media statement alongside a letter in which Iranian Permanent Representative to the U.N. Amir Saeid Iravani expressed to U.N. leadership his condemnation of what he called “unprovoked and premeditated acts of aggression” by the U.S. and urged the U.N. Security Council to take action.

“The United States and the bloodthirsty Zionist Regime of Israel shall be held fully accountable for these flagrant violations of international law and must face the grave consequences thereof,” the Iranian Mission said.

Update 06/22/25 5:09 a.m. ET: The headline was amended for clarity.

The IDF emphasized the strategic importance of the target, describing it as part of a significant underground project critical to Hezbollah’s military operations. “The presence of this site and the attempts to re-establish it constitute a blatant violation of the understandings between Israel and Lebanon,” the IDF declared in a statement. The military underscored its commitment to preventing Hezbollah from reactivating the facility, adding, “The IDF will not allow Hezbollah to operate at this site and will continue to act to eliminate any threat to the State of Israel.”

Lebanese media reported explosions in the area, corroborating the IDF’s account of the strike. The operation follows heightened tensions in the region, with Israel maintaining close surveillance of Hezbollah’s activities amid ongoing conflicts, including recent U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and continued fighting in Gaza. The Beaufort Castle area, a historic stronghold, has been a focal point for Hezbollah’s military infrastructure, making it a recurring target for Israeli operations aimed at curbing the group’s capabilities.

This airstrike aligns with Israel’s broader strategy to counter Hezbollah’s rearmament and fortification efforts, particularly after intense clashes in October 2024. The IDF’s actions reflect a zero-tolerance policy toward violations of bilateral agreements, as Israel seeks to maintain security along its northern border while addressing multiple regional threats.

In an official statement, the Home Secretary Yvette Cooper says:

“I have decided to proscribe Palestine Action under section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000. A draft proscription order will be laid in Parliament on Monday 30 June. If passed, it will make it illegal to be a member of, or invite support for, Palestine Action.”

It goes on to say that “the disgraceful attack on Brize Norton in the early hours of the morning on Friday 20 June is the latest in a long history of unacceptable criminal damage committed by Palestine Action. The UK’s defence enterprise is vital to the nation’s national security and this Government will not tolerate those that put that security at risk. Counter Terrorism Policing are leading the criminal investigation into this attack. It is important that this process is free from interference and the police are allowed to carry out their important work gathering evidence and working to bring the perpetrators to justice.

“Since its inception in 2020, Palestine Action has orchestrated a nationwide campaign of direct criminal action against businesses and institutions, including key national infrastructure and defence firms that provide services and supplies to support Ukraine, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), “Five Eyes” allies and the UK defence enterprise. Its activity has increased in frequency and severity since the start of 2024 and its methods have become more aggressive, with its members demonstrating a willingness to use violence. Palestine Action has also broadened its targets from the defence industry to include financial firms, charities, universities and government buildings. Its activities meet the threshold set out in the statutory tests established under the Terrorism Act 2000. This has been assessed through a robust evidence-based process, by a wide range of experts from across government, the police and the Security Services.”

The statement described millions of pounds worth of property damage, and says that proscription will “enable law enforcement to effectively disrupt the escalating actions of this serious group. Only last month Palestine Action claimed responsibility for an attack against a Jewish-owned business in North London, where the glass-front of the building was smashed and the building and floor defaced with red-paint including the slogan “drop Elbit”. Such incidents do not represent legitimate or peaceful protest. Regardless of whether this incident itself amounts to terrorism, such activity is clearly intimidatory and unacceptable. It is one that has been repeated many times by this organisation at sites the length and breadth of the UK.”

1 dead, 11 injured in Nabatieh following intense Israeli airstrikes

BEIRUT: On Friday afternoon, a series of Israeli airstrikes targeted southern Lebanon, including a residential building in Nabatieh, located 77 km south of Beirut.

According to the Ministry of Health, the raids killed a woman, the owner of a shop located within the targeted building, and injured 11 others.

Lebanon’s Prime Minister Nawaf Salam has condemned the attacks, calling them “a blatant violation of national sovereignty and of the ceasefire agreement reached in November.

“They also threaten the stability we are striving to maintain.”

According to official and security sources, the Israeli army launched a wave of violent and extensive raids on the hills surrounding Nabatieh. This marks the second-largest assault on Nabatieh since the ceasefire.

The strikes appear to have targeted ammunition depots, as prolonged explosions were heard across the area.

More than 20 airstrikes were launched on Nabatieh within 15 minutes. This formed a ring of fire around its forests, valleys and hills, in particularly the Ali Al-Taher hills, Jarmaq, Al-Dabshah, Kfar Tebnit heights and Nabatieh Al-Fawqa.

As explosions echoed across southern Lebanon, a security source stated that “the missiles used in this attack were likely concussion missiles given the intensity of the blasts.”

Residents claimed that the targeted sites included Hezbollah warehouses and tunnels used by the group.

Dozens of homes in Kfar Tebnit, Nabatieh Al-Fawqa and Kafr Rumman sustained damage, with windows shattered by the blasts. Rocks and debris from the strikes also blocked the Nabatieh-Khardali road.

The Israeli army carried out similar attacks in the area at the beginning of May.

Israeli army spokesman Avichay Adraee said that “Israeli warplanes targeted a site used by Hezbollah to operate fire control and defense systems in Jabal Shqif, southern Lebanon.”

He claimed: “The site was part of an underground project that had been put out of service following previous Israeli airstrikes on the area. The army observed attempts to restore the site, which is why the terrorist infrastructure in the area was struck.”

Israeli Army Radio reported that “extensive raids are once again targeting underground structures in southern Lebanon after restoration efforts were detected.”

The Israeli army insists on blocking any restoration efforts or the removal of debris from the destroyed border area.

Earlier this morning, an Israeli drone dropped a stun grenade near two pickup trucks in the town of Ramyeh while the drivers were loading scrap metal. The drivers fled the scene, and no injuries were reported.

The ceasefire agreement faces a political deadlock because it is linked to several issues including the disarmament of Hezbollah forces north of the Litani River, Israel’s withdrawal from five occupied Lebanese hills, and the granting of social rights to Palestinian refugees.

In this context, former head of the Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Jumblatt, a key political figure in Lebanon, revealed unexpectedly that “his party had handed its weapons over to the relevant authorities about three weeks ago.”

During a press conference on Wednesday evening, Jumblatt reiterated that he had informed President Joseph Aoun of his decision immediately after the latter’s election, “and of his intention to fill constitutional vacancies,” a declaration that sparked political debate on Friday.

Jumblatt announced that “the weapons that were stored at a compromised site were intended for use in acts of murder.” He explained that he “alerted the presidency and the competent agencies to take possession of this arsenal before any disaster occurred.

“The handover took place about three weeks ago, but I chose to remain discreet to preserve stability, as wars were raging in the east and west, and have now calmed down, thank God.”

Jumblatt revealed that the “weapons were gradually accumulated following the events of May 2008 between the sovereign forces and Hezbollah and its allies.”

All parties in Lebanon had surrendered their weapons after the signing of the Taif Agreement, with the exception of Hezbollah, which considered its arsenal at the time as “weapons of resistance against Israel.”

Jumblatt added: “There was great tension between the PSP and the other party (Hezbollah) which resulted in casualties on both sides. I made significant efforts with everyone and the state, and even with Hezbollah itself.

“We had contact with the party when necessary, and we were able to bring the issue to a halt. However, the weapons existed; some were purchased, and others were scattered in some areas.

“I worked to assemble the weapons in a central location, and I collected most of them, light and medium weapons, along with some 23-caliber machine guns and others. The weapons were handed over to the state.”

Jumblatt emphasized that “today, a new chapter has opened in the Middle East, and the previous means of confrontation are no longer viable.”

“All weapons must be under the authority of the state,” he added.

“Therefore, if there is a Lebanese party or Lebanese parties, or even non-Lebanese parties, that possess weapons, I hope that they will hand them over to the state in the proper form and manner.”

He also called for “the need to grant Palestinians in Lebanon their full rights to work and live with dignity, away from the policies of segregation and containment.”

“There are occupied border points and villages that have been completely destroyed,” Jumblatt said, rejecting any link between the handover of weapons and Israel’s withdrawal.

He emphasized “adherence to UN resolutions, especially Resolution 1701 and the Taif Agreement.”

Regarding Shebaa Farms — an area still occupied by Israel, which Hezbollah considers its duty to liberate it — Jumblatt highlighted the international debate over whether the territory was part of Lebanon or Syria.

He highlighted Syria’s refusal to submit relevant documentation to the UN and recalled an “agreement reached in the Lebanese National Dialogue in 2006.

“The three of us, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and former Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and I, agreed to go to Syria to demarcate the borders of the Shebaa Farms.”

He added: “If the farms are Lebanese, we would proceed to the UN, and if not, we would go to the UN to determine the farms’ fate.

“The Shebaa Farms are Syrian, occupied by Israel and fall under the scope of Resolution 242. Mount Hermon remains under occupation, partly Syrian and partly Lebanese.”