Information Cutoff: 8:00 AM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) are publishing multiple updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on the exchange of fire between Iran and Israel. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.

Click here to see ISW-CTP’s interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Key Takeaways:

The ceasefire between Iran and Israel appears to be holding despite both Israeli and Iranian claims of violations. Israel has responded to perceived Iranian violations of the ceasefire but has not resumed its campaign at this time.

Iran has conducted at least seven ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff at 5:00 PM ET on June 23. Iran launched five of the attacks before the ceasefire went into effect at 12:00 AM ET, one attack at 12:06 AM ET, and one attack around 3:25 AM ET. Israel conducted several waves of airstrikes in Tehran on June 23 and 24 before and after the ceasefire went into effect.

An unspecified senior US military official told the Associated Press on June 24 that the United States intercepted drones that targeted Ain al Asad Airbase and another unspecified base near Baghdad Airport overnight on June 23 and 24.

The ceasefire between Iran and Israel appears to be holding despite both Israeli and Iranian claims of violations.[1] US President Donald Trump announced on June 23 that Iran and Israel agreed to a ceasefire.[2] Trump said that Iran would halt strikes on Israel 12 hours before Israel stopped attacks on Iran.[3] It appears that Iran halted strikes on Israel at 12:00 AM ET on June 24 whereas Israel halted attacks at 8:30 PM ET on June 23.[4] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi both confirmed that their forces would abide by the ceasefire.[5] The Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) also confirmed that Iran would adhere to the ceasefire.[6]

Israel has responded to perceived Iranian violations of the ceasefire but has not resumed its campaign at this time. Netanyahu said that Iran launched three ballistic missiles targeting Israel after the ceasefire went into effect.[7] Iranian media and officials denied the claim.[8] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck a radar in Babolsar, north of Tehran, in response to the Iranian missile attack after 12:00 AM ET.[9] Netanyahu said that Israel would refrain from additional retaliatory attacks after a conversation with Trump.[10] Netanyahu told the Israeli cabinet and senior security officials that the IDF achieved all of its objectives in its campaign against Iran.[11] Iran has not conducted an attack on Israel since approximately 3:25 AM ET on June 24.[12] Israel has not conducted an attack on Iran since approximately 7:35 AM ET on June 24.[13]

Iran has conducted at least seven ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff at 5:00 PM ET on June 23.[14] Iran launched five of the attacks before the ceasefire went into effect at 12:00 AM ET, one attack at 12:06 AM ET, and one attack around 3:25 AM ET.[15] An Iranian missile impacted a residential building in Beer Sheva in southern Israel, killing four people and injuring 22 others.[16] Iran fired three missiles after the ceasefire went into effect. The missiles were intercepted or landed in open areas in Israel.[17]

The IDF intercepted at least 15 one-way attack drones launched from Iran overnight on June 23 and 24.[18]

Israel conducted several waves of airstrikes in Tehran on June 23 and 24 before and after the ceasefire went into effect. An IDF spokesperson said that the Israeli Air Force dropped over 100 munitions on “dozens” of Iranian military targets in Tehran overnight on June 23 and 24.[19] A security source told Israeli Army Radio that the IDF struck Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) assets, weapons production sites, nuclear laboratories, and personnel.[20] The IDF struck the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), which played a leading role in the Iranian nuclear weapons research program before 2003.[21] This attack marks the third time that the IDF has struck the SPND headquarters in Tehran.[22] The IDF also killed Iranian nuclear scientist Sayyed Mohammad Reza Seddighi Saber in Gilan Province. Saber led the SPND’s Shahid Karimi Group, which works on “explosives-related projects.”[23] The United States sanctioned Saber in May 2025 for conducting research and tests that could support the development of nuclear weapons.[24]

The IDF issued evacuation orders for Mehran Neighborhood in northern Tehran and District Six in central Tehran on June 23 prior to the ceasefire.[25] Iranian social media users reported at least two strikes in or near District Six.[26]

An unspecified senior US military official told the Associated Press on June 24 that the United States intercepted drones that targeted Ain al Asad Airbase and another unspecified base near Baghdad Airport overnight on June 23 and 24.[27] One of the drones crashed at an unspecified location.[28] The attacks did not cause any casualties.[29] No group has claimed responsibility for the attacks at the time of this writing.

[1] https://x.com/EnglishFars/status/1937455051812810961

[2] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114734934153569653

[3] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114734934153569653

[4] https://x.com/IsraeliPM/status/1937494189866123723 ; https://x.com/araghchi/status/1937311435882922420

[5] https://x.com/IsraeliPM/status/1937494189866123723 ; https://x.com/araghchi/status/1937311435882922420

[6] https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/1937429289638494391 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/23701

[7] https://t.me/moriahdoron/23720 ; https://x.com/IsraeliPM/status/1937494187949097288

[8] https://t.me/moriahdoron/23698 ; https://x.com/EnglishFars/status/1937446418110664912

[9] https://t.me/moriahdoron/23719 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/23717 ; https://x.com/IsraeliPM/status/1937494196925174118

[10] https://x.com/IsraeliPM/status/1937494196925174118

[11] https://t.me/moriahdoron/23678

[12] https://x.com/IsraeliPM/status/1937494193351307702

[13] https://t.me/moriahdoron/23717

[14] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1937331898197725467 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1937338277981225158 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1937347640045224365; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1937353814300152252 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1937358589112258931 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1937363267623563580 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1937412610137207152

[15] https://x.com/IsraeliPM/status/1937494193351307702

[16] https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/1937351976611700980 ; https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/1937373643237130468 ; https://x.com/IsraeliPM/status/1937494189866123723

[17] https://x.com/IsraeliPM/status/1937494193351307702

[18] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1937443734192279601

[19] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1937408632905187365

[20] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1937367646229385296; https://t.me/moriahdoron/23659; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1937408632905187365

[21] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1937408632905187365; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-4-2025

[22] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1935912784811766144; https://x.com/IAFsite/status/1934031792018973137;

[23] https://apnews.com/live/iran-israel-war-updates-6-24-2025#00000197-a22f-dc47-a5f7-aebf35060000; https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1937334229840351486; https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/05/imposition-of-new-u-s-sanctions-related-to-iranian-nuclear-related-research-with-potential-military-applications; https://x.com/no_itsmyturn/status/1937331023244624311

[24] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/05/imposition-of-new-u-s-sanctions-related-to-iranian-nuclear-related-research-with-potential-military-applications/

[25] https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/1937278323861913982

[26] https://x.com/Vahid/status/1937310330373439899; https://x.com/Vahid/status/1937455045429330200

[27] https://apnews.com/article/israel-iran-trump-ceasefire-attacks-continue-f1e60190722cc3410b69f21717872ffa

[28] https://apnews.com/article/israel-iran-trump-ceasefire-attacks-continue-f1e60190722cc3410b69f21717872ffa

[29] https://apnews.com/article/israel-iran-trump-ceasefire-attacks-continue-f1e60190722cc3410b69f21717872ffa

Information Cutoff: 5:00 AM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) are publishing multiple updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on the exchange of fire between Iran and Israel. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.

Click here to see ISW-CTP’s interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

NOTE: CTP-ISW is tracking early reports of Iranian missile attacks on US forces in Qatar and Iraq at the time of this publication. CTP-ISW will cover these events in our evening edition. We have published an assessment of Iran’s calculus and response options here.

Key Takeaways

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted airstrikes on June 23 targeting roads leading to the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) in order to “disrupt” access to the site. Israeli strikes on access roads to Fordow may prevent Iran from being able to assess damage at Fordow or move materials from the site to another location.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued to target Iranian internal security and social control institutions in Tehran. The IDF targeted the Basij headquarters in Tehran. The IDF also struck Evin Prison, which is Iran’s primary facility for holding regime dissidents. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF struck the prison’s entrances to facilitate the escape of regime dissidents.

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted airstrikes on June 23 targeting roads leading to the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) in order to “disrupt” access to the site.[6] These strikes mark the first time that CTP-ISW has recorded Israeli airstrikes targeting access roads to Fordow. The IDF struck air defenses that protected Fordow during the initial days of the Israeli air campaign.[7] The Israeli strikes on access roads come after the United States struck Fordow with bunker-buster bombs on June 21.[8] The chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that Fordow, Natanz, and an unspecified nuclear facility in Esfahan sustained “extreme damage” from the US strikes.[9] Israeli officials echoed this statement but noted that the Fordow nuclear facility was “not destroyed.”[10] Israeli strikes on access roads to Fordow may prevent Iran from being able to assess damage at Fordow or move materials from the site to another location. Israeli officials told the New York Times on June 22 that Iran may have moved materials and equipment from Fordow ahead of the US strikes.[11]

The IDF has continued to target Iranian internal security and social control institutions in Tehran. The IDF targeted the Basij headquarters in Tehran.[12] The Basij is a paramilitary organization that recruits and organizes regime loyalists and uses them to produce and disseminate propaganda, suppress internal dissent, and conduct civil defense operations.[13] The IDF previously targeted the Basij headquarters in Esfahan on June 17.[14] The IDF also struck Evin Prison, which is Iran’s primary facility for holding regime dissidents.[15] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF struck the prison’s entrances to facilitate the escape of regime dissidents.[16] Iranian media reported that Israeli airstrikes damaged a power feeder in Evin District, causing a power outage in the area.[17] An open-source watcher reported that the IDF targeted the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) headquarters, a state-controlled media outlet that the regime uses to disseminate propaganda.[18] The US Treasury sanctioned IRIB and added it to the Specially Designated National (SDN) list in 2013.[19] The IDF previously targeted the IRIB headquarters on June 16.[20]

There are unverified reports of Israeli airstrikes targeting the Tehran Power Distribution Company and a building at or near the Energy Ministry.[21] Electricity disruptions, particularly during hot summer temperatures, could fuel internal unrest and stoke protests, which could in turn threaten regime stability.

The IDF targeted the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Sarallah Operational Base and other IRGC headquarters in Tehran.[22] The Sarallah Operational Base is responsible for security in Tehran and oversees the 10th Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Division in Karaj, Alborz Province, and the 27th Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Operational Division in Tehran City.[23] The headquarters has historically played a significant role in suppressing internal dissent.[24] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF estimates that it killed many IRGC personnel in its recent strikes on IRGC facilities, given that the IDF did not issue evacuation warnings ahead of the strikes.[25]

The IDF struck military infrastructure in Tehran. The IDF struck a surface-to-air missile launcher in the “heart of Tehran.”[26] CTP-ISW is monitoring additional reports of IDF strikes in Tehran after its 5:00 AM ET data cutoff for this update. CTP-ISW will cover these strikes in its June 23 evening update.

The IDF conducted a series of airstrikes in western Iran on June 22 targeting missile launchers, missile storage facilities, and satellite and radar sites.[27] The IDF said that it struck positions in Kermanshah and Hamedan.[28]

Iran has conducted at least four ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff at 5:00 PM ET on June 22.[29] An Israeli military correspondent reported that Iran fired six or seven missiles across four waves of attacks, citing IDF assessments.[30] An Iranian missile impacted near a power station in Ashdod.[31] A missile or fragment fell near Safed and started a fire.[32] The attacks did not cause any injuries or casualties.

The IAF intercepted a drone near Eilat before it entered Israeli airspace.[33]

[1] https://amwaj.media/en/media-monitor/exclusive-iranian-retaliation-against-us-forces-most-probably-hours-away

[2] https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1937144830896877705

[3] https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/1937031939732668460

[4] https://x.com/mehrnews_ir/status/1936789878735282619

[5] https://www.nbcnews.com/nightly-news/video/u-s-officials-iran-threatened-terror-attacks-inside-u-s-242058821681

[6] https://x.com/IAFsite/status/1937100320556937347

[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-edition-israeli-strikes-iran-june-13-2025-200-pm-et

[8] https://www.axios.com/2025/06/21/us-strike-iran-nuclear-israel-trump

[9] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4222543/secretary-of-defense-pete-hegseth-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-gen/

[10] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/22/world/middleeast/iran-fordo-nuclear-damaged-not-destroyed.html?smid=url-share

[11] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/22/world/middleeast/iran-fordo-nuclear-damaged-not-destroyed.html?smid=url-sha

[13] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/explainer-the-iranian-armed-forces

[14] https://t.me/BenTzionM/5116

[15] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1937079090864865516

[16] https://t.me/moriahdoron/23581

[17] https://x.com/mehrnews_ir/status/1937073620213264455

[18] https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1937073822588362774

[19] https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20130206_33

[20] https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/1934648422738620897

[21] https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1937072736871797069 ; https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1937068784826937535

[22] https://t.me/moriahdoron/23585; https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/iran-news/article-858648

[23] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200121-Report-Iran%E2%80%99s-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf

[24] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/murmurs-second-cultural-revolution

[25] https://t.me/moriahdoron/23588

[26] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936885128245940475

[27] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936885128245940475

[28] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936885128245940475

[29] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936938282165862723 ;

[30] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1937062299233046772

[31] https://x.com/andynovy/status/1937057924381102573

[32] https://x.com/i24NEWS_EN/status/1937070603330056521

[33] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936977151988810014

Information Cutoff: 5:00 AM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) are publishing multiple updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on the exchange of fire between Iran and Israel. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.

Click here to see ISW-CTP’s interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Key Takeaways

The United States conducted strikes targeting three nuclear facilities with bunker-buster bombs and Tomahawk cruise missiles. The US chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said all three sites sustained “extreme damage.” Israeli officials echoed that statement, though they added the Fordow nuclear facility was “not destroyed.”

Iran began taking steps to retaliate against the United States, including by threatening shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran likely interfered with GPS signals in the Strait of Hormuz on June 22.

Israel continued its air campaign against Iran.

US strikes

The United States conducted strikes against three Iranian nuclear sites, including the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEEP) in Qom Province.[1] A US official told the New York Times that six American warplanes dropped 12 30,000-lb GBU-57 massive ordnance penetrator (MOP) bunker-busting bombs on Fordow.[2] The standard payload of a B-2 bomber is 40,000 lb, but the bomber refueled immediately after takeoff.[3] US President Donald Trump said on June 21 that US strikes were a “spectacular military success” and were a part of the US objective to destroy Iran’s nuclear enrichment capacity.[4] Trump said the facilities were “completely and totally obliterated.” The chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff said all three sites sustained “extreme damage and destruction.”[5] The chairman added that he did not yet have a complete battle damage assessment at this time, however. A senior Israeli official told Axios that US strikes set back Iran’s nuclear program by years.[6] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that there has been ”no increase in off-site radiation levels” following the attacks.[7]

Satellite imagery of Fordow from June 22 shows six probable entry-point craters on top of a ridge above the underground complex that houses two halls of at least 2000 centrifuges. Approximately half of the centrifuges at Fordow are advanced IR-6 centrifuges. The Wall Street Journal reported that Fordow was producing nearly enough highly enriched uranium to fuel one nuclear weapon per month. Two unspecified Israeli officials with knowledge of the matter said initial Israeli assessments indicate that US strikes did not destroy but inflicted serious damage to the site at Fordow.[8] The officials added that it appears Iran moved materials and equipment from the site ahead of the strike. A senior US official similarly said that the US strikes did not destroy but severely damaged the Fordow nuclear site and took it “off the table.”[9]

The US official also told the New York Times that a US B-2 bomber dropped two GBU-57 MOPs on the Natanz nuclear site.[10] Israel has previously struck Natanz multiple times since the start of Israel’s air campaign against Iran on June 12.[11] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi previously stated that Israeli strikes likely damaged or destroyed several thousand centrifuges at Natanz.[12] Satellite imagery from June 22 shows a probable entry-point crater at the above-ground complex at the Natanz nuclear site.

The United States separately struck an unspecified nuclear site in Esfahan with cruise missiles.[13] It is unclear what site the US strikes targeted. Israel has previously targeted the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) on June 13 and 21 and caused substantial damage to several facilities in the complex, including centrifuge production facilities and a uranium conversion plant.[14] Satellite imagery from June 22 shows that US strikes likely damaged additional buildings within the complex. The United States may have also struck a new Iranian nuclear facility south of Natanz in Esfahan Province. The Institute for Science and International Security reported in April 2025 that Iran is constructing a security perimeter around two underground nuclear tunnel complexes located within Mount Kolang Gaz La, south of the Natanz enrichment complex.[15] Iran announced in September 2020 that it was building a tunnel complex near Natanz to make advanced centrifuges after a former centrifuge production facility was destroyed in July 2020.[16]

Iran has taken steps to begin its retaliation for the US strikes. The Iranian Parliament approved a measure on June 22 to close the Strait of Hormuz, which would disrupt international shipping.[17] Iranian media reported that the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) still needs to provide final approval.[18] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on June 22 that Iran “reserves all options to defend its sovereignty, interests, and people.”[19] An open-source observer citing Windward confirmed that vessels are experiencing Global Positioning System (GPS) interference in the Strait of Hormuz.[20] Iran has previously threatened to disrupt international shipping in response to US or Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.[21] Around 20 percent of global oil exports flow through the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran launched two missile barrages at Israel after the US strikes.[22] This attack may or may not be in retaliation for the US strikes on Iran. Iran could expand its retaliation to include attacks on US forces in the region. It may be several days before Iran responds directly against the United States. Iran fired ballistic missiles at US forces at Ain al Asad Airbase in Iraq five days after the US strike that killed IRGC Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani in January 2020.[23] An Iranian source close to the regime posted on X that it “seems like” Iran’s response to US strikes will include attacking “one or more US positions in the region” and ”continuing the war with Israel with continuous strikes.”[24]

Iran has launched two ballistic missile attacks on Israel since CTP-ISW’s June 21, 5:00 PM EST data cut off.[25] Iran launched the two ballistic missile barrages after the United States conducted strikes against the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant and nuclear sites in Esfahan and Natanz.[26] Israeli sources reported missile or interceptor impacts in Haifa and Tel Aviv from the two barrages, which injured several people in both cities.[27] The IDF Air Force also struck six Iranian missile launch platforms and operators arming the missiles to strike Israel on June 22.[28] An IRGC spokesperson announced that these missile attacks employed a mix of long-range liquid- and solid-fuel ballistic missiles.[29] Iran fired between 22 and 30 missiles targeting Israel in these two barrages.[30] Israeli emergency services responded to at least 10 impacts throughout the country.[31]

Israeli air defenses have intercepted 30 one-way attack drones launched from Iran overnight.[32] One drone flew over the southern Golan Heights.[33] Two other drones entered near southern Israel.[34]

The IDF continued its campaign to destroy Iranian military infrastructure on June 22. Social media users reported Israeli airstrikes on an IRGC division headquarters in Tabriz, northwest Iran, on June 22.[35] The IRGC 31st Ashoura Mechanized Division operates at the site.[36] CTP-ISW has observed fewer reports of Israeli airstrikes from social media accounts based in Iran, which likely reflects widespread internet disruptions in Iran rather than an actual decrease in Israeli airstrikes.[37]

[1] https://www.axios.com/2025/06/21/us-strike-iran-nuclear-israel-trump

[2] https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/06/22/world/middleeast/us-iran-nuclear-sites.html

[3] https://www.northropgrumman.com/what-we-do/aircraft/b-2-stealth-bomber/technical-details

[4] https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1936603680805097741

[5] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4222543/secretary-of-defense-pete-hegseth-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-gen/

[6] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1936637486249251221

[7] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-on-developments-in-iran-4#:~:text=The%20Director%20General%20said%20the,the%20Fordow%20uranium%20enrichment%20site.

[8] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/22/world/middleeast/iran-fordo-nuclear-damaged-not-destroyed.html?smid=url-share

[9] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/22/world/middleeast/iran-fordo-nuclear-damaged-not-destroyed.html?smid=url-share

[10] https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/06/22/world/middleeast/us-iran-nuclear-sites.html

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-17-2025-evening-edition ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-edition-israeli-strikes-iran-june-13-2025-200-pm-et

[12] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/israel-iran-attack-news/card/natanz-operating-centrifuges-may-be-completely-destroyed-iaea-chief-says-Fcm6Fp5yj6iYAybEPYiR?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAjp8la8rvNwR462PX6fzFqW24hgOVncnNVoP8FXaMiLcuer5O5ua5H4MrZQTgU%3D&gaa_ts=685838a1&gaa_sig=2gRIkBtjEVL_cDO6Son1_H3Rdmq9btRv3HPDs9bLIirDKyYVYVBntlasLk6TLxw3B7y1cUmF0lm17ifOESUAUA%3D%3D

[13] https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/06/22/world/middleeast/us-iran-nuclear-sites.html

[14] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1933420882162016634 ; https://x.com/IAFsite/status/1933580390780055726 ; https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-general-grossis-statement-to-unsc-on-situation-in-iran

[15] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/new-security-perimeter-around-mt.-kolang-gaz-la-tunnel-complex ; https://www.newsweek.com/satellite-image-shows-iran-reinforcing-nuclear-complex-2063480

[16] https://www.reuters.com/article/world/iran-building-new-production-hall-for-centrifuges-in-mountains-near-natanz-idUSKBN25Z232/

[17] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2025/06/22/750031/iranian-parliament-moves-close-strait-hormuz-after-us-aggression-lawmaker

[18] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2025/06/22/750031/iranian-parliament-moves-close-strait-hormuz-after-us-aggression-lawmaker

[19] https://x.com/araghchi/status/1936638107169722536

[20]

https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1936742379567935575

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-19-2025

[22] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936678170578547094 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936650783564386369 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936643320396009484

[23] https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/03/01/al-asad-missile-attack-nearly-killed-150-us-troops-destroyed-30-aircraft-report.html

[24] https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/1936783666623209683

[25] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936678170578547094 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936650783564386369 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936643320396009484

[26] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114724035571020048

[27] https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1936646492451713414 ; https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1936647576847110639 ; https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1936647819391062164 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936678170578547094 ; https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/1936664050995450055 https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936677374755578053

[28] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936688174312428023 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936727769129341006 ; https://x.com/IAFsite/status/1936727620294697455

[29] https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/1936658785919172754 ; https://www dot timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/iran-claims-it-targeted-ben-gurion-airport-biological-research-center/

[30] https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/1936662357020987844 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936648655768883619 ; https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1936644117955801236

[31] https://x.com/AmitSegal/status/1936649878433575412

[32] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936714015603925481

[33] https://x.com/IAFsite/status/1936545247515091010 https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936545112105906542

[34] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936636498767413566

[35] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/1936699232670605568 ; https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1936673326585303160 ; https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/1936699232670605568

[36] neshan dot org/maps/places/dd84a591a31866a22f418c85573ca53c#c38.047-46.260-17z-0p

[37] https://x.com/netblocks/status/1936774099474206878

Iran Update Special Report, June 24, 2025, Evening Edition

Avery Borens, Ben Schmida, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Andie Parry and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 5:00PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) are publishing multiple updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on the exchange of fire between Iran and Israel. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.

Click here to see ISW-CTP’s interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

CTP-ISW will not publish a morning update given the ceasefire between Israel and Iran. All analysis of the Israel-Iran war will be covered in the daily evening update unless events warrant a resumption of twice-daily updates.

Israel conducted a two-week air campaign with the objective of degrading, destroying and removing the threat of Iran’s nuclear program.[1] Israel also pursued two supporting objectives to limit Iranian retaliation and provide itself with an offramp. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that “Operation Rising Lion” achieved all of Israel’s war aims “and much more.”[2] Israel described Iran’s nuclear program as an existential threat to Israel and stated that it would not allow Iran to weaponize its program.[3] Israel achieved its objectives vis-a-vis the nuclear program by destroying nuclear facilities and enrichment capacity with US support and killing key nuclear scientists who were instrumental in the development and weaponization of the program. The Israeli campaign, supported by US strikes, “effectively destroyed” Iran’s enrichment capacity, though stockpiles of various amounts of enriched uranium remain.[4] Iran’s ability to enrich these to weapons grade uranium is complicated by the destruction of most of Iran’s centrifuges and the loss of many nuclear scientists.[5] There is more information about the status of the nuclear program below.

Israel supported this main line of effort by conducting a campaign designed to prevent Iran from conducting effective retaliatory strikes on Israel by degrading its ballistic missile capabilities.[6] Iran originally planned to launch 1,000 ballistic missiles in response to Israeli strikes on Iran, but Israeli strikes forced it to fire much fewer (more on the status of the missile forces below).[7] Iranian ballistic missile strikes would have targeted Israeli military, intelligence, and political institutions that enabled Israeli operations. These strikes could have also caused major Israeli casualties, which would have been unacceptable for many Israelis. Israeli airstrikes on Iran’s ballistic missile program destroyed Iranian capabilities and forced Iran to launch fewer and smaller attacks on Israel, most of which were intercepted by the IDF.[8]

Israel pursued a second supporting effort to compel Iran to accept a ceasefire on Israeli terms by creating the perception of a credible existential threat to the Iranian regime. Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Minister Katz directed the IDF on June 20 to “intensify” strikes on Iranian institutions that support regime stability.[9] The Iranian regime has maintained social control by violently cracking down on protests and other expressions of popular anti-regime sentiment through internal security organizations. Israeli officials suggested that these airstrikes could create conditions which the Iranian population could exploit to overthrow the regime.[10] A series of strikes designed to demonstrate a credible threat to the regime’s stability could be expanded or contracted depending on how the regime responded and Israel’s desire for a ceasefire. Israel could have calculated that the Iranian regime’s overwhelming interest in ensuring regime survival could compel it to agree to a ceasefire.

The limited nature of strikes against internal security institutions suggests that the IDF sought to demonstrate a credible threat to regime stability rather than topple or meaningfully destabilize the regime. A focused, well-designed regime destabilization campaign would have systematically destroyed IRGC provincial and district-level headquarters while simultaneously destroying the Iranian Law Enforcement Command’s infrastructure and assets across the country. Israel struck these targets, but it only did so in Tehran and did not do so systematically even in Tehran.[11] Israel, given its air superiority over Iran, could have presumably destroyed these targets if needed, which indicates that the IDF made a deliberate choice not to systematically target Iranian internal security assets. The IDF did systematically target missile and nuclear facilities, in contrast.

Israeli strikes against Iran’s energy infrastructure appeared to be related to an effort to influence regime decision-making. Previous energy shortages in Iran have led to protests against the regime. Demonstrations over the rising gas prices in 2017 and 2018 escalated into broader challenges for the regime’s stability, for example.[12] Israel’s attacks on gas production and oil infrastructure, which would exacerbate the root causes of previous demonstrations, suggested that part of Israel’s campaign aimed to influence Iranian regime decision-making by building the perception of a possible credible threat to regime stability. The IDF struck a natural gas processing facility and gas refinery in Bushehr Province on June 14.[13] The ensuing fire forced Iranian authorities to partially suspend gas production at South Pars Gas Field, which is one of the largest gas fields in the world and is central to Iran’s domestic energy supply.[14] The IDF also struck Iranian oil infrastructure in Tehran on June 14, including an oil depot and an oil refinery in Tehran.[15] Both the strikes on internal security institutions and energy infrastructure were relatively limited compared to IDF strikes targeting the nuclear program or retaliatory capabilities.

The Institute for Science and International Security assessed that US and Israeli strikes on Iran have “effectively destroyed” Iran’s enrichment program.[16] The Institute said it will take a “long time” for Iran to restore its enrichment capabilities to pre-strike levels. This assessment is based on the destruction Iran suffered at Natanz nuclear facility, Fordow nuclear facility, Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center and the elimination of many nuclear scientists.[17] The six entry point craters for the US bunker-buster bombs at Fordow were above two weak points, and the bombs would have detonated within the facility.[18] The Institute for Science and International Security assesses that the bomb blast would have been channeled by the centrifuge cascade hall’s side walls, which would have destroyed all of the installed centrifuges there.[19] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) battle damage assessments indicate that Israeli strikes also likely damaged or destroyed several thousand centrifuges at Natanz.[20] Israel and the United States conducted airstrikes targeting the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant above ground and Fuel Enrichment Plant underground at Natanz, respectively.[21] The IAEA added that it was possible that uranium isotopes may have been dispersed within the facility (though not outside), which would make it difficult to access.[22] This means it may be some time before even the Iranians can determine the true extent of the damage.

The Institute for Science and International Security stated that Iran still retains stockpiles of 3 to 5 percent, 20 percent, and 60 percent enriched uranium, however.[23] Weapons-grade uranium (WGU) is uranium enriched up to 90 percent. The destruction of so many centrifuges will make enriching from 60 percent to 90 percent much slower. A US weapons expert stated that US and Israeli strikes have also made it significantly more difficult and time-consuming for Iran to turn WGU into a usable nuclear weapon.[24] He said the strikes have “significantly” increased the time required for Iran to “even build a non-missile deliverable weapon,“ such as a nuclear bomb. There are significant challenges associated with miniaturizing a nuclear weapon to install it on a ballistic missile warhead.

US President Donald Trump reiterated the US demand for Iran to maintain zero uranium enrichment capabilities.[25] Trump stated on June 24 that Iran is “not going to have enrichment and [Iran is] not going to have a nuclear weapon.”[26] He emphasized that “Iran will never rebuild their nuclear facilities.”[27] A senior US official reportedly said the Israel-Iran ceasefire was based on discussions with Iranian officials that indicated Iran is willing to resume nuclear negotiations as long as Israel stop its air campaign.[28] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated on June 24 that Iran is “ready for talks.”[29] Iran repeatedly rejected the US demand for zero uranium enrichment during the US-Iran nuclear negotiations from April to early June 2025.[30] It is unclear if Iran is currently willing to accept the US demand for zero uranium enrichment.

Israel has killed at least 14 Iranian nuclear scientists since June 12 as part of its campaign to delay Iran’s ability to weaponize its nuclear capabilities.[31] The IDF killed Sayyed Asghar Hashemi Tabar in Tehran Province on June 20.[32] Hashemi Tabar was a weapons expert at the Shahid Chamran Group, which is a subsidiary of the Iranian Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), and specialized in pulse power research.[33] Pulsed power is a technology that stores and releases energy in intense bursts to simulate nuclear detonation effects for research, but pulsed power does not trigger actual nuclear explosions.[34] The United States sanctioned the Shahid Chamran Group and Hashemi Tabar in 2019 for research related to Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation.[35] The IDF also killed Iranian nuclear scientist Mostafa Sadati Ermaki in Tehran Province.[36]

The IDF announced it thwarted a possible Iranian ceasefire violation on June 24 at 4:20 PM ET. The IDF intercepted two drones that it said “apparently” originated from Iran before they entered Israeli airspace.[37] This attack marks the first time that Iran may have launched drones targeting Israel since the ceasefire went into effect at 12:00 AM ET.[38] Senior Israeli military and political officials have not commented on the drone attack or threatened a response at the time of this writing.

Key Takeaways:

Israel pursued a campaign to destroy Iran’s nuclear program and with US support was largely successful in doing so. Israel also pursued two supporting lines of effort to limit Iran’s retaliation and create an off-ramp by creating conditions that would pressure Iran into terminating the conflict. Israel pressured Iran by creating a credible threat of regime destabilization.

The limited nature of strikes against internal security institutions suggests that the IDF sought to demonstrate a credible threat to regime stability rather than topple or meaningfully destabilize the regime. A focused, well-designed regime destabilization campaign would have systematically destroyed regime institutions, which did not happen.

Iran’s enrichment capabilities have been “effectively destroyed,” according to the Institute for Science and International Security. Iran still retains stockpiles of enriched uranium, but its ability to enrich these stockpiles further will be complicated by the loss of so many centrifuges and facilities.

Iran’s inability to accurately strike military or energy infrastructure highlights the limited accuracy of its ballistic missiles. The high Israeli intercept rate made it even more difficult for Iran to accurately target key Israeli infrastructure. Israel nonetheless faced sustained missile attacks against key population centers that was unprecedented in the October 7 War.

The IDF has targeted Iran’s internal security institutions, including the Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC), Basij, and IRGC provincial units since June 15.[39] Israeli strikes on regime security institutions continued on June 23 before the ceasefire. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announced on June 20 that he ordered “intensified” strikes on regime symbols and domestic repression centers in Tehran Province.[40] The IDF struck the IRGC Imam Hassan Mojtaba Corps headquarters in Alborz Province on June 23 and killed at least 23 IRGC members, including Provincial Deputy Commander Brigadier General Mojtaba Karami and Deputy for Social Affairs Brigadier General Akbar Enayati.[41]

The IDF also killed three senior security and intelligence commanders on June 23, including Deputy for social affairs of the Basij Organization Brigadier General Meysam Rezvanpour, LEC Intelligence Organization Deputy Brigadier General Alireza Lotfi and Basij Counterintelligence Commander Mohammad Taghi Yousefvand, likely to degrade the regime’s security and intelligence infrastructure.[42] The Iranian regime has maintained social control by violently cracking down on protests and other expressions of popular anti-regime sentiment through internal security organizations like the Basij, LEC, and the IRGC.[43] Basij units have been deployed to support LEC forces during major protest movements like the Mahsa Amini protests and the Iranian Green Movement.[44]

IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani appeared at a rally in Tehran Province on June 24.[45] A New York Times reporter claimed on June 13 that Israeli strikes killed Ghaani along with other senior IRGC commanders.[46]

IDF Campaign Against Iran’s Ballistic Missile Forces

The IDF sought to limit Iran’s ability to respond to Israel at the start of its campaign and continued to destroy Iranian missile launchers and stockpiles throughout the air campaign. Iranian leaders originally planned to launch up to one thousand ballistic missiles at Israel in the immediate aftermath of an Israeli strike, presumably in multiple barrages.[47] The first Iranian missile barrage included about 30 missiles, and Iran never managed to launch over 40 ballistic missiles in a single barrage throughout the 12 days of attacks.[48] Israel reportedly built a secret one-way attack drone base in Iran, which it used to strike Iranian ballistic missile launchers near Tehran on June 12.[49] Israel also targeted a meeting of senior IRGC Aerospace commanders who would have been responsible for giving the order to attack immediately after the strike.[50] The IDF Air Force proceeded to strike Iranian ballistic missile launchers as they were readied to launch and in warehouses at a consistent and daily tempo throughout the campaign.[51] Israel has also targeted Iranian missile production sites and equipment, including planetary mixers used to produce solid fuel for long-range ballistic missiles.[52] Israel’s concerted effort to disrupt missile production, destroy launch infrastructure, and eliminate missile stockpile and Aerospace Force leadership muted Iran’s ability to respond to Israel in both the short and medium term.

The IDF assessed that Iran launched between 500 and 550 ballistic missiles and more than 1,000 drones targeting Israel during its “Operation True Promise III.”[53] The IDF’s assessment is consistent with CTP-ISW’s observation of 543 Iranian ballistic missiles. CTP-ISW has recorded 43 waves of Iranian ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel since the start of “Operation True Promise III” on June 13. Iran’s ballistic missile barrages during “Operation True Promise III” varied in size. Iran used around 40 missiles in its largest barrage and one missile in its smallest barrage.[54] Iran’s missile barrages in the recent conflict are much smaller compared to its barrages in its October 2024 attack on Israel when Iran launched around 100 ballistic missiles per barrage in two barrages.[55] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on June 24 that Israeli air defense systems successfully intercepted 80 to 90 percent of Iran’s ballistic missiles.[56] Israel also reportedly had a 99.99 percent interception rate of Iranian drones, with only one drone making impact.[57]

Israeli air defenses maintained a high intercept rate against Iranian ballistic missile attacks during the war. Israeli air defense systems have successfully intercepted 89 percent of Iranian ballistic missiles launched at Israel since June 12. Israeli air defenses did not intercept Iranian ballistic missiles on trajectory to strike areas with no risk to Israeli civilians or no strategic value.[58] Air defense systems and their operators prioritize incoming projectiles that will hit targets of significance rather than attempting to stop every projectile. Missile strikes in open areas are not indicative of Israeli air defense failures or a shortage of interceptor missiles but rather Israel’s defensive priorities. Israeli air defenses have previously prioritized defending highly populated areas as seen during Iran’s October 2024 missile attack.[59] Iranian ballistic missiles did penetrate Israeli air defenses striking populated areas in some instances, however. Air defense systems are not perfect, and some projectiles will penetrate the system.[60]

Iranian ballistic missiles do not have pinpoint accuracy. Iran’s inability to accurately strike military or energy infrastructure highlights the limited accuracy of its ballistic missiles. All ballistic missiles have a circular error probable (CEP). The CEP is “the radius of a circle, centered at the intended target, within which 50% of the missiles would be expected to impact.”[61] The stated and publicly known CEPs of Iranian medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) used in this war are between 20 and 500 meters.[62] The relatively poor accuracy of these missiles compared to a precision-guided munition means that even in instances when Iranian missiles struck military targets, they were largely ineffective and caused no casualties and limited damage. Iran targeted an Israeli military intelligence facility during the war with four missiles, and three of the four completely missed the base while the fourth struck a warehouse on the outskirts of the compound.[63] This case demonstrates the futility of using these missiles against pinpoint military targets, which may explain the increased focus on civilian targets during this war. Iran likely began using cluster warheads–ballistic missile warheads with hundreds of submunitions–to maximize the potential impact of its ballistic missiles given their relatively low accuracy when fitted with standard warheads. [64]

Iran used several solid- and liquid-fuel MRBMs, including Ghadr, Emad, Kheybar Shekan, and Haj Qassem missiles.[65] Iran previously used the Ghadr, Emad, and Kheybar Shekan missiles during its April and October 2024 attacks on Israel.[66] Iran began using more technologically advanced missiles in its attacks on June 18.[67] Iran launched at least three missiles with cluster munition warheads, including two Khorramshahr-4 missiles.[68] Iran reportedly launched a Sejjil ballistic missile and several Fattah-1 missiles (which the Houthis have fired at Israel under the name Palestine-2) towards Israel on June 18.[69] The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said on June 22 that it ”employed new tactics using a mix of long-range liquid- and solid-fuel ballistic missiles with advanced warheads capable of penetrating air defenses.”[70] Iran also launched a variety of drones, including the Shahed-136, Arash-2, and an enlarged version of the Shahed-101.[71]

CTP-ISW has recorded 60 Iranian ballistic missile or Israeli interceptor impacts in Israel from over 40 Iranian barrages since the Israeli air campaign began on June 12. This estimate is consistent with an Israeli Army Radio correspondent’s assessment that between 50 and 60 Iranian ballistic missiles struck Israeli territory.[72] Iranian ballistic missile impacts killed 28 people in Israel, including one IDF soldier.[73] The majority of Iranian missiles struck civilian areas with only five out of the 60 impacts striking military or energy infrastructure facilities.[74] At least three Iranian missile impacts targeted Israeli military sites or facilities. One Iranian ballistic missile struck near HaKirya in Tel Aviv on June 13.[75] Another Iranian ballistic missile struck a warehouse near the Military Intelligence School in Camp Moshe Dayan on June 17.[76] An Iranian ballistic missile also struck the Gav Yem Negev Advanced Technologies Park which houses active military and cyber facilities.[77] At least two Iranian missile impacts targeted Israeli energy infrastructure. Iranian ballistic missiles struck the Bazan Oil refinery in Haifa on June 15, which caused the facility to temporarily shut down.[78] An Iranian ballistic missile struck an electrical substation in Ashdod on June 23.[79]

No group has claimed responsibility for the drone attacks that targeted Ain al Asad Airbase and Baghdad International Airport overnight on June 23 and 24 since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff at 08:00 AM on June 24. The United States intercepted both drones.[80] A third drone crashed in al Radwaniyah, Anbar Province, about seven kilometers south of the airport.[81] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have previously attacked both Ain al Asad Airbase and the airport.[82] Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatened prior to the US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites that the militias would target the United States and its regional interests if the United States entered the war.[83]

Drone attacks targeting Camp Taji, Baghdad Province, and Imam Ali Air Base, Dhi Qar Province, on June 23 “severely damaged” Iraqi radars at those sites, according to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s spokesperson.[84] No group has claimed responsibility for these attacks at the time of this writing. Sudani ordered the formation of a high-level committee to investigate the attacks. These attacks follow Iranian-backed Iraqi figures repeatedly condemning Israel’s use of Iraqi airspace to strike Iran.[85]

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[2] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1937548580178248104 ; https://x.com/IsraeliPM/status/1937407518667350282

[3] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1933420882162016634

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[5] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/post-attack-assessment-of-the-first-12-days-of-israeli-strikes-on-iranian-nuclear-facilities

[6] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936394722731229432

[7] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/13/world/middleeast/iran-israel-strikes-nuclear-talks.html

[8] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936394722731229432

[9] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/katz-says-he-instructed-idf-to-destabilize-iranian-regime-with-intensified-strikes-against-it/

[10] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/regime-change-in-iran-seems-unlikely-amid-war-with-israel-middle-east-scholar-says

[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-20-2025-morning-edition ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-18-2025-evening-edition

[12] https://apnews.com/article/208de9a8f9e64d32b3be2d98aa95e265 ;

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[13] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-06-14/israel-strikes-refinery-at-iran-s-giant-south-pars-gas-field ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/03/24/3335396

[14] https://www.offshore-technology.com/news/south-pars-gas-field-disruption-after-israeli-strike; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/03/24/3335380

[15] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1933992562794078642; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/14/world/middleeast/iran-israel-energy-facility-strikes-tehran.html

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[17] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/post-attack-assessment-of-the-first-12-days-of-israeli-strikes-on-iranian-nuclear-facilities ; https://x.com/TheGoodISIS/status/1937547337917669404

[18] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/post-attack-assessment-of-the-first-12-days-of-israeli-strikes-on-iranian-nuclear-facilities

[19] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/post-attack-assessment-of-the-first-12-days-of-israeli-strikes-on-iranian-nuclear-facilities ; https://x.com/TheGoodISIS/status/1937547337917669404

[20] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-general-grossis-statement-to-unsc-on-situation-in-iran ; https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/1936097757682389170

[21] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-the-board-of-governors-23-june-2025 ; https://x.com/TheGoodISIS/status/1933539314148823467

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[23] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/post-attack-assessment-of-the-first-12-days-of-israeli-strikes-on-iranian-nuclear-facilities ; https://x.com/DAVIDHALBRIGHT1/status/1937556394766450949

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[25] https://x.com/RapidResponse47/status/1937519347213222016

[26] https://x.com/RapidResponse47/status/1937519347213222016

[27] https://x.com/TrumpDailyPosts/status/1937490949816320259

[28] https://x.com/John_Hudson/status/1937320919711535199

[29] https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-conflict-us-trump-06-24-25-intl-hnk#cmcak7i80001s3b6qegh8qptj

[30] https://x.com/araghchi/status/1925669240461213916 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-us-resume-nuclear-talks-amid-clashing-red-lines-2025-05-11/

[31] https://apnews.com/article/israel-iran-nuclear-science-attacks-e298f00ba261debba4499a48c9df8b3d

[32] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/8a41u7di2

[33] https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/sayyed-asghar-hashemitabar

[34] https://www.sandia.gov/z-machine/#:~:text=The%20Sandia%20Z%2DMachine,Photo%20by%20Randy%20Montoya. ;

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[35] https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=26571 ; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm634

[36] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/514851

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[38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-24-2025-morning-edition

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[46] https://x.com/farnazfassihi/status/1933550127937171804

[47] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/13/world/middleeast/iran-israel-strikes-nuclear-talks.html

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[55] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-1-2024

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[58] https://x.com/i24NEWS_EN/status/1937070603330056521 ; https://www.nbcnews.com/video/iranian-missile-hits-bus-terminal-north-of-tel-aviv-241733701889

[59] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-1-2024

[60] https://www dot inss.org.il/social_media/the-israel-iran-war-air-defense-performance/

[61] https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd/6805/#:~:text=The%20Department%20of%20Defense%20has%20places%20emphasis,or%20%22The%20probability%20is%200.50%20that%20an

[62] https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/weapon-program-background-report/table-irans-missile-arsenal#fn6

[63] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-17-2025-evening-edition ; https://x.com/FaytuksNetwork/status/1934897791416844608

[64] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/17/iran-israel-attack-drones-missiles/ ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/06/3281426 ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/718877 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-13-2024; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-1-2024

[65] https://www.twz.com/land/iran-just-used-ballistic-missiles-with-cluster-warheads-to-strike-israel ; https://www.euronews.com/2025/06/22/iranian-weapon-with-ideological-payload-what-is-the-kheibar-shekan-missile ; https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/en/story/845868/iran-uses-new-missile-named-after-qassem-soleimani-in-attack-on-israel

[66] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/17/iran-israel-attack-drones-missiles/ ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/06/3281426 ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/718877 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-13-2024; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-1-2024

[67] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-19-2025-evening-edition

[68] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/1935703221961392613 ; https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/1936784300067750322 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/23373

[69] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/why-hypersonic-missiles-are-stirring-fears-in-the-conflict-between-israel-and-iran ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2025/06/19/3338126/iran-s-operation-true-promise-iii-israel-attacked-with-sejjil-missiles-for-first-time

[70] https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/1936658785919172754

[71] https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2025/06/israels-attack-and-the-limits-of-irans-missile-strategy/

[72] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1937525138087448600

[73] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1937525138087448600

[74] https://edition.cnn.com/2025/06/14/world/video/missile-strike-kirya-israel-military-digvid ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-17-2025-evening-edition ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-20-2025-evening-edition ; https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-strikes-technology-square-israel-microsoft-building-damaged ; https://x.com/andynovy/status/1937057924381102573

[75] https://edition.cnn.com/2025/06/14/world/video/missile-strike-kirya-israel-military-digvid

[76] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-17-2025-evening-edition

[77] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-20-2025-evening-edition ; https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-strikes-technology-square-israel-microsoft-building-damaged ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-16-2025-evening-edition

[78] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-16-2025-evening-edition

[79] https://x.com/andynovy/status/1937057924381102573

[80] https://apnews.com/article/israel-iran-trump-ceasefire-attacks-continue-f1e60190722cc3410b69f21717872ffa

[81] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/security/531043/بالصورة-بقايا-طائرة-مسيرة-في-الرضوانية

[82] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tracking-anti-us-and-anti-israel-strikes-iraq-and-syria-during-gaza-crisis ; https://x.com/USAmbIraq/status/1841107559576449043

[83] https://t.me/abualaskary/134 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-19-2025-evening-edition

[84] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/العراق-يعلن-التصدي-لطا-رات-انتحارية-مسي-رة-خرقت-اجوا-ه

[85] https://t.me/Al_Nojaba/1274 ; https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=227367 ; https://x.com/aboalaa_alwalae/status/1934724552795254855/photo/1

Information Cutoff: 5:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) are publishing multiple updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on the exchange of fire between Iran and Israel. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.

Click here to see ISW-CTP’s interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Key Takeaways

US President Donald Trump announced that Israel and Iran agreed to a ceasefire, beginning the evening of June 23. A senior Iranian official confirmed to Reuters that the ceasefire would occur following Qatari mediation.

Iran conducted a missile attack targeting the US al Udeid Airbase in Qatar in retaliation for the US strikes on the Iranian nuclear program. The attack was largely symbolic and inflicted no casualties or damage, however.

Iranian elite, including some moderate leaders, have reportedly tried to pressure Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to accept a ceasefire or sideline him entirely. It is unclear what role these individuals played in the US-announced ceasefire.

Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Policy Majid Takht Ravanchi announced that Iran will remain a member of the NPT. Iranian officials have previously threatened to withdraw from the NPT in response to US and Israeli strikes.

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi confirmed that the United States likely inflicted “very significant damage” in its strikes on the Fordow nuclear site. Iran may have moved some of its nuclear material to undisclosed locations beforehand, however.

NOTE: CTP-ISW will provide further analysis about the ceasefire between Israel and Iran in its June 24 Morning Update.

US President Donald Trump announced that Iran and Israel agreed to a ceasefire that will go into effect at 12:00 AM ET on June 24.[1] Trump said that Iran would adhere to the ceasefire starting at midnight on June 24 and that Israel would join at noon on June 24.[2] Trump said that the war would officially end at midnight on June 25. Trump congratulated Israel and Iran for “having the stamina, courage, and intelligence” to end the war.[3] Trump announced the ceasefire five hours after Iran conducted a ballistic missile attack targeting US forces in Qatar. A senior Iranian official confirmed to Reuters that Iran agreed to a Qatar-mediated, US-proposed ceasefire.[4]

Iran conducted a retaliatory, but largely symbolic, ballistic missile attack targeting a US airbase in Qatar on June 23. Iran launched 14 medium- and short-range ballistic missiles at the United States’ largest position in the Middle East—al Udeid Airbase—just before 1:00 PM ET.[5] The United States and partner forces intercepted 13 missiles and “set free” one missile on a “nonthreatening” trajectory.[6] Trump confirmed that the Iranian attack did not injure or kill any US servicemembers or Qataris and caused “hardly any damage.”[7] Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian claimed after the attack that Iran fired one missile at al Udeid Airbase for each bomb that the United States dropped on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 21.[8] Initial reports claimed that Iran also fired a single short-range ballistic missile targeting US forces at Ain al Asad Airbase in Iraq, but a US military official refuted that claim.[9]

Iranian leaders appear to have designed the attack to try to reestablish Iranian deterrence vis-a-vis the United States and Israel while simultaneously preventing further escalation. Trump confirmed that the United States received advanced warning of the attack through an Iranian notification to Qatar.[10] A US official confirmed before the strike that the Pentagon was tracking a “credible” threat.[11] Qatar closed its airspace, and the United States and the United Kingdom issued warnings to their citizens in Qatar to seek shelter prior to the strike.[12] Iran launched 14 missiles at al Udeid Airbase, which is significantly fewer missiles than Iran fired at Israel at the beginning of the war.[13] Israeli airstrikes have significantly degraded Iran’s ballistic missile launch capability, which has caused Iran to fire fewer missiles per salvo than at the start of the conflict.[14] It is unclear if IDF strikes have degraded Iran’s ability to launch short-range ballistic missiles, as it has degraded Iran’s ability to launch medium- and long-range missiles.

Iran’s retaliatory attack resembles Iran’s last direct attack on US forces in 2020, but Iran appears to have assumed less risk that the United States would respond forcefully to this attack than it did in its 2020 attack. Iran launched between 15 and 22 ballistic missiles at Ain al Asad Airbase and another US site in Iraq in January 2020 in retaliation for the United States killing former IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad.[15] The attack injured at least 64 US servicemembers at Ain al Asad Airbase, even though the United States received similar advanced warning that allowed personnel to enter bunkers.[16] The Qatari Foreign Ministry confirmed on June 23 that al Udeid Airbase in Qatar “had been evacuated [before the attack],” which suggests that there was limited risk to US servicemembers during the attack.[17] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 17 showed that unsheltered US aircraft at al Udeid Airbase relocated to an unspecified location, further suggesting that there was limited risk to US assets as well as personnel.[18] Iran’s decision to strike an evacuated US base suggests that Iran designed the attack to try to prevent further escalation. Iranian leaders accept a certain level of risk when conducting any attack on US interests, as such an attack could harm or kill US servicemembers, however. Trump warned prior to the Iranian attack on al Udeid Airbase that the United States would respond to Iran if it harmed US personnel.

US President Donald Trump indicated that the United States will not respond to Iran’s retaliatory strike.[19] Trump said after the Iranian attack on June 23 that “it is time for peace.”[20] Several unspecified US officials speaking to Western media emphasized that Trump does not want to respond to the strike and wants to pursue a deal with Iran.[21] Trump chose not to respond to Iran’s attack on Ain al Asad Airbase in 2020.[22]

Senior Israeli defense officials told an Israeli Army Radio correspondent on June 23 that Israel will increase strikes on Iran in the coming days in order to rapidly achieve its war aims.[23] This report was published before Trump announced the Iran-Israel ceasefire. Israel will start adhering to the Iran-Israel ceasefire at 12:00 PM ET on June 23. The unspecified defense officials said that Israel seeks to fully achieve its objectives in Iran “within a few days.”[24] Israel launched its air campaign on June 12 to “degrade, destroy, and remove [the] threat” of weaponization of the Iranian nuclear program.[25] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on June 22 that Israel was “very, very close” to achieving these aims.[26] Israeli and Arab officials told the Wall Street Journal on June 23 that Israel intends to “get through” a list of Iranian military targets in the coming days.[27] Senior Israeli officials have emphasized that Israel would continue its air campaign if Iran attacks Israel or if Israel “sees [Iran] is trying to reconstitute.[28]

Iranian Regime Survival

There appear to be internal fissures within the Iranian regime over how to respond to the conflict with the United States and Israel. Opposition media reported on June 21 that former moderate Iranian President Hassan Rouhani reportedly met with senior clerics in Qom in recent days to persuade them to pressure Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to concede to key US and Israeli demands, including the suspension of uranium enrichment.[29] The clerics included Mousa Shobeyri, Hossein Vahid Khorasani, and Nasser Makarem Shirazi. Rouhani framed the meetings as an effort to “save” the Islamic Republic. It is unclear how the clerics responded to Rouhani’s requests. IRGC-affiliated media claimed on June 19 that a “few suspicious and disreputable” individuals within the regime were trying to convince clerics in Qom to push for a compromise with Israel.[30] Rouhani, as well as Supreme Leader adviser Ali Larijani and Expediency Discernment Council head Sadegh Amoli Larijani, have reportedly unsuccessfully tried to contact Khamenei in recent days to advocate for renewed negotiations with the United States.[31] Ali Larijani’s reported support for negotiations is notable given that he made threats to US forces in the region in a post on X on June 23.[32]

Unspecified Iranian leaders have reportedly developed a contingency plan to govern Iran without Khamenei in the event that Khamenei is killed or informally sidelined.[33] The individuals developing this plan have agreed that a leadership committee would functionally replace Khamenei and negotiate a ceasefire with the United States and Israel. The individuals have considered Rouhani for a “key role” in the leadership committee. Some military officials involved in the plan have engaged Gulf countries to try to gain support for such political change in Iran. It is very notable that senior Iranian military, political, and religious leaders are discussing a potential post-Khamenei leadership structure in Iran. Reuters reported on June 23 that there have been increased efforts to appoint a successor for Khamenei, citing five insiders with knowledge of the discussions.[34] These efforts suggest that senior officials are highly concerned about the stability of the regime and seek to ensure regime survival in the event that Khamenei is killed or removed.

Israeli Strikes on Iran

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued to target the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Iranian internal security institutions in Tehran since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff at 5:00 AM ET on June 23. The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting the IRGC Ground Forces Imam Hassan Mojtaba Provincial Unit in Karaj, Alborz Province, on June 23.[35] The IDF also conducted airstrikes targeting the IRGC Ground Forces Seyyed ol Shohada Provincial Unit and the Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Provincial Unit in Tehran on June 23.[36] The IDF reported that the Seyyed ol Shohada Provincial Unit is responsible for defending Iranian territory and suppressing internal unrest.[37] The IRGC Ground Forces have historically played a role in suppressing internal dissent.[38] The Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Provincial Unit oversees security in Tehran Province, while the Seyyed ol Shohada Provincial Unit oversees security in Tehran City. The IDF also struck the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) “Information Security Command” in northern Tehran City, which likely refers to the LEC Information Protection Organization.[39] The LEC is the premier Iranian internal security and law enforcement service.[40] Its chief mission is to conduct ordinary police activities and ensure regime stability.[41]

The IDF issued an evacuation order on June 23 to residents in Tehran’s Seventh District.[42] The IDF informed residents to leave the area and not return for several hours.[43] The IDF has previously issued evacuation orders in Tehran before striking Iranian military infrastructure.[44]

The IDF conducted a series of strikes in western Iran on June 22 targeting Iranian underground military infrastructure, ballistic missile storage facilities, and a drone storage facility.[45] The IDF said that 15 Israeli fighter jets conducted the strikes.[46] The Israeli Air Force (IAF) also struck a ballistic missile launcher that was aimed at Israel, according to an Israeli military correspondent.[47] The IAF has conducted five waves of strikes in Iran on June 23 using approximately 200 munitions.[48]

Israeli Intelligence Operations

The Washington Post revealed that Israel conducted an intelligence operation to intimidate and divide senior Iranian military officials as part of its campaign against Iran.[49] Persian-speaking Israeli intelligence operatives called more than 20 senior Iranian leaders on their cellphones after Israel killed key Iranian military leaders on June 13.[50] The Israeli intelligence operatives threatened to kill Iranian leaders and their families unless they ceased their support for the Iranian regime and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[51] In an audio recording obtained by the Washington Post, an Israeli intelligence operative called an unspecified senior IRGC official and told the official that he and his family would be killed unless he sent a video disavowing the Iranian regime to the Israeli intelligence operative within 12 hours.[52] Three unspecified Israeli sources told the Washington Post that the official is still believed to be alive and that the primary objective of the operation was to deter and confuse the Iranian leadership.[53]

Iranian Nuclear Program

Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi stated on June 23 that Iran will remain a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[54] Iranian officials have threatened to withdraw from the NPT in response to US and Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities.[55] Iran ratified the NPT, which prohibits nuclear weaponization, in 1970 and has repeatedly threatened to withdraw from the treaty to impose pressure on the West.[56]

International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi stated on June 23 that the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in Qom Province likely sustained “very significant damage” as a result of the June 21 US strikes.[57] The chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that Fordow, Natanz, and an unspecified nuclear facility in Esfahan sustained “extreme damage” from the US strikes.[58] Grossi stated that “given the explosive payload utilized, and the extreme vibration-sensitive nature of centrifuges, very significant damage is expected to have occurred” at Fordow.[59] Grossi stated that buildings used for uranium conversion and tunnel entrances used for storing enriched material were damaged at the Esfahan site. Uranium conversion facilities convert uranium concentrate to a gas that can be enriched in centrifuges. The Institute for Science and International Security similarly reported that US airstrikes damaged at least three tunnel entrances leading to underground facilities at the Esfahan site.[60] The institute reported that Iran “backfilled” these entrances ahead of US strikes, likely in an effort to contain an explosion or prevent the dispersion of hazardous material, citing satellite imagery from June 20. Grossi said that US strikes also targeted the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz.[61] Israeli airstrikes previously destroyed the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and likely damaged or destroyed several thousand centrifuges at Natanz.[62]

Iran may have moved some materials from its nuclear facilities to other locations ahead of US or Israeli strikes. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi sent Grossi a letter on June 13 in which he stated that Iran would “adopt special measures to protect our nuclear equipment and materials.”[63] Israeli officials told the New York Times on June 22 that Iran may have moved materials and equipment from Fordow ahead of the US strikes.[64] CTP-ISW reported in its June 23 Morning Update that Israel conducted airstrikes on June 23 targeting roads leading to Fordow in order to “disrupt” access to the site, which may prevent Iran from being able to assess damage at Fordow or move materials from the site to other locations.[65]

Iranian Attacks on Israel

Iran has not launched any drones or ballistic missiles at Israel since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff at 5:00 AM ET on June 23. Iran fired six or seven missiles across at least four waves of attacks targeting Israel overnight on June 22 and 23.[66] An Iranian missile impacted near a power station in Ashdod, and another missile or fragment landed near Safed.[67]

Russia and Iran

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on June 23, reportedly to request Russian assistance for Iran. An Iranian delegation led by Araghchi met with Putin, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov, and Chief of the General Staff’s Main Directorate Igor Kostykov.[68] Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali and Deputy Foreign Minister for International and Legal Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi also attended the meeting.[69] An unspecified senior source told Reuters that Araghchi was expected to deliver a letter from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to Putin that sought “more help” from Russia.[70] Unspecified Iranian sources said that Iran has been unsatisfied with Russian support for Iran against the United States and Israel.[71] Putin stated that Russia is “making efforts” to assist Iran, according to a Kremlin readout.[72] Putin also said that “unprovoked” attacks against Iran have “no justification.”[73] Iran’s reported dissatisfaction with Russian support likely reflects Russian constraints in its ability to provide direct support to Iran due to its war in Ukraine, and also showcases the immediate limitations of the Russo-Iranian strategic relationship.[74] Iran and Russia’s recent Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement notably lacks a mutual defense clause.[75] Russia has likely resigned itself to providing diplomatic overtures and declarations of support for Iran, which underscores the limited benefits that Russia can provide its partners as it focuses on fighting Ukraine.[76]

[1] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114734934153569653

[2] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114734934153569653

[3] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114734934153569653

[4] https://x.com/phreuters/status/1937284123392880694?s=46

[5] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2025/06/23/world/iran-trump-israel-news/fc472102-f584-50ca-be52-6fe0dbdc8b1c?smid=url-share ; https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114734424268466099 ; https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-us-strikes-06-23-25-intl-hnk#cmc9e0cuc000u3b6usd1485nm

[6] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114734424268466099 ; https://www.nytimes.com/live/2025/06/23/world/iran-trump-israel-news/b1047d13-0d56-50d7-9ccc-8c2237ae9b2c?smid=url-share ; https://x.com/MOD_Qatar/status/1937196986970546600

[7] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/114734431573760700 ; https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/114734424268466099

[8] https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/1937195436906844664

[9] https://x.com/timourazhari/status/1937208526461366376 ; https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1937192269347742076 ; https://x.com/timourazhari/status/1937193066412278126 ; https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-us-strikes-06-23-25-intl-hnk#cmc9df6p6000b3b6u30xke1dq

[10] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114734424268466099

[11] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-israel-us-latest-news/card/iran-positions-missile-launchers-for-potential-attack-on-u-s-forces-officials-say-GcFCipf7h65viawsRVSv

[12] https://qa.usembassy.gov/security-alert-shelter-in-place-june-23/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-embassy-qatar-recommends-sheltering-place-qatar-says-situation-stable-2025-06-23/ ; https://www.bbc.com/news/live/cn7ze4vmk2pt?post=asset%3Ac7d71799-8fec-42fa-8e30-ad2348b58461#post

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-15-2025-evening-edition

[14] https://x.com/AmitSegal/status/1937203900873916784 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-14-2025-morning-edition

[15] https://www.csis.org/analysis/uncomfortable-lessons-reassessing-irans-missile-attack

[16] https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/11/middleeast/iran-strike-al-asad-air-base-exclusive-intl ; https://www.csis.org/analysis/uncomfortable-lessons-reassessing-irans-missile-attack

[17] https://x.com/majedalansari/status/1937196615128764606

[18] https://x.com/GeoPoliticJosh/status/1935230318933631377 ; https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-us-strikes-06-23-25-intl-hnk#cmc9dfii100173b703ubv2dta

[19] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114734462054466468

[20] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114734462054466468

[21] https://www.axios.com/2025/06/23/trump-iran-missile-attack-response ; https://x.com/davidmakovsky/status/1937208482131849647?s=46&t=EGYcIyXosW6lVJmixq2r5Q

[22] https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1214739853025394693 ; https://edition.cnn.com/2020/01/07/politics/rockets-us-airbase-iraq

[23] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1937031994166133195

[24] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1937031994166133195

[25] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1933420882162016634 ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/a-battered-iran-signals-it-wants-to-de-escalate-hostilities-with-israel-and-negotiate-9feab4ae?mod=hp_lead_pos1

[26] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-tries-to-buy-time-to-weigh-its-response-to-u-s-strikes-2c3d97be?msockid=31724c4845486561027c583141486b0b

[27] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-israel-us-latest-news/card/israel-seeks-an-end-to-fighting-with-iran-soon-bijK6KrvRZnWxiwhlQ6Z

[28] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-israel-us-latest-news/card/israel-seeks-an-end-to-fighting-with-iran-soon-bijK6KrvRZnWxiwhlQ6Z

[29] https://iranwire.com/en/features/142441-irans-senior-clerics-stay-silent-amid-war-as-former-president-seeks-compromise/

[30] https://www.iranintl.com/202506194418

[31] https://iranwire.com/en/news/142494-exclusive-senior-officials-cannot-reach-khamenei-ali-larijani-wants-to-rescue-iran/

[32] https://x.com/alilarijani_ir/status/1937204964193108120

[33] https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2025/06/inside-plot-push-khamenei-aside/683286/

[34] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-weighs-retaliation-against-us-strikes-nuclear-sites-2025-06-23/

[35] https://x.com/andynovy/status/1937107094651699224 ; https://x.com/Vahid/status/1937134588184449041 ; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/1937112226353058044

[36] https://x.com/Shayan86/status/1937139175028875291 ; https://x.com/IDF/status/1937121887852609823 ; https://x.com/Vahid/status/1937140934929743987 ; https://x.com/andynovy/status/1937127949763010584

[37] https://x.com/IDF/status/1937121887852609823

[38] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/murmurs-second-cultural-revolution

[39] https://x.com/Vahid/status/1937086261539545097 ; https://x.com/andynovy/status/1937092881891610648 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/23598

[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/explainer-iranian-armed-forces

[41] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/explainer-iranian-armed-forces

[42] https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/1937250842937295129

[43] https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/1937250842937295129

[44] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-20-2025-morning-edition

[45] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1937194942989754382

[46] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1937194942989754382

[47] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1937194942989754382

[48] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1937237374599151841

[49] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/06/23/exclusive-israel-intelligence-iran-call-audio/

[50] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/06/23/exclusive-israel-intelligence-iran-call-audio/

[51] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/06/23/exclusive-israel-intelligence-iran-call-audio/

[52] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/06/23/exclusive-israel-intelligence-iran-call-audio/

[53] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/06/23/exclusive-israel-intelligence-iran-call-audio/

[54] https://iranwire.com/en/news/142538-iran-vows-to-remain-in-nuclear-treaty-suspends-talks-after-us-strikes/

[55] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-06-23/iran-and-the-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-what-would-country-s-exit-mean ; https://www.cnbctv18.com/photos/world/iran-threatens-npt-exit-after-us-b-2-strike-what-the-treaty-means-and-why-it-matters-19625182.htm

[56] https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2020/jan/22/iran-and-npt ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/smoldering-iran-nuclear-crisis-risks-catching-fire-2023-05-05/

[57] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-the-board-of-governors-23-june-2025

[58] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4222543/secretary-of-defense-pete-hegseth-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-gen/

[59] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-general-grossis-statement-to-unsc-on-situation-in-iran-22-june-2025

[60] https://x.com/TheGoodISIS/status/1936887724465647775

[61] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-general-grossis-statement-to-unsc-on-situation-in-iran-22-june-2025

[62] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-special-report-june-16-2025-evening-edition

[63] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-the-board-of-governors-23-june-2025

[64] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/22/world/middleeast/iran-fordo-nuclear-damaged-not-destroyed.html?smid=url-sha

[65] https://x.com/IAFsite/status/1937100320556937347 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-23-2025-morning-edition

[66] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936938282165862723 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1937062299233046772

[67] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1937062299233046772 ; https://x.com/andynovy/status/1937057924381102573 ; https://x.com/i24NEWS_EN/status/1937070603330056521

[68] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/irans-supreme-leader-asks-putin-do-more-after-us-strikes-2025-06-23/

[69] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77237

[70] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/irans-supreme-leader-asks-putin-do-more-after-us-strikes-2025-06-23/

[71] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/irans-supreme-leader-asks-putin-do-more-after-us-strikes-2025-06-23/

[72] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77237

[73] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77237

[74] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-18-2025

[75] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-11-2025

[76] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-18-2025