Israel aims to maintain ‘aerial superiority’ over Iran
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Diverging Reports Breakdown
After Russia’s Failure, Iran Seeks China’s Military Might
Iran is seeking to acquire advanced military hardware from China. China is reluctant to provide advanced weaponry to Iran due to its efforts to stabilize relations with the United States and its valuable economic ties with Iran’s Sunni Arab neighbors. Russia’s support for Iran during this crisis has proven largely rhetorical. Russia has refused to sell the S-400 missile defense system to Iran, despite Tehran supplying Moscow with drones for its war in Ukraine, while providing such systems to Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Iran is now urgently seeking to rebuild its defenses — and is turning to China for the advanced military equipment that Russia has failed to deliver. But as Tehran pivots toward Beijing, it faces fresh obstacles and skepticism, revealing both the limits of its options and the depth of its strategic isolation. The situation underscores Iran’s deep strategic isolation, with both Russia and China prioritizing their own interests and relationships over formal alliance commitments with Tehran. The war with Israel last month decimated a senior echelon of Iran’s military leadership, crippled its air defenses, and exposed the vulnerability of its air force.
China is reluctant to provide advanced weaponry to Iran due to its efforts to stabilize relations with the United States and its valuable economic ties with Iran’s Sunni Arab neighbors.
Following a recent conflict that weakened its military and highlighted Russia’s limited support, Iran is seeking to acquire advanced military hardware from China.
The war with Israel last month decimated a senior echelon of Iran’s military leadership, crippled its air defenses, and exposed the vulnerability of its air force. Within days, Israel had established aerial superiority, paving the way for US air strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites.
But the war also tested the limits of Iran’s alliance with Russia, which offered little more than diplomatic support to Tehran during the 12-day conflict.
With faith in Moscow at a low point, Iran is now urgently seeking to rebuild its defenses — and is turning to China for the advanced military hardware that Russia has failed to deliver. But as Tehran pivots toward Beijing, it faces fresh obstacles and skepticism, revealing both the limits of its options and the depth of its strategic isolation.
Russia: A Strategic Partner In Name Only
Despite a recently signed strategic partnership agreement and years of close cooperation, Russia’s support for Iran during this crisis has proven largely rhetorical.
As the reformist newspaper Shargh notes, “this alliance, at critical junctures, is based more on shifting interests than on steadfast commitments.”
While Russian President Vladimir Putin condemned the US strikes as “unjustified” and offered dialogue, he made no commitment to military assistance, with the Kremlin repeatedly insisting that the partnership deal has no provisions for military aid in times of war.
Ali Motahari, a former deputy speaker of Iran’s parliament, captured the growing sense of frustration in a post on X.
Henoted that Russia has refused to sell the S-400 missile defense system to Iran, despite Tehran supplying Moscow with drones for its war in Ukraine, while providing such systems to Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
The ex-lawmaker argued that Russia’s reluctance is due to concerns Iran could use the S-400 against Israeli aggression, exposing the superficiality of the so-called strategic partnership “that Putin touts.”
Iran’s attempts to purchase advanced Russian military equipment — including Sukhoi-35 (Su-35) fighter jets and Mi-28 attack helicopters — have also stalled.
According to Shargh, “except for some trainer jets, none of the promised equipment has been delivered,” with production issues in Russia and diplomatic pressure from Persian Gulf states, Israel, and the United States cited as key reasons.
This pattern of noncommitment has likely left Iranian officials and analysts openly questioning Russia’s reliability as an ally.
Chinese Reluctance And Realpolitik
With Russia distracted and unreliable, unconfirmed reports both in Iranian and Western media claim that Iran has turned to China in hopes of acquiring advanced military hardware, particularly the Chengdu J-10C multirole fighter jet.
Iran’s air force is severely outdated and ill-equipped to confront modern adversaries. Its fleet consists largely of aging US and Soviet-era aircraft acquired before the 1979 revolution, many of which are kept operational through cannibalized parts and domestic improvisation.
The J-10C is a 4.5-generation, single-engine fighter jet equipped with advanced avionics, AESA radar, and capable of deploying PL-15 long-range missiles. It is considered a credible, though not equal, challenger to Israel’s advanced F-35I fleet.
However, Chinese reluctance to supply Iran is pronounced, according to Andrea Ghiselli, a lecturer at the University of Exeter and head of research of the TOChina Hub’s ChinaMed Project.
“Beijing is trying to stabilize the relations with Washington to buy some time to further increase its tech and economic self-sufficiency, Ghiselli told RFE/RL. “That’s more important than rebuilding the Iranian Air Force.”
Experts also agree that China’s relations with Iran’s regional rivals contribute to its disinclination to beef up Iran’s military.
“China has acted as an economic or geoeconomic actor in the Middle East,” said Hamidreza Azizi, a fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
He told RFE/RL that China values its relationships with Iran’s Sunni Arab neighbors in the Gulf Cooperation Council — Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates — who are critical energy suppliers and trading partners but maintain cautious relations with Tehran.
Analysts widely agree that China’s most effective way to support Iran is through continued oil purchases, which provide Tehran with vital revenue under sanctions.
For Beijing, maintaining access to energy and avoiding regional destabilization outweigh any potential benefits from selling advanced weaponry to Iran, Ghiselli argued.
Iran’s Strategic Isolation
The events of the past weeks have exposed the depth of Iran’s strategic isolation.
Both Moscow and Beijing have prioritized their own interests and relationships with Iran’s adversaries over any formal alliance commitments.
As Shargh concludes, Russia’s unwillingness to go beyond political statements has severely damaged its credibility as an ally, while China’s realpolitik ensures that any meaningful military support will remain out of reach.
Farzan Sabet, a managing researcher at the Geneva Graduate Institute, told RFE/RL that Tehran “doesn’t have any good options” when it comes to foreign military partners.
Even if Tehran managed to purchase fighter jets from China, it would need a lot more than it can pay for to be able to maintain aerial superiority in future conflicts, at least in its own skies.
“These are very, very expensive,” Sabet said. “With Iran being under sanctions, it’s not clear to anybody who would have the money to pay for it.”
By RFE/RL
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No Peace, Just Pause: Iran and Israel’s Fragile Standoff
has been released to mark the start of a new year in the U.S. This year marks the beginning of the first decade of the 21st century in the United States. It is also the first year in which the nation has been able to enjoy the benefits of the New Year without the threat of financial ruin. The year has been marked by the birth of a son, and the death of a father. It has also been a year of triumph for the nation, as well as a decade of heartache. It’s been the longest year in American history, but it’s also been the most difficult for many of the nation’s residents. It will be the first time since the end of the Second World War that many of these people have had a chance to experience the joys of the new year without the fear of financial problems. It also marks the start of a new era for the country, which will see many of its residents enjoy a new lease of life. It could also be the beginning of an era of prosperity, with the prospect of a brighter future.
Overall, Israel has used successive airstrikes to dismantle Iranian defenses and maintain aerial superiority, effectively forcing Iran to divert its missile arsenal from offensive operations to defense—thus constraining Tehran’s ability to take initiative. In response, Iran has embraced a policy of escalation-for-escalation, calculating that showing weakness would cost it dearly in future negotiations. Tehran also appears to be betting that such escalation will generate internal pressure on Netanyahu’s government and destabilize Israel’s economy through precise, intermittent strikes on populated and strategic areas.
Since the Iran-Iraq war, Tehran has demonstrated a political flexibility that often surprises its adversaries. Its leadership follows a strategy of “tactical retreats” that serve broader long-term goals. The regime may concede when cornered but consistently aims to regain lost ground. While Tehran may express readiness for a deal with the West and sanctions relief, it still views resistance to Western domination as the cornerstone of its ideology. Any major retreat would be interpreted as a defeat after decades of struggle
Following President Donald Trump’s announcement of a ceasefire agreement between Iran and Israel, many questions remain about the durability of such an arrangement after years of proxy conflict—culminating recently in a direct 12-day aerial exchange of fire.
Following President Donald Trump’s announcement of a ceasefire agreement between Iran and Israel, many questions remain about the durability of such an arrangement after years of proxy conflict—culminating recently in a direct 12-day aerial exchange of fire.
The nature of the agreement itself remains shrouded in ambiguity. Trump has yet to disclose the terms accepted by the Iranian and Israeli sides, and it is still unclear whether Washington and Tehran will return to the nuclear negotiation table—talks that had previously collapsed.
At this stage, all involved parties share an interest in halting hostilities, suggesting that the agreement may hold—at least temporarily—until the strategic calculations shift. The United States, exhausted by protracted Middle East conflicts, has little appetite for a new drawn-out war. Iran, for its part, appears more open to temporary deals due to its declining capabilities and escalating internal crises. Trump himself faced a divided political base: between isolationists wary of foreign entanglements and pro-Israel hawks who see US and Israeli interests as inherently aligned.
From Israel’s perspective, continuing the war may have yielded diminishing returns, especially after achieving key strategic goals—such as depleting Iran’s missile stockpiles and weakening the IRGC through targeted strikes—without triggering a full-scale confrontation. Preserving unity with Washington and avoiding embarrassment for the Trump administration were also decisive factors in accepting a truce.
Tehran, meanwhile, has little desire to provoke the US and seeks to end Israeli strikes on its facilities. Continued escalation raises the risk of direct confrontation with Washington—not just Tel Aviv—at a time when Iran is facing severe domestic pressures. With each passing day of war, the risk of regime collapse—or at least conditions that could lead to it—increases.
A ceasefire may reassure regional actors concerned about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, though they are even more alarmed by the prospect of a devastating war to prevent them. Still, Tehran remains cautious about offering nuclear concessions without real guarantees that Israel will not resume its attacks—especially given past episodes where Trump greenlit Israeli strikes despite ongoing negotiations. Since the October 7, 2023 attack, Netanyahu’s government has embraced a national security doctrine focused on regional dominance rather than peace, making any long-term deal with Iran appear unlikely.
Despite suffering serious blows to its nuclear infrastructure and missile capabilities, the Iranian regime remains intact and is seeking opportunities to rebuild its military strength. While this task will be difficult and expensive, it is not impossible, given the Iranian regime’s history of resilience.
The region has just witnessed one of the most dangerous flashpoints in the long-standing tension between Tehran and Tel Aviv. Israel views its latest strikes as a “relative success,” having neutralized much of Iran’s air defenses and secured near-total aerial freedom over Iranian skies. Iran responded with a barrage of missiles and drones—some of which penetrated Israeli defenses—focusing on dense population centers like Tel Aviv and employing a staggered timing strategy to stretch Israeli response capabilities.
However, Tehran’s retaliation failed to deter further Israeli escalation. Tel Aviv describes its operations as “preemptive strikes,” though their scope and context suggest objectives beyond halting Iran’s nuclear program—possibly even undermining the regime or dismantling its high command structure.
Since the Iran-Iraq war, Tehran has demonstrated a political flexibility that often surprises its adversaries. Its leadership follows a strategy of “tactical retreats” that serve broader long-term goals. The regime may concede when cornered but consistently aims to regain lost ground. While Tehran may express readiness for a deal with the West and sanctions relief, it still views resistance to Western domination as the cornerstone of its ideology. Any major retreat would be interpreted as a defeat after decades of struggle.
Though frequently floated as a response to Israeli or US aggression, the threat of closing the Strait of Hormuz remains largely impractical. Such a move would not serve Iran’s interests—it could provoke a harsh international backlash and alienate China, Iran’s largest oil customer. Alternative routes through the UAE and Oman also limit the effectiveness of such a threat. In fact, Iran itself would suffer most from the closure, as the bulk of its imports pass through the strait. Furthermore, much of the strait lies in Omani waters and spans up to 60 miles in width, making complete Iranian control virtually impossible.
Overall, Israel has used successive airstrikes to dismantle Iranian defenses and maintain aerial superiority, effectively forcing Iran to divert its missile arsenal from offensive operations to defense—thus constraining Tehran’s ability to take initiative. In response, Iran has embraced a policy of escalation-for-escalation, calculating that showing weakness would cost it dearly in future negotiations. Tehran also appears to be betting that such escalation will generate internal pressure on Netanyahu’s government and destabilize Israel’s economy through precise, intermittent strikes on populated and strategic areas.
Ultimately, this ceasefire does not signal a strategic shift toward peace. Rather, it reflects a moment of “mutual deterrence” within a fragile balance—one that could shift quickly with any change in power dynamics or political will.
Intelligence: Iran Seeks to Acquire Chinese J-10C Fighter Jets to Counter Israeli F-35I Superiority
Iranian Defense Minister recently visited China and initiated high-level discussions to procure Chengdu J-10C multirole fighter jets and advanced AWACS equipment. These negotiations signal a strategic shift in Tehran’s defense procurement policy following prolonged delays in the delivery of Russian Su-35 fighters. China has supplied a variety of military equipment to Iran, including the HQ-2 and HQ-7 surface-to-air missile systems, radar technology, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and naval systems such as fast attack boats and anti-ship missiles. If finalized, this Iran-China arms deal will mark a significant reorientation in Tehran’s defense strategy and may deepen military cooperation between two nations increasingly aligned against Western influence in the region. The outcome of these talks could redefine Iran’s air combat doctrine and inject new volatility into an already tense Middle Eastern security environment.
The Chengdu J-10C, a 4.5-generation combat aircraft, is one of China’s most advanced fighter platforms, featuring AESA radar, thrust-vectoring engines, and compatibility with PL-15 long-range air-to-air missiles. Its multirole capabilities allow it to perform air superiority missions, ground attack operations, and complex electronic warfare tasks. The J-10C has demonstrated high combat effectiveness within the Pakistan Air Force, notably in exercises simulating engagements against Indian Rafale F3R jets, giving it a proven edge in high-threat environments.
Compared to the Israeli Air Force’s inventory, the J-10C represents a credible challenger but not an outright peer competitor. Israel currently operates a highly advanced fleet that includes the F-35I Adir stealth fighter, F-15I Ra’am strike aircraft, and upgraded F-16I Sufa multirole jets. The F-35I offers significant advantages in stealth, sensor fusion, and electronic warfare, giving Israel air superiority in most scenarios. However, the J-10C’s AESA radar and long-range PL-15 missile system could potentially threaten non-stealth platforms like the F-15I and F-16I in contested airspace, especially when supported by Chinese-origin AWACS, which would greatly enhance Iranian situational awareness and coordination.
The growing defense relationship between China and Iran has evolved steadily over the past two decades, driven by mutual geopolitical interests and opposition to Western sanctions. China has supplied a variety of military equipment to Iran, including the HQ-2 and HQ-7 surface-to-air missile systems, radar technology, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and naval systems such as fast attack boats and anti-ship missiles. In the drone domain, Chinese technology has notably influenced several Iranian UAV models, including the Shahed and Mohajer series. Furthermore, joint naval drills and exchanges have reinforced military ties, underscoring Beijing’s strategic interest in maintaining access to the Persian Gulf.
Iran’s decision to pivot toward the J-10C is heavily influenced by the absence of the Russian Su-35s, for which Iran had already completed payments but received none. This delay raised concerns over Moscow’s reliability as a defense partner, prompting Tehran to seek alternatives to urgently modernize its aging fleet of legacy American fighters like the F-14, F-5, and F-4. The introduction of the J-10C into the Iranian Air Force would represent a significant leap in air combat capability and would provide Iran with a platform more closely aligned with the fifth-generation threshold.
In addition to the fighter jets, Iran’s request for Chinese AWACS systems could further strengthen its command-and-control capabilities, dramatically enhancing situational awareness, airborne battle management, and early warning functions. This combination would enable more integrated air defense and offensive operations, potentially shifting the balance of power in the Persian Gulf and Levant theaters, where Israel and U.S.-aligned Gulf states currently maintain qualitative superiority.
If finalized, this Iran-China arms deal will mark a significant reorientation in Tehran’s defense strategy and may deepen military cooperation between two nations increasingly aligned against Western influence in the region. The outcome of these talks could redefine Iran’s air combat doctrine and inject new volatility into an already tense Middle Eastern security environment.
Katz: Israel sought Khamenei strike
Defence Minister Israel Katz tells media that Israel would have killed Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei if the opportunity had presented itself. Israel and Iran each claimed victory in a 12-day war that ended with a ceasefire on June 24. Israel does not know the location of all of Iran’s enriched uranium, but its air strikes have destroyed the Islamic republic’s uranium enrichment capabilities, he says. Israel maintains its aerial superiority over Iran and that it is ready to strike again, he tells Israeli television Channel 13. Israel launched a bombing campaign that it said aimed to stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon — an ambition Iran has denied.
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Defence Minister Israel Katz told media that Israel would have killed Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during the war between the two countries if the opportunity had presented itself.
“If he had been in our sights, we would have taken him out,” Katz told Israel’s public radio station Kan Thursday evening, adding that the military had “searched a lot”.
“Khamenei understood this, went very deep underground, broke off contact with the commanders… so in the end it wasn’t realistic,” Katz told Kan.
He told Israeli television Channel 13 Thursday that Israel would cease its assassination attempts because “there is a difference between before the ceasefire and after the ceasefire”.
Katz had said during the war that Khamenei “can no longer be allowed to exist”, just days after reports that Washington vetoed Israeli plans to assassinate him.
But on Kan, Katz advised Khamenei to remain inside a bunker.
“He should learn from the late Nasrallah, who sat for a long time deep in the bunker”, he said, referring to Lebanese militant group Hezbollah’s former leader Hassan Nasrallah, who Israel killed in a Beirut air strike in September 2024.
The movements of the supreme leader, who has not left Iran since he took power, are subject to the tightest security and secrecy.
Katz said Thursday that Israel maintained its aerial superiority over Iran and that it was ready to strike again.
“We won’t let Iran develop nuclear weapons and threaten (Israel) with long-range missiles”, he said.
In his Channel 12 interview, Katz admitted that Israel does not know the location of all of Iran’s enriched uranium, but that its air strikes had destroyed the Islamic republic’s uranium enrichment capabilities.
“The material itself was not something that was supposed to be neutralised,” he said of the enriched uranium.
The impact of Israeli and US strikes on Iran’s nuclear programme has been a subject to debate.
A leaked US intelligence assessment estimated the programme to have set Iran back a few months, while Katz and other Israeli and US public figures said the damage would take years to rebuild.
Israel and Iran each claimed victory in a 12-day war that ended with a ceasefire on June 24.
The war erupted on June 13 when Israel launched a bombing campaign that it said aimed to stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon — an ambition Iran has consistently denied.
Iran bets on China’s J-10C to counter Israel’s F-35I might
Iran is accelerating negotiations with China to acquire Chengdu J-10C multirole fighter jets. Move prompted by the failure of a long-anticipated deal with Russia for Su-35 aircraft. The decision comes on the heels of a bruising 12-day conflict between Israel and the United States. Iran’s pivot to Beijing signals a desperate bid to modernize its dilapidated fleet amid escalating regional tensions. This development underscores China’s growing role as a defense supplier in the Persian Gulf, raising questions about the region’S shifting power dynamics. The J- 10C boasts a sleek delta-wing design with forewings, offering high-ability for both air-to-air and air- to-ground missions. It can carry a suite of advanced weaponry, including the PL-15 air-airing missile, which has a reported range exceeding 200 kilometers. It is comparable to the U.S. F-16 Gripen in terms of cost and cost-per-missile capability and cost.
Photo credit: Creative Commons
Summary
– Iran pivots to China’s J-10C jets after Russia’s Su-35 deal fails.
– J-10C’s advanced radar and missiles aim to counter Israel’s air power.
– Iran’s aging air force struggles post a 12-day war with Israel.
– China’s arms deal signals its growing influence in the Gulf.
– Only 36 jets may not close Iran’s gap with regional rivals.
In a significant shift in Middle Eastern geopolitics, Iran is accelerating negotiations with China to acquire Chengdu J-10C multirole fighter jets, a move prompted by the failure of a long-anticipated deal with Russia for Su-35 aircraft. The decision comes on the heels of a bruising 12-day conflict between Israel and the United States, which exposed critical vulnerabilities in Iran’s aging air force and air defense systems.
Tehran’s pivot to Beijing, reported by Iran’s Khorasan newspaper and cited by Kommersant, signals a desperate bid to modernize its dilapidated fleet amid escalating regional tensions. This development not only reshapes Iran’s military strategy but also underscores China’s growing role as a defense supplier in the Persian Gulf, raising questions about the region’s shifting power dynamics.
Iran’s Air Force: a relic of the past
Iran’s air force, officially known as the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force [IRIAF], has long struggled to maintain operational readiness. According to the Military Balance 2025, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s air force boasted approximately 150 fighter jets before the recent conflict, but the majority are relics from a bygone era.
The backbone of the fleet consists of American-made aircraft acquired before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, including 64 F-4 Phantom II jets, 35 F-5E/F Tiger II fighters, and 41 F-14A Tomcats. Additionally, Iran operates 18 MiG-29A/UB jets acquired from the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Most of these aircraft are plagued by maintenance issues, with many deemed non-operational due to a lack of spare parts and technical expertise.
The recent 12-day war, which began on June 13, 2025, laid bare these deficiencies. Israel’s Operation Rising Lion, involving F-35 stealth fighters and F-15 strike aircraft, overwhelmed Iran’s air defenses, targeting key nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. Iranian sources estimate losses of up to 30% of the IRIAF’s operational fleet, though exact figures remain unverified.
Could This Be a Game Changer for Iran in the Skies Over Tehran?
🚨🇮🇷🇨🇳 BREAKING: Iran’s air power is set to take a major leap.
Tehran is reportedly finalizing a landmark arms deal with China to acquire over 40 Chengdu J-10C fighter jets — a bold and strategic move that could… pic.twitter.com/8uP17D8u0W — john marufu (@JMarufu37136) June 27, 2025
Iran’s reliance on domestically produced surface-to-air missile systems, such as the Bavar-373, proved inadequate against Israel’s advanced electronic warfare and precision-guided munitions. The conflict demonstrated that Iran’s air force, once a formidable regional player, is no match for modern adversaries equipped with cutting-edge technology.
Chengdu J-10C: A modern lifeline for Iran
The Chengdu J-10C, often referred to as the “Vigorous Dragon,” is a single-engine, multi-role fighter jet developed by China’s Chengdu Aerospace Corporation. Positioned as a 4.5-generation aircraft, it is comparable to the American F-16V and Sweden’s Gripen E in terms of capability and cost. The J-10C boasts a sleek delta-wing design with canard forewings, offering high maneuverability for both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions.
Its standout feature is the KLJ-7A Active Electronically Scanned Array [AESA] radar, which provides superior target detection and tracking compared to older mechanically scanned radars. The jet can carry a suite of advanced weaponry, including the PL-15 air-to-air missile, which has a reported range exceeding 200 kilometers, rivaling Western equivalents like the AIM-120D AMRAAM.
In electronic warfare, the J-10C is equipped with advanced countermeasures, including infrared decoys and chaff dispensers, to evade enemy radar and missile locks. It also supports the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses [SEAD] and Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses [DEAD] missions, critical for countering sophisticated air defense networks. However, its electronic warfare capabilities remain largely untested in high-intensity conflicts against adversaries like Israel, which employs layered defenses and cutting-edge jamming systems.
Iran’s existing radio-electronic combat systems, such as the domestically developed Karrar drone, could potentially integrate with the J-10C, but significant technical hurdles remain due to differences in Chinese and Iranian technology standards.
🚨 BREAKING:
🇮🇷 Iran is increasingly frustrated with Russia over delays in the delivery of Su-35 fighter jets, and is now pivoting toward China to modernize its airpower.
The recent combat-proven performance of Pakistan’s J-10C, which reportedly shot down 6 Indian jets using… pic.twitter.com/6EU5gg5k3r — Defence Index (@Defence_Index) June 25, 2025
Compared to the Russian Su-35, which Iran had previously pursued, the J-10C offers distinct advantages. Priced between $60 million and $90 million per unit, it is significantly cheaper than the Su-35, which can exceed $100 million with full weapon packages. The J-10C’s single-engine design reduces maintenance costs, though it sacrifices some of the Su-35’s raw power and payload capacity. Its compatibility with modern network-centric warfare systems also makes it a more flexible platform for Iran’s needs, particularly in scenarios requiring rapid deployment against regional threats.
Why China? The collapse of the Su-35 deal
Iran’s decision to pursue the J-10C stems from a combination of geopolitical and economic factors. In 2023, Iran finalized a deal with Russia to acquire Su-35 Flanker-E jets, with deliveries expected to begin in the spring of that year. However, Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine has strained its defense industry, leading to significant delays.
By March 2025, reports surfaced that the Su-35s intended for Iran had been redirected to Algeria, leaving Tehran empty-handed. The National Interest noted that Moscow’s prioritization of its own military needs has left Iran searching for alternatives, with China emerging as the most viable option.
A pivotal development occurred on June 24, 2025, when the United States lifted sanctions on China’s purchase of Iranian oil, a move that facilitated negotiations for the J-10C. Tehran had previously offered to barter oil and gas for the jets, a proposal Beijing rejected due to its insistence on cash payments. T
The easing of sanctions has removed this barrier, enabling Iran to leverage its oil revenue to fund the deal. According to Kommersant, negotiations have now scaled down from an ambitious 150 jets to a more modest 36, reflecting Iran’s financial constraints and China’s cautious approach to large-scale arms exports.
China’s growing influence in the global arms market also plays a role. The J-10C’s recent combat success with the Pakistan Air Force, which reportedly used the jet to down Indian Rafale fighters in a May 2025 clash, has boosted its reputation. The National Security Journal reported that the J-10C’s PL-15 missiles and AESA radar gave Pakistan a decisive edge, a performance that likely caught Iran’s attention. China’s willingness to supply not only aircraft but also air defense systems and radars, as noted by Pravda, further sweetens the deal for Tehran.
Иран решил купить китайские истребители вместо российских
Иран активизировал переговоры с Китаем о покупке многоцелевых истребителей Chengdu J-10 после тяжелых потерь в 12-дневной войне с Израилем и США, пишет Khorasan. Kитайские самолеты рассматриваются как альтернатива Су-35. — Vitalie Moraru 🇷🇴 🇲🇩 (@VitaliiMoraru) June 27, 2025
Tactical and strategic implications for Iran
The acquisition of 36 J-10C jets could provide a significant boost to Iran’s air defense capabilities. The PL-15 missile’s long range and the J-10C’s advanced radar could enhance Iran’s ability to engage Israeli aircraft at greater distances, potentially deterring future strikes like those seen in the recent conflict. The jet’s multirole capabilities also allow it to conduct precision strikes against ground targets, a critical need given Iran’s reliance on outdated F-4s for such missions.
However, the deal’s limitations are stark. Thirty-six aircraft, even if delivered promptly, cannot replace the IRIAF’s aging fleet or close the technological gap with Israel’s F-35s and F-15s. The 12-day war exposed Iran’s broader vulnerabilities, including a lack of integrated air defense networks and insufficient pilot training. Israeli strikes on nuclear facilities demonstrated the effectiveness of coordinated electronic warfare and stealth tactics, areas where Iran lags significantly. The J-10C, while advanced, cannot single-handedly address these systemic issues.
Logistical challenges: a steep learning curve
Integrating the J-10C into Iran’s air force presents formidable logistical challenges. Iran has no prior experience operating Chinese combat aircraft, which differ significantly from its American and Russian platforms.
Establishing a new supply chain for spare parts, training pilots, and developing maintenance infrastructure will require substantial investment. China’s practice of restricting access to software codes and system interfaces, as seen in its arms deals with other nations, could further complicate matters. Without full access to the J-10C’s software, Iran may struggle to perform local modifications or integrate the jet with its existing systems.
The cost of building this infrastructure is likely to be high, potentially diverting resources from other critical defense priorities. For example, Iran’s efforts to maintain its F-14 Tomcats have relied on reverse engineering and cannibalization, a process that has kept only a fraction of the fleet operational. The Middle East Forum noted that Iran’s ability to sustain the J-10C in combat-ready condition will depend on Beijing’s willingness to provide long-term support, a factor that remains uncertain given China’s cautious approach to technology transfers.
Regional ripples: Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE
Iran’s potential acquisition of the J-10C is unlikely to go unnoticed by its regional rivals. Israel, which maintains air superiority through its fleet of F-35s and F-15s, may accelerate plans to expand its stealth capabilities. Reports from CNN indicate that Israel is already in talks with the United States for additional F-35 deliveries to counter emerging threats.
The Israeli Air Force’s demonstrated ability to penetrate Iranian airspace during the recent conflict suggests that the J-10C, while an improvement, will not fundamentally alter the balance of power.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, both key U.S. allies, are also likely to respond. Saudi Arabia’s air force operates advanced F-15SA jets, while the UAE has recently acquired French Rafale fighters. The introduction of J-10Cs in Iran could prompt these nations to invest in new platforms, such as the American F-15EX or the European Eurofighter Typhoon, to maintain their edge. The risk of an arms race in the Persian Gulf is real, with potential implications for regional stability.
China’s rising influence in the Middle East
Iran’s pivot to China reflects a broader trend of Beijing’s growing influence in the Middle East. Unlike Russia and the United States, which have historically dominated the region’s arms market, China offers cost-effective, combat-proven platforms like the J-10C and JF-17. The success of these aircraft in Pakistan’s air campaign against India has bolstered China’s credibility as a defense supplier.
According to Newsweek, Chinese commentators have suggested that Iran’s air defenses might have performed better with Chinese weaponry, a claim that underscores Beijing’s ambition to challenge Western dominance in the arms trade.
The J-10C’s appeal lies in its affordability and technological sophistication. Its AESA radar and PL-15 missiles represent a leap forward for nations unable to access Western fighters like the F-35 or Rafale.
China’s broader strategy includes not only aircraft sales but also the export of integrated air defense systems, such as the Hongqi series, which could complement Iran’s existing capabilities. However, reliance on Chinese technology carries risks, including potential restrictions on software updates and long-term maintenance support, which could limit Iran’s operational independence.
Missed opportunities: could Iran have done better?
Iran’s decision to pursue the J-10C raises questions about alternative options. The Sino-Pakistani JF-17 Block III, which shares the J-10C’s AESA radar and PL-15 missile compatibility, is a cheaper alternative that could have been considered.
Priced at approximatelyរដ: approximately $30 million per unit, the JF-17 is a joint venture between Pakistan and China, offering a cost-effective platform with similar capabilities. Iran’s interest in the JF-17 was reported by the Middle East Forum, but financial constraints may have pushed Tehran toward the J-10C, which offers superior performance despite its higher cost.
Another option would have been to invest in modernizing Iran’s existing fleet. The IRIAF’s F-14 Tomcats, for example, have undergone limited upgrades, including new avionics and radar systems. However, the complexity and cost of reverse-engineering these aging aircraft may outweigh the benefits of acquiring new platforms. The J-10C represents a more immediate solution, but its long-term sustainability depends on Iran’s ability to overcome logistical and financial hurdles.
A step forward, but is It Enough?
Iran’s pursuit of the Chengdu J-10C marks a critical step toward modernizing its beleaguered air force, driven by the harsh lessons of the 12-day war with Israel and the United States. The J-10C’s advanced radar, long-range missiles, and multirole capabilities offer a significant upgrade over Iran’s aging fleet, potentially enhancing its ability to counter regional threats.
However, the acquisition of just 36 jets, coupled with logistical challenges and regional rivalries, suggests that Iran’s air force will remain at a disadvantage against adversaries like Israel. China’s growing role as a defense supplier adds a new dimension to the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape, but it remains to be seen whether Iran can overcome its systemic weaknesses to effectively integrate this new capability. Will the J-10C be a game-changer or merely a stopgap in Iran’s struggle for air superiority?
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