The Chief Justice of India (CJI) is not a mere “post office” but a constitutional functionary duty-bound to act in defence of the institutional integrity of the judiciary, the Supreme Court on Wednesday told Justice Yashwant Varma, adding that there appeared to be no procedural violation in the then CJI Sanjiv Khanna recommending his removal over allegations of corruption. Justice Yashwant Varma. (PTI)

The court reserved its verdict on Justice Varma’s petition assailing the CJI’s recommendation made to the President and Prime Minister in May, after the in-house panel found “strong inferential evidence” of his involvement in the recovery of sacks of charred currency at his official residence in Delhi in March.

“The Chief Justice of India is not supposed to be a mere post office. He has a certain duty towards the nation because he is the head of the judiciary. On the basis of the materials, if he finds that the misdemeanour is such that it requires a certain line of action, we will affirm the authority of the CJI in doing so,” a bench of justices Dipankar Datta and AG Masih told senior advocate Kapil Sibal, appearing for the judge.

The court added that pertinent provisions in the Judges’ Protection Act apparently empower the CJI to take all non-punitive steps against the judges for maintaining institutional integrity. “In your case, there is no patent violation of the in-house procedure. Whatever has been laid down, the then CJI [Sanjiv Khanna] followed it,” the bench told Sibal.

It also questioned the judge’s conduct in approaching the court after the conclusion of the in-house inquiry and the adverse report that it gave. “You could have challenged it earlier. There your conduct does not inspire confidence. We did not want to comment on it, but your conduct has not been above par. You submitted yourself to the procedure. Why did you appear? On the face of it, you knew it could lead to an outcome not favourable to you,” it added.

Justice Varma, then a Delhi high court judge, was stripped of his judicial responsibilities in March after the charred currency notes were found at his residence following a fire. The CJI subsequently initiated an in-house inquiry, which culminated in a recommendation for his removal. Varma was later repatriated to the Allahabad high court.

During the arguments on Wednesday, Sibal, representing the judge, clarified that the petition did not challenge the in-house inquiry itself if it complied with the principles of natural justice, nor did it dispute the CJI’s authority to direct that a judge under inquiry be divested of work. He contended that the in-house committee making a recommendation for removal was “ultra vires” and created a parallel, extralegal mechanism inconsistent with the constitutional framework for impeachment.

“The recommendation for removal has to go. It is more than persuasive—when the CJI recommends removal, it virtually amounts to a death knell for a judge,” Sibal argued.

But the bench responded firmly, pressing Sibal on what relief he expected and whether a mere declaration would suffice, given that the final decision on removal lies with Parliament under Articles 124 and 217 of the Constitution.

“Parliament is supposed to act independently. It is not bound by what the judiciary or the CJI recommends. Once Parliament admits the motion, the judge will have a full opportunity to demolish the allegations before the inquiry panel constituted under the Judges Inquiry Act,” the court noted.

The judges also cited Section 3(2) of the Judges’ Protection Act, which they said explicitly empowers the Supreme Court, among others, to take civil, criminal, departmental or other non-punitive actions against a judge. “The term ‘otherwise’ has to be given substantial meaning,” said the bench, calling it a complete answer to Sibal’s challenge.

“The in-house procedure is rooted in Article 141. When there is a vacuum in law, the Supreme Court steps in, as it did in the Vishaka case [prevention of sexual harassment at workplace]. That becomes law,” the bench stressed, dismissing the contention that in-house proceedings lack legal authority.

Sibal insisted that the CJI’s powers, as seen in the previous judgment of the court, are “moral and ethical but not legal”. The bench responded that the judgment failed to consider Section 3(2) of the Judges’ Protection Act, and they would now read the CJI’s powers as moral, ethical, and legal.

At one point, Sibal said that the committee condemned him without proving that the charred currency belonged to Justice Varma. The court shot down this submission, saying: “That was not the issue before the committee…Let the Parliament decide. It was not the remit of the committee whether it was your money or not. Do not make us say anything on the report.”

Sibal argued that principles of natural justice were violated, as he was not allowed to cross-examine witnesses and was denied a hearing by the CJI despite repeated requests. Supporting this, senior advocate Mukul Rohatgi added that previous in-house inquiries always involved a direct hearing with the CJI and other collegium judges, but that was missing in this case.

But the court responded that the in-house mechanism does not provide for cross-examination and that such procedural gaps cannot vitiate the entire process, especially when the report was preliminary and Parliament has the final say.

The court closed the hearing with the observation that the in-house mechanism, formulated through precedent and law, has operated for nearly 30 years and is meant to preserve judicial integrity without compromising constitutional rights.