In the space of just five weeks, China held live-fire drills on the doorsteps of Australia, Taiwan and Vietnam. It tested new landing barges on ships that could facilitate an amphibious assault on Taiwan. And it unveiled deep-sea cable cutters with the ability to switch off another country’s internet access – a tool no other nation admits to having.

China has been flexing its maritime muscle in the Indo-Pacific to send a message of supremacy to its regional neighbours, experts say. But it’s also testing the thinking of a bigger rival further afield: Donald Trump.

Since Trump took office in January, he and his cabinet members have focused their China strategy on tariffs and have launched an escalating trade war with Beijing. They had been largely silent on China’s growing acts of aggression in the Indo-Pacific’s seas.

That’s starting to change.

On April 1, the US state department condemned Beijing’s “aggressive military activities and rhetoric” in relation to unannounced military drills in the Taiwan Strait, which have become bigger in scale in recent months and are increasingly resembling actual invasion. That came on the heels of a visit to the region by US defence secretary Pete Hegseth, where he assured Japan and the Philippines that America would continue to defend them against China. He clarified the US had not changed its status quo stance on Taiwan, and the Pentagon reiterated China remained the US’ biggest threat.

View image in fullscreen Donald Trump with secretary of state Marco Rubio, left, and defence secretary Pete Hegseth, right. Photograph: Molly Roberts/White House/Planet Pix/ZUMA Press Wire/REX/Shutterstock

But the US’s Indo-Pacific allies will want to hear those assurances from Trump, who has not shown his cards on issues like Taiwan. When asked by a journalist in February for his stance, Trump refused to be drawn and has said nothing on Taiwan since. He’s not afraid to diverge from his senior advisers, and his haphazard approach to Ukraine ceasefire talks – and tariffs – gives little confidence the president has a consistent, long-term strategy on any given global affair.

“The Chinese are watching what’s happening with the Trump administration and seeing how far they can push things,” said Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

And in their testing of Trump, the seas around China are likely to become more restive, Davis said, adding that China will keep ratcheting up its drills in the Taiwan Strait and target countries with which it has territorial disputes, including the Philippines and Japan.

“China will be more willing to impose the risk of casualties on the Philippines through ramming ships and so forth. It might go from using water cannon to something a bit more aggressive,” Davis said. “The goal is to intimidate Manila into accepting China’s interests.”

How heavily involved the US military should get in the Indo-Pacific and how far the US should go to protect Taiwan from China are issues that have divided Trump’s most senior officials, according to a former state department staffer who worked in Trump’s initial weeks in office.

“There are definitely different competing camps that you could liken to a royal court, all competing for the last word and influence with Trump,” the former staffer said. “There is definitely a split over Taiwan policy between traditional NatSec folks like (Marco) Rubio and (Mike) Waltz versus Maga folks.”

But which side Trump is on isn’t clear.

Sam Roggeveen, director of the Lowy Institute’s international security program, said it was known that a faction of the Trump administration wanted to turn away from Europe. “But it’s not at all clear that he agrees with the second part of it – doing more in Asia,” he said.

What is clear from Trump’s posture in Ukraine talks is that he is open to putting deals on trade and major geopolitical issues on the same table. He also has a tendency to change his stance on a subject in a matter of days.

Beijing will be watching to see how Trump sways. If Russia’s Vladimir Putin can strike a grand bargain with Trump by using economic incentives in exchange for Ukrainian land, Beijing may look to do the same with Taiwan.

And that’s causing anxiety among the US’s closest allies in the Indo-Pacific, said Jenny Schuch-Page, managing principal in energy and sustainability with the Washington-based Asia Group. “Even the prospect for a ‘grand bargain’ with China will make countries in South-east Asia wary about how they will fare,” she said.

A spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in Washington, Liu Pengyu, did not comment on whether Beijing was looking for such a deal, but he said China “deplores” the US’ criticisms of its drills near Taiwan, calling them “a mischaracterisation of the facts and truth and an interference in China’s internal affairs.”

What Trump is likely to focus on is staying competitive with China, which is ahead in areas including artificial intelligence, robotics, electric vehicles and 6G internet.

The lack of a long-term China strategy is problematic, according to Danny Russel, a former US diplomat and vice-president of international security and diplomacy with the Asia Society Policy Institute in Washington.

He points to mass firings in the country’s intelligence services, which included laying off dedicated China researchers from the CIA, as a dangerous move in terms of security and the US’s bargaining position in trade talks.

China will probably try to recruit those laid off for its own intelligence gathering on the US, he said. A Reuters report suggests it already is.

“We’re blinding ourselves at a moment when the national security and economic interests of the United States and our allies call for clarity,” Russel said.

How China is using salami slicing tactics against Taiwan – video

The defunding of Radio Free Asia – a sister organisation of Voice of America – is another own-goal, Russel said, cutting off a valuable source of information from China and other countries that are difficult to report from, like North Korea.

“It’s a kind of unilateral disarmament in the information space at a time when China, Russia, and North Korea are ramping up,” Russel said of the cuts. “Why are we voluntarily giving up our best tools of competition? There’s a big difference between belt-tightening and self-sabotage.”

That may become a security concern for countries like Australia, which has a long tradition of sharing intelligence back and forth with the US. China is likely to ramp up its missions in international waters near Australia, Davis and Roggenveen said, so a reliable flow of information on China is crucial.

A Chinese research vessel making a loop around Australia is a case in point. The Tan Suo Yi Hao has been cruising international waters off Australia’s southern and western coasts for two weeks surveying subsea communication cables – critical infrastructure that allows Australians to send everything from emails to military secrets.

“I’d prefer it wasn’t there,” is about as much as Australian prime minister Anthony Albanese could say when asked by journalists for his thoughts.

Without a strong signal on the region from Trump, there could be more Chinese ships to come.

Japan’s Seventh Regiment’s visible missile batteries on Okinawa aim to deter threats, particularly from China, while strengthening security ties with the U.S.

www.nytimes.com

Japan’s military strategy is evolving, particularly with the introduction of ship-slaying missiles by the Seventh Regiment. These advanced systems are mounted on mobile trucks, designed for visibility and deterrence against a growing Chinese navy.

6 Key Takeaways Japan’s Seventh Regiment uses mobile missile trucks.

Visible missile presence deters potential threats.

Targeting both China and U.S. interests.

Japan aims to strengthen security ties.

Trade negotiations involve energy and weapon purchases.

Response to U.S. criticism of Japan’s defense reliance.

Established just a year ago, the regiment occupies a prominent hilltop base in Okinawa, visible for miles. This visibility is intentional, as it serves as a show of force not only against China but also to reassure the united states, especially in light of President Trump’s concerns about Japan’s defense reliance.

As of 2025-06-08 08:01:00, Japan is negotiating with Washington to enhance security ties while addressing tariffs. The trade envoy’s recent meeting underscores Tokyo’s commitment to bolster its defense capabilities through significant purchases.

Fast Answer: Japan’s Seventh Regiment showcases new missile capabilities to deter threats, signaling a shift in military strategy amid growing regional tensions.

This strategic move raises critical questions about Japan’s defense posture. Will these advancements strengthen Japan’s security, or will they escalate tensions in the region?

Japan’s military modernization aims to enhance deterrence against China.

Negotiations with the U.S. focus on security and trade agreements.

The visibility of military assets serves a dual purpose: deterrence and reassurance.

Japan’s military developments reflect broader geopolitical shifts, emphasizing the need for international dialogue to maintain stability in the region.

As Japan continues to navigate its defense strategy, global observers should monitor these developments closely, as they could reshape regional security dynamics.

This year’s Japan’s Defense Security Equipment International (DSEI) exhibition and conference, held from May 21-23 at Makuhari Messe near Tokyo, was the largest ever, attracting 471 companies, 169 from Japan and 302 from the US, the UK and 30 other countries.

Reflecting the rapid advance of Japan’s arms industry and the country’s growing contribution to regional security and international military cooperation, this year’s event was about 60% larger than last year’s and about twice the size of the one held in 2023.

A year ago, US Forces Japan Strategic Relations Officer Tim Haffner noted that “DSEI brought industry, policy, and strategic leaders together in a collaborative forum to discuss regional security issues for the first time in Japan.

This was a pivotal event, signaling Japan as a leader in defense technology and security partnership.” This year’s turnout demonstrates that it most certainly was.

Billed as “the only large-scale, fully integrated defense event in the country,” the exhibition featured a very wide range of defense products, from ammunition and armored vehicles to communications and target identification systems, field medical supplies, and small, medium and heavy caliber weapons.

Models of Japan’s Mogami warship, underwater drones, railgun and Type-12 missiles attracted a lot of attention, as did the GCAP (Global Combat Air Program) next-generation fighter jet being developed by Japan, the UK and Italy. For Japan’s Ministry of Defence and defense industry, it was an unprecedented marketing opportunity.

Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba visited and spoke at the exhibition, the first sitting Japanese prime minister to do so. “We are currently facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of the Second World War,” he said. “Today’s Ukraine could be East Asia tomorrow.”

Minister of Defense Gen Nakatani, who delivered a keynote address at the conference, said that he hoped the event would “provide a new opportunity for cooperation and exchange between national delegations and companies, help sustain defense industry development, drive innovation and promote peace and stability.”

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) executive Katsuyuki Nabeta told the press that, “With today’s increasingly uncertain security environment, I believe we must respond not just domestically, but with a broader international perspective. We are pleased to have the opportunity to showcase our technologies and reach a wider audience.”

MHI is the prime contractor for Mogami-class frigates and the leading Japanese company in the GCAP project. BAE Systems and Leonardo are its British and Italian counterparts.

The conference, which also ran for three days, also included presentations by senior defense officials, ambassadors and defense industry executives from Japan, the US, the UK, Italy, Germany, Australia and Singapore.

They addressed the issues of maintaining stability in the Indo-Pacific, keeping pace with emerging threats, developing new technologies, strengthening the defense industrial base and enhancing defense industry cooperation, cybersecurity, the use of AI to improve decision-making on the battlefield and expanding surveillance capabilities in space.

One section of the conference was dedicated to the progress of the GCAP and related supply chain opportunities. Senior executives from the GCAP Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency and International Government Organization, Japan Aircraft Industrial Enhancement Co (the umbrella organization for Japanese participation in the project), BAE Systems and Leonardo spoke on this topic, demonstrating its importance.

In an article entitled “Doubts about Trump hang in background of weapons show,” Japan’s Asahi Shimbun reported that an unnamed Japanese Defense Ministry source had said that “Trump’s unpredictability has created unease about relying on US-made weapons and security arrangements,” and that “European countries in particular are beginning to seek security that does not depend on the United States, and they are likely to move away from the US in arms trading.”

Speaking at the event, the German ambassador to Japan, Petra Sigmund, said that, “Germany is increasingly looking to Japan as an arms provider, whom we can trust as a co-developer with similar strengths and similar needs. Also, as a potential procurement partner, in order to be able to scale up production to cut time and to reduce cost.”

Sigmund added that Germany is particularly eager to collaborate in the development of “unmanned systems, drones, stand-off weapons, missiles, air defense, cyberspace, as well as maritime intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.”

He also noted that, “Since 2021, Germany has gradually increased its security engagement here in the [Indo-Pacific] region. We have sent naval vessels, participated in multinational naval and air force exercises both in Japan, Australia and in India.”

Professor Mohd Faiz Abdullah, chairman of the Institute of Strategic and International Studies of Malaysia, provided a different perspective. The great powers, he said, are conducting “minilaterals,”which they claim are for “global governance, but it’s about containment really,” and “not conducive to peace and stability.”

The world, Abdullah concluded, is entering a period of “unfettered competition…where a lot of parties are going for the killing zone.”

But Lieutenant General Sir Tom Copinger-Symes, Deputy Commander of UK Strategic Command, stated that, “We must move beyond transactional relationships between defense and industry… We need to redraw the boundaries of national security… We now live in what we could describe as a state of persistent competition, punctuated by episodic crises, and under the constant shadow of potential major conflict… we must innovate together, or we will lose together.”

Meanwhile, on May 21, a symposium on the topic of Japan’s defense industry was held at the Global Front conference facility at Meiji University in Tokyo.

Led by military historian Professor Atsushi Koketsu, the symposium featured an address by Professor Christopher Hughes of the University of Warwick, UK, on the topic “Japan’s Defence Industrial Strategy and Fighter Aircraft Production: Striving for Tier-One Status.”

Starting with the observation that Japan has previously been seen as an exemplary model of a non-great power able to indigenize defence technology, Hughes stated that it clearly maintains this ambition.

Despite anti-militaristic constraints, including Article 9 of its Constitution, which renounces “war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes,” post-WWII limits on weapons production and arms export bans, Japan has consistently maintained the following rationales for defense production:

Deterrence capabilities and specific defense needs

Bargaining power in its alliance with the US and internationally

Self-sufficiency and ability to respond to national emergencies

Industrial policy through dual-use technology

Hughes emphasized that Japanese policymakers use “techno-nationalism” to avoid second-tier status.

At the same time, Japan limited its defense budget by embedding the defense sector into its civilian sector. This allowed it to avoid the creation of a military-industrial complex, but also led to fragmentation, inefficiency and low profitability, while export restrictions cut off access to international cooperation and markets.

Serious attempts to rectify these defects began with the adoption of “Three Principles on Defense Equipment Transfers” under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2014.

These allowed arms transfers if they contributed to “the active promotion of peace, international cooperation, or Japan’s security,” provided they were not destined for countries involved in conflict, with onward shipment to third parties subject to Japanese government control.

The next big step in Japan’s military reform came in December 2022, when the cabinet of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida approved a new National Security Strategy.

A Ministry of Foreign Affairs announcement noted that “the very foundation of the international order is being shaken and the world stands at a historic crossroads… [with Japan] finding itself in the midst of the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII…”

The new National Security Strategy was accompanied by two other documents, the National Defense Strategy and the Defense Buildup Program. The latter includes building up the capabilities of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces in the areas of stand-off defense, integrated air and missile defense, unmanned defense and cross-domain capabilities, including ground, maritime, air, space, cyber and electromagnetic operations.

The Japanese government also committed itself to raising the defense budget from 1% to 2% of GDP by 2027, increased weapons systems procurement as a percentage of the budget, raised profit margins on defense contracts to stop private companies from abandoning the sector and stepped up defense cooperation with Europe, Australia and Southeast Asia.

Freed from previous limits, Japanese defense contractors began to actively pursue export contracts, some small – e.g., patrol boats for the Philippines and Vietnam – and some large. An attempt to sell Soryu-class submarines to Australia fell through. Attempts to sell Mogami-class frigates to Australia and Indonesia are underway.

Hughes also put considerable emphasis on GCAP, noting that it is an equal partnership with full technology sharing and “freedom to modify.” While others have expressed doubts, he believes that the British government is committed to the project, a view that received support at the Japan-Italy-UK leaders meeting last November.

Hughes has been pursuing the subject for a long time. More than 20 years ago, he published “Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power?” while his latest book is entitled “Japan as a Global Military Power: New Capabilities, Alliance Integration, Bilateralism-Plus.”

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Japan and India have agreed to set up a new defense cooperation consultation body, the two countries’ defense chiefs have said, as Tokyo and New Delhi look to counter China’s growing military presence in the Indo-Pacific region.

Underscoring the importance of bilateral security ties, Defense Minister Gen Nakatani told his Indian counterpart, Rajnath Singh, during talks in New Delhi on Monday that strengthening defense coordination would “generate significant synergies” that open new doors for the partners and the region as a whole.

“Amid the rapidly changing and increasingly uncertain regional and international circumstances surrounding Japan and India, it is increasingly important and necessary for the two — which share the vision of a peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific region based on the rule of law — to further strengthen cooperation and coordination in the defense field,” the Defense Ministry quoted Nakatani as saying.

OKINAWA: The ship-slaying missiles of the Japanese army’s 7th Regiment are mounted aboard dark green trucks that are easy to move and conceal, but for now, the soldiers are making no effort to hide them.

Created in 2024, the fledgling regiment and its roving missile batteries occupy a hilltop base on the island of Okinawa that can be seen for miles.

The visibility is intentional. The 7th is one of two new missile regiments that the army, called the Ground Self-Defence Force, has placed along the islands on Japan’s south-western flank in response to an increasingly robust Chinese navy that frequently sails through waters near Japan.

“Our armaments are a show of force to deter an enemy from coming,” said Colonel Yohei Ito, the regiment’s commander.

China is not their only target. The display is also for the United States, and particularly President Donald Trump, who has criticised Japan for relying too heavily on the presence of US military bases for its security.

The missiles are part of a defence build-up that is central to Japan’s strategy for appealing to Mr Trump. While Tokyo is now deep in negotiations with Washington over lifting new tariffs, its top priority is improving security ties.

On June 6, Japan’s trade envoy, Ryosei Akazawa, met for 2½ hours in Washington with Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Mr Howard Lutnick, the secretary of commerce, for talks on a tariff-lifting deal that will probably see Tokyo promise large purchases of energy, computer chips and weapons.

By adding new missiles and other advanced weapons, both American-made and domestically developed, Japan is transforming its long-restricted military into a potent force with the skills and technology to operate alongside America’s ships and soldiers, to demonstrate that Japan is an indispensable partner.

“We want to be sure the US has our backs, and enhancing our conventional military capabilities is the way to do that,” said Nobukatsu Kanehara, who was deputy head of national security policy from 2014 to 2019 under then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. “We want to show President Trump that we are a valuable and essential ally.”

Given the growing military strength of nearby China and also North Korea, Japan wants to upgrade the defence alliance with the US by becoming a fuller-fledged military partner and moving further from the pacifism enshrined in its constitution adopted after World War II.

With the war in Ukraine stirring fears of a similar Chinese move on the democratic island of Taiwan, Japan announced in 2022 it would double spending on national security to about 2 per cent of gross domestic product. The resulting defence build-up is now under way.

Japan is buying expensive weapon systems from the US like the F-35B stealth fighter and Tomahawk cruise missiles that will give Japan the ability to strike targets on enemy soil for the first time since 1945.

The spending is also revitalising Japan’s own defence industry. At a trade show in May near Tokyo, Japanese manufacturers displayed weapons currently under development, including a hypersonic missile, a laser system for shooting down drones, and a jet fighter to be built with Italy and Britain.

Japan is also demonstrating a new resolve to fight alongside the US during a future crisis. When he visited Tokyo this spring, Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth praised a plan to create a new “war-fighting headquarters” in Tokyo where Japanese and American commanders will work side by side.

“During our discussions, I told him how Japan is making our own strong efforts to drastically strengthen our defence capabilities,” Mr Gen Nakatani, the Japanese defence minister, said after meeting with Hegseth. “We face the most severe security environment that Japan has encountered since the end of the war.”

It has been made even more severe by the uncertainty from Washington. While Japan’s leaders and policymakers see strong support from Mr Hegseth and other hardliners on China, like Secretary of State Marco Rubio, they remain worried about America First isolationists who could try to pull back the US military in Asia.

There is also the unpredictability of Trump. Their biggest fear is that the US President might suddenly strike a grand strategic deal with China’s leader, Xi Jinping, that would cede Japan and its neighbours to Beijing’s sphere of influence.

“We need to convince Trump and the Maga (Make America Great Again) camp that Japan is too good to give away,” said Professor Satoru Mori, a professor of international politics at Keio University in Tokyo. “It’s in the US’ interest not to let Japan fall into China’s sphere.”

The Chinese government has criticised Japan’s acquisition of offensive weapons as a return to wartime militarism.

Japan is hedging its bets by reaching out to other partners. In addition to the fighter plane jointly developed with Britain and Italy, it has strengthened defence relations with Australia, offering to sell it advanced Japanese-made frigates.

Tokyo also sent a warship and soldiers to the Philippines in May to join a multinational military exercise for the first time.

If Washington proves unreliable, Japan has an ultimate fallback: tonnes of plutonium stockpiled from its civilian nuclear power industry, which it could use to build a nuclear arsenal of its own. So far, the national trauma from the 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has kept such an option off the table.

“We need to think about a Plan B, if the US does withdraw from Asia,” said Mr Kazuto Suzuki, director of the Institute of Geo-economics, a Tokyo-based think-tank. — NEW YORK TIMES via The Straits Times/ANN