Legal Verdict Delhi Land: Supreme Court Rejects Waqf Board Plea Over Gurudwara
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‘Let It Be’: Supreme Court Rejects Delhi Waqf Board’s Claim On Gurdwara Property
The case centred on a piece of land on which a gurdwara had been standing and functioning for decades, predating India’s independence. The Delhi Waqf Board asserted ownership over this land, contending it fell under the category of waqf properties, which are endowments made by Muslims for religious or charitable purposes under Islamic law. The Supreme Court of India in a significant ruling on Wednesday dismissed an appeal filed by the Delhi Waquf Board.
The case centred on a piece of land on which a gurdwara had been standing and functioning for decades, predating India’s independence.
The Waqf Board claimed in court that the property has been used as waqf since time immemorial and was notified in the notification of the Gazette on December 3, 1970, and subsequently corrected by another notification of April 29, 1978, published in the Delhi Gazette on May 18, 1978. File pic/PTI
The Supreme Court of India in a significant ruling on Wednesday dismissed an appeal filed by the Delhi Waqf Board, which sought possession of a pre-independence gurdwara. The apex court emphasised that the board should have relinquished its claim once records clearly demonstrated that a gurdwara had been operating on the disputed land since 1948.
The Delhi Waqf Board asserted ownership over this land, contending it fell under the category of waqf properties, which are endowments made by Muslims for religious or charitable purposes under Islamic law, leading to a prolonged legal battle.
The Waqf Board claimed that the property has been used as waqf since time immemorial and was notified in the notification of the Gazette on December 3, 1970, and subsequently corrected by another notification of April 29, 1978, published in the Delhi Gazette on May 18, 1978.
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During the proceedings, the Supreme Court bench noted that the existence and continuous functioning of the gurdwara on the land since 1948 were well established through available records. The judges said that, given this clear historical evidence of a functioning religious institution of another faith, the Delhi Waqf Board ought to have withdrawn its claim rather than pursuing litigation.
The ruling has broader implications for property disputes involving religious institutions and the management of waqf properties. While the principle of “once a waqf, always a waqf” is a fundamental tenet of waqf law, some experts suggest that this judgment indicates such claims must be balanced against verifiable historical facts and the long-standing presence of other religious structures.
Supreme Court Reserves Judgment On Pleas Of SHUATS VC & Officials To Quash Cases Under UP Religious Conversion Law
The Supreme Court on October 1 reserved the judgment in a batch of petitions seeking to quash the criminal cases. The petitions were filed against the Vice Chancellor and other officials of the Sam Higginbottom University of Agriculture Technology and Science (SHUATS) The petitioners argued that the FIRs registered are false and frivolous and have been lodged to disrupt the functioning of the SHUATS. The Supreme Court had earlier granted interim protection from arrest to the ShUATS officials in December last year. It also stayed the arrest through in certain other cases. A bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra heard the matter and ruled in favour of the petitioners. The petition was filed under Article 136 of the Indian Constitution. It was filed in response to an order of the Allahabad High Court refusing to quak FIRs lodged against the Shugginbottom officials. The High Court had ruled that the orders were illegal under the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021.
The Supreme Court on October 1 reserved the judgment in a batch of petitions seeking to quash the criminal cases against the Vice Chancellor and other officials of the Sam Higginbottom University of Agriculture Technology and Science (SHUATS), Prayagraj over alleged forced mass religious conversions of people to Christianity.
The Special Leave Petitions under Article 136 were filed before the Supreme Court against an order of the Allahabad High Court refusing to quash FIRs lodged against the Vice-Chancellor (Dr.) Rajendra Bihari Lal Director Vinod Bihari Lal and five other officials of the institute. The parties have also filed writ petitions seeking to consolidate certain FIRs and challenging them.
Another is the set of writ petitions filed under Article 32 praying for the quashing of all FIRs and alternatively, transfer of all similar criminal complaints/FIRs filed across the State of Uttar Pradesh against the petitioners to Naini, Allahabad and then consolidating them all and for a stay of coercive action on them during the pendency of the present petition.
The FIRs [224/2022, 47, 54, 55 and 60 of 2023] are for offences punishable under Sections 153A, 506, 420, 467, 468, and 471 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 5(1) of The Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021.
The Supreme Court Court had earlier granted interim protection from arrest to the Vice Chancellor and other officials of the SHUATS in December last year. It also stayed the arrest through in certain other cases.
A bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra heard the matter. During a hearing in May, the Court had orally observed that some parts of the UP law on religious conversions seemed to be violative of Article 25 of the Constitution.
Arguments of the parties
The petitioners have argued that they belong to a religious minority and are continuously harassed and intimated by the Uttar Pradesh Government. It was stated that there is no evidence in support of the arguments contended by the respondents that the petitioners have engaged in forced conversions.
The petitioners stated that the FIRs registered are false and frivolous and untenable in law and have been lodged to disrupt the functioning of the SHUATS.
They have sought consolidation of all FIRs in this case as according to them several FIRs have been registered in different parts of Uttar Pradesh. One set of FIRs pertains to the alleged mass conversion. Another FIR was lodged in 2023, where individual persons have alleged that they were allured to convert to Christianity on the pretext of getting cash, a job in SHUATs or getting married in which the petitioners are directly named. Similar other FIRs registered in 2023 pertain to individual conversions.
“These several F.I.R’s are a part of well-coordinated and malicious campaign by the Respondent State to infringe the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 25, 29 and 30,” as argued by petitioners.
The petitioners referred to Arnab Ranjan Gonswami v. UOI (2020) and argued that multiple FIRs and their investigation endangered and infringed their personal rights and liberty.
Further, they relied on Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Government (NCT of Delhi) & Ors (2019) and stated that the Supreme Court has held that in exercising Article 32 jurisdiction, ‘bail can be granted if the multiple F.I.Rs originate from the same alleged incident’.
Considering the importance of the matter, the Attorney General for India R. Venkataramani, was asked to assist the Court relating to the issue of forceful and deceitful religious conversions. On the last hearing, the AGI submitted that the Court should adopt a ‘broad view’ in the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021 adding a caveat that there cannot be “a prosecution which is unfair under the law and a person’s liberty cannot be taken for granted”.
He informed the Court that the present FIRs disclose the commission of a cognisance offence. The evidence recovered such as Aadhar card printing machines have been recovered from the university’s premises along with bogus Aadhar cards. These were allegedly used for forceful conversion.
The AGI also referred to the provisions of the 2021 Act. As per Section 3 by “use of practice of misrepresentation, force, undue influence, coercion, allurement, or by any fraudulent means.” Section 3 prohibits any person to abet, or conspire for such conversions. AGI argued that the contents of the FIR indicate that conversions are unlawful.
Next, he perused Section 4 which allows “any aggrieved person” including persons, brother, sister, or any other person related to blood, marriage or adoption may lodge an FIR on such conversions which contravened provisions of Section 3. On seeking clarification as to who were the aggrieved persons who were entitled to file FIR in the present case, the AGI stated that except for the FIR lodged in 2024, all are by aggrieved persons.
It should be noted that a challenge to the constitutionality of the 2021 Act is pending before the Supreme Court in cases filed by Citizen for Justice and Peace and Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind.
Case Details: VINOD BIHARI LAL Versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANR., SLP(Crl) No. 3210/2023 (and connected matters)
Senior Advocates Siddharth Dave (for Rajendra Bihari Lal and Vinod Bihar Lal) VINOD BIHARI LAL Versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANR., WP(Crl) No. 123/2023 (and connected matters)
Divorced Wife Remaining Unmarried Entitled To Maintenance Reflective Of Standard Of Life She Had During Marriage: Supreme Court
The couple, married in 1997, separated in 2008, with a son born in 1998. The High Court had earlier granted a decree of divorce on grounds of mental cruelty and irretrievable breakdown of marriage. The wife argued that the alimony awarded was too low to match the standard of living she had enjoyed during the marriage and did not reflect the current cost of living. The husband argued that he had substantial financial commitments, including supporting his second wife, a dependent family, and aged parents. The Supreme Court, however, observed that the respondent-husband’s income, financial disclosures, and past earnings establish that he is in a position to pay a higher amount.
The Court observed that the appellant-wife, who has remained unmarried and is living independently, “is entitled to a level of maintenance that is reflective of the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage and which reasonably secures her future.”
A bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta delivered the judgment in Rakhi Sadhukhan v. Raja Sadhukhan while deciding an appeal challenging the quantum of alimony awarded following the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. The couple, married in 1997, separated in 2008, with a son born in 1998.
The High Court had earlier granted a decree of divorce on grounds of mental cruelty and irretrievable breakdown of marriage, awarding permanent alimony at ₹20,000 per month, subject to a 5% increase every three years. Dissatisfied with this, the wife approached the Supreme Court seeking an increase in the alimony, arguing that the award was inadequate given her estranged husband’s financial status.
During the hearing, the wife pointed out that the husband, who is employed at the Institute of Hotel Management in Kolkata, has a net monthly income of ₹1.64 lakh. She contended that the alimony awarded was too low to match the standard of living she had enjoyed during the marriage and did not reflect the current cost of living.
The husband argued that he had substantial financial commitments, including supporting his second wife, a dependent family, and aged parents. He also highlighted that their son was now 26 years old and financially independent.
The Supreme Court, however, observed:
“The respondent-husband’s income, financial disclosures, and past earnings establish that he is in a position to pay a higher amount. The appellant-wife is entitled to a level of maintenance that is reflective of the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage and which reasonably secures her future.”
The Court enhanced the alimony to ₹50,000 per month, subject to a 5% increase every two years,taking into account inflationary pressures and the wife’s continued reliance on maintenance as her sole financial support.
Regarding the son’s claim, the bench clarified that since he is now an adult, no mandatory maintenance would be required, but the father may voluntarily assist with educational or other reasonable expenses if he wishes. The Court also emphasized that the son’s inheritance rights remain unaffected and can be pursued under applicable laws.
Case Title: Rakhi Sadhukhan Vs Raja Sadhukhan
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 660
Click Here To Read/Download Judgment
Related – During Divorce Proceedings, Wife Entitled To Enjoy Same Life Amenities She Was Enjoying In Matrimonial Home : Supreme Court
‘Permanent Alimony Is Awarded To Ensure Decent Living Standard For Wife’ : Supreme Court Reiterates Factors To Be Considered
There is a gurdwara, let it be: Supreme Court rejects Delhi Waqf board’s claim
The petition was filed challenging a 2010 order of the Delhi High Court that held that the property in east Delhi’s Shahdara was being used as a gurdwara since 1947. The order comes at a time when another bench of the top court has reserved its decision on petitions challenging the constitutional validity of the Waqf law. The board claimed the mosque in question was a mosque, named ‘Masjid Takia Babbar Shah’
The petition was filed challenging a 2010 order of the Delhi High Court that held that the property in east Delhi’s Shahdara was being used as a gurdwara since 1947 and the Waqf board could not establish it to be a “waqf property”.
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“Once there is a gurdwara, let it be. A religious structure is already functioning there. You should yourself relinquish that claim,” the Supreme Court said.
The order comes at a time when another bench of the top court has reserved its decision on petitions challenging the constitutional validity of the Waqf law, which expands government oversight in regulating waqf properties.
In its petition, the Waqf board claimed the property in question was a mosque, named ‘Masjid Takia Babbar Shah’. The board claimed the mosque had existed since time immemorial.
In its suit, the Waqf board said the defendant became the owner of the property through adverse possession.
However, the defendant argued that the property was not a “waqf property” as its owner, Mohd Ahsaan, had sold it to him in 1953.
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In 2010, the Delhi High Court dismissed the Waqf board’s plea, noting that it failed to prove that the property was a “waqf property”.
“Defendant was admittedly in occupation of this property since 1947-48. The defendant was not able to adduce any document of title to evidence the purchase of this property, yet this does not in any manner benefit the plaintiff, who has to establish his own case and prove it to enable him to obtain a decree of possession,” the Delhi High Court had said.
Published By: Abhishek De Published On: Jun 4, 2025
S. 197 CrPC Applies To PMLA : Supreme Court Holds Prior Sanction Mandatory To Prosecute Public Servants For Money Laundering Offence
The Supreme Court held today that section 197(1) of CrPC, which provides that prior sanction from the government is required to prosecute public servants and judges, will apply to cases under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act. A bench of Justice Abhay Oka and Justice Augustine George Masih dismissed an appeal by the Directorate of Enforcement challenging Telangana High Court’s order that set aside cognizance orders against two IAS officers on the ground of lack of prior sanction. The allegations against respondents Bibhu Prasad Acharya and Adityanath Das involved misuse of official position in land allotments, undervaluation of assets, and unauthorized concessions that allegedly benefitted private companies linked to then Andhra Pradesh CM YS Jagan Mohan Reddy while causing significant financial loss to government. The ED alleged that Acharya conspired with prominent figures to facilitate these transactions. Before the HC, Acharya contended that he acted within official capacity, arguing that prior government sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC was necessary for prosecution.
A bench of Justice Abhay Oka and Justice Augustine George Masih dismissed an appeal by the Directorate of Enforcement challenging Telangana High Court’s order that set aside cognizance orders against two IAS officers on the ground of lack of prior sanction.
“Appeal dismissed. We have held that provisions of Section 197(1) CrPC will apply to PMLA”, Justice Oka pronounced.
“Section 65 makes the provisions of the CrPC applicable to all proceedings under the PMLA, provided the same are not inconsistent with the provisions contained in the PMLA. The words ‘All other proceedings’ include a complaint under Section 44 (1)(b) of the PMLA. We have carefully perused the provisions of the PMLA. We do not find that there is any provision therein which is inconsistent with the provisions of Section 197(1) of CrPC. Considering the object of Section 197(1) of the CrPC, its applicability cannot be excluded unless there is any provision in the PMLA which is inconsistent with Section 197(1). No such provision has been pointed out to us. Therefore, we hold that the provisions of Section 197(1) of CrPC are applicable to a complaint under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA”, the Court held.
The allegations against respondents Bibhu Prasad Acharya and Adityanath Das involved misuse of official position in land allotments, undervaluation of assets, and unauthorized concessions that allegedly benefitted private companies linked to then Andhra Pradesh CM YS Jagan Mohan Reddy while causing significant financial loss to government. The ED alleged that Acharya conspired with prominent figures to facilitate these transactions.
The ED alleged that Acharya, in his capacity as Vice Chairman and Managing Director of Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd. (APIIC), and Das, the Principal Secretary of the I&CAD Department of the Andhra Pradesh government, committed acts constituting money laundering. Acharya was accused of conspiring with Reddy to allot 250 acres of land for a special economic zone (SEZ) project in violation of regulations, thus indirectly facilitating money laundering. Das was accused of improperly approving an additional water allocation to India Cements Limited, allegedly in violation of norms and procedures.
The Special PMLA Court took cognizance of the complaints and issued summons to both respondents.
Before the HC, Acharya contended that he acted within official capacity, arguing that prior government sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC was necessary for prosecution.
The ED argued that the PMLA, being a special statute with overriding provisions under Sections 65 and 71, does not require such sanction. The ED maintained that the allegations involve abuse of official powers for private gain, thus negating the protection offered by Section 197 CrPC. ED further argued that the proceedings under the PMLA do not necessitate sanction as the PMLA is a complete code providing procedure for everything.
The Telangana High Court on January 21, 2019 allowed the quashing petition, setting aside the cognizance orders. The HC held that lack of required prior sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC rendered the cognizance orders unsustainable. The ED filed the present appeal against this decision in the Supreme Court, asserting that the PMLA overrides the CrPC, including Section 197, under Section 71 of the PMLA.
Arguments before the SC
Additional Solicitor General SV Raju for the ED argued that the PMLA’s provisions, particularly Section 71, which confers an overriding effect over other laws, exempt the need for sanction under Section 197(1) of the CrPC. He submitted that the requirement for such a sanction contradicts the objectives of the PMLA, aimed at tackling money laundering. Raju contended that Acharya did not qualify as a public servant under Section 197(1) as he was not employed in connection with the affairs of the State government in his role with APIIC, a corporation separate from the State administration. He asserted that the allegations against the respondents were not actions in the discharge of their official duties but rather individual misconduct.
Senior Advocate Kiran Suri for the respondents argued that APIIC’s Memorandum and Articles of Association authorized the Andhra Pradesh government to appoint and remove its directors, including the Vice Chairman and Managing Director. This, she argued, rendered Acharya a public servant under Section 197(1). She further contended that the requirement of prior sanction could be raised at any stage in proceedings and was not limited to the trial phase.
Supreme Court’s Verdict
The Court referenced previous rulings, such as Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India and Prakash Singh Badal and Anr. v. State of Punjab, which clarified that protection under Section 197 applies only to actions reasonably connected to the discharge of official duties, not those done solely under the guise of duty. It also recognized that the requirement of sanction could be raised at any stage, including after cognizance is taken, and that the question of sanction may require examination throughout the trial, depending on the evidence presented.
The Court observed that Das, the Principal Secretary, was indisputably a public servant and thus removable only with government approval. Regarding Acharya, the Court noted that the government appointed him as APIIC’s Vice Chairman and Managing Director on deputation, thus extending public servant status under Section 197(1). The Court examined APIIC’s Memorandum and concluded that the Andhra Pradesh government had the authority to appoint and remove directors, including the Vice Chairman, supporting Acharya’s claim to public servant status.
The Court determined that the acts alleged in the complaint—land allotment by Acharya and water allocation by Das—fell within the scope of official functions assigned to the respondents. Thus, the protection of Section 197(1) applied, as the actions were not mere opportunities afforded by official status but were directly connected to their official duties.
Section 65 of PMLA states that CrPC provisions apply to PMLA proceedings unless inconsistent with the PMLA, while Section 71 grants the PMLA overriding status over conflicting laws. The Court held that Section 197(1) of the CrPC is not inconsistent with the PMLA, finding no provision in the PMLA that explicitly excludes Section 197(1) requirements. Therefore, CrPC provisions, including Section 197, apply to PMLA cases as long as they are consistent with the PMLA’s objectives, the Court held.
The Court noted that an interpretation excluding Section 197(1) from the PMLA would render Section 65 meaningless. The Court reasoned that Section 71 could not override CrPC provisions like Section 197(1) when the CrPC provisions are integrated into the PMLA through Section 65. Consequently, the requirement of prior sanction under Section 197(1) applied to the PMLA, affirming that public servants facing prosecution for acts connected to their official duties are entitled to protection under Section 197, the Court concluded.
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision. The Court clarified that the effect of the impugned judgment was that the orders of the Special Court taking cognizance only against the two accused, B.P. Acharya and Adityanath Das, stand set aside. The order of cognizance against the other accused would remain unaffected. The Court further stated that it would be open for the appellant to move the Special Court to take cognizance of the offence against the two respondents if a sanction under Section 197(1) of CrPC is granted in the future, subject to any legal or factual objections available to the respondents.
Case no. – Crl.A. No. 4314-4316/2024
Case Title – Directorate of Enforcement Etc. v. Bibhu Prasad Acharya Etc. Etc.
Citation : 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 940
Click Here To Read/Download Judgment