Iran Update April 9, 2025

Alexandra Braverman, Ria Reddy, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Andie Parry, Siddhant Kishore, Ben Rezaei, and Annika Ganzeveld

Information Cutoff 2:00pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Iran and the Axis of Resistance are continuing to conduct an information operation targeting the West ahead of “high-level” talks between Iran and the United States on April 12. This campaign likely seeks to set conditions for Iran to argue during the negotiations that it is distancing itself from the Axis of Resistance, which is reportedly a US demand.[1] A senior Hezbollah official told Reuters on April 9 that Hezbollah is willing to discuss disarmament with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun.[2] Iranian media separately argued on April 9 that the United States must negotiate with Axis of Resistance groups directly because these groups operate “independently.”[3] These reports follow similar reports in recent days that claimed that Iran is reducing its support for the Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[4] This informational campaign is part of a long-running Iranian campaign that seeks to obfuscate Iranian support for its proxies and absolve Iran of responsibility for its proxies’ actions.

Iran is continuing to support the Axis of Resistance despite its claims to English-language media that it is reducing support for its proxies and partners.[5] Iran has financially supported the military reconstitution of Lebanese Hezbollah since the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire went into effect in November 2024.[6] UK-based outlet The Times reported on April 9 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force sent advanced missiles to unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in early April 2025.[7] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia sources separately told Emirati media on April 9 that the militias disagree about whether to disarm.[8] This report refutes earlier statements made by members of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to Western media on April 7 that the militias had agreed to disarm.[9] CTP-ISW continues to assess that Iran is unlikely to abandon its support for the Axis of Resistance as it serves as a key component of Iran’s long-standing regional strategy and deterrence against the United States and Israel.

Iran has continued to reject demands to fully dismantle its nuclear program. Some senior US and Israeli officials have recently called for the complete dismantlement of the Iranian nuclear program.[10] IRGC-affiliated media published an article on April 9 stating that Iran could agree to reduce its uranium enrichment but would “retain enrichment for non-weapons needs.”[11] Iran currently has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce six nuclear weapons.[12] Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani stated on April 9 that Iran’s network of nuclear facilities and technology is “stabilized, irreversible, and indestructible.”[13] An unspecified Iranian official similarly told Western media that the Iranian nuclear program “cannot be dismantled.”[14]

Israeli media reported on April 9 that the United States set a 60-day deadline, starting on April 12, for Iran to agree to a new nuclear deal.[15] Iran and the United States are expected to hold nuclear talks in Oman on April 12. Negotiations for the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) took around 20 months.[16] Israeli media reported on April 9 that Israel’s demands include Iran dismantling its nuclear program, halting ballistic missile production, ceasing support for the Axis of Resistance, and agreeing to a “long-term” deal. Iran has explicitly rejected some of these demands, including the full dismantlement of its nuclear program.[17] Trump previously warned in late March 2025 that “there will be a bombing” if Iran does not agree to a new nuclear deal.[18] Senior Iranian officials have threatened to attack US bases and forces in the Middle East in response to a potential strike on Iran.[19]

Iran reportedly recently delivered advanced missiles to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, possibly in order to diversify its strike options in response to a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. The Times reported on April 8 that Iran delivered an unspecified number of Arqab cruise missiles and Jamal 69 ballistic missiles to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[20] Arqab cruise missiles, also known as Paveh missiles, have a range of around 1,650 kilometers.[21] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, frequently used Arqab missiles to attack Israel between May and November 2024.[22] Iran has reportedly supplied Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with Jamal 69 ballistic missiles, or Iranian Zolfaghar missiles, since 2018.[23] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have increasingly threatened to target US forces in Iraq and Syria in recent days. Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Secretary General Abu Alaa al Walai implied on April 2 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would respond to a US or Israeli strike on Iran.[24] The Popular Campaign to Expel the American Occupation threatened to target the US Embassy in Baghdad if Iran is attacked.[25] These threats mirror Iranian efforts to discourage a US or Israeli strike on Iran by threatening attacks on the United States in Iraq.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 10 airstrikes on April 8 targeting a Houthi military base on Mount Nuqum on the eastern outskirts of Sanaa City.[26] The strike reportedly injured Houthi President Mahdi al Mashat and a senior Houthi intelligence officer.[27] Mashat largely serves as a figurehead in the Houthi regime, while the head of the presidential office, Ahmed Hamed, exerts control and influences decision-making behind the scenes.[28] Hamed has close ties to Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi and fought alongside Abdulmalik in the early 2000s.[29] Abdulmalik appointed Hamed as head of the presidential office in January 2018.[30]

CENTCOM has conducted at least 20 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff on April 8.[31] The military base that CENTCOM struck on Mount Nuqum reportedly contains underground weapons depots and tunnel networks.[32] CENTCOM conducted at least four airstrikes in two separate sorties targeting communications sites. These sites likely support Houthi operations in Houthi territory as well as Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and against Israel.[33] CENTCOM targeted likely Houthi barracks in Amin Muqbil on the outskirts of Hudaydah City.[34] Airstrikes targeting communications sites and strategic points near Houthi-controlled ports will likely impede the Houthis’ logistics, including the Houthis’ ability to move military supplies and coordinate operations.[35]

Internationally recognized Yemeni government officials argued on April 8 and 9 that a ground offensive, in addition to airstrikes, against the Houthis is the only way to eliminate the Houthi threat to international shipping.[36] These officials called for international support for a ground offensive. CENTCOM Commander General Erik Kurilla separately met with several US defense partners and allies in the Middle East between April 1 and 5 to discuss regional developments.[37] Kurilla held separate meetings with the Chief of Staff of the Yemeni Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Sagheer Ahmed Aziz, and the Chief of General Staff of the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces, General Fayyad bin Hamed al Ruwayli, in Riyadh between April 3 and 5.[38] The officials likely discussed the CENTCOM airstrike campaign against the Houthis in Yemen and may have discussed cooperation with the Yemeni Armed Forces and Saudi Arabian Armed Forces to address the Houthi threat.

A Syrian businessman and former militia leader admitted on April 8 that he ordered his forces to fight the Syrian transitional government in coastal Syria in early March 2025.[39] Mohammed Jabar acknowledged in an interview with a UAE-based outlet that he coordinated the March 6 attacks against transitional government forces.[40] Jabar is the former leader of a pro-Assad militia called the Desert Falcons. Jabar fled to Russia in 2016 following disagreements with Bashar al Assad.[41] Tartous security forces previously said that Assadist insurgents received salaries from abroad and used foreign communications equipment.[42] Jabar’s admission supports the assessment that Iran and Iranian-backed militias did not fund or oversee the Assadist insurgency in March.

Jabar may have admitted his role in the insurgency to perpetuate Alawite sectarian narratives that the insurgency was an act of self-defense. Jabar echoed a sectarian justification for the Alawite insurgency, claiming that his forces rose up without preparation in self-defense after transitional government forces targeted Alawites across coastal Syria.[43] Jabar also expressed personal grievances against the Shara government for seizing his property in Latakia.[44] The tactical proficiency of the insurgents’ actions, such as blocking the transitional government’s route to the Syrian coast, suggests that insurgents planned and coordinated the attacks in advance, contrary to Jabar’s claims.[45]

Key Takeaways:

Iranian Information Operation: Iran and the Axis of Resistance are continuing to conduct an information operation targeting the West ahead of “high-level” talks between Iran and the United States on April 12. This campaign likely seeks to set conditions for Iran to argue during the negotiations that it is distancing itself from the Axis of Resistance, which is reportedly a US demand. Iran is continuing to support the Axis of Resistance despite its claims to English-language media that it is reducing support for its proxies and partners.

Iran and the Axis of Resistance are continuing to conduct an information operation targeting the West ahead of “high-level” talks between Iran and the United States on April 12. This campaign likely seeks to set conditions for Iran to argue during the negotiations that it is distancing itself from the Axis of Resistance, which is reportedly a US demand. Iran is continuing to support the Axis of Resistance despite its claims to English-language media that it is reducing support for its proxies and partners. Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran has continued to reject demands to fully dismantle its nuclear program. IRGC-affiliated media published an article on April 9 stating that Iran could agree to reduce its uranium enrichment but would “retain enrichment for non-weapons needs.” Israeli media reported on April 9 that Israel’s demands include Iran dismantling its nuclear program, halting ballistic missile production, ceasing support for the Axis of Resistance, and agreeing to a “long-term” deal.

Iran has continued to reject demands to fully dismantle its nuclear program. IRGC-affiliated media published an article on April 9 stating that Iran could agree to reduce its uranium enrichment but would “retain enrichment for non-weapons needs.” Israeli media reported on April 9 that Israel’s demands include Iran dismantling its nuclear program, halting ballistic missile production, ceasing support for the Axis of Resistance, and agreeing to a “long-term” deal. CENTCOM Airstrikes in Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 10 airstrikes on April 8 targeting a Houthi military base on Mount Nuqum on the eastern outskirts of Sanaa City. The strike reportedly injured Houthi President Mahdi al Mashat and a senior Houthi intelligence officer.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 10 airstrikes on April 8 targeting a Houthi military base on Mount Nuqum on the eastern outskirts of Sanaa City. The strike reportedly injured Houthi President Mahdi al Mashat and a senior Houthi intelligence officer. Syrian Insurgency: A Syrian businessman and former militia leader admitted on April 8 that he ordered his forces to fight the Syrian transitional government in coastal Syria in early March 2025. Jabar is the former leader of a pro-Assad militia called the Desert Falcons. Jabar fled to Russia in 2016 following disagreements with Bashar al Assad. Jabar may have admitted his role in the insurgency to perpetuate Alawite sectarian narratives that the insurgency was an act of self-defense.

Syria

Alawite insurgents attacked transitional government forces at a checkpoint in Kasab, Latakia Province, on April 8.[46] Kasab is located near the Turkey-Syria border. The Syrian transitional government has established checkpoints across western Syria to improve security and limit insurgent freedom of movement. The fighters manning these checkpoints have killed civilians—both in extrajudicial killings and accidentally—on several occasions, which risks damaging the relationship between security forces and the local population and providing opportunities for insurgents to exploit.[47]

Transitional government forces seized over thirty 120mm mortar shells used by Alawite insurgents in a forested area of Beit Yashout, Latakia Province, on April 9.[48] Assadist insurgents fled to forested hills away from population centers during transitional government counterinsurgency operations in March, which suggests that the insurgents used the mortar shells during the early March insurgent campaign.[49]

A Sunni sectarian militia expressed support for hardline Salafi-jihadi ideology similar to the ideology of al Qaeda and ISIS on April 9.[50] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah claimed that it killed nearly 20 non-Sunni individuals across three provinces in the last week.[51] This sectarian militia has fewer than a thousand followers on multiple Telegram channels, demonstrating that the group’s hardline ideology has not gained traction in the Syrian information space at this time. Saraya Ansar al Sunnah has made repeated sectarian statements in recent weeks warning that it would target Alawites for crimes committed by the Assad regime and continue its attacks until Alawites and Shias were “eliminated” or displaced from the region.[52] Social media users have accused transitional government forces of committing some of the attacks that Saraya al Sunnah has claimed that it committed..[53] Attacks by Sunni sectarian militias within close proximity to government forces risk further decreasing trust between Alawites and government forces.

The Turkish foreign minister confirmed on April 9 that Turkey is open to holding talks with Israel to create a deconfliction line to avoid potential conflict over Israeli strikes in Syria.[54] The Turkish Defense Ministry denied on April 8 that it had held talks with Israel.[55] Middle East Eye reported on April 7 that talks between Turkey and Israel began after Israel struck Tiyas Airbase in Homs Province.[56] Israel struck Tiyas Airbase on March 21, March 24, and April 2.[57] An open line of communication between Turkey and Israel could possibly prevent a potential stand-off between the two countries, particularly one that may be triggered if Israel continues to strike Syrian bases and Turkey continues to develop plans to base its forces in Syria.

A second group of US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters withdrew from Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh neighborhoods in Aleppo City on April 9.[58] Nearly 500 SDF fighters withdrew from the two historically Kurdish neighborhoods of Aleppo City to SDF-controlled areas east of the Euphrates River.[59] Syrian media circulated videos on April 9 that showed a convoy of SDF vehicles withdrawing from Aleppo City.[60] Syrian transitional government forces supervised the withdrawal and deployed to the two neighborhoods to backfill the SDF.[61] Around 500 SDF fighters previously withdrew from Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh neighborhoods on April 4 after the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) agreed to transfer control of the two neighborhoods to the Syrian transitional government.[62] The YPG is the military arm of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which dominates the SDF.

Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society

Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent

The Iraqi Council of Ministers announced that the upcoming Iraqi parliamentary elections will take place on November 11, 2025.[63] An official from the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), which is the Iraqi electoral commission, told Kurdish media on April 9 that the Council of Ministers set this date in coordination with IHEC.[64] Iraqi electoral law requires parliamentary elections to occur at least 45 days before the end of the four-year legislative term, which corresponds to November 25, 2025.[65]

The Iraqi federal government signed memorandums of understanding (MoUs) with two US-based companies on April 9 to increase Iraq’s electricity supply.[66] The Iraqi federal government signed an MoU with GE Vernova for a 24,000-megawatt gas power plant. The government also signed an MOU with UGT Renewables to develop a 3,000-megawatt solar energy project and modernize electricity transmission networks. The Iraqi Chamber of Commerce separately signed an MoU with the US Chamber of Commerce to strengthen US-Iraqi economic cooperation. These MoUs follow the United States’ revocation of a waiver for Iraq to import Iranian electricity on March 10 as part of the US “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran.[67]

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas

Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen

Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

The Houthis claimed that they conducted a drone attack on an unspecified Israeli military target in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area on April 9.[68] The IDF has not commented on the attack at the time of this writing.

The Houthis claimed that they conducted a drone attack targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier in the Red Sea on April 9.[69] CENTCOM has not commented on the attack at the time of this writing.

The Houthis claimed on April 9 that they shot down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone over al Jawf Governorate in Yemen.[70] CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim.

US State Department Spokesperson Tammy Bruce reiterated on April 9 that the United States will “not tolerate” any country or commercial entity that supports the Houthis.[71] Bruce noted that offloading ships at Houthi-controlled ports or providing oil to the Houthis risks violating US law.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip

Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon

Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran’s nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas’ military organization and severed the group’s ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

The United States sanctioned five Iranian entities and one individual on April 9 for supporting the Iranian nuclear program.[72] The sanctions targeted entities and individuals that support the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and its subordinate, the Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA). US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated that the US Treasury will continue to use all available tools to prevent Iran from advancing its nuclear program and “broader destabilizing objectives.”[73]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

[1] https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/1903173404624367902 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/09/us/politics/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html

[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/facing-calls-disarm-hezbollah-ready-discuss-weapons-if-israel-withdraws-senior-2025-04-08/

[3] https://www.javanonline dot ir/fa/news/1290290/

[4] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/04/03/iran-abandons-houthis-us-air-strikes-trump-yemen-israel/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-backed-militias-iraq-ready-disarm-avert-trump-wrath-2025-04-07/

[5] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/735404/ ; https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/1903173404624367902 ; https://nournews dot ir/en/news/217575/Decoding-the-White-House’s-Message-to-Iran-A-Real-Change-or-Diplomatic-Deceit

[6] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-3-2025 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-31-2025 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-8-2025

[7] https://www.thetimes.com/world/middle-east/article/iran-arming-proxy-forces-iraq-long-range-missiles-5wpdx0w82

[8] https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/04/07/iraqi-militias-considering-to-disarm-ahead-of-us-iran-talks-sources-say/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-backed-militias-iraq-ready-disarm-avert-trump-wrath-2025-04-07/

[9] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-backed-militias-iraq-ready-disarm-avert-trump-wrath-2025-04-07/

[10] https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1909311018771349754 ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-says-u-s-will-hold-direct-talks-with-iran-d9eed5e5 ; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cd6j5l5w1lxo ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-sceptical-over-coming-us-talks-iranian-officials-say-2025-04-08/ ; https://www.mako.co dot il/news-diplomatic/2025_q2/Article-9c5624fb7461691026.htm

[11] https://www.javanonline dot ir/fa/news/1290290/

[12] https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-weapons-grade-uranium-trump-0b11a99a7364f9a43e1c83b220114d45 ; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iaea-chief-sees-time-running-out-revive-iran-nuclear-deal-2025-02-14/

[13] https://x.com/alishamkhani_ir/status/1909932055271518343

[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-sceptical-over-coming-us-talks-iranian-officials-say-2025-04-08/

[15] https://www.mako.co dot il/news-diplomatic/2025_q2/Article-9c5624fb7461691026.htm

[16] https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-is-reached-after-long-negotiations.html

[17] https://www.javanonline dot ir/fa/news/1290290 ; https://farsnews dot ir/Qaysar/1744182044464878915/FM%3A-US-Well-Aware-of-Iran%E2%80%99s-Military-Might ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-24-2025-67e1e57f7311a ; https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/1903173404624367902 ; https://nournews dot ir/en/news/217575/Decoding-the-White-House’s-Message-to-Iran-A-Real-Change-or-Diplomatic-Deceit

[18] https://www.axios.com/2025/03/30/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-bombing

[19] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-7-2025 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-2-2025

[20] https://www.thetimes.com/world/middle-east/article/iran-arming-proxy-forces-iraq-long-range-missiles-5wpdx0w82

[21] https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/1786303696915046671 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-1-2024

[22] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1275 ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1315

[23] https://www.reuters.com/article/world/exclusive-iran-moves-missiles-to-iraq-in-warning-to-enemies-idUSKCN1LG0W7/

[24] https://x.com/aboalaa_alwalae/status/1907540711123333483

[25] https://t.me/alhmla313/146

[26] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1909739106277466364 ; https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1909743130284273826

[27] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1910001983399796908 ; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1910002662180860349

[28] https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/14180

[29] https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/14180

[30] https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/14180

[31] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1909648586775687398

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1909649645535740127 ;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1909670759246811417 ;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1909709499457294364 ;

https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1909733593716605175 ;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1909739106277466364 ;

[32] https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1909743130284273826

[33] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1909649645535740127 ; https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1909650678592504294 ; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1909709499457294364 ; https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1909709683520053403

[34] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1909648586775687398 ; https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1909732668142399585

[35] https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/06/middleeast/us-airstrikes-yemen-houthis-may-be-relishing-them-intl/index.html?cid=ios_app

[36] https://asharq dot com/politics/122076/%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD-%D9%84%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B5%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA/; https://aawsat dot com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5130493-%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%81%D9%82%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-30-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9; https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1909681554046988736 ; https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1909707276689998135

[37] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1909671350341423548

[38] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1909671350341423548

[39] https://x.com/syriahr/status/1909692772422238487 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1909902004136058954

[40] https://x.com/syriahr/status/1909692772422238487

[41] https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/NK-UDtfFcapfTgvSyCZTr8tCq/

[42] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1898034823609942029

[43] https://x.com/syriahr/status/1909692772422238487

[44] https://x.com/syriahr/status/1909692772422238487

[45] https://snhr.org/blog/2025/03/11/803-individuals-extrajudicially-killed-between-march-6-10-2025/ ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1900497704771346582 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1899147654111670307

[46] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1909906040851755478 ; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1909909971652817192

[47] https://x.com/mohammadis4340/status/1909108483737235783 ; https://x.com/AlawiteMediaLab/status/1905370250725466253 ; https://www.facebook.com/alhadth.from.beityashout/posts/1100424778767379 ; https://x.com/AlawiteMediaLab/status/1907163146168717392 ; https://www.facebook.com/qadmoos/posts/pfbid02qfRC3YmBDjhVz2YzbCcVsnXDpUMkPG1aZcLffQk4Zv5e4PB45kLDWsUi2NBz4Qenl

[48] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1910012995817681083 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1910010832253022314 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/140704

[49] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1898039753523839169

[50] https://t.me/sraia5/43

[51] https://t.me/alaydiat/50 ; https://t.me/alaydiat/24 ; https://t.me/alaydiat/26 ; https://t.me/alaydiat/29 ; https://t.me/alaydiat/31

[52] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1888905513032732761

[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-7-2025

[54] https://www.cnnturk dot com/video/turkiye/son-dakika-disisleri-bakani-hakan-fidan-cnn-turkte-2267616 ; https://www dot timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/turkish-fm-says-ankara-and-jerusalem-holding-technical-talks-on-syria-deconfliction/

[55] https://www.haberler dot com/guncel/msb-den-turkiye-israil-iddialarina-yanit-18498530-haberi/

[56] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-and-israel-deconfliction-line-syria

[57] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1903203544003465615 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1904373127896805728 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1907518514614644959

[58] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1909936085720846730 ; https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1909932523620098474 ; https://x.com/NPA_Arabic/status/1909939323945755071

[59] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1909957122827133397 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/140679

[60] https://x.com/NPA_Arabic/status/1909939323945755071 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/140679 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1909957122827133397

[61] http://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1909929456673653133 ; https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1909936047661764843 ; https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1909932523620098474

[62] https://x.com/SDF_Syria/status/1908229305324409092 ; https://t.me/syrianmoi/23714 ; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1908186507162071040

[63] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/09042025

[64] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/09042025

[65] https://auis dot edu.krd/iris/publications/iraq%E2%80%99s-provincial-elections-electoral-dynamics-political-implications

[66] https://www.nrttv dot com/detail/47552

[67] https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-administration-ends-iraqs-waiver-buy-iranian-electricity-2025-03-09/

[68] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1909949055439941651/photo/2

[69] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1909949055439941651/photo/2

[70] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1909856647062712709

[71] https://www.state.gov/accountability-for-material-support-to-houthi-terrorist-activity-and-related-networks/

[72] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0077

[73] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0077

Donald Trump has threatened to bomb Iran unless a new nuclear deal is reached, only escalating tensions in a region already on edge.

‘If they do not make a deal, there will be bombing,’ the US president told NBC News on Sunday.

He added: ‘There is a chance that if they do not make a deal, that I will do secondary tariffs on them like I did four years ago, that brought them to a position that they very much wanted to be.’

Iran’s leaders fired back, warning that ‘someone in a glass room does not throw stones at anyone’ – a clear reference to America’s military presence in the Middle East.

Iran fires back at Trump’s bomb threat

Commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, said: ‘The Americans have at least 10 bases with 50,000 troops in the region, which means they are sitting in a glass room.’

An Iran-made Kheibarshekan missile, one of the country’s newest and most advanced (Picture: AFP)

With more than a dozen US bases in the region – all within Iran’s missile range – the exchange of threats has reignited fears that a miscalculation could spark a devastating war.

As of October 2024, US defence officials said there were at least 43,000 servicemembers in the Middle East, many on ships at sea, according to the Council on Foreign Relations.

In total, the US has military facilities across at least 19 sites – eight of them considered to be permanent by many regional analysts – in countries like Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates.

The US military also uses large bases in Djibouti and Turkey, which are part of other regional commands but often contribute significantly to missions in the Middle East.

Iran’s military arsenal largest in region

Meanwhile, Iran boasts more than 3,000 ballistic missiles, the largest arsenal in the Middle East, and has shown willingness to use them if it is pushed into a corner.

To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video Up Next Previous Page Next Page

This arsenal does not include its burgeoning land-attack cruise missile force.

Vast improvements have also been made over the past decade in the precision and accuracy of the missiles.

Many Iranian missiles are also inherently capable of carrying nuclear payloads, which has long been an international concern.

Timeline of nuclear fallout

The first steps of the fallout between Iran and the US were made during Trump’s first term in the White House, in 2017-2021.

A 2015 deal with global superpowers required Iran to limit its nuclear ambitions in exchange for sanctions relief.

The country has increasingly boasted of its underground ‘weapon cities’ (Picture: AFP)

But in 2018, the US leader withdrew, imposing sweeping sanctions.

It was after that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said that Iran had amassed enough fissile material for multiple bombs but had made no effort to build one.

On March 7, Trump said he had written to Khamenei, warning that he must either agree to fresh negotiations or face a military confrontation.

But Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian has ruled out direct negotiations with the Trump administration over the country’s nuclear programme.

Instead, he has signalled a willingness for ‘indirect talks’.

Get in touch with our news team by emailing us at webnews@metro.co.uk.

For more stories like this, check our news page.

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Iran Update March 31, 2025

Kelly Campa, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Johanna Moore, Katherine Wells, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Andie Parry, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Iran continues to threaten the United States with military action to dissuade the United States from a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid new US threats to strike the nuclear facilities. US President Donald Trump stated on March 30 that “there will be a bombing” if Iran does not make a new nuclear deal.[1] Trump added that he would impose secondary tariffs on Iran if Iran made no progress towards a deal.[2] Secondary tariffs would impose sanctions on countries that trade with Iran. US officials have previously threatened military action against Iran if there were no direct negotiations.[3] Iranian officials have said they are open to indirect negotiations, though they reject direct negotiations with the United States.[4] Senior Iranian officials have also repeatedly threatened to strike US interests in the region since at least January 2025, likely to shape US decision-making and discourage a US or Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear program.[5] An unspecified senior Iranian military official told the Telegraph on March 29 that Iran would attack any base “used by Americans” to attack Iran.[6] Iranian threats to attack US allies in the region may aim to discourage allies from allowing the United States to use their facilities out of fear of Iranian retaliation.

Iranian officials have recently threatened the following responses to a US-Israeli strike on Iran. These courses of action are not mutually exclusive.

Attack US bases and forces: Iranian officials have repeatedly explicitly threatened to attack US bases and forces in the region in recent months.[7] An unspecified senior Iranian military official told Western media on March 29 that Iran would target Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean if the United States attacked Iran.[8] The United States has recently increased its military presence at Diego Garcia Island, according to commercially available satellite imagery.[9] An anonymous official also told Tehran Times that Iran’s missile launchers at its underground bases are loaded with missiles and “ready for launch.”[10] Iran’s reported current maximum missile range is 2000 kilometers (km), and its reported maximum drone range is around 2500km.[11] Diego Garcia Island is located about 3700km from Iran’s southernmost city, Pasabandar. Iran would need to significantly decrease the payload of the warhead on its medium-range missiles or otherwise decrease missile weight to launch a successful attack on Diego Garcia. Iran could target other US facilities in the region if it chose to do so. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Air Force Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh threatened on March 31 that US bases in the region are “sitting in a glass house” near Iran.[12]

Disrupt international trade : IRGC Navy Commander Admiral Alireza Tangsiri suggested on March 29 that Iran may close the Strait of Hormuz if the United States and Israel attack Iran.[13] Tangsiri also threatened to seize ships if Iranian ships were seized.

: IRGC Navy Commander Admiral Alireza Tangsiri suggested on March 29 that Iran may close the Strait of Hormuz if the United States and Israel attack Iran.[13] Tangsiri also threatened to seize ships if Iranian ships were seized. Conduct a direct attack on Israel: Senior Iranian military commanders have recently resurfaced threats to conduct another missile attack on Israel.[14] Iran unveiled its latest precision-guided ballistic missile called the “Etemad” in February 2025.[15] Iranian media referred to the missile as the “Israeli ballistic missile” because it can reportedly hit key targets across Israel.[16] Iran’s stockpile of medium-range missiles, or missiles that can reach Israel, has been severely depleted following the April and October 2024 Israeli airstrikes on Iran, however.

Iranian officials have publicly stated that they are unwilling to make concessions to reach a new nuclear deal with the United States under President Trump’s desired timeline or terms. Iranian sources stated that Trump’s March 5 letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei included demands that Iran curtail its missile program and its role in supporting its proxies and partners in the Axis of Resistance.[17] A senior Iranian military official stated on March 29 that Iran will “never negotiate” on its missiles or the “capabilities” of the Axis of Resistance.[18] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran is unlikely to agree to curtail its missile program or the Axis of Resistance because to do so would cause it to lose the primary means with which it seeks to expel the United States from the region and establish itself as the regional hegemon. An unspecified senior Iranian source separately told a UK-based, Gulf-linked outlet that Trump’s letter refers to the “zero enrichment” approach.[19] It remains unclear if Iran is willing to reverse significant progress on its nuclear program to meet the terms. Western media also reported in mid-March that Trump’s letter set a two-month deadline to reach a new nuclear deal.[20] Prior negotiations for the 2015 nuclear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), took 20 months to negotiate.

Iran is likely rebuilding its solid-fuel propellant stocks after Israeli strikes damaged key production sites in October 2024.[21] The sanctioned Iranian cargo vessel Jairan, which is carrying sodium perchlorate, a chemical used to make solid missile fuel, arrived near Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, around March 29.[22] Marine Traffic and Maritime Executive confirmed that the Jairan, one of two Iranian Shipping Lines (IRISL) vessels sanctioned for transporting missile materials, is waiting near the Gheshm and Hormoz islands. Western officials told The Financial Times in January 2025 that Golbon and Jairan would deliver over 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate to Iran.[23] The IRGC’s Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization (SSJO), which partially oversees Iran’s missile research and development, received most of the shipment offloaded by Golbon on February 13.[24] Israeli strikes in October 2024 damaged three major long-range missile production sites in Iran, including the Shahroud Military Site in Semnan Province and the Khojir and Parchin complexes in Tehran Province.[25] The transfer of the Jairan’s cargo to one of these locations would suggest that Iran is trying to rebuild its long-range missile production capabilities after the Israeli strikes. Iran could also transfer the sodium perchlorate to a facility that produces short-range ballistic missiles.

Iran continues to coordinate with Russia and China on nuclear issues. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi met with Russian Ambassador to Iran Alexey Dedov in Tehran on March 31 to discuss nuclear talks and sanctions relief.[26] Gharibabadi said Iran, Russia, and China will continue trilateral meetings and that Russia invited him to a UN Charter group meeting in Moscow in mid-April. The meeting follows a March 14 joint statement from Russia, China, and Iran that condemned US sanctions and described Iran’s nuclear activities as “peaceful.”[27] It remains unclear what Iran hopes to gain from this coordination or how Russia and China plan to support Tehran under growing US pressure. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia is unlikely to secure US interests through mediation, particularly in talks on Iran’s nuclear program and support of the Axis of Resistance.[28]

Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara appointed loyalists to key cabinet positions in the new transitional government while nominally broadening his ruling coalition by appointing several minorities and technocrats to less-critical ministries. Shara announced the appointments of 23 transitional ministers to his cabinet during a press conference on March 29.[29] These ministers are expected to remain in power until the transitional government cedes power to a new, elected government after a five-year interim period.[30] Shara replaced the majority of former interim ministers with new appointments and appointed one woman, one Christian, one Alawite, one Druze, and two Kurds to lead ministries within his government.[31] Shara also appointed nine ”independent” ministers, including various professionals, former activists, and former Assad-era ministers who served in their positions before the civil war.[32] He also dismissed the former interim justice minister, who was an ex-Jabhat al Nusra official.[33] These are undoubtedly positive steps towards a representative transitional government, but Shara still prioritized maintaining his control over key ministries such as defense, interior, foreign affairs, and justice by appointing Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-affiliated officials or former HTS-controlled Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) officials to these posts.[34] He also appointed former HTS and SSG officials to the less important ministries of energy, local administration and environment, public works and housing, youth and sports, and administrative development.[35] The decision to expand his transitional cabinet to include minorities and “newcomers” follows widespread concern that Shara is personalizing power and appointing loyalists while blocking opportunities to represent Syria’s various minority communities in the transitional government.[36] Shara previously appointed a cabinet nearly entirely composed of bureaucrats that formerly served in the Idlib-based SSG.[37]

Shara’s appointments of long-time loyalists to key positions suggest Shara hopes to continue to maintain his own and HTS’s influence within the transitional government. Shara has appointed or reappointed close advisers and allies from HTS to oversee portfolios directly concerning internal security and state stability. Shara has retained two of his most trusted advisors, Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra and Asaad al Shaibani, as ministers of defense and foreign affairs, respectively.[38] Former al Qaeda in Iraq and Jabhat al Nusra member Anas Khattab has transitioned from intelligence chief to Interior Minister, where he will oversee the state’s General Security Services, border control, and intelligence services.[39] The United States and the UN sanctioned Khattab in 2012 and 2014, respectively, for his association with AQI.[40] It is not clear if or who Shara will appoint to directly oversee Syrian intelligence services, given the expansion of Khattab’s role. Shara also appointed “key HTS ideologue” and Sunni scholar Mazhar al Wais as his Justice Minister.[41] Arab media has reported that Wais has served as a ”senior legal figure” in HTS and has accompanied Shara to numerous high-level meetings without having been appointed to an official role.[42] Shara’s decision to position these loyalists in these roles will enable him to shape the trajectory of the Syrian government and its security services, which could allow him to maintain his rule well into the future. Qasra, Shaibani, Khattab, and Wais’s appointments suggest that Shara intends to maintain significant control over ministries that directly concern internal security and state stability, and it could enable him to sideline rivals as he did during his rule of Idlib.

Shara notably did not place visible loyalists in ministries that would allow Syrian Islamists to remake Syrian society in their image. Shara has allowed non-HTS officials to lead ministries that directly influence Syrian society, including education, information, communications, and religious endowments.[43] These ministries—particularly education—can be used to remake the next generation of a country by altering textbooks. The Assad regime and other Middle Eastern autocratic regimes—like the Houthis in Yemen and ISIS—have created educational materials to brainwash the next generation. Shara probably recognized that placing loyalists or ideologues in these roles would have earned him significant international blowback and created more challenges for his effort to remove sanctions. Shara could still employ a “supervisory” system in which deputy ministers make the decisions and hold the real power while the minister serves as a figurehead.

Shara’s new transitional government is unlikely to assuage fears from minority communities about the future of minority representation in the transitional government and the trajectory of Shara’s rule. Shara’s clear preference for Sunni Arabs, the very few minorities, and the lack of appointees from other strong Syrian parties like the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) or Kurdish National Council (KNC) has already led several minority-dominated groups to condemn his “one-party government.”[44] The Alawite community, for its part, remains deeply fearful of the new transitional government after the recent coastal massacres. The SDC decried the new government as “largely homogenous.”[45] A KNC official told Kurdish media that the KNC ”will not participate in a government that does not recognize the rights of the Kurdish people.”[46] The official warned that the Kurds have been ignored for the ”third time,” likely referring to widespread Kurdish criticism over exclusion from the National Dialogue Conference, the drafting of the constitutional declaration, and the recent appointments.[47] Fear among key Kurdish powerbrokers that Shara will continue to exclude their parties from a voice in his government’s formation risks disrupting the Syrian interim government’s efforts to integrate the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian state.

The separatist Druze-majority Suwayda Military Council (SMC) also rejected Shara’s “one-color” government during a press conference on March 30.[48] The group called on Shara to form a government that ”represents all Syrian components.”[49] The SMC is a group of Druze fighters who were previously aligned with the Assad regime.[50] A Western analyst recently reported that it is ”well known” within the Druze community that the SMC has connections to Israel through members of the Israeli Druze community.[51] It does not appear that the SMC represents a majority of the Syrian Druze population. That multiple camps across Syria continue to reject Shara’s transitional government will not help grow the government’s legitimacy, however.

Shara appointed fifteen members to the Supreme Fatwa Council via presidential decree on March 28.[52] Shara’s decree said that the council would issue new fatwas on new developments, explain Sharia rulings on cases that are referred to the council, appoint muftis and fatwa committees in Syrian provinces, and supervise fatwa centers in the provinces.[53] The Supreme Council of Fatwa will rule on decisions by majority vote, and Shara will vote as a tiebreaker if needed.[54] HTS established a Supreme Fatwa Council in Idlib in 2019 that Shara effectively controlled and used to sideline his hardline Islamist rivals.[55] Shara’s ability to use the council against his rivals will depend on his level of influence over a majority of its council members. Several notable HTS-affiliated scholars, including Sheikh Abdul Rahim Atun, former HTS-backed Supreme Fatwa Council member Anas Ayrut, and new Minister of Justice Mazhar al Wais, sit on the new council.[56]

Shara appointed Sheikh Osama al Rifai as the council’s chairman.[57] The Syrian Islamic Council, which was a body of Sunni Islamic scholars that opposed the Assad regime, appointed Rifai as the Grand Mufti in Syria in 2021 after the regime abolished the office.[58] Rifai has connections to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Muslim Brotherhood.[59]

Key Takeaways:

Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran continues to threaten the United States with military action to dissuade the United States from a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid new US threats to strike the nuclear facilities. US President Donald Trump stated on March 30 that “there will be a bombing” if Iran does not make a new nuclear deal. Iranian officials also threatened to attack US allies who enable a strike, which may aim to discourage allies from allowing the United States to use their facilities out of fear of Iranian retaliation. Iran has explicitly identified three possible responses to an attack on its nuclear facilities: retaliation against US bases and forces in the region, disruption of international trade in the Straits of Hormuz, and another attack on Israel.

Iran continues to threaten the United States with military action to dissuade the United States from a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid new US threats to strike the nuclear facilities. US President Donald Trump stated on March 30 that “there will be a bombing” if Iran does not make a new nuclear deal. Iranian officials also threatened to attack US allies who enable a strike, which may aim to discourage allies from allowing the United States to use their facilities out of fear of Iranian retaliation. Iran has explicitly identified three possible responses to an attack on its nuclear facilities: retaliation against US bases and forces in the region, disruption of international trade in the Straits of Hormuz, and another attack on Israel. Iranian Ballistic Missiles: Iran is likely rebuilding its solid fuel propellant stocks after Israeli strikes damaged key production sites in October 2024. Iran will presumably need to transport new solid fuel precursors to its production facilities . The transfer of the Jairan’s cargo to a production facility used to produce long-range missiles would suggest that Iran is trying to rebuild its long-range missile production capabilities after the Israeli strikes. Iran could also transfer the sodium perchlorate to a facility that produces short-range ballistic missiles.

Iran is likely rebuilding its solid fuel propellant stocks after Israeli strikes damaged key production sites in October 2024. Iran will presumably need to transport new solid fuel precursors to its production facilities The transfer of the Jairan’s cargo to a production facility used to produce long-range missiles would suggest that Iran is trying to rebuild its long-range missile production capabilities after the Israeli strikes. Iran could also transfer the sodium perchlorate to a facility that produces short-range ballistic missiles. Syrian Transitional Government: Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara appointed loyalists to key cabinet positions in the new transitional government while nominally broadening his ruling coalition by appointing several minorities and technocrats to less-critical ministries. Shara notably did not place visible loyalists in ministries that would allow Syrian Islamists to remake Syrian society in their image. Shara has allowed non-HTS officials to lead ministries that directly influence Syrian society, including education, information, communications, and religious endowments.

Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara appointed loyalists to key cabinet positions in the new transitional government while nominally broadening his ruling coalition by appointing several minorities and technocrats to less-critical ministries. Shara notably did not place visible loyalists in ministries that would allow Syrian Islamists to remake Syrian society in their image. Shara has allowed non-HTS officials to lead ministries that directly influence Syrian society, including education, information, communications, and religious endowments. Syrian Supreme Fatwa Council: Shara appointed fifteen members to the Supreme Fatwa Council via presidential decree on March 28. Shara’s decree said that the council would issue new fatwas on new developments, explain Sharia rulings on cases that are referred to the council, appoint muftis and fatwa committees in Syrian provinces, and supervise fatwa centers in the provinces.

Syria

The SDF and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army have continued limited engagements in northern Syria since March 28. The SDF reportedly attempted to advance on SNA positions along the western bank of the Euphrates River near Tishreen Dam on March 29.[60] The pace of engagements has declined between Turkish-backed forces and the SDF along these lines of contact since early March. Turkish airstrikes targeting the SDF have also declined. A Democratic Union Party (PYD) foreign relations co-chair said on March 30 that ”serious efforts” are ongoing to reach a ceasefire between the SDF and Turkey.[61] The SDF and Syrian interim government reached an initial ceasefire in early March that would place the SDF under the Defense Ministry.[62] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan told Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 28 that he supports integrating the SDF into the Syrian Defense Ministry.[63]

The Suwayda Military Council (SMC) announced its objectives and various units on March 30, indicating that the SMC is developing a formalized, organized structure.[64] The SMC is a group of Druze fighters who were previously aligned with the Assad regime, and some Druze sources in Suwayda claim that Israel is supporting the SMC.[65] An unspecified SMC commander announced on March 30 that the SMC is comprised of sixteen units, including a Special Tasks Brigade, a Political Bureau, an Artillery Department, an Administrative and Financial Department, an Organizational Department, and an Anti-Terrorism Battalion.[66] The unidentified commander stated that the Military Council‘s tasks are “clear and fixed,“ including ensuring security in Suwayda, preserving unity, establishing a safe environment that guarantees freedoms, and coordinating with all national and international forces that ”seek to achieve the interest of Syrians.”[67] This announcement follows the March 21 attack by SMC members on Military Council leader Colonel Tariq al Shoufi’s home in Suwayda Province due to delayed salary payments.[68] Shoufi stated that he did not agree to pay salaries and that the SMC has not fully formalized into a structure that would require him to compensate members.[69] The SMC does not have a formal relationship with the interim Syrian government and rejected the interim government cabinet announced on March 29.[70]

Pro-Assad insurgents have continued attacks on interim Syrian government forces since March 28. Former Assad regime members attacked a police station in Latakia City on March 29.[71] Former Assad regime members separately attacked a Syrian security force patrol in Najha, south of Damascus, on March 30.[72] Security forces killed two of the attackers.[73] Interim Syrian government forces then executed a cordon-and-search operation in Najha.[74]

Intelligence from local informants enabled a government raid targeting a weapons and explosives storage site in al Waer, Homs City, suggesting that the insurgents have little to no support in al Waer.[75] Forces acting on the tip from locals raided a weapons warehouse used by pro-Assad insurgents.[76] Forces seized small arms ammunition and RPGs that insurgents could have used in an attack.[77] The Assad regime besieged al Waer during the Syrian Civil War, so, unsurprisingly, local residents would be unwilling to support insurgents who support the former regime or its structures. Accurate, actionable intelligence from the locals suggests that al Waer is a relatively non-permissive environment for the insurgents, who would need to secure at least tacit acquiescence to their activities to establish a base of operations. The insurgents’ ability to investigate the leak and track down the informant will be a strong indicator of their relative power in western Homs City.

The insurgents may have been using al Waer as a temporary way station to move weapons into the city rather than a long-term stockpile. The seized cache was relatively small, and al Waer is located on the western outskirts of Homs City just north of the M1 Highway that connects Homs and the Alawite-majority coastal provinces. This would make it a logical waypoint between the Alawite-majority areas and Homs City’s center, and the small cache is likely reflective of a small shipment designed to be moved quickly.

Counterproductive government operations could threaten to drive support for insurgents in Talkalakh, Homs Province. Syrian government security forces deployed to Talkalakh, west of Homs City, on March 30 in response to an insurgent attack that killed two Syrian soldiers.[78] Local footage circulated on Syrian media appeared to show individuals who had been beaten or killed by government forces during clearing operations in Talkalakh.[79] Pro-Assad insurgents have conducted attacks on interim government forces in Talkalakh since the Assad regime fell in December 2024.[80] Heavy-handed operations will further alienate and inspire fear within the local population. Insurgents very likely seek to trigger violent government reprisals to generate support for the insurgency.

Reports of violence against Alawites continue to permeate across Syrian media, fueling distrust and fear among the Alawite community. These reports will continue to fuel support for the majority Alawite insurgent movements regardless of their veracity. Two interim Syrian government soldiers assassinated the chief of Harf al Benmira and five other men present in his home on March 31.[81] The local Syrian security force commander reported that the perpetrators were from a police unit and that they had been arrested.[82] Arrests are insufficient to maintain the trust of the population unless the perpetrators are also charged and imprisoned through a fair and transparent judicial process. Locals separately discovered the bodies of 11 executed Alawites dumped in the Jouber River, Baniyas City, Tartous Province, on March 31.[83] Pro-Alawite media accused interim government forces of the sectarian attack.[84] The informational effect generated by these reports fuels a cycle of distrust among the Alawite community, which discourages cooperation with the interim government. This would enable the insurgents to replace the government as a legitimate authority, at least in western Syria.[85]

Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society

Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent

Several Iraqi Shia tribes have announced that they will boycott the November 2025 parliamentary elections after Iraqi nationalist Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr announced on March 27 that his Shia National Movement would not participate in the elections.[86] The Bani Tamim, Bani Kaab, Bani Lam, and al Sawaed tribes, among others, announced on March 28 and 29 that they would boycott the elections.[87] Some of these tribes, including Bani Tamim and Bani Kaab, previously participated in pro-Sadr demonstrations in Baghdad in August 2022.[88] Sadr withdrew from politics in August 2022 amid political deadlock after the October 2021 parliamentary elections.[89] CTP-ISW previously assessed that some Iraqi politicians are concerned that Sadr’s boycott of the upcoming elections could destabilize Iraq.[90]

The leader of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq, Qais al Khazali, called on the Iraqi federal government to confront the “events in Syria,” likely referring to recent sectarian violence in coastal Syria.[91] Khazali was likely referring to attacks committed by Syrian interim government forces against Alawites, although the recent sectarian violence in Syria was committed by both Alawites and Sunnis and began when pro-Assad insurgents attacked interim government forces in early March 2025.[92] Khazali claimed that Israel, the United States, and an unspecified Arab country seek to divide Syria and warned that the situation in Syria poses a “direct and dangerous threat” to Iraq.[93] CTP-ISW previously assessed that sectarian violence in Syria could spill over into Iraq.[94]

Khazali separately criticized Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani for removing the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Law from the parliamentary agenda on March 12, describing the removal of the law as a “crime.”[95] The PMF Law would remove Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh from his post. Khazali accused Sudani of removing the law from parliament to protect Fayyadh.

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas

Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen

Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 62 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff on March 28.[96] CENTCOM conducted at least eight airstrikes targeting three reportedly new Houthi military bases and ammunition depots in Sanhan District, Sanaa Governorate, on March 28.[97] CENTCOM also targeted the Houthis’ government complex in Hazm City, al Jawf Governorate, on March 28.[98]

CENTCOM likely killed Houthi leaders in an airstrike that targeted a vehicle in the Hajjah government on March 30. An airstrike targeting a lone vehicle is usually intended to eliminate a significant enemy leader rather than individual low-ranking fighters. CENTCOM struck the vehicle on the N5 highway in al Tour, Hajjah Governorate, northwestern Yemen, reportedly killing two unidentified individuals.[99]

Senior Houthi officials recently acknowledged that CENTCOM airstrikes have killed Houthi fighters but also denied that CENTCOM’s airstrikes have impacted their missile and drone production capabilities.[100] The Houthis conducted three combined missile and drone attacks targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier and US destroyers in the Red Sea between March 29 and March 30.[101] The attack did not succeed, and CENTCOM did not acknowledge the attacks.

The Houthis launched a ballistic missile at Ben Gurion Airport in central Israel on March 30.[102] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted the missile before it entered Israeli territory.[103]

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip

Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon

Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem implicitly threatened to resume attacks targeting Israel or Israeli forces in a speech on March 30.[104] Qassem has previously failed to attack after making threats against Israel. Qassem reiterated that the Lebanese state is responsible for implementing the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement but warned that Hezbollah’s patience with Lebanon’s diplomatic efforts “has a limit.”[105] Qassem warned that when that limit is reached, Hezbollah will ”have no choice but to resort to other options.” Qassem may be speaking to appease hardline Hezbollah elements who feel that Hezbollah needs to act in response to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) airstrike on March 28 that targeted a Hezbollah drone storage facility in Beirut.[106] Qassem previously implicitly threatened Israel, but Hezbollah has not fulfilled those threats.[107] CTP-ISW continues to assess that Hezbollah’s central leadership is unlikely to approve any attacks targeting Israel at this time as it would almost certainly risk major Israeli reprisals.[108]

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran’s nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas’s military organization and severed the group’s ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

The Iranian rial appreciated from 1,042,000 rials to one US dollar on March 28 to 1,033,000 rials to one US dollar on March 31.[109]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan discussed future opportunities for economic cooperation in a phone call on March 29.[110] Pezeshkian expressed a willingness to discuss various unspecified regional and international issues to strengthen relations between the two countries. This phone call follows recent statements from other senior Iranian officials in which they criticized Turkish regional policy, especially in Syria.[111]

Approximately 100 Iranian farmers protested over water shortages in Esfahan Province on March 29 and 30.[112] Anti-regime media circulated footage of Iranian security forces firing tear gas at protesters in Esfahan Province on March 30.[113] The same outlet also published a video that showed that protesters had set fire to a water pumping station that diverts water from the Zayandeh Rud River before the water reaches Esfahan.[114] The Zayandeh Rud River, which is one of the main sources of water for Esfahan Province, runs dry for the majority of the year due to water extraction before the water reaches Esfahan.[115] Iranian farmers previously protested water scarcity in Esfahan for over two weeks in 2021 before Iranian security forces cracked down on the protests.[116]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

[1] https://www.axios.com/2025/03/30/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-bombing

[2] https://x.com/RapidResponse47/status/1906514897933934770

[3] https://www.c-span.org/program/senate-committee/dni-director-gabbard-fbi-director-patel-and-other-national-security-officials-testfy-on-global-threats/657476

[4] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85788832 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/10/3283431

[5] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/12/06/3264097 ; https://farsnews dot ir/Rahgozar_b/1743156850902814441/Iran-Parliament-Speaker%3A-Palestine-Litmus-Test-for-West’s-Double-Standards

[6] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/03/31/iran-urged-to-strike-diego-garcia-base-immediately/

[7] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/12/06/3264097 ; https://farsnews dot ir/Rahgozar_b/1743156850902814441/Iran-Parliament-Speaker%3A-Palestine-Litmus-Test-for-West’s-Double-Standards

[8] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/03/31/iran-urged-to-strike-diego-garcia-base-immediately/

[9] https://www.twz.com/air/signs-u-s-massing-b-2-spirit-bombers-in-diego-garcia

[10] https://x.com/KhosroIsfahani/status/1906445318381855087

[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-unveils-2000-km-ballistic-missile-irna-2023-05-25/

[12] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/11/3283869

[13] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/735404/

[14] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/727771 ;

https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/727740 ;

https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6382158

[15] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/14/3249508

[16] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/732433

[17] https://t dot co/m8UiJkokUW ; https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/1903173404624367902 ; https://nournews dot ir/en/news/217575/Decoding-the-White-House’s-Message-to-Iran-A-Real-Change-or-Diplomatic-Deceit

[18] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/735404/

[19] https://amwaj.media/en/article/exclusive-iran-to-decide-on-negotiations-with-the-us-in-the-uae

[20] https://www.axios.com/2025/03/19/trump-letter-iran-nuclear-deal ; https://www.axios.com/2025/03/07/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-letter

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/consequences-idf-strikes-iran

[22] https://maritime-executive.com/article/shipload-of-rocket-fuel-arrives-in-iran

[23] https://www.ft.com/content/f0bc9fcc-11b3-4615-bd24-163f8938f2a5

[24] https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/13/middleeast/iran-is-rearming-its-missile-program-and-a-ship-of-supplies-just-arrived-from-china-western-sources-say/index.html

[25] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy7dkgz71x6o

[26] https://x.com/Gharibabadi/status/1906384154700218466

[27] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-iran-russia-kick-off-talks-beijing-over-irans-nuclear-issues-2025-03-14/

[28] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-14-2025

[29] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/697

[30] https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/2025.03.13%20-%20Constitutional%20declaration%20%28English%29.pdf

[31] https://x.com/Levant_24_/status/1906246372229362052; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/30/world/middleeast/syria-new-transitional-government.html

[32] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/30/world/middleeast/syria-new-transitional-government.html

[33] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/syria-justice-minister-execution-video-adultery-assad-regime-rcna186523; https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/03/30/syria-replaces-controversial-justice-minister-as-it-forms-new-government/

[34] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/126602; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/126603; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/126604; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/126605

[35] https://x.com/Levant_24_/status/1906246372229362052/photo/1; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/126612; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/126616 ; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/126627; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/126631; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/126629

[36] https://x.com/AJA_Syria/status/1904497463425438179; https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/02/05/syrian-cabinet-set-for-imminent-reshuffle-souces-say

[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-25-2025

[38] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/126602; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/126603

[39] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/126604

[40] https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/individual/anas-hasan-khattab; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1797

[41] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/126605 ; Aaron Zelin, The age of political jihadism: A study of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2023), 31.

[42] https://www.newarab dot com/news/what-know-about-syrias-new-cabinet-and-its-top-ministers; https://www.enabbaladi dot net/746906/حكومة-سورية-بـ23-وزيرًا-من-هم؟/

[43] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/126606; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/126607; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/126613; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/126614 ; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/126618 ; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/126626 ; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/126636

[44] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/53975

[45] https://m-syria-d dot com/en/?p=8303

[46] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/syria/30032025

[47] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/syria/30032025

[48] https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1906331503388155968

[49] https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1906331503388155968

[50] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1893704565544903043 ; https://t.me/nahermedia/45125; https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/03/27/israel-syria-druze-war-assad/

[51] https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/03/27/israel-syria-druze-war-assad/

[52] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/655

[53] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/655

[54] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/655

[55] Jerome Drevon and Patrick Haenni. ”How global Jihad relocalises and where it leads: the case of HTS, the former AQ franchise in Syria.” Middle East Directions 8, (2021).

[56] https://www.syrianmemory.org/archive/figures/5cdbf100e2bb8f000177a78c; https://syrianmemory.org/archive/figures/5d73d08407204700012dd8a9 ; https://x.com/MohammedHawaidi/status/1905968458166083621; Aaron Zelin, The age of political jihadism: A study of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2023), 31.

[57] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/655

[58] https://www.syria dot tv/%D8%A5%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%AE-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A; https://www.aljazeera dot net/encyclopedia/2024/10/28/%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d8%ac%d9%84%d8%b3-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a5%d8%b3%d9%84%d8%a7%d9%85%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a-%d9%87%d9%8a%d8%a6%d8%a9-%d9%84%d9%84%d8%af%d8%b9%d8%a7%d8%a9

[59] https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2014/03/damascus-preachers-and-the-armed-rebellion?lang=en ; https://nordicmonitor dot com/2022/03/pro-erdogan-grand-mufti-of-syria-set-up-a-foundation-in-turkey-to-run-schools-including-university/

[60] https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1906088601492062580

[61] https://www dot rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/300320252

[62] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/593

[63] https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/turkiye/turkiye-russia-cooperation-is-key-to-resolving-regional-issues-turkish-president/3522464

[64] https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1906331503388155968

[65] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1893704565544903043 ; https://t.me/nahermedia/45125 ; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1894189377032499400 ; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1897286303907242168 ; https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/03/27/israel-syria-druze-war-assad/

[66] https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1906331503388155968

[67] https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1906331503388155968

[68] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1903560523397947556 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/139119

[69] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-24-2025 ; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1903560523397947556

[70] https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1906331503388155968

[71] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1905939409427374092 ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1881561385995315

[72] https://t.me/syrianmoi/23712 ;

[73] https://t.me/syrianmoi/23712 ; https://t.me/backstage_24/1241

[74] https://t.me/syrianmoi/23712

[75] https://t.me/syrianmoi/23639 ; https://x.com/NavvarSaban/status/1905969301808378119

[76] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1905960573306556431 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1905961322145054851

[77] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1905960573306556431 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1905961322145054851

[78] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1906444359429398819 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1906425690582298625 ; https://t.me/ALMHARAR/75841

[79] GRAPHIC: https://x.com/Sy_intelligence/status/1906500981375762440 ; GRAPHIC: https://x.com/Sy_intelligence/status/1906528776013422722

[80] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1872346261388722649 ; https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5419 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1883097186357137741 ; https://t.me/syria_mukawama/6031

[81] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1906661783152038103 ; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1906768620476322221 ; [GRAPHIC] https://x.com/Sy_intelligence/status/1906695118494589396

[82] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1906768620476322221

[83] https://x.com/AlawiteMediaLab/status/1906609276942266534 ; https://www.facebook.com/100093260989904/videos/9737315626289752/?__cft__[0]=AZXQA9BLnfIcmo78htWRBeXTHuhk9D6kE1YTacBHjNFPOx5e5IYwzEXGD0Rk-waMTsGRk218IVAsCejwhHJ5aOzFAueZ8Gpl2GetO7yZ88Efw45uKwjId6hby9IdU3uDLe69hPaUBF3aorkkzWFMM-ljFWALkUJC9FEOfywtjqXDZ6Mb3gny71swHUmwhZPOo6B0Rono3YUXaq0QSkFhNT0j&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://www.facebook.com/SyriansInBritain/videos/1642231056661804/?__cft__[0]=AZXlCoFhZtNFGwlPkV2FDfhrrXfwBJGk3nodoeM37t2BKuqIUI6lhZavNKTpC7kF–O-EqRqZbaaF05R2vWAigK2UKUSzZu3P0EvDCbA40kOPKdUFnYph07mskjRLfmSQPQ0roFdZ5ArciS5BBNPBFvcjVuRdiegrwGuWJ8pdM-sXqlEij3kKvrU64pOLQnbxq13m0bTT6ZMLxdW_AU0dMIJ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[84] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=122123723222700456&id=61571013687250&__cft__[0]=AZVp6e6ZmWxEPyag8br1Ox0WBxCydaBPXbsMQ9NKbakviv5oI0tlhe_A4lcm5oY6PO0Zyj2t1Jj93ky83cheGpHuR1qqLWrPSyfhCIhU9CaTsUHQcqs7dn8RbwSKDfmHhDwyY_q3B2oTctHA-TAlECk4&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=636854039118984&id=100083831813099&__cft__[0]=AZVABv2K-0IRQGD45h8uQt8rSuCL_T4R9-a51fGL8SrOkfmTwZs4dRFj91TLikAVBQR7AYbJQ7uH6Gd0hdHb7XXsWq62XFkGIFIpJcaD0nPI7GJhfAO2ESeDW6iBzecIn-MZ52vl1xvAV6czZWfSPyKNqZXdfVciSvydlZgSPGzDFb6g-X21V6tzcSg7Amyb97vbHQeRtRp_lWKM0j5ONcyi&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://x.com/AlawiteMediaLab/status/1906748592280445146

[85] https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf

[86] https://thenewregion dot com/posts/1895 ;

https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/290320252

[87] https://t.me/almanesr_MSA/33364 ;

https://thenewregion dot com/posts/1895 ;

https://t.me/almanesr_MSA/33367 ;

https://t.me/almanesr_MSA/33356 ;

https://t.me/almanesr_MSA/33350

[88] https://www.facebook.com/Timimsajad/videos/-%D8%B9%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%8A-%EF%B8%8F-%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%AF%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%AA/596258382210190/ ;

https://www.alhurra dot com/hl-hqa/2022/08/03/%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%A9%D8%9F

[89] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqi-cleric-sadr-announces-full-withdrawal-political-life-twitter-2022-08-29/

[90] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-28-2025

[91] https://almadapaper dot net/399832/

[92] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-6-2025

[93] https://almadapaper dot net/399832/

[94] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-12-2025

[95] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B2%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%8A-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B0-%D8%A8-%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D9%84

[96] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1905702114581733877;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1905703002415267974;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1905703116970086518;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1905708350471545118;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1905728655374037329;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1906083246271570280;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1906101670896922964;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1906102815694487897;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1906102991272522090;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1906112117905772695;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1906368882765386010;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1906404193402748952;

https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1906650166192476651

[97] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1905702114581733877; https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1905716790220787714

[98] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1905708350471545118

[99] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1906650166192476651

[100] https://x.com/TheMediaOfficee/status/1906360558556729740; https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3457591.htm; https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3458980.htm

[101] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1906223523476934675

[102] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1906286695743377595

[103] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1906252197861396706

[104] https://mediarelations-lb dot org/post.php?id=19180

[105] https://mediarelations-lb dot org/post.php?id=19180

[106] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1905589040583184476

[107] https://nna-leb dot gov.lb/ar/سياسة/761456/قاسم-في-تشييع-نصر-الله-وصفي-الدين-المقاومة-لم-تنته ; https://www.almanar dot com.lb/13102762 ; https://nna-leb dot gov.lb/ar/سياسة/764600/قاسم-من-حق-المقاومة-أن-تستمر-وبدون-الإعمار-لا-يوجد

[108] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-28-2025

[109] bon-bast.com; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-28-2025

[110] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/09/3283039/

[111] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-4-2025

[112] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202503301875

[113] https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/1906372888938107295

[114] https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/1906402544034709522

[115] https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-middle-east-14031700 ; https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/497549/Dry-river-sinking-city-urgent-measures-needed-to-save-Isfahan-s ; https://www.iransafar.co/zayandeh-rud/

[116] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/26/world/middleeast/iran-protests-water-shortages.html

Iran Update April 2, 2025

Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Alexandra Braverman, Andie Parry, Ben Rezaei, Carolyn Moorman, George Ekmekjian, Faris Almaari, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity, even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Iran continued to threaten US bases and forces, likely to try to discourage a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid US threats to strike these facilities. Iranian armed forces-run Defa Press published a piece on April 2 claiming that Iran “certainly has sufficient weapons” to attack Diego Garcia Island.[1] The United States has recently increased its military presence at Diego Garcia Island.[2] The piece stated that US Air Force and Navy “strategic assets” and “4000 US soldiers” at Diego Garcia would be “at risk of complete destruction” if the United States attacked Iran.[3] There are normally roughly 400 US military personnel and 2,000 civilian contractors at Diego Garcia.[4] The article outlined the following options for an Iranian attack on US assets at Diego Garcia.

Missile and drone attack: Defa Press stated that Iran could conduct a drone attack “using advanced Shahed 136 drones.” [5] Iran unveiled the Shahed-136B drone in September 2024 and claimed it has a range of 4000 kilometers (km). [6] The original Shahed-136 drone has a maximum speed of 185 km per hour, which means it would take about 20 hours to reach Diego Garcia from the southernmost city in Iran. Iran previously launched about 170 drones in their April 2024 attack on Israel, none of which entered Israeli airspace, in part because the drone’s slow speed enabled allied aircraft to intercept and destroy the drones. [7] The drones launched from Iran would have taken roughly nine hours to reach Israel, though Israel had the benefit of a plethora of Israeli and allied land-based aircraft available to intercept drones. [8] Defa Press also stated that Iran could use ballistic and cruise missiles, including Khorramshahr ballistic missiles, at “close range” to Diego Garcia. [9] Iran’s stockpile of medium-range missiles and ability to manufacture some advanced ballistic missiles have been severely depleted following the April and October 2024 Israeli airstrikes on Iran, but Iran would presumably expend a large proportion of its remaining stockpile in the event of a strike on its nuclear facilities. [10] Iran would need to significantly decrease the payload of its drones and missiles or otherwise alter the weight of the drones and missiles themselves to launch a land-based attack with sufficient range to hit Diego Garcia.

Defa Press stated that Iran could conduct a drone attack “using advanced Shahed 136 drones.” Iran unveiled the Shahed-136B drone in September 2024 and claimed it has a range of 4000 kilometers (km). The original Shahed-136 drone has a maximum speed of 185 km per hour, which means it would take about 20 hours to reach Diego Garcia from the southernmost city in Iran. Iran previously launched about 170 drones in their April 2024 attack on Israel, none of which entered Israeli airspace, in part because the drone’s slow speed enabled allied aircraft to intercept and destroy the drones. The drones launched from Iran would have taken roughly nine hours to reach Israel, though Israel had the benefit of a plethora of Israeli and allied land-based aircraft available to intercept drones. Defa Press also stated that Iran could use ballistic and cruise missiles, including Khorramshahr ballistic missiles, at “close range” to Diego Garcia. Iran’s stockpile of medium-range missiles and ability to manufacture some advanced ballistic missiles have been severely depleted following the April and October 2024 Israeli airstrikes on Iran, but Iran would presumably expend a large proportion of its remaining stockpile in the event of a strike on its nuclear facilities. Iran would need to significantly decrease the payload of its drones and missiles or otherwise alter the weight of the drones and missiles themselves to launch a land-based attack with sufficient range to hit Diego Garcia. Naval drone and missile attack launched from surface vessels: Defa Press also threatened that Iran could hit targets in the Indian Ocean using surface vessels, presumably its drone carriers and others, to launch cruise missiles and drones. [11] This would—in theory—allow Iranian ships to get closer to Diego Garcia. Such vessels lack the necessary countermeasures to seriously defend themselves against US naval action, however.

Iran still retains a large number of short-range ballistic missiles that it could use to strike other US bases in the Middle East, however. Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened in recent weeks to attack US bases and forces in the Gulf countries.[12] An unspecified Iranian official told the Wall Street Journal that “each American soldier will be an individual target” if the United States attacks Iran.[13] Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Aerospace Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh similarly stated that the United States has “at least 10 bases and over 50,000 troops” near Iran that Iran could target.[14] Iran has previously attacked US bases in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, and the Houthis have previously targeted al Dhafra Airbase in Abu Dhabi, which hosts US and French personnel.[15]

Hezbollah may be using networks abroad to help it reconstitute its military capabilities in Lebanon. Spanish security forces detained three individuals residing in Barcelona, Spain, on April 1 on suspicion of purchasing drone components on behalf of Hezbollah.[16] Hezbollah has probably long used its international networks to procure some weapons and drone components, though it could decide to prioritize these efforts after the collapse of Assad and the setbacks caused by Israel.[17]

These individuals are likely part of a larger, Spain-based Hezbollah cell that has been procuring drone parts through European front companies for Hezbollah since at least 2015.[18] Spanish media reported that the three individuals arrested on April 1 resided on the same street as another group of Hezbollah-affiliated individuals that Spanish police detained in 2024 for producing over 1,000 drones for Hezbollah.[19] Spanish media noted that the investigation that led to the arrest of the three individuals on April 1 has also led to the arrests of an unspecified number of individuals in France and the United Kingdom.[20]

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and interim government appear to be reaching a series of agreements to redistribute territory after signing a comprehensive ceasefire on March 10.[21] The SDF agreed to withdraw from two historically Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo City on April 1.[22] An interim government official said that the withdrawal agreement is the first step toward the comprehensive agreement between the SDF and interim government.[23] Local sources subsequently reported that the SDF withdrew from the Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge on April 2, where they have fought the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) since December 2024.[24] An anti-SDF source also claimed that the SDF would withdraw from Deir Hafer, Nasiriyah, and Maskanah south of the dam along Highway 4 after leaving Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge.[25] Syrian sources, including those close to the interim government, claimed that the SDF’s withdrawal was the result of “a preliminary agreement” to create a demilitarized zone around frequent engagement sites.[26] A “special administration,” possibly consisting of dam employees, will be in control of the Tishreen Dam area.[27] Dam employees were allowed to remain in the area to permit the electrical plant to continue its regular functions during the last ceasefire agreement between the SDF and the SNA in December 2024.[28] Syrian Kurdish sources have refuted the reports that the SDF withdrew from its positions on the western bank of the Euphrates River.[29] Official SDF and interim government sources have not commented on the rumored SDF withdrawal or agreement at the time of this writing.

Key Takeaways:

Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran continued to threaten US bases and forces, likely to try to discourage a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid US threats to strike these facilities. Iranian media said that Iran could attack Diego Garcia using very long-range one-way attack drones or by using a naval surface combatant to launch drones and cruise missiles.

Iran continued to threaten US bases and forces, likely to try to discourage a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid US threats to strike these facilities. Iranian media said that Iran could attack Diego Garcia using very long-range one-way attack drones or by using a naval surface combatant to launch drones and cruise missiles. Hezbollah Reconstitution: Hezbollah may be using networks abroad to help it reconstitute its military capabilities in Lebanon. Spanish security forces detained three individuals residing in Barcelona, Spain, on April 1 on suspicion of purchasing drone components on behalf of Hezbollah. These individuals are likely part of a larger, Spain-based Hezbollah cell that has been procuring drone parts through European front companies for Hezbollah since at least 2015.

Hezbollah may be using networks abroad to help it reconstitute its military capabilities in Lebanon. Spanish security forces detained three individuals residing in Barcelona, Spain, on April 1 on suspicion of purchasing drone components on behalf of Hezbollah. These individuals are likely part of a larger, Spain-based Hezbollah cell that has been procuring drone parts through European front companies for Hezbollah since at least 2015. SDF-Syrian Interim Government Agreement: The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and interim government appear to be reaching a series of agreements to redistribute territory after signing a comprehensive ceasefire on March 10.

Syria

The Syrian interim government is attempting to address local concerns amid continued murders and violence committed by government-backed forces. Two interim Syrian government soldiers assassinated the mukhtar, or village head, of Harf al Benmira and five other men present in his home on March 31.[30] The local Syrian security force commander reported that the perpetrators were from a police unit in the al Dinsa area of Tartous and that the perpetrators had been arrested on March 31.[31] The interim government removed all those associated with the violence in Harf al Benmira from al Dinsa on March 31.[32] The group based in al Dinsa was also reportedly firing their weapons into the air and the sea, which caused fear among local residents and a breakdown in relations between the residents and local security forces.[33] The Syrian Civil Peace Commitee, which Syrian President Ahmed al Shara created after the spate of sectarian violence on the Syrian coast in early March, visited Harf al Benmira to update the community on the government‘s efforts to seek justice.[34] Committee member Dr. Anas Ayrouth, who Shara recently appointed to the Supreme Fatwa Council, told the community that the assailants have been “referred to the judiciary.”[35] Ayrouth’s statement is a positive step, but it will need to be backed by public, transparent trials that demonstrate to the local population that suspects are being held accountable.

Israel reneged on its promise on April 2 to provide Israeli work visas to Syrian Druze agricultural workers.[36] Israel previously announced it would provide work visas to “dozens“ of Syrian Druze to work on various agricultural and construction projects in the Golan Heights.[37] Israel has increased diplomatic outreach to the Druze community in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime, such as by facilitating the visit of clerics from Syria to a religious shrine in the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights.[38] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz directed the IDF on March 3 to ”prepare to defend the Druze community” in response to fighting in Syria.[39] The Druze community is highly diverse, and loyalty to a particular leader within the community varies across Israel, Lebanon, and Syria.[40]

Syrian General Security forces arrested two former Assad regime members who attempted to carry out an attack on a security checkpoint in Bustan al Dour, Damascus City.[41] Syrian security forces seized at least two handguns, several grenades, and forged military IDs from the two attackers.[42] A Syrian source reported that the two individuals were former members of the ”National Defense Forces” and another Baathist anti-Israel militia.[43] The ”National Defense Forces” was a Baathist paramilitary organization trained by Iran and Hezbollah that functionally became part of the Assad regime in 2014.[44]

Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society

Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent

A Syrian Kurd militant attacked an Assyrian festival with an axe in Duhok City on April 1, injuring at least two people.[45] A video of the militant’s arrest shows that the militant shouted ”dawlat al Islam’ (state of Islam), which is distinct from al Dawliya al Islamiya (the Islamic State, or ISIS).[46] A security source told Kurdish media on April 1 that the preliminary investigation indicated that the militant belongs to an unidentified armed group.[47] The militant may have been inspired by ISIS or another armed Salafi jihadi group. An organized group would very likely use small arms or a suicide bomb in an attack of this kind.

Turkey continued to target Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) positions in Duhok Province, Iraqi Kurdistan, on April 1 and 2.[48] Kurdish media reported on April 1 that Turkish forces clashed with PKK fighters near Matin Mountain, Amedi district.[49] The Turkish military reportedly shelled PKK positions near Miwin Valley on April 2.[50]

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas

Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen

Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 22 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff on April 1.[51] CENTCOM conducted at least four airstrikes in two separate sorties targeting reported Houthi training facilities east of Mansuriyah District, Hudaydah Governorate.[52] CENTCOM also targeted Houthi sites near Hudaydah Port, including Kamaran Island, for the second consecutive day.[53] A Yemeni journalist circulated a Houthi directive on X, warning civilians in Houthi areas not to document or share information on US airstrikes.[54]

The Houthis conducted three combined cruise missile and drone attacks targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier and US destroyers in the Red Sea between March 31 and April 1.[55] The attack did not succeed, and CENTCOM did not acknowledge the attacks. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) separately reported that vessels in the Red Sea experienced global positioning system (GPS) interference for several hours on April 2.[56] USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group also departed Guam on March 28 and is set to replace the USS Harry S. Truman in the Red Sea in the next two weeks.[57]

Houthi spokesperson Mohammad Abdulsalam reportedly visited an unspecified location in Saudi Arabia in the final days of Ramadan at the end of March 2025, according to an unspecified source speaking to a Yemeni human rights activist.[58] CTP-ISW cannot confirm this report.

The United States sanctioned four Russian-based individuals, one Turkey-based individual, and four Russian entities for facilitating arms procurement for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force-backed Houthi financier Said al Jamal’s network on April 2.[59] The Russia-based Afghan brothers Hushang Ghairat and Sohrab Ghairat procured weapons and diverted stolen Ukrainian grain from Crimea to Yemen in 2024 aboard a vessel from a Hong Kong-based shipping company. Two of the sanctioned individuals are the captains of this vessel, Russian nationals Vyacheslav Vladimirovich Vidanov and Vladimirovich Belyakov. The United States also sanctioned Sohrab’s three Russia-based companies, namely LLC Sky Frame, LLC Edison, and LLC Kolibri Group, and a Turkey-based Iranian national for laundering American dollars and facilitating payments worth millions of dollars for Jamal. The United States sanctioned Jamal in June 2021 for arms procurement for the Houthis and sanctioned his associate, Houthi operative Khaled Hussein Saleh Gaber, in March 2025.[60]

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip

Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon

Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran’s nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas’ military organization and severed the group’s ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

The Iranian rial appreciated from 1,035,000 rials to one US dollar on April 1 to 1,029,000 rials to one US dollar on April 2.[61]

The Iranian Defense Ministry showcased new missile, drone, and air defense systems at the Latin America Aerospace and Defense (LAAD) 2025 exhibition in Sao Paulo, Brazil, on April 2.[62] This marked Iran’s first participation in the event, joining 41 countries.[63] Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh also attended the exhibition.[64] Iran showcased systems across multiple defense sectors, including cruise missiles, drones, air defense systems, and short-range ballistic missiles.[65] Iran’s participation aligns with its broader aim to increase defense export revenue amid worsening economic conditions.[66] Iran’s military exports were 276 percent higher between 2019 and 2023 compared to the period between 2014 and 2018.[67] Senior Iranian officials, including Armed Force General Staff Chief Major General Bagheri, have repeatedly stated that Iran aims to export military capabilities to ”friendly” countries.[68] Iran’s push for military exports comes as the United States steps up its ”maximum pressure” sanctions, including new efforts to target Iranian oil revenues.[69]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

[1] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/735701/

[2] https://www.twz.com/air/signs-u-s-massing-b-2-spirit-bombers-in-diego-garcia

[3] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/735701/

[4] https://installations.militaryonesource.mil/in-depth-overview/navy-support-facility-diego-garcia#:~:text=Active%20duty%20military%20and%20DOD,2%2C000%20DoD%20civilians%20and%20contractors.

[5] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/735701/

[6] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/tehran-unveils-new-drone-missile-claims-israel-deterred-by-its-power/ ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/31/3162266/ ; https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/1961089

[7] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-tries-to-calibrate-response-against-israel-after-deadly-bombing-abb38b57

[8] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/as-israel-waits-for-a-2nd-attack-what-are-irans-missile-and-drone-capabilities/

[9] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/735701/

[10] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-consequences-of-the-idf-strikes-into-iran

[11] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/735701/

[12] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/12/06/3264097 ; https://farsnews dot ir/Rahgozar_b/1743156850902814441/Iran-Parliament-Speaker%3A-Palestine-Litmus-Test-for-West’s-Double-Standards

[13] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-sends-warplanes-ships-to-the-middle-east-in-warning-to-iran-f72fcaff?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos3

[14] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/11/3283869

[15] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/gulf-of-aden-security-review/gulf-of-aden-security-review-january-24-2022

[16] es.euronews dot com/my-europe/2025/04/01/tres-detenidos-en-una-operacion-antiterrorista-contra-una-celula-de-hezbola-en-barcelona ; elpais dot com/espana/catalunya/2025-04-01/la-guardia-civil-pone-en-marcha-una-operacion-contra-el-terrorismo-yihadista-en-el-centro-de-barcelona.html

[17] https://www.npr dot org/2025/03/28/nx-s1-5343466/israel-strike-beirut-lebanon-hezbollah

[18] elespanol dot com/espana/20250401/guardia-civil-lanza-nueva-operacion-antiterrorista-celula-envio-drones-hezbola-espana/935656535_0.html

[19] elpais dot com/espana/catalunya/2025-04-01/la-guardia-civil-pone-en-marcha-una-operacion-contra-el-terrorismo-yihadista-en-el-centro-de-barcelona.html ; elespanol dot com/espana/20250401/guardia-civil-lanza-nueva-operacion-antiterrorista-celula-envio-drones-hezbola-espana/935656535_0.html

[20] elpais dot com/espana/catalunya/2025-04-01/la-guardia-civil-pone-en-marcha-una-operacion-contra-el-terrorismo-yihadista-en-el-centro-de-barcelona.html

[21] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/593

[22] https://t.me/syrianmoi/23714

[23] https://t.me/AleppoGov1/3621 ; https://t.me/syrianmoi/23714

[24] https://x.com/AbomosaabSharke/status/1907472677264306471 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/140068 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1907421378132738505 ; https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1907415829244715417 ; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/54161

[25] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/140066

[26] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/54165 ; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1907487903376150982

[27] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/54165

[28] https://t.me/Dawn_of_Freedom1/271 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-12-2024

[29] https://x.com/RojavaNetwork/status/1907476298190000501 ; https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1907449170941612516

[30] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1906661783152038103 ; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1906768620476322221 ; [GRAPHIC] https://x.com/Sy_intelligence/status/1906695118494589396 ; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/54125

[31] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1906768620476322221 ; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1907195374655451191

[32] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1907195374655451191

[33] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1907195374655451191

[34] https://t.me/TartusGov1/2472 ; https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1898804550104211705

[35] https://t.me/TartusGov1/2472 ; https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/655

[36] https://www.kan.org dot il/content/kan-news/defense/878377/

[37] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/katz-says-israel-will-soon-allow-syrian-druze-to-work-in-the-golan-heights/

[38] https://apnews.com/article/syria-israel-druze-golan-heights-tarif-assad-fall-hts-2000a5fdc1d53a1df2dccd404b6cf140

[39] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-3-2025

[40] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-3-2025

[41] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1907482636164923652

[42] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1907482636164923652

[43] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1907485171265262061

[44] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/syria-update-fall-al-qusayr ; https://www.iswresearch.org/2015/05/the-regime-military-capabilities-part-1.html

[45] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D9%80%D9%80%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%88-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A9 ; https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/status/1907151896563065330

[46] https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/status/1907151896563065330

[47] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D9%80%D9%80%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%88-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A9

[48] https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/status/1907189831899443648 ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D9%80%D9%80%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AF%D9%87%D9%88%D9%83 ; https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1195341

[49] https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/status/1907189831899443648

[50] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D9%80%D9%80%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AF%D9%87%D9%88%D9%83 ; https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1195341

[51] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907203702185713977 ;

https://x.com/Alhadath_Ymn/status/1907161263534207037 ;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907161808882085942 ;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907166031484977472 ;

https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1907171915774747084;

https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1907172029540774155;

https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1907177897820836303;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907184563715178773;

https://x.com/Alhadath_Ymn/status/1907187033098879484;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907408945951428755

[52] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907203702185713977 ;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907408945951428755 ; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907408945951428755

[53] https://x.com/Alhadath_Ymn/status/1907161263534207037;

https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1907171915774747084; https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1907149741986598917

[54] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1907485671855395010

[55] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1907194249663127780

[56] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1907361793543991703

[57] https://news.usni.org/2025/03/28/uss-carl-vinson-departs-guam-for-middle-east-tasking

[58] https://x.com/AlmuthannaSaif/status/1907143963858846205

[59] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0068

[60] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0068,https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0221,https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0041

[61] bon-bast.com

[62] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/13/3284410

[63] https://laadexpo dot com.br/defence/en/ ;

https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/13/3284410

[64] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6423230

[65] https://x.com/IRIran_Military/status/1907176122015772949

[66] https://www.wsj.com/world/irans-rise-as-global-arms-supplier-vexes-u-s-and-its-allies-6f205083 ;

https://www.iranintl.com/en/202407248345 ; https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/1875433 ;

https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-sends-russia-hundreds-ballistic-missiles-sources-say-2024-02-21/

[67] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85543801 ;

https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/fs_2403_at_2023.pdf (P.2)

[68] https://www.foxnews.com/world/iran-prepared-wholesale-export-weapons-allies-top-general-says ;

https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/215319 ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/592742

[69] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-04-02/bessent-pushes-banks-for-help-enforcing-maximum-pressure-on-iran

Iran Update, April 15, 2025

Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Siddhant Kishore, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, and Annika Ganzeveld

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei may calculate that engaging in nuclear negotiations with the United States is the best option for preserving the Iranian regime’s stability. Khamenei discussed the United States-Iran nuclear talks and economic priorities during a meeting with senior Iranian government officials on April 15.[1] Khamenei called for mitigating the impact of international sanctions on the Iranian economy while simultaneously expressing support for nuclear talks with the United States. Khamenei’s main priority is preserving the Iranian regime. The New York Times reported on April 11 that President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf convinced Khamenei to approve nuclear talks with the United States to avoid a potential “two-front war” against both external military threats and internal unrest.[2] Khamenei may calculate that engaging in nuclear negotiations with the United States will improve Iranian economic conditions and prevent a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Senior Iranian officials have recently expressed concern that Iran’s worsening economic conditions could cause internal unrest.[3] Khamenei would likely be skeptical of any agreement that Iran signs with the Trump administration, however, given that US President Donald Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018. Khamenei stated that Iran must “proceed carefully” in the negotiations with the United States and emphasized Iran’s distrust toward the United States during the meeting with government officials.

Khamenei also likely seeks to manage domestic expectations about the possibility of Iran reaching a nuclear agreement with the United States. Khamenei cautioned against both “excessive optimism and pessimism” and stressed that Iran’s progress must continue “independently of the negotiations” during his meeting with government officials.[4] Khamenei’s cautious position may seek to protect the regime from internal backlash if the talks fail or produce only limited economic benefits.

US President Donald Trump discussed the ongoing nuclear talks with Iran with senior US foreign policy and national security officials on April 15.[5] The United States and Iran began nuclear talks in Muscat, Oman, on April 12.[6] Axios reported on April 15 that there is “intense debate” in the administration about the trajectory of the talks and potential US compromises. Unspecified individuals briefed on the talks told the Wall Street Journal on April 14 that the Trump administration intends to discuss Iran’s support for the Axis of Resistance with Iran but that “the topic didn’t come up for discussion” on April 12.[7] Iranian sources previously stated that Trump’s March 5 letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei included demands that Iran curtail its support for the Axis of Resistance.[8] Iran and the Axis of Resistance have conducted an information operation targeting the West in recent weeks that seeks to obfuscate Iran’s role in leading the Axis of Resistance.[9] This campaign likely seeks to set conditions for Iran to argue during negotiations that it has already distanced itself from the Axis of Resistance. This informational campaign is part of a long-running Iranian campaign that seeks to obfuscate Iran’s support for its proxies and absolve Iran of responsibility for its proxies’ actions. Iran and the United States are scheduled to hold a second round of talks in Muscat, Oman, on April 19.[10]

US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff stated in an interview on April 14 that Iran “do[es] not need” to enrich uranium past 3.67 percent.[11] Witkoff later posted on X (Twitter) on April 15 that any nuclear deal with Iran must “stop and eliminate” the Iranian nuclear enrichment program.[12] Unspecified Iranian officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 12 that Iran would be willing to reduce its uranium enrichment to 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) levels.[13] The JCPOA limited Iranian uranium enrichment to 300 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride enriched up to 3.67 percent for fifteen years.[14] Iran currently has 274.8 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium, which is enough uranium, if enriched further, to produce around six nuclear weapons.[15]

Witkoff stated on April 14 that nuclear negotiations with Iran would also focus on ensuring “verification on weaponization,” which includes monitoring the kinds of missiles that Iran has.[16] United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA in 2015, stipulated that Iran cannot undertake “any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons…until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day.”[17] The missile restrictions in UNSC Resolution 2231 expired in October 2023. Iranian officials have repeatedly stressed in recent weeks that Iran is unwilling to negotiate on the Iranian drone and missile programs.[18] Iran is unlikely to agree to curtail its missile program because doing so would cause it to lose one of its primary deterrent powers and means with which it seeks to achieve its strategic objectives. Iran uses its ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones to pressure its adversaries and increase its military influence in the region.[19]

The Eighth Brigade announced on April 13 that it would dissolve itself and surrender its weapons to the Syrian transitional government amid government pressure on the group. Eighth Brigade spokesperson Muhammad al Hourani announced the group’s “complete” dissolution and readiness to hand over all “human and military resources” to the Syrian MoD.[20] The Eighth Brigade, which is based in southeastern Daraa and led by Ahmed al Awda, is comprised of former opposition fighters who reconciled with the Assad regime. The militia has operated as an independent organization in recent weeks despite nominally integrating into the General Security Services (GSS) since February 2025.[21] The transitional government deployed significant forces to Busra al Sham after Eighth Brigade members in the Busra al Sham GSS shot an MoD official on April 10.[22] The transitional government negotiated the handover of the Eighth Brigade members who had committed the attack and pressured the Eighth Brigade to dissolve during these negotiations.[23] Eighth Brigade Commander Ahmed al Awda has not publicly confirmed the group’s dissolution, but it is unlikely that Hourani would announce the Eighth Brigade’s dissolution without Awda’s approval. The government assumed control over all former Eighth Brigade positions in Busra al Sham and confiscated the group’s remaining military equipment and assets in the city and surrounding countryside.[24] GSS members called on all residents in the area to hand in their weapons at GSS checkpoints.[25]

The transitional government appears to be trying to reduce the Eighth Brigade’s influence over security in southeastern Daraa. Senior Daraa provincial and security officials discussed on April 12 opening a new GSS center in Busra al Sham that would be led by reliable GSS members from outside of the area.[26] The GSS appears to recruit local fighters, which enabled the Eighth Brigade to effectively reflag themselves as a GSS unit and continue to control the southeastern Daraa countryside. Deploying non-local GSS members to Busra al Sham could reduce the Eighth Brigade’s influence in the area and serve as a model for integrating other militias into Syrian security services.

Iran is reportedly cooperating with Sunni extremist groups in Syria, including ISIS, following the collapse of its networks in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime.[27] Unspecified European and regional security officials cited by the Washington Post on April 12 claimed that Iran has reached out to Sunni extremist groups to try to destabilize the Syrian transitional government and facilitate smuggling.[28] The sources did not specify how Iran is working with extremist groups to try to destabilize the transitional government. Iran has previously cooperated with other Sunni extremist groups, including al Qaeda, to pursue various regional objectives.[29] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran is attempting to inflame sectarian tensions in Syria, likely to try to destabilize the Syrian transitional government and thereby re-entrench itself in Syria.[30] Several Sunni extremist groups have formed in western Syria since the fall of the Assad regime and the transitional government has fought a counterinsurgency campaign in the areas where these groups operate since early March 2025.[31] There is currently no evidence that these groups have any connections to Iran, but Iran could seek to work with these groups to try to advance its strategic objectives in Syria.

There appear to be emerging localized formations in Hasakah Province, northeastern Syria, that seek to undermine the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). A group called the Free Hasakah Forces released a statement on April 14 urging Arab tribal leaders to distance themselves from the SDF.[32] The group threatened to assassinate four tribal leaders who they claim have cooperated with the SDF and urged others to defect from the SDF. This group’s statement closely mirrors a recent statement from another anti-SDF group called the Ahrar al Jazeera Brigade.[33] The Ahrar al Jazeera Brigade claimed that it assassinated an alleged SDF informant in Qamishli, Hasakah Province, on April 13.[34] Both groups included the Syrian revolutionary flag in their statements, which suggests that the groups likely do not oppose the Syrian transitional government. The SDF has historically relied on support from Arab tribal networks to maintain its presence in areas under its control and to conduct anti-ISIS operations.[35] Continued threats against pro-SDF tribal leaders in Hasakah Province could cause these leaders to reduce support for the SDF, which would in turn likely undermine SDF influence in the area.

Anti-Houthi Yemeni factions are reportedly planning a ground offensive against the Houthis to recapture the western coast of Yemen, including Hudaydah Port, according to US and Yemeni officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal.[36] A successful ground operation against the Houthis would require some degree of political and military coordination among the fragmented anti-Houthi Yemeni factions. National Resistance Front (NRF) leader and Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Vice President Tariq Saleh met with the Yemeni Defense Ministry operations chief on April 14 in Mokha to discuss cooperation among anti-Houthi factions.[37] Saleh has argued that “military action [is] the only way to end the threat” posed by the Houthis, according to the Wall Street Journal.[38] The NRF controls territory in southwestern Yemen near Mokha and would, therefore, likely be involved in an offensive on Hudaydah Governorate.[39] The Joint Forces on the West Coast, which is a militia that supports the internationally-recognized Yemeni government, stated that the Joint Forces on the West Coast is ready to “liberate Hudaydah and all areas [under] Houthi control – with or without American involvement.”[40] The Joint Forces on the West Coast is backed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and includes around 40,000 fighters from the Guards of the Republic, the Southern Giants Brigades, and the Tihama Resistance.[41]

The UAE, which provides financial and military support to anti-Houthi Yemeni factions, has discussed the ground campaign plan with US officials in recent weeks, according to the US and Yemeni officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal.[42] The US officials noted that the United States has not decided whether it would support a ground offensive against the Houthis. Unspecified Saudi officials have stated that Saudi Arabia would not get involved in a ground offensive because the Saudi government is concerned that participating in such a military operation would cause the Houthis to resume drone and missile attacks targeting Saudi territory.[43] The Joint Forces on the West Coast spokesperson told the Wall Street Journal that a ground campaign against the Houthis would require the support of the internationally-recognized Yemeni government and the Saudi-Emirati military coalition.[44]

The US and Yemeni officials stated that US private security contractors have been advising Yemeni factions on a potential ground offensive.[45] Private security contractors have previously worked alongside the Yemeni Armed Forces and UAE-backed anti-Houthi militias in Yemen.[46]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 27 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on April 14.[47] CENTCOM conducted at least seven airstrikes targeting reported Houthi barracks and weapons depots on Kamaran Island, Hudaydah Governorate. These airstrikes mark the ninth time that CENTCOM has targeted Houthi infrastructure on Kamaran Island since the start of the CENTCOM airstrike campaign on March 15.[48]

CENTCOM has continued to target Houthi military bases near the al Jawf Junction that connects Houthi supply lines from Sanaa City to the Houthis’ eastern front in Marib and al Jawf governorates.[49] Many of these bases, including the Mass Military Base, were previously Yemeni Armed Forces bases before the Houthis occupied western Marib and al Jawf governorates in 2020.[50] These bases include Houthi underground facilities, weapons depots, missile and drone launch sites, and command and control centers, according to an independent Yemeni defense outlet.[51] The outlet reported on April 15 that the Houthis control the Nihm and Heelan mountain ranges in the area, which is where the Salb Gold Extraction Company is based. This company is an important source of income for the Houthis.[52] The outlet added that the Houthis have recently moved heavy weapons, including tanks, artillery, and military equipment, to its eastern front.[53]

US forces will reportedly begin withdrawing from Syria by mid-June 2025, according to Israeli media.[54] The Trump administration ordered the US Defense Department to begin preparing plans for the withdrawal of US service members from Syria in early February 2025.[55] CTP-ISW previously assessed that ISIS could resurge in Syria in 12 to 24 months without a US presence there.[56] US Central Command warned in July 2024 that ISIS is trying to reconstitute.[57] A US withdrawal would severely undermine the counter-ISIS mission in Iraq and Syria and would create a vacuum that ISIS could exploit to reconstitute.[58]

Jordanian authorities arrested 16 individuals linked to the Muslim Brotherhood on April 15 for planning rocket and drone attacks in Jordan.[59] Jordanian authorities said that the Muslim Brotherhood trained and financed some of the individuals in Lebanon. Jordanian security services located dozens of rockets at a rocket manufacturing facility and a drone factory on the outskirts of Amman. The suspects had manufactured rockets with a three-to-five-kilometer range to strike Jordanian targets and had enough material to produce 300 rockets.[60] There is currently no evidence that links Iran or Iranian-backed actors to this incident. The incident is notable given that Iran has recently placed greater importance on Jordan in its regional strategy, however.[61] Israeli and Jordanian police thwarted multiple Iranian-led attempts to smuggle small arms and other weapons to the West Bank via Jordan in 2024.[62] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could seek to invest further in building networks in Jordan to develop Iranian-backed militia infrastructure in the West Bank. A prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia separately claimed in April 2024 that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, planned to “equip” 12,000 “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” fighters with weapons.[63]

Key Takeaways:

Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei may calculate that engaging in nuclear negotiations with the United States is the best option for preserving the Iranian regime’s stability. Khamenei’s main priority is preserving the Iranian regime. Khamenei may calculate that engaging in nuclear negotiations with the United States will improve Iranian economic conditions and prevent a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei may calculate that engaging in nuclear negotiations with the United States is the best option for preserving the Iranian regime’s stability. Khamenei’s main priority is preserving the Iranian regime. Khamenei may calculate that engaging in nuclear negotiations with the United States will improve Iranian economic conditions and prevent a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: US President Donald Trump discussed the ongoing nuclear talks with Iran with senior US foreign policy and national security officials on April 15. Unspecified individuals briefed on the talks told the Wall Street Journal on April 14 that the Trump administration intends to discuss Iran’s support for the Axis of Resistance with Iran but that “the topic didn’t come up for discussion” on April 12. Iranian sources previously stated that Trump’s March 5 letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei included demands that Iran curtail its support for the Axis of Resistance. Iran and the Axis of Resistance have conducted an information operation targeting the West in recent weeks that seeks to obfuscate Iran’s role in leading the Axis of Resistance.

US President Donald Trump discussed the ongoing nuclear talks with Iran with senior US foreign policy and national security officials on April 15. Unspecified individuals briefed on the talks told the Wall Street Journal on April 14 that the Trump administration intends to discuss Iran’s support for the Axis of Resistance with Iran but that “the topic didn’t come up for discussion” on April 12. Iranian sources previously stated that Trump’s March 5 letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei included demands that Iran curtail its support for the Axis of Resistance. Iran and the Axis of Resistance have conducted an information operation targeting the West in recent weeks that seeks to obfuscate Iran’s role in leading the Axis of Resistance. Syrian Militia Integration: The Eighth Brigade announced on April 13 that it will dissolve itself and surrender its weapons to the Syrian transitional government amid government pressure on the group. The transitional government appears to be trying to reduce the Eighth Brigade’s influence over security in southeastern Daraa.

The Eighth Brigade announced on April 13 that it will dissolve itself and surrender its weapons to the Syrian transitional government amid government pressure on the group. The transitional government appears to be trying to reduce the Eighth Brigade’s influence over security in southeastern Daraa. Iranian Efforts in Syria: Iran is reportedly cooperating with Sunni extremist groups in Syria, including ISIS, following the collapse of its networks in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran is attempting to inflame sectarian tensions in Syria, likely to try to destabilize the Syrian transitional government and thereby re-entrench itself in Syria. Several Sunni extremist groups have formed in western Syria since the fall of the Assad regime and the transitional government has fought a counterinsurgency campaign in the areas where these groups operate since early March 2025. There is currently no evidence that these groups have any connections to Iran, but Iran could seek to work with these groups try to advance its strategic objectives in Syria.

Iran is reportedly cooperating with Sunni extremist groups in Syria, including ISIS, following the collapse of its networks in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran is attempting to inflame sectarian tensions in Syria, likely to try to destabilize the Syrian transitional government and thereby re-entrench itself in Syria. Several Sunni extremist groups have formed in western Syria since the fall of the Assad regime and the transitional government has fought a counterinsurgency campaign in the areas where these groups operate since early March 2025. There is currently no evidence that these groups have any connections to Iran, but Iran could seek to work with these groups try to advance its strategic objectives in Syria. Potential Ground Offensive Against the Houthis: Anti-Houthi Yemeni factions are reportedly planning a ground offensive against the Houthis to recapture the western coast of Yemen, including Hudaydah Port, according to US and Yemeni officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal. A successful ground operation against the Houthis would require some degree of political and military coordination among the fragmented anti-Houthi Yemeni factions. The Joint Forces on the West Coast spokesperson told the Wall Street Journal that a ground campaign against the Houthis would require the support of the internationally-recognized Yemeni government and the Saudi-Emirati military coalition.[64]

Anti-Houthi Yemeni factions are reportedly planning a ground offensive against the Houthis to recapture the western coast of Yemen, including Hudaydah Port, according to US and Yemeni officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal. A successful ground operation against the Houthis would require some degree of political and military coordination among the fragmented anti-Houthi Yemeni factions. The Joint Forces on the West Coast spokesperson told the Wall Street Journal that a ground campaign against the Houthis would require the support of the internationally-recognized Yemeni government and the Saudi-Emirati military coalition.[64] Potential US Military Withdrawal from the Middle East: US forces will reportedly begin withdrawing from Syria by mid-June 2025, according to Israeli media. The Trump administration ordered the US Defense Department to begin preparing plans for the withdrawal of US service members from Syria in early February 2025. CTP-ISW previously assessed that ISIS could resurge in Syria in 12 to 24 months without a US presence there.

US forces will reportedly begin withdrawing from Syria by mid-June 2025, according to Israeli media. The Trump administration ordered the US Defense Department to begin preparing plans for the withdrawal of US service members from Syria in early February 2025. CTP-ISW previously assessed that ISIS could resurge in Syria in 12 to 24 months without a US presence there. Jordan Attack Plot: Jordanian authorities arrested 16 individuals linked to the Muslim Brotherhood on April 15 for planning rocket and drone attacks in Jordan. There is currently no evidence that links Iran or Iranian-backed actors to this incident. The incident is notable given that Iran has recently placed greater importance on Jordan in its regional strategy, however.

Syria

A Daraa resident attempted to conduct a suicide attack targeting an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) checkpoint in al Rafeed, Quneitra Province, on April 15.[65] The attacker reportedly used grenades in the attempted attack.[66] Using grenades to conduct a suicide attack is more rudimentary than using a suicide vest (SVEST) that has explosive materials connected to a detonator.[67] The attacker reportedly fled from the checkpoint unharmed after the IDF opened fired at him.[68]

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara met with Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad al Thani during a visit to Doha on April 15.[69] Thani personally welcomed Shara and his delegation at the international airport in Doha, a notable gesture of diplomatic support.[70] Qatar was the first Arab country to recognize the new Syrian government after it reopened its embassy in Damascus in December 2024.[71] Thani was the first foreign leader to visit Syria after the fall of the Assad regime.[72]

Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society

Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent

Multiple Iraqi parliamentarians affiliated with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias urged the Iraqi federal government on April 15 to investigate several Sunni groups in Kirkuk and Ninewa provinces for their alleged ties to Turkey.[73] A member of Asaib Ahl al Haq’s Sadiqoun bloc called for the Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee to investigate the Ninewa Guards and Kirkuk Shield Forces.[74] A Badr Organization parliamentarian separately urged the Iraqi Defense Ministry to “vet” these groups and hold accountable any forces that do not operate under the Iraqi federal government.[75] Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali claimed on April 1 that Turkey equips the Ninewa Guards and Kirkuk Shield Forces and that the groups have “infiltrated” the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) 59th Brigade.[76] Former Ninewa Governor Atheel al Nujaifi established the Ninewa Guards in 2014 to fight ISIS.[77] Turkey and the United States helped train the group’s members. The Ninewa Guards integrated into the Mosul-based PMF 59th Brigade in 2017.[78] Asaib Ahl al Haq-controlled media claimed on April 11 that the Ninewa Guards includes former senior Baathist officers and is equipped with “light and medium weapons,” including mortars.[79] Asaib Ahl al Haq-controlled media, citing unspecified documents seized by the Counter Terrorism Service, also reported that Turkey and former Baathist officers train Kirkuk Shield Brigade members.[80] Senior Baathist officers from the Saddam Hussein era are likely elderly now, and it is unclear why Asaib Ahl al Haq is accusing these officers of working with the Ninewa Guards and Kirkuk Shield Forces. Asaib Ahl al Haq-controlled media claimed that Turkey pays the Kirkuk Sheild Brigades hundreds of dollars a month to guard the Turkman Front party’s headquarters in Kirkuk and gather intelligence for Turkey.[81] This report comes as Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have recently expressed concern about Turkish regional influence, particularly after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria.[82]

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas

Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen

Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

See topline section.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip

Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon

Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

See topline section.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran’s nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas’ military organization and severed the group’s ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

The Iranian rial depreciated from 879,000 rials to one US dollar on April 14 to 890,000 rials on April 15.[83]

Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Tajik Defense Minister Lieutenant General Emomali Sobirzoda in Tehran on April 15 to discuss strengthening defense cooperation.[84] The two ministers emphasized the role of organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in addressing regional security threats. Iran has increased defense cooperation with Tajikistan in recent years. Iran opened a drone production facility in Dushanbe in 2022, for example.[85]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

[1] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/28142

[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/11/world/middleeast/us-iran-talks-trump-khamenei.html

[3] https://www.radiofarda.com/a/iran-on-the-new-eve-protests-economy-social-discontent/33320195.html ; https://beta.iranintl.com/fa/202502048174

[4] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/28142

[5] https://www.axios.com/2025/04/15/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-situation-room-meeting

[6] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-us-start-talks-oman-under-shadow-regional-conflict-2025-04-12/

[7] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/yemen-houthis-operation-us-support-975febe6

[8] https://t dot co/m8UiJkokUW ; https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/1903173404624367902 ; https://nournews dot ir/en/news/217575/Decoding-the-White-House’s-Message-to-Iran-A-Real-Change-or-Diplomatic-Deceit

[9] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-9-2025

[10] https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-nuclear-talks-italy-77b07a31957b2cb64bd2c37a9d47dad5

[11] https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/15/politics/us-iran-talks-focus-nuclear-verification-trump-envoy-says-intl/index.html ; https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1911963766972953004

[12] https://x.com/SE_MiddleEast/status/1912141949932298432

[13] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-iran-begin-high-stakes-nuclear-talks-in-oman-fc07cdce

[14] https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/245318.pdf

[15] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-stock-near-bomb-grade-uranium-grows-sharply-iaea-report-shows-2025-02-26/

[16] https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/15/politics/us-iran-talks-focus-nuclear-verification-trump-envoy-says-intl/index.html ; https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1911963766972953004

[17] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n15/225/27/pdf/n1522527.pdf?OpenElement

[18] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/26/3291970 ; https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/28066

[19] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-24-2025-67e1e57f7311a

[20] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1911423095300071586

[21] https://npasyria dot com/208142; https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1910672422803489070; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate021225

[22] https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1910653925889351748 ; https://www.enabbaladi dot net/748594/%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D8%AD%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B0%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%89/

[23] https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1910653925889351748

[24] https://t.me/DaraaGov1/2990; https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1911450079988162813;

https://t.me/Euphrats_post/91232; https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1911756232265785475; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/54998

[25] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1911420492654707190; https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1911732724064223486

[26] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1911045387755925566

[27] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/04/12/syria-iran-hezbollah-weapons-smuggling/

[28] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/04/12/syria-iran-hezbollah-weapons-smuggling/

[29] https://www.brookings.edu/articles/unlikely-alliance-irans-secretive-relationship-with-al-qaeda/

[30] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-30-2024

[31] https://t.me/s/sraia5

[32] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1911762842765676618

[33] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1911762842765676618 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1911459906181353585

[34] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1911459906181353585

[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/anti-isis-coalition-begins-losing-tribal-support-syria ; https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/2020-11/Between%20the%20Coalition%2C%20ISIS%2C%20and%20Assad%20-%20Courting%20the%20Tribes%20of%20Deir%20ez-Zor_1.pdf?

[36] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/yemen-houthis-operation-us-support-975febe6?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

[37] https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1911830967154602319

[38] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/yemen-houthis-operation-us-support-975febe6?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

[39]https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/yemen-houthis-operation-us-support-975febe6?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1 (see map)

[40] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/yemen-houthis-operation-us-support-975febe6?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

[41] https://acleddata.com/yemen-conflict-observatory/actor-profiles/joint-forces-on-the-west-coast/; https://www.moderninsurgent.org/post/yemeni-national-resistance\

[42] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/yemen-houthis-operation-us-support-975febe6?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

[43] https://www.csis.org/analysis/iranian-and-houthi-war-against-saudi-arabia

[44] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/yemen-houthis-operation-us-support-975febe6?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

[45] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/yemen-houthis-operation-us-support-975febe6?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

[46] https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/26/world/middleeast/emirates-secretly-sends-colombian-mercenaries-to-fight-in-yemen.html

[47] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1911825745489338664;

https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1911848574335291658;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1911841549639462929;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1911898942989533311;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1911898942989533311;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1911899278311649737

[48] https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1911848574335291658;

[49] https://www.defenseliney dot com/posts/247; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1911841549639462929 ;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1911898942989533311;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1911899278311649737

[50] https://www.defenseliney dot com/posts/247

[51] https://www.defenseliney dot com/posts/247

[52] https://www.defenseliney dot com/posts/247; https://en.ypagency dot net/158374

[53] https://www.defenseliney dot com/posts/247

[54] https://www dot ynetnews.com/article/byp0bl2rye

[55] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate020525 ; https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/dod-drafting-plans-withdraw-us-troops-syria-recent-trump-comments-rcna190726

[56] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-march-29-2023

[57] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1813332001010630840

[58] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/us-withdrawal-syria-will-reinvigorate-isis-terror-threat

[59] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-foils-plot-involving-rockets-drones-source-says-suspects-linked-hamas-2025-04-15/

[60] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-foils-plot-involving-rockets-drones-source-says-suspects-linked-hamas-2025-04-15/ ; https://x.com/ndawsari/status/1912187743460872420?s=46&t=EGYcIyXosW6lVJmixq2r5Q

[61] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-28-2024

[62] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/CTC-SENTINEL-072023.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-2-2024; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-foils-arms-plot-kingdom-caught-iran-israel-shadow-war-2024-05-15/

[63] https://t.me/abualaskary/118

[64] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/yemen-houthis-operation-us-support-975febe6?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

[65] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1912172696277778546

[66] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1912172696277778546

[67] https://info.publicintelligence.net/FBI-TEDAC-SuicideVests.pdf

[68] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1912172696277778546

[69] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1912099690599833955 ; https://x.com/AJEnglish/status/1912209627753930754

[70] https://www.newarab.com/news/syrias-sharaa-meets-qatari-emir-first-official-visit-doha

[71] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatar-re-open-its-embassy-syria-2024-12-15/

[72] https://www.barrons.com/news/qatari-emir-to-visit-syria-al-jazeera-syrian-embassy-c082a9f1

[73] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%82%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B6-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9—%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1

[74] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%82%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B6-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9—%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1

[75] https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=220457

[76] https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/status/1907015362056450103

[77] https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=220053

[78] https://greydynamics.com/popular-mobilization-forces-exploring-iraqs-armed-entities/ ; https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/285760 ; https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/status/1907015362056450103

[79] https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=220053

[80] https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=220053

[81] https://x.com/ahad_en/status/1911481908271456690 ; https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=220329

[82] https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-turkey-and-future-south-caucasus ; https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-and-turkey-power-dynamics-south-caucasus ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-27-2025 ; https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/04/07/iraqi-militias-considering-to-disarm-ahead-of-us-iran-talks-sources-say/

[83] www.bon-bast.com

[84] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/26/3292217

[85] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/02/28/2712908 ;

https://www.iranintl.com/en/202205175418