Theme

Romania’s 2025 presidential elections reflect the country’s broader shift towards populist nationalism and institutional distrust, with important implications for regional stability and European unity.

Summary

George Simion’s solid performance in the first round of Romania’s presidential election reflects the growing anti-establishment sentiment following the annulled 2024 elections. The country has been experiencing deep political divisions for years, marked by populist nationalism, institutional distrust and foreign interference. Despite Romania’s pro-EU and NATO orientation, disillusionment with mainstream parties has fuelled the far-right’s ascent. Foreign policy has emerged as a contested domain amid US and Russian influence. The outcome will influence not only Romania’s governance and regional stability but also the EU’s eastern cohesion, particularly in Moldova and Poland, as nationalist-populist rhetoric gains traction across Europe during a period of geopolitical uncertainty and democratic fragility.

Analysis

Romania held the first round of its presidential election on Sunday, 4 May 2025, and the results mark a significant moment in the country’s political life. George Simion, leader of the far-right Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), won with 40.69% of the vote. While George Simion’s strong performance in the first round of Romania’s presidential election may come as a shock to many observers, it was, in fact, a foreseeable outcome given the political turbulence following the annulled November 2024 elections and the deep-rooted structural issues facing the country.

The controversy and debates surrounding the Constitutional Court’s decision to annul the previous vote over foreign interference and electoral irregularities significantly undermined public confidence in democratic institutions. This, combined with widespread dissatisfaction over economic stagnation and a perceived disconnection between the political elite and ordinary citizens, created fertile ground for growth in anti-establishment rhetoric. Simion’s nationalist and populist message capitalised on this environment, resonating with voters who feel left behind by Romania’s post-EU accession trajectory and increasingly sceptical of traditional parties and Western alignments.

1. The annulled 2024 election and its ripple effects

The presidential election of November 2024 became a flashpoint for these tensions when, in an unprecedented move, Romania’s Constitutional Court annulled the election results amid serious allegations of foreign interference. The decision did more than create a political crisis, it highlighted the vulnerability of even firmly pro-European states to external manipulation and internal fragmentation.

In what should have been the first round of voting, on 24 November, a relatively obscure ultra-nationalist candidate, Călin Georgescu, surged to the lead with approximately 23% of the vote. His sudden rise was accompanied by intelligence reports indicating a coordinated online disinformation campaign. The implications were serious enough that, just two days before the scheduled run-off, the Constitutional Court intervened and nullified the election results entirely.

Georgescu, a far-right figure with pro-Russian leanings, denied any wrongdoing, as did the Kremlin. Nevertheless, he was barred from standing in the re-run of the election. The annulment ignited mass protests, particularly among Georgescu’s supporters, who viewed the court’s decision as a blow to democratic legitimacy. The controversy also resonated internationally, with figures such as Elon Musk and US Senator J.D. Vance joining Russian officials in condemning the court’s action as a ‘coup’ against the popular will.

In the wake of the annulled presidential election, Romania’s political establishment moved swiftly to contain the crisis and restore a sense of stability. In an effort to stave off further gains by the far-right, Romania’s traditional powerhouses –the Social Democrats (PSD), the National Liberals (PNL) and the ethnic Hungarian UDMR– formed a grand coalition. These longtime rivals united under a new electoral alliance, ‘Romania Forward’, and agreed to back a single presidential candidate: Crin Antonescu, a veteran PNL figure and former Senate President. The decision was a strategic compromise. For the PSD it meant swallowing a bitter pill: the party had failed to reach the presidential run-off for the first time since the fall of communism, and now it had to forgo fielding its own contender.

As the political centre closed ranks, the far-right continued to gain significant momentum. In the parliamentary elections held on 1 December 2024, three ultranationalist and hard-right parties –the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), led by George Simion and backed by Georgescu; SOS Romania; and the Party of Young People– collectively secured around 35% of the seats.

Meanwhile, the pro-European, anti-establishment Save Romania Movement (USR) managed to win just over 12% of the seats, a noticeable drop from the nearly 15% it received in the 2020 elections. The mainstream parties also saw significant losses: the Social Democrats (PSD) received 22.5% of the vote –down 6.4 percentage points from 2020– while the National Liberals (PNL) dropped to 13.6%, a steep decline of 11.6 percentage points. The results underscored a broader erosion of trust in traditional parties, as voters increasingly turned to populist and nationalist alternatives.

With tensions high and the political map redrawn, the stage was set for a high-stakes re-match of the presidential race. In response to mounting concerns over foreign interference, the Romanian government introduced stricter election regulations aimed at curbing malign influence. Yet despite these interventions, the annulment of the 2024 election has left Romanian society deeply polarised. Large street protests and widespread scepticism towards both judicial and political institutions have revealed a nation grappling with distrust on all sides.

The Romanian authorities recently decided to close all overseas polling stations at 9:00pm Bucharest time, aligning them with domestic voting hours. Framed as a measure to protect electoral integrity and prevent last-minute disinformation, the change also ensures exit polls are released only after all votes are cast. The move responds to the annulled 2024 election, where early projections influenced voters abroad, contributing to a surprise run-off result. Critics argued the new rule limits the diaspora’s influence –typically more reformist and anti-establishment– thus favouring mainstream candidates and preserving the political status quo.

2. The deeper forces behind the vote

Eleven candidates qualified for the first round of Romania’s presidential election on 4 May 2025, with four emerging as front-runners by April: Crin Antonescu, Nicușor Dan, Victor Ponta and George Simion (in alphabetical order). George Simion and Nicușor Dan advanced to the run-off, set for 18 May. Leading up to the vote, polling was highly volatile, and on election day, exit pollsters reported a significant number of voters declined to share their choices. This contributed to a gap between pre-election estimates –which placed, for instance, George Simion at around 30%– while the final result had him at over 40%. Still, consistent patterns from earlier polls, surveys and social barometers remain relevant and continue to shape the broader electoral dynamics.

2.1. The roots of anti-establishment nationalism

One of the most visible trends shaping Romanian politics today is the growing anti-establishment sentiment among voters. This is neither new nor unexpected in a country still dealing with the legacy of its authoritarian past. Until 1990, Romania endured an exceptionally repressive communist regime under Nicolae Ceaușescu –one that was not only isolated from the West, but eventually from the rest of the Eastern Bloc as well–. Ceaușescu’s system thrived on fear and distrust, with the Securitate secret police fostering suspicion even among neighbours. Corruption and clientelism were deeply rooted, and with a crumbling economy, survival often depended on informal networks and personal connections. These experiences have left lasting institutional and social scars. Romanians are still navigating the difficult path of building democratic institutions and a culture of transparency, challenges made harder by the lingering distrust and the absence of a stable, shared democratic tradition.

A functioning political debate is essential to Romania’s democratic build-up process, yet it remains one of the least developed features of Romania’s political system. Romanian political parties, generously funded by the state for both operations and campaigns, have had little motivation to build genuine connections with voters. Instead, significant resources have been channelled into shaping media narratives –buying airtime and cultivating ties with sympathetic journalists and commentators– further widening the gap between political elites and the public. At the same time, civil society remains in its early stages of development, with few independent political foundations or think tanks.

Widespread perceptions of corruption and cronyism have left many Romanians seeing today’s political elites as barely different from the old communist leadership. This disillusionment has fuelled support for anti-establishment populist movements that promise –though seldom deliver– the merit-based, prosperous society many hoped for after the 1989 revolution.

Post-communist Romania’s first populist wave, led by the nationalist Greater Romania Party, still supported EU and NATO integration. A more lasting form emerged with Traian Băsescu, who won the 2004 presidency by positioning himself as an anti-corruption outsider fighting a corrupt political elite. In 2012, amid economic hardship, the populist PPDD party gained seats despite lacking a clear ideology beyond anti-elitism. By 2016, populism took a reformist, pro-European turn with the rise of USR, which has since maintained steady electoral success. More recently, a radical nationalist wave has gained ground through parties like AUR, SOS and POT –fuelled by COVID-era discontent– collectively securing over 30% in national (December 2024) and European (June 2024) elections and over 40% in the latest presidential race.

2.2. Extremism rising, but along which lines?

Although Călin Georgescu, the leading far-right candidate in the previous election, was barred from running, he signalled support for George Simion by appearing alongside him at the polls on election day –an implicit endorsement of AUR’s nationalist-populist agenda–. Other candidates also embraced similar messages, including the former Prime Minister Victor Ponta, who campaigned on a left-leaning nationalist platform targeting a different voter base. Rather than fading away, this wave of political extremism is becoming entrenched, shaped by both local dynamics and the influence of Trump-style rhetoric, strategy and populist appeal.

The far-right in Romania draws support from a diverse but frustrated coalition with the way politics have ran the country during the last few decades: young voters, rural and small-town populations and segments of the working-class diaspora. Despite expectations, George Simion –like Georgescu before him– enjoys a strong backing among 18-35 year-old men, especially those disillusioned with mainstream politics and drawn to AUR’s rebellious, patriotic tone. Simion also resonates in rural regions like Western Moldavia and Wallachia, traditional PSD strongholds now marked by poverty and migration, where his populist message finds fertile ground.

George Simion has built a strong support among Romania’s Western European diaspora, especially younger, working-class emigrants in countries like Italy, Spain and the UK. Disillusioned with centrist parties like the USR, which failed to deliver meaningful reforms, many former reformist voters have shifted towards AUR. Simion’s nationalist message and promises to aid returnees resonate deeply, especially as AUR has effectively mobilised diaspora support through targeted social media campaigns. In contrast, USR’s technocratic style and perceived disconnection from everyday struggles have led to a decline in its influence abroad.

Simion appeals strongly to social conservatives and religious voters; although other candidates are Orthodox, his embrace of church-linked rhetoric –emphasising family values and tradition– gives him an advantage among the deeply devout, aside from those still loyal to the PSD’s old guard. His core support tends to be lower-income and less formally educated, though it also includes educated ultranationalists and anti-vaccine sympathisers. During the pandemic and the Ukraine war, Kremlin-aligned narratives gained traction among parts of his base, leading to speculation –alongside Georgescu– that he had Moscow’s backing. Simion has also adopted Trump-style messaging, particularly around religion and anti-LGBT themes, reinforcing his image as Romania’s most prominent pro-Trump figure.

The Former Prime Minister Victor Ponta, another prominent anti-establishment nationalist, appealed to a hybrid electorate, drawing support both from the PSD’s traditional base and from nationalist voters. Positioning himself as a more polished and pragmatic alternative, he embraced slogans like ‘Make Romania Great Again’, offering a softer version of the populist nationalist wave. After Georgescu’s disqualification, some pro-Russia and hard-right voters initially turned to Ponta, though it now appears likely that Simion will reclaim much of that support.

Another influential group fuelling the nationalist-populist wave is the so-called ‘patriotic left’, socially conservative voters who romanticise aspects of the communist era while supporting a stronger state role in the economy, without aligning fully with far-right ideology. They often idealise the perceived stability of the past –guaranteed jobs, affordable housing and national self-sufficiency– while overlooking the authoritarian realities of centralised control and forced economic isolation. In today’s climate of economic uncertainty, such nostalgia is resurging. A recent INSCOOP poll shows that over 56% of respondents favour more state-owned enterprises, while just 38.7% trust private companies to drive growth –sentiments that nationalist populists have been quick to harness–.

With Romania facing a bleak economic outlook –characterised by potential inflation, stagnant wages and ongoing uncertainty–, economic nationalism is poised to remain a dominant theme in the political landscape. The visible shift in US policy towards protecting domestic industries and re-shoring supply chains, seen under both the Trump and Biden Administrations since 2016, has provided Romanian politicians with both a model and a justification for pushing similar measures. Calls for increased state control, support for local industry and restrictions on foreign ownership have gained traction, driven by public frustration and nostalgia for the perceived economic stability of earlier decades. Regardless of who wins the presidency, this strain of economic nationalism is unlikely to fade. This is especially significant since foreign policy issues are expected to become a central focus in the days leading up to the 18 May run-off.

3. Foreign pressure and fog: the unclear fight over Romania’s foreign policy

Until recently, foreign policy played a minimal role in Romania’s election campaigns, with a broad consensus among major parties in favour of NATO, the EU and the country’s pro-Western orientation. Political discourse focused almost entirely on domestic issues like corruption, economic development and social welfare. However, the rise of sovereignist movements in 2024 has shifted the narrative. Some candidates have begun to question elements of Romania’s integration into Western alliances, calling for greater ‘independence’ or even ‘neutrality’. While this does not signal a rejection of NATO or the EU, it marks the emergence of a more contested and complex foreign policy debate.

3.1. Foreign players in Romania’s election

The emerging foreign policy debate in Romania is increasingly shaped by concerns over foreign interference –both from Russia and the US– that played a pivotal role in the annulment of the 2024 presidential elections. While much attention has focused on Russian disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining trust in democratic institutions and promoting extremist candidates, far less scrutiny has been given to the influence –and at times, interference– of the US. Following the annulment of the December 2024 elections, prominent US figures, especially those aligned with Donald Trump, including the US Vice President J.D. Vance amplified narratives framing the decision as a ‘Western coup’.

Tensions were further inflamed by the US Embassy’s increasingly visible role in domestic affairs, which some interpreted as overreach. These concerns peaked when, on the eve of the election, the US government abruptly announced Romania’s exclusion from the Visa Waiver Program –a long-standing goal of Romanian diplomacy–. Coming just 24 hours before the vote, the move was widely seen as a diplomatic snub and a failure of mainstream Romanian politics to maintain a stable and productive relationship with Washington. Together, these developments have fuelled the narrative –championed by nationalist-populist candidates– that Romania needs a more assertive foreign policy. The apparent endorsement of Kremlin-style narratives by the US Administration has disrupted Romania’s internal political discourse, blurring the once-clear distinction between ‘pro-Western’ and ‘anti-Western’ positions.

While the nationalist populist rhetoric was planned to diminish the pro-EU feelings among the public, Romanians remain among the most strongly pro-European and pro-NATO populations in the EU. Eurobarometer data and national surveys consistently reflect this trend. A December 2024 INSCOP survey found that 88.1% of Romanians oppose leaving the EU, with the same percentage against exiting NATO. Trust in NATO stands at nearly 70%, and confidence in the EU at 66.8% –both marking significant increases compared with previous years–. Distrust towards Russia is also widespread: only 5.9% of respondents said they trust Russia, a sharp drop from 18% in January 2022. Meanwhile, trust in the US rose to 59.1%, up from 50% in early 2022, with over 80% of respondents viewing both the US and the EU as having a positive influence on Romania. A March 2025 INSCOP poll confirmed these attitudes, showing continued strong public support for Romania’s Western alliances.

3.2. The better voice beyond the borders

Romania’s deeply rooted Euro-Atlantic orientation means that security concerns are closely intertwined with national identity and political loyalty. Aware of this dynamic, Russian influence operations –particularly around the 2024 elections– have deliberately avoided promoting overtly pro-Russian or explicitly anti-Western narratives, knowing such messages would have little traction among a public that remains strongly pro-EU, pro-NATO and firmly aligned with the Transatlantic alliance, as confirmed by consistent polling.

Even George Simion, despite his nationalist rhetoric, acknowledged these realities. In a recorded message at the end of election day on 4 May, he explicitly stated that he is not anti-NATO or anti-EU –an admission likely driven by the understanding that any suggestion otherwise would cost him votes–. For most Romanians, the threat posed by Russia remains the overriding concern, and any political figure perceived as sympathetic to Moscow risks alienating the majority of the electorate.

Instead of promoting overtly pro-Russian messages, the Kremlin has focused on amplifying sovereignist and anti-establishment narratives that erode trust in Romania’s already weakened institutions. These include stoking socio-economic grievances, attacking EU policies, spreading anti-vaccine misinformation and blaming the political elite for mishandling the COVID-19 crisis. Russia has also exploited dissatisfaction with how Romanian authorities managed the response to the war in Ukraine, capitalising on poor public communication to push claims that the conflict is either exaggerated or that Romania is blindly following Western orders. The goal is not to turn Romanians directly against the West, but to deepen disillusionment with domestic leadership and reinforce the belief that the political elite fails to represent the people –a belief reflected in consistently low trust in national institutions compared with the EU–.

3.3. Foreign policy as the campaign spotlight

As debates over Ukraine, European security and the future of the Transatlantic alliance intensify, Romanian voters are showing heightened interest in foreign policy –no longer the exclusive realm of diplomats but now a visible issue in campaigns and public discourse–. In the lead-up to the annulled December 2024 elections, sovereignist candidates pushed for a stronger nationalist stance within the EU and criticised Romania’s perceived obedience to Brussels, though NATO criticism remained minimal.

George Simion continues to promote a sovereignist foreign policy, warning against Romania being ‘dragged’ into foreign conflicts like the Ukraine war. His alignment with Central and Eastern European nationalist movements was underscored by the presence of Poland’s Jarosław Kaczyński at his campaign launch. Meanwhile, Nicușor Dan affirms Romania’s commitment to NATO and the EU, proposing increased defence spending and expanding the Kogălniceanu air base into a major NATO hub. However, he is a technocrat with limited international exposure who leans on cautious lines delivered by former establishment advisers, which makes for an often standard response without demonstrating deeper knowledge of foreign policy. Simion, by contrast, inherits Georgescu’s vague and Kremlin-aligned platform, which benefits from ambiguity. This demonstrates the reasoning behind the Kremlin’s support for his stance. For Russia, a strategically unclear Romania serves its broader aim of undermining EU unity and weakening Western cohesion.

4. Beyond the borders: how Romania’s vote shapes the region

The most immediate outcome of Romania’s 2025 presidential election, whoever the winner may be, is the onset of political instability. With the mainstream coalition holding only a fragile parliamentary majority –and both George Simion and Nicușor Dan declaring they cannot work with the current government– early elections are increasingly likely. This would plunge Romania into another round of campaigning and institutional uncertainty, compounding its already fragile economic outlook.

This instability comes at a crucial moment, as the war in Ukraine enters a decisive phase. While neither candidate publicly endorses pro-Russian positions –knowing such a stance would cost them politically –their push for political upheaval through early elections indirectly serves Russian interests. Leadership vacuums, policy delays and weakened executive focus would all slow Romania’s ability to support Ukraine, coordinate with NATO and contribute meaningfully to regional security. At home, this disruption will stall much-needed economic reforms, prolong uncertainty and further damage investor confidence.

Beyond its domestic implications, the aftermath of Romania’s elections sends a powerful signal across Europe. A strong showing by nationalist-populist forces not only emboldens similar movements in other EU states but also contributes to a broader sense of volatility along the Eastern flank. At a time when Western unity is essential, Romania’s internal turbulence risks weakening the resilience of the EU-NATO containment line and undermining collective efforts to counter Russian influence in the region.

The outcome of Romania’s 2025 presidential election is particularly echoing in Poland and Moldova –two states where domestic politics and strategic orientation are tightly linked to the broader European order–. As Poland heads into its own presidential race, Romania’s shift towards nationalist-populist politics could embolden similar forces there, especially those pushing for stronger national sovereignty and challenging EU authority.

A potential victory for George Simion –who channels anti-establishment rhetoric while claiming support for NATO and the EU– parallels the messaging of Poland’s right-wing, especially factions within Law and Justice (PiS). His rise may embolden Polish politicians who frame themselves as defenders of national interest against Brussels, reinforcing EU scepticism even within traditionally pro-NATO circles.

In Moldova, however, the impact is likely to be far more dramatic. Moldova’s political landscape is far more fragile, and the country’s path toward EU accession is more precarious. For years, Romania has served as Moldova’s key strategic ally –not through overt declarations, but through consistent support for security cooperation, energy resilience and diplomatic backing in EU forums–. Bucharest has quietly facilitated defence coordination and economic aid, especially in the face of Russian hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns. Moldova’s pro-Western leadership has relied heavily on this partnership, both symbolically and practically, as a stabilising force.

A shift in tone from Bucharest –even limited to criticism of the EU– could seriously undermine Moldova’s pro-European leadership, especially ahead of its upcoming elections. Pro-Western forces in Chișinău are already under pressure from economic hardship and growing public frustration with slow reforms. If Romania, long seen as Moldova’s key ally and advocate for EU integration, is perceived as stepping back or becoming ambivalent, it would deliver both a psychological and strategic blow to Moldova’s Western path. In contrast to Romania, pro-Russian parties in Moldova operate openly, backed by Kremlin-linked media and funding. Any nationalist or Euro-sceptic rhetoric from the next Romanian President would likely embolden these factions and intensify polarisation.

Conclusions

Romania’s election is more than a national decision –it sends a regional signal that could either reinforce or undermine fragile democracies across Eastern Europe–. The final outcome will shape not only Romania’s path, but also have an impact on neighbouring countries, the unity of the EU and the strength of NATO’s eastern flank. At a time that calls for stability, leadership and strategic coordination, continued political uncertainty in Bucharest risks becoming a weak link in the West’s defences. Yet this is happening just as the West itself is undergoing a period of internal restructuring and recalibration.

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The Polish elections, held on the first of June, resulted in conservative Karol Nawrocki beating liberal Warsaw mayor Rafał Trzaskowski by a very close margin. Nawrocki won 50.89% of the vote against Trzaskowki’s 49.11%. Polish politicians, namely from Trzaskowski’s camp, have been asking for the results to be investigated.

Chief among these those expressing concerns is Rafał Trzaskowski’s chief of staff Wiola Paprocka, who wrote about the surprising reversal of support in the second round of the presidential election in some commissions.

“We will contact the PKW [National Electoral Comission] to clarify each of these cases,” Paprocka announced on Twitter. Her statement included four polling stations at which reports of irregularities have come to light.

Due to suspected irregularities, Paprocka appealed for electoral protests to be filed with the Supreme Court.

In one station in the city of Kraków, Trzaskowski won in the first round of elections, winning with 550 votes. Nawrocki, on the other hand, came in third place, after the Warsaw major and hard right candidate Sławomir Mentzen. In the run-off, however, Nawrocki received the most votes, according to the official count, prompting questions about the results of the count.

An investigation into the case is being carried out by the district electoral commission in Krakow. Krakow City Council chairman Jakub Kosek wrote in a post on social media that the votes had been incorrectly entered into the minutes.

“From what we know today, a mistake was made in the minutes – and the results of the candidates were swapped,” – Kosek emphasised.

Polish Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Affairs Krzysztof Gawkowski expressed that he was surprised by such “mistakes”. “I am counting on this to be clarified, because as I myself looked at the results,” he said.

“We have never had such cases in the past,” he added.

Protesting the results

The National Electoral Commission (PKW) seperately addressed the matter. Responding to a request for comment from Euronews, PKW representatives stated that any irregularities must be reported to Poland’s Supreme Court by the 16th of June.

“Currently, the results of the district voting can only be verified by the Supreme Court in connection with the consideration of election protests,” they told Euronews.

‘To serious a matter to brush it aside’

A spokesman for the Polish Peasants’ Party (which is currently part of Donald Tusk’s ruling coalition) and long-time member of the electoral commissions Miłosz Motyka emphasized in an interview with Euronews that the issues of irregularities in the vote count should be carefully checked.

“There should not be a situation where, having several members of the electoral commission from different political formations, from municipalities, from city halls, we have a situation where a result that affects the final result [of the election – ed.] is wrongly recorded in the minutes”, he said.

“This is too serious a matter to simply brush aside. That is why any of this information should be verified and always the PKW should also conduct appropriate proceedings with the committee chairman. The aim here is really to verify irregularities”, he added.

Law and Justice: ‘This is to create a myth of the victory that was to be taken away’

Law and Justice MP Radosław Fogiel, pointed out in an interview with Euronews that it is standard procedure to investigate irregularities. However, he emphasized that he is critical of the actions of some members of the ruling coalition.

“Here, unfortunately, we are starting to deal with an organised action and the creation of a whole narrative of alleged falsification” he said, adding that “the Civic Platform milieu” is “formulating these kinds of theses and this is a serious and dangerous matter”.

“If I had to guess why someone would do this, assuming that there is a method in this madness and that it is not just the result of political paranoia, I would say that it is to serve the purpose of creating a myth about the victory that was to be claimed”, Fogiel told Euronews.

OSCE mission takes stock of the elections

Observers representing the joint mission of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe said in a statement that the elections were conducted “professionally and efficiently”. In their view, freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly were respected in both rounds. However, they drew attention to media bias as well as irregularities in campaign financing.

Karol Nawrocki won the second round of the presidential election by a difference of 369,451 votes, or by 1.19 percentage points. This is the smallest vote difference between the candidates since 1990.

Karol Nawrocki and members of his family give their thumbs up as they pose behind a ballot box at a polling station in Warsaw, Poland, during the second round of the presidential elections on June 1, 2025

There are more and more worrying signs that the Polish left-liberal establishment may be working to delegitimize conservative Karol Nawrocki’s election victory.

Prominent politicians of Donald Tusk’s ruling party, in cahoots with the mainstream liberal media and close-to-the-government ’experts,’ are making claims on social media that there was fraud in the second round of the presidential election last Sunday. Ordo Iuris President Jerzy Kwaśniewski sounded the alarm on X on Friday.

Liberals in Poland start the “stolen elections” campaign.

A HUGE rise in support for @NawrockiKn in the 2nd round is presented as proof of fraud.

I wouldn’t bother, but the liberal government refuses to recognize the Supreme Court chamber responsible for election validity… — Jerzy Kwaśniewski (@jerzKwasniewski) June 6, 2025

The allegations made, for instance, by Civic Coalition (KO) MP Roman Giertych, include outright insinuation of fraud. In an open letter posted on social media to members of district electoral commissions, the politician said he had received “hundreds of emails with information about irregularities in individual commissions. A certain pattern is repeated … Namely, in many commissions, the results of the vote in the second round of the election do not correspond to those from the first round. If in some we have an increase for Mr. Nawrocki by 400%, and a decrease for Trzaskowski, it is obvious that an error (or rather a fraud) occurred.”

Giertych has even asked for an investigation into the alleged irregularities by the Polish Internal Security Agency (ABW).

I expect immediate action by the ABW in the following areas: determining the algorithms used by TikTok …and securing all data related to #AplikacjaMateckiego. Also securing screenshots from accounts on X propagating it.

The app Giertych refers to is one that PiS politician Dariusz Matecki recommended to members of the so-called Election Control Movement who sit on election commissions, to prevent potential fraud and verify the certificates of voters coming to the polling stations. ”Trusting they won’t try to cheat is like believing in Putin’s good intentions,” the politician said on X. But Giertych now alleges—without providing any evidence—that the app itself may have somehow enabled fraud.

Journalists working for the liberal mainstream media perpetuate the insinuations, with Bartoz Wieliński, deputy editor-in-chief of Gazeta Wyborcza, saying on X,

Nawrocki’s miraculous victories in many committees in Poland. Where did the sudden increase in the number of votes come from? It wasn’t only in the Krakow commission that a miracle with the ballot box took place on Sunday. There are many more such commissions throughout Poland.

Cudowne zwycięstwa Nawrockiego w wielu komisjach w Polsce. Skąd nagłe wzrosty liczby głosów?

Nie tylko w krakowskiej komisji doszło w niedzielę do cudu na urną. Takich komisji jest znacznie więcej w całej Polsce. https://t.co/B8DOjB48JL — Bartosz T. Wieliński 🇵🇱🇪🇺🇺🇦 (@Bart_Wielinski) June 5, 2025

A prominent lawyer with links to the Tusk government has once again brought into question the legitimacy of the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court, a body that adjudicates cases filed regarding the validity of elections. Michal Paprocki said on X:

The validity of elections is still decided by a chamber whose status as a court was questioned by the CJEU—the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs (IKNiSP) of the Supreme Court, composed of judges appointed in a procedure deemed to be contrary to standards of independence. Rule of law on paper—in reality: a structure subordinated to PiS. A bit like Orwell’s: “First they catch you, then they convince you that you control them.”

Argument – który pomijamy:

O ważności wyborów wciąż decyduje Izba, której status jako sądu został zakwestionowany przez TSUE – Izba Kontroli Nadzwyczajnej i Spraw Publicznych (IKNiSP) Sądu Najwyższego, złożona z sędziów powołanych w procedurze uznanej za sprzeczną ze standardami… — Michał Paprocki (@mpaprocki) June 6, 2025

The First President of the Supreme Court Małgorzata Manowska issued an official response to the claims suggesting that the Chamber is illegitimate. She referenced the “numerous false statements made by Minister Adam Bodnar and other politicians, repeated in the media, questioning the constitutional authority of the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs (IKNiSP),” and nailed down that

The claims that the competence of IKNiSP does not result from the Constitution of the Republic of Poland are false and misleading to the public opinion.

According to the Ordo Iuris president, a renowned attorney, what is happening is an “artificial whipping up of election hysteria.”

It is clear that radicals among liberals are pushing towards a ’Romanian Scenario.’

Kwaśniewski stressed to europeanconservative.com that

Poland is a stable democracy, and never before have election results—confirmed by the official National Electoral Commission on Monday after all ballots were hand-counted—been attacked so aggressively. Liberals understand that raising false claims may be supported by hand-picked judges, especially after the Chamber of the Supreme Court has already been delegitimized. This could open the way to new elections.

The allegations by the sore loser left-liberals in Poland are all the more ironic as they come after it has been revealed that the Tusk-backed candidate Rafał Trzaskowski’s campaign was illegally propped up by foreign funding. At the same time, public financing of opposition PiS (the Law and Justice party) was unlawfully withheld by the minister of finance, going against the decisions of both the National Electoral Commission and the Supreme Court.

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“Europe, as a whole, has not been this strong and united for a very long time.”

This is how Keir Starmer, the prime minister of the United Kingdom, has described the diplomatic push to assemble a “Coalition of the Willing” to safeguard a potential deal to end Russia’s war on Ukraine, a task that took on sudden urgency after Donald Trump caught Europe off guard by unilaterally launching negotiations with Vladimir Putin.

Since that 90-minute phone call on 12 February, the continent has been trying to reassert its standing in the fast-moving chains of events to ensure its voice is heard and its interests are considered. Among them is the imperative need to guarantee Ukraine’s survival as an independent, sovereign nation and put the brakes on Putin’s expanionist agenda, which many fear will continue unchecked should his invasion prevail.

Doing so will require a peace deal that holds and lasts.

But Europe is deeply distrustful of Russia, having seen the country breach its commitments under the so-called Minsk agreements designed to end the Donbas war. This explains why this time, with the bloodiest conflict on its soil since World War II, Europe is coming together on a larger, bolder scale to prevent a repeat of the past.

“Our goal is clear: to secure peace,” French President Emmanuel Macron said last week after hosting a leaders’ summit in Paris. “To do this, we must put Ukraine in the best possible position to negotiate and ensure that the peace that is negotiated is solid and lasting for Ukrainians and all Europeans.”

Here’s everything we know so far about the “Coalition of the Willing.”

Who’s part of the coalition?

The seeds of the coalition were planted on 17 February, when Macron convened a small meeting of leaders in reaction to the Trump-Putin phone call. The hand-picked selection of guests suggested a new political format was about to emerge.

Less than two weeks later, on 2 March, as Europe was reeling from the disastrous encounter that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had experienced in the Oval Office, Keir Starmer hosted a second meeting of leaders in London, with a longer list of attendants.

At the end of the closely watched deliberations, the prime minister publicly declared the birth of a “Coalition of the Willing”, co-led by Britain and France.

Last week’s summit in Paris further enlarged the number of participants.

Besides Macron, Starmer and Zelenskyy, the summit brought in leaders from Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.

Turkey sent its vice president, Cevdet Yilmaz, while Australia and Canada were represented by their respective ambassadors in France.

Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission; António Costa, the president of the European Council; and Mark Rutte, the secretary general of NATO, were also present, adding a wider dimension to the talks.

In total, 33 delegations.

Starmer had previously mentioned Japan and New Zealand as part of the coalition, even if both nations did not attend the recent meeting in Paris.

Who’s not in the coalition?

It’s clear that the majority of the participants in the coalition are also members of the European Union, which Ukraine wishes to join one day.

There are, however, some eye-catching exceptions.

Malta and Austria have so far not joined the meetings due to their countries’ neutrality. By contrast, Ireland, which is also neutral, was present in Paris. “We’re willing to do whatever we possibly can to help,” Micheál Martin, the Taoiseach, said in March.

Hungary and Slovakia are the other EU countries that have not joined the coalition. They are not neutral – both are in fact NATO members – but strongly disagree over Europe’s approach to the war. Hungary and Slovakia oppose sending military assistance to Ukraine, which they depict as escalatory.

Viktor Orbán has taken his opposition to a new level and twice blocked joint EU conclusions on Ukraine, though Slovakia endorsed the text.

Switzerland, a long-standing neutral state, and the six Balkan countries have also remained outside the discussions.

The coalition is co-led by Emmanuel Macron and Kier Starmer. Ludovic Marin/AP

What’s the coalition working on?

The “Coalition of the Willing” has established “three areas of work”, Macron explained at the end of the summit in Paris.

First, continued support for Ukraine’s Armed Forces, which Kyiv and Europe consider the first security guarantee to deter Russian aggression. The rapprochement of Washington and Moscow has already led to new pledges of military donations from European countries, with a focus on artillery, air defence systems, missiles, drones and training.

Second, the creation of a brand-new reassurance force that could be deployed on Ukrainian soil as an additional security guarantee.

Macron was quick to clarify the force would not act as a peacekeeping mission stationed along the front line. This task, he suggested, should fall onto the United Nations or the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

Instead, Macron said, the reassurance force will be based in “certain strategic locations” across the country, such as cities, ports and power plants, and act as a “deterrent” against Russia. Western troops could be potentially deployed on land, air and sea.

“Nothing is excluded at this time,” the French president told reporters.

By setting up this new force, the coalition will be “ready to operationalise a peace deal whenever its precise shape turns out to be,” Starmer said.

“This is a force designed to deter (and) send a message to Putin that this is a deal that is going to be defended,” he added. “That’s supposed to be the best description of it.”

The third area of work involves ramping up Europe’s own defence capabilities. The European Commission has proposed a new plan to mobilise up to €800 billion in fresh investments for defence, from which Ukraine is expected to benefit.

How many countries have committed troops?

The question of “boots on the ground” has loomed over the coalition since its first meeting. Today, it remains divisive despite the political traction it has gained.

So far, only France and the UK have officially committed to contribute soldiers as part of the reassurance force. France and the UK are the only European countries with nuclear weapons. Both are permanent members of the UN Security Council.

“There is no unanimity on this point,” Macron admitted. “Some states don’t have the capacity to do so, others don’t have the political context that allows them to do so.”

Other coalition members are expected to pledge troops as talks move forward.

Sweden, Denmark and Australia have publicly expressed their openness to consider sending their soldiers to Ukraine as part of an international mission. More recently, Belgium said it would be “logical” to participate “if Europe decides to do it.”

By contrast, Poland and Greece, two of Europe’s biggest defence spenders, have already said they would not put boots on the ground due to the threats they face from their neighbourhood (Belarus in the case of Poland, Turkey in the case of Greece).

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has also rejected the possibility, casting doubt over the “effectiveness” of the Franco-British proposal.

“In my opinion, it is very difficult to implement,” she said last month.

Meanwhile, Russia has repeatedly protested against any plan that will see the establishment of Western troops inside Ukraine. But these complaints will have no bearing on the coalition’s deliberations, Macron and Starmer have said.

“It is not Russia that will choose what happens on Ukrainian territory,” Macron said.

“We know what Russia wants. It wants a defenceless Ukraine,” Starmer said.

The Ukrainian army will remain the first security guarantee, the coalition has agreed. Oleg Petrasiuk/Ukrainian 24th Mechanized brigade

Will the US be involved in any way?

As things stand, the US is not a member of the “Coalition of the Willing.” In fact, the main reason why the coalition exists in the first place is because Trump broke the three-year united front among allies and went his own way to launch negotiations with Putin.

However, the group still hopes the US might become involved at one point in the process and provide some assistance to the reassurance force, such as air protection or intelligence sharing. This will likely motivate more nations to commit more troops.

This is the so-called “US backstop” that Starmer has referred to several times.

“As I’ve always said, this will require the engagement and support of the United States,” Starmer said. “That’s a discussion we’ve had with the US president on many occasions.”

The British and French leaders have been in regular contact with Trump to keep him updated about the progress made by the coalition. They depict their work as being in Europe’s and America’s interest, as it will safeguard the peace deal that Trump is after.

Despite the many diplomatic overtures, including visits to the White House, there has been no indication that the US would supply the famous “backstop”. If anything, the Trump administration has suggested a gradual reduction of American troops in Europe.

“There is a lack of clarity on the nature of American commitments for the day after,” Macron said. “We must hope for the best but prepare for the worst.”

What’s next for the coalition?

Following high-level summits in Paris and London that enlarged its membership, the coalition is focused on fleshing out the details of the reassurance force. President Zelenskyy has invited military representatives to visit Ukraine and begin technical discussions to concretise the abstract project.

“We need clear, operational decisions – and a shared vision for the future security system,” he told leaders last week.

According to Zelenskyy, the questions that need to be answered include: Which countries will deploy soldiers on land, air and sea? Where exactly will these soldiers be located? How big will the reassurance force be? What structure will it have? How will the force respond in case of a threat from Russia?

Zelenskyy put another question on the table: “When will our coalition actually deploy forces in Ukraine: when a ceasefire begins or once the war is fully over and a settlement is reached?”

The outcome of this work is expected to be presented to leaders in an upcoming summit, although no date has yet been announced. According to AFP, the coalition’s defence ministers are set to meet on 10 April in Brussels.

The real estate fuss is yet another blow to the historian, whose credibility has already been battered by reports of his bizarre effort to promote his book on organized crime in a TV interview with an expert who turned out to be Nawrocki in disguise.

Even his effort to flaunt his geopolitical heft by meeting with Donald Trump in the Oval Office last week was overshadowed when the White House later posted an AI-generated image of Trump as the pope.

Nawrocki is trailing Warsaw Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski by 7 percentage points according to POLITICO’s poll of polls ahead of the first round of the presidential election on May 18. The top two candidates go through to the second round on June 1 — which currently appears likely to be a face-off between Trzaskowski and Nawrocki.

The election is a crucial one. PiS hopes that a Nawrocki victory will reverse its political fortunes ahead of the next parliamentary election due in 2027. The government, led by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, wants Trzaskowski in the presidential palace to help advance its legislative agenda, which is currently being blocked by pro-PiS incumbent President Andrzej Duda.

But that’s now in danger thanks to the real estate kerfuffle.

Nawrocki set the trap for himself by responding in a TV debate to a question on whether he favored a tax on owners of multiple properties. He didn’t, but added that, like other “ordinary Poles,” he owned only “a single apartment.”