US President Donald Trump claimed that the States had taken “complete and total control of the skies over Iran.” He further warned Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei saying that “We know exactly where the so-called ‘Supreme Leader’ is hiding. He is an easy target, but is safe there – We are not going to take him out (kill!), at least not for now. But we don’t want missiles shot at civilians, or American soldiers. Our patience is wearing thin. Thank you for your attention to this matter!”

The long-simmering tensions between Israel and Iran have exploded into open warfare since Friday, June 13, 2025, marking an unprecedented period of direct military confrontation. Israel initiated a major campaign of fighter jet and drone strikes across Iran, targeting nuclear and military sites, including surface-to-surface missile production facilities, detection radar sites, and surface-to-air missile launchers. Reports indicate strikes on residential areas and fuel depots, with Iran’s health ministry reporting at least 224 fatalities and over 1,200 injuries, mostly civilians. Israeli forces have also reportedly killed several top Iranian military commanders and atomic scientists. The IDF claims to have destroyed one-third of Iran’s surface-to-surface missile launchers and achieved “full air superiority over Tehran,” also striking an Iranian refueling aircraft 2,300 km away.

In retaliation, Tehran has launched barrages of missiles and drones, hitting Israeli cities and towns, causing at least 24 deaths and 592 injuries, with a major oil refinery in Haifa among the targets. The IDF confirmed intercepting over 100 Iranian UAVs.

The international community, including China, Turkey, and G7 leaders, has urgently called for de-escalation, but both sides remain defiant. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asserts the offensive aims to thwart “existential” nuclear and missile threats and has not ruled out targeting Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, suggesting it would “end the conflict.” The UN’s IAEA reported physical damage to an above-ground component of Iran’s Natanz uranium enrichment facility but normal external radiation levels, while warning of potential internal contamination. Amidst the crisis, planned nuclear negotiations between Tehran and Washington were called off.

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On June 12, Israel carried out a series of airstrikes in Iran targeting the country’s nuclear sites. The surprise attack was followed by several days of Israel and Iran trading deadly strikes. Below, Brookings scholars examine the implications of the attack for the region and beyond.

Back to top Asli Aydintasbas Israel’s strike and America’s choice

For anyone seeking evidence that the world is going through a historic inflection point, the summer of 2025 will have plenty to offer. Israel’s strikes to decapitate Iran’s military leadership and degrade its nuclear program—launched only days before the sixth round of negotiations between Washington and Tehran—have been an extraordinary initial success. Through coordinated operations, the Israeli military neutralized Iran’s air defense, established air superiority, eliminated top Iranian generals and nuclear scientists, and struck hundreds of targets, including Iran’s key enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow. Not surprisingly, the Trump administration’s tone has quickly changed from Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s initial remarks about Israel acting unilaterally (“We are not involved in strikes against Iran”) to President Donald Trump bragging about having prior knowledge of the operation and U.S. weapons used. But the real question is whether Trump will go beyond rhetoric and formally join Israel’s war on Iran. While Operation Rising Lion has burnished Israel’s credentials as the regional hegemon, it has not achieved the destruction of Iran’s nuclear program. Reports suggest much of the enrichment activity in Fordow remains intact—and Tehran will likely accelerate its program once hostilities cease. To achieve the goal of substantially downgrading Iran’s nuclear capacity, Israel needs advanced U.S. weapons and possibly air support in destroying layers of the underground installations at Fordow. Therein lies the legacy-defining challenge for Trump, the man who ran on ending wars but has made little progress toward peace in Ukraine, Gaza, or elsewhere. Will the United States revert to its traditional role as the region’s hegemon and sheriff, and allow itself to get sucked into another Middle East war? Or will Trump listen to the restrainers in his “America First” coalition and maintain some distance from this fight? Trump is undoubtedly torn between his restrainer instincts, warning him that direct U.S. engagement in a war with Iran could have devastating consequences for the United States and its allies, and Israel’s push to finish the job. His choice is anyone’s guess but will determine how the next chapter in world history is written.

Back to top Robert Einhorn Military means alone won’t eliminate Iran’s nuclear program

In the initial phases of their campaign, the Israelis have done significant damage to Iran’s nuclear program. But eliminating that program would require much more in subsequent phases, including severely damaging or destroying the deeply buried Fordow enrichment facility. Unless the Israelis can devise novel ways of incapacitating that facility or persuade President Donald Trump to destroy it using a massive U.S. earth-penetrating bomb unavailable to them, Fordow will be a major deficiency in Israel’s war aims. Even if Fordow and other critical facilities could be destroyed, most experts believe Iran could reconstitute its nuclear program in a year or two and would likely do so at secret locations, having evicted inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency—requiring repeated attacks for the indefinite future. Israeli National Security Advisor Tzachi Hanegbi said on Friday that military strikes alone won’t be able to totally destroy Iran’s nuclear program and that Israel’s goal is to pressure Iran into agreeing to completely dismantle its program. Trump has also expressed the hope that the military campaign will force Iran to come to the negotiating table and accept zero enrichment. But hopes for Iran abandoning its nuclear program underestimate its resilience and attachment to its enrichment program and ignore that Israel’s attack will strengthen, not weaken, its desire for nuclear weapons. Israelis probably understand this—which is why they regard regime change as the most promising means of ending the Iranian nuclear threat and why it is a thinly-veiled goal of their campaign. But regime change is difficult to engineer. And there’s no guarantee that a successor regime, perhaps led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, will be less interested in nuclear weapons than the current one.

Back to top Vanda Felbab-Brown Israel has mastered clandestine operations

Whether or not Israel’s attack on Iran accomplishes Tel Aviv’s strategic objectives, the initial strikes show once again Israel’s mastery of clandestine operations. Like its stunning decapitation of Hezbollah’s leaders by exploding walkie-talkies in September 2024, Israel was once again able to identify and track the location of key Iranian military leaders, including the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Hossein Salami, who was killed, and this time, also smuggle drones deep into Iran for a range of attacks. The latter likely required an extended presence of Israel’s operatives in Iran, a feat all the greater since one would have expected Iran to significantly improve its counterintelligence after the Hezbollah decapitation and after the political chief of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, was killed by Israel in July 2024—in Tehran, no less. The persisting weakness of Iran’s counterintelligence will hamper its ability to rebuild its proxy militias, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, whom Israel is now also hitting. In addition to Iran’s depleted resources and its focus on internal rebuilding, the glamour of Iran’s support for militia forces across the Middle East is badly damaged. This provides opportunities to politically, economically, and institutionally attempt to weaken Iran-supported militias in Iraq. Iran may well resort to more assassination attempts of its own—such as against Israeli targets, perhaps outside of Israel. It has attempted to assassinate Iranian political dissidents, such as in New York and Europe, as well as former U.S. government officials. While these attacks have caused grave damage to their victims even when they fail, since the targets have their lives dramatically disrupted for a long time, and sap targeted countries’ counterintelligence and law enforcement resources, the Iranian clandestine operations have been often unsuccessful. Iran has frequently relied on rather incompetent criminals (sometimes not even criminal groups) and failed to detect sting operations by law enforcement.

Back to top Sharan Grewal Netanyahu is becoming a liability for Trump

President Donald Trump had campaigned on a promise to end all wars, particularly the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. Yet today, each continues to escalate. Israel’s attack on Iran undermines Trump’s claim to be a peacemaker and his assertion that wars would never have started under his leadership. Although Secretary of State Marco Rubio had attempted to paint the strikes as a unilateral Israeli decision, the choice to move U.S. Embassy staff and military families out of harm’s way was in effect a green light. Trump’s claim that “we knew everything,” and that the attack occurred because his 60-day ultimatum to Iran expired, likewise suggests a level of coordination. Israel, for its part, claimed the United States provided intelligence, defense against Iranian retaliation, and bunker-buster bombs earlier this year. This level of involvement in Israel’s war with Iran puts Trump in a difficult position. He had wanted a deal to solidify his image as a peacemaker and perhaps win himself a Nobel Peace Prize one day. Instead, negotiations with Iran have been suspended. While Iran may eventually rejoin, it will do so with even less trust in the United States and Israel than before, making a deal even more difficult to reach. Finally, Israel’s attack has amplified divisions among Republicans, with Iran hawks like Lindsey Graham urging the United States to “fly with Israel,” and America First folks like Tucker Carlson urging the United States to “drop Israel.” The longer the conflict continues, the more likely Trump is to lose one side of his base.

Back to top Samantha Gross and Louison Sall Flipping the script on global oil markets

The global oil market has experienced whiplash-inducing events over the last two weeks. On May 31, the members of OPEC+ (a coalition of OPEC members and other large oil producers that formed in 2016) announced the latest in a series of production quota increases. Oil prices looked to be headed downward, and markets were well supplied. A lot can change overnight. Israel’s military strikes initially focused on Iran’s nuclear program, but on June 14, they included an oil refinery and production and processing facilities for South Pars, the world’s largest natural gas field. The global benchmark Brent Crude oil price jumped 7% on June 13, the day after the attacks began, and a further 0.5% on the morning of June 16. Concern falls into two categories. First, Iran is today the world’s ninth-largest oil producer, despite international sanctions. Spare oil production capacity in OPEC+ is roughly equal to Iran’s production, so a large disruption in Iranian production would leave supply very precarious. The greater concern is that Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz, a global chokepoint through which about 20% of global oil shipments pass. Closure of the strait or significantly disrupted oil shipments could bring about a global energy crisis and pull the other Gulf oil producers, who would see their shipments and revenues disrupted, into the conflict. Houthi actions in the Red Sea demonstrated that a few strikes on strategic targets can have outsized effects on global commerce. A complete blockade would not be necessary for Iran to make its point.

Back to top Steven Heydemann The Arab world’s Israel problem

In recent years, an Arab-led regional security order was beginning to take shape in the Middle East. Conflicts and competition that flared in the aftermath of mass protests in 2011 were slowly giving way to accommodation, compromise, and diplomacy. Led by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, this new security order hoped to stabilize the region by offering the prospect of economic and political integration to historic adversaries, bridging divides between Gulf states and Iran, on the one hand, and between Israel and Gulf states, on the other hand. Since October 7, 2023, however, Israel has moved aggressively and unilaterally to impose its own expansionist vision of a regional security order, devastating Gaza, destroying Hezbollah’s military capacity, enabling the overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria, and now attacking Iran directly based on yet unverified claims of an imminent Iranian nuclear threat. Arab governments have publicly criticized Israel’s attack, though many quietly applaud the weakening of Iran and its proxies. It is also probable, however, that they are deeply unsettled to see their diplomatic investments shredded by Israel’s attack, and, in the longer term, by the prospect that their own security is now subject to an Israel determined to impose its own vision of regional order by force of arms. Balancing against an empowered and aggressive Israel is likely to emerge as a leading priority of Arab governments in the coming period, even as they take steps to respond to the potential fallout of Israel’s attacks, including the risk of conflict spillover should Iran target U.S. forces in the Gulf and the very real possibility that Iran will now accelerate its development of nuclear weapons.

Back to top Mara Karlin Israel’s attack leaves Iran with a choice

For three decades or so, policymakers traded worries over the progress of Iran’s nuclear program and the potential of an Israeli military attack on it. Last week, hours after the International Atomic Energy Agency’s board of governors censured Iran—for the first time in two decades—because of its failure to comply with nuclear commitments, the inevitable occurred. The United States and Israel—sometimes alone, sometimes together, and often working with the international community—had employed a wide range of tools to delay an Israeli attack, including diplomacy, targeted killings, economic sanctions, and supply chain disruptions, which bought both parties time. Nevertheless, Israeli concerns about Iran’s intentions and progress were ultimately channeled into military force. This conflict will be studied long and hard. Offhand, it shows that some key characteristics of war haven’t changed. Eight months of serious and intense strategic planning by Israel’s national security establishment to lay the groundwork, exceptional intelligence, the element of surprise in launching the attack, a concerted information operations campaign, and a mix of high and low military capabilities ranging from sophisticated fighter aircraft to drones have shaped the campaign so far. It further demonstrates that when the Israeli national security establishment prioritizes a threat—in the case of Iran and Hezbollah—it can achieve outsized gains. Looking ahead, history offers mixed messages. In the two examples where Israel struck an adversary’s nuclear program—Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007—the long-term results were diametrically different. Operationally, Israel destroyed both programs. But at the strategic level, Damascus chose to pause its pursuit of nuclear weapons whereas Baghdad doubled down on its desire for the ultimate weapon. Tehran could conceivably choose either path. And, as long as the uranium enrichment complex at Fordow remains largely intact, it does not need to decide.

Back to top Suzanne Maloney The limits of spectacular operational success

In launching “Operation Rising Lion” last week against Iran, Israel has dealt the most catastrophic blow to the Islamic Republic since Saddam Hussein’s invasion in 1980. Precision strikes against hundreds of nuclear, missile, and leadership targets have decimated Iran’s chain of command, significantly degraded its military and economic infrastructure, and exposed the Islamic Republic’s profound vulnerability at the hands of its foremost adversary. Tehran has fired back with drones and ballistic missiles and can sustain those volleys for weeks but has few good alternatives. With its once-fearsome militia network largely neutralized, Iranian escalation could include small-scale terrorist attacks, cyberattacks, and threats to the Strait of Hormuz. None of these options would restore deterrence and all entail risky tradeoffs, especially the prospect of precipitating U.S. military intervention, which Tehran would prefer to avoid. Despite Israel’s stunning start, much of Tehran’s three decades of investment in its nuclear program remains intact or salvageable. And Israel cannot achieve its war aims—a definitive end to Iranian nuclear weapons capability—without American help to disable Iran’s Fordow fuel enrichment plant. President Donald Trump has swung his support behind the Israeli campaign, but for reasons of both politics and policy, an American intervention in the conflict in such a direct and dramatic way is highly unlikely at present. The same is true for diplomacy. Iranian leaders are insisting that they won’t surrender, the Israelis are shifting to broader targets in hopes of collapsing the Islamic Republic, and Trump is content to let the two “fight it out” for the time being. That is a perilous approach in a region where spectacular operational successes have rarely yielded sustained strategic breakthroughs. In the wake of Saddam’s invasion nearly 45 years ago, Iran’s fledging theocracy capitalized on the war to consolidate its power and rally Iranians around defending their homeland. More recently, rapid American victories in Afghanistan and Iraq succumbed to bloody insurgencies and protracted instability. Israel’s early success in Iran today should not blind the world to the risks of overreach and unintended consequences, particularly for a U.S. president determined to extricate Washington from two decades of costly, messy Middle East conflicts.

Back to top Itamar Rabinovich From reliance on proxies to an Israeli-Iranian war

For more than two decades, Iran’s regional policy in the Middle East and the conduct of its conflict with Israel were predicated on the construction and management of a network of proxies. These proxies—Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Assad regime in Syria, the pro-Iranian Shiite militias in Iraq, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip, and the Houthis in Yemen—were the building blocks of Iran’s quest for regional hegemony and designated as partners in a future war with Israel. A second pillar of Iran’s national security policy was the development of a military nuclear capacity. During most of this period, Iran avoided a direct military confrontation with Israel and left it to its proxies. This changed in 2024 when Iran launched ballistic missiles against Israel in April (after the killing of an Iranian general in Damascus) and in October (after the killing of Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut and Ismail Hanieh in Tehran). Israel’s response in April was mild, but in October it destroyed most of Iran’s ground-to-air defenses. Iran’s decision at the time reflected both its anger and a feeling that its position was undermined by the perception in the region that it was exploiting its Arab proxies in order to preserve Iranian lives and assets. In the past few years, the network of proxies began to disintegrate. The man who built it and ran it, Qassim Soleimani, was killed by the United States. Hezbollah was dealt a severe blow by Israel and is constrained by a revived Lebanese state. Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza were eliminated as military forces. The toppling of the Assad regime led to the formation of an anti-Iranian government in Damascus. In Iraq, the change is more subtle, but there are indications that some of the pro-Iranian Shiite militias are adopting a more independent line. For years, Iran provided Hezbollah with a huge number of rockets and missiles as a deterrent against an Israeli or an American attack on its nuclear installations. When Israel launched its offensive last week, there was no response by Hezbollah. Iran had to respond by itself, launching missiles and drones at Israel. This must not be taken lightly: Iran has a large arsenal of ballistic missiles and drones and some of them hit urban areas in Israel and inflicted significant damage. Iran can continue to respond to Israel’s offensive for quite some time. The Houthis are the only proxy that makes a marginal contribution to the Iranian war effort. In other words, the notion of war by proxies has been replaced by the reality of a direct Israeli-Iranian war.

Back to top Yun Sun What’s next for China?

The Israeli strikes on Iran exacerbate multiple concerns for China. From energy security to the safety of Chinese assets and personnel, from regional instability to the significant weakening of a valued partner, China’s traditional approach in the Middle East has come under mounting distress. Since the collapse of Iran’s “axis of resistance” in the region, Beijing has become increasingly sober about Iran’s internal quagmire and external duress. Consequently, China has not only been extremely modest in its economic investment in Iran—contrary to the ambitious 25-year $400 billion economic cooperation agreement signed in March 2021—but Beijing has also been vigorously diversifying its regional partnerships, especially with the Gulf countries. In the short term, China has expressed its interest in playing a “constructive role” in easing the tension, indicating a potential for Chinese mediation and diplomatic efforts. The phone calls between the Chinese foreign minister and both his Iranian and Israeli counterparts on June 14 allude to this possibility. China could also refer the conflict to the U.N. Security Council or the U.N. General Assembly, with the understanding that neither could generate binding resolutions that Israel will abide by. The challenge for China in the long run lies in the inevitable decline of Iran in the regional balance of power. China has diversified its relationships across the Middle East, but Iran has been a unique pillar of China’s regional engagement, and that pillar has been inevitably and perhaps irreversibly shaken by recent events.

Israel’s air force is targeting ballistic launching sites in Isfahan, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokesperson Effie Defrin said Tuesday evening. He said 12 sites are being struck in the current wave of attacks.

Israel has targeted three key Iranian nuclear facilities, including Isfahan, since it launched strikes on Iran.

Meanwhile in Iran, state television Press TV said Iran’s air defenses were dealing with a fresh wave of Israeli attacks in “densely populated” Tehran neighborhoods.

The IDF released a video which it said showed three key sites for storing and launching surface-to-surface missiles that were struck in Isfahan on Tuesday. CNN has not been able to independently verify the video.

“Thanks to our strikes, the forces of the Iranian regime have been pushed toward central Iran,” the spokesperson said. “Now they are concentrating their efforts on launching from the Isfahan area. They have withdrawn from western Iran — but we are right behind them.”

The military official said there are no more “cities of refuge” in the region, for Iran and its proxies. He drew parallels between Hamas and Hezbollah figures Israel targeted, with senior Iranian officials.

His remarks come as the IDF announced in a statement that it struck more than 70 Iranian aerial defense missile batteries. The Israeli military also hit several missile launchers and detection radars across Iran that it said were intended to prevent IDF strikes.

Based on facts, either observed and verified firsthand by the reporter, or reported and verified from knowledgeable sources.

Newsweek AI is in beta. Translations may contain inaccuracies—please refer to the original content.

The Pentagon and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth signaled on Monday that the United States does not plan to strike Iran as President Donald Trump prepares to meet with the National Security Council (NSC) at the White House.

The NSC meeting comes as the U.S. has repositioned both warships and military aircraft in the region to respond if the conflict between Israel and Iran further escalates.

“American Forces are maintaining their defensive posture & that has not changed,” Sean Parnell, chief Pentagon spokesperson, wrote on X, formerly Twitter. “We will protect American troops & our interests.”

The Context

Israel launched a number of strikes against Iran last week, igniting the most serious escalation to date in their long-running conflict.

Both countries have lobbed missiles at one another since Israel first attacked Iran early Friday, local time, with Iran bearing the brunt of the cost in the days since.

Israeli airstrikes have decapitated Iran’s military and intelligence leadership and targeted critical nuclear sites and scientists, killing more than 224 people since Friday. Israeli officials have said that 24 people in Israel have been killed and at least 500 were injured as a result of Iran’s retaliatory strikes.

President Donald Trump participates in the Group of Seven summit on Monday in Kananaskis, Canada. President Donald Trump participates in the Group of Seven summit on Monday in Kananaskis, Canada. Mark Schiefelbein/AP

What To Know

Hegseth underscored America’s defensive posture vis-à-vis Iran, telling Fox News that Trump’s priority is still achieving a new nuclear agreement with Iran.

“We believe that Iran … should not have a nuclear weapon,” he told Fox’s Jesse Watters. “That position hasn’t changed.”

“Right now, we’ve got assets in the region and we’re going to defend them,” he said, adding: “We’re strong, we’re prepared, we’re defensive … President Trump hopes there can be peace.”

The Trump administration has been working to negotiate a new nuclear agreement in Iran since he took office in January. Trump scrapped the Obama administration’s 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran in 2018, during his first term.

On Monday evening, the president issued a warning to Tehran residents, telling them to “immediately” evacuate the capital city.

“Iran should have signed the ‘deal’ I told them to sign,” he wrote. “What a shame, and waste of human life. Simply stated, IRAN CAN NOT HAVE A NUCLEAR WEAPON. I said it over and over again! Everyone should immediately evacuate Tehran!”

Trump initially planned to be at the Group of Seven (G7) summit in Canada until it wrapped, but White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said Monday that the president will leave early to deal with the Israel-Iran crisis.

“President Trump had a great day at the G7, even signing a major trade deal with the United Kingdom and Prime Minister Keir Starmer,” Leavitt wrote. “Much was accomplished, but because of what’s going on in the Middle East, President Trump will be leaving tonight after dinner with Heads of State.”

A reporter asked Trump on Monday why he’s leaving the G7 earlier than planned, to which he replied: “Well, I have to be back, it’s very important.”

“I have to be back as soon as I can … I have to be back early, for obvious reasons,” he added.

“I wish I could stay until tomorrow, but they understand,” Trump said, referring to the other world leaders who are at the summit. “This is big stuff.”

Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said regime change in Iran is not his goal, but he said it could “certainly be the result” of Israel’s strikes, adding that the Iranian government is “very weak.”

Netanyahu’s comments came after Gideon Sa’ar, Israel’s foreign minister, said Sunday that his country is not aiming for regime change, even as Israeli forces expand their offensive against Iran. Netanyahu also addressed reporting on Monday that Trump had vetoed an Israeli strike against Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei out of concern that it would further escalate the Israel-Iran conflict.

Such a strike would not “escalate the conflict, it’s going to end the conflict,” Netanyahu told ABC News’ Jonathan Karl.

Israel’s defense minister, Israel Katz, also alluded to continued air strikes against Iranian targets, writing on X earlier Monday: “The arrogant dictator from Tehran has become a cowardly murderer who fires targeted shots at the civilian home front in Israel to deter the IDF from continuing the attack that is collapsing its capabilities.”

“The residents of Tehran will pay the price, and soon,” Katz wrote.

What People Are Saying

A little after 3:30 a.m., local time, Israel Defense Forces posted to X: “The IDF identified that missiles were recently launched from Iran towards the territory of the State of Israel. The defense systems are working to intercept the threat. You must enter the protected areas upon receiving the alert, and remain there until further notice.”

The Council on American-Islamic Relations, America’s largest Muslim civil rights and advocacy organization, criticized Trump’s call for everyone to evacuate Tehran, saying in a statement sent to Newsweek: “President Trump is repeating the same mistakes of President George W. Bush. Just like Iraq did not have and was not pursuing weapons of mass destruction, Iran does not have and was not pursuing a nuclear weapon. Everyone knows this, and Trump’s own Director of National Intelligence just reaffirmed it to Congress.”

CAIR added: “President Trump could have easily signed a new deal with Iran limiting it to low, civilian-use levels of enrichment and extreme monitoring that would have made pursuing a weapon impossible. Instead, under pressure from [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu and pro-Israel war mongers, Trump insisted on the poison pill ‘zero enrichment’ requirement that Iran was never going to accept.”

What Happens Next

Trump said that Iranian officials have told him they’re willing to discuss de-escalating the situation with Israel, while Israel has said it believes the conflict will escalate.

The Associated Press contributed reporting to this article.

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Iran and Israel continue to trade fire this week after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered what he called a “preemptive strike” to disable Iran’s ability to produce a nuclear weapon. President Donald Trump has been generally supportive of Israel but has left the door open to negotiations over the nuclear issue. Meanwhile, there’s ongoing speculation about whether the United States might get involved in the military campaign given questions about Israel’s capability to strike Iran’s most hardened targets. Trump fanned those flames on Tuesday by posting on social media that “we” control the skies over Iran and demanding “UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER” from its leaders.

What do the players involved want from this conflict and how does it all end? I gathered Post columnists David Ignatius and Jason Willick to discuss.

— Max Boot, columnist

💬 💬 💬

Max Boot: So, first question for David and Jason: Echoing Gen. David Petraeus during the invasion of Iraq, tell me how this (in this case, the Israel-Iran conflict) ends?

Jason Willick: The ideal end would be a weakened Iran submitting to a new, stronger deal with the U.S. to stop the Israeli bombardment.

David Ignatius: Like most wars, this will end either with a negotiated settlement or a capitulation by a defeated adversary. Trump still appears very much interested in negotiating a new nuclear deal that would fulfill his pledge that “Iran will never have a nuclear weapon.” Israel seems much less confident than such a deal would achieve the desired result of no nukes — and it may want to push on toward victory. So, the question for Israel is: What does “victory” look like? Increasingly, to me, it looks like a regime that isn’t led by a “supreme leader” and is changed fundamentally so that it won’t behave the same way in the future.

David: If I had to guess, this war will end with a settlement — because international pressure will demand it. That might be the worst of all possible outcomes, leaving a crippled regime that could behave as Saddam Hussein did in the 1990s — expressing its power by repressing its people more than ever.

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Max: Do you think Netanyahu is trying to achieve regime change?

Jason: Netanyahu is definitely talking about regime change. Whether that’s a way to pressure Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, or an actual objective, or both, is hard to say.

Jason: A word about regime change: The collapse of the Soviet Union set the tone for what regime change could mean for an older generation. The war in Iraq set the tone for what it means for a younger generation. Younger people, it seems to me, are more skeptical about what it means in practice — cognizant that civil war might be the rule and stable democracy the exception when regimes collapse.

Jason: Iran, of course, has several ethnic groups besides the Persian majority. It’s reasonable to imagine “regime change” leading to fracturing along new borders rather than simply a new government emerging to run the state as it exists. That’s why I think the best outcome is a deal with the current regime from a position of strength.

Max: How would it even happen if Netanyahu pursues it? I’m not familiar with examples from history of regime change triggered from the air.

David: I wrote this week that you can’t bomb your way into creating a better society. And I think that’s the big danger for Israel. I’ve been to Iran twice over the past 20 years, and I became quite convinced that the regime is deeply unpopular and that the people would much prefer a freer and more secular government. Unfortunately, there’s no sign whatsoever of a real movement for change — and, as your question implies, people usually respond to bombardment by getting angry at the attackers rather than their own rulers.

David: One more thing: Iranians tell me that in their contacts with people back home, a constant refrain is that the authorities have spent more time policing hijabs than looking for secret Mossad shipments of drones. In other words, people think this regime is incompetent, in addition to being repressive.

Jason: Right. That the regime is oppressive is the more powerful Western messaging and propaganda. But the raw incompetence might be more politically deadly.

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Max: Both of you talked about having the war end in some kind of settlement. What do you think such a settlement would need to say to satisfy Trump and Netanyahu?

Jason: The more or less complete dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program. The questions are: (1) Would Iran agree to that even under extreme duress, and (2) how would you persuade the Israelis it would actually happen, such that they would stop their successful attacks and give Iran the chance to regroup?

David: A real settlement would have verifiable terms that deliver what Netanyahu and Trump have demanded — that Iran cannot acquire a nuclear weapon. Given considerable evidence that Iran engaged in nuclear weapons building activities in the past, despite its promises, the level of inspection would have to be extraordinarily intrusive.

Max: One sticking point is whether Iran will be allowed to retain any uranium enrichment capacity. Netanyahu insists the answer must be no; Khamenei insists the answer must be yes. Trump seemed to go back and forth but landed on no enrichment at all. Will the damage that Israel inflicts from the air be sufficient to coerce Iran into giving up all enrichment?

Jason: It would be rational for Iran to agree to this — but then it would have been rational for it to agree to that and avoid this attack in the first place. Like Hamas, it might prefer a fight to the death even if it ends in defeat.

David: I’d be a lot more willing to slide on modest enrichment capability for civilian uses if there was real assurance on weaponization. The problem with weaponization activity, I’m told by both Israelis and Americans, is that it can be dispersed in different labs, and the strands brought back together at the last minute. That makes the verification job difficult, for sure, but not impossible.

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Max: Do you think Iran has any more cards to play? Its ballistic missile attacks on Israel appear pretty ineffectual because of Israel’s missile defenses and Israeli strikes to take out Iranian missiles before they can be fired. I’m struck by the fact that Iran is not moving to disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. What do you think it is waiting for? Is this intended to deter the U.S. from entering the conflict militarily?

David: I fear that Iran does have some unconventional capabilities that, in extremis, it could use. I wrote last week about Iran‘s back-channel links with al-Qaeda, and in particular with the group’s leadership in Yemen. Al-Qaeda has never given up its interest in mass casualty attacks on the United States and Israel. That’s something I hope counterterrorism experts have a close eye on. There are other ways Iran could raise the ante — involving cyberattacks and other means of disrupting Israeli life. I hope the Israelis are thinking carefully about these “black swan” dangers.

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Max: Do you think Trump should or will join Israel in bombing Iran?

Jason: It seems as though he’s tempted. I think he’s in his strongest position making such threats while he uses Israel for leverage. I think the U.S. should resist direct involvement. However: You have to imagine that pulling Israel back, at this point, would involve a U.S. promise to use its bombing capabilities should Iran prove intransigent again.

David: My sense from talking this week to Trump administration officials is that the president really, really doesn’t want to get involved in military action if he can avoid it. I’m told his basic philosophy for this conflict, and most others, is: “make trade not war.”

Max: Except, of course, he is massively disrupting trade with his tariffs!

David: Consistency is not his strong suit.