Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Daria Novikov, Jessica Sobieski, Justin Young, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Karolina Hird

August 7, 2025, 10:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on August 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US and Russian officials continue to provide updates about a possible meeting between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in the near future, but exact details remain uncertain. A White House official told ABC News, Bloomberg, and the New York Post on August 7 that the United States and Russia have not yet set a location for the meeting, and a White House source told CNN on August 6 that the meeting could occur within the next two weeks (by about August 21).[1] The White House official told Western news outlets that Trump set the condition that Putin must agree to meet bilaterally with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky before Trump would meet with Putin. Putin stated on August 7 that he is not against meeting with Zelensky “in general” but that “certain conditions must be created” before such a meeting.[2] Trump later clarified, however, that Putin does not have to meet with Zelensky before Trump will meet with Putin.[3]

Putin proposed the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a possible location to meet with Trump.[4] Kremlin Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed on August 7 that US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff proposed a trilateral meeting between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin during Witkoff’s August 6 visit to Moscow, but that Russia did not comment on this “option” during the visit.[5] Ushakov stated that Russia wants to first focus on a bilateral Trump-Putin meeting and claimed that the United States and Russia have set a location for this meeting. The Kremlin has attempted to set the pace and sequence of negotiations about temporary ceasefires and a permanent peace in Ukraine since the start of the US effort to hold negotiations to end the war in February 2025.[6] Putin’s efforts to posture himself as amenable to US peace proposals and meaningful negotiations while refusing to meet with Zelensky in the near term are attempts to obfuscate the reality that Putin remains uninterested in ending his war and is attempting to extract bilateral concessions from the United States without meaningfully engaging in a peace process.

Zelensky reiterated his willingness on August 7 to meet with Trump and Putin and commit to a ceasefire.[7] Zelensky listed Ukraine’s top priorities as ceasing casualties and reaching a ceasefire agreement with Russia; a meeting between the heads of state to achieve a lasting peace; and ensuring long-term security with assistance from the United States and Ukraine’s European partners.

Putin may have used his meeting with Witkoff to propose a long-range strikes moratorium, which would allow Russia to stockpile long-range drones and missiles and renew devastating large-scale strikes against Ukraine after the moratorium expires. A strikes moratorium will also handicap Ukraine’s ability to continue its long-range strike campaign aimed at attriting the Russian defense industrial base and wartime economy. Bloomberg reported on August 5, citing people familiar with the situation, that Russia considered accepting a moratorium on long-range strikes in order to mitigate the threat of secondary US sanctions.[8] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, who often reiterates Kremlin rhetorical lines to support the Kremlin’s objectives, claimed on August 1 that he recently told US representatives that Russia is interested in another long-range strikes moratorium.[9] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed on August 6 that Putin gave Witkoff a ceasefire proposal but did not specify the contents of the proposal.[10] Rubio stated that a ceasefire is an important part of the negotiation process because it is difficult to negotiate a permanent peace deal while under fire — reiterating Trump’s preferred timeline of establishing a ceasefire in Ukraine before starting formal peace negotiations to end the war.[11]

Russia has significantly scaled up its drone and missile production in 2025, allowing Russia to rapidly increase the size of its strike packages that it launches against Ukraine. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) assessed on June 9 that Russia can produce roughly 170 Shahed-type drones per day and that Russia plans to increase production capacity to 190 drones per day by the end of 2025.[12] Ukrainian outlet Kyiv Independent reported on June 24 that it received GUR intelligence in early June 2025 that indicated that Russia had stockpiled roughly 600 Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 300 Iskander-K cruise missiles — a stockpile that would last about two years, should Russia sustain its current pace of missile strikes against Ukraine.[13] Russia continues to heavily invest in its long-range drone and missile production capabilities, including by leaning on partners and allies like Belarus, Iran, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and North Korea for weapons provisions, joint production efforts, and sanctions evasion schemes.[14] Russia will only continue to invest in its drone and missile production capabilities and lean on its allies as it prepares for a prolonged war effort in Ukraine and potential future conflict against NATO. The size of Russia’s strike packages against Ukraine will therefore likely only continue to increase, as will the damage to civilian infrastructure and civilian casualties.[15] Russia in 2025 has already conducted over 10 of the largest-ever drone and missile strikes in the war thus far and reportedly seeks to increase the size of its strike packages to contain up to 2,000 drones.[16] A temporary strikes moratorium would also degrade Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign targeting Russia’s defense industrial facilities and energy infrastructure — a campaign that is aimed at targeting Russia’s defense production and energy revenues, as opposed to the solely civilian infrastructure that the Russian campaign often strikes.[17] Any agreement less than a full and long-term cessation in long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure will pose a great threat to Ukraine’s civilian population and infrastructure upon the expiration of the agreement and resumption of long-range Russian strikes.

Putin likely claimed to Witkoff that Russia’s territorial ambitions are limited to the seizure of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Putin is likely attempting to frame Russia’s seizure of the four oblasts as inevitable in order to push Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Kremlin demands. Kremlin sources recently implied to Reuters that Putin remains committed to his demand that Russia occupy all four oblasts before he would be willing to establish a ceasefire — a reiteration of Putin’s June 2024 demand that he and other Kremlin officials have since publicly repeated.[18] A Kremlin source also told Reuters that the Russian General Staff recently told Putin that the frontline in Ukraine will likely “crumble” in two to three months. ISW assessed that the Kremlin is likely leaking this information to try to project confidence in Russia’s military capabilities and, in turn, to undermine Ukrainian and Western morale.

Russia’s occupation of the four oblasts is neither inevitable nor imminent, as Russian forces will face serious operational obstacles in what are likely to be multi-year endeavors. ISW assesses that Russia has yet to seize roughly 6,500 square kilometers of Donetsk Oblast, or about 25 percent of the region. Russian advances aimed at enveloping Pokrovsk have accelerated in recent weeks, but Russian forces have spent the last 18 months trying to seize an area of about 30 square kilometers.[19] Russian forces have been fighting to seize Chasiv Yar (pre-war population of 12,000) since April 2024, and it took Russian forces 26 months to advance 11 kilometers from western Bakhmut to western Chasiv Yar.[20] Russian forces in the Chasiv Yar and Toretsk directions are increasingly threatening the southern tip of Ukraine’s fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast at Kostyantynivka.[21] Kostyantynivka is roughly 30 kilometers from Slovyansk, the northern tip of the fortress belt, and the cities in the fortress belt (Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, and Slovyansk) collectively had a pre-war population of roughly 373,000. Russian forces have not demonstrated the capacity to seize cities of this size since mid-2022, and ISW continues to assess that the seizure of the fortress belt will be a difficult, multiyear effort.[22]

Future Russian operations to seize the entirety of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts will require significant river crossing operations that Russian forces have historically struggled to complete since 2022. Russian forces still have to seize roughly 7,200 square kilometers of Zaporizhia Oblast (about 26 percent of the region) and roughly 7,000 square kilometers in Kherson Oblast (about 26 percent of the region). Russian gains in the Zaporizhia direction in the past two years have mostly consisted of advances in areas that Ukrainian forces liberated during their Summer 2023 counteroffensive, and Russian forces have yet to seize Orikhiv (roughly 35 kilometers southeast of Zaporizhzhia City). Russian forces appear to be trying to advance along the Kamyanske-Stepnohirsk line (west of Orikhiv on the bank of the Dnipro River) northward toward Zaporizhzhia City but are roughly 20 kilometers from the southern outskirts of the city. Zaporizhzhia City had a pre-war population of 706,000 people, and the seizure of the city and the rest of the oblast will require Russian forces to cross the Dnipro River, which runs through the city and separates northwestern Zaporizhia Oblast from the rest of the region. Zaporizhzhia City is a heavily fortified city like those of the Donetsk Oblast fortress belt, and the Russian military command would have to commit a significant contingent of Russian personnel and equipment to the seizure of these cities. The seizure of Kherson Oblast would also require operations to cross the Dnipro River, establish a lodgment on the west (right) bank of the river, and seize Kherson City (pre-war population of 275,000). Russian forces would also have to contend with significant defenses that Ukrainian forces have established on west bank Kherson Oblast since liberating this area in 2022. Russian forces have not conducted a successful cross-river operation at scale across the Dnipro River since Russian forces withdrew to east (left) bank Kherson Oblast in November 2022, and this river crossing occurred as Russian forces attempted to rapidly retreat from oncoming Ukrainian forces. Russia would likely struggle to pursue simultaneous efforts in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts, particularly considering the impacts of three years of war on Russian combat capabilities.

Russian objectives are not limited to the occupation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, however, despite Kremlin attempts to frame Russia’s war aims as such in an effort to make its demands seem more reasonable. Russia has not abandoned its more extensive, original war aims. Statements from Kremlin officials, including Putin, have repeatedly indicated that Russia has more expansive territorial aims in Ukraine beyond the four oblasts.[23] Putin recently claimed that “all of Ukraine” is Russia’s, Russian officials have called for Russia to seize Sumy City, and Kremlin officials routinely label Odesa and Kharkiv cities as “Russian” cities, for example.[24] Russia is also committing significant forces and means to offensive operations beyond the four oblasts, further casting doubt on claims that Russia only seeks to occupy these four regions. Russian forces are currently conducting offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast and northern and eastern Kharkiv Oblast. The Russian military command has committed elements of its relatively more “elite” airborne (VDV) and naval infantry forces to fighting in northern Sumy Oblast and has been intensifying efforts to seize Kupyansk in recent months.[25] The deployment of VDV and naval infantry forces to these sectors suggest some level of prioritization within the Russian General Staff — prioritization that is incongruent with the claim that Russia is only concerned with the seizure of Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts.

Putin’s war aims are also not limited to territory. Kremlin statements continue to indicate that Putin remains committed to replacing the democratically elected Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government, reducing Ukraine’s military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself from future aggression, abolishing NATO’s long-held Open Door Policy, and changing the Ukrainian constitution to commit Ukraine to neutrality.[26] Putin remains committed to destroying the Ukrainian state, identity, and culture and subjugating the Ukrainian people.[27] Russian efforts to conquer all of Ukraine through battlefield gains would take decades should the current rate of advance continue, but Putin’s theory of victory is contingent on the hypothesis that the West will abandon Ukraine long before he must.[28] Putin continues to believe that time is on Russia’s side and that Russia can outlast Ukraine and the West. Economic measures coupled with Western military aid that enables Ukraine to inflict battlefield setbacks on Russian forces remain critical to changing Putin’s calculus and bringing him to the negotiating table willing to make compromises to end the war.

The Kremlin is engaged in a delicate balancing act between feigning interest in negotiations to Trump and conditioning Russian society to accept nothing short of Putin’s desired full victory in Ukraine, no matter how long it takes. Russian State Duma Deputy and former 58th Combined Arms Army Commander Lieutenant General Viktor Sobolev claimed on August 7 that “under no circumstances” should one expect talks between Putin and Trump to end Russia’s war against Ukraine.[29] Sobolev claimed that Russia will not be able to accomplish its war goals with a ceasefire or truce. Sobolev reiterated claims that any peace settlement must eliminate the “initial causes” of the war — a variation on the phrase that Kremlin officials often invoke to refer to NATO expansion and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers.[30] Sobolev repeated Putin’s original war goals to “demilitarize” and “denazify” Ukraine — that is, to significantly constrain the Ukrainian military and replace the Ukrainian government. Sobolev claimed that Russia seeks control over Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and that Russian forces will create “buffer zones” in Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts. Russian forces currently only occupy minuscule parts of Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv oblasts, and Sobolev appears to be demanding that Russia seize additional territory. Russian forces are also notably not operating in Chernihiv and Odesa oblasts, indicating that Sobolev is calling for Russia to launch completely new offensive operations. State Duma Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev claimed on August 7 that Russia will “obviously” not be satisfied with freezing the frontline and that Trump must understand that Russia “cannot be defeated.”[31] State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed on August 7 that Russia has always been ready for peace talks but noted that Russia’s position has not changed since Russia’s pre-war ultimatums in 2021 (when Russia demanded that NATO and the United States cease NATO expansion and limit military activity in Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia).[32] Russian ultranationalist outlet Tsargrad published an op-ed on August 7 claiming that the war in Ukraine is an “internal affair” for Russia.[33] The article claimed that Russia does not want peace with Ukraine, “but peace without Ukraine,” as “there should be no Ukraine.” Russian state media also amplified narratives from Russian officials on August 7 about Ukrainian authorities’ alleged disregard for Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians.[34]

Russian deputies’ statements are largely intended for domestic consumption, and Kremlin-affiliated Russian oligarch, Orthodox nationalist, and Tsargrad founder Konstantin Malofeev often works to condition the Russian nationalist community to support Russia’s war effort.[35] These statements from Russian officials and Russian media are part of the Kremlin’s efforts to prepare Russian society for negotiations to fail and for the war to continue. The Kremlin is setting conditions to accuse Ukraine of not caring about its own population in the event of Ukrainian disagreements with Russian demands in future negotiations. The Kremlin will likely try to use this narrative to shift the blame for failed negotiations onto Ukraine — not Russia — and to justify a prolonged war to the Russian people.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are likely operating west of Kupyansk, indicating that Russian forces may not yet maintain enduring positions on the settlement’s western outskirts in Sobolivka. ISW reported on August 6 that geolocated footage showing two Russian servicemembers moving on foot in fields and windbreaks in Sobolivka (immediately west of Kupyansk) indicated that Russian forces recently advanced to the western outskirts of Kupyansk and seized Sobolivka.[36] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on August 7 that Russian forces have not seized Sobolivka.[37] The milblogger claimed that the footage may show a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group and referenced another milblogger’s claim from late July 2025 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are operating near Kupyansk.[38] Russian forces are increasingly using sabotage and reconnaissance groups to infiltrate behind Ukrainian positions into settlements as part of larger envelopment efforts.[39] ISW assessments of Russian advances based on geolocated footage reflect the observed presence of Russian forces within a given area. ISW’s “Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine” map layer is distinct from the “Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory” layer, for which ISW uses the doctrinal definition of control that imposes a high bar to confirm the exclusion of enemy forces from an area.[40] ISW will continue to monitor the situation for further reporting about Russian activity near Sobolivka.

Key Takeaways:

US and Russian officials continue to provide updates about a possible meeting between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in the near future, but exact details remain uncertain.

Putin may have used his meeting with Witkoff to propose a long-range strikes moratorium, which would allow Russia to stockpile long-range drones and missiles and renew devastating large-scale strikes against Ukraine after the moratorium expires. A strikes moratorium will also handicap Ukraine’s ability to continue its long-range strike campaign aimed at attriting the Russian defense industrial base and wartime economy.

Russia has significantly scaled up its drone and missile production in 2025, allowing Russia to rapidly increase the size of its strike packages that it launches against Ukraine.

Putin likely claimed to Witkoff that Russia’s territorial ambitions are limited to the seizure of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Putin is likely attempting to frame Russia’s seizure of the four oblasts as inevitable in order to push Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Kremlin demands.

Russia’s occupation of the four oblasts is neither inevitable nor imminent, as Russian forces will face serious operational obstacles in what are likely to be multi-year endeavors.

Russian objectives are not limited to the occupation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, however, despite Kremlin attempts to frame Russia’s war aims as such in an effort to make its demands seem more reasonable. Russia has not abandoned its more extensive, original war aims.

Putin’s war aims are also not limited to territory.

The Kremlin is engaged in a delicate balancing act between feigning interest in negotiations to Trump and conditioning Russian society to accept nothing short of Putin’s desired full victory in Ukraine, no matter how long it takes.

Russian forces advanced in the Toretsk direction and likely completed the seizure of Toretsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 6 and August 7 but did not advance.[41]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military infrastructure and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities in the Russian deep rear. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 7 that Ukrainian drones struck the Afipsky Oil Refinery in Afipsky, Krasnodar Krai, overnight on August 6 to 7.[42] Geolocated footage published on August 7 shows a drone strike and subsequent fire at a gas and gas condensate processing unit of the Afipsky Refinery.[43] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the refinery refines 6.25 million tons of oil annually, which is 2.1 percent of Russia’s total oil refining capacity.[44] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces also struck other unspecified Russian defense industrial facilities and are clarifying outcomes. Krasnodar Krai authorities reported that falling drone debris caused a fire that burned down a gas processing unit at the Afipsky Oil Refinery.[45] Russian opposition outlet Astra published footage of a fire at Russian military unit number 61661 in Slavyansk-on-Kuban, Krasnodar Krai and stated that local authorities reported a drone strike on the military unit.[46] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence-focused channel stated on August 7 that drone strikes against the base of unit number 61661 caused a fire at a fuel and lubricant warehouse reportedly belonging to the Russian 76th Separate Repair and Restoration Battalion.[47] Astra also published footage on August 6 of a fire at a railway station in Surovikino, Volgograd Oblast, following a reported Ukrainian drone strike.[48] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrey Bocharov reported on August 7 that Russian air defense repelled drone strikes against Volgograd Oblast and that a fire broke out at an unspecified railway station.[49]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced on the east (left) bank of the Loknya River in Sumy Oblast (northeast of Sumy City).[50]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Kostyantynivka, and Novokostyantynivka; northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Sadky; and southeast of Sumy City near Lukashivka (near the Sumy-Kharkiv Oblast administrative border) on August 6 and 7.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Andriivka, Oleksiivka, Novokostyantynivka, and Stepove; and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, Varachyne, and Sadky.[52]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed that the Russian military command deemed elements of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade unfit for assault tasks and sent the brigade to dig trenches and hold defensive positions near Yunakivka in areas under threat by Ukrainian drones.[53] The milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces broke through defensive positions of the Russian 104th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division) in Yunakivka, compelling Russian military command to divert elements of the 234th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division) from assault missions to reinforce the 104th VDV Regiment.[54] The milblogger stated that there are roughly three such Ukrainian breakthroughs per day. The milblogger noted that the Russian military command is using assault troops to hold fortifications while regular infantry conduct assaults. The milblogger added that elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) recently refused to take up assigned positions in their area of responsibility (AOR).[55] ISW observed reports of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade operating near Kostyantynivka (north of Sumy City) as of August 6.[56]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating on the eastern bank of the Loknya River.[57] Elements of the 1st Battalion of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Oleksiivka.[58] Elements of the 51st VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate near Sadky.[59] Elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz, 11th Separate VDV Brigade, and artillery elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[60] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Velyka Berizka (northwest of Sumy City), Kindrativka, Mohrytsya (northeast of Sumy City), and Luhivka (southeast of Sumy City).[61] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Mykilske (northeast of Sumy City).[62]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Vovchansk and Synelnykove (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[63]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Synelnykove, and Vovchanski Khutory on August 6 and 7.[64]

The commander of a Ukrainian border guard brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported that the Russian military command is constantly concentrating forces for combat operations in the Vovchansk direction and that Russian forces launch daily assaults in fireteams of three to five personnel with support from large numbers of strike and reconnaissance drones.[65] The commander added that Russian forces are landing fiber-optic cable drones in fields near Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs), setting the drones to wait, and then activating the drones to strike passing Ukrainian vehicles.[66] The officer also reported that Russian forces still field tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers to transport infantry during larger-scale assaults.[67]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Chervona Zorya, Neskuchne, and Hoptivka (all north of Kharkiv City).[68]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove.[69]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[70]

Russian forces attacked toward Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka and Myrove; northwest of Kupyansk near Tyshchenkivka; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka, Kindrashivka, and Radkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka, Krasne Pershe, and Kamyanka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Kurylivka on August 6 and 7.[71]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Azimut-31 Detachment (Belgorod Oblast’s volunteer unit) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kupyansk.[72]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Olhivka on August 6 and 7.[73]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Lyman near Karpivka, Serednie, and Shandryholove; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; and east of Lyman near Zarichne and in the Serebryanske forest area.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that at least part of Zarichne is a contested “gray zone.”[75]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Karpivka and toward Serednie and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Lypove, and Zelena Dolyna and toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, Myrne, and Yampolivka; and east of Lyman near Torske, Dibrova, and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 6 and 7.[76]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on August 7 that the Russian military command is sending poorly equipped and supplied personnel to conduct attritional infantry-led assaults.[77]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Lyman direction.[78]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; south of Siversk near Pereizne; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on August 6 and 7.[79]

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets, operating in the Siversk direction, stated that Russian forces recently intensified their offensive activity and are attempting to bypass Siversk from the directions of Hryhorivka, Serebryanka, and the Serebryanske forest area.[80] Zaporozhets stated that Ukrainian forces are anticipating that Russian forces will soon resume offensives in the Siversk direction from the Toresk direction in an effort to consolidate the frontlines and put more pressure on Ukrainian defenses in Kostyantynivka. Zaporozhets added that Russian forces are currently taking a tactical pause in the Siversk direction and are not conducting active assaults against Kostyantynivka but are instead launching artillery and air strikes against the city. Zaporozhets added that Russian shelling increased from five to 10 artillery fires per day to between 150 and 180.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Serebryanka.[81]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of southern Chasiv Yar.[82]

Russian forces attacked north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Predtechyne on August 6 and 7.[83]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 7 indicates that Russian forces advanced to central Katerynivka (immediately northwest of Toretsk) and central Shcherbynivka (immediately west of Toretsk) during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault, indicating that Russian forces likely recently completed the seizure of Toretsk.[84]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east and southeast of Oleksandro-Shultyne (north of Toretsk), east of Nelipivka, and northeast and southwest of Rusyn Yar (both northwest of Toretsk).[85]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk near Pleshchiivka; north of Toretsk toward Oleksandro-Shultyne; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and northwest of Toretsk near Popiv Yar, Poltavka, Katerynivka, Yablunivka, Oleksandro-Kalynove, and Rusyn Yar on August 6 and 7.[86]

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction stated that the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 54th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 3rd CAA, SMD) and the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD), including its 68th Tank Regiment, are relatively well-trained units and that elements of these units recently redeployed to the Toretsk direction.[87] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are only conducting infantry assaults and not fielding heavy military equipment, and that Russian forces are actively operating fiber-optic and reconnaissance drones in the Toretsk direction.

A Russian milblogger published footage purportedly showing a Russian FAB-3000 glide bomb strike near Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[88]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 39th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are attacking toward Rusyn Yar (northwest of Toretsk) from Poltavka.[89] Drone operators of the Berkut Group of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Kostyantynivka.[90]

Elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka.[91] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Oleksandro-Kalynove.[92] Elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet unit) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[93] Elements of the 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly fighting near Oleksandro-Shultyne.[94]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets stated that Russian forces are attempting to seize Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk), indicating that Ukrainian forces may have retaken some or all of the settlement.[95] ISW assessed that Russian forces seized Kotlyne as of January 24, and a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on February 26 that Ukrainian forces had retaken Kotlyne.[96] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Pokrovsk.[97]

Russian forces attacked north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Sukhetske and toward Krasnyi Lyman; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Mayak, Novoekonomichne, Boykivka, Nykanorivka, Zatyshok, and Mykolaivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne and toward Molodetske on August 6 and 7.[98] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Mayak and Udachne.[99]

The chief sergeant of a Ukrainian drone platoon operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are attempting to bypass and envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad and noted that Russian forces are using motorcycles, buggies, and first-person view (FPV) and fiber-optic drones in attacks.[100] The communications department head of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are utilizing injured personnel in attempts to infiltrate Pokrovsk.[101] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces sometimes wear civilian clothes or clothes with Ukrainian patterns to evade detection and merge with the terrain.[102] Wearing civilian clothing in combat operations is perfidy under international law, which prohibits killing, injuring, or capturing an adversary by resort to perfidy.[103]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly attacking toward Volodymyrivka and Mayak.[104] Mashovets stated that elements of the 1st and 9th motorized rifle brigades (both 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating northeast of Pokrovsk near Fedorivka and Razine and north of Pokrovsk toward Rodynske. Mashovets stated that elements of the 1441st Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely comprised of mobilized personnel) are simultaneously attempting to retain control over Zvirove. Elements of the Russian Somali Battalion of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[105]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 7 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced northeast of Yalta (south of Novopavlivka).[106]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka and Novomykailivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and near Zelenyi Kut; south of Novopavlivka near Zaporizhzhia; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and Tovste and toward Filiya on August 6 and 7.[107] Mashovets and a Russian milblogger stated that Ukrainian forces counterattacked between Kotlyarivka and Horikhove (both northeast of Novopavlivka) and near Filiya and Dachne (south of Novopavlivka).[108]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are operating near Kotlyarivka and Horikhove.[109] Mashovets stated that elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are operating toward Zelenyi Hai and Ivanivka (both southwest of Novopavlivka).[110] Elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Dnipropetrovsk (Novopavlivka) direction.[111]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) advanced 1.5 kilometers northeast of Oleksandrohrad (northeast of Velykomykhailivka) with support of elements of the 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA).[112] Mashovets stated that Russian forces also seized Voskresenka (east of Velykomykhailivka) and consolidated positions within the settlement.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne and toward Oleksandrohrad and Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Novomykhailivka near Voskresenka; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka and Novopil and toward Zaporizke on August 6 and 7.[113]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are operating near Voskresenka, Maliivka, and Sichneve (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[114] Mashovets stated that elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) and the 69th Cover Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are operating near Shevchenko and Komyshuvakha (both southeast of Velykomykhailivka). Mashovets stated that elements of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade or 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (both 5th CAA, EMD), are operating southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Novopil and Temyrivka. Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Zaporizke, Sichneve, Berezove, and Kalynivkse (both south of Velykomykhailivka).[115]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 7.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Ternove (southeast of Hulyaipole).[116]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced to northern Plavni and made advances northeast of Kamyanske and near Stepnohirsk (all west of Orikhiv).[117]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv toward Novodanylivka; and west of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka and toward Plavni and Stepnohirsk on August 6 and 7.[118] Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stepnohirsk.[119]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Novoandriivka (west of Orikhiv).[120] Elements of the 108th and 247th Airborne (VDV) regiments (both 7th VDV Division), are reportedly operating near Kamyanske.[121]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on August 7 but did not advance.[122]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces on the right (west) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[123]

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian military targets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) published footage on August 7 showing Ukrainian drones striking Russian Nebo-SVU, Podlyot K-1, and 96L6E radar stations, a Raptor-class project 02510 landing craft, and the air defense base of the Russian 3rd Radio Engineer Regiment (Russian Aerospace Forces’ [VKS] radio engineering troops) in unspecified locations in occupied Crimea.[124]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on August 6 to 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russia launched 112 Shahed-type strike and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[125] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 89 strike and decoy drones and that 23 Russian drones struck 11 unspecified locations in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged residential buildings and transportation infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[126]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 7 that Russian forces currently launch about 200 guided glide bombs against Ukraine per day.[127]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) submitted a draft law to the Belarusian House of Representatives on August 7 that proposes amending the criteria for adopting martial law in Belarus to include attacks on the Union State and CSTO member states.[128]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/06/europe/putin-witkoff-meeting-constructive-kremlin-says-intl; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-07/russia-says-putin-trump-meeting-to-take-place-in-next-few-days; https://nypost.com/2025/08/07/us-news/trump-to-meet-putin-in-coming-days-with-venue-to-be-announced-later-kremlin-says/; ttps://abcnews.go.com/International/kremlin-trump-putin-agreed-meeting-coming-days/story?id=124438908&cid=social_twitter_abcn

[2] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77728

[3] https://x.com/Archer83Able/status/1953555552627576928; https://x.com/annmarie/status/1953554705277497696; https://x.com/christopherjm/status/1953561690118766911?s=46

[4] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77728

[5] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77725; https://t.me/tass_agency/329676; https://t.me/tass_agency/329678; https://t.me/MID_Russia/63555 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/08/07/kreml-rossiya-i-ssha-dogovorilis-o-vstreche-putina-i-trampa-v-blizhayshie-dni

[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072425; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022625

[7] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15536; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15551; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/prezidenti-ukrayini-ta-franciyi-obminyalisya-detalyami-konta-99393

[8] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-05/russia-weighs-ukraine-air-truce-offer-to-trump-without-ending-war

[9] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/24688783

[10] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/08/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-with-larry-kudlow-of-fox-business-network

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225;

[12] https://mezha dot media/oboronka/chi-bude-1000-shahediv-za-nich-302439/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2025

[13] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025; https://kyivindependent dot com/investigation-russia-expands-strategic-plant-producing-icbms-with-chinas-help/

[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar073125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072625

[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-9-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2025

[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-battlefield-air-interdiction; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2025

[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070725; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070525

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073125

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625

[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar053125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225

[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031925

[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071225; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060225; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025

[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125

[27] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825

[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071425; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2025 https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2025 https://isw.pub/UkrWar061424

[29] https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/news/2025/08/07/26444930.shtml

[30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024

[31] https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/13436 ; https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/13434

[32] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/08/07/v-rossii-vyskazalis-ob-ozhidaniyah-ot-vstrechi-putina-i-trampa/

[33] https://tsargrad dot tv/articles/ukraina-raspolzjotsja-do-urala-esli-peregovory-neizbezhny-bej-pervym_1330855

[34] https://t.me/MID_Russia/63567; https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/13428; https://t.me/tass_agency/329569; https://t.me/tass_agency/329570; https://t.me/tass_agency/329663; https://t.me/tass_agency/329574; https://t.me/tass_agency/329575; https://t.me/tass_agency/329776; https://t.me/tass_agency/329769

[35] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/primer-russian-cognitive-warfare

[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2025; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9758

[37] https://t.me/rybar/72676

[38] https://t.me/kcaebirds/1820

[39] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072725; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072225;

[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Cartographical%20Methodology%20Explanation%20ISW%20CTP%202022.pdf

[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532

[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27522; https://suspilne dot media/1085219-gur-ta-sili-oboroni-urazili-naftopererobnij-zavod-u-krasnodaskomu-krai-rf/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/88909 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/08/07/drony-vsu-atakovali-krasnodarskiy-kray-proizoshel-pozhar-na-neftepererabatyvayuschemzavode

[43] https://t.me/supernova_plus/42433; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1953435619348103417; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1953435701699051918; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1953314750084874734; https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1953413656068215217

[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27522

[45] https://t.me/opershtab23/13899

[46] https://t.me/astrapress/88886 ; https://t.me/astrapress/88881 ; https://t.me/astrapress/88898

[47] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/11872

[48] https://t.me/astrapress/88878 ; https://t.me/astrapress/88880 ; https://t.me/astrapress/88882

[49] https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1953340389148053703 ; https://t.me/rgn_34/9609 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1953341054062637162; https://t.me/tass_agency/329632

[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32163

[51] https://t.me/wargonzo/28324; https://t.me/severnnyi/4752; https://t.me/rusich_army/25084; https://t.me/tass_agency/329670

[52] https://t.me/tass_agency/329670; https://t.me/severnnyi/4752; https://t.me/rusich_army/25084

[53] https://t.me/severnnyi/4753

[54] https://t.me/severnnyi/4756

[55] https://t.me/severnnyi/4752

[56] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2025

[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32163; https://t.me/severnnyi/4753

[58] https://t.me/severnnyi/4752

[59] https://t.me/severnnyi/4752

[60] https://t.me/dva_majors/76910; https://t.me/severnnyi/4753;

[61] https://t.me/bear007/73394; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175105

[62] https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/380; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175151

[63] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32152; https://t.me/severnnyi/4752

[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/wargonzo/28324; https://t.me/tass_agency/329641

[65] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wn0NmT8f2mg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/07/sidayut-na-dorozi-chekayut-na-tehniku-zasyllya-vorozhyh-dronnyh-zasidok-na-vovchanskomu-napryamku/

[66] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wn0NmT8f2mg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/07/sidayut-na-dorozi-chekayut-na-tehniku-zasyllya-vorozhyh-dronnyh-zasidok-na-vovchanskomu-napryamku/

[67] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wn0NmT8f2mg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/07/sidayut-na-dorozi-chekayut-na-tehniku-zasyllya-vorozhyh-dronnyh-zasidok-na-vovchanskomu-napryamku/

[68] https://t.me/bear007/73394; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175105

[69] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32152

[70] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32178

[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40084; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32178; https://t.me/rybar/72676; https://t.me/dva_majors/76903

[72] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13772

[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176

[74] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32180; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66487; https://t.me/milinfolive/154239; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97240; https://t.me/tass_agency/329635

[75] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97240

[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66487; https://t.me/wargonzo/28324; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32180; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/22276; https://t.me/milinfolive/15423; https://t.me/dva_majors/76903; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97240

[77] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/07/prosto-jdut-u-pustyh-bronikah-poblyzu-lymanu-rosiyany-pryrecheno-chvalayut-vmyraty-z-minimumom-amunicziyi/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GuRX3eyVWyA&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8

[78] https://t.me/voin_dv/16354

[79] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176

[80] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/07/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-yak-vorog-zastosovuyu-taktyku-tysyachi-poriziv/

[81] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40119

[82] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66512

[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176

[84] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1953363367231377818; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30102; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/1449; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9761

[85] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66512; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40100; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40137; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175106; https://t.me/dva_majors/76903; https://t.me/wargonzo/28324

[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66512

[87] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/07/zayihaty-na-bud-yaki-pozycziyi-cze-fart-na-toreczkomu-napryamku-drony-lyutuyut-v-kilzoni/

[88] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175132

[89] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2907

[90] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14157

[91] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40100

[92] https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/379

[93] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97261

[94] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40144

[95] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2907

[96] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025

[97] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40106

[98] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40106; https://t.me/wargonzo/28324; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2907

[99] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2907

[100] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/07/drg-ta-vulychni-boyi-okupanty-namagayutsya-vzyaty-pokrovsk-v-kilcze/

[101] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/07/probuvav-na-mylyczyah-prosuvatysya-pid-pokrovskom-menshaye-rosiyan-vidpravlyayut-atakuvaty-poranenyh/

[102] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/07/maskarad-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-protyvnyk-pochav-chastishe-zminyuvaty-taktyku/

[103] https://casebook dot icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/perfidy?afd_azwaf_tok=eyJraWQiOiJCMERCQzkzNTgwRTlCM0FCNzJBRUMyRDQ4RjU0MDYwRkI5Rjc2ODIzMEE5OUJDOEEyQUE0MUEwMkE0RjIzNTUzIiwiYWxnIjoiUlMyNTYifQ.eyJhdWQiOiJjYXNlYm9vay5pY3JjLm9yZyIsImV4cCI6MTc1NDYxMTExNywiaWF0IjoxNzU0NjExMTA3LCJpc3MiOiJ0aWVyMS04NGZiZjk3ODU5LXZoOTI0Iiwic3ViIjoiMTI2OjUyMDE6MjAyOmQwZDY6OWM3Yjo4OTgyOjVjYmE6NTg2IiwiZGF0YSI6eyJ0eXBlIjoiaXNzdWVkIiwicmVmIjoiMjAyNTA4MDdUMjM1ODI3Wi0xODRmYmY5Nzg1OXZoOTI0aEMxQkwxcTMwczAwMDAwMDA2ZjAwMDAwMDAwMDd2cjAiLCJiIjoieEJoNDRvS0VKcUFFSktkVWMzMm1fUkJreEZqLTE2enJIZk41a0RQU1VhRSIsImgiOiJtUkdoZzJvaUNsSU9SSzJwanctNmFieFYyUmRjZXVqRWpyTnhacEZybHlNIn19.be5B7dfTWqsKZ1MIYH9FAs3_CFJZKwKIls7kBcCyi8vpWduHztz9L0jZiMePWLKGugJqmVuikjuvgBT8m9_jviF1Sr76dx3HCdSW6E0Tb6RVCiUCHfp9moi3eZCaN3rlsnC2Rz_CaJP8XUuC79BWRp5_fBZ34MWIKgoebYcTJJwqZ4knKkt-0PaoGLx2J1cXQU_POnMu6nXPg6NZKogtmVnLlm_xg-hHx6L8k7_deyyAO1teP5ddja7_GENEslr4QrL6Xc8wHkFx9odDVG06UxlCTgFmf47DB6Le4VueZrDgqWMK0g7L_sEKDUHEZ7DeTWASBkREiJRoOlZem-R6Og.WF3obl2IDtqgvMFRqVdYkD5s

[104] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2907

[105] https://t.me/basurin_e/20296

[106] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32154

[107] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32154

[108] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32154; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2908

[109] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2908

[110] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2909

[111] https://t.me/dva_majors/76913

[112] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2909

[113] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176; https://t.me/wargonzo/28324

[114] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2909

[115] https://t.me/voin_dv/16357; https://t.me/voin_dv/16357

[116] https://t.me/voin_dv/16363

[117] https://t.me/wargonzo/28324; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175106; https://t.me/rusich_army/25089

[118] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/dva_majors/76903; https://t.me/rusich_army/25089; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32192

[119] https://t.me/rusich_army/25089; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32192

[120] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97260

[121] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32192

[122] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02hpJQkC51M21tFvcKjfmJrfmWXHk6G2JtK9np1WBQTkFATLwDdmdzTX5ocZPqaEhQl

[123] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32163

[124] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6583; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1085223-gur-pokazalo-rezultati-roboti-u-krimu-urazeno-bazu-ppo-na-aj-petri-desantnij-kater-ta-radiolokacijni-stancii/; https://gur dot gov.ua/content/vorozhi-rls-u-kupolakh-desantnyi-kater-baza-ppo-na-aipetri-cherhova-zdobych-rozvidnykiv-u-krymu.html

[125] https://t.me/kpszsu/40028

[126] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/23430; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1084861-masovana-dronova-ataka-po-dnipropetrovsini-cetvero-poranenih-gorili-avto-i-budinki-zniseno-33-bpla/

[127] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15537

[128] https://belta dot by/society/view/deputat-polozhenija-voennoj-doktriny-budut-zakrepleny-zakonodatelno-730736-2025/

Angelica Evans, Anna Harvey, Daria Novikov, Jennie Olmsted, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 9, 2025, 6:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:00 pm ET on August 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Trump Administration has described Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reported demands for a ceasefire in Ukraine in four different ways since August 6. The exact details of Putin’s position remain unclear. German outlet BILD reported on August 9 that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff misunderstood Putin’s demand for Ukraine to withdraw from the remainder of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, in addition to the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, as an offer for Russia to withdraw from occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts during the August 6 Putin-Witkoff meeting.[1] BILD reported that Witkoff also misunderstood Putin’s proposal for an energy infrastructure and long-range strikes ceasefire, and that Witkoff interpreted Putin’s offer as a general ceasefire that would curtail frontline military activity. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that European officials familiar with the conversation and call stated that US President Donald Trump, presumably after being briefed by Witkoff, told Ukrainian and European officials on August 6 that Putin would withdraw from occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts in exchange for Ukraine ceding unoccupied areas of Donetsk Oblast.[2] The officials told WSJ that Witkoff walked back Trump’s statement during a call with European officials on August 7 and stated that Russia would “both withdraw and freeze” the frontline, presumably referring to Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. European officials reportedly asked Witkoff to further clarify Putin’s demand during a call on August 8, and Witkoff stated that the “only offer” on the table was for Ukraine to unilaterally withdraw from Donetsk Oblast in exchange for a ceasefire. Ukrainian outlet Kyiv Independent reported that a source in Ukraine’s Presidential Office briefed on the Putin-Witkoff meeting, presumably by Witkoff himself, stated that Putin also offered to withdraw from northeastern Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts as a “sign of goodwill” in exchange for Ukraine ceding the remainder of unoccupied Donetsk Oblast.[3] The source stated that Putin reportedly told Witkoff that Putin would be willing to freeze the frontline in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Bloomberg reported on August 8 that unnamed sources stated that Putin demanded that Ukraine withdraw from the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and concede occupied Crimea to Russia in exchange for freezing the frontline in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts and beginning negotiations on a ceasefire agreement.[4] It remains unclear, based on Western reporting, if Putin ever truly offered to withdraw from occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky rejected Putin’s demand.[5]

The only element of Putin’s reported position common to all reports is Putin’s continued demand for Ukraine to withdraw from unoccupied areas of Donetsk Oblast — a major Ukrainian concession. Conceding to such a demand would force Ukraine to abandon its “fortress belt,” the main fortified defensive line in Donetsk Oblast since 2014 — with no guarantee that fighting will not resume.[6] Ukraine’s fortress belt stymied Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast in 2014 and 2022 and is still impeding Russia’s efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast in 2025, as ISW has recently described. The fortress belt is a significant obstacle to Russia’s current path of advance westward in Ukraine, and surrendering the remainder of Donetsk Oblast as the prerequisite of a ceasefire with no commitment to a final peace settlement would position Russian forces extremely well to renew their attacks on more favorable terms, having avoided a long and bloody struggle for the ground.[7]

Ukrainian and European officials reportedly presented a counterproposal to US officials on August 9 as European officials continue to issue statements of support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. WSJ reported on August 9 that Ukraine and European leaders proposed a counteroffer to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s demands for Ukrainian territorial concessions as a precondition to ceasefire during a meeting with US Vice President JD Vance in the United Kingdom (UK) on August 9.[8] WSJ reported that the counteroffer stipulates that a full ceasefire in Ukraine must be implemented prior to territorial negotiations, in accordance with US President Donald Trump’s previously articulated preferred timeline for an end to Russia’s war against Ukraine.[9] WSJ reported that the counteroffer also states that territorial exchanges should be conducted in a reciprocal manner and that Ukraine must receive robust security guarantees in exchange for any Ukrainian territorial concessions to prevent future Russian aggression against Ukraine. WSJ reported that Finnish President Alexander Stubb presented the Ukrainian-European counterproposal to Trump during a phone call on August 9. European leaders, including UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, French President Emmanuel Macron, Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys, Latvian Foreign Minister Baiba Braze, and Romanian Foreign Minister Toiu Oana, expressed support for Ukraine’s efforts to achieve a just and lasting resolution to Russia’s war on August 9.[10]

Russian officials welcomed the announcement that US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet in Alaska on August 15 and referenced Russian narratives about Russia’s historical claims to Alaska. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed that Alaska is a logical meeting place due to the fact that the United States and Russia are close neighbors across the Bering Strait and share economic interests in Alaska and the Arctic region.[11] Leading Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev, who attended the August 6 meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff, described Alaska on August 9 as “a Russian-born American” and claimed that Alaska reflects the ties between the United States and Russia.[12] Dmitriev also noted Alaska’s historic ties to the Russian Orthodox Church and Russia’s past military and economic presence in Alaska.[13] Russian officials and state media have previously claimed that the United States should return Alaska to Russia. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed in January 2024 that Russia has been waiting for the United States to return Alaska “any day” in response to a US Department of State statement to the contrary.[14] Russian TV hosts and propagandists Vladimir Solovyov and Olga Skabeyeva repeatedly claimed in 2024 that the United States should return Alaska to Russia.[15] Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin claimed in July 2022 that Russia would claim Alaska as its own if the United States froze foreign-based Russian assets.[16] Russian state media outlet RT claimed in October 2018 that Russia should demand Alaska back from the United States after the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.[17]

Ukraine continues its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on August 9 that it conducted a drone strike against a Russian Shahed drone warehouse in Kzyl Yul, Republic of Tatarstan and that the drone strike started a fire at the warehouse.[18] The SBU stated that Russia stored Shahed drones and related foreign-sourced components at the facility. Kzyl Yul is located roughly 43 kilometers from the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) near Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan, where Russia has based a large-scale Shahed drone production facility.[19] Ukrainian outlets Suspilne and Militarnyi reported that sources within Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that GUR conducted a sabotage operation in Afipsky, Krasnodar Krai on August 8, causing two explosions near a checkpoint on the Russian 90th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade’s (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) base.[20]

Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) replaced Northern Grouping of Forces and Leningrad Military District (LMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin with Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov. Several Russian milbloggers claimed on August 8 that the Russian military command appointed Nikiforov as the new commander of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces, replacing Lapin, who has held the position since Fall 2024.[21] Russian milbloggers have been highly critical of Lapin for Russia’s failure to establish a buffer zone in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[22] Nikiforov has reportedly been overseeing Russia’s response to the August 2025 Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and subsequent Russian offensive into northern Sumy Oblast alongside Lapin since mid-August 2024.[23] A Kremlin insider source claimed that Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov is a close ally of Nikiforov and likely had a role in Nikiforov’s appointment.[24] Neither Russian state media nor the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has yet confirmed Nikiforov’s appointment, and Lapin’s next assignment remains unclear.

Key Takeaways:

The Trump Administration has described Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reported demands for a ceasefire in Ukraine in four different ways since August 6. The exact details of Putin’s position remain unclear.

The only element of Putin’s reported position common to all reports is Putin’s continued demand for Ukraine to withdraw from unoccupied areas of Donetsk Oblast — a major Ukrainian concession.

Ukrainian and European officials reportedly presented a counterproposal to US officials on August 9 as European officials continue to issue statements of support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Russian officials welcomed the announcement that US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet in Alaska on August 15 and referenced Russian narratives about Russia’s historical claims to Alaska.

Ukraine continues its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities.

Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) replaced Northern Grouping of Forces and Leningrad Military District (LMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin with Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov.

Ukrainian forces advanced near Kupyansk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 8 and 9, but there were no advances.[25]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to cross the border near Malev, Bryansk Oblast (southwest of Bryansk City) on August 9.[26]

Russian sources claimed on August 9 that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Tetkino and near Novyi Put (both southwest of Glushkovo) and near Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[27]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Fighting continued in northern Sumy Oblast on August 9.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed on August 9 that Ukrainian forces crossed into Kursk Oblast near Novokostyantynivka (north of Sumy City) and that Russian forces retreated from Stepne (northwest of Sumy City) and Novokostyantynivka.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[29]

Russian forces attacked in northern Sumy Oblast, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Andriivka, and Oleksiivka and toward Novokostyantynivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on August 8 and 9.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Yunakivka.[31]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[32] Elements of the Russian 11th Separate VDV Brigade and 234th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division) reportedly relieved the 83rd Separate VDV Brigade in the Sumy direction.[33] Additional elements of the 76th VDV Division are reportedly operating in Yunakivka.[34] Elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynivka (north of Sumy City).[35] Elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial reserve call up) are reportedly operating in northern Sumy Oblast.[36] Drone operators of the pro-Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Aida Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Sumy direction.[37]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on August 9 that Russian forces advanced in Vovchansk and near Vovchansky Khutoryi, Ohirtseve, and Hatyshche (all northeast of Kharkiv City) and near Lypsti (north of Kharkiv City).[38]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on August 8 and 9.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 8 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Synelnykove (northeast of Kharkiv City).[40]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed on August 9 that Russian forces are struggling to maintain positions and advance near Vovchansk, and that Russian forces recently retreated in some areas.[41]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 9.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently retook and advanced southwest of Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk).[42]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized a railway station northeast of Kupyansk.[43]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka; northwest of Kupyansk near Myrove and toward Kovalivka; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; and northeast of Kupyansk toward Kolodyazne, Petro-Ivanivka, and Novovasylivka on August 8 and 9.[44]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Stepova Novoselivka (southwest of Kupyansk).[45] Drone operators of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kupyansk with fiber optic Groza Leska drones.[46]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova toward Nova Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Olhivka on August 8 and 9 but did not advance.[47]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within southern Karpivka (north of Lyman) and up to the northern outskirts of Serednie (northwest of Lyman).[48]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Serednie and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Karpivka and Ridkodub and toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Yampolivka; east of Lyman near Zarichne, Dibrova, and Torske; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 8 and 9.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Torske.[50]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced from Dibrova (northeast of Siversk) toward Serebryanka (south of Dibrova).[51]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and southwest of Siversk near Pereizne and Fedorivka on August 8 and 9.[52]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself on August 8 and 9 but did not advance.[53]

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets refuted claims that Russian forces seized Chasiv Yar and stated that Ukrainian forces still maintain positions in a majority of the settlement.[54] Zaporozhets stated that Ukrainian shelling is preventing Russian forces from attacking toward Kostyantynivka from the Chasiv Yar direction.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on August 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk), and Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov credited elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) with seizing the settlement.[55] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also seized Shcherbynivka.[56] Another milblogger, however, claimed that while elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) advanced in northern Shcherbynivka, other milbloggers’ claims that Russian forces seized the settlement are premature.[57] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps [AC]) advanced into southern Oleksandro-Shultyne (north of Toretsk).[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups advanced to the Kleban Byk reservoir (northwest of Toretsk), although the milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions east of the reservoir.[59]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Bila Hora, Oleskandro-Shultyne, and Dyliivka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and northwest of Toretsk near Poltavka, Rusyn Yar, Pleshchiivka, and Katerynivka and toward Stepanivka on August 8 and 9.[60]

The chief of staff of a Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion operating in the Toretsk direction reported that Russian forces changed their tactics in the battalion’s area of responsibility (AOR) after suffering massive armored vehicle losses, presumably referring to Russian armored vehicle losses in 2024.[61] The chief of staff reported that Russian forces currently primarily use armored vehicles as a disposable way to transport infantry to the frontline and typically do not expect the vehicles to return. The chief of staff reported that Russian forces attack in small fire teams and are using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs).

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are reportedly operating near the Kleban Byk reservoir.[62]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are operating near Dobropillya (north of Pokrovsk).[63]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Nove Shakhove, Dorozhne, Sukhetske, Zatyshok, Boikivka, Volodymyrivka, Chervonyi Lyman, Novoekonomichne, and Myrolyubivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, Kotlyne, and Molodetske on August 8 and 9.[64] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from the Tsentralna Mine in central Myrnohrad and near Chunyshyne and Novopavlivka (both immediately south of Pokrovsk).[65] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Chunyshyne is a contested “gray zone.”[66]

Ukrainian Dnipro Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on August 9 that Russian forces have a manpower advantage in the Pokrovsk direction.[67] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction noted that units of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are disrupting Ukrainian logistics in the area.[68] The spokesperson stated that Rubikon units are training and improving other drone units in the area and forming new tactical drone groups near Pokrovsk. The commander of a Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces have intensified attacks near Pokrovsk.[69]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Zelenyi Kut; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zaporizhzhia, Zelenyi Hai, and Tovste on August 8 and 9.[70] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Dachne.[71]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating near Novopavlivka.[72] Elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Dnipropetrovsk (Novopavlivka) direction.[73]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced one kilometer toward Komyshuvakha (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[74]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka toward Andriivka-Klevtsove, east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and Voskresenka, and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka, Sichneve, Vilne Pole, and Komyshuvakha on August 8 and 9.[75]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Andriivka-Klevtsove.[76]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Temyrivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[77]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Temyrivka, Olhivske, Novopil, and Novoukrainka and east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on August 8 and 9.[78]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Olhivske, Poltavka (northeast of Hulyaipole), and Zelenyi Hai (east of Hulyaipole).[79] Drone operators of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Zaporizhia Oblast.[80]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[81]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv toward Novodanylivka and west of Orikhiv near Kamyanske and Stepnohirsk and toward Novoandriivka on August 8 and 9.[82] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kamyanske and Plavni (west of Orikhiv).[83]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions toward Orikhiv.[84] Drone operators of the 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Stepnohirsk.[85]

Russian forces continued attacks in the Kherson direction on August 9 but did not advance.[86]

Ukrainian officials reported on August 9 that a Russian drone struck a civilian bus near Kherson City, killing two civilians.[87]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on August 8 to 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russia launched 47 Shahed-type strike and decoy drones and two Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[88] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces targeted frontline areas in Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Donetsk oblasts with drones and Dnipro City with cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 16 drones and one Iskander-K cruise missile and that 31 Russian drones struck 15 locations in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged residential infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast. Zolochiv City Military Administration Head Viktor Kovalenko told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on August 9 that at least three Russian jet-engine drones, likely Geran-3s, struck a former hospital building in Zolochiv (northwest of Kharkiv City).[89]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.bild dot de/politik/ausland-und-internationales/friedlicher-rueckzug-hat-trumps-mann-putin-falsch-verstanden-6895de301174f91cb081eb54

[2] https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraine-and-europe-counter-putins-cease-fire-proposal-6a16133c?st=XtqGt5&reflink=article_copyURL_share

[3] https://kyivindependent.com/exclusive-putin-to-demand-ukraine-cede-new-territory-in-alaska-peace-plan-us-likely-to-agree-kyiv-to-reject/

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2025

[5] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15575 ; https://suspilne dot media/1086707-zelenskij-vikluciv-bud-aki-teritorialni-postupki-rosii/; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/vidpovid-na-ukrayinske-teritorialne-pitannya-ye-vzhe-v-konst-99445

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2025

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2025

[8] https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraine-and-europe-counter-putins-cease-fire-proposal-6a16133c?st=XtqGt5&reflink=article_copyURL_share

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050925

[10] https://x.com/EmmanuelMacron/status/1954201798484381980; https://x.com/Tsahkna/status/1954088534106616063 ; https://x.com/Braze_Baiba/status/1954103784453349728 ; https://x.com/BudrysKestutis/status/1954111017673216350; https://x.com/oana_toiu/status/1954255014169563570; https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-call-with-president-zelenskyy-of-ukraine-9-august-2025

[11] https://t.me/tass_agency/330036 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77745; https://t.me/news_kremlin/6121; https://t.me/tass_agency/330038

[12] https://t.me/tass_agency/330048 ; https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/1953940768952893899

[13] https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/1953940768952893899; https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/1954177766267420898 ; https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/1954148333406019993

[14] https://x.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1749520810933404072

[15] https://www.newsweek.com/vladimir-solovyov-calls-alaskas-return-russia-2006979 ; https://www.newsweek.com/russian-state-tv-us-threat-alaska-1931298

[16] https://alaskapublic.org/news/2022-07-06/putins-aide-threatens-to-claim-back-alaska-in-response-to-us-sanctions

[17] https://www.rt dot com/russia/442754-us-russia-inf-alaska/

[18] https://ssu.gov dot ua/novyny/bezpilotnyky-sbu-vrazyly-terminal-zberihannia-shakhediv-u-tatarstani; https://t.me/SBUkr/1552

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062825

[20] https://suspilne dot media/1086555-gur-atakuvalo-zenitno-raketnu-brigadu-rf-u-krasnodarskomu-krai-dzerela/; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/diu-attacked-russian-anti-aircraft-missile-brigade-in-krasnodar-territory/

[21] https://t.me/pograni4nik_iz_ada/11777 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66550 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/154390 https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-26-2024 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97363

[22] https://t.me/akashevarova/8124 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4772 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4773 https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2025

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2024

[24] https://t.me/arbat/2133

[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27625; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599

[26] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97392; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66567; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32261; https://t.me/dva_majors/77104 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/24281

[27] https://t.me/tass_agency/330035; https://t.me/severnnyi/4774 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40264

[28] https://t.me/severnnyi/4777 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4774

[29] https://t.me/wargonzo/28362

[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27625; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32256; https://t.me/wargonzo/28362; https://t.me/severnnyi/4774; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32256

[31] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40253

[32] https://t.me/severnnyi/4774

[33] https://t.me/severnnyi/4774

[34] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40253

[35] https://t.me/severnnyi/4774

[36] https://t.me/severnnyi/4774

[37] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5894

[38] https://t.me/wargonzo/28362; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40293 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32235

[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27625; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15308; https://t.me/tass_agency/330045

[40] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32235

[41] https://t.me/severnnyi/4774

[42] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1953931316077932656; https://t.me/mangustzzzz/983

[43] https://t.me/wargonzo/28362

[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27625; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15308; https://t.me/wargonzo/28362

[45] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40301; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40247

[46] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97387

[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15308

[48] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40246; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66546

[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27625; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15308; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40246; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66546; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32234; https://t.me/wargonzo/28362; https://t.me/tass_agency/330057

[50] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66546

[51] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66544

[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27625 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15308 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66544

[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27625 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15308

[54] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/09/chasiv-yar-perebuvaye-pid-povnym-vognevym-kontrolem-syl-oborony/

[55] https://t.me/tass_agency/330124 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/55393 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/55397

[56] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66556

[57] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40295 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40296 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40269

[58] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40285

[59] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40277 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40297

[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27625 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15308 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40286

[61] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tFO62_O-gpw ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/09/odnorazove-bronetaksi-vorog-pislya-velykyh-vtrat-zminyv-taktyku-zastosuvannya-tehniky/

[62] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40247 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40301

[63] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66543

[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27625 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15308 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66539 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66543 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28362

[65] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66539 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/25116

[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32231

[67] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/09/evolyucziya-navpaky-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-vidmovylysya-vid-pryamohodinnya/

[68] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/08/bagato-fantastychnyh-vkydiv-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-vorog-bye-po-logistyczi-i-psyhologiyi/

[69] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tFO62_O-gpw ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/09/yakshho-pide-na-shturm-50-50-yakshho-ni-100-dvohsotyj-boyecz-pro-vybir-yakyj-stoyit-pered-okupantom/

[70] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15308 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602

[71] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40249

[72] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14162

[73] https://t.me/dva_majors/77087

[74] https://t.me/voin_dv/16389

[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27625 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15308 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28362

[76] https://t.me/voin_dv/16389

[77] https://t.me/wargonzo/28362

[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27625 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15308

[79] https://t.me/voin_dv/16386

[80] https://t.me/voin_dv/16394

[81] https://t.me/rusich_army/25112 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40280 ; https://t.me/vrogov/21426 ; https://ria dot ru/20250808/rogov-2034177081.html

[82] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27625 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02TmNnZbA3NGqWPFdh8DkNtTy1FSgWjoo2iKmR5v5cBtnpV2RLqdsoGPKXLXgpeDyTl?__cft__[0]=AZW3jpOB5rQOvE9y3UxiDOHdU3m7ZRL-zNT1XcVknC9I5jeyuKeEmI8t-MceMyUjHT1uxvDMxcEFygTMor3o1JlcC3vAZai3AUop07PMtG_NOk5qniBCQpDl3KHG51WnDt8oE4dJSaZyzlrXpPsMVFA_fo71Y36yxHAOmsmI3MwFVW8M-G-hYa4z2egmEPca-bQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ;

[83] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40280

[84] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97411

[85] https://t.me/russian_airborne/11039; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40289

[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27625; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/19vrJbPojC/

[87] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12824; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12824

[88] https://t.me/kpszsu/40130

[89] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1086691-reaktivni-gerani-vdarili-u-kolisnu-likarnu-v-zolocevi-de-planuvali-zrobiti-reabilitacijnij-centr-kerivnik-sva/

August 10, 2025, 8:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1 pm ET on August 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The United States and Ukraine’s European allies agree that Europe, not the United States, will fund further military and security assistance to Ukraine. US Vice President JD Vance gave an interview to Fox News on August 10 and reiterated the Trump Administration’s consistent position that the United States will no longer directly fund the Ukrainian military effort, but that Europe can continue to buy weapons from US manufacturers for Ukraine and Europe’s own defensive needs.[1] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General Mark Rutte stated in an interview with Face the Nation published on August 10 that the “floodgate” of lethal aid packages to Ukraine opened after US President Donald Trump met with Rutte on July 14 and that Canada and European NATO allies will continue to fund weapons for Ukraine.[2] Rutte stated that these deliveries are in addition to Europe’s investments in European and Ukrainian defense industrial facilities and that there will be additional European aid package announcements in the coming weeks. Western outlets reported on August 7 that NATO allies, the European Parliament, and several international banks — including US JP Morgan Chase, German Commerzbank, and Canadian RBC Capital Markets — are backing the new Bank for Defense, Security, and Resilience (DSRB), an international bank that will specialize in lending to NATO and allied countries for defense procurement.[3] Western media reported that the DSRB will help NATO states reach their goal of committing five percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to defense spending and that more than 40 unspecified countries are expected to become shareholders. UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves and UK Defense Secretary John Healy endorsed the DSRB.[4] The DSRB announcement signals NATO allies’ commitment to increasing defense spending, and European NATO members will likely leverage the bank to sustain investments in Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB), to launch further joint production initiatives with Ukraine, and to fund defense production intended for Ukraine and NATO allies’ own stocks.

US President Donald Trump is reportedly considering a trilateral meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during the August 15 summit in Alaska. Reuters reported on August 9, citing sources in the White House, that Trump is open to holding a trilateral summit in Alaska with Zelensky and Putin but that the White House is currently preparing for a bilateral meeting between Trump and Putin.[5] CNN and NBC reported on August 10, citing senior US officials and sources familiar with the matter, that the White House has not ruled out the possibility of inviting Zelensky to Alaska.[6] One of the sources noted that any meeting with Zelensky would likely occur after the Trump-Putin meeting. Vance told Fox News on August 10 that the United States is trying to schedule a trilateral meeting between Putin, Trump, and Zelensky in order to negotiate an end to the war.[7] Vance stated that Putin’s refusal to meet with Zelensky has been one of the most significant impediments to the peace process.

The Kremlin is attempting to use the upcoming Alaska summit to divide the United States from Europe rather than engage in meaningful peace efforts. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on August 10 on both his English and Russian language Telegram accounts that Europe is trying to prevent the United States from helping to stop the war in Ukraine.[8] Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head Leonid Slutsky claimed on August 9 that European countries are pursuing an anti-Russian policy and trying to prevent a quick peace settlement in Ukraine.[9] Russian political scientist Sergei Markov told the Washington Post on August 10 that Russia’s main interest in the Alaska summit is to portray Ukraine and Europe rather than Russia as the obstacles to peace in Ukraine.[10] Markov stated that Russia refuses to take any steps backward and that the only compromise that Russia is willing to consider is halting military efforts to seize Odesa and Kharkiv oblasts and Kherson and Zaporizhzhia cities. Markov expressed hope that Trump will realize that Zelensky is the main reason for Russia’s war in Ukraine and that European leaders are the second reason for the war, rather than Russia.

European and Ukrainian officials, including Zelensky, have consistently demonstrated their willingness to promote and engage in good faith negotiations and impose substantive ceasefire agreements to progress the peace initiative, which Russia has consistently rejected in pursuit of incremental battlefield gains and additional concessions from Ukraine and the West.[11] The Kremlin has long attempted to weaken cohesion between the United States, Europe, and Ukraine as part of a wider campaign to deter further Western support to Ukraine and distract from Russia’s intransigence regarding the peace process and unwillingness to compromise on Putin’s original war demands.[12] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains unwilling to compromise on its long-standing war aims of preventing Ukraine from joining NATO, regime change in Ukraine in favor of a pro-Russian proxy government, and Ukraine’s demilitarization – all of which would ensure Ukraine’s full capitulation – and that Russia will very likely violate and weaponize any future ceasefire agreements in Ukraine while blaming Ukraine for the violations as it repeatedly did in Spring 2025.[13]

Ukraine’s European allies continue to signal their support for Ukraine and US-led peace efforts ahead of the Alaska summit. French President Emmanuel Macron, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen published a joint statement on August 9 expressing support for US-led peace efforts and calling for Ukrainian and European involvement in future peace negotiations.[14] The European leaders called for a ceasefire or reduction of hostilities before negotiations begin and stated that the current frontline should be the starting point for negotiations. The leaders also called for robust and credible security guarantees that protect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The leaders expressed their commitment to the principle that international borders cannot be changed by force and reiterated that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine violates the UN Charter, the Helsinki Act, and the Budapest Memorandum, among other Russian international agreements.

Russian tank losses appear to be declining as Russian forces continue to deprioritize mechanized assaults across the frontline, indicating that the Russian command recognizes that it cannot protect vehicles from Ukrainian drone strike capabilities on the frontline and near rear. An intelligence focused open source that tracks Russian vehicle losses in Ukraine reported on August 10 that the rate of Russian tank losses continues to decline and reached its lowest levels of the war in June and July 2025.[15] The source stated that it has visually confirmed 22 Russian tank losses in June 2025 and 19 Russian tank losses in July 2025, down from 116 confirmed tank losses in June 2024 and 97 confirmed tank losses in July 2024.[16] The source indicated that Russian tank loss rates began to decrease in December 2024, which is consistent with the Russian military command’s theater-wide shift from costly mechanized assaults toward gradual, creeping infantry assaults.[17] The source stated that Russian T-62 and T-90 loss rates remain consistent, T-72 loss rates have declined in proportion to the overall decline of Russian tank losses, and T-80 tank loss rates have significantly declined.[18] Russia has likely exhausted much or all of its stockpiles of T-80 tanks and is likely conserving existing stores and stockpiling newer tank models while depleting stores of other tanks and armored vehicles, including the older T-62. Russian forces have conducted relatively few but costly mechanized assaults in Ukraine thus far in 2025 due to the effectiveness of Ukrainian drone strikes against armored vehicles, instead prioritizing infantry-led assaults and assaults on expendable motorcycles and other light vehicles.[19] Russian forces have been using armored vehicles to transport infantry to forward positions for infantry assaults, constraining Russian advances to foot pace and preventing Russia from using mechanized maneuver warfare to exploit breakthroughs and achieve operationally significant advances.[20] It remains unclear why Russia continues to invest significantly in tank and armored vehicle development and production while Russian forces are largely unable to field these vehicles for their intended purposes, as Ukrainian forces maintain the ability to inflict high frontline and near rear armored vehicle losses with drone reconnaissance and strikes.[21] Russia may be preparing for the eventuality that Russian forces will become able to counter Ukrainian drone operations well enough to be able to field armored vehicles and restore at least some maneuver to the battlefield, but ISW has observed no indications of Russian technological advances in this direction.

Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure overnight on August 9 to 10, including the first drone strike against a target in the Komi Republic. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 10 that Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) conducted a drone strike against the Saratov Oil Refinery near Saratov City, causing a fire.[22] The General Staff reported that the facility produces up to seven million tons of gasoline and diesel fuels per year and over 20 types of petroleum products and supplies the Russian military. Geolocated footage published on August 9 shows a large smoke plume over the Saratov Oil Refinery, and NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies in the area that are consistent with reports of fires in the area.[23] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin claimed that a drone damaged an industrial enterprise in Saratov Oblast.[24] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Saratov Oil Refinery in February 2025, January 2025, and November 2024.[25] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Lukoil Refinery in Ukhta, Komi Republic with at least one drone, and geolocated footage published on August 10 shows damage to a tank at the refinery.[26] Ukhta is more than 2,000 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.[27] Russian authorities have not yet acknowledged a Ukrainian drone strike against the Komi Republic, but did temporarily stop flights from the Utkha Airport, consistent with reactions to Ukrainian drone strikes elsewhere in Russia.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 10 that Ukrainian forces struck the command post of an unspecified Russian battalion near occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast, killing 25 Russian personnel, including the battalion commander.[29] ISW has recently observed elements of the Russian 31st Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 328th VDV Regiment (104th VDV Division), and 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) operating near Oleshky.[30]

Ukrainian drone manufacturers have developed a new drone capable of intercepting higher-speed Russian drones. Representatives of the Ukrainian drone manufacturer Besomar told Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi on August 10 that Besomar developed a reusable interceptor drone that is capable of downing Russian drones at speeds up to 200 kilometers per hour, including Geran-type long-range strike drones.[31] The interceptor drone is equipped with a shotgun and an automated firing system that can hold between two and four shots. The interceptor drone is also equipped with a digital communications system with a frequency response that allows the drone to approach its target unnoticed by the Russian drone’s evasion systems. The drone can fire manually or automatically due to a sensor in the nose of the drone that the drone operator can activate to initiate a shot when a target enters the drone’s range.

Key Takeaways:

The United States and Ukraine’s European allies agree that Europe, not the United States, will fund further military and security assistance to Ukraine.

US President Donald Trump is reportedly considering a trilateral meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during the August 15 summit in Alaska.

The Kremlin is attempting to use the upcoming Alaska summit to divide the United States from Europe rather than engage in meaningful peace efforts.

Ukraine’s European allies continue to signal their support for Ukraine and US-led peace efforts ahead of the Alaska summit.

Russian tank losses appear to be declining as Russian forces continue to deprioritize mechanized assaults across the frontline, indicating that the Russian command recognizes that it cannot protect vehicles from Ukrainian drone strike capabilities on the frontline and near rear.

Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure overnight on August 9 to 10, including the first drone strike against a target in the Komi Republic.

Ukrainian drone manufacturers have developed a new drone capable of intercepting higher-speed Russian drones.

Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 9 and 10.[32]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed that elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) struggled with cohesion when repelling a recent Ukrainian counterattack near Novokostyantynivka (north of Sumy City).[33]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group near Manev, Bryansk Oblast (northeast of Chernihiv City along the international border).[34]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on August 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces recaptured Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City), but a Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces refuted this claim.[35] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Kostyantynivka (north of Sumy City).[36]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy City near Bezsalivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on August 9 and 10.[37] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near and within Yunakivka.[38]

The Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces have partially encircled elements of the 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) in forest areas near Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[39] The milblogger claimed that these Russian forces suffered a breakdown in communication as a result and are panicking and struggling to distinguish between enemy and friendly forces.

Order of Battle: The Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed that the Russian military command redeployed an unspecified battalion of the Russian 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) to the Kindrativka-Andriivka area (north of Sumy City) from an unspecified area to stabilize the frontline.[40]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced on the southern (left) bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) near Ohirtseve and Hatyshche (both west of Vovchansk), east of Vovchansk, and west of Synelnykove (south of Vovchansk).[41]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on August 9 and 10.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ohirtseve and Hatyshche.[43]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian targets in Vovchansk.[44]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 10.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within northern Kupyansk.[45]

Russian forces continued ground assaults toward Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Myrove (formerly Moskovka) and toward Kovalivka; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and Radkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Novovasylivka and toward Petro-Ivanivka and Kolodyazne; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and south of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on August 9 and 10.[46]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly fighting near Stepova Novoselivka.[47] Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kasyanivka (north of Kupyansk).[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground assaults northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove and southeast of Borova toward Olhivka on August 9 and 10.[49]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into northern Shandryholove (northwest of Lyman) and northwest of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[50]

Unconfirmed claims: Russians source claimed that Russian forces advanced near Zelena Dolyna (north of Lyman) and established positions in Serednie (west of Zelena Dolyna).[51] Another Russian source claimed that Russian forces only advanced east of Serednie.[52]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Lyman near Karpivka and Serednie and toward Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Novyi Mir and Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske, Zarichne, Dibrova, and the Serebryanske forest area on August 9 and 10.[53]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian motorized assault consisting of 25 motorcycles near Torske on an unspecified date.[54] The spokesperson described the Russian assault as the largest assault on motorcycles that the brigade had repelled in the area.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly fighting in the Serebryanske forest area.[55]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Siversk itself, northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka and Ivano-Darivka, and southwest of Siversk near Pereizne on August 9 and 10.[56]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Chasiv Yar itself, north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove, and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne on August 9 and 10.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade and Berkut Group of the 238th Artillery Brigade (both 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Oleksiievo-Druzhivka (northwest of Chasiv Yar).[58]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on August 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on August 10 that Russian forces advanced west of Toretsk and northwest of Toretsk near Katerynivka, Rusyn Yar, and Yablunivka.[59]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and toward Bila Hora and Oleskandro-Shultyne; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Oleksandro-Kalynove; and northwest of Toretsk in Poltavka, near Katerynivka, Ivanopillya, and Zolotyi Kolodyaz and toward Pleshchiivka and Rusyn Yar on August 9 and 10.[60]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD), including the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, and the 20th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet unit) are reportedly operating near Kleban-Byk (northwest of Toretsk).[61] Additional elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly operating near Poltavka, and additional elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly fighting near Rusyn Yar and Yablunivka.[62] Elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [AC], SMD) are reportedly operating on the southern outskirts of Oleksandro-Shultyne.[63]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Nove Shakhove (northeast of Pokrovsk).[64] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have not yet seized Nove Shakhove and that the Russian forces that reportedly entered Nove Shakhove were only sabotage and reconnaissance groups.[65] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Chervonyi Lyman (northeast of Pokrovsk).[66]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Zatyshok, Novoekonomichne, Sukhetske, Zapovidne, Chervonyi Lyman, Ivanivka, Pankivka, Fedorivka, and Nykanorivka, and toward Kucheriv Yar and Vilne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka, Chunyshyne, and Zelene; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, Kotlyne, and Molodetske on August 9 and 10.[67]

Ukrainian Dnipro Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on August 10 that Russian forces have concentrated up to 100,000 personnel in the Pokrovsk direction in an effort to seize Pokrovsk.[68] Trehubov stated that Russian forces are trying to advance from the southwest and northeast to envelop Pokrovsk and cut off Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Pokrovsk.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Novokhatske (southwest of Novopavlivka).[69]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove; south of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Zaporizhzhia and toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Tovste and Zelenyi Hai on August 9 and 10.[70] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dachne and Filiya.[71]

The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Dachne and refuted Russian claims that Russian forces seized the settlement.[72] A Ukrainian soldier operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Russian forces continue attacking in three groups with 10 soldiers in each and using greenery to conceal themselves from Ukrainian drones and make gradual advances.[73] The soldier stated that Russian forces primarily only attack with infantry but sometimes attack on motorcycles, and that Russian forces are using fiber optic drones waiting on the ground near Ukrainian logistics routes to ambush passing Ukrainian vehicles.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Dnipropetrovsk (Novopavlivka) direction.[74] Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border.[75]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the eastern outskirts of Oleksandrohrad (east of Velykomykhailivka) and north of Zelene Pole (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[76]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka toward Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and Voskresenka; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka, Vilne Pole, Shevchenko, and Komyshuvakha; and south of Velykomykhailivka toward Novoivanivka on August 9 and 10.[77]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Oleksandrohrad.[78]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Temyrivka and Olhivske and east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on August 9 and 10.[79]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions northeast of Hulyaipole near Olhivske, Ternove, and Kalynivske and east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka.[80]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division consolidated positions in Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv) but do not control the entire settlement.[81] The milblogger claimed that the area between Stepnohirsk and Kamyanske (south of Stepnohirsk) is a contested “gray zone.”

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka, Kamyanske, and Stepnohirsk and south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka on August 9 and 10.[82] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Kamyanske and Plavni (west of Orikhiv).[83]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to target Ukrainian forces near Plavni and Stepnohirsk.[84] Drone operators of the Russian 218th Tank Regiment and 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[85]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on August 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Kherson City toward Karantynnyi Island, southwest of Kherson City near Bilohrudyi Island, and east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi road bridge on August 9 and 10.[86]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on August 9 to 10. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russia launched 100 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiivske, Crimea.[87] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 70 drones in northern and eastern Ukraine, that 30 drones struck 12 locations in Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, and that drone debris struck three unspecified locations. Kharkiv Oblast officials reported that Russian forces struck Chuhuiv, Rozdolne, and Martove, damaging civilian infrastructure.[88]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky spoke with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and condemned Russia’s recent strikes against the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR) oil depot in Odesa City and Ukrainian gas infrastructure transporting Azerbaijani gas.[89] Russian Shahed drones struck the Ukrainian gas compressor station in Odesa Oblast that transports Azerbaijani gas overnight on August 5 to 6 and struck the SOCAR depot overnight on August 7 to 8.[90] Azerbaijani outlet Caliber reported, citing unspecified sources, that Azerbaijan will consider lifting arms embargos on Azerbaijani military supplies to Ukraine if Russia continues to strike Azerbaijani energy facilities in Ukraine.[91]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cA6bhAuQDVk ; https://www.foxnews.com/video/6376764434112

[2] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nato-mark-rutte-face-the-nation-08-10-2025/

[3] https://financialpost.com/fp-finance/banking/rbc-defence-bank-partner-nato-target; https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20250807391220/en/Transatlantic-Financial-Leaders-Back-Creation-of-New-Defence-Bank; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-07/jp-morgan-commerzbank-and-ing-to-support-european-defense-bank ; https://www.ing dot com/Newsroom/News/ING-backs-new-defence-bank-for-Europe.htm

[4] https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20250807391220/en/Transatlantic-Financial-Leaders-Back-Creation-of-New-Defence-Bank

[5] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/trump-open-alaska-summit-with-putin-zelenskiy-white-house-says-2025-08-10/

[6] https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/09/politics/white-house-zelensky-trump-putin-meeting ; https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-administration/white-house-considering-inviting-zelenskyy-alaska-rcna224070

[7] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cA6bhAuQDVk ; https://www.foxnews.com/video/6376764434112

[8] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/601 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/90

[9] https://t.me/tass_agency/330184 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/24751717

[10] https://archive.ph/MoZ1g ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/08/10/putin-trump-russia-ukraine-summit/

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072425

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080225

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041925

[14] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-leaders-statement-on-peace-for-ukraine

[15] https://x.com/verekerrichard1/status/1954457603762733304; https://x.com/verekerrichard1/status/1954458383030874597

[16] https://x.com/verekerrichard1/status/1954460321839497232/photo/1; https://x.com/verekerrichard1/status/1954459538234413520/photo/1

[17] https://x.com/verekerrichard1/status/1954459538234413520/photo/1

[18] https://x.com/verekerrichard1/status/1954458383030874597; https://x.com/verekerrichard1/status/1954457603762733304

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021325

[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-22-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-25-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-8-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-6-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-3-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-20-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2024

[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062725

[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27649 ; https://suspilne dot media/1087310-u-genstabi-zsu-pidtverdili-urazenna-saratovskogo-naftopererobnogo-zavodu-u-rosii/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/10/syly-oborony-vdaryly-po-naftopererobnomu-zavodu-na-rosiyi/ ; https://t.me/idelrealii/42162

[23] https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/1954386189240172846 ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/11394 ; https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@45.94,51.45,14.00z

[24] https://t.me/busargin_r/9340 ; https://t.me/busargin_r/9342 ; https://suspilne dot media/1087158-gubernator-saratovskoi-oblasti-rf-zaaviv-pro-poskodzenna-dronami-promislovogo-obekta-u-regioni/

[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021125

[26] https://t.me/astrapress/89148 ; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/1954534164381810838 ; https://t.me/ssternenko/47700

[27] https://meduza.io/news/2025/08/10/ukrainskie-bespilotniki-vpervye-atakovali-respubliku-komi-do-granitsy-ot-nee-okolo-dvuh-tysyach-kilometrov https://t.me/supernova_plus/42547 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/08/10/ukrainskie-bespilotniki-vpervye-atakovali-respubliku-komi-do-granitsy-ot-nee-okolo-dvuh-tysyach-kilometrov

[28] https://t.me/tass_agency/330275

[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27653 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/10/znyshheno-blyzko-25-okupantiv-povitryani-syly-zsu-urazyly-komandnyj-punkt-rosiyan-v-rajoni-oleshok/

[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2025

[31] https://youtu.be/jmtvmbeBUnk?si=V5dK8G8MxmPZASqw; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/ukraine-creates-reusable-interceptor-drone-equipped-with-shotgun/

[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27654 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1AywJTbHSW/ ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27643

[33] https://t.me/severnnyi/4780

[34] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97429 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32274

[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27647 ; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1087218-sili-oboroni-ukraini-zvilnili-ta-povnistu-zacistili-vid-rosijskih-vijskovih-naselenij-punkt-bezsalivka-na-sumsini/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/10/syly-oborony-zvilnyly-selo-bezsalivka-vid-okupantiv/; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/ukrainian-defense-forces-clear-bezsalivka-village-from-russian-invaders/ ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4782 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4785

[36] https://t.me/wargonzo/28376

[37] https://t.me/severnnyi/4785 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27654 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1AywJTbHSW/ ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27643 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/330225 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28376 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32274 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4780

[38] https://t.me/wargonzo/28376 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32274

[39] https://t.me/severnnyi/4786

[40] https://t.me/severnnyi/4780

[41] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32271 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/330237 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4780 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77142; https://t.me/rybar/72723

[42] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15368 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27643 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1AywJTbHSW/ ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27654 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28376 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4780

[43] https://t.me/severnnyi/4780

[44] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97431

[45] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32212

[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27654; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27643; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PLx9AxgKPy2GWkcBi6ZEgAyN7EgLJpPhGhtQm9vtSLZY7KqncgVNDGnuAtQPafFel?rdid=wSCEKK0M1HTEbbTa#; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15368; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40321; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13809

[47] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40321

[48] https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/9399 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/16409

[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27654; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27643; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PLx9AxgKPy2GWkcBi6ZEgAyN7EgLJpPhGhtQm9vtSLZY7KqncgVNDGnuAtQPafFel?rdid=wSCEKK0M1HTEbbTa#; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15368;

[50] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9770; https://t.me/OMIBr_60/1139; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1954409696799908181; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9769;

[51] https://t.me/tass_agency/330208; https://t.me/wargonzo/28376

[52] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40329

[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27654; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27643; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PLx9AxgKPy2GWkcBi6ZEgAyN7EgLJpPhGhtQm9vtSLZY7KqncgVNDGnuAtQPafFel?rdid=wSCEKK0M1HTEbbTa#; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15368; https://t.me/dva_majors/77142; https://t.me/rybar/72723; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40329

[54] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_8VwBGK32ho; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/10/na-lymanskomu-napryamku-zsu-znyshhyly-rekordnyj-shturm-rosiyan-na-motoczyklah/

[55] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40331

[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27654; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1AywJTbHSW/; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27643; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15368 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32292

[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27654; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1AywJTbHSW/; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27643; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15368

[58] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14164

[59] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32209 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40347

[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27654; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1AywJTbHSW/; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27643; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15368

[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40327; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40321

[62] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40321; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40327 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40347

[63] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32297 ; https://t.me/z4lpr/1160 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1954505521978896494

[64] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175534

[65] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40314

[66] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40339

[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27654 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1AywJTbHSW/ ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27643 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15368 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175534 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28376

[68] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JFvyCBahZ_k ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/09/vorog-kynuv-do-100-tysyach-osobovogo-skladu-shhob-vzyaty-pid-kontrol-pokrovsk-na-donechchyni/

[69] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32206

[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27654 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1AywJTbHSW/ ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27643 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15368 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32298

[71] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32298

[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27648 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15386 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/10/genshtab-zsu-sprostuvav-rosijskyj-fejk-pro-okupacziyu-dachnogo/

[73] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8 ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1087170-rosiani-atakuut-malimi-grupami-ta-vikoristovuut-zasidki-na-optovolokni-na-novopavlivskomu-napramku-31-sa-ombr/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/10/okupanty-dilyatsya-na-try-grupy-po-10-osib-syly-oborony-pro-vorozhu-taktyku-povzuchogo-prosuvannya/

[74] https://t.me/dva_majors/77147

[75] https://t.me/voin_dv/16405

[76] https://t.me/wargonzo/28376 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32203

[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27654 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1AywJTbHSW/ ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27643 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15368 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/24312 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28376

[78] https://t.me/voin_dv/16403 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40324

[79] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PLx9AxgKPy2GWkcBi6ZEgAyN7EgLJpPhGhtQm9vtSLZY7KqncgVNDGnuAtQPafFel?rdid=wSCEKK0M1HTEbbTa#; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27643; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27654; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0oKXRKzFubkaCCCC31tkYVvTM1LWLpYTfiBiFWLjrBmnmG3MsV2fGNzFN4B6hK1eDl?rdid=7Fw58EEGI9o0PFmR#

[80] https://t.me/voin_dv/16400

[81] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32287

[82] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27654; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PLx9AxgKPy2GWkcBi6ZEgAyN7EgLJpPhGhtQm9vtSLZY7KqncgVNDGnuAtQPafFel?rdid=wSCEKK0M1HTEbbTa#; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27643; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0oKXRKzFubkaCCCC31tkYVvTM1LWLpYTfiBiFWLjrBmnmG3MsV2fGNzFN4B6hK1eDl?rdid=hOz3EY16g5DX3sFO#; https://t.me/wargonzo/28376; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32287;

[83] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32287; https://t.me/wargonzo/28376

[84] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32278

[85] https://t.me/voin_dv/16407; https://t.me/voin_dv/16398

[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27654; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PLx9AxgKPy2GWkcBi6ZEgAyN7EgLJpPhGhtQm9vtSLZY7KqncgVNDGnuAtQPafFel?rdid=wSCEKK0M1HTEbbTa#; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27643; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0oKXRKzFubkaCCCC31tkYVvTM1LWLpYTfiBiFWLjrBmnmG3MsV2fGNzFN4B6hK1eDl?rdid=hOz3EY16g5DX3sFO#; https://t.me/dva_majors/77142; https://t.me/rybar/72723

[87] https://t.me/kpszsu/40178

[88] https://t.me/synegubov/16457 ; https://kh dot dsns.gov.ua/news/nadzvicaini-podiyi/xarkivska-oblast-operativna-informaciia-stanom-na-0700-10-serpnia-2025-roku ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1087138-cuguivskij-rajon-harkivsini-zaznav-masovanoi-ataki-rosijskih-bpla/

[89] https://president dot az/ru/articles/view/69583

[90] https://unn dot ua/en/news/azerbaijan-may-lift-arms-embargo-on-ukraine-due-to-russian-attacks-media; https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/news/2025/08/8/7525327/

[91] https://caliber dot az/en/post/russia-strikes-azerbaijani-oil-and-gas-facilities-in-ukraine-azerbaijan-prepares-response

Anna Harvey, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, Justin Young, Nate Trotter, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 5, 2025, 8:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00 pm ET on August 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Private and public Kremlin statements indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to demand the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before he will initiate a peace agreement. Helping Ukraine inflict battlefield setbacks on Russian forces remains essential to efforts to persuade Putin to reevaluate his position on the war and negotiations. Reuters reported on August 5 that three Kremlin sources familiar with the matter stated that Putin’s belief that Russia is winning and his doubts that US sanctions will have a significant impact on Russia are driving Putin’s decision to continue his war against Ukraine.[1] Two of the sources claimed that Putin’s war aims take precedence over his efforts to improve relations with the United States and US President Donald Trump. One source claimed that the recent Ukrainian-Russian peace talks in Istanbul were a Russian attempt to convince Trump that Putin was open to peace but noted that the talks were devoid of any real substance. One source claimed that “Putin cannot afford to end the war just because Trump wants it.” A source described Trump’s reported March 2025 offer — in which Trump purportedly proposed to lift all US sanctions against Russia, to “de jure” recognize Russian sovereignty over occupied Crimea, and to “de facto” recognize Russian control over the other parts of Ukraine that Russian forces occupied at the time — as a “fantastic chance,” but stated that stopping a war is more difficult than starting one. Putin rejected that offer.

The Kremlin insider sources likely leaked this information in an attempt to obfuscate Putin’s actual, more extreme war aims. One of Reuters’ sources stated that Putin does not see the logic in stopping Russian offensive operations, as Russian forces are making relatively more rapid advances on the battlefield.[2] The Kremlin sources implied that Putin would be willing to establish a ceasefire if Russia first occupied (or was given) the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Recent Kremlin statements, including from Putin himself, have repeatedly indicated that Putin remains committed to achieving his maximalist objectives that amount to full Ukrainian capitulation, however.[3] Putin claimed as recently as June 20 that “all of Ukraine is [Russia’s].”[4] Russian State Duma Deputy Anatoly Wasserman said in an interview with Azerbaijani news outlet Minval published on August 3 that the stated goals of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine are “incompatible with the continued existence of Ukraine” as a sovereign state and that Russia alone will determine the end date for its war.[5] Kremlin newswire RIA Novosti published two op-eds on July 30 entitled “There is no other option: no one should remain alive in Ukraine” and “Noted: Ukraine will end very soon.”[6] Kremlin insiders are likely speaking to Western media outlets in order to socialize Putin’s demands to Western policymakers and audiences, frame Russia’s demand for the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as reasonable, and insinuate that there is a possibility for a full ceasefire and lasting peace should Ukraine and the West acquiesce to Putin’s demands.

The Kremlin also likely intends for these leaks to Western media to advance its ongoing effort to break Ukrainian and Western morale. One Kremlin source told Reuters that the Russian General Staff recently told Putin that the front line in Ukraine will likely “crumble” in two to three months.[7] This source is likely providing an accurate reflection of the situation in the Kremlin and the Russian General Staff, as the Russian General Staff is almost certainly giving Putin a positive assessment of Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine. The Russian military has a pervasive culture of lying and submitting overly positive reports to superiors, and this culture is likely also an issue at the upper echelon of the Russian military.[8] Deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin repeatedly claimed that Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov and then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu lied to Putin about issues in Russia’s war effort.[9] The Russian General Staff significantly downplayed Ukraine’s August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast to Putin, and Putin repeatedly falsely claimed that Russian forces encircled several groups of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast — likely after being misinformed by the Russian General Staff.[10] Putin even appeared to scold Gerasimov and current Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov on August 1, claiming that he recently pressed Belousov and Gerasimov to tell him “honestly” about the frontline in Ukraine.[11] Russian forces are continuing to advance in Ukraine only at a footpace, if more rapidly than previously, and the Kremlin sources’ statement reflects the Russian General Staff’s and Putin’s confidence in continued gains rather than an objective assessment of prospects on the battlefield.

The Kremlin source likely leaked this information in order to project confidence in Russia’s military capabilities and, in turn, to undermine Ukrainian and Western morale. The Kremlin routinely shifts its rhetorical efforts based on what Kremlin officials assess will be most impactful during particular geopolitical moments, such as the Kremlin’s recent shift from feigning interest in good-faith peace negotiations in early 2025 to reiterating its commitment to Putin’s long-standing war aims.[12] The Kremlin has been engaged in a significant effort since January 2025 to convince Trump that Putin was willing to conclude a peace agreement in the short term, but is now attempting to justify prolonging the war in hopes that Russia can militarily defeat Ukraine. The Kremlin likely assesses that projecting confidence in Russia’s ability to militarily defeat Ukraine in Western media outlets will generate fear and distrust in Ukrainian and Western society, further degrading Ukraine’s morale to continue defending against Russian aggression.

Putin has intentionally put himself in a position where he cannot present any peace settlement that falls short of his original war aims as a victory to the Russian military or people. One Kremlin source told Reuters that Putin does not feel that now is the time to end the war because Russian society and the Russian military would not understand such a decision.[13] The Kremlin has been engaged in a concerted multi-year effort to justify Putin’s maximalist war objectives as necessary for the existence of the Russian state and to garner societal support for a protracted war until Russia achieves such goals.[14] Russian state and independent polling from early 2025 suggested that most Russians support continuing the war in Ukraine, and the Kremlin is likely seizing on these sentiments, which it has actively fostered, to justify Putin’s decision to continue the war.[15] Putin is also increasing Russian society’s reliance on military spending by heavily investing in Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB), which now accounts for a significant portion of overall Russian domestic production.[16] ISW continues to assess that any sharp decrease in Russia’s defensive spending will likely depress the Russian economy in the medium term, furthering Putin’s incentive to continue a protracted war in Ukraine and instigate future military conflicts despite high Russian losses on the battlefield and critical constraints on its economy.[17] Putin has intentionally cultivated Russian society’s commitment to his war aims and has not set conditions to take any off-ramps to accept a peace settlement that falls short of his original war aims.

Russia announced on August 4 that it will withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, likely as a rhetorical response to US President Donald Trump’s August 1 announcement about the redeployment of US nuclear submarines toward Russia. Russia’s INF Treaty withdrawal does not portend a shift in Russia’s use of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles, however. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed on August 4 that the conditions for Russia’s “unilateral moratorium” on the deployment of weapons banned under the INF Treaty are “disappearing” such that Russia “no longer considers itself bound” by the INF Treaty’s restrictions.[18] The Russian MFA claimed that the Russian leadership will decide on response measures after analyzing the deployment of Western land-based intermediate-range missiles. The Russian MFA claimed that Russia has “proactively made efforts to maintain restraint” following the US suspension of the INF treaty in 2019. The Russian MFA claimed that Western states have built up “destabilizing” missiles in areas near Russia, creating a “strategic” threat to Russian security. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to the MFA’s announcement, stating that Russia is no longer “limited” in any way and that Russia has the right to take “appropriate measures.”[19] Peskov claimed that the West should not expect any announcements about the deployment of Russian shorter- and intermediate-range missiles as this information is “sensitive.”[20] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on August 4 on his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account that the Russian MFA’s statement is the result of NATO states’ “anti-Russian policy” and that “this is a new reality all [Russia’s] opponents will have to reckon with.”[21] Medvedev vaguely threatened that the West should “expect further steps” from Russia. Medvedev’s August 4 threat on his English-language account is the latest in a string of recent nuclear threats against the West that are part of the Kremlin’s wider reflexive control campaign that aims to push the West to make decisions that benefit Russia.[22]

Russia has long violated the INF Treaty and publicly flaunted its use of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles banned under the treaty. The United States suspended participation in the INF Treaty on February 1, 2019, and withdrew from the treaty on August 2, 2019, due to Russian violations of the treaty with Russia’s development, testing, and deployment of intermediate-range 9M729 (SSC-8) missiles. Russia suspended its participation in the INF in response on February 2, 2019, but had not formally withdrawn from the treaty.[23] Russia conducted a strike against Ukraine using an Oreshnik ballistic missile (reportedly an experimental variant of the RS-26 missile, which has a range of 2,000 to 5,800 kilometers) in November 2024, and Putin publicly claimed on August 1 that Russia produced its first serial Oreshnik complex and missiles and that the missile system entered into service.[24] Russia has also routinely launched Iskander missiles, with a reported range of 400 to 500 kilometers, against Ukraine and permanently deployed Iskanders to Kaliningrad Oblast in 2018.[25] High-ranking Russian officials began to set conditions in the information space for Russia to permanently withdraw from the INF Treaty in June 2025, suggesting that the Kremlin had made the decision to withdraw previously.[26] The Kremlin is attempting to posture its withdrawal from the treaty as a response to Trump’s August 1 announcement, however.

European and NATO allies announced that they will purchase over one billion euros worth of US weapons for Ukraine through a new NATO funding mechanism. Ukraine’s Minister of Defense (MoD), Denis Shmyhal, announced on August 4 that the United States and NATO launched the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which is a new mechanism that will allow NATO members and partners to finance the supply of American weapons and technology to Ukraine through voluntary contributions.[27] Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans stated on August 4 that the Netherlands is allocating 500 million euros (roughly $570 million) to purchase American weapons systems, including Patriot components and missiles, through the PURL initiative.[28] NATO announced on August 5 that Denmark, Norway, and Sweden will finance a combined $500 million military aid package to purchase air defense systems, Patriot munitions, anti-tank systems, ammunition, and spare parts from the United States through the PURL initiative.[29]

A Ukrainian company recently launched a new reusable interceptor drone designed to down Russian Shahed-variant drones. Ukrainian Technary design bureau CEO Hennadii Suldin told Ukrainian defense technology outlet Defender Media on July 30 that Technary has developed a reusable Mongoose interceptor drone, designed to intercept Russian Shahed-variant drones.[30] Suldin stated that the Mongoose interceptor drone has a jet engine and an automatic homing system, which allows the drone to approach an enemy drone, fire a projectile into a drone’s engine or propeller, and then continue its mission or return for refueling. Suldin stated that the drone can lock onto a target from 800 meters and that the drone’s auto-guidance system activates when the target is within a range of 150-200 meters. Suldin stated that the Mongoose interceptor drone can reach speeds of up to 300 to 310 kilometers per hour with a maximum flight altitude of 5,000 meters and a combat radius of 12 kilometers. Suldin estimated that a Mongoose interceptor drone could likely destroy 10 to 12 Shahed drones over its lifecycle and noted that the drone’s reusability can help overcome Ukraine’s currently constrained interceptor drone production capabilities. Suldin stated that Ukrainian forces will begin integrating prototypes of the Mongoose interceptor drone in the near future. Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi noted that the Mongoose interceptor drone is designed to combat high-speed aerial threats such as the Shahed-136.[31] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat told RBC-Ukraine on July 31 that Russian forces are launching new, jet-powered Shahed drones that fly at speeds of 500 kilometers or more.[32] ISW previously observed reporting that Geran-3 drones can reach speeds of up to 800 kilometers per hour.[33]

Key Takeaways:

Private and public Kremlin statements indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to demand the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before he will initiate a peace agreement.

Helping Ukraine inflict battlefield setbacks on Russian forces remains essential to efforts to persuade Putin to reevaluate his position on the war and negotiations.

The Kremlin insider sources likely leaked this information in an attempt to obfuscate Putin’s actual, more extreme war aims.

The Kremlin also likely intends for these leaks to Western media to advance its ongoing effort to break Ukrainian and Western morale.

Putin has intentionally put himself in a position where he cannot present any peace settlement that falls short of his original war aims as a victory to the Russian military or people.

Russia announced on August 4 that it will withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, likely as a rhetorical response to US President Donald Trump’s August 1 announcement about the redeployment of US nuclear submarines toward Russia. Russia’s INF Treaty withdrawal does not portend a shift in Russia’s use of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles, however.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Siversk, and Toretsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 3 and 4 but did not advance.[34]

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against railway infrastructure in Rostov Oblast on the night of August 4 to 5. Geolocated footage published on August 5 shows a drone strike and subsequent fire at the Tatsinskaya railway station in Tatsinskaya, Rostov Oblast.[35] Acting Rostov Oblast Governor Yury Slyusar claimed that Russian forces destroyed drones over Rostov Oblast, including over Tatsinsky Raion, and that a house caught fire in the raion.[36]

Satellite imagery and Western media sources indicate that Ukrainian drone strikes on the night of August 1 to 2 damaged a defense industrial enterprise and two oil refineries in Russia. Recent satellite imagery indicates that Ukrainian drone strikes against the Elektropribor plant in Penza City likely destroyed two workshops at the plant.[37] The Electropribor plant manufactures equipment for digital networks in Russian military control systems and devices for aircraft, armored vehicles, ships, and spacecraft.[38] Reuters reported on August 4 that three industry sources stated that Ukrainian drone strikes against the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan City halted two primary oil refining units, leaving the refinery able to produce roughly half of its total capacity.[39] Reuters reported that Ukrainian drone strikes also damaged and halted Rosneft’s Novokuybyshevsk Oil Refinery near Samara City.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in and near Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[40]

Russian forces attacked in northern Sumy Oblast, including northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, Myropillya, and Oleksandriya, on August 4 and 5.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Sumy direction, including near Novokostyantynivka (north of Sumy City).[42]

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on August 5 that GUR elements entered the Russian near rear in the Sumy direction, gained a foothold, and disrupted Russian supplies.[43]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly withdrawing from Oleksiivka to Gornal, Kursk Oblast after having lost their combat capability.[44] Elements of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy); elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating in Novokostyantynivka; elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Kindrativka; and elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Oleksiivka (both north of Sumy).[45] Elements of the 51st VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Sadky (northeast of Sumy).[46] Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Sumy region.[47] Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Luhivka (southeast of Sumy City) and Mykolaivka (north of Sumy City).[48]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Kozacha Lopan, Kudiivka, and Hoptivka and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on August 4 and 5.[49]

A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast stated that poor weather is limiting Russian forces’ ability to conduct ground attacks with drone support in the Kharkiv direction.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting is intensifying near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[51]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Kharkiv Oblast.[52] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Bati Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[53]

A Russian milblogger claimed on August 5 that Russian forces attacked north of Velykyi Burluk near Dehtyarne and northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove.[54]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Hlushkivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[55]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka; northwest of Kupyansk near Myrne; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe, Dvorichna, and Fyholivka and toward Novovasylivka and Kolodyazne; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on August 4 and 5.[56]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Lozova and toward Bohuslavka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Cherneshchyne, Druzhelyubivka, and Olhivka on August 4 and 5.[57]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 5 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Novomykhailivka (northeast of Lyman).[58]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) recently seized Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[59]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Karpivka toward Serednie and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna, Hlushchenkove, and Novyi Myr; northeast of Lyman near Myrne and Novomykhailivka; east of Lyman near Torske and toward Zarichne on August 4 and 5.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kolodyazi.[61]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone company operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces are using motorcycles, and occasionally slower-moving electric bikes, to attack Ukrainian positions in the area.[62] A non-commissioned officer (NCO) in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that the Russian military command deployed reserve forces in the Lyman direction.[63] The NCO estimated that Russian forces are suffering 25 to 30 casualties per day in the Lyman direction.[64]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating south of Torske (northeast of Lyman).[65]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 4 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in eastern Serebryanka (northeast of Siversk) and northwest of Soledar (southwest of Siversk).[66]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Serebryanka; northwest, south, and southwest of Novoselivka (east of Siversk); and into the eastern outskirts of Siversk.[67]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk toward Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on August 4 and 5.[68]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Serebryanka.[69]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[70]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, northwest of Chasiv Yar toward Virolyubivka, south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, and southwest of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne on August 4 and 5.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Bila Hora and near Predtechyne and Stupochky.[72]

Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed on August 5 that it could take Russian forces weeks to completely clear Ukrainian forces from Chasiv Yar.[73]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 299th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Chasiv Yar.[74]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 4 and 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east and southeast of Nelipivka (northwest of Toretsk) and southeast of Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[75]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and northeast of Poltavka (northwest of Toretsk), in southern Rusyn Yar and east of the settlement (northwest of Toretsk), and toward Oleksandro-Shultyne (north of Toretsk) and Nelipivka.[76] One of the milbloggers claimed that Russian forces interdicted Ukraine’s main ground line of communication (GLOC) between Shcherbynivka and Katerynivka.[77]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Oleksandro-Shultyne; northwest of Toretsk near Katerynivka, Popiv Yar, Poltavka, and south of the Kleban Buk Reservoir; southwest of Toretsk near Romanivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on August 4 and 5.[78]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment and 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Katerynivka and Shcherbynivka.[79] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Rusyn Yar and Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk).[80]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are consolidating positions on the eastern outskirts of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) and have advanced in southwestern and southeastern Pokrovsk and northeast of Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[81] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing toward Rybizhne and Zolotyi Kolodyazi (both northeast of Pokrovsk).[82] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian troops in Nove Shakhove (northeast of Pokrovsk) and are advancing toward Novyi Donbas (west of Nove Shakhove) and Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Nove Shakhove).[83]

Russian forces attacked north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Sukhetske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Boykivka, Zapovidne (formerly Nykanorivka), Suvorove, Krasnyi Lyman, Novoekonomichne, Myrolyubivka, and Mykolaivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Leontovychi, Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on August 4 and 5.[84]

An officer in a Ukrainian National Guard brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on August 5 that Russian forces are mainly using first-person view (FPV) drones to deliver supplies and ammunition to frontline positions and that this is becoming a key aspect of frontline logistics.[85] The officer stated that further Russian advances are expanding the contested “gray zone” in Rodynske. A Russian milblogger claimed that superior Ukrainian drone operations are hindering Russia’s ability to advance in the Pokrovsk direction.[86] The milblogger noted that the frontline is not continuous in the Pokrovsk direction and that Russian infantry groups and sabotage and reconnaissance teams are able to infiltrate behind Ukrainian positions. A Ukrainian source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence stated that Russian fiber optic drone operators are interdicting the M-30 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway and complicating Ukrainian logistics.[87] The Ukrainian source noted that Russian forces are concentrating most of their assaults near Rodynske, but that Russian forces will likely have to regroup before launching the main assault on Pokrovsk from the north.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian AIRNOMAD Detachment are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[88]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and southwest of Horikhove (east of Novopavlivka) and northeast of Dachne (southeast of Novopavlivka).[89]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Novoukrainka, Oleksiivka, and Zelenyi Kut; south of Novopavlivka toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and Ivanivka on August 4 and 5.[90] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka) and Dachne.[91]

A servicemember in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that the level of training among Russian personnel varies, with better-trained soldiers able to evade Ukrainian drones.[92] A Russian milblogger claimed that the northern and western parts of Zelenyi Hai are contested “gray zones.”[93]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and drone operators of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA) and 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Novopavlivka direction.[94]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 5 that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) seized Sichneve (east of Velykomykhailivka).[95] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Piddubne (northeast of Velykomykhailivka), northwest of Voskresenka (east of Velykomykhailivka), west and southwest of Vilne Pole (southeast of Velykomykhailivka), and toward Komyshuvakha (southeast of Velykomykhailivka) and retook Maliivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[96]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne, Myrne, Tovste, and Andriivka-Klevtsove; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka and Shevchenko; and east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka and Oleksandrohrad on August 4 and 5.[97]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Hulyaipole near Zelene Pole and Temyrivka and east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on August 4 and 5 but did not advance.[98]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Plavni (west of Orikhiv).[99]

Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv toward Novoandriivka and west of Orikhiv in Plavni and toward Prymorske on August 4 and 5.[100] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv).[101]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on August 4 and 5 but did not advance.[102]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Tuman Drone Group and Fobos Drone Group (reportedly of the 18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kherson direction.[103]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 4 to 5. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Bryansk Oblast and 46 Shahed-type drones and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[104] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 29 drones over northern and eastern Ukraine and that 17 drones, one ballistic missile, and drone debris struck three locations in southern and northeastern Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported on August 5 that Russian forces launched 35 Shahed drones and one Molniya drone at Lozova, Kharkiv Oblast, and damaged a train depot and station and killed two civilians.[105] The Ukrainian Southern Air Command reported that Russian forces launched another Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied Crimea and struck Odesa Oblast on the night of August 4 to 5.[106] Ukrainian sources reported that a Russian missile also struck an agricultural business in Sumy City on the morning of August 5 and killed two civilians.

Ukrainian military expert Petro Chernyk stated that sanctions are forcing Russian forces to increasingly use cheaper Shahed-variant drones instead of more expensive cruise and ballistic missiles.[107] Chernyk noted that Shaheds can only carry a warhead up to 50 kilograms, while Kalibr cruise missiles, Kh-47 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles, and North Korean Kn-23 ballistic missiles can carry a warhead up to 500 kilograms. Chernyk noted that Ukrainian forces intercept 92 to 95 percent of Russian Shaheds and that the IRIS-T air defense system would be able to intercept jet-powered Shahed drones, likely referring to Geran-3 drones.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-doubts-potency-trumps-ultimatum-end-war-sources-say-2025-08-05/

[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-doubts-potency-trumps-ultimatum-end-war-sources-say-2025-08-05/

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar05022025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040425

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025

[5] https://minval dot az/news/124478813

[6] https://ria dot ru/20250730/ukraina-2032235759.html ; https://ria dot ru/20250730/ukraina-2032148351.html

[7] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-doubts-potency-trumps-ultimatum-end-war-sources-say-2025-08-05/

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2024

[9] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-65996531 ; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66013532

[10] https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2024/08/10/nachalnika-genshtaba-gerasimova-ulichili-vovrane-putinu-osituatsii-vkurskoi-oblasti-a139136 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-15-2025

[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051225

[28] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15400 ; https://suspilne dot media/1080979-zelenskij-vidreaguvav-na-slova-putina-pro-zataguvanna-zustrici/ ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1951256842966896707 ; https://yle dot fi/a/74-20175439

[13] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-doubts-potency-trumps-ultimatum-end-war-sources-say-2025-08-05/

[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2025

[15] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-28-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2025

[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071725 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2025

[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062725

[18] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2039749/

[19] https://tass dot ru/politika/24709501

[20] https://tass dot ru/politika/24709555

[21] https://x.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1952452686802198557

[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080425 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125

[23] https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/article/article/1924779/us-withdraws-from-intermediate-range-nuclear-forces-treaty/; https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_166100.htm#:~:text=It%20eliminated%20a%20whole%20category,significant%20risk%20to%20Alliance%20security.; https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty; https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ssc-8-novator-9m729/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-28-2024

[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112124

[25] https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-26-2/; https://missilethreat.csis.org/russia-deploys-iskander-missiles-kaliningrad-2/

[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060825

[27] https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/11025 ; https://suspilne dot media/1083025-ssa-i-nato-zapuskaut-novij-mehanizm-pidtrimki-ukraini-pro-so-jdetsa/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/04/ssha-ta-nato-zapuskayut-novyj-mehanizm-pidtrymky-ukrayiny-denys-shmygal/

[28] https://x.com/DefensieMin/status/1952405406627639403

[29] https://www.nato dot int/cps/en/natohq/news_237131.htm

[30] https://thedefender dot media/en/2025/07/tekhnari-developed-mungoose-interceptor/

[31] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/kb-tekhnari-presents-jet-powered-interceptor-for-shahed-drones/

[32] https://newsukraine dot rbc.ua/news/jet-powered-shaheds-spotted-over-ukraine-1753953147.html

[33] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025

[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u6FXaX3SB7u9tdRExRjMw2TVQGFJGV4vuR72ZYNTxTvaufm2ovPpwaT8K9tpp15Ql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022dRGwoFGSRE1BcxHuA6CqRGEQhgUxUS1d3PHbcPbArX5R5guxRzWSz1wZ5RGjyPtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YPvVAzkWTnSxbDbjSgzYV5MtrPuiZAknA2cZ5yPCAeDNHk8yhocEAPG7EzTjuAnal

[35] https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1952634519699271980; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1952619198988820988; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1952605162465337508 ; https://t.me/supernova_plus/42346 ; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1952674748275548309; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1952755058182869412

[36] https://t.me/tass_agency/329194; https://t.me/Yuri_Slusar/2510

[37] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/6392; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/satellite-images-confirm-destruction-of-elektropribor-plant-in-russian-penza; https://x.com/exilenova_plus/status/1952328970231267416?s=46

[38] https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/1952328970231267416; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/satellite-images-confirm-destruction-of-elektropribor-plant-in-russian-penza/; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080225

[39] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-ryazan-oil-refinery-halves-refining-capacity-after-drone-attacks-sources-2025-08-04/

[40] https://t.me/smotri_z/47205; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/47011; https://t.me/dva_majors/76772; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32066

[41]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u6FXaX3SB7u9tdRExRjMw2TVQGFJGV4vuR72ZYNTxTvaufm2ovPpwaT8K9tpp15Ql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022dRGwoFGSRE1BcxHuA6CqRGEQhgUxUS1d3PHbcPbArX5R5guxRzWSz1wZ5RGjyPtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YPvVAzkWTnSxbDbjSgzYV5MtrPuiZAknA2cZ5yPCAeDNHk8yhocEAPG7EzTjuAnal; https://t.me/severnnyi/4735; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32066

[42] https://t.me/dva_majors/76772; https://t.me/smotri_z/47205; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/47011

[43] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6572; https://suspilne dot media/1083073-niderlandi-zakuplat-u-ssa-zbrou-dla-ukraini-sili-oboroni-urazili-aerodrom-saki-v-krimu-1259-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1754392102&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/diu-operation-russians-lose-up-to-eight-infantry-companies-in-the-sumy-region/

[44] https://t.me/severnnyi/4739

[45] https://t.me/severnnyi/4739

[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32079

[47] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/174883; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/174949

[48] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/174909

[49]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u6FXaX3SB7u9tdRExRjMw2TVQGFJGV4vuR72ZYNTxTvaufm2ovPpwaT8K9tpp15Ql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022dRGwoFGSRE1BcxHuA6CqRGEQhgUxUS1d3PHbcPbArX5R5guxRzWSz1wZ5RGjyPtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YPvVAzkWTnSxbDbjSgzYV5MtrPuiZAknA2cZ5yPCAeDNHk8yhocEAPG7EzTjuAnal; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15054

[50] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/04/tehnika-yim-dorozhcha-za-lyudej-na-harkivshhyni-cherez-pogodu-pomenshalo-shturmiv/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo

[51] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13765

[52] https://t.me/tass_agency/329309

[53] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5887

[54] https://t.me/dva_majors/76772

[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32107

[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u6FXaX3SB7u9tdRExRjMw2TVQGFJGV4vuR72ZYNTxTvaufm2ovPpwaT8K9tpp15Ql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022dRGwoFGSRE1BcxHuA6CqRGEQhgUxUS1d3PHbcPbArX5R5guxRzWSz1wZ5RGjyPtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YPvVAzkWTnSxbDbjSgzYV5MtrPuiZAknA2cZ5yPCAeDNHk8yhocEAPG7EzTjuAnal; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15054; https://t.me/wargonzo/28276; https://t.me/tass_agency/329362

[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u6FXaX3SB7u9tdRExRjMw2TVQGFJGV4vuR72ZYNTxTvaufm2ovPpwaT8K9tpp15Ql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022dRGwoFGSRE1BcxHuA6CqRGEQhgUxUS1d3PHbcPbArX5R5guxRzWSz1wZ5RGjyPtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YPvVAzkWTnSxbDbjSgzYV5MtrPuiZAknA2cZ5yPCAeDNHk8yhocEAPG7EzTjuAnal; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15054

[58] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9742; https://t.me/Ci4team_4mb/405

[59] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40024

[60] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u6FXaX3SB7u9tdRExRjMw2TVQGFJGV4vuR72ZYNTxTvaufm2ovPpwaT8K9tpp15Ql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022dRGwoFGSRE1BcxHuA6CqRGEQhgUxUS1d3PHbcPbArX5R5guxRzWSz1wZ5RGjyPtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YPvVAzkWTnSxbDbjSgzYV5MtrPuiZAknA2cZ5yPCAeDNHk8yhocEAPG7EzTjuAnal; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15054

[61] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32069

[62] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/05/ryukzak-avtomat-krosivky-i-vse-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-praktykuyut-plyazhni-ataky/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iioRHNGxNCQ

[63] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1083175-okupanti-sukaut-slahi-sob-zdatisa-nam-v-polon-vijskovij-zsu-rozpoviv-pro-situaciu-na-limanskomu-napramku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8

[64] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/05/shturmy-po-ponyatiyam-nashi-vijskovi-rozpovily-na-kogo-robyt-stavku-rosiya/

[65] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39997

[66] https://t.me/ua_dshv/6488 ; https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1952289320238518291 ; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1952760870586483073 ; https://t.me/Komanda_A111/91

[67] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/174859 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/174915 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40008 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97145

[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u6FXaX3SB7u9tdRExRjMw2TVQGFJGV4vuR72ZYNTxTvaufm2ovPpwaT8K9tpp15Ql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022dRGwoFGSRE1BcxHuA6CqRGEQhgUxUS1d3PHbcPbArX5R5guxRzWSz1wZ5RGjyPtl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15054

[69] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40008 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40021

[70] https://t.me/t3mny/2301 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1952747361597313363

[71] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u6FXaX3SB7u9tdRExRjMw2TVQGFJGV4vuR72ZYNTxTvaufm2ovPpwaT8K9tpp15Ql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022dRGwoFGSRE1BcxHuA6CqRGEQhgUxUS1d3PHbcPbArX5R5guxRzWSz1wZ5RGjyPtl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15054 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66456

[72] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66456

[73] https://t.me/tass_agency/329232

[74] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32079

[75] https://t.me/ORUB152/313 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1952643223303684364 ; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/1435 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1952640015252463938

[76] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/174915 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97130 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66456

[77] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66456

[78] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u6FXaX3SB7u9tdRExRjMw2TVQGFJGV4vuR72ZYNTxTvaufm2ovPpwaT8K9tpp15Ql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022dRGwoFGSRE1BcxHuA6CqRGEQhgUxUS1d3PHbcPbArX5R5guxRzWSz1wZ5RGjyPtl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YPvVAzkWTnSxbDbjSgzYV5MtrPuiZAknA2cZ5yPCAeDNHk8yhocEAPG7EzTjuAnal ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15054 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66456

[79] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40027

[80] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1952486340899258668 ; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/370

[81] https://t.me/sashakots/55337 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/76773 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/25054

[82] https://t.me/rusich_army/25054

[83] https://t.me/yurasumy/24221

[84] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u6FXaX3SB7u9tdRExRjMw2TVQGFJGV4vuR72ZYNTxTvaufm2ovPpwaT8K9tpp15Ql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022dRGwoFGSRE1BcxHuA6CqRGEQhgUxUS1d3PHbcPbArX5R5guxRzWSz1wZ5RGjyPtl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022dRGwoFGSRE1BcxHuA6CqRGEQhgUxUS1d3PHbcPbArX5R5guxRzWSz1wZ5RGjyPtl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15054 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28276 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/174856

[85] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/05/taktyka-nadiyi-okupantiv-obijshly-kupu-trupiv-ta-mriyut-zakripytysya/

[86] https://t.me/lomovkaa/111698 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66462

[87] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/22270 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97169

[88] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32098

[89] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39999 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66439

[90] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15054; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YPvVAzkWTnSxbDbjSgzYV5MtrPuiZAknA2cZ5yPCAeDNHk8yhocEAPG7EzTjuAnal; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022dRGwoFGSRE1BcxHuA6CqRGEQhgUxUS1d3PHbcPbArX5R5guxRzWSz1wZ5RGjyPtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u6FXaX3SB7u9tdRExRjMw2TVQGFJGV4vuR72ZYNTxTvaufm2ovPpwaT8K9tpp15Ql; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66439

[91] ttps://t.me/motopatriot78/39999; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66439; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32090

[92] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/05/bilshist-prosto-lezhyt-i-chekaye-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku-drony-nyshhat-rosijskyh-shturmovykiv/

[93] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/174868

[94] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39995; ttps://t.me/motopatriot78/39999; https://t.me/dva_majors/76764; https://t.me/dva_majors/76781

[95] https://t.me/mod_russia/55273; https://t.me/mod_russia/55275; https://t.me/mod_russia/55276

[96] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39995; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32090; https://t.me/milinfolive/154173; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32090; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39998;

[97] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15054; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YPvVAzkWTnSxbDbjSgzYV5MtrPuiZAknA2cZ5yPCAeDNHk8yhocEAPG7EzTjuAnal; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022dRGwoFGSRE1BcxHuA6CqRGEQhgUxUS1d3PHbcPbArX5R5guxRzWSz1wZ5RGjyPtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u6FXaX3SB7u9tdRExRjMw2TVQGFJGV4vuR72ZYNTxTvaufm2ovPpwaT8K9tpp15Ql; https://t.me/wargonzo/28276; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/174868

[98] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u6FXaX3SB7u9tdRExRjMw2TVQGFJGV4vuR72ZYNTxTvaufm2ovPpwaT8K9tpp15Ql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022dRGwoFGSRE1BcxHuA6CqRGEQhgUxUS1d3PHbcPbArX5R5guxRzWSz1wZ5RGjyPtl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YPvVAzkWTnSxbDbjSgzYV5MtrPuiZAknA2cZ5yPCAeDNHk8yhocEAPG7EzTjuAnal; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15054

[99] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97143

[100] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u6FXaX3SB7u9tdRExRjMw2TVQGFJGV4vuR72ZYNTxTvaufm2ovPpwaT8K9tpp15Ql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022dRGwoFGSRE1BcxHuA6CqRGEQhgUxUS1d3PHbcPbArX5R5guxRzWSz1wZ5RGjyPtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YPvVAzkWTnSxbDbjSgzYV5MtrPuiZAknA2cZ5yPCAeDNHk8yhocEAPG7EzTjuAnal ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32089

[101] https://t.me/yurasumy/24221 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97143 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32089

[102] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u6FXaX3SB7u9tdRExRjMw2TVQGFJGV4vuR72ZYNTxTvaufm2ovPpwaT8K9tpp15Ql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022dRGwoFGSRE1BcxHuA6CqRGEQhgUxUS1d3PHbcPbArX5R5guxRzWSz1wZ5RGjyPtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YPvVAzkWTnSxbDbjSgzYV5MtrPuiZAknA2cZ5yPCAeDNHk8yhocEAPG7EzTjuAnal

[103] https://t.me/dva_majors/76769; https://t.me/Fobos_herson/143855; https://t.me/milinfolive/154133; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/174925

[104] https://t.me/kpszsu/39932

[105] https://t.me/Zelenskiy_Sergiy/7237 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1083087-lozova-na-harkivsini-perezila-najmasovanisu-ataku-z-pocatku-vijni-e-poraneni-zelenskij/; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1439510307330081 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1083105-u-lozovij-cerez-masovanu-ataku-droniv-rf-zaginuv-zaliznicnik-poskodzeno-vokzal/; https://t.me/severrealii/31187; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/24248 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1083127-ponad-30-udarnih-bezpilotnikiv-tipu-geran-2-atakuvali-lozovu-na-harkivsini/; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/7164; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1952623597140209708 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15469; https://t.me/synegubov/16326; https://t.me/synegubov/16339

[106] https://suspilne dot media/1083073-niderlandi-zakuplat-u-ssa-zbrou-dla-ukraini-sili-oboroni-urazili-aerodrom-saki-v-krimu-1259-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1754386001&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[107] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/05/chomu-rosiya-perehodyt-vid-raket-do-deshevyh-droniv-dumka-eksperta/

August 8, 2025, 10:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on August 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Kremlin officials are reportedly demanding that Ukraine cede to Russia strategically vital unoccupied territory in Donetsk Oblast and freeze the frontline in other areas as part of a ceasefire agreement. Unnamed sources told Bloomberg on August 8 that Russian President Vladimir Putin demanded that Ukraine cede the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, along with Crimea, as part of ceasefire negotiations.[1] Bloomberg reported that this demand would require Ukraine to withdraw troops from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts that Russian forces have been trying and failing to capture since February 2022, after having failed to take it during Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Bloomberg reported that the terms stipulate that Russian forces would also halt offensives in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts while Ukraine and Russia negotiate a ceasefire and subsequent peace deal. Bloomberg reported that it is not clear whether Russia is willing to give up any land that it currently occupies, and US sources indicated that Ukraine and European allies still need to approve the deal. The Wall Street Journal similarly reported on August 8 that European and Ukrainian officials briefed by the Trump Administration stated that it was unclear whether Putin intended to freeze the current front lines in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts or eventually pull out of those regions entirely.[2]

The reported settlement notably does not include any mention of a Russian withdrawal from the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) or from positions in Kharkiv, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts. Two European officials told the Wall Street Journal that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff stated that the Russian proposal included two phases: the first in which Ukraine would withdraw from Donetsk Oblast and Russia and Ukraine would freeze the frontline, followed by a second phase in which Putin and US President Donald Trump would agree on a peace plan that they would later negotiate with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. The Wall Street Journal reported that a Ukrainian official who participated in a call with Trump on Wednesday said that Ukraine was not opposed to any proposals in principle, but that a ceasefire would be a prerequisite to any further steps. Trump stated at a press conference on August 8 that “there will be some swapping of territories to the betterment of both,“ but did not provide further details and noted that there will be no further announcements until August 9 or a later date.[3] US President Donald Trump and Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov announced on August 8 that Trump and Putin will meet in Alaska on August 15 and discuss options for long-term peace in Ukraine.[4]

Putin may be offering this proposal in an attempt to delay the sanctions that Trump threatened to impose by August 8 if Putin did not begin to negotiate with Ukraine to end the war.[5] Putin’s proposal demands the surrender of Ukrainian-held territory before a ceasefire, a sequence at odds with Trump’s and Zelensky’s stipulation that a ceasefire must precede any peace negotiations.[6] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on August 6 that a ceasefire is an important part of the negotiation process because it is difficult to negotiate a permanent peace deal while under fire — reiterating Trump’s preferred timeline of establishing a ceasefire in Ukraine before starting formal peace negotiations to end the war.[7] The Wall Street Journal noted that European and Ukrainian officials worry that Putin is simply using the offer as a ploy to avoid new US sanctions while continuing the war.[8] Putin is likely deliberately offering a proposal designed to be unacceptable to Ukraine in order to delay sanctions as well as meaningful ceasefire negotiations and place the blame for the failure of negotiations on Ukraine.

The surrender of the rest of Donetsk Oblast as the prerequisite of a ceasefire with no commitment to a final peace settlement ending the war would position Russian forces extremely well to renew their attacks on much more favorable terms, having avoided a long and bloody struggle for the ground. Conceding such a demand would force Ukraine to abandon its “fortress belt,” the main fortified defensive line in Donetsk Oblast since 2014 — with no guarantee that fighting will not resume. Ukraine’s fortress belt has served as a major obstacle to the Kremlin’s territorial ambitions in Ukraine over the last 11 years. The fortress belt is made up of four large cities and several towns and settlements that run north to south along the H-20 Kostyantynivka-Slovyansk highway, with a total pre-war population of over 380,537 people.[9] The line is 50 kilometers long (roughly 31 miles, about the distance between Washington, D.C. and Baltimore, Maryland). Slovyansk and Kramatorsk form the northern half of the fortress belt and serve as significant logistics hubs for Ukrainian forces defending in Donetsk Oblast. Kramatorsk currently serves as Donetsk Oblast’s provisional administrative center (because Russian forces occupy the regional center of Donetsk City) and is a major industrial city.[10] Druzhkivka, Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka, and Kostyantynivka serve as the southern half of the fortress belt. Ukrainian forces first began building up defensive positions in and around these cities after retaking them from pro-Russian proxy forces who attacked and seized Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Kostyantynivka in April 2014.[11] Ukrainian forces have maintained control of these cities since July 2014.[12] Ukraine has spent the last 11 years pouring time, money, and effort into reinforcing the fortress belt and establishing significant defense industrial and defensive infrastructure in and around these cities.

Russia’s failure to seize Slovyansk in 2022 and ongoing struggles to envelop the fortress belt underscore the success of Ukraine’s long-term efforts to reinforce the fortress belt cities. Russian forces attempted to attack the fortress belt from Izyum (northwest of Slovyansk) after advancing into eastern Kharkiv Oblast following the failure of Russian forces to make any significant gains immediately east and west of the fortress belt in March and April 2022.[13] ISW noted in early April 2022 that Russia’s ability to seize the entirety of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts hinged on Russia’s ability to seize Slovyansk.[14] Russian forces failed to seize Slovyansk and the rest of the fortress belt in Summer 2022, however, and a Ukrainian counteroffensive drove Russian forces out of Kharkiv Oblast and away from Slovyansk in Fall 2022.[15] Russian forces refocused their efforts on the seizure of Bakhmut in Spring 2023, but then culminated and deprioritized advances toward the fortress belt. Russian forces re-intensified assaults on the fortress belt from the southwest near Toretsk starting in Summer 2024.[16]

Russian forces are currently still attempting to envelop the fortress belt from the southwest and are engaged in an effort to seize it that would likely take several years to complete. The Russian military command appeared to increase its efforts in the Toretsk and eastern Pokrovsk directions by redeploying elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division and the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) from the Kurakhove direction to the area in February 2025.[17] Russian forces also redeployed elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) from the Kurakhove direction to near Malynivka (northeast of Pokrovsk) in early May 2025, indicating a re-intensification of the Russian effort to expand Russian forces’ salient northeast of Pokrovsk and southwest of the fortress belt.[18] Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk in early July 2025 indicate that Russian forces may be attempting to advance further toward Dobropillya as part of a mutually reinforcing effort to envelop Pokrovsk and bypass Ukraine’s fortress belt from the west in the coming months after failing to advance from Chasiv Yar or north of the Kleban Byk Reservoir (northwest of Toretsk).[19]

Russian forces failed to conduct a wide envelopment of Ukraine’s fortress belt in 2022, and such an operation three and a half years into the war would likely be a multi-year effort with significant personnel and materiel losses.[20] The Russian military command has spent the last 18 months developing and disseminating a doctrinal method for advances throughout the theater that aims to leverage creeping partial envelopments of frontline towns and settlements to force Ukrainian withdrawals, as demonstrated in its seizure of Avdiivka, Vuhledar, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka and ongoing efforts near Kupyansk and Pokrovsk.[21] The Russian military command, however, has yet to conduct a successful operational-level envelopment of a significant Ukrainian defensive line and will likely be unable to leverage this tactic to seize Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, or Druzhkivka, as it would require Russian forces to first seize other fortress belt cities first via frontal assault.[22] Putin’s reported proposal reportedly demands that Ukraine concede this critical defensive position, which Russian forces currently have no means of rapidly enveloping or penetrating, apparently in exchange for nothing.

Ceding Ukrainian-held parts of Donetsk Oblast will place Russian forces on the borders of Donetsk Oblast, a position that is significantly less defensible than the current line. Allowing Russian forces to take up positions along the Donetsk Oblast border would require Ukrainian forces to urgently build up massive defensive fortifications along the Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblast border areas, whose terrain is poorly suited to act as a defensive line. There are few settlements in the sparsely populated Donetsk Oblast border area, meaning that Ukraine would require enormous, urgent investment from its Western allies to establish and properly fortify a defensive line and supporting infrastructure in this area. Potential Ukrainian defensive lines in this area would run through open fields, and natural obstacles such as the Oskil and Siverskyi Donets rivers are too far east to serve as defensive positions for Ukrainian forces defending the Donetsk Oblast border. A potential ceasefire along the Donetsk Oblast border would also require large-scale investment in infrastructure compatible with a large-scale, long-term ceasefire monitoring mission.

Russian positions along the Donetsk-Kharkiv and Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border areas would provide a more advantageous launching point for a future Russian offensive into nearby areas of Kharkiv or Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will almost certainly violate any future ceasefire or peace agreement and renew military aggression against Ukraine in the future unless a peace agreement includes robust monitoring mechanisms and security guarantees for Ukraine.[23] Forcing Ukraine to concede the remainder of western Donetsk Oblast to Russia would bring Russian forces 82 kilometers further west in Ukraine (roughly 51 miles, or about the distance from downtown Manhattan, New York to Trenton, New Jersey). Conceding Lyman, Donetsk Oblast to Russian occupation would set favorable conditions for the Russians to attack Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv Oblast on the east bank of the Oskil River in renewed fighting.[24] Russian forces could then attempt to invert their 2022 efforts and leverage Slovyansk and further advances along the E-40 Kharkiv City-Novoshakhtinsk highway to attack Izyum, Kharkiv Oblast, from the south. Russian forces would be roughly 20 kilometers (12.4 miles, about the distance between Washington D.C. and Gaithersburg, Maryland) from Izyum, and only a handful of settlements and small water features would stand in their way of seizing the town. Russian forces leveraged the seizure of Izyum and Chuhuiv (northwest of Izyum) to threaten Kharkiv City in 2022, and Russian forces would likely leverage positions along the Donetsk-Kharkiv oblast border and future advances from Kupyansk to similarly threaten Kharkiv City in renewed fighting.

Russian forces also hold limited positions along the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border southwest of Pokrovsk, but ceding the remainder of Donetsk Oblast would allow Russian forces to avoid completing their ongoing costly efforts to envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. Russian forces would also avoid having to fight through Ukraine’s westernmost Dobropillya-Bilozerske-Novodonetske-Oleksandrivka defensive line, which also runs north to south, similar to the fortress belt. The Dobropillya line is Ukraine’s last north-to-south defensive line, comprised of several towns and cities before the Dnipro City line in central Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Pavlohrad (northeast of Dnipro City) would likely serve as Ukraine’s next defensive hub if Ukraine is forced to concede the remainder of Donetsk Oblast. Pavlohrad is a lone settlement roughly 70 kilometers from the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk oblast border area (roughly the distance between Washington, D.C. and Leesburg, Virginia). Most significant water features along the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border also flow east to west, making them relatively ineffective defensive positions against Russian advances from the east. Conceding the remains of Donetsk Oblast would thus also provide Russian forces more advantageous positions from which to attack into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

Putin’s reported proposal once again underscores that he maintains his uncompromising demands for Ukraine’s capitulation and remains disinterested in good-faith negotiations. Putin stated on August 1 that the conditions laid out in his June 2024 speech “certainly” remain the same.[25] Putin demanded in June 2024 that any peace agreement must address the “root causes” of the war and provide for Ukraine’s demilitarization, denazification, and alliance neutrality. Putin effectively demanded the removal of the current legitimate Ukrainian government and the establishment of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv.[26] Putin has since consistently demanded that Ukraine concede all of Donbas and “Novorossiya,” referring to occupied and non-occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts as a prerequisite for any sort of negotiations with Ukraine.[27] Kremlin officials often invoke the term “Novorossiya” — an amorphous invented region in Ukraine — as an “integral” part of Russia in order to lay claims to territory beyond the four partially occupied oblasts and include all of southern and eastern Ukraine, including Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa Oblasts.[28] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov previously stated that there are “no secrets” about Russia’s demands and reiterated the importance of addressing the “root causes” of the war in a future peace agreement.[29] Putin stated on August 7, following his meeting with Witkoff, that, while not opposed to meeting with Zelensky, certain conditions must be “created” before Putin will meet with Zelensky, and that these conditions are still far away.[30] Putin’s efforts to posture himself as amenable to US peace proposals and meaningful negotiations while continuing to make the same demands and refusing to make any concessions are attempts to obfuscate the fact that Putin himself remains uninterested in ending his war on terms short of full victory. Putin and other Kremlin officials have also intentionally cultivated Russian society’s commitment to Putin’s stated war aims and have not set conditions to take any off-ramps to accept a peace settlement that falls short — in contradiction with Putin’s claims that he is interested in peace.[31]

The Kremlin does not appear to be setting the domestic information conditions necessary for the Russian people to accept a settlement short of full victory in Ukraine. Several Russian federal newswires amplified Bloomberg’s reporting of the proposal with no additional commentary, but contextualized Putin’s proposal by repeating Putin’s 2024 demand that Russia gain control of Luhansk, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Kherson oblasts as a precondition to any ceasefire.[32] The Russian federal newswires’ messaging indicates that the Kremlin’s domestic narrative about the resolution of the was has not changed. Other Russian state media outlets reported limited details of the ceasefire proposal and heavily emphasized that the deal may change before a final settlement.[33] A Russian outlet added an observation that “only Putin would dictate the terms of peace” when discussing the ceasefire proposal, likely to condition the Russian domestic audience to believe that Russia is the sole decider of the war’s outcome.[34] Another Russian outlet simply stated that the proposal may freeze the frontline in Ukraine and did not discuss the possibility of Russia halting its offensives in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts or Ukraine ceding Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to Russia.[35] State Duma Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev stated that Putin is ”capable of outplaying any of the currently living politicians,” insinuating that Putin is not entering these negotiations in good faith and is superior to Trump.[36] A Russian US political expert assessed that Putin and Trump will only be able to reach a temporary agreement and noted that the agreement will only concern the Trump administration.[37] Russian public officials and unofficial messaging does not communicate any changes in the ongoing Kremlin line, insinuating that Putin is not preparing for any meaningful concessions. The lack of change in public Kremlin messaging, in combination with ongoing speculation that Putin is looking to “outplay” the West, signifies that Putin himself likely does not see his reported proposal as a concession and likely retains territorial aspirations beyond Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

Ongoing Russian long-range drone strikes against major Ukrainian cities also demonstrate the Kremlin’s lack of interest in good-faith negotiations to end Russia’s war against Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russia launched four jet-powered drones and 104 Shahed-type strike and decoy drones from the directions of Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Kursk City; Bryansk City; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea, on the night of August 7 to 8.[38] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed three jet-powered drones and 79 strike and decoy drones and that 26 Russian drones struck ten unspecified locations in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drone and missile strikes damaged civilian and industrial infrastructure in Saltyvskyi Raion, Kharkiv City and Kharkiv Oblast; residential areas in Bucha Raion, Kyiv Oblast; and civilian infrastructure in Sumy and Odesa oblasts.[39]

A Russian milblogger, appearing to cite statistics from the Ukrainian Air Force, claimed that Russian forces launched over 6,000 drones at Ukrainian cities during July 2025, a substantial increase from roughly 4,500 reported in June 2025.[40] The milblogger added that Russian forces reportedly increased their use of Geran-3 jet-powered drones, the Russian analogue to the Iranian Shahed-238. Ukrainian Air Force statistics indicate that Russian forces launched 728 drones on July 9, more than in any previous 24-hour period since February 2022.[41]

Putin is likely attempting to shore up support abroad to portray strength and confidence ahead of the August 15 meeting with Trump. Putin called People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping on August 8 to discuss the results of Putin’s August 6 meeting with US Middle East Steve Witkoff, Russia-China bilateral relations, and Putin’s upcoming visit to the PRC in September 2025.[42] Xi reiterated that China will uphold its consistent position and persist in promoting peace and dialogue.[43] Putin called Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to discuss trade, economic and investment cooperation, and Witkoff’s meeting with Putin amidst threats of US tariffs in response to India’s continued purchases of Russian oil.[44] Putin called South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, and Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to discuss his meeting with Witkoff.[45] Putin also called Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko to discuss the contents of the American peace proposal and the results of Putin’s meeting with Witkoff.[46] Putin is likely attempting to present himself as a powerful opponent with support abroad as he continues to reject US and Ukrainian negotiation proposals. Putin’s posturing suggests that he likely remains confident in his ability to secure his war aims in Ukraine via negotiations or military operations.

Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide monetary aid to Ukraine. The European Council of the European Union (EU) announced on August 8 that it approved a fourth tranche of financial aid to Ukraine worth over 3.2 billion euros (roughly $3.7 billion) as part of the EU’s Ukraine Facility program.[47]

Ukrainian drone manufacturers developed a new drone capable of intercepting Russian Shahed-type drones. Co-owner of Ukrainian drone manufacturer Tenebris, Kyrylo Andrusyak, told Ukrainian newswire Ukrinform on August 7 that Tenebris developed a new “Bayonet” interceptor drone specifically designed to counter Russian Shahed and Geran drones.[48] The “Bayonet” drone can reportedly match Shahed speeds of up to 250 kilometers per hour, fly at an altitude of up to five kilometers, has a range of 40 kilometers, and has automatic takeoff and return capabilities and visual target locks that plot the optimal interception course without relying on GPS or radio communication.[49] The manufacturers are also finalizing a full autonomous guidance system and network that would allow one drone operator to control 15 interceptors from three stations.

Key Takeaways:

Kremlin officials are reportedly demanding that Ukraine cede to Russia strategically vital unoccupied territory in Donetsk Oblast and freeze the frontline in other areas as part of a ceasefire agreement.

The surrender of the rest of Donetsk Oblast as the prerequisite of a ceasefire with no commitment to a final peace settlement ending the war would position Russian forces extremely well to renew their attacks on much more favorable terms, having avoided a long and bloody struggle for the ground. Conceding such a demand would force Ukraine to abandon its “fortress belt,” the main fortified defensive line in Donetsk Oblast since 2014 — with no guarantee that fighting will not resume.

Russia’s failure to seize Slovyansk in 2022 and ongoing struggles to envelop the fortress belt underscore the success of Ukraine’s long-term efforts to reinforce the fortress belt cities.

Russian forces are currently still attempting to envelop the fortress belt from the southwest and are engaged in an effort to seize it that would likely take several years to complete.

Ceding Ukrainian-held parts of Donetsk Oblast will place Russian forces on the borders of Donetsk Oblast, a position that is significantly less defensible than the current line.

Russian positions along the Donetsk-Kharkiv and Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border areas would provide a more advantageous launching point for a future Russian offensive into nearby areas of Kharkiv or Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will almost certainly violate any future ceasefire or peace agreement and renew military aggression against Ukraine in the future unless a peace agreement includes robust monitoring mechanisms and security guarantees for Ukraine.

Putin’s reported proposal once again underscores that he maintains his uncompromising demands for Ukraine’s capitulation and remains disinterested in good-faith negotiations.

The Kremlin does not appear to be setting the domestic information conditions necessary for the Russian people to accept a settlement short of full victory in Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces advanced near Kupyansk and Toretsk. Russian forces advanced near Lyman, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 7 and 8 but did not advance.[50]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Fighting continued in northern Sumy Oblast on August 8.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Kindrativka and south of Andriivka (both north of Sumy City).[51]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka, Kindrativka, and Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Varachyne and Sadky.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked in southern Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[53] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) failed to prevent a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group from advancing into Oleksiivka.[54] The milblogger attributed the failure to Russian forces lacking the necessary manpower to sufficiently protect the frontline.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 234th VDV Regiment, are reportedly attacking near Yunakivka.[55] Drone operators of the Russian 76th VDV Division and the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly struck Ukrainian positions near Mykilske (northeast of Sumy City).[56] Artillery elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC, LMD) are reportedly shelling Ukrainian positions in Novokostyantynivka (north of Sumy City).[57] Elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), 83rd VDV Brigade, 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), and 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating in northern Sumy Oblast.[58] Drone operators of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade and elements of the Smuglyanka Detachment and Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[59]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanskyi Khutory and toward Synelnykove on August 7 and 8.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in a forest near Synelnykove.[61]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Antagonist Group (likely part of Sudoplatov Battalion) are reportedly operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[62]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 8.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Radkivka (north of Kupyansk).[63] Russian forces have recently advanced northwest and north of Kupyansk in ongoing efforts to envelop and seize the city, and further Ukrainian counterattacks may impede Russian envelopment efforts.[64]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk near Myrove and Kindrashivka; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Radkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe, Fyholivka and Kamyanka and toward Novovasylivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on August 7 and 8.[65]

The commander of a Ukrainian reconnaissance company operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces constantly commit small infantry groups to high-attrition assaults in attempts to break into Kupyansk and use various watercraft, such as rubber boats, when attempting to cross to the left bank of the Oskil River.[66] The commander reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed Russian armored vehicles when Russian forces attempted to use these vehicles to advance in the Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi direction.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and toward Nova Kruhlyakivka and southwest of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Olhivka on August 7 and 8.[67]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 8 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced during a motorized assault in western Zarichne (east of Lyman).[68]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Karpivka and toward Shandryholove and Serednie; north of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna and Novyi Myr; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Yampolivka; east of Lyman near Torske and Dibrova; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on August 7 and 8.[69]

The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces are leveraging various combinations of armored and motorized vehicles in assaults.[70] The commander stated that the Russian assault groups are composed of poorly trained recruits and well-trained personnel and that these groups attempt to infiltrate into the Ukrainian rear.

Order of Battle: Elements of Russian Tuman Spetsnaz Detachment (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Serebryanske forest area.[71]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on August 7 and 8.[72]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Serebryanka.[73] Artillery elements of the 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Fedorivka.[74]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing along the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal near Hryhorivka (north of Chasiv Yar).[75]

Russian forces attacked north of Chasiv Yar toward Novomarkove, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, and south of Chasiv Yar toward Stupochky on August 7 and 8.[76]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated on August 8 that Ukrainian forces repelled several motorized assaults in this direction on August 7.[77] The commander added that Russian forces in the Chasiv Yar direction are leveraging drones to compensate for armored vehicle losses and noted that the battalion destroyed 350 drones of various types over July 2025. A chief sergeant of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction refuted Russian claims on August 8 that Russian forces seized Chasiv Yar and stated that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the city.[78] The chief sergeant implied that Russian forces send poorly equipped infantry into highly attritional assaults along the same routes.

Donetsk Oblast Police reported that Russian forces struck Kostyantynivka (southwest of Chasiv Yar) using a KAB-250 glide bomb, wounding a civilian and damaging a hospital.[79]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[80] Drone operators of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (Chasiv Yar) direction.[81]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced within Katerynivka (immediately northwest of Toretsk) and Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[82]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 8 indicates that Russian forces advanced within central Rusyn Yar and seized Poltavka (both northwest of Toretsk).[83]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Mykolaivka (north of Toretsk), north and northwest of Rusyn Yar, and near Yablunivka (both northwest of Toretsk).[84]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Bila Hora and Dyliivka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and northwest of Toretsk near Popiv Yar, Poltavka, Rusyn Yar, Oleksandro-Kalynove, Katerynivka and Pleshchiivka and toward Stepanivka on August 7 and 8.[85]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in Rusyn Yar and near Poltavka.[86] Artillery elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade and drone operators of the 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade (both of the 8th CAA) are reportedly coordinating strikes against Ukrainian positions near Kleban-Byk (northwest of Toretsk).[87] Drone operators of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Pleshchiivka.[88]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 8 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern and central Pokrovsk.[89]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within Pokrovsk, north of Novokostyantynivka (just south of Pokrovsk), and west of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[90]

Russian forces attacked north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and toward Krasnyi Lyman; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Sukhetske, Novoekonomichne, Boykivka, Nykanorivka, Dorozhnie, and Mykolaivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Moskovske; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka, Sukhyi Yar, and Novopavlivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on August 7 and 8.[91]

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on August 7 that Russian forces are attacking more in the Pokrovsk direction than any other area on the frontline and are sustaining massive casualties.[92] Syrskyi stated that Russian forces have engaged in efforts to seize Pokrovsk for over a year and that the Pokrovsk direction remains extremely difficult, but stated that Ukrainian forces maintain their positions in Pokrovsk against over 110,000 Russian personnel operating in this direction. Syrskyi stated that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction recently changed tactics, increased the number of troops, and are leveraging armored vehicles in attempts to advance. ISW previously assessed that Russian advances aimed at enveloping Pokrovsk have accelerated in recent weeks.[93] The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces continue to “probe“ Ukrainian defensive lines for weak points to then attack in small fire teams of two infantrymen and are constantly changing supply routes in attempts to evade Ukrainian drones and sustain offensive operations.[94]

Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast Police reported on August 8 that Russian forces struck Dobropillya (north of Pokrovsk) with two KAB guided glide bombs overnight on August 7 to 8.[95] A Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (VR) Deputy and Chairman of the Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Mykhailo Volynets, reported that Russian artillery fire struck the Dobropillyavugol-vydobutok mine in Dobropillya, damaging and disabling a 110-kW substation, and that the substation is now in critical condition with gas contamination and flooding. [96]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Slovyansk Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating near Koptieve and Novotoretske (both northeast of Pokrovsk).[97]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Zelenyi Kut; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Tovste and Zelenyi Hai and toward Filiya on August 7 and 8.[98] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dachne (southeast of Novopavlivka) and toward Yalta (southwest of Novopavlivka).[99]

Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov refuted claims on August 8 that Russian forces advanced near Dachne (southeast of Novopavlivka) and stated that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack near Dachne several days ago.[100] Trehubov stated that Russian forces are accumulating forces in Donetsk Oblast and are likely preparing to attack Dachne again.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Novopavlivka direction.[101]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Komyshuvakha southeast of Velykomykhailivka.[102]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka and Oleksandrohrad and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Zelene Pole, Maliivka, Novopil, Vilne Pole, Temyrivka, and toward Komyshuvakha on August 7 and 8.[103] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Temyrivka.[104]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly FAB glide bomb striking Ukrainian forces near Andriivka-Klevtsove (northeast of Velykomykhailivka).[105] Elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) and 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Oleksandrohrad and Andriivka-Klevtsove.[106]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Olhivske and toward Ivanivka and east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on August 7 and 8, but did not advance.[107]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Kamyanske (west of Orikhiv).[108]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv toward Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Nesteryanka; and west of Orikhiv near Kamyanske, Stepnohirsk, and Plavni on August 7 and 8.[109] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Orikhiv itself, Stepnohirsk, and Plavni.[110]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements and drone operators of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhia direction and near Plavni, respectively.[111] Drone operators of the 247th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), 218th Tank and 143rd Motorized Rifle regiments (both of 127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]), and the Rostov Battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Zaporizhia direction.[112] Drone operators of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novoandriivka (west of Orikhiv).[113] Elements of the 7th VDV Division, including of its 108th and 247th VDV regiments, are reportedly operating near Plavni.[114]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on August 8 but did not advance.[115]

The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) published footage on August 8 showing Ukrainian drones striking a Russian 98L6 Yenisei radar station in an unspecified location in occupied Crimea.[116]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko requested an interview with Time Magazine, published on August 8, in which Lukashenko stated that he is not currently planning to run for another presidential term but declined to comment on who he might choose as his successor.[117] Lukashenko also claimed that Belarus will have an operational Oreshnik missile system by the end of 2025.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-08/us-and-russia-plan-truce-deal-to-cement-putin-s-gains-in-ukraine?sref=bWSPFsy2

[2] https://www.wsj.com/world/putin-russia-ukraine-ceasefire-proposal-0021453b

[3] https://x.com/Acyn/status/1953915344881692830

[4] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114995403653615328 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/330036 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/330039

[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-19-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2025

[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2025

[8] https://www.wsj.com/world/putin-russia-ukraine-ceasefire-proposal-0021453b

[9] db dot ukrcensus dot gov dot ua/PXWEB2007/ukr/publ_new1/2022/zb_Сhuselnist dot pdf ; db dot ukrcensus dot gov dot ua/PXWEB2007/ukr/publ_new1/2022/zb_Сhuselnist dot pdf ; db dot ukrcensus dot gov dot ua/PXWEB2007/ukr/publ_new1/2022/zb_Сhuselnist dot pdf ; db dot ukrcensus dot gov dot ua/PXWEB2007/ukr/publ_new1/2022/zb_Сhuselnist dot pdf ; db dot ukrcensus dot gov dot ua/PXWEB2007/ukr/publ_new1/2022/zb_Сhuselnist dot pdf

[10] https://www.encyclopediaofukraine dot com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CK%5CR%5CKramatorsk.htm

[11] https://kyivindependent.com/russian-authorities-reportedly-arrest-warlord-who-seized-slovyansk-in-2014/ ; https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/02/27/world/europe/ukraine-divisions-crimea.html

[12] https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/22/world/europe/ukrainian-military-and-rebel-fighters-clash-in-donetsk.html ; https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/02/27/world/europe/ukraine-divisions-crimea.html

[13] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignApr4 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignApr16 ;

[14] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignApr4

[15] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignMay12 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignJune1 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignJune2 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignJuly18 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignJuly20

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut

[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-16-2025 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2564

[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625

[19] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025

[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-16-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013125

[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070525

[22] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025

[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar033025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2025

[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis

[25] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77637

[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041925

[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022725

[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121423 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724

[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525

[30] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77728

[31] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080525

[32] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/08/08/2025/68960b959a794734652b7187; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2025/08/08/1130397-obsuzhdayut-vivod-voisk-ukraini ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024

[33] https://www.osnmedia dot ru/politika/bloomberg-rf-mozhet-ostanovit-nastuplenie-v-hersonskoj-i-zaporozhskoj-oblastyah/; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7955984

[34] https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/news/2025/08/08/26455502.shtml

[35] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/08/08/stalo-izvestno-o-planah-rossii-i-ssha-zaklyuchit-peremirie/

[36] https://life dot ru/p/1777756 ; https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/13437

[37] https://t.me/DDrobnitski/8379

[38] https://t.me/kpszsu/40078

[39] https://t.me/synegubov/16408; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/08/rakety-kaby-drony-okupanty-zavdaly-masovanyh-udariv-po-harkovu-ta-oblasti/; https://t.me/synegubov/16408; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/6535; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/08/troye-zhinok-postrazhdaly-vnaslidok-ataky-droniv-na-kyyivshhyni/; https://suspilne dot media/1085751-tri-zinki-postrazdali-vnaslidok-ataki-droniv-na-kiivsini/; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1085781-rosia-atakuvala-dronami-odeskij-rajon-postrazdav-ohoronec-azs/; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1085735-v-odesi-lunaut-vibuhi-so-vidomo-4/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/10853; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/08/vnochi-vorog-vchergove-atakuvav-udarnymy-bezpilotnykamy-odeshhynu/; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1085747-vijska-rf-udarili-po-sumskij-ta-sostkinskij-gromadah-bpla-e-poranini/; https://t.me/grigorov_oleg/386; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/08/vorozhi-bpla-atakuvaly-sumshhynu-ye-postrazhdalyj-poshkodzheni-bagatopoverhivky/

[40] https://t.me/milinfolive/154305

[41] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/09/masovana-ataka-rf-okupanty-zapustyly-po-ukrayini-ponad-700-bpla-i-13-raket/

[42] http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77738; https://t.me/MID_Russia/63588

[43] https://news dot cctv.com/2025/08/08/ARTINEFfDveqScwCK4oVjVWJ250808.shtml?spm=C96370.PPDB2vhvSivD.E0O8qNryTckW.1

[44] https://t.me/MID_Russia/63589; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77741

[45] https://t.me/MID_Russia/63570; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77732; https://t.me/MID_Russia/63580; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77735; https://t.me/MID_Russia/63579; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77734

[46] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77740; https://t.me/pul_1/17762

[47] https://www.consilium.europa dot eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/08/08/ukraine-facility-kyiv-to-receive-over-32-billion-in-eu-support-following-council-decision-approving-fourth-payment/?utm_source=brevo&utm_campaign=AUTOMATED%20-%20Alert%20-%20Newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_id=3318

[48] https://www dot ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/4022869-ukrainian-developers-unveil-bagnet-interceptor-drone.html ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JJQ45s8fTiQ ; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/ukraine-creates-new-interceptor-drone-to-counter-shahed-drones/

[49] https://united24media dot com/latest-news/ukraine-deploys-new-bagnet-drone-to-hunt-and-destroy-russian-drones-midair-10526 ; https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1953713369803878864 ; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1953711104510529950

[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27588 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27568 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27542

[51] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32220

[52] https://t.me/wargonzo/28346 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32220; https://t.me/dva_majors/76980

[53] https://t.me/wargonzo/28346

[54] https://t.me/severnnyi/4765

[55] https://t.me/severnnyi/4759 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4760

[56] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32208

[57] https://t.me/severnnyi/4759

[58] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32220 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77002

[59] https://t.me/dva_majors/76956 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77037

[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27588; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27568; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27542; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15231; https://t.me/wargonzo/28346

[61] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32198;

[62] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175273 ; https://t.me/sudoplatov_official/5884; https://t.me/sudoplatov_official/5936

[63] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30124; https://t.me/Tsaplienko/78484

[64] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2025

[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27588; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27568; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27542; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15231; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32201; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/08/trykutnyk-zagrozy-na-harkivshhyni-vorog-pragne-prosunutysya-v-napryamku-velykogo-burluka/

[66] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MOlijqyP9Mk ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/08/ruhalysya-tehnikoyu-ale-yim-bagato-popalyly-rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-shturmuvaty-pihotoyu-pozycziyi-nepodalik-kupyanska/

[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27588; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27568; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27542; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15231

[68] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9768; https://t.me/ombr_63/1308;

[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27588; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27568; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27542; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15231; https://t.me/wargonzo/28346

[70] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/08/prosto-zibraly-na-vulyczi-ta-prygnaly-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-vorog-vykorystovuye-riznomanitni-taktyky/

[71] https://t.me/voin_dv/16371

[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27588; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27568; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27542; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15231

[73] https://t.me/shock3OA/1811; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1953765983979810979

[74] https://t.me/shock3OA/1814

[75] https://t.me/dva_majors/76980

[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27568; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27542; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15231

[77] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/08/vorog-pochav-vidchuvaty-cze-troshky-ranishe-u-tretomu-korpusi-poyasnyly-taktyku-rosijskogo-prosuvannya/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0

[78] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/08/postijno-zhaliyutsya-shho-v-nyh-nemaye-vody-ta-yizhi-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-radiyut-vygadanym-peremogam/

[79] https://t.me/don_gunp/18773

[80] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32208

[81] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97306

[82] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1953746824499499054; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1953747758772306091; https://t.me/nm_dnr/14159; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1953736711336284602; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1953738428685713665; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/392; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1953811058981806217; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1953811286199857152; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97261

[83] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9767; https://t.me/VARTOVI_36/665; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1953703225036505593; https://t.me/fakhivtsi/387

[84] https://t.me/wargonzo/28346; https://t.me/epoddubny/24290; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40234

[85] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27588; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27568; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27542; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15231; https://t.me/dva_majors/76980

[86] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40234

[87] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14159

[88] https://t.me/mod_russia/55336

[89] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9765 ; https://t.me/corps7DSHV/116 ; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1953834102123118636 ; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1953823701306130643 ; https://t.me/skala425/636

[90] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32188 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32191 ; https://t.me/rybar/72685 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/24554

[91] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27588 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27568 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27542 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15231 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28346

[92] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1086011-situacia-pid-pokrovskom-zagrozliva-sirskij/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qXe4MMEtjxQ

[93] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2025

[94] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/08/zminyuyut-posadky-dorogy-polya-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-vorog-skonczentruvav-ugrupovannya-i-bezperestanku-atakuye/

[95] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1086151-u-dobropilli-cerez-obstril-rf-znestrumilo-sahtu-ii-zatoplue-volinec/

[96] https://www.facebook.com/MykhailoVolynets/posts/pfbid02DPuwNfQzETgryPsafpeQYaTxmzaHAYDF6wcsTwSewedEv1JiV7towabfnn5QUn2l?locale=uk_UA; https://www.facebook.com/don.gunp/posts/pfbid02cJKGZcLT4RVs7dbTBfySGBZCYhrCM4grmtpk5Nb4WvrEBMfwjhPVzDacwbX8ErWQl

[97] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175272

[98] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27588 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27568 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27542 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15231 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32230

[99] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32230

[100] https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1064703-vijska-rf-prosunulisa-poblizu-dacnogo-na-dnipropetrovsini-deepstate-so-kazut-v-osuv-hortica/

[101] https://t.me/dva_majors/76987

[102] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32230

[103] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27588 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27568 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27542 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15231; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32230

[104] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32230

[105] https://t.me/voin_dv/16379

[106] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32230

[107] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27588; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27568; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27542

[108] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40233

[109] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27588; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27568; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27542; https://t.me/dva_majors/76980; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32201; https://t.me/wargonzo/28346; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32227; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32208

[110] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32227; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32227

[111] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32222; https://t.me/dva_majors/76998

[112] https://t.me/rogozin_do/7416; https://t.me/rusich_army/25107; https://t.me/voin_dv/16367; https://t.me/voin_dv/16368

[113] https://t.me/vrogov/21415

[114] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32208; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32227; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32201

[115] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27588; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27568

[116] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6586; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1086345-u-krimu-dronami-vrazili-rls-enisej-z-kompleksu-s-500-gur/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/08/u-krymu-urazyly-najnovishu-rls-okupantiv-novi-detali-vyd-gur/; https://gur dot gov.ua/content/onovleno-prymary-hur-u-krymu-urazyly-odnu-z-naitsinnishykh-rls-okupantiv-yenisiei-z-kompleksu-s500.html

[117] https://t.me/tass_agency/329932 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/329934 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/329936 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/329937 ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/328107 ; https://belta dot by/president/view/kakim-lukashenko-vidit-svoego-preemnika-i-pojdet-li-na-novyj-prezidentskij-srok-730922-2025/ ; https://t.me/sotaproject/101515 ; https://time.com/7308021/lukashenko-belarus-minsk-backchannel-trump-putin/