Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Jennie Olmsted, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey, Justin Young, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 15, 2025, 9pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on August 15, except for reports about the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 16 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US President Donald Trump met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska, on August 15. Trump and Putin initially planned to meet one-on-one, but the talks expanded to a three-on-three format, including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff, for unspecified reasons.[1] Leading Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev claimed that the talks went “remarkably well” following the three-on-three discussions.[2] Trump and Putin then held a joint press conference. Putin addressed the crowd first and spoke in Russian, reiterating several long-standing Kremlin information operations about the war in Ukraine, Russian history, and the US-Russia relationship.[3] Putin invoked the geographical closeness of Alaska and the Russian Federation and called back to US-Soviet military cooperation during the Second World War in order to artificially highlight bilateral US-Russia relations. Putin emphasized the importance of solving the “root causes” of the war in Ukraine, which the Kremlin has defined as NATO’s eastward expansion and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers.[4] Putin also accused European states of attempting to undermine the negotiation process. These statements are two standard narrative lines that the Kremlin employs in order to justify its illegal invasion of Ukraine and to drive a wedge between the United States, Europe, and Ukraine.[5] Trump then spoke for a shorter time than Putin and emphasized that the meeting had been “productive,” but that the US and Russian delegations reached “no deal.” Putin concluded by addressing Trump in English and inviting him to Moscow.[6] Trump and Putin left the press conference stage without taking any audience questions, and a luncheon planned for after the meeting was reportedly cancelled.[7]

Putin said nothing in the joint press conference to indicate that he has moderated either his war aims or his willingness to compromise on them and reiterated language he has used since 2021 to justify Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Putin again demonstrated that he has not changed his views on Ukrainian sovereignty since 2021 and remains disinterested in serious peace negotiations with Ukraine. Putin used the joint press conference following the August 15 Alaska summit to evoke the Kremlin’s long-standing narrative that Russia and Ukraine share the “same roots” and that Russia considers Ukraine to be a “brotherly” nation.[8] Putin published an essay on the “Historic Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” in July 2021, in which he similarly ideologized that Ukrainians and Belarusians have always belonged to the Russian nation because of their shared “historical and spiritual space.”[9] ISW previously assessed that the essay, which Putin published less than a month after meeting with then-US President Joe Biden in Geneva in June 2021, was an ultimatum to Kyiv as it openly questioned Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Putin stated in the essay that Ukraine was a ”product of the Soviet era shaped on the lands of historical Russia,” and reiterated these arguments in his February 2022 declaration of war against Ukraine as a justification for his full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[10] The continuity between Putin’s statements at the August 15 press conference with Trump and his previous statements demonstrates that he remains committed to the view that Ukraine’s existence as a state and territorial integrity depend on Ukraine’s alignment with Russia.

Trump stated that the United States and Russia did not come to a firm agreement about the war in Ukraine. Trump reported that he and Putin “made great progress” and agreed on “many points,” but did not agree on other points.[11] Trump did not elaborate on the specifics of what the US and Russian delegations discussed, upon what points the delegations agreed, and which points remain in contention. Trump stated that “there’s no deal until there’s a deal” and stated that he will inform Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and NATO states about the conversation and that an agreement on Ukraine is “ultimately up to them.”[12] Trump reiterated his timeline that any bilateral economic agreements with Russia will come after the war is “over with.”

Russia conducted drone and missile strikes in Ukraine in the hours before the August 15 Alaska summit, causing civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Voronezh and Bryansk oblasts and 97 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the direction of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast on the night of August 14 to August 15.[13] Russian forces used drones to target frontline areas of Sumy, Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Chernihiv oblasts, and the missiles to target Kharkiv and Chernihiv oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down or suppressed 63 Shahed-type and decoy drones over northern and eastern Ukraine.[14] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the two Iskander-Ms and 34 drones struck 13 locations throughout Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that the ballistic missiles hit cars in Dniprovskyi Raion, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and an agricultural enterprise in Koryukivka Hromada, Chernihiv Oblast, killing and wounding civilians.[15] Russian drones hit an ambulance and a civilian car in Velykapyskarivka Hromada, Sumy Oblast, on the morning of August 15, killing one civilian.[16] Ukrainian officials and media sources reported on the evening of August 15 that a Russian drone hit the Sumy City Central Market, damaging retail outlets, an educational institution, and other buildings.[17] A Russian milblogger acknowledged that Russian forces conducted drone strikes against Sumy, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv oblasts “on the eve of the [Alaska] meeting.”[18] US President Donald Trump responded to the August 15 Russian strikes while en route to Alaska, noting that Russian President Vladimir Putin is “trying to set a stage” ahead of the summit.[19] Trump stated that the Russian strikes will “hurt” Putin’s ability to make a deal with Trump. Russia continues to conduct drone and missile strikes that result in high civilian casualties even as Trump has repeatedly called on Russia to stop strike series that disproportionately affect civilian areas.[20] The United Nations (UN) reported on August 13 that Russian air and drone strikes in July 2025 contributed to the highest total monthly casualty toll since May 2022.[21]

Ukrainian officials continue to indicate that Ukrainian counterattacks are stabilizing the situation east and northeast of Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk). Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on August 15 that Ukrainian forces have stabilized Russian penetration near Pokrovsk and Dobropillya.[22] Trehubov stated that Ukrainian forces continue to destroy the Russian assault groups in the area and that Russian forces have not been able to redeploy additional troops to the area. A Ukrainian corps operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on August 15 that Ukrainian forces cleared Pokrovsk of Russian groups and individual soldiers who had previously infiltrated the settlement.[23] A Ukrainian corps operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on August 15 that Ukrainian forces cleared Hruzke, Rubizhne, Novovodyane, Petrivka, Vesele, and Zolotyi Kolodyaz (all northeast of Dobropillya).[24] A Ukrainian source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported on August 15 that Ukrainian forces have in part stabilized the situation along the Vesele-Zolotyi Kolodyaz-Kucheriv Yar line (northeast of Dobropillya).[25] ISW has not observed broader reporting about Ukrainian forces clearing settlements in the Russian penetration near Dobropillya at this time. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 15 that elements of the Russian 5th, 110th, and 132nd separate motorized rifle brigades (all of the 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) initially advanced several hundred meters east of Pankivka (east of Dobropillya) but that Ukrainian counterattacks from Volodymyrivka and Shakhove (both north of Pankivka) pushed back the Russian advance.[26] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 114th and 132nd separate motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) have been attempting to hold Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya) and to repel Ukrainian counterattacks in the Ivanivka-Zapovidne direction (north to east of Dorozhnie) since August 13.[27] A Russian milblogger also acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya).[28] The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces had tactical successes near the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway.[29] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Volodymyrivka and Shakhove.[30] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claimed Russian advances, however.

The Russian military command is reportedly trying to redeploy forces and means to reinforce and exploit the penetration near Dobropillya but has so far been unsuccessful. Mashovets stated that small infantry groups of the Russian 5th, 110th, and 132nd separate motorized rifle brigades (all three of the 51st CAA) conducted the initial penetration, but that the total number of Russian forces that conducted the tactical breakthrough did not exceed 300 to 350 personnel.[31] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command tried to consolidate the penetration by redeploying elements of the 114th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) to near Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) and Zapovidne.[32] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command asked senior commanders in the area to provide additional forces and means by redeploying up to two battalions with armored vehicles from the 8th CAA (SMD), which is largely operating in the Toretsk direction, to support the other elements of the 51st CAA that conducted the tactical breakthrough.

Ukrainian officials continue to conduct evacuations of settlements near the Russian penetration area, however, likely reflecting the increased Russian drone threat due to the Russian advance near Dobropillya. Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin announced on August 14 the mandatory evacuation of families with children from Druzhkivka (northeast of Dobropillya) and villages in Andriivka Hromada, northeast, north, and northwest of Zolotyi Kolodyaz, noting that roughly 1,800 children live in these settlements.[33] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s use of drone strikes to generate battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects in the Ukrainian near rear is severely hindering Ukrainian evacuation efforts in the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya area.[34]

Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure overnight on August 14 to 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 15 that Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) and other Ukrainian elements conducted a drone strike against the Rosneft Syzran Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast, causing explosions and fires.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Syrzan Oil Refinery is one of Rosneft’s largest refineries and produces a wide range of fuel products, including aviation kerosene for the Russian military. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone strikes, posted images on August 15 showing smoke over the Syzran Oil Refinery.[36] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Syzran Oil Refinery in February 2025.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 15 that the Ukrainian SSO and other Ukrainian forces also struck the Russian Olya Seaport in Astrakhan Oblast, including the Port Olya 4 vessel, which was carrying Shahed-type drone components and ammunition from Iran.[38] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Russian military uses the Olya Seaport as a logistics supply point for military goods from Iran. The Ukrainian SSO Command reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed the Port Olya-4.[39] Astrakhan Oblast Governor Igor Babushkin claimed that Russian air defenses downed Ukrainian drones targeting the Olya Seaport and that drone debris damaged a ship.[40]

Russian opposition outlet Baza reported on August 15 that there was an explosion at the Elastik Gunpowder Factory in Ryazan Oblast.[41] Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov confirmed that there was an “emergency situation” at a plant in the area that killed five and injured 100 others and declared a state of emergency in the municipality.[42] The Russian Investigative Committee (Sledkom) opened an investigation into the violation of safety procedures following the explosion.[43] Kovalenko posted footage on August 15 showing an explosion at a gunpowder plant in Ryazan Oblast, noted that there were roughly 50 workers at the plant, and stated that “something strange” occurred at the plant.[44] Ukrainian sources have not yet claimed responsibility for the strike, however, and ISW cannot confirm its causes at this time.

Key Takeaways:

US President Donald Trump met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska, on August 15.

Putin said nothing in the joint press conference to indicate that he has moderated either his war aims or his willingness to compromise on them and reiterated language he has used since 2021 to justify Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

Trump stated that the United States and Russia did not come to a firm agreement about the war in Ukraine.

Russia conducted drone and missile strikes in Ukraine in the hours before the August 15 Alaska summit, causing civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure.

Ukrainian officials continue to indicate that Ukrainian counterattacks are stabilizing the situation east and northeast of Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk).

The Russian military command is reportedly trying to redeploy forces and means to reinforce and exploit the penetration near Dobropillya but has so far been unsuccessful.

Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure overnight on August 14 to 15.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Limited fighting continued in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 15.[45]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked southwest of Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) along the Seim River shore.[46]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger, citing unnamed Ukrainian military analysts, claimed that Russian forces advanced into Novokostyantynivka (near the international border north of Sumy City) and that the settlement is a contested “gray zone.”[47]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Novokostyantynivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and toward Sadky on August 14 and 15.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novokostyantynivka, Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City), Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City), and Sadky.[49]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) continue to face the threat of encirclement in an unspecified forest area, likely referring to previous reports of the Russian military command abandoning elements of the regiment near Sadky on August 12.[50] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced on two flanks and from the rear, forcing Russian forces to hastily retreat to unprepared positions. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are struggling with logistics and are unable to resolve supply problems with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in forested environments. The milblogger added that Ukrainian forces are actively targeting elements of the regiment with drones.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are working with elements of the 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) in the Sumy direction.[51]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Hlyboke, Synelnykove, and on the south (left) bank of the Vovcha River on August 14 and 15.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Synelnykove.[53]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast stated that Russian forces operating in the Vovchansk direction mostly leverage small infantry groups for assaults because Ukrainian strikes against Russian armored equipment have forced the Russian military command to pull Russian materiel, such as tanks and artillery systems, back to Russia.[54]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne on August 15 but did not advance.[55]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast stated on August 15 that the intensity of Russian military activity in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AOR) decreased compared to the first half of July 2025, particularly near Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burlyk).[56]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka; north of Kupyansk near Radkivka and Holubivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka; and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on August 14 and 15.[57]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[58]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Borova itself; northeast of Borova near Zahryzove; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Olhivka on August 14 and 15.[59]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Ivan Group of the 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions southwest of Lozova (northeast of Borova).[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Stavky (north of Lyman) and into western Zarichne (east of Lyman).[61]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Serednie, Shandryholove, and Karpivka; north of Lyman near Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 14 and 15.[62]

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on August 15 that Russian forces in this direction are attempting to set conditions for a mechanized assault by using engineering detachments to build river crossings, including across the Chornyi Zherebets (Zherebets) River.[63] The officer added that Russian forces in the Lyman direction are conducting motorcycle assaults in small fireteams of four to eight infantrymen. The officer noted that Russian forces are using anti-heat vision cloaks and tents to evade detection and constantly reinforcing elements of the Russian 3rd (Southern Military District [SMD]) and 20th (MMD) combined arms armies (CAAs) operating in the Ukrainian unit’s area of responsibility (AOR) with drone detachments. The officer added that Russian forces operating near Lyman are increasing air strikes with guided glide bombs and other munitions and drone strikes, suggesting that Russian forces are intensifying their offensive tempo. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on August 15 that Russian forces in the Lyman direction are leveraging small infantry groups in day and night assaults, expecting that some of the groups will reach assigned rally points in the Ukrainian near rear.[64]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 11th Tank Brigade (25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Serebryanske forest area.[65] Drone operators of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[66]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Siversk itself; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; south of Siversk near Pereizne; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka, and Vasyukivka on August 14 and 15.[67]

The Ukrainian Dnipro Grouping of Forces reported on August 15 that Russian forces in the Siversk direction increased their use of guided glide bomb strikes from eight to 22 in the past three days (since August 12).[68]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 15 that Russian forces advanced in Mykolaivka (just west of Chasiv Yar).[69]

Russian forces attacked north of Chasiv Yar near Minkivka and Orikhovo-Vasylivka and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora on August 14 and 15.[70]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1065th Artillery Regiment (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Mykolaivka.[71]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[72]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Poltavka, south of Rusyn Yar, and toward Sofiivka (all northwest of Toretsk).[73]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk near Oleksandro-Kalynove, Katerynivka, Yablunivka, Popiv Yar, Rusyn Yar, and Poltavka and toward Stepanivka and Pleshchiivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on August 14 and 15.[74]

A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported that Russian forces have been fighting for Toretsk for more than one year and that the brigade has killed or wounded more than 50,000 Russian forces in that time – roughly five divisions’ worth.[75]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka and the Kleban Byk reservoir.[76] Drone operators of the 98th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian logistics in the Kostyantynivka direction.[77]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

See topline text for reports of activity east and northeast of Dobropillya.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 15 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk).[78] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces likely withdrew from Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[79] Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 1437th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial reserve call-up), with support from elements of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), advanced from Udachne toward Zvirove (east of Udachne).[80]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Fedorivka, Novoekonomichne, Zapovidne, Mayak, Shakhove, Krasnyi Lyman, Zaytshok, and Vesele; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske, Sukhetske, Zolotyi Kolodyaz, and Rubizhne; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Myrolyubivka, and Mykolaivka and toward Balahan; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, and Kotlyne and toward Molodetske on August 14 and 15.[81]

A servicemember of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are attacking during both the day and night and continue to use tactics to accumulate small groups of one to two personnel for further attacks.[82] The commander of a drone crew operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces continue to conduct repeated highly attritional, infantry-led assaults to attack the same positions.[83] An aerial reconnaissance officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces continue to attack in groups of two to six personnel.[84] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Ukrainian forces are using “Hiyena” unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) that can carry 26 kilograms of explosives to attack Russian fortified positions or infantry in buildings.[85]

Mashovets reported that the area of responsibility (AoR) of the 2nd CAA (CMD) extends approximately from the southern outskirts of Pokrovsk to Myrolyubivka.[86] Mashovets stated that the AoR of the 41st CAA (CMD) extends approximately from Kotlyne to north of Oleksiivka (southeast of Novopavlivka) and that the AoR of the 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD), which includes personnel from occupied Ukraine, is approximately from Myrolyubivka to Popiv Yar (northeast of Pokrovsk and northwest of Toretsk).

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are fighting in the Surove-Bilytske direction (north of Pokrovsk) and that elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are fighting near Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[87] Mashovets stated that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are fighting in southern Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk).[88] Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are striking Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk and Rodynske.[89]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and northwest of Andriivka-Klevtsove (southeast of Novopavlivka).[90]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Novoukrainka; south of Novopavlivka toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai, Tovste, Zirka, Andriivka-Klevtsove, and Ivanivka on August 14 and 15.[91]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 15 shows elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) raising a flag in western Oleksandrohrad (east of Velykomykhailivka), indicating that Russian forces recently seized Oleksandrohrad and Voskresenka (southeast of Oleksandrohrad).[92]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Vorone (southeast of Velykomykhailivka) and advanced west of Oleksandrohrad to the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk Oblast border area.[93

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Myrne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and Voskresenka, and toward Novoselivka; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka and Zelene Pole, and toward Zaporizke, Komyshuvakha, and Novoheorhiivka on August 14 and 15.[94]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Vorone, Sichneve (southeast of Velykomykhailivka), and Sosnivka (south of Velykomykhailivka).[95] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly conducting unguided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions in Novoselivka.[96]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger posted a map on August 15 that claimed that Russian forces advanced into central Temyrivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[97]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Olhivske, Novodarivka, and Temyrivka on August 14 and 15.[98]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Poltavka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[99]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 15 that Russian forces are advancing from the southeastern side of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) in order to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) between Orikhiv and Zaporizhzhia City.[100] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing on the southeastern side of Mala Tokmachka.[101]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and toward Prymorske on August 15.[102] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked within Stepnohirsk.[103]

Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Head Ivan Fedorov stated that Russian forces struck a highway near Orikhiv with a first-person view (FPV) drone, injuring one civilian.[104]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Plavni (west of Orikhiv).[105] Elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka.[106]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on August 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson City direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivsky road bridge and southeast of Kherson City near Bilohrudyi Island on August 14 and 15.[107]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating on unspecified islands of the Dnipro River Delta.[108] Drone operators of an unspecified Russian VDV artillery brigade, likely the 52nd VDV Artillery Brigade, are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River with Lancet loitering munitions.[109]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for today’s report on Russian air, missile, and drone campaign,

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

US President Donald Trump called Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko on August 15 ahead of the Alaska summit and thanked Lukashenko for releasing 16 prisoners.[110] Trump stated that the United States and Belarus discussed the release of 1,300 additional prisoners, the Alaska summit, and plans for a future Trump-Lukashenko meeting. Belarusian state news agency Belta claimed that Lukashenko invited Trump and his family to visit Belarus and that Trump agreed.[111] Belta added that Trump and Lukashenko discussed bilateral relations, regional affairs, and war in Ukraine. Lukashenko recently met with US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg on June 21 and requested an interview with Time Magazine published on August 8.[112]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/trump-putin-alaska-summit/card/top-putin-aides-will-join-trump-meeting-AAWryfNUXRFLA6qJJf1o ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/63871

[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/updates-trump-putin-meet-alaska-summit-war-ukraine-2025-08-15/

[3] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/trump-putin-alaska-summit?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAgDtYYBoHGseNzklHvHtk1TURzZ0KSHNmP21v9MG8m_XImpjI4NLv9X5BdH5nI%3D&gaa_ts=689fc8c1&gaa_sig=lqBHP6Jl4yS655aH2kk0wEQU3lcfdQGiTb0jeXFT_SqEUJkDVooxf7pZCrbjnAS7nMINZOdLDF-hL8MlgUEM4A%3D%3D

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070325

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080225; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031825; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122924

[6] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/trump-putin-alaska-summit?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAgDtYYBoHGseNzklHvHtk1TURzZ0KSHNmP21v9MG8m_XImpjI4NLv9X5BdH5nI%3D&gaa_ts=689fc8c1&gaa_sig=lqBHP6Jl4yS655aH2kk0wEQU3lcfdQGiTb0jeXFT_SqEUJkDVooxf7pZCrbjnAS7nMINZOdLDF-hL8MlgUEM4A%3D%3D

[7] https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/trump-putin-meeting-alaska-ukraine/#post-update-4b3acefa

[8] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77793

[9] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/66181

[10] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/67843

[11] https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-putin-meeting-news-08-15-25#cmedgbprz00053b6vgezqijf0

[12] https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-putin-meeting-news-08-15-25#cmedgbprz00053b6vgezqijf0

[13] https://t.me/kpszsu/40434

[14] https://t.me/kpszsu/40434

[15] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/23635 ; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1091620-raketna-ataka-po-dniprovskou-rajonu-e-poranenij/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/okupanty-vdaryly-balistychnoyu-raketoyu-po-selu-na-chernigivshhyni/; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/23420

[16] https://t.me/prokuraturasumy/4475; https://t.me/grigorov_oleg/432; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1091144-rosijskij-dron-atakuvav-civilnu-avtivku-na-ohtirsini-zaginuv-colovik/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/na-sumshhyni-vorozhyj-bezpilotnyk-atakuvav-mashynu-medykiv-ye-zagyblyj/;

[17] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1091688-armia-rf-vdarila-po-centru-sum-zdijnalas-pozeza/; https://t.me/grigorov_oleg/433

[18] https://t.me/dva_majors/77472

[19] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/trump-putin-alaska-summit/card/trump-says-drone-attacks-are-negotiating-strategy-ahead-of-talks-mI67MUFTzjj3gofLyPeV

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081325; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar07292025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072125; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070825 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2025

[21] https://ukraine.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2025-08/Ukraine%20-%20protection%20of%20civilians%20in%20armed%20conflict%20%28July%202025%29_ENG.pdf

[22] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/zhaliyutsya-v-telegrami-shho-hlopczi-goli-j-bosi-rosijsku-infiltracziyu-poblyzu-dobropillya-zupynyly-j-vidsikly/

[23] https://t.me/corps7DSHV/224

[24] https://t.me/azov_media/7159

[25] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/22318

[26] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2921

[27] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2921

[28] https://t.me/wargonzo/28507

[29] https://t.me/wargonzo/28507

[30] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176012

[31] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2921

[32] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2922

[33] https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/10352

[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081325

[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27842

[36] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9628

[37] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021925

[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27823

[39] https://www.facebook.com/usofcom/posts/1138440454766888?ref=embed_post

[40] https://t.me/babushkin30/8726

[41] https://t.me/bazabazon/40058 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/40063

[42] https://t.me/tass_agency/331268

[43] https://t.me/tass_agency/331262

[44] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9632

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822

[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32481

[47] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97755

[48] https://t.me/rybar/72833 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77472 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4832 ;

[49] https://t.me/severnnyi/4832 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77472 ; https://t.me/rybar/72833

[50] https://t.me/severnnyi/4836 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2025

[51] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97758

[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507; https://t.me/severnnyi/4832; https://t.me/dva_majors/77472

[53] https://t.me/dva_majors/77472; https://t.me/severnnyi/4832

[54] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/yak-tilky-vyyavlyayut-zhyrnu-czil-tudy-praczyuyut-usi-na-harkivshhyni-rosiyany-ne-ryzykuyut-pokazuvaty-tehniku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0

[55] https://t.me/wargonzo/28507

[56] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/yak-tilky-vyyavlyayut-zhyrnu-czil-tudy-praczyuyut-usi-na-harkivshhyni-rosiyany-ne-ryzykuyut-pokazuvaty-tehniku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0

[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507

[58] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40868

[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507

[60] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1956027445997658237; https://t.me/privet_iz_doma152/16823; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1956353186375016773

[61] https://t.me/tass_agency/331172; https://t.me/tass_agency/331195

[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32490

[63] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/vorog-vykorystovuye-kytajski-namety-rosiyany-hochut-peretyagty-tehniku-cherez-chornyj-zherebecz/

[64] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/kill-zony-popovnyuyutsya-tilamy-rosiyan-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-okupanty-nevdalo-pidkradayutsya-vnochi/; https://t.me/ombr66/1930%5C

[65] https://t.me/operationall_space/5777; https://t.me/voin_dv/16465;

[66] https://t.me/voin_dv/16464

[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32490

[68] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/na-siverskomu-napryamku-okupanty-vtrychi-zbilshyly-vykorystannya-kabiv/

[69] https://t.me/wargonzo/28507

[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822

[71] https://t.me/mod_russia/55597

[72] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1956107606587793677 ; https://t.me/z4lpr/1171

[73] https://t.me/wargonzo/28507; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32223

[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77472

[75] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/zamist-pereglyadu-futbolu-rosiyany-obraly-pomerty-v-toreczku-staleva-sotka-peremolola-kilka-vorozhyh-dyvizij/

[76] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40868 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40813 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97743

[77] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32467

[78] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30272; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9802; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/22120

[79] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2922

[80] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2922

[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://t.me/dva_majors/77472; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507

[82] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/15/vidsotkiv-50-vedut-ptashky-poblyzu-pokrovska-rosiyany-pokladayutsya-na-karty-v-telefoni/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O14SWvrF1AU

[83] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/nazad-ty-200-vpyerod-uvidim-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-u-rosiyan-nevelykyj-vybir/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ScdUZNkwcYc

[84] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/zhodnyh-genialnyh-planiv-tilky-kilkist-operator-droniv-pro-shturmy-okupantiv/

[85] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/giyena-na-kolesah-ukrayinskyj-robot-kamikadze-znis-ukriplennya-voroga-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/; https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1BvAKBx5sY/

[86] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2919

[87] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2921

[88] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2921

[89] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1956353087708205220; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/413

[90] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40865; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66705

[91] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678

[92] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1956275486776287456; https://t.me/voin_dv/16472; https://t.me/osintpen/1627; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9797

[93] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40865; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66705

[94] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66705; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175932; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507

[95] https://t.me/voin_dv/16468

[96] https://t.me/voin_dv/16478

[97] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97767

[98] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822

[99] https://t.me/voin_dv/16476

[100] https://t.me/dva_majors/77472

[101] https://t.me/wargonzo/28507

[102] https://t.me/dva_majors/77472; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507

[103] https://t.me/dva_majors/77472; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507

[104] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/23798

[105] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32467

[106] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97747

[107] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822

[108] https://t.me/mod_russia/55578

[109] https://t.me/mod_russia/55571

[110] https://t.me/pul_1/17844; https://t.me/sotaproject/101786; https://t.me/bbcrussian/84217; https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115033133751064517

[111] https://t.me/pul_1/17844; https://t.me/sotaproject/101786; https://eng.belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-invites-trump-and-family-to-visit-belarus-170549-2025/

[112] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2025

August 16, 2025, 9pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on August 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Various US officials indicated that Russian President Vladimir Putin may be willing to compromise on some war termination demands, but Putin’s own statements and Russian official statements contradict these claims. US President Donald Trump stated on August 16 that his meeting with Putin and subsequent call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European and NATO leaders were productive.[1] Trump stated following that “all” determined that the best way to end Russia’s war in Ukraine is to begin direct negotiations for a peace agreement, rather than a ceasefire agreement. Trump announced that he will meet with Zelensky at the White House on August 18 and that he and Zelensky may schedule a subsequent meeting with Putin if the August 18 meeting goes well. Trump did not specify whether the subsequent meeting with Putin will be bilateral or trilateral, though Trump told Fox News following the Alaska summit on August 15 that both Putin and Zelensky want Trump to attend a leader-level meeting.[2] Axios correspondent Barak Ravid reported on August 16, citing an unspecified source who was on Trump’s call with Zelensky and European leaders, that Trump stated that Putin expressed interest in a comprehensive settlement to end the war rather than a ceasefire and stated that “a quick peace agreement is better than a ceasefire.”[3] Bloomberg reported, citing sources familiar with the matter, that Trump stated on this call that Putin wants Ukraine to cede all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts but noted that it is up to Ukraine to decide what to do with its territory.[4] The sources told Bloomberg that Putin proposed to effectively freeze the front line in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. The sources reported that Trump expressed the United States’ readiness to contribute to security guarantees for Ukraine so long as the guarantees do not involve NATO, and that Trump suggested that Putin would accept this. Axios reported, citing a source with direct knowledge of Trump’s phone call, that Trump informed Zelensky and the European leaders that Putin claimed that Russian forces were making significant battlefield progress and that Putin could seize all of Donetsk Oblast.[5] The source told Axios that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff briefed Zelensky and NATO leaders during the call on how Putin views territorial issues and what Putin is willing to give in return. The source reported that Witkoff informed the leaders that Putin is willing to end the war and commit to abstaining from seizing more Ukrainian territory and not to attack Ukraine or other countries in a new war.

It is unclear what Putin offered in his meeting with Trump beyond reiterating his demand for Donetsk Oblast and offering a limited ceasefire with no known timeframe in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov stated on August 16, after the Alaska Summit, that he did not know when Trump and Putin would meet again and that the subject of a trilateral meeting between Putin, Trump, and Zelensky has not been discussed.[6] Ravid reported that a source briefed on Trump’s talks with Putin stated that Putin proposed to freeze the frontline in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts in exchange for Ukraine’s withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast and that the US delegation perceived that Putin is open to negotiations regarding Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[7] Ravid reported that Putin requested that the United States recognize “these four oblasts” (presumably Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, although the reporting is not clear) and occupied Crimea as Russian. The Financial Times (FT) reported, citing four sources with direct knowledge of the talks, that Putin demanded that Ukrainian forces withdraw from all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as a precondition for ending Russia’s war in Ukraine.[8] Three of the sources told FT that Putin offered to freeze the frontline in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts and not to launch new attacks to seize additional territory (it is not clear if he meant in those two oblasts or elsewhere), in exchange for Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Senior Russian officials and most sources speaking to Western media did not indicate that Putin mentioned Sumy or Kharkiv oblasts, which is notable because Russian forces are also conducting offensive operations in these regions. Newsmax White House correspondent Mike Carter reported on August 15, citing unspecified sources, that Putin dropped his objections to teaching the Ukrainian language in Ukraine and NATO states providing security guarantees to Ukraine that would enable NATO states to defend Ukraine if Russia violates any agreement.[9] Carter reported that the unspecified sources stated that Russia and Ukraine still need to work out the definition and implementation of a ceasefire.

Putin’s demand for all of Donetsk Oblast is the most clear and consistent demand coming out of the Alaska Summit. Putin may have also offered a limited ceasefire in southern Ukraine in exchange for Donetsk Oblast, but other details of Putin’s offer to Trump remain unclear. Putin has established territorial demands over the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, which are typically the subject of war termination negotiations, as preconditions for any possible future ceasefire in Ukraine. A former senior Kremlin official suggested to FT that Putin is prepared to compromise on other issues, including territory, if Putin is satisfied that an agreement addresses the “root causes” of the war.[10] The Kremlin has repeatedly defined root causes as NATO’s eastward expansion and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers and has repeatedly invoked this phrase as shorthand for Ukraine’s full capitulation to Russia and the resumption of Russian control over Ukraine.[11] Putin’s demand that any agreement address these “root causes” is not a compromise from his original war aims, and reports that Putin “compromised” on issues such as Ukraine’s ability to teach its own language in its own country are designed to obfuscate Putin’s actual unwillingness to compromise.

Ukrainian forces would not be able to conduct a safe and orderly withdrawal from unoccupied Donetsk Oblast in accordance with Putin’s demand without a full ceasefire across the entire theater, however. A Ukrainian withdrawal from the remainder of Donetsk Oblast – which ISW continues to assess would be a major strategic military and political concession – without a full ceasefire that extends to long-range strikes and all frontline activity would pose major risks to both withdrawing Ukrainian forces and Ukrainian forces in rear areas in Kharkiv Oblast. Putin notably has not offered a ceasefire under which Ukrainian forces would be able to safely withdraw across the Donetsk Oblast border and defend rear areas against renewed Russian aggression on the flanks. The Donetsk Oblast administrative boundary is far from Ukraine’s main defensive line in Donetsk Oblast known as the “fortress belt,” and even if Putin implemented a ceasefire long enough for Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Donetsk Oblast, renewed Russian ground assaults and fires both from advancing forces in Donetsk Oblast and forces on the flank in Kharkiv Oblast would threaten Ukrainian forces along the frontline and in rear areas.[12] A Ukrainian withdrawal would likely result in large force concentrations along major Ukrainian thoroughfares and defensive structures that Russian aviation, drones, and artillery would likely target upon the expiration of a ceasefire. These strikes would degrade Ukrainian forces’ combat capabilities, including Ukraine’s ability to defend against renewed Russian efforts to advance into Kharkiv Oblast from Donetsk Oblast or along the right flank in Kharkiv Oblast. Russian forces operating in Donetsk Oblast would also likely pursue withdrawing Ukrainian forces along routes of egress, threatening to rout the withdrawing Ukrainian forces and degrade their ability to establish new defensive positions in Kharkiv Oblast. Russian forces in Donetsk Oblast would likely also receive fire support from Russian forces already operating in neighboring Kharkiv Oblast, which would further threaten the rear of the withdrawing Ukrainian forces. These Russian strikes would also make it untenable for Ukrainian forces to maintain their positions on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River and set conditions for Russian forces to push further into Kharkiv Oblast from Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. A partial ceasefire that does not extend to Russian military activity in Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts would therefore be insufficient for assuring the safe withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the remainder of Donetsk Oblast.

ISW continues to assess that a potential Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast would degrade Ukraine’s defensive capabilities and defense industrial base (DIB) and put hundreds of thousands more Ukrainian civilians under Russian occupation. Ukraine would require robust international security guarantees and the immediate deployment of an international peacekeeping contingent to deter future Russian aggression. ISW continues to assess that surrendering currently unoccupied areas of Donetsk Oblast to Russia would position Russian forces extremely well to renew their aggression against Ukraine on much more favorable terms, having avoided a long and bloody struggle for this territory and given Russia the opportunity to build up manpower and weapons stocks.[13] ISW previously noted that allowing Russia to occupy the remainder of Donetsk Oblast would concede Ukraine’s fortress belt to Russian forces, and this fortress belt also includes significant DIB infrastructure. Russian forces have notably been unable to advance to or envelop the fortress belt since Fall 2022. The Russian military command would almost certainly work to rapidly establish lasting positions throughout the fortress belt and utilize the fortress belt’s DIB for military production if Ukrainian forces withdraw from their positions in Donetsk Oblast. ISW also previously noted that the Donetsk Oblast border area is naturally poorly suited to act as a robust defensive line due to its few settlements, open fields, and natural obstacles such as the Oskil and Siverskyi Donets rivers.[14] A Ukrainian withdrawal across the Donetsk Oblast border would therefore also require the deployment of a robust international peacekeeping force and large-scale investment in infrastructure compatible with a large-scale, long-term ceasefire monitoring mission to prevent future Russian aggression. The absence of a full ceasefire on the frontline and regarding long-range strikes would likely preclude the deployment of this international force, however.

Seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast would likely be a difficult and years-long effort for Russian forces rather than a quick effort as Putin likely aims to portray, as Russian forces remain unable to secure operationally significant advances or advance faster than foot pace. Putin has remained committed to slow, grinding advances on the battlefield through attritional infantry assaults – constraining the maximum possible rate of Russian advance to footpace.[15] Ukrainian drone strikes have significantly complicated the Russian military command’s ability to tactically employ heavy equipment, as Russia has not figured out how to adequately protect armored vehicles and tanks from Ukrainian drones.[16] Russian forces have therefore been unable to restore mechanized maneuver to the battlefield to create and exploit breakthroughs and achieve operationally-significant advances.[17] The Russian military command has implemented an operational pattern that leverages creeping partial envelopments of frontline towns and settlements before beginning street-by-street frontal assaults to force Ukrainian withdrawals. Russian forces have proven unable to make significant advances in Ukraine by conducting frontal assaults.[18] The Russian military command has failed to operationalize its envelopment tactic against a significant Ukrainian defensive line and will likely be unable to leverage this tactic to seize the fortress belt cities that form the backbone of the Ukrainian forces’ defense rapidly — such an operation three and a half years into the war would likely be a multi-year effort with significant Russian personnel and material losses.[19] Russian forces have also recently leaned on infiltration tactics to make tactically-significant advances, but have thus far struggled to exploit these infiltrations and consolidate positions in their paths of advance at scale.[20] Russian forces currently have no means of rapidly enveloping, penetrating, or otherwise seizing Ukraine’s fortress belt or the remainder of unoccupied Donetsk Oblast, which Putin has demanded as a precondition for a ceasefire with no comparable Russian concessions.

Putin’s reported rejection of a full ceasefire in Ukraine and the ongoing Russian offensives in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts indicate that Putin intends to continue his war in Ukraine while negotiations are ongoing — a point that Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev welcomed. Medvedev stated on his Russian- and English-language Telegram channels on August 16 that the Trump-Putin meeting “demonstrated that negotiations are possible without preconditions” while Russia continues its war in Ukraine.[21] The Kremlin appears to have successfully narrowed discussions of the war in Ukraine to the fate of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts — the four oblasts that Russia illegally annexed in September 2022.[22] Russian forces continue offensive efforts to advance into northern Sumy Oblast and northern and eastern Kharkiv Oblast, however. Putin’s reported demands largely do not address the fate of these oblasts or the Russian military efforts within them. Russian forces would presumably continue their offensive efforts in these areas while negotiations are ongoing. Putin is attempting to obfuscate his unwillingness to commit to a comprehensive ceasefire by repackaging one of his war aims as a prerequisite to negotiations for a permanent peace. Putin likely aims to both stave off further US sanctions that could hinder Russia’s ability to finance its war effort and to extract further US, Ukrainian, and European concessions through the ongoing negotiation process.

The Kremlin reportedly instructed Russian media outlets to present the Alaska summit as a meeting between two superpowers and to prepare Russian society for the possibility of a protracted war in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on August 16 that the Kremlin disseminated an instruction manual to pro-government and state-run media outlets in Russia after the summit to report that “no deal [on Ukraine] was reached at the summit — and that no deal could have been reached.”[23] Meduza reported that the Kremlin instructed media outlets to claim that Trump and Putin did not discuss “Ukrainian and European demands for an unconditional ceasefire,” that Trump urged Zelensky to make a deal with Putin, and that Trump greeted Putin on the tarmac as a gesture of goodwill. Meduza reported that the Kremlin instructed media outlets to describe the meeting as “historic” because “Putin restored Russia’s status as a great superpower” and to describe Trump and Putin as “equals.” Meduza quoted the manual as claiming that “the revival of Russia’s power and authority is the result of recent years,” likely referring to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, long-term military reorganization efforts, and strengthened ties with states including Iran, North Korea, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since February 2022.[24] Meduza reported that the Kremlin issued a separate instruction manual before the summit stating that media outlets should emphasize that Putin spoke with Trump about “Kyiv’s unwillingness to negotiate,” that Russia is ready for any scenario in the talks, and that it is Putin — rather than Trump —who sets the agenda for US-Russian relations.[25] Meduza reported that the pre-summit manual instructed reporters to emphasize that the United States and Russia have many avenues for “mutual understanding” and that bilateral cooperation would not be limited to the “Ukrainian issue.” A media strategist working with the Russian Presidential Administration’s political team told Meduza that the Russian government aimed to prepare the Russian public for the possibility that the summit would fail to pause fighting and emphasize that Putin is setting the terms — cohering with ISW’s long-held assessment that the Kremlin is not setting informational conditions for Russians to accept an end to the war that does not amount to a Russian victory on Putin’s terms.

Russian officials continue rhetorical campaigns designed to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty and peace negotiations and to legitimize Russia’s war in Ukraine. Russian State Duma Deputy Alexei Zhuravlev claimed in an interview with Russian outlet News dot ru on August 16 that Trump and Putin communicated as political equals and that the summit was a major event in global diplomacy.[26] Zhuravlev also claimed that the United States understands the ”root causes” of the war in Ukraine — a term Russian officials use as shorthand to reiterate Putin’s pre-war demands of Ukrainian neutrality and regime change.[27] Zhuravlev claimed in another interview to Russian outlet Gazeta dot ru that the war in Ukraine can only end if the United States “confirm[s] Russia’s security guarantees” and added that Ukraine and the EU should not be involved in the peace process.[28] Russian officials have frequently claimed that Ukrainian and European leadership are prolonging the war in Ukraine and are not interested in peace negotiations in an effort to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty, deny Kyiv a role in the peace process, and divide Ukraine from its allies.[29] Russian Federation Council Committee on Constitutional Legislation and State Building Chairperson Andrei Klishas claimed that the meeting between Trump and Putin confirmed Russia’s desire for a long-term and just peace and that Russia will achieve this goal either through military or diplomatic means.[30] Klishas also reiterated a long-standing Russian claim that there can be no unconditional ceasefire in Ukraine.[31] This rhetoric reinforces to a domestic Russian audience that it must not expect Putin to compromise on his long-held, public demands to achieve his full objectives in Ukraine.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who was part of the Russian delegation in Alaska, arrived in Anchorage on August 15 wearing a USSR sweatshirt in a staged media stunt.[32] Lavrov likely sought to present Russia as the inheritor of the Soviet Union and simultaneously equate Russia and the United States as comparable superpowers, in line with the reported Kremlin command to Russian media to report that Putin restored Russia to its great power status, a status that Putin and other Russian officials have long complained was lost when the Soviet Union collapsed.[33] Russian officials have claimed that the Soviet Union never legally dissolved and that the Soviet Union therefore still exists, with Russia as the legal inheritor of its power, territory, and treaties — setting informational conditions to exert control over former Soviet Union states.[34] ISW continues to assess that Russia very likely maintains territorial ambitions beyond occupied Crimea and the other four Ukrainian oblasts it has illegally annexed.[35] Lavrov also likely sought to present the war in Ukraine as a matter that falls within Russia’s sphere of influence in which other states should not interfere, similar to Russian Presidential Advisor Anton Kobyakov’s claim in May 2025 that the Soviet Union still legally exists and that the war in Ukraine is therefore an “internal process.”[36] Putin also stated during the joint press conference with Trump on August 15 that Russia and Ukraine share the “same roots” and that Russia considers Ukraine to be a “brotherly” nation, a long-standing Kremlin narrative with roots in Putin’s July 2021 essay on the “Historic Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” that also seeks to present the war in Ukraine as an internal affair.[37]

Ukrainian forces likely cleared several settlements within the Russian penetration northeast of Dobropillya. Geolocated footage published on August 15 shows Ukrainian forces clearing Russian positions and taking Russian prisoners of war (POWs) northeast of Dobropillya within Vesele and Hruzke (northeast of Dobropillya).[38] The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed the 1st Azov Army Corps (AC) August 15 report that Ukrainian forces cleared six settlements northeast of Dobropillya, including Hruzke, Rubizhne, Novovodyane, Petrivka, Vesele, and Zolotyi Kolodyaz in operations from August 12 to 15.[39] The Ukrainian General Staff and 1st Azov AC stated that Ukrainian forces killed 271 Russian personnel, wounded 101, and took 13 POWs, and that Ukrainian forces destroyed one Russian tank, two armored vehicles, and 37 motorcycles and other vehicles in these operations. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces only advanced in unfortified areas northeast of Dobropilllya and that Russian forces are strengthening their positions in the northern section of the penetration.[40] One Russian milblogger denied Ukrainian claims that Ukrainian forces advanced in the salient but conceded that Ukrainian forces entered Vesele and Zolotyi Kolodyaz.[41] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces are holding their positions near Zolotyi Kolodyaz.[42] Another Russian milblogger complained that the Russian penetration is not sustainable because it is too narrow and vulnerable to Ukrainian interdiction efforts and assaults that threaten Russian forces’ ability to sustain the penetration.[43] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are unable to cut the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway because the base of the penetration is too narrow for its depth, and that Russian forces need to widen the penetration’s flanks before fighting toward the highway. The footage of Ukrainian forces recapturing settlements northeast of Dobropillya and the lack of reporting suggesting that Russian forces are reinforcing and resupplying the penetration enough to exploit the penetration indicates that Ukrainian forces have likely retaken these settlements, as multiple Ukrainian sources have now reported.[44] This footage and these reports also suggest that Russian forces very likely do not have stable and enduring positions within the penetration and likely do not control the area between Russian positions east and northeast of Dobropillya and the base of the penetration southeast of Dobropillya.

Key Takeaways:

Various US officials indicated that Russian President Vladimir Putin may be willing to compromise on some war termination demands, but Putin’s own statements and Russian official statements contradict these claims.

It is unclear what Putin offered in his meeting with Trump beyond reiterating his demand for Donetsk Oblast and offering a limited ceasefire with no known timeframe in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.

Putin’s demand for all of Donetsk Oblast is the most clear and consistent demand coming out of the Alaska Summit.

Ukrainian forces would not be able to conduct a safe and orderly withdrawal from unoccupied Donetsk Oblast in accordance with Putin’s demand without a full ceasefire across the entire theater, however

ISW continues to assess that a potential Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast would degrade Ukraine’s defensive capabilities and defense industrial base (DIB) and put hundreds of thousands more Ukrainian civilians under Russian occupation. Ukraine would require robust international security guarantees and the immediate deployment of an international peacekeeping contingent to deter future Russian aggression.

Seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast would likely be a difficult and years-long effort for Russian forces rather than a quick effort as Putin likely aims to portray, as Russian forces remain unable to secure operationally significant advances or advance faster than foot pace.

Putin’s reported rejection of a full ceasefire in Ukraine and the ongoing Russian offensives in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts indicate that Putin intends to continue his war in Ukraine while negotiations are ongoing — a point that Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev welcomed.

The Kremlin reportedly instructed Russian media outlets to present the Alaska summit as a meeting between two superpowers and to prepare Russian society for the possibility of a protracted war in Ukraine.

Russian officials continue rhetorical campaigns designed to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty and peace negotiations and to legitimize Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces likely cleared several settlements within the Russian penetration northeast of Dobropillya.

Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces advanced near Siversk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Limited fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on August 16.[45]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast.[46] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and crossed the Seim River.[47]

Ukrainian forces likely struck a Russian defense industrial base (DIB) enterprise in Stavropol Krai overnight on August 15 to 16. The Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Krai Mayor Mikhail Minenkov claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the city’s industrial zone overnight on August 15 to 16.[48] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported, citing locals, that there were at least nine explosions and a fire near the Azot chemical plant in Nevinnomyssk.[49] Astra noted that the August 15 to 16 strike marks the third strike against the Azot Chemical Plant thus far in Summer 2025. Astra reported that the Azot chemical plant is Russia’s largest producer of nitrogen fertilizers and ammonia and is located roughly 650 kilometers from Ukrainian-controlled territory.[50]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Novokostyantynivka and Varachnye and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on August 15 and 16.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novokostyantynivka, Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City), and Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[52]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate near Sadky.[53]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on August 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 15 that Russian forces advanced to the south (left) bank of the Vovcha River in central Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[54]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on August 15 and 16.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked on the south (left) bank of the Vovcha River and near Synelnykove.[56]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on August 16 that Russian forces are attacking blindly in small infantry groups with drones to guide their routes of advance and are leveraging motorcycles and foliage and motorcycles to advance more quickly.[57]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and Khatnie on August 15 and 16.[58]

The Ukrainian Dnipro Grouping of Forces reported that Russian forces increased their guided glide bomb strikes to support assaults in the Milove and Khatnie directions.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also struck Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) with unguided glide bombs.[60]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[61]

Geolocated footage published on August 16 indicates that Russian forces recently conducted a roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault southwest of Lyman Pershyi (northeast of Kupyansk).[62]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Zapadne and toward Kolodyazne; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka; and west of Kupyansk near Solobivka on August 15 and 16.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Petropavlivka.[64]

The commander of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces are wearing civilian clothes to disguise themselves as locals to infiltrate Ukrainian battle formations in the Kupyansk direction.[65] Combatants dressing as civilians to support efforts intending to injure, kill, or capture an adversary is classified as perfidy and is illegal under international law.[66] The Ukrainian commander reported that Russian forces have maintained the intensity of their attacks and are trying to interdict Ukrainian logistics in the Kupyansk direction.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions with Groza Leska fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones near Kupyansk.[67]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove on August 15 and 16, but did not advance.[68]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[70]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Serednie, Shandryholove, and Karpivka; north of Lyman near Ridkodub and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Yampolivka; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 15 and 16.[71]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[72]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 16 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Serebryanka (north of Siversk).[73]

Russian forces attacked toward Siversk itself, north of Siversk near Serebryanka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, south of Siversk near Pereizne, and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on August 15 and 16.[74]

The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction stated that recent rainfall has complicated Russian forces’ attempts to field infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs).[75]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and toward Bondarne on August 15 and 16.[76]

Ukrainian Kostyantynivka Military Administration Head Serhiy Horbunov stated on August 15 that Russian forces conducted two first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against civilian infrastructure in Kostyantynivka, killing one Ukrainian civilian.[77]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Oleksandro-Shultyne, and northwest of Toretsk near Pleshchiivka, Yablunivka, Kleban Byk, Rusyn Yar, Poltavka, and Katerynivka, and toward Stepanivka on August 15 and 16.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[79]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly coordinating artillery strikes of elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) against Ukrainian positions near Kleban Byk.[80]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

See topline text for reports of activity east and northeast of Dobropillya.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Rodynske (northeast of Pokrovsk) and are attacking on the north and northeast outskirts of the settlement.[81] Another Russian milblogger refuted claims that Russian forces are attacking in Rodynske, claiming that Russian forces hold positions in the north and northeastern outskirts but that Ukrainian forces maintain positions within the settlement.[82]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Sukhetske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Fedorivka, Novoekonomichne, Nove Shakhove, Zapovidne, and Zatyshok; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Troyanda, Leontovychi, Kotlyne, and Udachne on August 15 and 16.[83]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces continue to constantly attack in small infantry fire teams of one to two personnel and are attempting to camouflage themselves with greenery and anti-drone thermal imaging cloaks.[84] The spokesperson added that Russian forces are attempting to use motorcycles to bypass Ukrainian positions. The commander of a Ukrainian drone crew operating in the Pokrovsk direction assessed that Russian forces continue to fear the heavy losses necessary for an operation against Pokrovsk itself and are attempting to encircle Pokrovsk and Dobropillya (north of Pokrovsk) instead.[85]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian AirNomads Group reportedly continue to operate in the Pokrovsk direction.[86]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne, Novoukrainka, and Horikhove; south of Novopavlivka toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Novokhatske and Tovste on August 15 and 16.[87]

A servicemember of a Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion operating in the Novopavlivka direction stated that Ukrainian drone strikes, mines, and anti-tank ditches are denying Russian forces the ability to advance closer than five kilometers from the frontline in this direction.[88] The servicemember stated that Russian forces continue to conduct small infantry assaults of two to four personnel to several areas to attack Ukrainian positions from multiple sides.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Novopavlivka) direction.[89]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently recaptured Andriivka-Klevtsove (northeast of Velykomykhailivka).[90]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka, Oleksandrohrad, and Myrne; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vilne Pole, Vorone, and Maliivka, and toward Zaporizhske, Komyshuvakha, and Novoheorhiivka on August 15 and 16.[91]

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on August 16 that the Russian military command is sending small infantry groups of two personnel to bypass Ukrainian positions, enter a given settlement, and film themselves raising a Russian flag in order to falsely claim seizures of settlements and create the false perception of Russian advances.[92] The GUR reported that Russian forces recently filmed themselves near Andriivka-Klevtsove for this purpose, but that Ukrainian forces control the settlement.

Order of Battle: Artillery and drone elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly participated in the August 15 claimed seizure of Vorone.[93] Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to operate near Oleksandrohrad.[94] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) reportedly continue unguided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions in Novoselivka (east of Velykomykhailivka).[95]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Zelene Pole and toward Olhivske on August 15 and 16.[96]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[97]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka, south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka, southwest of Orikhiv near Nesteryanka, west of Orikhiv near Plavni and Stepnohirsk, and northwest of Orikhiv toward Prymorske on August 16.[98]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv.[99]

Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction on August 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivsky road and rail bridges and southwest of Kherson City near Bilohrudyi Island on August 15 and 16.[100]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating on the Dnipro River islands.[101]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 15 to 16. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile and 85 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[102] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 61 drones over northern and eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted frontline areas in Sumy, Donetsk, Chernihiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces damaged civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts.[103]

The US Special Inspector General Quarterly Operation Atlantic Resolve report from April 1 to June 30 indicated that a US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report confirmed that the increase in Russian use of ballistic missiles with enhanced maneuverability has undermined the effectiveness of the Patriot air defense system in Ukraine.[104] The report stated that Ukraine is struggling to consistently down Russian ballistic missiles due to Russian tactical technological improvements, including enhanced guidance and maneuverability systems, that allow missiles to fly irregular flight paths and adjust paths in-flight rather than only flying along typical ballistic trajectories. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported in late May 2025 that Russian adaptations to its ballistic weapons were complicating Ukraine’s efforts to intercept these ballistic missiles[105]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media, as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115037569702889410

[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/16/world/europe/trump-hannity-interview-fox-news.html ; https://www.foxnews.com/video/6376968557112

[3] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1956619580744274342

[4] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-16/zelenskiy-says-he-will-meet-trump-in-washington-on-monday

[5] https://archive.ph/7th56 ; https://www.axios.com/2025/08/16/trump-zelensky-meet-white-house-putin-summit

[6] https://t.me/tass_agency/331561 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/331562

[7] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1956722650123841678 ; https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1956724881732599961

[8] https://www.ft.com/content/6b0b4912-9438-4de0-aebe-2a8dd804cbab

[9] https://x.com/MikeCarterTV/status/1956506083079680103

[10] https://www.ft.com/content/6b0b4912-9438-4de0-aebe-2a8dd804cbab

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080825 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041925

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080825

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080825

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080825

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080525 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070125

[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061625

[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081025

[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar120724

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080825

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081325

[21] https://t.me/tass_agency/331571 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/602 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/91

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20

[23] https://meduza dot io/en/feature/2025/08/16/putin-restored-russia-s-status-as-a-superpower

[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121624; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122623; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121723; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121823; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120723; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar073025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-ukraine-warning-update-initial-russian-offensive-campaign-assessment

[25] https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/08/15/propagandistam-rekomendovali-ne-obnadezhivat-rossiyan-pered-sammitom-putina-i-trampa-v-ankoridzhe-vot-o-chem-budut-govorit-v-gossmi

[26] https://news dot ru/vlast/v-gosdume-obyasnili-kakaya-fraza-trampa-sulit-snyatie-sankcij-s-rossii

[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070325

[28] https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/news/2025/08/16/26508452.shtml

[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022625

[30] https://t.me/tass_agency/331563

[31] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725 ;

[32] https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/08/15/lavrov-ussr-russia-trump-putin-ukraine-summit-alaska/

[33] https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/08/16/putin-vosstanovil-otnoshenie-k-rossii-kak-k-velikoy-derzhave-trebovaniya-kieva-dazhe-ne-obsuzhdalis; https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7632057; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-rues-soviet-collapse-demise-historical-russia-2021-12-12/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025

[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030424

[35] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025

[36] https://t.me/agentstvonews/10328 ; https://t.me/severrealii/30495

[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2025; http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/66181

[38] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30294; https://t.me/HolodniyYar_93ombr/1439; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1956445467296104912

[39] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/271-rosiyanyn-nazavzhdy-zalyshyv-pole-boyu-azov-zachystyv-6-sil-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/; https://t.me/azov_media/7159 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1956410147233771808 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1956411132001784116 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27846

[40] https://t.me/yurasumy/24354; https://t.me/wargonzo/28528

[41] https://t.me/yurasumy/24361

[42] https://t.me/yurasumy/24354

[43] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2955

[44] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081525

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847

[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847

[47] https://t.me/severnnyi/4840

[48] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/drones-attacked-azot-chemical-plant-in-stavropol-krai/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/89723

[49] https://t.me/astrapress/89723

[50] https://t.me/dva_majors/77564

[51] https://t.me/dva_majors/77564 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28528 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4840 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847

[52] https://t.me/severnnyi/4840 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77564

[53] https://t.me/severnnyi/4840

[54] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32496

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32496

[56] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32496

[57] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/16/slipyh-shturmovykiv-vedut-pomyraty-yihni-zh-roboty-poblyzu-vovchanska-rosiyan-masovo-utylizuyut/

[58] https://t.me/wargonzo/28528 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738

[59] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738

[60] https://t.me/wargonzo/28528

[61] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13852

[62] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1956665765538508803 ; https://t.me/skyraders/776

[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28528 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13852

[64] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13852

[65] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/16/chuvaky-v-czyvilnomu-vykonuyut-speczyfichni-zavdannya-nepodalik-kupyanska-aktyvni-vorozhi-dyversanty/

[66] https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/perfidy?afd_azwaf_tok=eyJraWQiOiJCMERCQzkzNTgwRTlCM0FCNzJBRUMyRDQ4RjU0MDYwRkI5Rjc2ODIzMEE5OUJDOEEyQUE0MUEwMkE0RjIzNTUzIiwiYWxnIjoiUlMyNTYifQ.eyJhdWQiOiJjYXNlYm9vay5pY3JjLm9yZyIsImV4cCI6MTc1NTM4NzY5MCwiaWF0IjoxNzU1Mzg3NjgwLCJpc3MiOiJ0aWVyMS03YzY0NDU3ZmMtYnRsNnciLCJzdWIiOiIxOTEuOTYuMTIyLjUzIiwiZGF0YSI6eyJ0eXBlIjoiaXNzdWVkIiwicmVmIjoiMjAyNTA4MTZUMjM0MTIwWi1yMTdjNjQ0NTdmY2J0bDZ3aEMxTE9ObWM1czAwMDAwMDExYTAwMDAwMDAwMG43bnAiLCJiIjoidkR2YUkzU2hQWGhlYVpUQkxQTy1qLU0xV2JDMTRxOVBrYlY0UWVJOGRWWSIsImgiOiJ6RzJjOHlianMzS0ViV1oyZmU1S1dlbG9ZQkdCRS1Yemp4b00tWTFNTk44In19.VmeeKq3sRMyLISuDjXxphUfPVbvXVJ91GQdc9HToDgJsEG6wLdpyhySnQ3brL-V_BBB8bCq7cRU8m7XyAzmm6RyRZ8sUL4Nd1GZEOrGr_fOLX-jpb-UiFTF7sxUOdhtinSA0WJhY1PcZ6OK4jxVuVNZ6Bl0YUhL6HZkXpeRBh9K1biVc9PbATtnA9ojhIf8o1jgU6tSO1m_iDELNhfRhgFFyDCmEOu-B26nq2I7wutu7uJim_3jmlcdy9QpOPffPUrqUqNqti07M2TMOmFErr7flVXpGunMI173mk7ZtNjsZ5hHd8EsdRY8Bqm–fRFiD3Gc4yjyDPLZeqaTHCA8cw.WF3obl2IDtqgvMFRqVdYkD5s

[67] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97842

[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738

[69] https://t.me/mod_russia/55613 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/55615 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32542 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32542 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77590 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66738 ; https://t.me/sashakots/55601

[70] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32539

[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32539

[72] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/20539

[73] https://t.me/osintpen/1642; https://t.me/shock3OA/1933

[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32546

[75] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/16/vse-peretvoryuyetsya-na-take-safari-na-siverskomu-napryamku-vshhent-rozbyrayut-shturmovi-grupy-rosiyan/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0

[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847

[77] https://www.facebook.com/sergij.gorbunov.197981/posts/pfbid0Q6rk1Y6gkXETfDDsmwx4hEMYhv6hKAuETG8ht1KiWhiovJH5VGTB21vzgoAoyY8yl

[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738; https://t.me/wargonzo/28528

[79] https://t.me/wargonzo/28528

[80] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14183

[81] https://t.me/dva_majors/77564

[82] https://t.me/yurasumy/24355

[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32550 , https://t.me/wargonzo/28528 , https://t.me/dva_majors/77564

[84] https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1HcYjRrAbE/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/16/rezhym-nevydymky-ne-spraczyuvav-pid-pokrovskom-vorozhi-grupy-shhodnya-stayut-mishenyamy/

[85] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1092170-armia-rf-moze-zajti-v-pokrovsk-ale-boitsa-velikih-vtrat-komandir-zagonu-bpla/

[86] https://t.me/voin_dv/16490 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32548 ;

[87] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738

[88] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/16/yakshho-zastrybuye-v-riv-to-bude-jomu-aj-yaj-yaj-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku-rosiyan-galmuyut-fortyfikacziyi/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-O_iTjCYsKI

[89] https://t.me/dva_majors/77574 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77601

[90] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9806; https://t.me/OVMBr_5/269; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1956600815470391789

[91] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32538; https://t.me/wargonzo/28528

[92] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6668

[93] https://t.me/mod_russia/55618; *GRAPHIC* https://t.me/voin_dv/16484; https://t.me/voin_dv/16488; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97867; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32551

[94] https://t.me/dva_majors/77564

[95] https://t.me/voin_dv/16491

[96] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738

[97] https://t.me/voin_dv/16480

[98] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/dva_majors/77564; https://t.me/dva_majors/77564; https://t.me/wargonzo/28528

[99] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97850

[100] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847

[101] https://t.me/mod_russia/55621

[102] https://t.me/kpszsu/40478

[103] https://t.me/synegubov/16537 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/16/vorog-obstrilyav-harkivsku-oblast-poshkodzheno-zhytlovi-budynky/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/udar-po-czentru-sum-vorog-atakuvav-misto-bezpilotnykom-na-misczi-vluchannya-pozhezha/; https://t.me/sumy_mva/547

[104] https://www.twz.com/land/ukraines-patriots-now-struggling-with-enhanced-russian-ballistic-missiles ; https://www.stateoig.gov/uploads/report/report_pdf_file/oar_q3_fy25_final_508.pdf

[105] https://kyivindependent dot com/the-missile-no-longer-flies-straight-ukraine-says-russia-improved-its-ballistic-missiles/

Christina Harward, Jennie Olmsted, Anna Harvey, Justin Young, Karolina Hird, and Kateryna Stepanenko

August 14, 2025, 8:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on August 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian and US officials further clarified the details of the upcoming August 15 Alaska summit. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov confirmed that Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump will meet around 11:30 am local time at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska.[1] Ushakov stated that the meeting will occur face-to-face with interpreters present, after which Putin and Trump will hold a joint press conference. The Russian delegation will include Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, and leading Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev.[2] White House Spokesperson Karoline Leavitt confirmed the location of the meeting on August 14 and noted that Trump will meet one-on-one with Putin, then attend a bilateral lunch meeting with the US and Russian delegations, and conclude with a press conference.[3] Trump stated during an interview with Fox News that he will either hold a joint press conference alongside Putin or hold the press conference alone, depending on the outcome of his one-on-one meeting with Putin.[4]

The Kremlin is likely to use the Alaska summit to try to deflect attention away from peace negotiations with Ukraine and towards the Russia-US relationship in order to court the Trump administration into offering Moscow sorely needed economic rapprochement. The Kremlin’s inclusion of Russian Finance Minister Siluanov and RDIF CEO Dmitriev in the Alaska delegation suggests that Russia will likely attempt to shift the focus of the summit away from its war in Ukraine and towards potential bilateral economic deals. Neither Siluanov nor Dmitriev attended the previous Russia-Ukraine negotiations in Istanbul in May or June 2025.[5] Dmitriev was present during the February 2025 US-Russia talks in Istanbul, however.[6] The Kremlin has frequently leveraged Dmitriev in order to frame Russia as an attractive economic partner to the United States and used his business experience to advocate on behalf of Russia’s economic interests, as ISW has previously noted.[7] Dmitriev has notably been instrumental to the Russian narrative, claiming that Alaska is a historical part of Russia ahead of the summit and leveraging the summit to portray Russia as a world power equal to the United States, however, undermining Dmitriev’s apparent position as a neutral, economic-focused arbiter.[8] The Kremlin relies on Siluanov to downplay the detrimental effects of Western sanctions on the Russian economy in an attempt to convince the West to drop sanctions against Russia due to their falsely claimed ineffectiveness.[9] Dmitriev and Siluanov’s presence at the Alaska summit is likely intended to frame the summit as a potential business deal.

Other Russian officials have also indicated that the Kremlin will attempt to use the Alaska summit to engage in economic negotiations with the United States. Ushakov stated on August 14 that, in addition to discussing Ukraine, Trump and Putin will also speak about bilateral cooperation “in the trade and economic sphere,” where there is “enormous” and “untapped” potential.[10] State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed on August 14 that Putin and Trump “may” discuss sanctions and other economic issues.[11] Russian First Deputy Chair of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs Svetlana Zhurova claimed that “Russia and the United States will conclude an economic deal in any case” following the Alaska summit.[12] These statements are likely part of a concerted Russian effort to exploit the Alaska summit to secure much-needed economic relief from the United States. ISW continues to assess that any American acceptance of Russian-offered economic deals in the absence of reciprocal Russian concessions on Ukraine in return will degrade important economic leverage that the United States currently holds over Russia.[13]

The Kremlin is coming to Alaska with a severely weakened domestic economy, which affords the Trump administration significant leverage during the summit. Bloomberg reported on August 13 that Western sanctions and Russia’s wartime economy are seriously harming the Russian economy, while Putin’s attempts at stabilizing the economy are failing as Russian oil revenue continues to fall.[14] Falling oil prices, coupled with heavy Western sanctions and declining energy revenue, have put a serious strain on Russia’s already strained federal budget, which is now facing its highest budget deficit in 30 years, according to Bloomberg.[15] Unnamed officials told Bloomberg that Putin has repeatedly requested sanctions relief as part of any deal to be discussed in Alaska, which ISW assesses likely indicates that Putin is concerned about the state of the Russian economy and is seeking economic reprieve from the West.[16] Putin signed a law on February 25, 2022 that forced Russian lenders to issue preferential loans to war-related contracts at a government-set interest rate below the market rate.[17] The Kremlin designed this law to flood the Russian defense industrial complex with cash, which effectively subordinated Russian banks to the government and its wartime goals. ISW previously reported that Russian bankers had growing concerns over the growing number of non-performing loans and are seeking a state-funded bailout, undercutting Putin’s long-standing narrative that neither the war in Ukraine nor Western sanctions are hurting the Russian economy.[18] The Russian economy’s fiscal strain is eroding the Kremlin’s ability to sustain its war effort in the long term, depleting reserves, and exposes underlying economic fragility. Trump previously threatened secondary sanctions and tariffs on countries that continue to import Russian oil, which ISW continues to assess would likely further impact the Russian economy by undercutting revenues essential for the Kremlin’s financing of its war against Ukraine.[19] Russia is likely setting conditions to attempt to use the Alaska summit to secure economic relief, but the Trump administration indicated that it may leverage Russia’s economic fragility to push Putin for concessions.[20]

US President Donald Trump expressed concerns about the success of a potential secondary meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Trump stated in an interview with Fox News Radio on August 14 that Putin is entering the Alaska summit in a good headspace and is looking to “make a deal” in Alaska, but that it is unlikely that Alaska will result in a quick ceasefire.[21] Trump stated that there is a “25 percent chance” that a “second meeting” in Alaska (likely between Zelensky and Putin) will fail. Trump acknowledged that economic sanctions are “incredibly powerful” and that Putin likely agreed to meet in Alaska because of the impact of secondary sanctions against India and the threat of further US sanctions. White House Spokesperson Karoline Leavitt stated to Fox News on August 14 that Trump has other sanctions and measures that he can levy against Russia if the need arises, but that diplomatic negotiations are his top priority.[22] Trump previously stated on August 13 that there will be “very severe consequences” if Putin fails to engage in serious peace talks with Ukraine after the Alaska summit.[23]

The Kremlin is also likely to try to distract from the war in Ukraine by pressuring the Trump administration to engage in bilateral arms control talks at the Alaska summit. Putin held a meeting on August 14 with high-ranking Kremlin officials to prepare for the Alaska summit, wherein he claimed that the US-Russian talks would create conditions to ensure “peace…in the world as a whole” should the talks lead to agreements about strategic offensive weapons agreements.[24] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed that Putin and Trump may “touch upon” the broader tasks of ensuring peace and security.[25] ISW has assessed in recent weeks that the Kremlin was dangling the prospect of bilateral arms control talks in front of the United States to secure Russia’s desired demands in Ukraine and deflect from the subject of Russia-Ukraine peace negotiations.[26] Russia announced on August 4 that it was permanently withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, for example.[27] Kremlin officials began to set conditions to justify Russia’s withdrawal from the treaty in June 2025.[28] Russia and Belarus publicly promoted Russia’s deployment of Oreshnik ballistic missiles (which the INF Treaty banned) to Belarus even before Russia’s withdrawal from the INF on August 4, 2025.[29] Reuters reported on August 13 that the Middlebury Institute of International Studies and the Center for Naval Analysis both assessed that satellite imagery shows activity at the Pankovo test site in Arkhangelsk Oblast since July 2025 that is similar to activity preceding previous Russian tests of its 9M730 Burevestnik nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise missile.[30] Reuters reported that a Western security source confirmed that Russia is preparing a Burevestnik test. Russia has been deliberately flaunting its missile capabilities in recent weeks in order to create the facade of an escalating situation and to pressure the Trump administration into pursuing arms talks at the Alaska summit. Russia has long violated the INF Treaty, including by launching Oreshnik missiles at Ukraine before withdrawing from the INF, and has largely failed to successfully test its Burevestnik missile; as such, the situation has not escalated in reality.[31] Russia has essentially been trying to manufacture an escalation in advance of the Alaska summit in order to coerce the Trump administration to engage in arms control talks, with the ultimate goal of extracting concessions from the United States regarding Ukraine and distracting from the Kremlin’s disinterest in engaging in serious peace talks with Ukraine.

The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) reported that the July 2025 civilian casualties from Russia’s war against Ukraine were the highest on record since May 2022. The UN OHCHR reported on August 13 that there were at least 1,674 civilian casualties in Ukraine in July 2025 – a record high since May 2022 and a 22.5 percent increase from July 2024.[32] The UN OHCHR reported that Russian glide bombs accounted for the largest increase in civilian casualties in July 2025 (276) as compared to June 2025 (114). The UN OHCHR stated that almost 40 percent of the civilian casualties in July 2025 were due to Russia’s long-range drone and missile strikes, but that the number of casualties from these strikes decreased by about 20 percent in July 2025 as compared to June 2025. The UN OHCHR reported that short-range drones accounted for 24 percent of the casualties in July 2025 – the second largest cause. Russian forces notably started targeting civilian and military vehicles with short-to-medium range tactical drones along Ukrainian highways in an effort to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Spring and Summer 2025.[33] Russia dramatically increased the size of its missile and drone strike packages throughout Summer 2025 due to increased production and stockpiling, and these larger-scale strikes have caused significant civilian casualties and damage.[34] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s relatively smaller-scale strikes in recent weeks are allowing Russia to stockpile missiles and drones, and that Russia may resume larger-scale strike packages in the near future, likely following the Alaska summit.[35]

Russian forces have yet to reinforce and consolidate positions east and northeast of Dobropillya, and Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian reinforcements are stabilizing the situation. Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Andriy Kovalev and Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin reported on August 14 that newly-arrived Ukrainian reserves stabilized the situation in the Dobropillya direction and are holding the front line.[36] Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Ukrainian reserves are counterattacking in the Dobropillya direction, have started to stabilize the situation, and pushed Russian forces back slightly in unspecified areas of the penetration.[37] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Vesele, north of Zolotyi Kolodyaz (both northeast of Dobropillya), and to eastern Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya).[38] Other Russian milbloggers, however, continued to urge caution to their Russian audience about unconfirmed claims of Russian advances and emphasized that it remains unclear if Russian forces have been able to consolidate positions.[39] A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor also highlighted that Russian forces will have difficulties supplying and exploiting their narrow yet deep penetration, especially in the face of Ukrainian drone operations and flank attacks, and that Russian forces have been unable to introduce a large number of troops into the area quickly enough for consolidation and exploitation.[40]

ISW continues to assess that Russian forces do not control the territory east and northeast of Dobropillya where Russian forces recently infiltrated. ISW’s Assessed Russian Advances map layer does not differentiate between enduring Russian positions and limited infiltration missions. ISW uses the US Army doctrinal term “forward line of own troops” (FLOT) to indicate the most forward observed positions of forces in any kind of operation at a specific time. ISW largely uses its Assessed Russian Advances layer to depict areas within the Russian FLOT, where ISW has observed evidence of a Russian presence, but this layer does not necessarily denote areas where Russian forces have established an enduring presence. ISW evaluates its Assessed Russian-Controlled Ukrainian Territory map layer using the doctrinal definition of “control” — a tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations. ISW deliberately distinguishes between the Russian FLOT and areas that ISW assesses that Russian forces control. ISW does not assess that Russian forces exercise control over the areas in their tactical penetration near Dobropillya as of August 14 and will reassess Russian advances when ISW has observed confirmed, reliable reporting that Ukrainian forces have retaken the territory.

The United Kingdom reaffirmed its commitment to providing Ukraine with long-term, post-war security guarantees. The Times reported on August 14 that following the August 13 virtual meeting between Trump, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and various EU leaders, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer stated that the UK and other European nations have developed “realistic” plans to deploy a “reassurance force” to Ukraine upon the conclusion of a potential ceasefire.[41] The reassurance force reportedly includes “air reassurance” over western Ukraine, training for Ukrainian military personnel, and mine clearance operations in the Black Sea. Starmer also noted that the UK is ready to increase economic pressure on Russia in order to force Putin into making concessions on the war in Ukraine. ISW has long assessed that Western security guarantees and continued support for Ukraine’s military and economy following a potential ceasefire are critical to the development of a stable, post-war European security architecture, which will crucially bolster Ukraine’s and Europe’s ability to forcefully deter future Russian aggression.[42]

Ukraine’s European partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including through the purchase of US weapons. Germany announced on August 13 that it will fund the purchase of $500 million worth of US equipment and munitions for Ukraine through NATO’s Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which allows NATO members and partners to finance the supply of American weapons and technology to Ukraine.[43] The Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway previously contributed a total of one billion dollars to Ukraine through the PURL initiative.[44] Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala stated on August 13 that the Czech-led ammunition initiative has delivered one million rounds of large-caliber ammunition to Ukraine so far in 2025.[45] A US official reported to Axios on August 13 that US President Donald Trump will continue to sell weapons to NATO states that they can transfer to Ukraine even if diplomatic efforts to resolve the war fail.[46]

Ukraine and Russia conducted their 67th prisoner exchange of the war on August 14. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Ukraine and Russia each exchanged 84 civilian prisoners and prisoners of war (POWs) on August 14.[47] Zelensky noted that the prisoners returned to Ukraine include servicemembers who defended Mariupol in early 2022 and civilians who Russian forces illegally detained, some of whom had been imprisoned since 2014.[48] Zelensky added that almost all of the returned prisoners require significant medical care. Ukrainian media outlet Hromadske reported that one of the civilian prisoners returned in the exchange was 17 years old when Russian forces detained him in 2016 in occupied Yasynuvata, Donetsk Oblast, and sentenced him to ten years in a penal colony on false charges of espionage.[49]

Ukrainian forces struck a large oil refinery in Volgograd Oblast on the night of August 13 to 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 14 that elements of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted a drone strike against the Lukoil oil refinery in Volgograd City and caused several fires at the facility.[50] The Ukrainian General Staff added that the refinery is the largest producer of fuel and lubricants in Russia’s Southern Federal Okrug and produces over 15 million tons of oil annually, or 5.6 percent of Russia’s total oil refining, in addition to diesel, gasoline, and aviation fuel, which Russian forces require for military purposes. Geolocated footage published on August 14 shows fires and smoke at the facility.[51] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrey Bocharov claimed that Russian forces downed Ukrainian drones over Volgograd Oblast and that falling debris caused an oil spill and set fire to petroleum products at the refinery.[52] Russian authorities temporarily grounded flights from Volgograd Airport.[53]

Key Takeaways:

Russian and US officials further clarified the details of the upcoming August 15 Alaska summit.

The Kremlin is likely to use the Alaska summit to try to deflect attention away from peace negotiations with Ukraine and towards the Russia-US relationship in order to court the Trump administration into offering Moscow sorely needed economic rapprochement.

The Kremlin is coming to Alaska with a severely weakened domestic economy, which affords the Trump administration significant leverage during the summit.

US President Donald Trump expressed concerns about the success of a potential secondary meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The Kremlin is also likely to try to distract from the war in Ukraine by pressuring the Trump administration to engage in bilateral arms control talks at the Alaska summit.

The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) reported that the July 2025 civilian casualties from Russia’s war against Ukraine were the highest on record since May 2022.

Russian forces have yet to reinforce and consolidate positions east and northeast of Dobropillya, and Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian reinforcements are stabilizing the situation. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces do not control the territory east and northeast of Dobropillya where Russian forces recently infiltrated.

Ukraine’s European partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including through the purchase of US weapons.

Ukraine and Russia conducted their 67th prisoner exchange of the war on August 14.

Ukrainian forces struck a large oil refinery in Volgograd Oblast on the night of August 13 to 14.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, and Russian forces recently advanced near Velykomykhailivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Limited fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on August 14.

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 13 and 14.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in the Tetkino direction (southwest of Glushkovo).[55]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces crossed the international border near Novokostyantynivka (north of Sumy City) and Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City) and are operating in Kursk Oblast.[56]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division 44th Army Corps, Leningrad Military District) are reportedly arriving in Bolshoye Soldatske, Kursk Oblast, before deploying to participate in assaults in the Sumy direction.[57]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 13 that Ukrainian forces liberated Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[58] Another Russian milblogger claimed on August 14 that Ukrainian forces liberated Andriivka (also north of Sumy City) on July 9.[59]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and toward Sadky on August 13 and 14.[60] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stepne (northwest of Sumy City), Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City) and Novokostyantynivka (north of Sumy City).[61]

Ukrainian State Border Guard Spokesperson Colonel Andriy Demchenko stated on August 14 that small Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are trying to infiltrate unspecified areas of the Sumy Oblast border, but that Ukrainian forces are striking the groups.[62] The Sumy Oblast Military Administration reported on August 14 that a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone struck a civilian vehicle in Yunakivskyi Hromada (northeast of Sumy City).[63] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and the 382nd Separate Naval Infantry Battalion (810th Naval Infantry Brigade, Black Sea Fleet) retreated from Sumy Oblast toward the international border and are “chaotically scattered” around Yelizavetovka, Kursk Oblast (just north of Novokostyantynivka).[64] The milblogger claimed that a recent rotation to replace elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) with elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade in Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City) was very difficult, suggesting that Russian forces completed the rotation but struggled to do so efficiently or effectively.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Mohrytsya (northwest of Sumy City) and in Chernihiv Oblast border areas.[65] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kyianytsia (north of Sumy City).[66]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced on the southern (left) bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and near Synelnykove (south of Vovchansk).[67]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on August 13 and 14.[68] Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces counterattacked on the southern bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk and near Synelnykove.[69]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Kanada Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) and 79th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions along the E105 Kharkiv-Belgorod City highway on the international border.[70] Elements of the Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion and Chechen Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) forces are reportedly operating near Vovchansk.[71]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 14.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk) and advanced southwest of Tyshchenkivka (northwest of Kupyansk) and in eastern and east of Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[72] A Russian milblogger subsequently claimed that the situation around Petropavlivka is unclear, and Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[73] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces “infiltrated” Kupyansk in unspecified locations and are holding some positions in buildings likely on the outskirts of the settlement.[74]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Myrove; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, Zapadne and Holubivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and Fyholivka; and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on August 13 and 14.[75]

Kupyansk Raion Military Administration Head Andriy Kanashevich stated on August 14 that indiscriminate Russian FPV drone strikes against civilian and military vehicles have made some areas around Kupyansk inaccessible for Ukrainian police and emergency services.[76]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[77]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Druzhelyubivka, Novovodyane and Hrekivka on August 13 and 14.[78]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Torske (east of Lyman).[79]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Serednie and 500 meters within Shandryholove (both northwest of Lyman).[80]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Serednie, Shandryholove, and Karpivka; north of Lyman in Hlushchenkove and Novyi Myr, near Ridkodub, and toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near and in Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area.[81]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces have concentrated a large number of troops in this direction and are constantly replenishing reserves.[82] The spokesperson added that Russian forces operating in this direction receive only a month of training and attack Ukrainian positions in fireteams of two to four infantrymen. The spokesperson stated that the “kill zone” (in Ukrainian military parlance, an area of elevated drone strike risk) in the area is between 15 and 20 kilometers deep.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on August 14 that Russian forces, including elements of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [AC], Southern Military District [SMD]), advanced south of Novoselivka (east of Siversk).[83] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced south of Serebryanka (northeast of Siversk).[84]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Novoselivka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and south of Siversk near Pereizne on August 13 and 14.[85]

A drone operator of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Siversk direction reported on August 14 that Russian forces are attempting to break through Ukrainian defenses in this direction on all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) before accumulating for further attacks.[86] The drone operator reported that Russian forces have almost entirely destroyed Siversk with mortar, artillery, and glide bomb strikes and that there are almost no civilians left in the settlement. The drone operator stated that Russian forces are adjusting to changes in Ukrainian drone technology and tactics in this direction by altering the settings on electronic warfare (EW) systems, increasing their use of interceptor drones, and shooting down Ukrainian drones.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Chasiv Yar and north of Predtechyne (south of Chasiv Yar).[87]

Russian forces attacked south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Predtechyne on August 13 and 14.[88]

The chief sergeant of a Ukrainian company operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated on August 14 that Russian forces have yet to seize Chasiv Yar despite fighting for the town since 2023.[89] The chief sergeant stated that small Russian infantry groups are penetrating Ukrainian lines in order to plant flags to claim advances and seizures, but that Russian forces often do not maintain enduring positions at the flag locations.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including elements of its 331st VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (Chasiv Yar) direction.[90]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on August 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on August 14 that Russian forces, including elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD), seized Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[91] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk) and to the eastern bank of the Kleban Byk reservoir north of Shcherbynivka.[92]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk near Pleshchiivka, Kleban Byk, Oleksandro-Kalynove, Katerynivka, Yablunivka, Popiv Yar, and Rusyn Yar and toward Stepanivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on August 13 and 14.[93] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Pleshchiivka.[94]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Katerynivka, Pleshchiivka, Nelipivka (northwest of Toretsk), and Oleksandro-Shultyne (northeast of Toretsk).[95] Elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Kleban Byk and Katerynivka.[96] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade and 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade (both of the 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Katerynivka.[97]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 13 and 14 but did not make confirmed advances

See topline text for reports of Russian activity east and northeast of Dobropillya.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) and advanced east of Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Pokrovsk).[98]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rubizhne and toward Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Shakhove, Volodymyrivka, Zapovidne, Krasnyi Lyman, Rodynske, Myrolyubivka, Mayak, Vilne, Fedorivka, and Zolotyi Kolodyaz; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, Novoekonomichne, Myrolyubivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on August 13 and 14.[99] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Vesele, and Hruzke (all northeast of Pokrovsk).[100]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces have maintained their rate of attack in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AOR) for the past few months and continue to attack using small group tactics.[101] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are primarily attacking on motorcycles, but Russian forces recently “staged” an armored assault for the first time in three months. The spokesperson of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces have increased drone usage in the Pokrovsk direction compared to the spring, when Ukrainian forces shot down an average of 100 to 150 Russian drones per week, as opposed to over 250 in the last week (roughly since August 7).[102] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces significantly changed their tactics in the last year, transitioning from massive assaults with both heavy and light armor in the summer of 2024, to now only attacking with light infantry and drones. The spokesperson noted that Ukrainian forces in this area have only destroyed one tank and three armored vehicles, highlighting how infrequently Russian forces are now using armor. The spokesperson also reported that Russian forces have maintained the intensity of their attacks and are continually replenishing forces. A Russian milblogger claimed that the southern part of the Pokrovsk direction near the city of Pokrovsk proper is the calmest section of this front, and that the scale of fighting is greater in the northern sector despite the fact that Russian forces have managed to advance into Pokrovsk with small fire teams.[103] The Telegraph reported that Russian forces are stealing civilian clothes from abandoned homes and using them to attempt to disguise themselves and infiltrate Pokrovsk, likely a resort to perfidy that would amount to a violation of international law.[104]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Vega Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Pokrovsk direction.[105] Elements of the 2nd CAA and 51st CAA are reportedly attempting to cut off the M04 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway from either side in order to encircle Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[106]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Novokhatske (southeast of Novopavlivka).[107]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Dachne, and Novoukrainka; south of Novopavlivka toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Tovste on August 13 and 14.[108]

The commander of a Ukrainian artillery battalion operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported on August 14 that Russian forces have made practically no progress in the last week.[109] The commander reported that Russian forces continue to attack in small fire teams on foot and have not used heavy or light equipment in a long time. The commander stated that Russian forces in the area are not using motorcycles but have to bring supplies to forward positions on foot. The commander reported that Russian forces, including drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, are striking settlements, crossings, and bridges with guided glide bombs to complicate Ukrainian logistics and are very active at night when Ukrainian forces supply positions and conduct rotations.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Dnipropetrovsk (Novopavlivka) direction.[110]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 14 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Andriivka-Klevstove (northeast of Velykomykhailivka).[111] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov credited elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) with seizing the settlement.[112]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Oleksandrohrad (east of Velykomykhailivka).[113]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne and Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka and Shevchenko and toward Komyshuvakha, Zaporizke, and Novoheorhiivka on August 13 and 14.[114]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Nefrit Assault Company of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Sichneve (east of Velykomykhailivka).[115]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground attacks east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka and northeast of Hulyaipole near Poltavka on August 13 and 14.[116]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground attacks west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Plavni; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; and southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka on August 13 and 14.[117] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in southern Stepnohirsk.[118]

A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) are attempting to advance toward the T-0605 Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia City highway.[119]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on August 13 and 14 but did not advance.[120]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in Kherson Oblast.[121]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 13 to 14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two S-300/S-400 air defense missiles from Kursk Oblast and 45 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast.[122] The Ukrainian Air Force noted that Russian drones mainly targeted frontline areas of Donetsk and Chernihiv oblasts and conducted missile strikes against Sumy Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down or suppressed 24 drones over northern and eastern Ukraine.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on August 14 that Russia delivered another batch of Su-30SM2 multirole fighter aircraft to Belarus as part of a bilateral military-technical cooperation agreement.[123] The Belarusian MoD claimed that the Su-30s will allow Belarus to secure its airspace. Russia previously delivered a batch of Su-30 aircraft, including some SM2 variants, in May 2025.[124]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media, as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77774

[2] https://t.me/rian_ru/309951; https://suspilne dot media/1090390-u-kremli-ogolosili-cas-zustrici-putina-z-trampom-ta-sklad-delegacii/ ; https://t.me/bazabazon/40031; https://t.me/tass_agency/330978

[3] https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-putin-alaska-summit-news-08-14-25

[4] https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-putin-alaska-summit-news-08-14-25

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051525

[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021725

[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/primer-russian-cognitive-warfare

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081325; https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/1954177766267420898

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-7-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2025

[10] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77774

[11] https://news dot ru/vlast/v-gd-otvetili-chto-obsudyat-rossiya-i-ssha-na-alyaske-posle-ukrainskogo-voprosa

[12] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/08/14/sdelka/amp/

[13] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2025

[14] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2025-08-13/russia-s-faltering-war-economy-adds-to-putin-s-woes-ahead-of-trump-summit?srnd=homepage-americas?srnd=homepage-americas

[15] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2025

[16] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2025-08-13/russia-s-faltering-war-economy-adds-to-putin-s-woes-ahead-of-trump-summit?srnd=homepage-americas?srnd=homepage-americas

[17] https://legalacts dot ru/doc/FZ-o-gosudarstvennom-oboronnom-zakaze/glava-3.1/statja-8.2/; https://rg dot ru/documents/2022/03/01/oborona-dok.html; https://navigatingrussia.substack.com/p/russias-hidden-war-debt

[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071725

[19] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2025

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081325; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t47O1PQuaKk; https://suspilne dot media/1090026-pidsumki-konferencii-zelenskogo-trampa-i-evropejskih-lideriv-frn-profinansue-boepripasi-ukraini-1268-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1755178215&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[21] https://radio.foxnews.com/fox-news-talk/brian-kilmeade/

[22] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t47O1PQuaKk; https://suspilne dot media/1090026-pidsumki-konferencii-zelenskogo-trampa-i-evropejskih-lideriv-frn-profinansue-boepripasi-ukraini-1268-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1755178215&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://kyivindependent dot com/trump-prefers-talks-over-new-russia-sanctions-but-has-many-measures-ready-white-house-says/

[23] https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-berlin-talks-trump-zelenskyy-merz-9f613b905f81af71920f754da503657a

[24] http://kremlin dot ru/supplement/6371; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77775

[25] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77774

[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar07292025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071025

[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080525

[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060825

[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081325; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112224

[30] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-appears-ready-test-new-missile-he-prepares-trump-talks-researchers-say-2025-08-13/

[31] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-appears-ready-test-new-missile-he-prepares-trump-talks-researchers-say-2025-08-13/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112224

[32] https://ukraine.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2025-08/Ukraine%20-%20protection%20of%20civilians%20in%20armed%20conflict%20%28July%202025%29_ENG.pdf

[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-battlefield-air-interdiction; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081325; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1089618-evakuacia-z-doneccini-trivae-ponad-170-ludej-vivezli-volonteri-z-dobropilla-ta-bilozerskogo/

[34] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070425

[35] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-13-2025

[36] https://t.me/AFUStratCom/30785 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/14/zahopyly-v-polon-8-okupantiv-sytuacziya-na-dobropilskomu-napryamku-stabilizuyetsya/; https://t.me/azov_media/7146 ; https://t.me/DonetskaODA/45930 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1955909845309120564 ; https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/10332

[37] https://t.me/yurasumy/24327 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175910 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/24328

[38] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66675

[39] https://t.me/wargonzo/28471 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28487 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/154682

[40] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2948 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2949 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2950

[41] https://www.thetimes.com/uk/politics/article/trump-prioritises-ukraine-ceasefire-peace-talks-putin-2v65qr3bf

[42] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062625; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031125

[43] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_237162.htm ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080525 ;

[44] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15628; https://www.nato dot int/cps/en/natohq/news_237162.htm

[45] https://x.com/P_Fiala/status/1955666721420784008

[46] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-13-2025

[47] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15638; https://t.me/tass_agency/331031; https://t.me/DIUkraine/6650

[48] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15634

[49] https://hromadske dot ua/suspilstvo/249634-pislia-9-rokiv-polonu-v-ukrayinu-povernusia-tsyvilnyy-zaruchnyk-bohdan-kovalchuk

[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27801

[51] https://x.com/markito0171/status/1955873203475075403; https://t.me/supernova_plus/42664; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30258; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/1955790064501579902; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1955842868553376031

[52] https://t.me/rgn_34/9694; https://t.me/bbcrussian/84136

[53] https://t.me/tass_agency/331081

[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27810; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27777; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27775

[55] https://t.me/rusich_army/25204

[56] https://t.me/severnnyi/4819

[57] https://t.me/severnnyi/4829

[58] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32403

[59] https://t.me/rybar/72805

[60] https://t.me/dva_majors/77385; https://t.me/rusich_army/25197; https://t.me/severnnyi/4819; https://t.me/wargonzo/28471

[61] https://t.me/dva_majors/77385; https://t.me/rusich_army/25197; https://t.me/wargonzo/28471

[62] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/14/drg-na-sumshhyni-ta-zbir-vijsk-u-bilorusi-sytuacziya-na-kordoni/

[63] https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/37812

[64] https://t.me/severnnyi/4820

[65] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175888; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175913

[66] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175916

[67] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32412; https://t.me/wargonzo/28471; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32454

[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27810; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27777; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27775; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15606; https://t.me/wargonzo/28471; https://t.me/severnnyi/4819

[69] https://t.me/severnnyi/4819; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32412; https://t.me/dva_majors/77385; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32454

[70] https://t.me/AptiAlaudinovAKHMAT/13106; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1955780096134144397

[71] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5904

[72] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40802; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40803; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66684; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66682; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32451

[73] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66700

[74] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13833

[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27810; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27777; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27775; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15606; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66684; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32451

[76] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1090458-u-kupansku-e-rajoni-v-aki-cerez-nebezpeku-ne-idut-pracivniki-dsns-i-policii-rva/

[77] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40666

[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27810; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15606; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27810; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27775; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27777

[79] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30240; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9793; https://t.me/ombr_63/1317

[80] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66674

[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27810; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27777; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27775’ https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15606; https://t.me/wargonzo/28471; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66674

[82] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1090452-armia-rf-na-limanskij-napramok-kidae-nedosvidcenih-soldativ-zsu-znisuut-tehniku-se-na-marsi/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GuRX3eyVWyA ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/14/znyshhyty-vidrazu-shhob-ne-shukaty-po-kushhah-rosijski-oficzery-vedut-svoyih-shturmovykiv-na-bijnyu-yak-koriv/

[83] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40738; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32444

[84] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32444

[85] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27810; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27777; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27775; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15606

[86] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/14/okupanty-namagayutsya-prorvatysya-u-bezlyudnyj-ta-zrujnovanyj-siversk/

[87] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66683

[88] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27777; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27775; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15606

[89] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/14/bizhat-vstanovyty-prapor-i-pomerty-vijskovi-rozpovily-yak-rosiyany-chasiv-yar-okupuvaly/

[90] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32421

[91] https://t.me/mod_russia/55550; https://t.me/mod_russia/55556; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40808; https://t.me/mod_russia/55546 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/331005 ; https://t.me/sashakots/55555; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97709

[92] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66683

[93] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27810; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27777; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27775; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15606; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32426 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77385; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66683

[94] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66683

[95] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175877; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66683

[96] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40666 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/14179

[97] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14179

[98] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66675 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32410

[99] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27777 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27775 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15606 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27810

[100] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66675

[101] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pXXHKFsnbek ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/14/pomyraly-shvydko-i-bez-problem-poblyzu-pokrovska-znyshhyly-shturmovykiv-na-bronetransporterah/

[102] https://armyinform.com dot a/2025/08/14/na-takyh-korytah-namagayutsya-zaletity-poblyzu-pokrovska-rosiyany-zabuly-pro-vykorystannya-bronemashyn/

[103] https://t.me/yurasumy/24330

[104] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/08/13/russian-soldiers-disguised-civilian-clothing-infiltrating/ ; https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule65

[105] https://t.me/sashakots/55557

[106] https://t.me/yurasumy/24330

[107] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97709

[108] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27777 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27775 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15606 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27810

[109] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pXXHKFsnbek ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/14/samyj-nekrasyvyj-ork-tyagne-velyku-vagu-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku-v-okupantiv-bida-z-tehnikoyu/

[110] https://t.me/dva_majors/77394

[111] https://t.me/voin_dv/16455 ; https://t.me/osintpen/1621 ; https://t.me/osintpen/1624 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9794 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1955911451073503530 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/16455

[112] https://t.me/mod_russia/55551

[113] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97719

[114] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27777 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27775 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15606 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27810

[115] https://t.me/tass_agency/330903

[116] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27777; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27775; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15606

[117] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27777; https://t.me/dva_majors/77385; https://t.me/wargonzo/28471

[118] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32435

[119] https://t.me/dva_majors/77385

[120] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27775; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27777; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27810

[121] https://t.me/dva_majors/77402

[122] https://t.me/kpszsu/40392

[123] https://t.me/modmilby/49578

[124] https://thedefensepost dot com/2025/05/30/belarus-su30-jets-russia/

Christina Harward, Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, Kateryna Stepanenko, Justin Young, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter

August 13, 2025, 9:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45 pm ET on August 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 14 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian officials reiterated that Russia’s objectives in Ukraine remain unchanged ahead of the Alaska summit on August 15, once again demonstrating that the Kremlin remains uninterested in pursuing serious peace negotiations. Russian Foreign Ministry’s Deputy Director of Information and Press Department Alexei Fadeev stated on August 13 that Russia’s position on resolving its war against Ukraine remained “unchanged” since Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 14, 2024 speech.[1] Fadeev added that the goals for Russia’s delegation to the Alaska summit on August 15 are defined “exclusively by national interests” and implied that Russia will not consider any territorial concessions.[2] Putin outlined his uncompromising demands for Ukraine’s capitulation as a prerequisite for “peace” negotiations in Ukraine on June 14, 2024. The demands included that Ukraine must withdraw from the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, including areas that Russian forces do not currently occupy; demilitarization; and denazification of the Ukrainian government and society, including the removal of Ukraine’s current democratically elected government; and future Ukrainian alliance neutrality, likely referring to NATO membership. Fadeev’s statements indicate that the Kremlin maintains its long-standing objectives in the war against Ukraine that amount to Ukraine’s full military and political capitulation to Russia and has not adjusted its position ahead of the Alaska summit.

The Trump administration clarified that the United States will not pursue any agreements with Russia regarding a peace settlement in Ukraine without an immediate ceasefire and without Ukraine’s formal involvement in peace negotiations. US President Donald Trump held a virtual summit on August 13 with select European leaders and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in preparation for Trump’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the August 15 Alaska summit.[3] German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated that Trump reaffirmed that Trump would not negotiate territorial issues with Putin.[4] French President Emmanuel Macron noted that Trump clearly demonstrated that the United States seeks to convince Putin to commit to a ceasefire during the Alaska summit.[5] Macron added that Trump agreed that no one but Zelensky should negotiate issues concerning territory and that Trump will not be engaging in any “schemes for territory swaps” during the summit.[6] Macron stated that Trump accepted that the United States and Europe will need to jointly give Ukraine security guarantees but made it clear that these security guarantees would not involve NATO.[7] Two unnamed meeting participants told the Wall Street Journal that Trump pledged to ask Putin for an immediate ceasefire but expressed doubts that Putin would agree to this condition.[8]

US State Department Spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated on August 12 that the Alaska summit is ”not a negotiation” and affirmed that Trump remains committed to informing Zelensky and European leaders about his meeting with Putin.[9] White House Spokesperson Karoline Leavitt stated on August 12 that Trump wants to use the Alaska summit to develop a better understanding of how to end the war in Ukraine and that the summit will be a “listening exercise” for Trump.[10] Leavitt added that the Alaska summit is a bilateral meeting but that any peace negotiations would require a trilateral meeting between Russia, Ukraine, and the United States.[11] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated in an interview on August 12 that Trump’s primary objective for the Alaska summit is to have an in-person meeting to “feel out” Putin in order to enable Trump to make further decisions on how to end Russia’s war in Ukraine.[12] Rubio noted that Russian forces suffered 60,000 casualties in July 2025 alone and that such high casualty rates indicate Russia’s commitment to its war effort in Ukraine.

Trump reiterated US interest in facilitating future Ukraine-Russia peace negotiations and warned that Russia would face “very severe consequences” if Putin fails to engage in serious peace talks with Ukraine after the Alaska summit. Trump stated after his virtual summit with European leaders and Zelensky on August 13 that he hopes to organize a trilateral meeting with Putin and Zelensky in the event of a successful Alaska summit.[13] Trump warned that there will be “very severe consequences” if Putin does not agree to stop his war against Ukraine after the Alaska summit but did not specify those consequences.[14] US Secretary of Treasury Scott Bessent told Bloomberg on August 13 that the United States could increase or loosen sanctions against Russia depending on the outcome of the Alaska summit.[15] Bessent urged European leaders to prepare to join the United States in introducing harsher sanctions against Russia and tariffs against the People’s Republic of China and other consumers of Russian energy. One US official told Axios on August 13 that the Trump administration believes that it can “bring down the Russian economy” and that Trump will continue to sell weapons to NATO countries for Ukraine even if diplomatic efforts to resolve the war fail.[16]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders formulated common principles for potential peace negotiations with Russia ahead of the Alaska summit, many of which are in line with the Trump administration’s August 12 and 13 statements. Zelensky, following a series of virtual meetings with European leaders and Trump and US Vice President JD Vance, announced on August 13 that Ukraine and its European allies agreed upon and conveyed to Trump the following common principles regarding the Alaska summit and a potential peace agreement: everything that concerns Ukraine should be discussed with Ukraine; parties should arrange a trilateral meeting between Zelensky, Trump, and Putin; parties should agree to a ceasefire prior to a broader peace agreement; the West should provide reliable security guarantees for Ukraine; Russia cannot be allowed a veto over Ukraine’s potential accession to the European Union (EU) or NATO; and stakeholders should strengthen sanctions against Russia if Putin refuses a ceasefire following the Alaska summit.[17] These stated principles cohere with the Trump administration’s articulated timeline for a ceasefire prior to peace negotiations, preference that negotiations occur between Putin and Zelensky directly, security guarantees for Ukraine, and resolve to impose sanctions against Russia in the event of Putin’s continued intransigence after the Alaska summit and continuation of Russia’s war against Ukraine.[18]

The Kremlin is using the Alaska summit to portray Russia as a world power equal to the United States and to posture Putin as an equal to US President Donald Trump. Leading Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev alluded on August 13 to the 1945 Yalta Conference between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, claiming that the Yalta conference “won World War II” and that Putin and Trump will similarly “prevent World War III.”[19] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Deputy Head Alexei Chepa amplified comparisons between the upcoming summit and the Yalta Conference and claims that the United States and Russia should “talk to each other as friends.”[20] Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov claimed that Trump should visit occupied Crimea in order to agree to a “new Yalta peace.”[21] Multiple Russian outlets similarly compared the Alaska summit to Yalta and claimed that “people who have a real influence on global processes” will be at the table in Alaska.[22]

Russian comparisons of the August 15 US-Russia summit with the 1945 Yalta Conference attempt to conceal the power disparity between the United States and Russia and are efforts to present Russia as having much stronger diplomatic, military, and economic positions than it does. Russia is already trying to present the very fact that Trump and Putin are meeting as a Russian victory in order to foster perceptions that Russia is an equal of the United States. Comparisons between the two meetings are also inaccurate because the 1945 Yalta Conference resulted in an agreement about post-war Europe, while Trump and other US officials have reiterated that the August 15 summit will not result in any US-Russia agreements about the end of the war in Ukraine.

Russia is reportedly preparing to conduct further offensive operations in priority sectors of the front line and to resume limited offensives in southern Ukraine, particularly in Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 12 that Russia may transfer 15,000 troops to the Zaporizhia direction, 7,000 troops to the Pokrovsk direction, and 5,000 troops to the Novopavlivka direction to intensify offensive operations in these areas in the near future.[23] Zelensky noted that the Russian military command may redeploy these troops from the Sumy direction. The Russian force grouping operating in northern Sumy Oblast largely consists of Russian airborne (VDV) and naval infantry elements, and the Russian military command may intend to redeploy these relatively more “elite” elements to eastern and southern Ukraine in the near future.[24]

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated in an interview with Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne published on August 12 that the GUR received confirmed information that the Russian military command plans to achieve its “preliminary results” in Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, Toretsk, and Chasiv Yar – likely referring to Russian plans to seize these settlements – by the end of August 2025 or early September 2025.[25] Skibitskyi stated that Russian forces have recently changed their tactics and are currently focusing on destroying any defensible positions with persistent strikes and forcing civilian evacuations before infiltrating a settlement in small sabotage and reconnaissance groups. Skibitskyi noted that Russian forces then consolidate and accumulate forces for larger attacks.

Skibitskyi noted that Russia has recently started shelling Kherson City intensively in order to force locals to evacuate – suggesting that Russian forces may be preparing for limited infiltration operations against Kherson City and west (right) bank Kherson Oblast. Russian forces have implemented drone tactics and adaptations in recent months to generate some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) and to facilitate Russian advances on key Ukrainian settlements as ISW has reported.[26] Russian forces have notably conducted drone and missile strikes against Kherson Oblast that appear to be generating some BAI effects, suggesting that Russian forces may be applying new tactics that have proven successful in other parts of the front line for preparations to resume larger-scale offensive operations in the Kherson direction.[27] Russian forces may also use infiltration tactics like those seen in the recent Russian penetration in the Dobropillya direction to attack in the Kherson direction following strike preparations. The likelihood of imminent renewed, large-scale Russian offensive operations against Kherson City and west bank Kherson Oblast remains low at the moment, however, as the Russian military command would likely need to redeploy a significant number of forces to the area to cross the Dnipro River and establish and hold a bridgehead.

Russia is simultaneously preparing to continue its long-range drone strike campaign against Ukrainian rear areas, which will likely result in further civilian casualties. Skibitskyi stated that Russia’s production of drones, Iskander ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles is enabling Russia to conduct combined strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure, logistics, and civilian facilities.[28] Skibitskyi noted that Russia plans to manufacture over 79,000 Shahed-type strike drones in 2025, including 40,000 Geran-2 drones, 5,700 Garpiya-A1 drones, and 34,000 Gerber and other decoy drones. Skibitskyi stated that Russia is able to increase its drone and missile production after establishing new production lines in Izhevsk (referring to the Russian defense manufacturer Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant Kupol that produces Garpiya-A1 drones) and Yelabuga (referring to Russia’s Shahed-type drone factory in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone [SEZ] near Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan). Skibitskyi reported that Russia is also working to decrease its dependence on foreign-made components and has already domestically produced internal combustion engines, navigation system components, and antennas.

Russia has been able to dramatically increase the size of its missile and drone strike packages in recent weeks due to increased production and stockpiling, and these larger-scale strikes have caused significant civilian casualties and damage.[29] Russia’s overnight strike packages in August 2025 have contained between 45 and 163 drones and missiles – a relatively small number compared to strike packages in recent months that contained hundreds of drones and missiles per night.[30] Russia is likely not conducting massive strikes against Ukraine at this time to set conditions for the upcoming Alaska summit and will likely refrain from such strikes until the summit is over. The smaller-scale strikes, however, allow Russia to stockpile missiles and drones, particularly as the quantity of drones used in many of Russia’s drone strikes in recent weeks has been below Russia’s reported June 2025 daily production rate of 170 Shahed and decoy drones.[31] Russia’s daily drone production rate is likely even higher now. Russia may resume its large-scale strike packages following the bilateral summit.

Russian forces have yet to reinforce and consolidate positions east and northeast of Dobropillya, and Russian and Ukrainian sources continued on August 13 to characterize the Russian penetration as consisting of limited, dismounted sabotage and reconnaissance groups.[32] Russian milbloggers continued to urge caution to their Russian audience about unconfirmed claims of Russian advance. [33] Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Andriy Kovalev stated on August 12 that three groups of Russian forces conducted the recent penetration and that Ukrainian forces destroyed two of the groups and some of the third group.[34] Kovalev stated that Ukrainian forces still need to clear Vesele, Rubizhne, Kucheriv Yar (all three northeast of Dobropillya), and Vilne (east of Dobropillya), but that Russian forces do not control these settlements. Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya), while other milbloggers denied these claims.[35] One milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized the settlement.[36] ISW observed reports that elements of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade were operating near Toretsk throughout June 2025, and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported in late July 2025 that elements of the brigade were attacking in the Dobropillya direction.[37] The recent redeployment of elements of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade suggests that the Russian military command is currently prioritizing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction over those in the Toretsk area, possibly as part of efforts to bypass the southern tip of Ukraine’s fortress belt in Kostyantynivka from the southwest after Russian forces have failed to make significant advances north of Toretsk.

ISW continues to assess that Russian forces do not control the territory east and northeast of Dobropillya where Russian forces recently infiltrated. ISW’s Assessed Russian Advances map layer does not differentiate between enduring Russian positions and limited infiltration missions. ISW’s definition of the Assessed Russian Advances layer is any area in which ISW assesses Russian forces have operated or launched attacks against but do not control. ISW uses the US Army doctrinal term “forward line of own troops” (FLOT) to indicate the most forward observed positions of forces in any kind of operation at a specific time. ISW largely uses its Assessed Russian Advances layer to depict areas within the Russian FLOT but over which Russian forces have not yet established control. ISW’s Assessed Russian Advances layer illustrates areas where ISW has observed evidence of a Russian presence but does not necessarily denote areas where Russian forces have established an enduring presence. ISW evaluates its Assessed Russian-Controlled Ukrainian Territory map layer using the doctrinal definition of “control” – a tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations. ISW deliberately distinguishes between the Russian FLOT and areas that ISW assesses that Russian forces control. ISW does not assess that Russian forces exercise control over the areas in their tactical penetration near Dobropillya as of August 13.

Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups continue attempts to infiltrate Pokrovsk as Russian forces heavily strike the town. Ukrainian battalion commanders operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on August 12 and 13 that Russian forces are using small sabotage and reconnaissance groups to try to enter Pokrovsk.[38] One commander reported that Russian forces resumed intensive artillery, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), and air strikes against Pokrovsk in recent days, suggesting that the presence of Russian forces in the town is minimal.[39] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi’s comments about Russian tactics focusing on striking settlements to destroy any defensible positions and force civilian evacuations before entering a settlement in small sabotage and reconnaissance groups – are consistent with reporting that Russian forces are intensely striking Pokrovsk and conducting infiltration missions.[40]

Russia’s use of drone strikes to generate battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects in the Ukrainian near rear are severely hindering Ukrainian evacuation efforts in the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya area. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a strike against a Ukrainian drone operation point near Novomykolaivka (northeast of Dobropillya) using five Geran-2 drones.[41] Russian forces have been leveraging recent adaptations in drone technology and tactics to more heavily target Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[42] Pokrovsk City Military Administration Head Serhiy Dobryak stated on August 12 that over 1,300 Ukrainian civilians remain in Pokrovsk but that Russian forces are striking “everything that moves” along roads going into the town, forcing civilians to walk to evacuation vehicles.[43] Donetsk Oblast Administration Head Vadym Filashkin announced on August 13 the mandatory evacuation of families with children from settlements due north, northwest, and west of Dobropillya, noting that roughly 1,150 children are present in these settlements.[44] Yevhen Tkachev, head of the Proliska humanitarian mission in Donetsk Oblast, reported on August 13 that Russian forces are conducting fiber optic drone strikes against civilian vehicles that are trying to evacuate Ukrainians from areas in Kostyantynivka.[45]

The Kremlin is likely using the upcoming Zapad-2025 joint Russian-Belarusian military exercises to facilitate its nuclear saber-rattling campaign ahead of the Alaska summit. Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin announced on August 13 that Belarusian and Russian forces will jointly rehearse planning for the employment of tactical nuclear weapons and Oreshnik ballistic missiles during the Zapad-2025 exercises on September 12 through 16.[46] Kremlin officials and their affiliates often use nuclear saber-rattling and demonstrative military exercises as part of their reflexive control campaign that aims to push the West to make decisions that disproportionately benefit Russia.[47] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko recently participated in a likely staged press event with Russian President Vladimir Putin on August 1, during which both amplified the Kremlin’s nuclear saber-rattling narratives.[48] Khrenin’s mention of tactical nuclear weapons and Oreshnik planning exercises are likely part of the Kremlin’s broader effort to posture military strength ahead of the Alaska summit. Russian officials have also used Russia’s recent withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which Russia had violated for years, to threaten the United States.[49] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin dangles the prospect of bilateral arms control talks to extract preemptive concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine.[50] Russia may intend the announcement that Zapad-2025 will focus on the employment of Oreshnik missiles (missiles that are banned under the INF Treaty and that Russia has publicly flaunted and employed against Ukraine) and nuclear weapons to pressure Trump to engage in arms control talks, distracting from talks about the war.

Skibitskyi recently stated that Russia and Belarus are actively preparing for Zapad-2025 but that the exercises do not pose a significant threat to Ukraine.[51] Skibitskyi noted that Lukashenko does not want to be directly involved in Russia’s war against Ukraine. ISW similarly assessed that Belarusian forces will not enter the war on behalf of Russia, but Belarus nonetheless plays an important role in Russia’s war effort by forcing Ukrainian forces to defend the Ukrainian-Belarusian border, pinning forces that Ukraine could deploy along the frontline.[52]

Key Takeaways:

Russian officials reiterated that Russia’s objectives in Ukraine remain unchanged ahead of the Alaska summit on August 15, once again demonstrating that the Kremlin remains uninterested in pursuing serious peace negotiations.

The Trump administration clarified that the United States will not pursue any agreements with Russia regarding a peace settlement in Ukraine without an immediate ceasefire and without Ukraine’s formal involvement in peace negotiations.

Trump reiterated US interest in facilitating future Ukraine-Russia peace negotiations and warned that Russia would face “very severe consequences” if Putin fails to engage in serious peace talks with Ukraine after the Alaska summit.

The Kremlin is using the Alaska summit to portray Russia as a world power equal to the United States and to posture Putin as an equal to US President Donald Trump.

Russia is reportedly preparing to conduct further offensive operations in priority sectors of the frontline and to resume limited offensives in southern Ukraine, particularly in Kherson Oblast.

Russia is simultaneously preparing to continue its long-range drone strike campaign against Ukrainian rear areas, which will likely result in further civilian casualties.

Russian forces have yet to reinforce and consolidate positions east and northeast of Dobropillya, and Russian and Ukrainian sources continued on August 13 to characterize the Russian penetration as consisting of limited, dismounted sabotage and reconnaissance groups.

ISW continues to assess that Russian forces do not control the territory east and northeast of Dobropillya where Russian forces recently infiltrated. ISW’s Assessed Russian Advances map layer does not differentiate between enduring Russian positions and limited infiltration missions.

Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups continue attempts to infiltrate Pokrovsk as Russian forces heavily strike the town.

The Kremlin is likely using the upcoming Zapad-2025 joint Russian-Belarusian military exercises to facilitate its nuclear saber-rattling campaign ahead of the Alaska summit.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and western Zaporizhia Oblast and near Lyman and Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 12 and 13.[53]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked in Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[54]

Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure overnight on August 12 to 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 13 that elements of Ukraine’s Missile and Artillery Forces, Unmanned Systems Forces, and Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted drone strikes against several major Russian defense industrial facilities, including the Unecha oil pumping station in Vysokoe, Bryansk Oblast.[55] The General Staff reported that the strike caused damage and started a large fire in the area of a support pumping station building. The General Staff added that the station supplies the Russian military and has an annual pumping capacity of 60 million tons of oil. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that Ukrainian intelligence sources confirmed that GUR drone operators conducted a strike against the pumping station, which is part of the 9,000-kilometer Transneft Druzhba pipeline.[56] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that local residents observed the glow from the fire, and NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies in the area.[57] Bryansk Oblast Governor Aleksandr Bogomaz claimed Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone and HIMARS strike, which caused a fire at a fuel infrastructure facility in Unechsky Raion.[58]

Ukrainian State Security Service (SBU) Head Vasyl Malyuk stated in an August 12 interview with Ukrainian TV channel My-Ukraina that the SBU has struck over 200 Russian defense industrial and logistics facilities, command posts, and oil refineries in the Russian deep rear with long-range drones since February 24, 2022.[59]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[60]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 13 that Ukrainian forces control Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[61]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy City near Stepne; north of Sumy City in Oleksiivka and near Novokostyantynivka and Kindrativka; and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on August 12 and 13.[62] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City in Oleksiivka and near and within Kindrativka; and northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka and near and within Yunakivka.[63]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[64] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed that the Russian military command is planning to withdraw the reconnaissance company of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) from Oleksiivka to the rear to either restore combat readiness or redeploy elements of the regiment to a different direction.[65] Elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) reportedly continue to operate near Kindrativka.[66] Elements of the rocket artillery battalion of the 106th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Sumy Oblast.[67]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a Ukrainian command post in Byryne, Chernihiv Oblast (northeast of Chernihiv City) with a Geran-2 drone.[68]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 13 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced within central Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[69]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Synelnykove, and on the south (left) bank of the Vovcha River on August 12 and 13.[70] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Synelnykove.[71]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Pro-Russian Chechen Sheikh Mansur volunteer battalion (subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense [MoD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kharkiv direction.[72]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced near Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[73]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie and Ambarne on August 13.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[75]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Myrove; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, Kolodyazne, Radkivka, and Holubivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Novovasylivka, Kamyanka, and Krasne Pershe on August 12 and 13.[76]

A servicemember in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on August 13 that Russian forces are using groups of one to three soldiers to find blind spots in Ukrainian defenses to advance and then conduct reconnaissance and adjust artillery fire and drone strikes.[77] An officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on August 13 that Russian forces are using different tactics due to a significant manpower advantage, including using drones to strike Ukrainian logistics and attacking primarily with light vehicles and sometimes armored vehicles in the direction.[78] The Ukrainian officer stated that small Russian infantry groups are leveraging fog, rain, and anti-thermal imaging coats to advance in forests and clearings and that Russian sabotage groups are constantly infiltrating Ukrainian positions to push far into the Ukrainian rear.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue operating near Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[79]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Bohuslavka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Novovodyane on August 12 and 13.[80]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southeastern Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[81]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on August 13 that Russian forces advanced near Serednie, Shandryholove (both northwest of Lyman), and Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[82]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Serednie, Shandryholove, and Karpivka; north of Lyman near Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near Torske, Dibrova, and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on August 12 and 13.[83]

A Russian milblogger claimed on August 13 that the southwestern part of the Serebryanske forest is a contested “gray zone.”[84]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Novoselivka, and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on August 12 and 13.[85]

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on August 13 that Russian forces operating in the Siversk direction are increasing the number of infantry assaults and are leveraging artillery, tactical airstrikes, and new types of drones, particularly the Molniya strike drone, to strike the remaining buildings within Siversk to eliminate potential Ukrainian fortifications within the city.[86]

Order of Battle: Sniper elements of the Russian 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd LNR AC, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[87]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Oleksandro-Shultyne, and Predtechyne on August 12 and 13 but did not advance.[88]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (Chasiv Yar) direction.[89]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Footage published on August 9 and geolocated on August 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced into northwestern Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[90]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Poltavka (northwest of Toretsk).[91] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 8th CAA (SMD), including its 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions, are operating near Poltavka.[92]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk near Pleshchiivka, Kleban Byk, Oleksandro-Kalynove, Katerynivka, Yablunivka, Popiv Yar, Rusyn Yar, and Nelipivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on August 12 and 13.[93]

Order of Battle: Elements, including drone operators, of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka and Kleban-Byk.[94]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 13 that Russian forces seized Zatyshok and Nykanorivka (both northeast of Pokrovsk).[95] ISW assessed that Russian forces seized Zatyshok and Nykanorivka as of August 11, 2025.[96] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk) and within eastern Rodynske (northeast of Pokrovsk) and that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in northwestern Udachne.[97]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko; north of Pokrovsk near Rubizhne, Novyi Donbas, Marivka, Petrivka, and Novotroitske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Kucheriv Yar, Hruzke, Mayak, Nove Shakhove, Pankivka, Fedorivka, Volodymyrivka, Kolodyazi, Zapovidne, Krasnyi Lyman, and Rodynske and toward Zolotyi Kolodyaz; east of Pokrovsk near Svitle, Novoekonomichne, Myrolyubivka, Myrnohrad, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on August 12 and 13.[98] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zolotyi Kolodyaz.[99]

The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on August 13 that Russian forces are mostly sending small infantry groups of one to three personnel to attack on foot or with light motorized vehicles such as motorcycles and scooters in the Pokrovsk direction.[100] The commander stated that Russian forces leverage mechanized vehicles in occasional, isolated instances and that Russian drone operators provide support for ground troops.

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Myrnohrad.[101]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 13

Russian forces attacked southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Dachne, Novoukrainka; south of Novopavlivka near Zirka, Tovste, Filiya, and Myrne; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove on August 12 and 13.[102]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka and Oleksandrohrad; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka, Vilne Pole, and Shevchenko and toward Komyshuvakha on August 12 and 13.[103]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novoselivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[104]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Olhivske and toward Poltavka on August 12 and 13.[105]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Separate Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Brigade (Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Vremivka (Hulyaipole) direction.[106]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 13 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[107]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; southwest of Orikhiv near Nesteryanka; and west of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka, Plavni, and Kamyanske on August 12 and 13.[108] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Mala Tokmachka.[109]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Orikhiv direction reported on August 13 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian mechanized assault near Mala Tokmachka and destroyed one tank, four buggies, and four motorcycles and damaged an unspecified number of infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers.[110] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces increased artillery and unguided bomb strikes while maintaining a high degree of first person view drone strikes in the days leading up to mechanized assault. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces increased artillery and unguided bomb strikes while maintaining a high degree of first person view drone strikes in days leading up to mechanized assault.

Order of Battle: Elements, including drone operators, of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate near Kamyanske, Plavni, and Stepnohirsk.[111] Elements, including drone operators, of the 4th Military Base (58th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions near Mala Tokmachka.[112] Elements of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and drone operators of the 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhia direction.[113]

Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Dnipro direction immediately east of Kherson City near Antonivka and Prydniprovske and southwest of Kherson City near Hola Prystan on August 13 but did not advance.[114]

Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin reported on August 13 that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a civilian vehicle along the T-0403 Novoraysk-Kostryka highway in Beryslav (northeast of Kherson City), killing two civilians.[115] This precision drone strike may suggest that Russian forces may be achieving some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects in the Kherson direction.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on August 12 and 13. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Kursk Oblast and 49 Shahed-type and decoy drones from Kursk City; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast.[116] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed two Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles and 32 drones and that 17 unspecified drones struck 15 unspecified locations.

Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) Head Vasyl Malyuk reported on August 13 that Russia aims to eliminate Ukrainian officials via Shahed and missile strikes against residential buildings associated with such officials rather than targeted assassination attempts due to traditional assassination methods’ apparent ineffectiveness.[117] Russian forces conducting high-impact strikes against residential buildings with Iskander ballistic missiles would very likely constitute a violation of the proportionality principle as defined by international law due to the subsequent civilian harm that would excessively outweigh Russia’s expected military advantage.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarus continues to deepen military cooperation with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on August 13 that Belarusian Logistics Chief of Staff Major General Alexander Mosolov will lead a Belarusian delegation to meet with PRC representatives to discuss bilateral military logistics cooperation to support the rear and visit PRC military bases in the rear.[118]

Belarus is hosting additional joint military exercises ahead of its Belarusian-Russian Zapad-2025 military exercise. Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin stated on August 13 that military forces from some Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) states will conduct military exercises in Vitebsk Oblast (in northern Belarus bordering Lithuania, Latvia, and Russia) from August 31 to September 6 and that some Russian forces have already arrived.[119]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://tass dot ru/politika/24771689

[2] https://tass dot ru/politika/24771955

[3] https://www.wsj.com/world/trump-talks-ukraine-red-lines-with-europe-before-putin-summit-cd691edf

[4] https://www.wsj.com/world/trump-talks-ukraine-red-lines-with-europe-before-putin-summit-cd691edf

[5] https://www.wsj.com/world/trump-talks-ukraine-red-lines-with-europe-before-putin-summit-cd691edf

[6] https://www.ft.com/content/82453d76-ff81-4875-b7f3-000f400887d2

[7] https://www.wsj.com/world/trump-talks-ukraine-red-lines-with-europe-before-putin-summit-cd691edf

[8] https://www.wsj.com/world/trump-talks-ukraine-red-lines-with-europe-before-putin-summit-cd691edf

[9] https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-august-12-2025

[10] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/white-house-says-trump-putin-meeting-is-listening-exercise-2025-08-12/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i8_BV0Agrbc

[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/white-house-says-trump-putin-meeting-is-listening-exercise-2025-08-12/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i8_BV0Agrbc

[12] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/08/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-with-sid-rosenberg-of-sid-and-friends-in-the-morning

[13] https://suspilne dot media/1089966-akso-zustric-z-putinim-bude-horosou-to-druga-projde-miz-putinim-ta-zelenskim-tramp/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W2K2j_Wakgs

[14] https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-berlin-talks-trump-zelenskyy-merz-9f613b905f81af71920f754da503657a

[15] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-13/bessent-warns-europe-it-s-put-up-or-shut-up-time-on-russia; https://www.youtube.com/live/iEpJwprxDdk

[16] https://www.axios.com/2025/08/13/zelensky-trump-putin-summit-ukraine

[17] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/zayava-prezidenta-ukrayini-pid-chas-spilnogo-z-federalnim-ka-99553

[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar073025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033025

[19] https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/1955599221618597929

[20] https://t.me/alexchepa_duma/3619

[21] https://t.me/Aksenov82/7940

[22] https://tsargrad dot tv/articles/sekretnyj-protokol-sammita-na-aljaske-pjat-punktov-kotorye-govorjat-obo-vsem-putin-vypolnjaet-obeshhanie-stalina-rassekrechennaja-perepiska_1336918; https://topwar dot ru/269473-aljaska-2025-v-luchshih-tradicijah-jalty-1945.html; https://www.mk dot ru/politics/2025/08/13/tolko-s-kievom-makron-raskryl-klyuchevoe-obeshhanie-trampa.html

[23] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1089162-zelenskij-rosia-perekidae-vijska-z-sumskogo-napramku/

[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-9-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2025

[25] https://suspilne dot media/1089054-akso-putin-dast-komandu-pocnetsa-peregovornij-proces-skibickij-iz-gur-pro-plani-rosian-ta-ihnij-zapas-micnosti/

[26] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-battlefield-air-interdiction

[27] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-battlefield-air-interdiction; https://suspilne dot media/1089188-tramp-i-putin-zustrinutsa-v-ankoridzi-rosia-perekidae-sili-z-sumsini-na-insi-napramki-1267-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1755066669&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2025; https://kyivindependent dot com/russia-bombs-central-kherson-partially-destroys-regional-administration-building/

[28] https://suspilne dot media/1089054-akso-putin-dast-komandu-pocnetsa-peregovornij-proces-skibickij-iz-gur-pro-plani-rosian-ta-ihnij-zapas-micnosti/

[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20June%2020%2C%202025%20%28PDF%29.pdf

[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-9 2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may 26-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment may-24-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2025

[31] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2025

[32] https://suspilne dot media/1089188-tramp-i-putin-zustrinutsa-v-ankoridzi-rosia-perekidae-sili-z-sumsini-na-insi-napramki-1267-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1755068161&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/13/protyvnyk-ne-znaye-i-ne-oriyentuyetsya-tolkom-poblyzu-pokrovska-likvidovuyut-vorozhyj-proryv/;

[33] https://t.me/wargonzo/28442; https://t.me/rybar/72790 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/25186

[34] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1089180-pereviriti-kozen-kvadratnij-metr-ak-rosijski-vijska-prosunulisa-na-fronti-bila-dobropilla-i-cim-ce-zagrozue/

[35] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66649; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175755; https://t.me/yurasumy/24320; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97624; https://t.me/rybar/72790; https://t.me/rusich_army/25186; https://t.me/sashakots/55518

[36] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66657

[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-28-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2025

[38] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1089180-pereviriti-kozen-kvadratnij-metr-ak-rosijski-vijska-prosunulisa-na-fronti-bila-dobropilla-i-cim-ce-zagrozue/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/13/protyvnyk-namagayetsya-otochyty-pokrovsk-i-dobropillya-podrobyczi-nochi/

[39] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/13/zsu-vybyly-drg-z-pokrovska-protyvnyk-vidnovyv-intensyvni-obstrily/

[40] https://suspilne dot media/1089054-akso-putin-dast-komandu-pocnetsa-peregovornij-proces-skibickij-iz-gur-pro-plani-rosian-ta-ihnij-zapas-micnosti/

[41] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32408

[42] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-battlefield-air-interdiction

[43] https://hromadske dot ua/viyna/249515-u-pokrovsku-zakrylasia-ostannia-kramnytsia-iak-zyve-pryfrontove-misto

[44] https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/10309

[45] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1089618-evakuacia-z-doneccini-trivae-ponad-170-ludej-vivezli-volonteri-z-dobropilla-ta-bilozerskogo/

[46] https://t.me/modmilby/49546

[47] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725

[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025

[49] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2025

[50] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2025

[51] https://suspilne dot media/1089054-akso-putin-dast-komandu-pocnetsa-peregovornij-proces-skibickij-iz-gur-pro-plani-rosian-ta-ihnij-zapas-micnosti/

[52] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2024

[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27773; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27756; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27753

[54] https://t.me/severnnyi/4811

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27771; https://t.me/astrapress/89370

[56] https://suspilne dot media/1089436-droni-gur-urazili-naftoperekacuvalnu-stanciu-v-branskij-oblasti/

[57] https://t.me/astrapress/89337; https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@32.97,52.77,14.00z

[58] https://t.me/avbogomaz/13870

[59] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G4oqiMkOeuo; https://suspilne dot media/1089188-tramp-i-putin-zustrinutsa-v-ankoridzi-rosia-perekidae-sili-z-sumsini-na-insi-napramki-1267-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1755033072&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://suspilne dot media/1089200-za-cas-povnomasstabnogo-vtorgnenna-sbu-atakuvali-ponad-200-obektiv-u-glibokomu-tilu-rf-maluk/

[60] https://x.com/LloydUkrYT/status/1955319730404831707; https://x.com/LloydUkrYT/status/1955319888194457633; https://t.me/soniah_hub/11820

[61] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32403

[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27773; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27756; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27753; https://t.me/wargonzo/28442; https://t.me/pozyvnoy_leon/15748; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40610; https://t.me/severnnyi/4816; https://t.me/dva_majors/77316; https://t.me/severnnyi/4811

[63] https://t.me/pozyvnoy_leon/15748; https://t.me/severnnyi/4811; https://t.me/dva_majors/77316; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32403

[64] https://t.me/severnnyi/4811

[65] https://t.me/severnnyi/4812

[66] https://t.me/severnnyi/4817

[67] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32381

[68] https://t.me/tass_agency/330725 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97627 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/55510

[69] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30225

[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27773; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27756; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15566; https://t.me/severnnyi/4811; https://t.me/dva_majors/77316; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32374; https://t.me/wargonzo/28442

[71] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32374

[72] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5903

[73] https://t.me/tass_agency/330724

[74] https://t.me/tass_agency/330724; https://t.me/tass_agency/330720

[75] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32374

[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27773; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27756; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27753; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15566; https://t.me/wargonzo/28442

[77] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rxzs8XoObOQ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/13/yim-ne-shkoda-pihoty-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-metodychno-peremelyuyut-pihotni-mikrogrupy/

[78] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/13/vidpravlyayut-sotnyu-orkiv-90-z-nyh-pomre-poblyzu-kupyanska-rosijski-oficzery-riznomanitno-znyshhuyut-svoyu-pihotu/

[79] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40599

[80] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27756; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27756; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27753; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27773; https://t.me/wargonzo/28442

[81] https://t.co/DjdLb2nqeq; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1955385032270365145

[82] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40608; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40617; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32390

[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27773; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27756; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27753; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15566; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32390; https://t.me/tass_agency/330727; https://t.me/wargonzo/28442; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40608

[84] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32404

[85] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27773; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27756; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27753; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15566

[86] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1089454-siverskij-napramok-lokalni-uspihi-vijsk-rf-ne-pererostaut-u-proriv-zaporozec/; https://www.youtube.com/live/vnsq2tu2Oo0?si=vB8wuLnAYQaCmav4

[87] https://t.me/otryad_shtorm/23; https://t.me/shock3OA/1864; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32404

[88] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27756; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27753; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15566

[89] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97601

[90] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1955391460620239061 https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1954191104011604405 https://t.me/motopatriot78/40295

[91] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1955576651611353147; https://t.me/fakhivtsi/396; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9791

[92] https://t.me/wargonzo/28442

[93] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27773; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27756; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27753; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15566; https://t.me/dva_majors/77316; https://t.me/wargonzo/28442

[94] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40599; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40295

[95] https://t.me/tass_agency/330783; https://t.me/mod_russia/55517

[96] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081125

[97] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66657

[98] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27773; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27756; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27753; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15566; https://t.me/dva_majors/77316; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32393; https://t.me/wargonzo/28442; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175808; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66657

[99] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66657

[100] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/13/poranyvsya-jomu-vidklyuchayut-stancziyu-poblyzu-pokrovska-shturmovyky-atakuyut-razom-iz-mavikistamy/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0

[101] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14170

[102] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27753 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27756 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27773 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15566

[103] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27753 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27756 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27773 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15566 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/330761

[104] https://t.me/voin_dv/16441

[105] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27753 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27756 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27773 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15566

[106] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175751

[107] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1955648640489505143; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1955648987526303861; https://t.me/polk_210/3341; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1955654569519898733; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1955654567477088728

[108] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27756 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27753 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77316

[109] https://t.me/wargonzo/28442

[110] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/13/raportuvaly-shho-zakripylysya-v-tyurmi-poblyzu-orihovogo-try-godyny-vidbyvaly-shturm-rosijskoyi-broni/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/13/povnyj-rozprodazh-kvytkiv-na-kobzona-na-zaporizhzhi-rozgromyly-mehanizovanyj-shturm-voroga/ ; https://www.facebook.com/118ombr/videos/751469467684100/?rdid=nTPx08FyZuzPdrur

[111] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32387 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/330714

[112] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97610

[113] https://t.me/voin_dv/16445 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/16449

[114] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27773 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27756 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27753

[115] https://suspilne dot media/1089188-tramp-i-putin-zustrinutsa-v-ankoridzi-rosia-perekidae-sili-z-sumsini-na-insi-napramki-1267-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1755066669&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[116] https://t.me/kpszsu/40326

[117] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G4oqiMkOeuo; https://suspilne dot media/1089188-tramp-i-putin-zustrinutsa-v-ankoridzi-rosia-perekidae-sili-z-sumsini-na-insi-napramki-1267-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1755060621&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://suspilne dot media/1089228-voni-nad-cim-postijno-pracuut-maluk-rozpoviv-pro-zamahi-na-nogo-z-boku-rf/

[118] https://t.me/modmilby/49532

[119] https://t.me/modmilby/49549

August 11, 2025, 10:15 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on August 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US President Donald Trump expressed the United States’ willingness to facilitate substantive peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in an effort to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine. Trump commented on August 11 about the upcoming August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska and stated that “it is not up to [Trump]” to make a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin about the end of Russia’s war in Ukraine.[1] Trump stated that “a deal should be made for both [Russia and Ukraine],” suggesting that the United States will not pursue a US-Russian brokered agreement that would exclude Ukraine during the Alaska meeting. Trump added that he would notify Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders about his upcoming meeting with Putin. Trump stated that a meeting between Zelensky and Putin or with Zelensky, Putin, and Trump will follow the Alaska summit – suggesting that the United States is interested in facilitating substantive peace talks that include Ukraine in negotiations with Russia.

Trump signaled that the United States would aim to return some of Ukraine’s economically and strategically significant territories during the peace negotiations process. Trump noted that Russian forces currently occupy “some very prime territory” in Ukraine and that the United States is going to “try and get some of that territory back for Ukraine.”[2] Trump did not clarify what he considers to be “prime” territory, only vaguely noting that Russia has taken “largely ocean in real estate” and that Ukraine only maintains control over the coastline in Odesa Oblast. Trump’s references to “prime” territory are likely about Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, given his discussions about territory on the ocean or a river and his mention of Odesa Oblast. Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts host an abundance of economically and strategically significant land and offer much broader access to the Black Sea and the Dnipro River. Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea is critical for Ukraine’s sizeable export market, particularly of agricultural products and minerals.[3] Ukraine is also rich in critical raw materials, and Russia’s direct access to the Black Sea may enable Russia to capture significant revenue streams associated with Ukraine’s raw material export. Ukraine’s access to the Dnipro River and a buffer around that river is operationally significant because the river acts as a naturally defensible barrier. Allowing Russia to maintain control over east (left) bank Kherson Oblast would put Russia in a much more advantageous position to conduct offensive operations against west (right) bank Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts, given how the current Ukrainian positions along the Dnipro River, if frozen, would lack the necessary operational depth to prevent a repeat Russian invasion. Persistent Ukrainian artillery and drone strikes are currently preventing Russian forces from accumulating engineering and bridging equipment to cross the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast, but a future ceasefire would prevent such strikes. Zaporizhia Oblast also hosts Europe’s largest nuclear power station – the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) – which supplied roughly one-fifth of Ukraine’s electricity before Russia’s full-scale invasion, and Russian forces have occupied the facility since March 2022.[4] The Trump administration had previously attempted to negotiate an agreement to secure joint Ukrainian and US control over the ZNPP, which Russia explicitly rejected in spring 2025.[5]

Trump indicated that Putin’s fear of the impact of US sanctions against Russia and Russia’s economic partners drove Putin to propose a bilateral summit. Trump stated that the Russian economy is “not doing well right now.”[6] Trump stated that his announcement imposing 50 percent tariffs on India for importing Russian oil is also not helping the Russian economy and “was a big blow” to countries that purchase Russian oil. Trump stated that he was “all set” to implement much more significant economic restrictions, but that Trump “got a call that [Russian officials] would like to meet.” Trump correctly indicated that the Russian economy is a liability that the United States, Europe, and Ukraine can leverage to degrade Russia’s ability to continue its war in Ukraine. Putin has long sustained a theory of victory that relies upon the assumption that Russia can outlast Ukraine and the West, including by relying on Russia’s partners to sustain the Russian economy and war machine.[7] ISW continues to assess that strong US and other Western economic measures against Russia, in concert with timely and sufficient Western military assistance to Ukraine, can enable Ukraine to inflict more severe battlefield losses on Russia and thereby challenge Putin’s theory of victory.[8]

Putin’s decision to reach out immediately before Trump imposed further economic restrictions against Russia or its trading partners undermines the Kremlin’s ongoing narrative that sanctions have not and will not affect the Russian economy. Kremlin officials have routinely claimed that Russia’s economy is strong and impervious to further US or other Western sanctions, both in order to portray stability to the domestic Russian audience and to convince Western states not to impose further sanctions against Russia and its trading partners.[9] Putin’s decision to reach out to Trump immediately before the United States imposed additional economic restrictions demonstrates the Kremlin’s recognition that this narrative is false. The Russian economy is weaker than Russian officials project, and Russia has implemented monetary and economic policies to disguise Russia’s economic issues, but that will likely exacerbate Russia’s instability instead.[10]

Kremlin officials continue to emphasize that Russia is unwilling to compromise and remains committed to achieving its original war goals in Ukraine. State Duma Committee on International Affairs First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed on August 11 that the primary issue of the Putin-Trump meeting will be discussions about solutions to the “root causes” of the war in Ukraine (a common Kremlin reference to Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian speakers and North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] expansion) to ensure that these causes “cannot be repeated.”[11] Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestiya published an opinion piece on August 11 by Vice-Rector of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) Diplomatic Academy Oleg Karpovich claiming that Russia has yet to achieve its objective of protecting the Russian language and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) and reiterating that Russia considers Ukrainian membership in NATO “impossible.”[12] Karpovich claimed that Ukraine’s “denazification” is a “matter of time.” Putin and other Russian officials have continued to demand Ukraine’s demilitarization (a demand for the reduction of Ukraine’s military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself against future Russian aggression), denazification (a demand for regime change in Ukraine and the installation of a Russian puppet government), and alliance neutrality.[13] Putin most recently reaffirmed his uncompromising demands on August 1 when he claimed that his June 2024 demands that Ukraine cede all of the four illegally annexed oblasts before he would agree to a ceasefire are still in place. Putin’s recent demand is notably only about the conditions that Ukraine must meet before Putin will agree to a ceasefire, not war termination. Putin’s demands before he agrees to a war termination agreement will likely be even more extensive.

Putin is reportedly demoting officials within his inner circle who have voiced disagreement with Putin’s determination to continue the war. The New York Times reported on August 10 that Western and Russian sources indicated that Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Dmitry Kozak lost his influence in the Kremlin after Kozak advised Putin in the past few months to immediately stop fighting in Ukraine, start peace negotiations, and reduce the power of Russia’s security services.[14] Kozak was previously one of Putin’s closest advisors and oversaw Kremlin strategy in Ukraine before the Kremlin shifted this responsibility to Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko.[15] Kozak’s recent opposition to Russia’s war and the subsequent reduction in his influence in the Kremlin demonstrate Putin’s determination to continue his war to achieve his maximalist demands.

Russian officials and media are also setting informational conditions for Russia to renege on any future peace agreement to end the war. Russian State Duma Deputy Alexei Zhuravlev claimed on August 9 that US President Donald Trump is a “temporary person” due to US presidential term limits and that US presidents often renege on agreements that their predecessors reached.[16] Russian ultranationalist outlet Tsargrad, which often works to condition the Russian nationalist community to support Russia’s war effort, published an opinion piece on August 11 claiming that any peace deal that Russia agrees to with Trump is a deal only with his administration, not the United States or the broader West.[17] The article further claimed that the next US administration will not adhere to any agreement that Trump concludes with Putin and that peace in Ukraine is “just a truce” and the war will resume. Russian State Duma Deputy Leonid Ivlev stated on August 10 that Ukraine’s Constitution is meaningless and is simply a result of Ukrainian politicians and oligarchs bargaining.[18] The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that the Ukrainian government is illegitimate, likely to allow Russia to renege on a peace settlement that Russia signs with Ukraine in the future at a time of Russia’s choosing.[19]

Putin may try to use the prospect of US-Russian arms control talks to gain concessions from Trump about the war in Ukraine in the August 15 meeting in Alaska. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on August 10 that Russia continued research and development of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles while the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was in effect and that Russia has a “fairly solid arsenal” of such missiles.[20] Rybakov claimed on August 11 that Russia’s “reliable” sources confirmed that Russia’s recent withdrawal from the INF Treaty achieved its “desired result” and a “sobering effect” in the United States.[21] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin was dangling the prospect of bilateral arms control talks to extract preemptive concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine.[22] Putin may offer to negotiate arms control treaties with Trump during the August 15 bilateral summit in Alaska. The June 2021 summit between Putin and former US President Joe Biden in Geneva in June 2021 notably focused on arms control and largely ignored Ukraine despite the buildup of Russian forces on Ukraine’s border at the time.[23] Russia has long violated the INF Treaty and publicly flaunted its use and production of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles banned under the treaty, including the Oreshnik ballistic missile and possibly the Iskander missile.[24] The renewal of the INF Treaty or the establishment of a similar treaty would likely not result in any significant change in Russia’s deployment and use of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles.

Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are reportedly infiltrating areas near Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk), and Russian forces likely recently advanced southeast of the settlement. A Ukrainian source stated on August 11 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are operating near Dobropillya.[25] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) shows heat anomalies west of Nove Shakhove and in Novyi Donbas (both east of Dobropillya), Bilytske (southeast of Dobropillya), and Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk and southeast of Dobropillya), suggesting fire missions in the area.[26] ISW therefore assesses that Russian forces likely recently seized Razine, Sukhetske, Fedorivka, Zatyshok, Boikivka, Novotoretske, Zapovidne (all southeast of Dobropillya), Mayak, and Pankivka (both east of Dobropillya). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 11 that Russian forces seized Fedorivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[27] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that forward Russian assault units and “infiltration” groups are operating near Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya), Nove Shakhove, and Bilytske.[28] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya) and advanced north of Zapovidne, south of Bilytske, south of Dorozhnie, west of Shakhove, southeast of Vilne (both east of Dobropillya), to Nove Shakhove, south of Kucheriv Yar, and to the outskirts of Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya).[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces occupy roughly half of Volodymyrivka (south of Shakhove) and that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in northern Pankivka.[30] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have interdicted a roughly 2.5 kilometer wide section of the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya highway. Another Russian milblogger claimed that Kucheriv Yar and Zolotyi Kolodyaz are contested “gray zones” and that Russian forces are likely conducting reconnaissance-in-force missions in these areas.[31] It is premature to call the Russian advances in the Dobropillya area an operational-level breakthrough, though Russian forces very likely seek to mature their tactical advances into an operational-level breakthrough in the coming days. Russian forces used a similar tactical penetration in mid-April 2024 to facilitate the seizure of operationally significant territory northwest of Avdiivka.[32] The next several days in the Pokrovsk area of operations will likely be critical for Ukraine’s ability to prevent accelerated Russian gains north and northwest of Pokrovsk.

Russia is likely focusing on advances toward Dobropillya to set informational conditions ahead of the August 15 US-Russian summit. ISW continues to assess that Putin is attempting to frame Russia’s seizure of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as inevitable to push Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Kremlin demands.[33] Russia’s occupation of the four oblasts is neither inevitable nor imminent, as Russian forces will face serious operational obstacles, particularly in likely multi-year endeavors in Donetsk Oblast. Putin likely seeks to leverage intensified tactical pushes in Avdiivka to set conditions to seek US concessions on Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Russian forces have been using drone strikes against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the near rear in recent weeks to set conditions for more rapid advances in the Pokrovsk direction. ISW recently assessed that Russian drone adaptations are likely achieving some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI).[34] Russian forces have increased their use of first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against the T-0514 Dobropillya-Lyman highway after having significantly improved their tactical drone capabilities to threaten Ukrainian GLOCs deeper in the rear than before. Russian drones have also been targeting Ukrainian vehicles along the T-0515 highway in Rodynske. Russia’s persistent drone strikes at longer ranges are likely forcing Ukrainian forces to take alternative roads and further stretch GLOCs, which is likely impacting Ukraine’s defensive operations that rely on the consistent flow of equipment, supplies, and manpower.

Russian forces continue to implement and field technological drone innovations designed to strike Ukrainian forces’ rear and near rear. Russian milbloggers, including a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger, claimed on August 11 that Russian forces have adapted their indigenous Geran drone (the Russian analogue to the Iranian Shahed-136) to carry anti-tank mines that enable operators to remotely mine Ukrainian forces’ rear and near rear.[35] Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov amplified footage on August 11 from a Russian milblogger showing an unspecified Russian drone remotely mining an unspecified logistics route in Ukraine and noted that Russian Shahed-type drones are now capable of carrying two mines.[36] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are achieving partial effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) and are advancing on the battlefield by leveraging technological innovations and combined drone strike tactics.[37] Russian forces are now fielding fiber optic controlled sleeper drones to locations such as rooftops, hilltops, and roads for up to several weeks in support of missions targeting Ukrainian positions and logistics; the drones are capable of remaining electronically silent and physically inactive.[38] Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to be defined by its dramatically shortened innovation cycle, underscoring the critical importance of continued Western support for Ukraine’s development of kinetic drone countermeasures and drone interceptors that are capable of interdicting Russian Shahed-type and tactical drones.[39]

Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian defense industrial infrastructure overnight on August 10 to 11. Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne reported that sources within Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) stated that Ukrainian forces conducted a long-range drone strike against the Arzamas Instrument-Making Plant in Arzamas, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, which produces components for Kh-32 and Kh-101 missiles. A geolocated photograph shows damage to a building at the plant and footage shows a fire at the building.[40] Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin claimed that Ukrainian drones targeted unspecified enterprises in two industrial zones in the oblast on the night of August 10 to 11 and that a drone strike killed one enterprise employee and injured two in Arzamassky Okrug.[41]

Ukrainian official sources confirmed that Ukrainian drone strike against Komi Republic on the night of August 9 to 10. Suspilne reported on August 11 that sources in the Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) confirmed that GUR conducted a drone strike against the Lukoil Refinery in Ukhta, Komi Republic, which supplied fuel and lubricants to Russian forces.[42] The GUR sources reported that the strike damaged a tank with petroleum products and a gas and gas condensate processing plant. Ukhta City Civil Defense and Emergencies Department Head Andrey Dudnikov claimed on August 11 that two drones fell on the oil refinery on August 10, damaging a water tank and smokestack.[43] ISW continues to assess that a possible long-range strikes moratorium will hinder Ukraine’s ability to continue its long-range strike campaign against the Russian defense industrial facilities and energy infrastructure — a campaign that is aimed at targeting Russia’s defense production and energy revenues, as opposed to the solely civilian infrastructure that the Russian campaign often strikes.[44] Any agreement less than a full and long-term cessation in long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure will pose a great threat to Ukraine’s civilian population and infrastructure upon the expiration of the agreement and resumption of long-range Russian strikes.

Key Takeaways:

US President Donald Trump expressed the United States’ willingness to facilitate substantive peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in an effort to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine.

Trump signaled that the United States would aim to return some of Ukraine’s economically and strategically significant territories during the peace negotiations process.

Trump indicated that Putin’s fear of the impact of US sanctions against Russia and Russia’s economic partners drove Putin to propose a bilateral summit.

Putin’s decision to reach out immediately before Trump imposed further economic restrictions against Russia or its trading partners undermines the Kremlin’s ongoing narrative that sanctions have not and will not affect the Russian economy .

. Kremlin officials continue to emphasize that Russia is unwilling to compromise and remains committed to achieving its original war goals in Ukraine.

Russian officials and media are also setting informational conditions for Russia to renege on any future peace agreement to end the war.

Putin may try to use the prospect of US-Russian arms control talks to gain concessions from Trump about the war in Ukraine in the August 15 meeting in Alaska.

Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are reportedly infiltrating areas near Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk), and Russian forces likely recently advanced southeast of the settlement.

Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian defense industrial infrastructure overnight on August 10 to 11.

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on August 11.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 10 and 11.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited attacks near Novyi Put (southwest of Glushkovo).[46]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City) and southwest of Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[47]

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during 2022 partial reserve call up) pushed Ukrainian forces back from Novomykolaivka (north of Sumy City) but have been unable to advance between Oleksiivka and Varachyne (east of Oleksiivka).[48] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command began to introduce elements of the 234th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) that had been in reserve near Yunakivka. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces successfully counterattacked in an unspecified area of Sumy Oblast and advanced up to 400 meters.[49]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy City near Bezsalivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Sadky on August 10 and 11.[50] Mashovets and Russian milbloggers stated that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yunakivka, Novokostyantynivka, and Kostyantynivka (all north of Sumy City).[51]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed that the Russian military command deployed elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), and 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) north of Andriivka (north of Sumy City) and that the units are struggling with communication and cohesion.[52] The milblogger claimed that the Russian command had initially planned to redeploy elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment, 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), and 40th Naval Infantry Brigade to unspecified areas in Donetsk Oblast, but then deployed them to attacks near Novokostyantynivka, where they are suffering high personnel and equipment losses. The milblogger further claimed that elements of the 1st Battalion of the 83rd VDV Separate Brigade took up new positions in Yablunivka and immediately fell under friendly fire due to communication issues. The milblogger claimed that the command of the 2nd Battalion of the 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment appointed officers to command assault groups near Novomykolaivka due to personnel shortages and that elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz in the area turned off communication systems, causing panic.[53]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the 104th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division) are operating in Yunakivka.[54] Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian logistics in Fotovyzh (northwest of Sumy City).[55] Drone operators of the 106th VDV Division are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[56]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on August 10 and 11.[57] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces are attacking in small assault groups toward Tykhe and Zybyne (both east of Vovchansk).[58]

Order of Battle: Elements of the pro-Russian Chechen Sheikh Mansur volunteer battalion (subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense [MoD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[59] Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Starytsya (northeast of Kharkiv City).[60]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 11.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground assaults north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and Radkivka and toward Kolodyazne; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on August 10 and 11.[61]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are operating in the Kupyansk direction and that elements of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are attacking toward Putynkove (north of Kupyansk) and Kolodyazne.[62] Elements of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly fighting near Stepova Novoselivka.[63]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground assaults northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Olhivka on August 10 and 11.[64]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are operating in the Druzhelyubivka direction (southeast of Borova).[65]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest and southeast of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[66]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Torske and Dibrova (both east of Lyman) and north and southeast of Serednie (northwest of Lyman).[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Myrne (northeast of Lyman).[68]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Lyman near Serednie, Shandryholove, and Karpivka; north of Lyman near Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 10 and 11.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Kolodyazi and near Myrne.[70]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that the bulk of Russian forces operating in this direction only signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) one month ago and received only two weeks of training.[71] The spokesperson added that the Russian forces are intensifying their attacks before road conditions worsen during the autumnal muddy season. A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces attack Ukrainian forward positions in pairs simultaneously from different directions, allowing Russian forces to gradually concentrate entire detachments against one position.[72] The servicemember added that Russian forces are deploying drone operators near infantry positions to hit targets as deep into the Ukrainian near rear as possible, and that the risk the Russian military command is willing to put Russian drone operators in demonstrates the abundance of drone operators. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are not conducting unguided glide bomb strikes against the dams on the Zherebets River east of Kolodyazi to avoid destroying the dams and flooding the surrounding area.[73]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 67th Motorized Rifle Division (25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are operating in Torske.[74] Elements of the 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th CAA, CMD) are also reportedly operating in Torske.[75] Mashovets stated that elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) and 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st GTA, MMD) are operating near Zelena Dolyna, Lypove, Hlushchenkove (all north of Lyman), Karpivka, Ridkodub, and Shandryholove. Drone operators of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[76]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself, northwest of Siversk toward Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka and Ivano-Darivka on August 10 and 11.[77]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces east of Zvanivka (south of Siversk).[78]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within and southwest of Chasiv Yar; northwest of Stupochky; and north, northwest, and south of Predtechyne (both south of Chasiv Yar).[79]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on August 10 and 11.[80]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are reportedly operating in Predtechyne.[81] Armored elements of the Nevsky Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[82]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 10 indicates that elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) recently advanced in eastern Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[83] Additional geolocated footage published on August 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Stepanivka (northwest of Toretsk).[84]

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that small Russian assault groups infiltrated east of the T-0516 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka road, almost to the northern outskirts of Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[85] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest and east of Katerynivka, north of Yablunivka, to the eastern outskirts of Kleban-Byk, and near Poltavka and Rusyn Yar (all northwest of Toretsk).[86]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Bila Hora; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Oleksandro-Kalynove; and northwest of Toretsk near Katerynivka, Popiv Yar, Rusyn Yar, and Poltavka and toward Stepanivka and Pleshchiivka on August 10 and 11.[87]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are trying to break through weak points in Ukrainian defenses, especially in areas that depend on natural barriers and limited ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[88] The milblogger claimed that Russian reconnaissance and sabotage groups regularly enter the outskirts of Rusyn Yar and that the settlement is a contested “gray zone.”

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, SMD) are attacking toward Oleksandro-Shultyne (north of Toretsk) on both sides of the railway.[89] Mashovets stated that elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are operating near Yablunivka. Elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating near the Kleban-Byk Reservoir (northwest of Toretsk).[90] Drone operators of the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Ivanopillya (north of Toretsk).[91] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[92]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

See topline text for reports of assessed Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Troyanda (southwest of Pokrovsk).[93]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Pokrovsk near Vilne, Sukhetske, and Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Mayak, Dorozhnie, Shakhove, Nove Shakhove, Novoekonomichne, Volodymyrivka, Zatyshok, Zapovidne, Krasnyi Lyman, Fedorivka, and Boikivka and toward Kucheriv Yar; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Myrolyubivka, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on August 10 and 11.[94]

Ukrainian Dnipro Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction are conducting both highly attritional infantry assaults with poorly trained personnel and attacks with more combat experienced and better trained personnel.[95] A Russian milblogger claimed that drone operators of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are using first-person view (FPV) drones to drop anti-tank grenades in the Pokrovsk direction.[96] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces are bringing up fresh reserves in the Pokrovsk direction.[97] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted two Geran-2 drone strikes against Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Pokrovsk).[98]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating in the Dobropillya direction northeast of Pokrovsk.[99] Mashovets stated that elements of the 1st and 9th motorized rifle brigades (both 51st CAA, SMD) are attacking near Rodynske and Krasnyi Lyman. Drone operators of the 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Myrnohrad.[100]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Dachne; south of Novopavlivka toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and Ivanivka on August 10 and 11.[101]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 430th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (both 29th CAA, EMD), with reinforcements from elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), are operating near Zelenyi Hai.[102]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) advanced roughly one kilometer south of Maliivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[103] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Piddubne (northeast of Velykomykhailivka).[104]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Myrne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka and Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vilne Pole, Sichneve, Maliivka, and Shevchenko and toward Novoheorhiivka and Komyshuvakha on August 10 and 11.[105]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 430th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (both 29th CAA, EMD), with reinforcements from elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), are operating toward Andriivka-Klevtsove (northeast of Velykomykhailivka).[106] Mashovets reported that elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are operating in the Sichneve and Oleksandrohrad directions. Drone operators of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions east of Shevchenko.[107]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 11, but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Russian forces advanced south of Temyrivka (northeast of Hulyaipole) along the O-0510 Velyka Novosilka-Hulyaipole highway.[108]

Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on August 10 and 11.[109]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 69th Covering Brigade and 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Malynivka.[110] Drone operators of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) and 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction (likely referring to eastern Zaporizhia Oblast).[111]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Plavni and Stepnohirsk; southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske; south of Orikhiv towards Novodanylivka; and southeast of Orikhiv towards Mala Tokmachka on August 10 and 11.[112] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kamyanske and Plavni.[113]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Stepnohirsk.[114]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on August 10 and 11, but did not advance.[115]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) and the 104th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[116]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on August 10 to 11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russia launched 71 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[117] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 59 drones, that 12 drones struck six locations, and that drone debris hit one location.[118]

The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported that a Russian airstrike damaged the External Crisis Center of the ZNPP building in Zaporizhzhia City on August 10.[119] The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported that the External Crisis Center monitors radiation levels at the ZNPP after the Russian occupation authorities stopped transmitting data on the nuclear and radiation status of the plant to Ukrainian authorities. Ukrainian officials stated on August 11 that Russian glide bombs also damaged residential buildings and medical infrastructure and injured at least 23 civilians in Zaporizhzhia City on August 10.[120]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russia and Belarus continue to develop governmental infrastructure to increase integration within the Union State framework. Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko to also serve as Russia’s Special Representative for the Agreement on Security Guarantees for the Union State.[121] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko appointed Belarusian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Sekreta to act as Belarus’ special representative on July 15.[122]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZtVMoko3mSI ; https://www.whitehouse.gov/videos/president-trump-holds-a-press-conference-aug-11-2025/

[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZtVMoko3mSI ; https://www.whitehouse.gov/videos/president-trump-holds-a-press-conference-aug-11-2025/

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/lands-ukraine-must-liberate

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4 ; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/04/zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-everything-you-need-to-know

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032225

[6] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sypwNUiVR1Q

[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-july-30-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-july-2-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825

[9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071725; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060625; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2025;

[11] https://news dot ru/vlast/v-gd-otvetili-na-slova-ryutte-o-reshenii-territorialnogo-voprosa-ukrainy ; https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/08/08/v-rossii-vyskazalis-o-gotovnosti-k-sammitu-s-evrosoyuzom/ ; https://iz dot ru/1933926/2025-08-08/v-gosdume-vyskazalis-o-vozmozhnosti-sammita-rf-i-evrosoiuza

[12] https://iz dot ru/1934898/oleg-karpovich/sammit-vo-imia-budushchego

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080825

[14] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/10/world/europe/putin-russia-ukraine-war-dmitri-kozak.html

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-kremlins-fake-de-escalation-donbas; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2024 ; https://meduza dot io/en/feature/2022/06/10/the-viceroy

[16] https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/13450

[17] https://tsargrad dot tv/articles/uzhe-ne-skryt-kompromiss-s-ssha-po-ukraine-lovushka-dlja-rossii-lavrov-skazal-glavnoe_1334486

[18] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/08/10/v-gosdume-otvetili-na-zayavlenie-zelenskogo-o-territoriyah/

[19] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121624; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070424

[20] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24751559

[21] https://tass dot ru/politika/24754151

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2025

[23] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/biden-putin-summit-review-good-news-for-ukraine/; https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN11694/IN11694.5.pdf

[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080525

[25] https://t.me/Dobropillya_info/13316

[26] https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@37.16,48.43,10.00z;

[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/55459; https://t.me/mod_russia/55460;

[28] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2915

[29] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32215; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175534; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66605

[30] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66605

[31] https://t.me/dva_majors/77185

[32] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042824; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042524

[33] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2025

[34] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-battlefield-air-interdiction

[35] https://t.me/rybar/72741 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/154488 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/22389; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/22390 ; https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1954885734982148519

[36] https://t.me/serhii_flash/6050

[37] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-battlefield-air-interdiction

[38] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-battlefield-air-interdiction

[39] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073125 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080825

[40] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1954717862003933242; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/11401

[41] https://t.me/glebnikitin_nn/7410; https://t.me/tass_agency/330372

[42] https://suspilne dot media/1087534-droni-gur-atakuvali-rosijskij-npz-za-2000-km-vid-ukraini-dzerela/

[43] https://t.me/pgukhta11/19585

[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2025

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27665

[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32300

[47] https://t.me/OMBR156/867 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9772 ; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1954837169010290773; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1954797025020567627; https://t.me/black_swan_ukraine/380; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30189

[48] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2913

[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27704

[50]https://t.me/severnnyi/4788 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28404 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175582 ; https://t.me/rybar/72737

[51] https://t.me/severnnyi/4788 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28404 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175582; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2913

[52] https://t.me/severnnyi/4793

[53] https://t.me/severnnyi/4792

[54] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2913

[55] https://t.me/bear007/73615

[56] https://t.me/mod_russia/55458

[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27665 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15422 ; https://t.me/rybar/72737 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77184 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28404 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175582 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4788

[58] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2913

[59] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5899

[60] https://t.me/bear007/73615

[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27665

[62] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2914

[63] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40350

[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15422

[65] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2914

[66] https://t.me/bbps_vidarr/241; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1954871360712478947; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9777; https://t.me/bbps_vidarr/241

[67] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40448; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66586; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66587

[68] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40467; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40470

[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27665; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15422; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66586; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66587; https://t.me/wargonzo/28404; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175582

[70] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66586; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66587

[71] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ch7hItGD05g ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/11/aktyvno-prymushuyut-kupuvaty-motoczykly-rosiyany-pershymy-kydayut-pomyraty-v-atakah-misyachnykiv/

[72] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/11/yakshho-yih-absolyutno-ne-shkoda-to-yih-duzhe-bagato-poblyzu-lymanu-generaly-rf-vidpravlyayut-dronariv-na-pihotni-pozycziyi/

[73] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40467; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40470

[74] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2914

[75] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40446

[76] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175561

[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27665; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15422; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175582;

[78] https://t.me/shock3OA/1858; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1954822367223640553

[79] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32297; https://t.me/rusich_army/25154

[80] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27665

[81] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40517; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40519

[82] https://t.me/tass_agency/330431

[83] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1954813872541483425 ; https://t.me/rus_alania/175

[84] https://t.me/bbc44ombr/107 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9775

[85] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2914

[86] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175541 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/330302 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175541

[87] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27665 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15422

[88] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175600

[89] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2914

[90] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40350

[91] https://t.me/sashakots/55460

[92] https://t.me/tass_agency/330458

[93] https://t.me/wargonzo/28404

[94] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27665; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15422; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66605

[95] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/11/daleko-ne-dzhony-rembo-ale-i-ne-chmoni-pokrovsk-atakuyut-rosijski-pidrozdily-zarobitchan/

[96] https://t.me/sashakots/55465

[97] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175582

[98] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175590

[99] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2915

[100] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14166

[101] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27665 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15422

[102] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2915

[103] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2915

[104] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40521

[105] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27665 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15422 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28404 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66584 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175582

[106] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2915

[107] https://t.me/voin_dv/16407; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1954594349658030169

[108] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2915

[109] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27665; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2915

[110] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2915

[111] https://t.me/voin_dv/16419; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32327; https://t.me/voin_dv/16410

[112] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27665; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175582; https://t.me/rybar/72737; https://t.me/rybar/72738 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77184

[113] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175582; https://t.me/rybar/72737; https://t.me/rybar/72738 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77184

[114] https://t.me/rybar/72738 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77184

[115] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27668; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27665

[116] https://t.me/dva_majors/77222; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32321

[117] https://t.me/kpszsu/40202

[118] https://t.me/kpszsu/40202

[119] https://t.me/energyofukraine/4249 ; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1088130-vnaslidok-rosijskogo-aviaudaru-po-zaporizzu-10-serpna-poskodzeno-zovnisnij-krizovij-centr-zaes/

[120] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1954609405863071994; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1087444-armia-rf-atakuvala-zaporizza-e-poraneni-8/; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/23635

[121] https://t.me/tass_agency/330428; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/328528; https://belta dot by/politics/view/putin-naznachil-spetspredstavitelja-po-dogovoru-o-garantijah-bezopasnosti-mezhdu-belarusjju-i-rf-731302-2025/

[122] https://belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-naznachil-spetspredstavitelja-belarusi-po-realizatsii-dogovora-o-garantijah-bezopasnosti-v-726599-2025/