Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 10, 2025

Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Daria Novikov, Jennie Olmsted, Olivia Gibson, Jessica Sobieski, and Karolina Hird

July 10, 2025, 7:00pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45 am ET on July 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed frustration following a July 10 meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov about Russia’s lack of progress towards ending the war in Ukraine.[1] Rubio stated after the meeting with Lavrov that he conveyed US President Donald Trump’s frustration with Russia’s insufficient “flexibility” to end the war.[2] Rubio stated that he and Lavrov shared ideas about “a new or different approach” from Russia and that there must be a “roadmap moving forward” about how the war can end. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that Rubio and Lavrov discussed their “mutual intention” to find a solution to the war.[3] Kremlin officials’ public statements continue to demonstrate that Russia remains committed to achieving its original war goals in Ukraine and is not interested in good faith negotiations to end the war, however. Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova reiterated on July 9 Russia’s original war demands for Ukrainian regime change and “demilitarization.”[4] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 10 that Russia prefers to achieve its war goals through peaceful and diplomatic means but that the war continues and the “realities on the ground” are changing every day.[5] Kremlin officials often call for Ukraine to recognize the “realities on the ground” (a reference to the frontline in Ukraine) to allude to the idea that Russia is in a stronger negotiating position given the battlefield situation and to demand that Ukraine concede to Russia’s unwavering demands amounting to complete capitulation to Russia.[6]

The Kremlin continues efforts to use its diplomatic engagements with the United States in an effort to divert attention from the war in Ukraine and toward the potential restoration of US-Russian relations. The Russian MFA readout of the Rubio-Lavrov meeting heavily emphasized Rubio and Lavrov’s reported discussions about bilateral US-Russian issues unrelated to the war in Ukraine, including the restoration of US-Russian contacts, economic and humanitarian cooperation, direct air traffic, and diplomatic missions.[7] The Russian MFA’s readout concluded that the United States and Russia will continue dialogue about a “growing range of issues of mutual interest.” Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on July 10 there has been no “slowdown in progress” in developing US-Russian relations.[8] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin attempted to use economic incentives unrelated to the war in Ukraine and the prospect of US-Russian arms control talks to extract concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine.[9] ISW also recently assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin unsuccessfully attempted to use Iranian nuclear negotiations and offers to mediate the Israel-Iran war to pose himself to Trump as an effective negotiator as part of efforts to secure concessions on the war in Ukraine.[10] The Kremlin is likely attempting to push the United States to suspend its diplomatic efforts to end the war in Ukraine in exchange for developing US-Russian bilateral relations and economic opportunities.

The Economist assessed that it would take Russia about 89 years to seize all of Ukraine at its current relatively accelerated rate of advance, which has fluctuated throughout the war and is unlikely to remain constant.[11] The Economist published an analysis on July 9 about the ongoing Russian Summer 2025 offensive campaign, which the Economist assessed started on May 1. The Economist found that Russia has seized an average of about 15 square kilometers per day during this offensive effort — roughly the area of the Los Angeles International Airport — cohering with ISW’s own assessment of the Russian rate of advance since May 2025.[12] ISW assesses that Russian forces seized a total of 498.53 square kilometers in May 2025 and 466.71 square kilometers in June 2025, averaging about 15.8 square kilometers per day in May and June 2025. The Economist assessed that it would take Russian forces 89 years to seize the remainder of Ukraine at this rate of advance and until February 2028 to seize the remainder of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts, which Russia has illegally annexed. The Russian rate of advance of 15.8 square kilometers per day is unusually high compared to the Russian rate of advance in Winter 2024-2025 and Spring 2025, and is unlikely to remain constant. The rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has significantly varied throughout the war depending on multiple factors, including the number of active Russian offensive operations on various sectors of the front, the time of year and associated weather and terrain conditions, and Russian and Ukrainian forces’ respective staffing levels and materiel stocks.[13] The Russian rate of advance will very likely continue to fluctuate in the coming months with the onset of the autumn rains and muddy terrain that affect maneuverability, as it has in the prior three years of war.[14]

Russia continues to expend staggeringly high amounts of manpower for its disproportionately small gains. The Economist used a modelling system that factors in “trends in war intensity, territory shifts, and credible open-source and intelligence assessments of losses” to assess Russian personnel casualties.[15] The Economist used this model to estimate that Russia has suffered between 900,000 and 1.3 million personnel casualties since February 24, 2022, including between 190,000 and 350,000 killed-in-action (KIA). The Economist also estimated that Russia may have suffered about 31,000 KIA since May 1 in its Summer 2025 offensive and that Russia has gained about 0.038 square kilometers of territory (or about nine acres) per KIA soldier since about July 2024. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa previously stated that Russia was sustaining roughly 167 KIA and wounded in action (WIA) per square kilometer of advance as of June 4, or about 0.0059 square kilometers or 1.45 acres per WIA or KIA soldier.[16] Russian forces will likely continue to burn through personnel in ongoing summer offensive operations that aim to seize the remainder of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts and advance into Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy oblasts.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg in Rome on July 9.[17] Zelensky noted that the discussion largely centered around arms supplies, strengthening Ukraine’s air defense, and joint weapons production and localization against the backdrop of increased Russian strikes. Zelensky and Kellogg also discussed possible harsher US sanctions on Russia and those who support its energy and banking sector.

The United States reportedly resumed some military aid shipments to Ukraine. The Associated Press (AP) and Reuters, citing two US officials, reported on July 9 that the United States resumed military aid deliveries to Ukraine, including shipments of 155mm artillery shells and Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rockets.[18] The officials did not specify the quantity of weapons in the resumed shipments or whether a new shipment has already arrived in Ukraine.

Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine. The United Kingdom (UK) announced on July 10 a defense agreement with Ukraine that includes additional military assistance and joint defense production.[19] The agreement will provide Ukraine with over five thousand air defense interceptors from Belfast-based Thales Air Defense, a subsidiary of the French defense company Thales Group.[20] The UK will also commit an additional £283 million (roughly $384 million) in bilateral assistance for Ukraine over the 2025-2026 financial year, including £10.5 million (roughly $14 million) for the Ukrainian Governance Reform Program and £1 million (roughly $1.3 million) for Ukraine‘s Green Transition Office. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated on July 10 that Germany is prepared to purchase Patriot air defense systems for Ukraine from the United States.[21] The Czech Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on July 9 that the Czech government approved an F-16 training program for up to eight Ukrainian pilots, aiming to provide 150 hours of flight training per pilot by 2026.[22]

Russia launched another large-scale missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of July 9 to 10 that heavily targeted Kyiv City, resulting in civilian casualties and significant damage to civilian infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 397 Shahed-type strike drones and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast – of which about 200 were Shahed-type drones.[23] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched eight Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast, six Kh-101 cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast airspace; and four S-300 air defense missiles at ground targets from Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 178 total projectiles, including 164 drones, all eight Iskander-M ballistic missiles, and all six Kh-101 cruise missiles, and that 204 drones and missiles were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that the main targets of the Russian strike series were Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast and that Russian strikes also damaged Chernihiv, Sumy, Poltava, Kirovohrad, and Kharkiv oblasts.[24] Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast officials reported that the Russian strikes damaged residential, medical, educational, commercial, and transport infrastructure, killing at least two civilians and injuring 26.[25

Russia’s strike tactics, coupled with the increased scale and concentrated targeting of Russia’s recent strike packages, aim to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and are resulting in significant damage. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger stated that Russian forces are employing new strike tactics, which involve targeting massive strike packages against one or two main target cities.[26] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian air defenses protecting the cities are unable to repel such large-scale and concentrated strike packages. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reiterated that Russian forces are launching drones and missiles from different directions and at different altitudes, which complicates Ukrainian air defense measures.[27] Ihnat noted that Ukrainian forces are working to destroy Russian reconnaissance drones that use repeaters to fly deep into Ukraine’s rear and that relay real-time targeting data to Russian forces. ISW previously observed reports of Russian forces adapting their strike tactics by launching missiles and drones from varying directions and altitudes.[28] Russia continues to use these tactics while increasing the size of its strike packages and targeting particular cities to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and increase damage. ISW continues to assess that Russia’s large-scale strike packages in recent weeks aim to maximize damage against Ukraine, are disproportionately affecting civilian areas, and support wider Russian efforts to degrade Ukrainian morale.[29] Russia’s recent large-scale strike packages underscore Ukraine’s need for both continued Western support to Ukraine’s interceptor drone development and production capabilities and for the contribution of Western air defense systems like US Patriots. Ukraine requires both indigenous and partner-provided air defense integrated into its wider air defense umbrella in order to secure its cities.

Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed Deputy Foreign Minister and Presidential Special Representative to the Middle East and Africa Mikhail Bogdanov on July 9.[30] Kremlin newswire TASS, citing unnamed sources, claimed that Putin released Bogdanov from his duties at Bogdanov’s request for unspecified personal reasons.[31] Bogdanov was heavily involved in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)’s efforts to provide military support to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in exchange for a Russian Red Sea naval base, as the Critical Threats Project’s Africa File previously assessed.[32] Sudan provides an alternative base for Russian efforts to project power into the Mediterranean and Red Seas and provide logistic support for its military operations across Africa given its bases in Syria are in jeopardy after the fall of the Assad regime.[33] Putin may have dismissed Bogdanov in favor of a replacement who can better manage the situation in the MENA region following the fall of Assad.

Key Takeaways:

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed frustration following a July 10 meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov about Russia’s lack of progress towards ending the war in Ukraine.

The Kremlin continues efforts to use its diplomatic engagements with the United States in an effort to divert attention from the war in Ukraine and toward the potential restoration of US-Russian relations.

The Economist assessed that it would take Russia about 89 years to seize all of Ukraine at its current relatively accelerated rate of advance, which has fluctuated throughout the war and is unlikely to remain constant.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg in Rome on July 9.

The United States reportedly resumed some military aid shipments to Ukraine.

Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.

Russia launched another large-scale missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of July 9 to 10 that heavily targeted Kyiv City, resulting in civilian casualties and significant damage to civilian infrastructure.

Russia’s strike tactics, coupled with the increased scale and concentrated targeting of Russia’s recent strike packages, aim to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and are resulting in significant damage.

Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed Deputy Foreign Minister and Presidential Special Representative to the Middle East and Africa Mikhail Bogdanov on July 9.

Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 10.

Russian forces continued attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 9 and 10.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Glushkovo and Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[35]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Tetkino.[36]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) advanced south of Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City).[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Yunakivka and Varachyne (both northeast of Sumy City).[38]

Russian forces attacked in the Sumy Oblast border area near Ryzhivka (northwest of Sumy City) and Bezsalivka on July 9 and 10.[39] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bezsalivka, Andriivka, and Kindrativka (both north of Sumy City).[40]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian counterattacks in Sumy Oblast are complicating Russian advances and threatening to encircle Russian forces operating in Andriivka.[41] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces are transferring reserves to reinforce Russian forces near Andriivka and Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City).[42]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Sumy Oblast.[43] Elements of the Russian 76th and 106th VDV divisions and the 11th and 83rd Separate VDV brigades are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[44] Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating in Kindrativka and near Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City), respectively.[45] Drone operators of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Pysarivka and Khotin (both north of Sumy City).[46] Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating near Kindrativka.[47]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced within Vovchansk and across the Siverskyi Donets River east of Buhruvatka (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[48]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Starytsya on July 9 and 10.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Vovchansk.[50]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar Volunteer Detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Vilcha (northeast of Kharkiv City).[51]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed Russian forces seized Holubivka (north of Kupyansk) and advanced west of Kamyanka and northwest and west of Topoli (both northeast of Kupyansk).[52]

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Radivka, Petro-Ivanivka, Ambarne, and Holubivka and toward Hryhorivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Novovasylivka, Krasne Pershe, and Kamyanka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane and toward Novoosynove on July 9 and 10.[53]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar Volunteer Detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Bolohivka (northeast of Kupyansk near the international border).[54]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Borivska Andriivka (northeast of Borova).[55]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Borivska Andriivka and west of Zahryzove (northeast of Borova).[56]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Novoyehorivka on July 9 and 10.[57]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman); seized Zelena Dolyna and advanced west and south of Zelena Dolyna; and advanced within, east, and south of Karpivka; west and south of Novyi Myr; and south of Hlushchenkove (all north of Lyman).[58]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Karpivka, Zelena Dolyna, and Novyi Myr and toward Serednie; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske and the Serebryanske forest area on July 9 and 10.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Katerynivka (north of Lyman).[60]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are reportedly operating near Karpivka, Zelena Dolyna, and Kolodyazi.[61]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 10 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[62]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka and toward Vyimka on June 9 and 10.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[64]

A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction stated on July 9 that about 30 percent of Russian drones in the Siversk direction are fiber optic drones.[65]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating north of Vyimka.[66] Elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly fighting in western Verkhnokamyanske.[67]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, Predtechnye, and Stupochky on June 9 and 10.[68] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bila Hora.[69]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[70]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 10 indicates that Russian forces advanced along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway north of Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk).[71]

Unconfirmed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Dachne (north of Toretsk).[72]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk toward Pleshchiivka, Katerynivka, Stepanivka, Rusyn Yar, Popiv Yar, Shakhove, and Poltavka; and west of Toretsk toward Shcherbynivka on June 9 and 10.[73]

A Ukrainian brigade published footage indicating that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a Russian reduced platoon-sized mechanized assault consisting of two tanks in the Toretsk direction, reportedly near Dyliivka.[74]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and drone operators of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk) direction.[75] Drone operators of the 3rd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Yablunivka.[76] Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating along the railroad toward Oleksandro-Shultyne (north of Toretsk).[77]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Razine, Novoekonomichne, Myrne, and Mykolaivka and toward Novotoretske and Rodynske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Promin and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne and toward Molodetske and Novopidhorodne on July 9 and 10.[78]

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on July 10 that Russian forces continue to attack in small groups but are showing signs of exhaustion.[79] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces continue to use heavy equipment primarily to transport personnel.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating near Novoukrainka.[80] Drone operators of the Typhoon Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Cental Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Pokrovsk direction.[81] Artillery elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[82] Drone operators of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA) are also reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[83]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Voskresenka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[84]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into eastern Voskresenka and north and west of Tovste (southwest of Novopavlivka).[85]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Oleksiivka, and Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Yalta, Zaporizhzhia, Piddubne, Myrne, Hrushivske, and Komar; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Tovste on July 9 and 10.[86] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Myrne.[87]

A Ukrainian servicemember of a brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Russian forces are increasingly relying on North Korean weapons, especially mortars, artillery, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).[88] The servicemember noted that North Korean munitions often do not explode.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Novoukrainka.[89] Elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Tovste and toward Novokhatske (southwest of Novopavlivka), and elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Myrne.[90]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 10 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD), are advancing toward Komyshuvakha (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[91]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko, Komyshuvakha, Maliivka, and Vilne Pole; and west of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole and Novopil on July 9 and 10.[92]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Temyrivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[93]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on July 10.[94]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1466th Motorized Rifle Regiment (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Malynivka.[95]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations southwest of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka and Kamyanske on July 9 and 10.[96] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kamyanske and Plavni (just north of Kamyanske).[97]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and 108th and 247th airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Kamyanske.[98] Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[99] Drone operators of the Nemets group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[100]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on July 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground assaults in the Kherson direction, including toward Prydniprovske (east of Kherson City in west [right] bank Kherson Oblast) and Bilohrudnyi Island (southwest of Kherson City), on July 9 and 10.[101]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 31st Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions on the west bank of Kherson Oblast.[102]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/rubio-meet-russias-lavrov-kuala-lumpur-us-official-says-2025-07-10/

[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/rubio-meet-russias-lavrov-kuala-lumpur-us-official-says-2025-07-10/

[3] https://t.me/MID_Russia/62472

[4] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2034998/

[5] https://tass dot ru/politika/24480935

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-16-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20March%2012%2C%202025%20PDF-compressed%20%281%29.pdf ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025

[7] https://t.me/MID_Russia/62472

[8] https://tass dot ru/politika/24484767

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022525

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-july-9-2025

[11] https://www.economist.com/interactive/graphic-detail/2025/07/09/russias-summer-ukraine-offensive-looks-like-its-deadliest-so-far; https://archive.is/bCzlk

[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2025

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051325 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122324 ;

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120422 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar100823; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112123; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120223; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110623

[15] https://www.economist.com/interactive/graphic-detail/2025/07/09/russias-summer-ukraine-offensive-looks-like-its-deadliest-so-far; https://archive.is/bCzlk

[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060525

[17] https://suspilne dot media/1062769-zelenskij-zustrivsa-z-kellogom-u-rimi/

[18] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-military-delivering-some-weapons-ukraine-after-pause-2025-07-09/; https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-weapons-shipments-trump-a1a39c136bce749debe36646f69b5196

[19] https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-russia-latest-updates-european-leaders-attend-kyiv-aid-conference-rome-2025-07-10/?arena_mid=8MolQq7miapjzCKur8ct; https://www.gov.uk/government/news/british-investment-boost-in-ukraine-to-benefit-both-countries

[20] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/british-investment-boost-in-ukraine-to-benefit-both-countries

[21] https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-russia-latest-updates-european-leaders-attend-kyiv-aid-conference-rome-2025-07-10/?arena_mid=PpfhOod3yxiP5oXakCmX; https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-russia-latest-updates-european-leaders-attend-kyiv-aid-conference-rome-2025-07-10/

[22] https://mocr dot mo.gov.cz/informacni-servis/zpravodajstvi/ceska-armada-zajisti-letecky-vycvik-osmi-ukrajinskych-pilotu-259298/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/10/chehiya-pidgotuye-ukrayinskyh-pilotiv-dlya-vynyshhuvachiv-f-16/; https://suspilne dot media/1062761-do-kinca-2025-roku-cehia-pidgotue-vismoh-ukrainskih-pilotiv/

[23] https://t.me/kpszsu/38093

[24] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnrp2S2L6qk ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/10/sposterigalysya-navit-povitryani-kuli-v-povitryanyh-sylah-rozpovily-pro-nebezpeku-vorozhyh-rozvidnykiv/; https://t.me/kpszsu/38093; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15040; https://t.me/synegubov/15641; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/10/sposterigalysya-navit-povitryani-kuli-v-povitryanyh-sylah-rozpovily-pro-nebezpeku-vorozhyh-rozvidnykiv/

[25] https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1465 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/10/vnaslidok-masovanoyi-ataky-rf-na-kyyiv-zagynuly-dvi-lyudyny-shhe-14-postrazhdaly/ ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/45796 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/10/zagybla-policzejska-poshkodzheni-budynky-gurtozhytky-ta-trcz-naslidky-rosijskoyi-ataky-na-kyyiv/; https://t.me/UA_National_Police/44036 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/10/zagybla-policzejska-poshkodzheni-budynky-gurtozhytky-ta-trcz-naslidky-rosijskoyi-ataky-na-kyyiv/; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/12845; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1062885-kiiv-zaznav-udariv-droniv-i-raket-e-zagibli-i-poraneni-rujnuvanna-u-kilkoh-rajonah/; https://t.me/sazanovicholeksandr/128; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1445; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1446; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1449; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4976; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1452; https://t.me/Klymenko_MVS/1590; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4989; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1473; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1474 ; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/12845 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/10/kilkist-poranenyh-u-kyyevi-zrosla-do-19-poshkodzheno-shist-rajoniv-mista/; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zTbTAL3UQiArSYEKfJJhngU8YRxXtu6Xf1rH9Brvkwdqu1MH8S3ZY7rZ852k9Yiel; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/6213; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1063027-primisenna-5-kanalu-bulo-poskodzene-vnaslidok-ataki-na-kiiv/; https://www.5 dot ua/suspilstvo/5-kanal-poshkodzhenyi-vnaslidok-masovanoi-povitrianoi-ataky-na-kyiv-355182.html?fbclid=IwQ0xDSwLcPyhleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHsxZ8r-zW6YK8WkBtNZpE-_De1NPiRrzyTt3pyjOVCX6OeQk3KWqHXsBb-4R_aem_QrDukX3njSvn3L3izN7vXg#mcx0mxvgqsk4cb9harh; https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukrainian-air-defences-repel-russian-drone-attack-kyiv-2025-07-10/

[26] https://t.me/rybar/72044

[27] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/10/sposterigalysya-navit-povitryani-kuli-v-povitryanyh-sylah-rozpovily-pro-nebezpeku-vorozhyh-rozvidnykiv/

[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-22-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2025

[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070925

[30] http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202507090029; https://ria dot ru/20250709/bogdanov-2028228489.html ; https://t.me/tass_agency/324605

[31] https://t.me/tass_agency/324607

[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-may-16-2024-russian-outreach-across-africa ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-february-13-2025-saf-announces-government-plan-and-russian-naval-base-drc-concedes-to-direct-talks-with-m23-turkeys-growing-defense-partnerships-in-africa ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-march-27-2025-saf-liberates-khartoum-burundi-and-rwanda-tensions

[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-may-31-2024-russian-red-sea-logistics-center-sudan ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-special-edition-external-meddling-red-sea-exacerbates-conflicts-horn-africa ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-may-9-2024-america-and-russias-shifting-roles-in-west-africa-is-africa-media-russias-morphing-stance-in-sudan ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-february-13-2025-saf-announces-government-plan-and-russian-naval-base-drc-concedes-to-direct-talks-with-m23-turkeys-growing-defense-partnerships-in-africa

[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dYGeCgwNDuLE1Xqr6DmwcvwxS8VVedZQzzCGVUL33XFZ4B6Qqaa4a9rHuhiCwSAzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl

[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31069; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13582; https://t.me/wargonzo/27791

[36] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95524

[37] https://t.me/mod_russia/54574

[38] https://t.me/dva_majors/75057

[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dYGeCgwNDuLE1Xqr6DmwcvwxS8VVedZQzzCGVUL33XFZ4B6Qqaa4a9rHuhiCwSAzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl

[40] https://t.me/mod_russia/54574; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38362

[41] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38362; https://t.me/wargonzo/27791; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38399

[42] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38399

[43] https://t.me/rodnaya98vdd/1691

[44] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31045

[45] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38362

[46] https://t.me/dva_majors/75040

[47] https://t.me/dva_majors/75044

[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31035

[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dYGeCgwNDuLE1Xqr6DmwcvwxS8VVedZQzzCGVUL33XFZ4B6Qqaa4a9rHuhiCwSAzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13582; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13487; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31035

[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31035

[51] https://t.me/epoddubny/24089

[52] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31957 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31958 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31970

[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dYGeCgwNDuLE1Xqr6DmwcvwxS8VVedZQzzCGVUL33XFZ4B6Qqaa4a9rHuhiCwSAzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13487 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1062731-rf-namagalasa-prorivati-oboronu-v-rajoni-vovcanska-ta-grigorivki-na-pivnoci-harkivsini-osuv-hortica/

[54] https://t.me/epoddubny/24089

[55] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9552; https://t.me/msb_company/100

[56] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31961

[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dYGeCgwNDuLE1Xqr6DmwcvwxS8VVedZQzzCGVUL33XFZ4B6Qqaa4a9rHuhiCwSAzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13487

[58] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95479 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38369 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38390 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171925 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38373

[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dYGeCgwNDuLE1Xqr6DmwcvwxS8VVedZQzzCGVUL33XFZ4B6Qqaa4a9rHuhiCwSAzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13487

[60] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95479

[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38369 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38390 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38373

[62] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31967

[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dYGeCgwNDuLE1Xqr6DmwcvwxS8VVedZQzzCGVUL33XFZ4B6Qqaa4a9rHuhiCwSAzl?__cft__[0]=AZV5MZSLPFxT-ju3Wh_aabVP_miwtR9j32sLLsBhaVUhtBbtR0RVHQH_daoLbxT_JdutJrpBnmS21_kdvCk8iU8fbuKgXJYcsN7oqfvlisKTvU6-0Rq4qDJMtOWi1GqidimpeDJLbutDHIJQgzJXPRWOlMp-y5bOEfuvVFVK5xQYuw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l?__cft__[0]=AZWQmIglTSbUIso3FUNMxr0EVJc8eaY-Pq4gczqCj76b8tHeweAWd8dFN39IuQSgjrBfJ6uHhzhqJNXRjzArDQoNxoYHitVXKZcAvFUJoG6CmxRUrlwkLjN_BG_iFRTELCBOmQaqD6DogBCT7oP8YLyLRwOuNi_j2mIvjlyAFqYxlw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl?__cft__[0]=AZVeVrqdpXNxRcAuwzW8NqNOANq1e6In3UhPyf7aprRwZ9RNKvMswgcXySlboBsBU3UgcfJXdQdNN9m4W34heM0L1HQjsyp8CHUp_2GfFkGRj27zlhE4Imx5rAbxfZdOPP99PwphdHvW8meYdXELFMf5FpJc6vpcBoVppjwvLVRvPQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R;

[64] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38391

[65] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1062805-rosijski-vijska-vikoristovuut-na-siverskomu-napramku-blizko-30-droniv-na-optovolokni-vid-zagalnoi-kilkosti/; https://youtu.be/WY8sDvZdWEA

[66] https://t.me/VestovoyDP/8545; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1943320115417674116

[67] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38391

[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dYGeCgwNDuLE1Xqr6DmwcvwxS8VVedZQzzCGVUL33XFZ4B6Qqaa4a9rHuhiCwSAzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13487; https://t.me/rybar/72039; https://t.me/wargonzo/27791

[69] https://t.me/wargonzo/27791

[70] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31045

[71] https://t.me/ua_marines_36brigade/3332; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9550

[72] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38356

[73] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dYGeCgwNDuLE1Xqr6DmwcvwxS8VVedZQzzCGVUL33XFZ4B6Qqaa4a9rHuhiCwSAzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13487;

[74] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2944379535735799&rdid=8zzbCSKz6UUfCfJs; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/ukrainian-defenders-repel-tank-assault-near-toretsk/;

[75] https://t.me/dva_majors/75078; https://t.me/sashakots/54827; https://t.me/dva_majors/75112

[76] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14018

[77] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38356

[78] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dYGeCgwNDuLE1Xqr6DmwcvwxS8VVedZQzzCGVUL33XFZ4B6Qqaa4a9rHuhiCwSAzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13487

[79] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OD9Bs6ZLiNQ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/10/vtratyv-mavik-jdesh-na-shturm-poblyzu-pokrovska-postijni-ataky-vysnazhuyut-vorozhyh-pihotyncziv/

[80] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14017

[81] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38370

[82] https://t.me/mod_russia/54548

[83] https://t.me/Sib_army/6102

[84] https://www.facebook.com/31ombr/videos/1371969470768471/; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9551

[85] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38368

[86] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13487 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dYGeCgwNDuLE1Xqr6DmwcvwxS8VVedZQzzCGVUL33XFZ4B6Qqaa4a9rHuhiCwSAzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15919

[87] https://t.me/voin_dv/15919

[88] https://suspilne dot media/1062857-u-rimi-rozpocinaetsa-konferencia-z-vidnovlenna-ukraini-zelenskij-zustrivsa-z-kellogom-1233-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1752135650&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[89] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14017

[90] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38368 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38383 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15919

[91] https://t.me/voin_dv/15919

[92] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13487 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dYGeCgwNDuLE1Xqr6DmwcvwxS8VVedZQzzCGVUL33XFZ4B6Qqaa4a9rHuhiCwSAzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl

[93] https://t.me/voin_dv/15919

[94] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13487

[95] https://t.me/voin_dv/15919

[96] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12722; https://t.me/wargonzo/27791?single

[97] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31053; https://t.me/wargonzo/27791; https://t.me/dva_majors/75057

[98] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95486; https://t.me/wargonzo/27790; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95546; https://t.me/dva_majors/75057

[99] https://t.me/dva_majors/75057

[100] https://t.me/wargonzo/27799

[101] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dYGeCgwNDuLE1Xqr6DmwcvwxS8VVedZQzzCGVUL33XFZ4B6Qqaa4a9rHuhiCwSAzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1AfGDc6HHV/; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12722

[102] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31045; https://t.me/mod_russia/54548

Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Anna Harvey, Jennie Olmsted, Olivia Gibson, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 7, 2025, 5:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on July 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated the Kremlin’s rejection of a ceasefire and unchanged demands, including demilitarization and regime change in Ukraine. Lavrov gave an interview to Hungarian outlet Magyar Nemzet published on July 7 and claimed that a settlement to the war must eliminate the “root causes” of the war, which Lavrov again defined as NATO’s expansion and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers.[1] Lavrov claimed that Russia is against a ceasefire as Ukraine and its allies would use the pause to regroup and reconstitute Ukraine’s military. Lavrov explicitly highlighted Russia’s demands for Ukraine’s demilitarization and “denazification” (a phrase Russia uses to demand regime change in Ukraine), and these demands are notably Russia’s original war goals. Lavrov also demanded international recognition of Russia’s illegal annexation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea – including the areas of these four oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy – and called for a future settlement to include sanctions relief and the return of frozen Russian assets. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin remains uninterested in good-faith peace negotiations and any settlement to the war that does not acquiesce to its demands.[2]

Russia is leveraging its “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies to improve its theater-wide drone capabilities, including in priority frontline areas in Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian servicemembers operating in the Kostyantynivka direction told the New York Times in an interview published on July 7 that the recent arrival of drone operators of the Rubikon Center – Russia’s recently formed drone training and innovation center – represented a “turning point” in Russia’s tactical drone capacity.[3] Russia reportedly deployed Rubikon drone units to Kursk Oblast in early 2025, where Rubikon drone operators equipped with fiber optic drones played a significant role in eliminating the remaining Ukrainian salient.[4] Ukrainian servicemembers reported that Russia redeployed Rubikon units to the Kostyantynivka area in Spring 2025, which has allowed Russian forces to significantly complicate Ukrainian logistics in the area. Russian and Ukrainian use of the fiber optic drones that Rubikon introduced en masse in Kursk Oblast has played a key role in creating the 15- to 20-kilometer-wide kill zones between frontline Russian and Ukrainian positions.

Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov stated in May 2025 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) oversees Rubikon and prioritizes supplying and staffing the center.[5] Beskrestnov stated that Rubikon is organized into four parts: the center for unmanned systems and robotic ground complexes development; the center for teaching instructors to train military personnel to use innovative unmanned solutions; the center for analytics; and frontline combat units. Beskrestnov stated that Rubikon units operate various types of drones, including Lancet loitering munitions, Molniya strike drones, fiber optic drones, and long-range first-person view (FPV) drones, and that some units receive special training to operate against Ukrainian aircraft. Beskrestnov noted that some Rubikon units are still operating in the Sumy-Kursk direction, but that Russia redeployed various units to eastern Ukraine, mainly to Donetsk Oblast. The Russian MoD is reportedly forming five unmanned systems detachments under Rubikon to support combat operations in the five Russian groupings of forces operating in Ukraine.[6]

ISW has observed reports of Rubikon units operating in Kursk Oblast and throughout eastern Ukraine from the Borova direction in eastern Kharkiv Oblast to the Velyka Novosilka direction in western Donetsk Oblast.[7] ISW has not observed reports of Rubikon units operating in western Zaporizhia or Kherson oblasts as of this report, indicating that the MoD is likely still expanding Rubikon. ISW previously assessed that Rubikon appears to be the central thrust of the MoD’s initiative to establish the educational and drone development infrastructure necessary for the establishment of Russia’s new Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and an effort to selectively reorganize and centralize unmanned systems detachments and assets.[8]

Russian forces have yet to reach parity with Ukraine’s innovative and deeply integrated drone program, however. The Russian MoD is currently attempting to replicate Ukraine’s drone programs via Russia’s USF and Rubikon Center, but Russia’s tendency towards centralization and bureaucratic ineptitude will likely lead to obstacles in this process. ISW previously assessed that Russia’s centralization and restructuring efforts may degrade the effectiveness of Russian drone operations and slow the Russian unmanned systems innovation cycle.[9] Russia’s efforts should not be dismissed, however, as a sufficiently trained and organized class of Russian drone operators spread across the frontline and integrated with Russian ground units in the future represents a long-term threat not only to Ukraine, but also to NATO.

Russian forces appear to be reprioritizing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction over the Kostyantynivka direction after several weeks of unsuccessful activity aimed at advancing toward Kostyantynivka. Geolocated footage published on July 6 and 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Novoekonomichne (east of Pokrovsk) and in southern Novoekonomichne during a platoon-sized mechanized assault.[10] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced northwest of Koptieve, west of Myrne (both northeast of Pokrovsk), and southwest of Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk).[11] Russian forces appear to be refocusing their attention on the area northeast of Pokrovsk in the direction of Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk) after renewing assaults in this area in May 2025.[12] ISW recently assessed that these advances support both the envelopment of Pokrovsk and the establishment of a salient to allow Russian forces in the longer term to try to envelop Kostyantynivka and Ukraine’s wider fortress belt — a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions.[13] Russian forces have not made significant gains in the area west of Toretsk toward Kostyantynivka since early June 2025, and the Russian military command is likely temporarily deprioritizing that effort in favor of more opportunistic advances in the Pokrovsk direction.[14] One Russian milblogger noted that Russian forces previously unsuccessfully attempted to advance into Novoekonomichne from the east near Malynivka, but that Russian forces were able to advance into the settlement from the south.[15] Russian forces have struggled to advance into Novoekonomichne over the last two months in the face of ongoing Ukrainian defensive operations and counterattacks in the area.[16] Russian forces will likely attempt to leverage these gains to advance toward Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk and northeast of Novoekonomichne) and force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) under threat of encirclement before refocusing on the Kostyantynivka direction.

Russian Minister of Transport and former Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit reportedly recently committed suicide after Russian President Vladimir Putin removed Starovoit from his position, likely due in part to the Ministry of Transport’s role in Russian failures that enabled Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web in June 2025. Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed Starovoit on July 7.[17] The Russian Investigative Committee claimed that unspecified actors found Starovoit’s body on July 7 in his car with a gunshot wound and that Starovoit’s preliminary cause of death is suicide.[18] Deputy Head of the Ministry of Transport’s Property Management Department Andrei Korneichuk also reportedly died on July 7 at the Ministry of Transport in Moscow of a heart attack.[19] Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web was able to transport drones into Russia and strike major Russian military airfields by storing the drones in cargo containers transported throughout the country.[20] Putin appointed Deputy Minister of Transport Andrei Nikitin to replace Starovoit as the acting minister, and Nikitin emphasized during his July 7 meeting with Putin that the ministry is taking measures to monitor cargo moving in Russia and to identify unmanned systems – suggesting that Putin is laying part of the blame for Operation Spider Web on the Ministry of Transport.[21]

Putin may have planned to punish Starovoit by arresting him on charges related to his time as the governor of Kursk Oblast in order to avoid acknowledging the Kremlin’s failure to prevent Operation Spider Web. Russian business outlet Kommersant reported that former Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov, whom Russian authorities arrested in April 2025 on fraud charges, testified against Starovoit in the case on the theft of at least one billion rubles (about $12.7 million) allocated for the construction of defensive structures on the Russian-Ukrainian border in Kursk Oblast.[22] Smirnov’s arrest was likely part of a wider Kremlin effort to scapegoat Kursk Oblast officials for Russia’s failure to respond to Ukraine’s August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast, and Starovoit was the governor of Kursk Oblast before Smirnov from October 2018 to May 2024.[23] Putin has been unwilling to acknowledge Russia’s failures in preventing Operation Spider Web and may have planned to use charges related to the defense of Kursk Oblast to punish Starovoit.

Ukrainian forces continue to conduct long-range strikes against Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB). The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 7 that Ukrainian forces, including elements of the Unmanned Systems Forces, conducted a drone strike against the Russian Krasnozavodsk Chemical Plant in Moscow Oblast on the night of July 6 to 7.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that the plant produces pyrotechnics, ammunition, and thermobaric warheads for Shahed-type drones. Geolocated footage published on July 7 shows smoke and fires at the Krasnozavodsk Chemical Plant.[25] Ukrainian intelligence sources told Ukrainian outlet Suspline that Ukrainian forces also struck the Ilsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai on July 7 and damaged a technical workshop and the refinery itself.[26] The sources stated that the Ilsky Oil Refinery processes and stores hydrocarbon raw materials and is directly involved in the Russian DIB. Head of Ukraine’s Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko previously reported that the Ilsky Oil Refinery has an annual refining capacity of roughly 6.6 million tons; specializes in producing fuel, mazut, bitumen, and gas oil; and supplies Russian forces, particularly in southern Russia and occupied Ukraine.[27]

Key Takeaways:

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated the Kremlin’s rejection of a ceasefire and unchanged demands, including demilitarization and regime change in Ukraine.

Russia is leveraging its “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies to improve its theater-wide drone capabilities, including in priority frontline areas in Donetsk Oblast.

Russian forces have yet to reach parity with Ukraine’s innovative and deeply integrated drone program, however.

Russian forces appear to be reprioritizing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction over the Kostyantynivka direction after several weeks of unsuccessful activity aimed at advancing toward Kostyantynivka.

Russian Minister of Transport and former Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit reportedly recently committed suicide after Russian President Vladimir Putin removed Starovoit from his position, likely due in part to the Ministry of Transport’s role in Russian failures that enabled Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web in June 2025.

Putin may have planned to punish Starovoit by arresting him on charges related to his time as the governor of Kursk Oblast in order to avoid acknowledging the Kremlin’s failure to prevent Operation Spider Web.

Ukrainian forces continue to conduct long-range strikes against Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB).

Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 7.

Russian forces continued attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 6 and 7.[28] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Glushkovo and Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[29]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating near Gornal (south of Sudzha near the international border).[30] Elements of the 11th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[31]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[32]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Bezsalivka (east of Tetkino along the international border) and advanced south of the settlement.[33] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on July 7 that Ukrainian forces advanced at least 2.5 kilometers between Kindrativka and Kostyantynivka (both north of Sumy City).[34] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces advanced up to 3.4 kilometers east of Oleksiivka (east of Kindrativka) and entered Novomykolaivka (northeast of Oleksiivka). A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Kindrativka and northwest of Pershe Travnia (northwest of Kindrativka).[35]

Russian forces attacked in Sumy Oblast, including near Yunakivka, on July 6 and 7.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka, Andriivka (north of Sumy City), Oleksiivka, Yunakivka, Yablunivka, and Sadky (the latter two are northeast of Sumy City).[37]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) and 40th and 155th naval infantry brigades (both of the Pacific Fleet) are operating near Kindrativka and Kostyantynivka.[38] Mashovets reported that elements of the 83rd and 11th separate airborne (VDV) brigades, reinforced by elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC, LMD), are operating near Novomykolaivka, and that elements of 76th VDV Division and 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are operating near Yunakivka and Sadky. Drone operators of the “Anvar” Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment), the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), and the 106th VDV Division reportedly continue to operate in the Sumy Oblast border area.[39] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating near Kindrativka.[40]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Zelene on July 6 and 7.[41]

The chief of staff of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported that Russian forces are attempting to find weak points in Ukrainian defenses and then attack in pairs or groups of up to eight servicemembers.[42] The chief of staff reported that Russian forces are using drones equipped with eight to 10 kilograms of explosives and fiber optic cables up to 30 kilometers long. The chief of staff forecasted that Russian drones will soon use fiber optic cables up to 50 kilometers long, which would help Russian forces disrupt Ukrainian logistics.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Anvar” Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv Oblast border areas.[43]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 7 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced more than 700 meters near Milove (north of Kupyansk along the international border).[44]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and Kamyanka and toward Novovasylivka; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and toward Kutkivka, Ambarne, and Khatnie; and northwest of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and Moskovka on July 6 and 7.[45]

A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on July 7 that Russian forces continue to attack constantly in small groups with the aim of infiltrating, accumulating, and assaulting Ukrainian positions.[46] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces have a manpower advantage in the area and are not suffering from ammunition shortages. The spokesperson noted that fighting in the area in the past few months has largely been drone engagements.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Olhivka, Chervonyi Stav, and Druzhelyubivka on July 6 and 7.[47]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 7, but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Hlushchenkove, northwest of Ridkodub, in eastern Karpivka, and southwest of Zelena Dolyna (all north of Lyman).[48] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces recaptured half of Ridkodub and entered Katerynivka (east of Ridkodub).[49]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Hlushchenkove, Ridkodub, Zelena Dolyna, Karpivka, and Novyi Myr and east of Lyman near Torske and the Serebryanske forest area on July 6 and 7.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Shandryholove (northwest of Lyman).[51]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka and Vyimka on July 6 and 7.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Serebryanka.[53]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, north of Chasiv Yar near Markove and Novomarkove, and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Predtechnye on July 6 and 7.[55]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kramatorsk (Chasiv Yar) direction reported that Russian forces are capitalizing on warm temperatures to attack when Ukrainian reconnaissance drones cannot operate as long or as efficiently and using foliage for concealment.[56]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) and Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[57]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[58]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces recaptured Popiv Yar.[59]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Dyliivka, and toward Pleshchiivka, and northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka, Popiv Yar, Poltavka, and Rusyn Yar on July 6 and 7.[60]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[61] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (Toretsk) direction.[62]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

See topline text for reports of assessed Russian advances and unconfirmed claims in the Pokrovsk direction.

Russian forces attacked toward Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrne, Razine, and Malynivka and toward Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Promin, and Novoekonomichne; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Mykolaivka and toward Novopavlivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Shevchenko; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Kotlyne, and Zvirove and toward Molodetske on July 6 and 7.[63]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are conducting highly attritional, infantry-led assaults, sometimes without weapons, in order to divert Ukrainian attention from well-equipped groups attacking on the flanks.[64] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are using summer foliage as camouflage against Ukrainian drones.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian “Typhoon” Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[65]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Dachne (southeast of Novopavlivka).[66]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to southern Tovste (formerly Tolstoi, south of Novopavlivka).[67]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD), seized Dachne.[68] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast and west of Tovste and south and northwest of Myrne (south of Novopavlivka).[69]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka, Novoserhiivka, and Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Novoukrainka, Oleksiivka, and Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Piddubne, Yalta, Myrne, Fedorivka, Zirka, Zaporizhzhia, Komar, and toward Filiya; and southwest near Voskresenka on July 6 and 7.[70] DNR Head Denis Pushilin claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Dachne.[71]

Ukraine’s Donetsk Operational-Tactical Group reported on July 7 that Russian forces have not seized Dachne, but that fighting is ongoing.[72] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov also denied the Russian MoD’s claimed seizure of Dachne. A Ukrainian brigade operating near Dachne reported that Russian forces are deploying infantry in an effort to evade Ukrainian drones more effectively than with light vehicles.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Myrne.[73] Elements of the 43rd Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 29th CAA, EMD) and the 200th Artillery Brigade (29th CAA) are reportedly operating west of Piddubne.[74] Drone operators of the “Snegiri” Reconnaissance Group (37th Motorized Rifle Brigade) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions along the Voskresenka-Myrne line.[75] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Zelenyi Hai (southwest of Novopavlivka).[76]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Shevchenko and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and Novopil on July 6 and 7.[77]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (VKS and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Komyshuvakha (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and near Temyrivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[78] Elements of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[79]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on July 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on July 6 and 7.[80]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Hulyaipole direction.[81]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast on July 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv) and west of Stepove (west of Orikhiv).[82]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv toward Mala Tokmachka and southwest of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky, Stepove, and Kamyanske on July 7.[83]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Shaman” Detachment of the 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv).[84] Drone operators of the 4th Military Base (58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly supporting assaults near Kamyanske, Mala Tokmachka, and Novodanylivka.[85]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on July 7.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) and 81st Artillery Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[86] Drone operators of the “Tuman” Drone Group are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Havrylivka (northeast of Kherson City).[87]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 6 and 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four S-300/400 air defense missiles from Kursk Oblast and 101 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[88] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 58 drones and that 17 were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhia cities and caused civilian casualties.[89] Geolocated footage published on July 7 shows a drone striking a residential building in Kharkiv City. [90]Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian strikes targeted high-rise residential buildings in Kharkiv City and killed one person in Odesa City.[91] The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on July 7 that the strikes in Kharkiv City injured 33 people, including three children.[92] Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office Head Amil Omarov reported that preliminary investigations indicate that Russian forces may have used Geran-2 drones (the Russian analogue of the Iranian Shahed-136 drone) with thermobaric warheads in the overnight strike against Kharkiv City.[93]

Ukraine’s Ground Forces reported that Russian forces struck Ukrainian military registration and enlistment offices in Kharkiv and Zaporizhia cities on July 7, marking the fourth and fifth strikes against Ukrainian recruitment offices since June 30.[94] The Ground Forces reported that the strike against the office in Kharkiv City injured three people.[95] Ukraine’s Ground Forces Spokesperson Vitaly Sarantsev stated that the strike against the office in Zaporizhia City injured 11 servicemembers.[96] Former Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Militia Spokesperson Eduard Basurin claimed that Russian forces are systematically and deliberately conducting “precision strikes” against Ukrainian registration and enlistment offices and that Russia’s increased drone production capabilities will allow it to continue to strike these offices.[97] ISW continues to assess that Russian strikes against Ukrainian military registration and enlistment offices likely aim to disrupt Ukrainian recruitment efforts.[98]

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported to Radio Svoboda on July 7 that Russia is increasingly relying on Chinese drone components and that 60 to 65 percent of the components in Geran-2 drones are Chinese.[99]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarus recently unveiled a jointly produced Russian-Belarusian modernized armored personnel carrier. Ukrainian military-focused outlet Militarnyi reported on July 7 that the Belarusian 140th Repair Plant coordinated with an unspecified Russian defense industrial enterprise to produce a modernized BTR-60MB3 armored personnel carrier that features enhanced firepower, an upgraded powertrain, and a modernized troop compartment equipped with advanced electronics and surveillance cameras.[100] Militarnyi noted that the armored personnel carrier still suffers from insufficient armor protection, a difficult dismount, and an underpowered engine. Militarnyi reported that the Russian Ministry of Defense-run TV network Zvezda claimed that the modernized vehicle is intended for foreign customers.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://magyarnemzet dot hu/oroszul/2025/07/lavrol-oroszul-exkuziv-magyar-nemzet

[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060325 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021225

[3] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/07/world/europe/ukraine-war-russia-donetsk.html

[4] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/07/world/europe/ukraine-war-russia-donetsk.html ; https://t.me/serhii_flash/5682

[5] https://t.me/serhii_flash/5682

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-efforts-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2025

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112924 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-efforts-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-efforts-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations

[10] https://t.me/optb_91/115 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9530 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9533 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/v/16vL5qJX43/; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1942184883696120267; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1942185969345601898; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1942189684383248792

[11] https://t.me/rybar/71960 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65707 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38195

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2025

[13] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2025

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2025

[15] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38207

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2025

[17] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/07/07/2025/686b667c9a79476596c4f53b

[18] https://t.me/tass_agency/324277

[19] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/society/news/2025/07/07/1122679-umer-aleksei-korneichuk; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/07/07/mash-baza-i-112-v-ministerstve-transporta-rf-vo-vremya-soveschaniya-umer-chinovnik

[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2025

[21] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/07/07/2025/686b73809a79478209e3d98b; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77376

[22] https://meduza dot io/en/feature/2025/04/17/russia-has-arrested-the-kursk-region-s-ex-governor-he-oversaw-the-construction-of-anti-tank-barriers-which-later-crumbled-from-rain-and-snow; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7871214?from=top_main_1

[23] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7871214?from=top_main_1; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-16-2025

[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26367

[25] https://x.com/Vijesti11111/status/1942087557346476263; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/9979; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/9975; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1942070964545818846; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/1942049368942490026; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/1942056090172305732

[26] https://suspilne dot media/1060095-zelenskij-pidpisav-novij-sankcijnij-paket-proti-rf-v-odesi-lunaut-vibuhi-1230-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1751888885&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021725 ; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8831

[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26366 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26337 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027ur38K5whY7Sz4mTUW5VSRWnRAuHWhABXUpxWTPcH1fjp3trD6gBDa7U45PwmEWFl

[29] https://t.me/dva_majors/74846

[30] https://t.me/rybar/71979

[31] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30895

[32] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9535; https://t.me/OMBR156/749

[33] https://t.me/mod_russia/54466; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38188; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38203; https:// t.me/RVvoenkor/95304

[34] https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid0A7jRrrnCFWvDj3b7ydJDRaqHAy69L3B5x5dLPycjwXPYabx1FSb4hKHVFV1S8uezl

[35] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38208

[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26366 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26337 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027ur38K5whY7Sz4mTUW5VSRWnRAuHWhABXUpxWTPcH1fjp3trD6gBDa7U45PwmEWFl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74846

[37] https://t.me/dva_majors/74846

[38] https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid0A7jRrrnCFWvDj3b7ydJDRaqHAy69L3B5x5dLPycjwXPYabx1FSb4hKHVFV1S8uezl

[39] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171572 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30895

[40] https://t.me/dva_majors/74828 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74870

[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26366 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26337 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027ur38K5whY7Sz4mTUW5VSRWnRAuHWhABXUpxWTPcH1fjp3trD6gBDa7U45PwmEWFl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13299

[42] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/07/mozhut-klasty-10-kilogramiv-trotylu-na-harkivshhyni-byutsya-proty-vorozhyh-shturmovykiv-i-droniv/

[43] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95274

[44] https://t.me/dva_majors/74846

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26366 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26337 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027ur38K5whY7Sz4mTUW5VSRWnRAuHWhABXUpxWTPcH1fjp3trD6gBDa7U45PwmEWFl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13299

[46] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/07/cze-chysto-dronova-vijna-poblyzu-kupyanska-bezpilotnykamy-vidbyvayut-80-atak/

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027ur38K5whY7Sz4mTUW5VSRWnRAuHWhABXUpxWTPcH1fjp3trD6gBDa7U45PwmEWFl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26337 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13299 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65693

[48] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38189 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38190 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65706

[49] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38189 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38190

[50] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65693 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65706

[51] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65693

[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26337 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027ur38K5whY7Sz4mTUW5VSRWnRAuHWhABXUpxWTPcH1fjp3trD6gBDa7U45PwmEWFl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13299

[53] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65690

[54] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95293 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54459

[55]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26366 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26337 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171614 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27731

[56] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/07/legshe-maskuvatysya-bo-potuzhna-teplova-sygnatura-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku-vorog-atakuye-pid-sonczem/

[57] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95275 ;https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30895 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38199 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/5445

[58] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1942000366096093402; https://t.me/BabaYaga_152orr/299

[59] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38211

[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26366 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26337 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027ur38K5whY7Sz4mTUW5VSRWnRAuHWhABXUpxWTPcH1fjp3trD6gBDa7U45PwmEWFl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13299 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74846 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38211

[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38220

[62] https://t.me/dva_majors/74831 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74854

[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26366 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26337 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027ur38K5whY7Sz4mTUW5VSRWnRAuHWhABXUpxWTPcH1fjp3trD6gBDa7U45PwmEWFl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13299 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171614

[64] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/07/bere-v-ruchky-i-jde-z-nym-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-vorog-ne-zabuvaye-pro-svoyu-ulyublenu-taktyku/

[65] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38192

[66] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1941922927579902269; https://x.com/p6060083/status/1941902951297036417; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/29469

[67] https://t.me/OVMBr_5/188; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9532

[68] https://t.me/mod_russia/54470 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38201 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38205 ;

[69] https://t.me/rybar/71961b ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65707; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38195; https:// t.me/rybar/71961; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38195

[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26366 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26337 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027ur38K5whY7Sz4mTUW5VSRWnRAuHWhABXUpxWTPcH1fjp3trD6gBDa7U45PwmEWFl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13299 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171614 ; https://t.me/rybar/71961 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65707 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27731 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38186 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38195 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74846

[71] https://t.me/tass_agency/324149

[72] https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1055343-ukrainski-vijskovi-sprostuvali-okupaciu-sela-dacne-na-dnipropetrovsini/

[73] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38195 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15858

[74] https://t.me/voin_dv/15875

[75] https://t.me/voin_dv/15865

[76] https://t.me/voin_dv/15859

[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26366 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26337 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027ur38K5whY7Sz4mTUW5VSRWnRAuHWhABXUpxWTPcH1fjp3trD6gBDa7U45PwmEWFl ;

[78] https://t.me/voin_dv/15877 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15864

[79] https://t.me/voin_dv/15874

[80] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26366; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26337; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027ur38K5whY7Sz4mTUW5VSRWnRAuHWhABXUpxWTPcH1fjp3trD6gBDa7U45PwmEWFl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13299; https://t.me/dva_majors/74846

[81] https://t.me/voin_dv/15863

[82] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95258; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38191; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30895; https://t.me/wargonzo/27731

[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26366 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74846

[84] https://t.me/vrogov/21020

[85] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95261

[86] https://t.me/dva_majors/74853; https://t.me/dva_majors/74868

[87] https://t.me/dva_majors/74873

[88] https://t.me/kpszsu/37873

[89] https://t.me/synegubov/15539 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2762 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/07/harkiv-zaznav-vorozhogo-udaru-shahedy-vluchyly-u-bagatopoverhivky-postrazhdaly-17-osib/; https://t.me/synegubov/15564; https://t.me/synegubov/15562; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2788; https://t.me/synegubov/15555; https://t.me/synegubov/15562; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1060103-armia-rf-atakuvala-kiiv-bezpilotnikami-so-vidomo-2/ ; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1429 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/07/vybuhy-nad-kyyevom-ulamky-droniv-poshkodyly-infrastrukturu-u-dvoh-rajonah/; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4971 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12702 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1060139-nicnij-udar-bpla-po-odesi-e-rujnuvanna-ta-zagiblij/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/45598 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/07/v-odesi-vnaslidok-rosijskoyi-ataky-zagynula-lyudyna/; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02ysQh8jMT3QfwoNgeAy2DCj9P4qM8uRVk8EUVv2Fw2kBhxatgwCKzgQRfxVGEHxMnl?__cft__[0]=AZVsV5Mk_wYUoySNZKoR_4eOjDzG8WYiwn56UZhdzmtkGYXkJ6fPyU7pPFqvoSulwDo6FAWG2VgP1jSZvE2I9ikxvHx3nhBjJCswlUdoSUQ8T6DfJHy_b92ULLWpm1VKbviAd4RB4dmeIUO3mBwciX60px6c_N8VcyU0FXcgvT_KHmKK2mCGeC4BNFUvcjaicIxUtbSg9_wm3-x6f0MFsbbH&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12703; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/21856 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/07/udar-po-zaporizhzhyu-kilkist-postrazhdalyh-zrosla-do-17/; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/21835; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/45051; https://t.me/milinfolive/152526; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/21832

[90] https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1942220374277591400; https://x.com/BohuslavskaKate/status/1942187481379545196; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1942219556551856398; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1942190015112495229; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/45606

[91] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15011; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1942133353383080394 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15012

[92] https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/23904 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/07/33-postrazhdalyh-cherez-udar-droniv-po-harkovu-sered-poranenyh-dity/

[93] https://suspilne dot media/1060095-zelenskij-pidpisav-novij-sankcijnij-paket-proti-rf-v-odesi-lunaut-vibuhi-1230-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1751891955&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[94] https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/24835 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/07/rosijski-drony-atakuvaly-oblasni-tczk-u-harkovi-ta-zaporizhzhi-poraneni-vijskovi/; https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/24835 ; https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/24835 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1060323-rosia-zavdala-udaru-po-budivli-oblasnogo-tck-ta-sp-u-harkovi/ ; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1060333-armia-rf-atakuvala-dronom-poblizu-otck-ta-sp-u-zaporizzi-e-poranenij-vijskovosluzbovec/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/85869

[95] https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/24835

[96] https://unn dot ua/en/news/11-servicemen-of-the-tcc-and-sp-were-wounded-as-a-result-of-the-shelling-of-zaporizhzhia-sarantsev

[97] https://t.me/basurin_e/19762

[98] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-6-2025

[99] https://www.radiosvoboda dot org/a/kytays%CA%B9ka-elektronika-u-shakhedakh-syahaye-65-hur/33464954.html ; https://suspilne dot media/1060397-kitajska-elektronika-vitisnae-zahidnu-z-rosijskih-droniv-gur/

[100] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/belarus-russia-develop-btr-60-upgrade-project/

July 8, 2025, 5:15 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on July 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US President Donald Trump announced on July 7 that the United States would resume weapons deliveries to Ukraine as discussions about provisions of additional air defense systems and interceptors are reportedly ongoing. Trump stated on July 7 that the United States will send more weapons to Ukraine to help Ukraine defend itself.[1] Trump stated that the United States is “going to see if [it] can make some [Patriot interceptors] available.” Politico reported that two sources stated that shipments of US military aid to Ukraine could resume over the “coming weeks.”[2] Chief Pentagon Spokesperson Sean Parnell stated on July 7 that Trump directed the US Department of Defense (DoD) to send additional defensive weapons to Ukraine to ensure that Ukraine can defend itself while the United States works to secure a “lasting peace.”[3] Axios reported on July 8 that sources stated that Trump told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that he wants to help Ukraine’s air defenses and promised to immediately send 10 Patriot interceptors and help to find other means of supply.[4] Axios’ sources reportedly stated that Trump suggested that Germany should sell one of its Patriot batteries to Ukraine and that the United States and Europe would split the costs of the purchase. Axios reported that US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has identified Patriot batteries in Germany and Greece that the US could finance and send to Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that US-provided Patriot systems and interceptors are critical for Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russian long-range overnight strikes, particularly against Russian ballistic missiles.[5]

The Kremlin continues to leverage Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev’s aggressive rhetoric to undermine support for US military aid to Ukraine, likely as part of a top-down, concerted Kremlin informational effort. Medvedev responded on July 8 on his Russian- and English-language channels to US President Donald Trump’s statements about resuming weapons supplies to Ukraine, claiming that Russia should continue “business as usual.”[6] Medvedev claimed that Russia will “push forward” to achieve its war goals and “reclaim [its] land.” Medvedev’s July 8 statements aim to present Western military aid to Ukraine as futile in the face of an alleged inevitable Russian victory. The West should not disregard all of Medvedev’s statements as hyperbole or fringe, however. Russian President Vladimir Putin often leverages Medvedev to amplify inflammatory rhetoric designed to stoke panic and fear among Western decision-makers and discourage aid to Ukraine.[7] Medvedev’s statements are part of a wider Kremlin reflexive control campaign against the West. Medvedev’s provocative and at times threatening statements are very likely part of a top-down, concerted Kremlin informational strategy. Putin would be able to censor Medvedev’s statements should Putin choose to do so, especially considering the coordination within the Kremlin on official statements and the Kremlin’s overall grip on the Russian information space, internet, and media. Medvedev’s continued use of his platform to make aggressive statements that specifically target the United States and Europe suggests that the Kremlin is approving and encouraging this effort. Medvedev’s aggressive statements serve a specific purpose for Putin, as they push the West to see Putin’s statements as more moderate and rational by comparison and open space for Putin to make greater demands or larger threats.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast amidst a series of ongoing counterattacks. Geolocated footage published on July 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern and northeastern Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[8] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on July 7 that Ukrainian forces advanced between Kindrativka and Kostyantynivka (north of Kindrativka) and east of Oleksiivka (east of Kindrativka) and entered Novomykolaivka (northeast of Oleksiivka).[9] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 8 that Ukrainian forces entered Kindrativka from the northwest and Oleksiivka from the northeast.[10] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized central and northern Kindrativka and have cut off Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) along the C-191502 Novomykolaivka-Volodymyrivka road. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command deployed elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) to Kindrativka to support Russian personnel retreating from the settlement. The milblogger claimed that the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) is fighting to establish a foothold south of Oleksiivka, but that recent Ukrainian advances are complicating this effort.

Russian advances in northern Sumy Oblast slowed between late May and early June 2025, and Ukrainian forces began counterattacking and regaining territory in mid-June. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 14 that Ukrainian forces retook Andriivka (southeast of Kindrativka), and Ukrainian forces advanced in other areas of northern Sumy Oblast throughout late June 2025.[11] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on July 8 that fighting remains intense in the North Slobozhansk (Kursk and northern Sumy oblasts) direction and that Ukrainian forces are restoring positions in this direction and maintaining positions in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts.[12] The Russian military command redeployed some drone and elite naval infantry units from the Kursk and Sumy directions to other higher-priority sectors of the frontline in Donetsk Oblast in May and June 2025, and the command may further deprioritize the offensive in northern Sumy Oblast if Ukrainian forces continue to complicate further Russian advances.[13] Russia could also reinforce its frontline units in northern Sumy Oblast in the near future in order to continue advancing toward Sumy City, however.

Russia continues to expand its domestic drone production capacity amid the ever-growing role of tactical drones in frontline combat operations and Russia’s increasingly large nightly long-range strike packages against Ukraine. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin claimed on July 8 that Russia has already more than tripled its planned overall drone production volumes for 2025.[14] Mishustin credited this increase to state financial support for drone producers and innovators, including civilian companies. Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight stated on July 8 that Russian forces have launched 28,743 total Shahed variant drones (Shahed-136/131 and Geran 2) since the beginning of the full-scale invasion and that Russian forces launched 10 percent of this total (2,736 drones) in June 2025 alone.[15] Frontelligence Insight assessed that Russia produced an average of 60.5 Geran drones per day, or roughly 1,850 drones per month, between February and April 2025. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on July 8 that Russian forces launched 1.6 times more missiles and drones against Ukraine in June 2025 than in May 2025.[16] Increased Russian long-range drone production is enabling Russia’s increasingly large nightly strikes against Ukraine and has also enabled Russian forces to integrate Gerans into strikes against frontline Ukrainian positions.[17] Russian forces are continuing to integrate drones into frontline combat operations to strike frontline and near rear Ukrainian positions and to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in tandem with Russian MLRS and artillery systems.

Ongoing Russian cooperation with Chinese companies is facilitating Russia’s increasing domestic drone production. Documents analyzed by Bloomberg, including memos from Russian drone manufacturer Aero-HIT and unspecified Russian officials between late 2022 and June 2025, indicate that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) has cooperated with Chinese companies to increase Russia’s drone manufacturing capacity and subvert Western sanctions for drone components since the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine in February 2022.[18] Bloomberg reported that a Russian delegation visiting China in May 2023 established a joint venture with a Chinese university to form the Aero-HIT drone production facility in Khabarovsk, Khabarovsk Krai. Bloomberg reported that Aero-HIT submitted a 7.1-billion-ruble (roughly $90 million) funding request to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in June 2025, which stated that Aero-HIT has partnered with Chinese engineers since early 2023. Aero-HIT memos reviewed by Bloomberg state that Aero-HIT’s plant can produce up to 10,000 drones per month in 2025 and plans for further production increases. Bloomberg reported that Aero-HIT’s relationship with Chinese engineers is crucial to Aero-HIT’s ability to manufacture at scale its “Veles” first-person view (FPV) drone, which Russian forces have used significantly in Kherson Oblast.[19] Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov stated on July 7 that Ukrainian forces recently observed a new type of Chinese wi-fi router on Chinese radio modems installed on Russian “Gerber” drones.[20] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported to Radio Svoboda on July 7 that 60 to 65 percent of the components in Russian-produced Geran-type drones (the Russian analogue of the Iranian Shahed drone) are of Chinese origin.[21] Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on July 4 that Ukrainian investigators discovered components manufactured at the Chinese Suzhou Ecod Precision Manufacturing Company in Russian Geran-type drones recovered in Kyiv City.[22]

Russian milblogger complaints suggest that the Russian military command is struggling to supply frontline units with drones despite increased drone production, possibly indicating how Russia’s centralization and bureaucracy are degrading the effectiveness of Russian drone operations and slowing the Russian innovation cycle. A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed on July 8 that the Russian military command is prioritizing drone supplies to several specialized drone units and that the standards for equipping regular drone units are far below the units’ actual needs.[23] Another Russian milblogger complained that the Russian military command is creating a small number of specialized drone units with unlimited support instead of creating drone units in all regiments and brigades.[24] The milblogger claimed that the specialized drone units produce results, but that the other units are left severely under resourced. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command supplies only 20 drones per month to non-specialized units and that these units have to instead rely on volunteer drone supplies.[25] Another milblogger complained that the Russian military has warehouses full of drones but that only “elite” units receive these supplies.[26] Russia’s Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, to which the Russian MoD reportedly prioritizes supplies and staffing, appears to be Russia’s effort to selectively reorganize and centralize unmanned systems detachments and assets.[27] ISW continues to assess that the Russian MoD is attempting to replicate Ukraine’s drone programs via Russia’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and Rubikon Center, but that Russia’s tendency towards centralization and bureaucratic ineptitude is leading to obstacles in this process.[28]

Key Takeaways:

US President Donald Trump announced on July 7 that the United States would resume weapons deliveries to Ukraine as discussions about provisions of additional air defense systems and interceptors are reportedly ongoing.

The Kremlin continues to leverage Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev’s aggressive rhetoric to undermine support for US military aid to Ukraine, likely as part of a top-down, concerted Kremlin informational effort.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast amidst a series of ongoing counterattacks.

Russia continues to expand its domestic drone production capacity amid the ever-growing role of tactical drones in frontline combat operations and Russia’s increasingly large nightly long-range strike packages against Ukraine.

Ongoing Russian cooperation with Chinese companies is facilitating Russia’s increasing domestic drone production.

Russian milblogger complaints suggest that the Russian military command is struggling to supply frontline units with drones despite increased drone production, possibly indicating how Russia’s centralization and bureaucracy are degrading the effectiveness of Russian drone operations and slowing the Russian innovation cycle.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 8.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 7 and 8.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked from Ryzhivka (near the international border in Ukraine) toward Tetkino.[30]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions along the international border near Tetkino.[31]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

See topline text for reported of assessed Ukrainian advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 8 that Russian forces retook Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City).[32] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south and east of Bezsalivka and northwest of Mala Korchakivka (north of Sumy City).[33]

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of northern Sumy Oblast on July 7 and 8.[34]

Order of Battle: Elements of the “Granita” Detachment of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[35] Elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating near Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[36]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 8 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[37]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Lyptsi, northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Zelene, and further northeast of Kharkiv City along the international border toward Dehtyarne on July 7 and 8.[38]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported on July 8 that Russian forces increased the frequency of their assaults in northern Kharkiv Oblast, conducting 19 assaults on July 7 and 24 assaults on July 6 as compared to a daily average of five to seven assaults in June 2025.[39] Shamshyn stated that Ukrainian drone operators are repelling ongoing Russian attempts to seize positions in the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant on the north (right) bank of the Vovcha River, including nightly Russian infantry attacks of one to two personnel in anti-thermal imaging ponchos.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Holubivka, along the P-79 Kupyansk-Velykyi Burluk highway near Radkivka (both north of Kupyansk), and north and east of Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[40]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and Kamyanka and toward Novovasylivka; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and toward Kutkivka and Ambarne (along the international border); northwest of Kupyansk toward Lozova Druha; west of Kupyansk near Myrne and Sobolivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Hlushkivka on July 7 and 8.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kolisnykivka and Tabayevka (southeast of Kupyansk).[42]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn stated on July 8 that Russian forces have intensified their attacks near Milove (north of Kupyansk near the international border) since July 7 and are crossing the international border and leveraging artillery and drone support to strike Ukrainian positions.[43] Shamshyn also stated that Ukrainian forces recently stopped Russian advances toward Ambarne (south of Milove) and Hatne (southeast of Ambarne). An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces have begun leveraging unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for remote mining, logistical operations, and evacuations and are continuing to attack in contested “gray” areas in groups of one to two personnel.[44]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova toward Olhivka on July 7 and 8.[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Hlushchenkove (north of Lyman).[47]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Karpivka, Ridkodub, Hlushchenkove, Zelena Dolyna, and Novyi Myr; and east of Lyman near Torske and in the Serebryanske forest area on July 7 and 8.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ridkodub.[49]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on July 7 and 8.[50]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 8 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Bila Hora (south of Chasiv Yar).[51]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar toward Markove; west of Chasiv Yar toward Mykolaivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Bila Hora, and Predtechyne on July 7 and 8.[52]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported that Russian forces are attacking in small infantry groups, occasionally on motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs).[53] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are increasingly using drones in order to cut off Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) and that Russian forces are constantly conducting guided glide bomb strikes against Chasiv Yar, Kostyantynivka (southwest of Chasiv Yar), Druzhkivka (west of Chasiv Yar), and Kramatorsk (northwest of Chasiv Yar). A Russian milblogger said that claims about Russian advances in Mykolaivka are premature.[54]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 7 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[55]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Yablunivka and southwest of Popiv Yar (both northwest of Toretsk).[56]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; and northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka, Oleksandro-Kalynove, Poltavka, and Popiv Yar and toward Katerynivka and Pleshchiivka on July 7 and 8.[57]

A servicemember in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported that Russian forces have not been able to seize Toretsk despite fighting for the settlement for almost a year.[58] The servicemember stated that the summer 2025 Russian offensive is focusing on seizing Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk and that Russian forces are trying to envelop the settlements to avoid costly frontal assaults.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[59]

Russian forces continued assaults in the Pokrovsk direction on July 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Novoekonomichne (east of Pokrovsk) and west of Razine (northeast of Pokrovsk).[60] Another Russian milblogger denied previous Russian claims that Russian forces seized Koptieve (northeast of Pokrovsk).[61]

Russian forces continued assaults near Pokrovsk; northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrne, Malynivka, and Razine; east of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, Novoukrainka, and Zvirove; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne on July 7 and 8.[62]

A Ukrainian intelligence officer of a special forces unit operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on July 8 that Russian forces are equipping well-trained infantry with increasingly advanced anti-drone camouflage technology, including thermal cloaks that Ukrainian infrared imaging has a difficult time detecting.[63] The officer also reported that Russian forces have increased their use of drones in the Pokrovsk direction in order to interrupt Ukrainian logistics and that Russian forces are setting drone ambushes against Ukrainian vehicles along GLOCs.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and the “Typhoon” Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[64]

Russian forces continued assaults in the Novopavlivka direction on July 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are advancing toward Andriivka-Klevtsove (formerly Iskra, southwest of Novopavlivka) and that elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are advancing toward and into northeastern Myrne (southeast of Andriivka-Klevtsove).[65] Additional Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating south of Novopavlivka also advanced southwest of Tovste, west and northwest of Piddubne, and west of Komar.[66]

Russian forces continued assaults toward Novopavlivka; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka and Horikhove; southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka and Zelenyi Kut; south of Novopavlivka near Zaporizhzhia, Piddubne, Yalta, Komar, and Fedorivka; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Myrne, Andriivka-Klevtsove, and Vozkresenka on July 7 and 8.[67]

Russian forces continued assaults in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka, Zelene Pole, and Novopil on July 7 and 8.[68]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Hulyaipole direction on July 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on July 7 and 8.[69]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA) are reportedly operating near Malynivka.[70]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast on July 8 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 108th and 247th airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 7th VDV Division) advanced in western, eastern, and central Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv) and raised a flag in the settlement.[71] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized the settlement.[72]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv toward Mala Tokmachka and southwest of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky, Stepove, and Kamyanske on July 7 and 8.[73]

A deputy commander for a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported on July 7 that Russian forces are attacking in groups of three to four soldiers, usually without equipment but sometimes with motorcycles and buggies.[74] The deputy commander stated that the intensity of Russian assaults is currently the highest since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 and that Russian forces will conduct assaults throughout the summer in order to reach the Mariupol highway and seize Orikhiv, Kamyanske, and then Komyshuvakha.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Nemets” group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[75]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on July 8.

The “Atesh” Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group reported on July 8 that the Russian Navy has moved practically all Russian Navy vessels out of Streletskaya Bay in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea and that the remaining Russian Navy vessels in the bay are either moving or in hiding.[76]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian BARS-33 “Vasily Margelov” volunteer detachment are reportedly operating in Kherson Oblast.[77]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 7 and 8. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four S-300/400 air defense missiles from Kursk Oblast and 54 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[78] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 26 drones and that 8 were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv and Mykolaiv oblasts and caused civilian casualties.[79]

Ukraine’s Ground Forces Spokesperson Vitaly Sarantsev reported on July 8 that Russian strikes may cause Ukrainian military recruitment centers to change to a remote format or disperse in order to protect the lives of staff and visitors.[80] The Vinnytsia Oblast Military Recruitment Center reported on July 7 that Ukrainian military recruitment centers in the oblast are suspending in-office services due to Russia’s targeted strikes against the centers but that ongoing force generation efforts will continue.[81]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian Foreign Minister Maxim Ryzhenkov stated on July 7 that Belarus intends to become a full member of BRICS after taking part as a partner for the first time at the BRICS summit on July 6 and 7 in Rio de Janeiro.[82]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/07/ukraine-aid-weapons-shipments-00441828 ; https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/trump-told-zelensky-he-wasnt-responsible-for-weapons-holdup-f684444b ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/trump-says-us-will-send-more-weapons-ukraine-2025-07-08/; https://suspilne dot media/1061033-tramp-zaaviv-so-ssa-nadislut-ukraini-bilse-zbroi/

[2] https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/07/ukraine-aid-weapons-shipments-00441828

[3] https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4236261/statement-by-chief-pentagon-spokesman-sean-parnell-on-ukraine-military-aid/

[4] https://www.axios.com/2025/07/08/trump-patriot-missiles-ukraine-germany

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070425

[6] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/597 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/324380 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/86

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025

[8] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1942490660411462048; https://t.me/operator_ak12/10855; https://x.com/p6060083/status/1942559366730916141; https://t.me/dva_majors/74930; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1942484583984828591

[9] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2849 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid0A7jRrrnCFWvDj3b7ydJDRaqHAy69L3B5x5dLPycjwXPYabx1FSb4hKHVFV1S8uezl

[10] https://t.me/severnnyi/4519

[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2025

[12] https://t.me/osirskiy/1219

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061425; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2025;

[14] https://ria dot ru/20250708/bespilotniki-2027912145.html?chat_room_id=2027912145

[15] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1942596877347696848

[16] https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/posts/pfbid02M42M9y2AdcVwh9BTuCeQu5szKDAWno3fTPaSUjDrTETK5Jg4Qvitj52wgmLWD2Y6l?rdid=aX7Kez9Co7dM5v7Q#

[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062725

[18] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-08/china-s-suppliers-key-for-russian-drones-in-war-against-ukraine-documents-show

[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-7-2024; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2404

[20] https://t.me/serhii_flash/5869; https://www.facebook.com/Serhii.Flash/posts/pfbid028qaWLVhG8unh1yWHpihCs1BHfsZfGiofYm1ibpeeeGL27xQGNt1zhZaeuz52SA1Xl?__cft__[0]=AZWWs3dfDmrWAHmNgs7pL2qrwf1dj231zsN6hV_yNCy5tTVncStQ6DqOBb7-rVMNvgH2tzAwHzb0QFeCnUDF4jrlq6icAmh1BaulDexurXKZvUolbfE4kC_91A7iDFnDY2-7rWziWGkpZbX68y-h3m7ZiYCmmiY1SyVWZdyp9nTjpvH4SIzbfX9z5V0K2EoWLZuNjntdKrpqlVdYIOicuAIR&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2025; https://www.radiosvoboda dot org/a/kytays%CA%B9ka-elektronika-u-shakhedakh-syahaye-65-hur/33464954.html ; https://suspilne dot media/1060397-kitajska-elektronika-vitisnae-zahidnu-z-rosijskih-droniv-gur/

[22] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2025

[23] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2672

[24] https://t.me/vault8pro/52775; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2667

[25] https://t.me/vault8pro/52778; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2671; https://t.me/vault8pro/52777; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2669

[26] https://t.me/filatovcorr/5389; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2668

[27] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112924 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-efforts-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations

[28] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2025

[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cM2hCVWx7rLbRuNShMCPMkiih7zyRMFFW4ZbhNZsJ3KUNUyFtQda5Mmx2XEXgdZ1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml

[30] https://t.me/dva_majors/74910; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30962; https://t.me/severnnyi/4519

[31] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95341

[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30962 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74910

[33] https://t.me/severnnyi/4519 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30962; https://t.me/wargonzo/27748; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171704

[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cM2hCVWx7rLbRuNShMCPMkiih7zyRMFFW4ZbhNZsJ3KUNUyFtQda5Mmx2XEXgdZ1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml

[35] https://t.me/dva_majors/74908

[36] https://t.me/dva_majors/74907; https://t.me/dva_majors/74926 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74930; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38271 ; https://x.com/p6060083/status/1942559366730916141; https://t.me/dva_majors/74930; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1942484583984828591

[37] https://t.me/severnnyi/4519

[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cM2hCVWx7rLbRuNShMCPMkiih7zyRMFFW4ZbhNZsJ3KUNUyFtQda5Mmx2XEXgdZ1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13561; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13352

[39] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/4012766-rosijska-pihota-peretnula-derzkordon-u-rajoni-milovogo-na-harkivsini-sili-oboroni-vidbili-ataku.html

[40] https://t.me/rybar/71986; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30942

[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cM2hCVWx7rLbRuNShMCPMkiih7zyRMFFW4ZbhNZsJ3KUNUyFtQda5Mmx2XEXgdZ1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml; https://t.me/rybar/71986; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30942; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13352

[42] https://t.me/rybar/71986

[43] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/4012766-rosijska-pihota-peretnula-derzkordon-u-rajoni-milovogo-na-harkivsini-sili-oboroni-vidbili-ataku.html

[44] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/08/prosochytysya-po-siromu-i-prodavyty-pozycziyi-poblyzu-kupyanska-rosiyany-vykorystovuyut-nazemnyh-robotiv/

[45] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171694

[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cM2hCVWx7rLbRuNShMCPMkiih7zyRMFFW4ZbhNZsJ3KUNUyFtQda5Mmx2XEXgdZ1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml

[47] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38264

[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cM2hCVWx7rLbRuNShMCPMkiih7zyRMFFW4ZbhNZsJ3KUNUyFtQda5Mmx2XEXgdZ1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13352

[49] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38264

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cM2hCVWx7rLbRuNShMCPMkiih7zyRMFFW4ZbhNZsJ3KUNUyFtQda5Mmx2XEXgdZ1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml

[51] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1942476724270153819; https://t.me/Radisnyi_93/198; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1942476897314599048 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9538

[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cM2hCVWx7rLbRuNShMCPMkiih7zyRMFFW4ZbhNZsJ3KUNUyFtQda5Mmx2XEXgdZ1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13352; https://t.me/wargonzo/27748

[53] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1061349-misto-akogo-vze-nema-ale-e-pozicii-vijska-rf-narosuut-kilkist-bezpilotnikiv-u-rajoni-casovogo-aru/

[54] https://t.me/wargonzo/27748

[55] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1942473499890602286; https://t.me/The_life_of_Predova/4789

[56] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38280 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30975

[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cM2hCVWx7rLbRuNShMCPMkiih7zyRMFFW4ZbhNZsJ3KUNUyFtQda5Mmx2XEXgdZ1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13352

[58] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1061231-na-toreckomu-napramku-ukrainski-bijci-fiksuut-zmensenna-aktivnosti-vazkoi-tehniki-rf-dani-12-i-brigadi-azov/

[59] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38280

[60] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30975

[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38251

[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cM2hCVWx7rLbRuNShMCPMkiih7zyRMFFW4ZbhNZsJ3KUNUyFtQda5Mmx2XEXgdZ1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml

[63] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/08/trishky-golosno-trishky-pobolily-golovy-poblyzu-pokrovska-vorog-namagayetsya-vysikaty-logistyku-zasidkamy-droniv/

[64] https://t.me/Andrafanaslive/14684 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38281

[65] https://t.me/voin_dv/15880 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171664 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74910

[66] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171704 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171664 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38234

[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cM2hCVWx7rLbRuNShMCPMkiih7zyRMFFW4ZbhNZsJ3KUNUyFtQda5Mmx2XEXgdZ1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95339 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27748

[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cM2hCVWx7rLbRuNShMCPMkiih7zyRMFFW4ZbhNZsJ3KUNUyFtQda5Mmx2XEXgdZ1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml

[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0BfcYDMr1pPzRhowq1kezxjP5kFo2dD38MdH3EwxJgt4koN5HFBfFkWMK4DyWCUzVl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13352

[70] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38253; https://t.me/voin_dv/15880; https://t.me/voin_dv/15889

[71] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30971 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74943; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95397; https://t.me/wargonzo/27748; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38250; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38273; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171719; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171731; https://t.me/rusich_army/24588; https://t.me/rusich_army/24589; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65734

[72] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95397; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38273; https://t.me/rusich_army/24588; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65734

[73] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0BfcYDMr1pPzRhowq1kezxjP5kFo2dD38MdH3EwxJgt4koN5HFBfFkWMK4DyWCUzVl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml; https://t.me/dva_majors/74910

[74] https://espreso dot tv/viyna-z-rosiyeyu-za-tri-roki-takogo-ne-bulo-na-zaporizkomu-napryamku-komandir-batalyonu-65-i-ombr

[75] https://t.me/dva_majors/74936

[76] https://t.me/atesh_ua/7351

[77] https://t.me/tavria_kherson/56635; https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/8342

[78] https://t.me/kpszsu/37924

[79] https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/23914; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/08/ataka-bezpilotnykiv-na-harkiv-zagynula-zhinka-ponad-80-postrazhdalyh/; https://t.me/synegubov/15582; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0BfcYDMr1pPzRhowq1kezxjP5kFo2dD38MdH3EwxJgt4koN5HFBfFkWMK4DyWCUzVl; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/15155; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/08/na-mykolayivshhyni-pozhezhi-pislya-atak-droniv-poraneno-cholovika/

[80] https://suspilne dot media/1061071-ataki-rf-na-tck-u-suhoputnih-vijskah-zaavili-pro-mozlivi-zmini-u-formati-roboti-tck-ta-sp/; https://youtu.be/Gwv_we0tun8?feature=shared

[81] https://www.facebook.com/Vinobltck/posts/pfbid0CYHYxvmEuMbdLVzRRiDBFy9VKzA7CfUgj2ZaxBzNvDtJdJCogFrycrDkS6iTumXCl?__cft__[0]=AZVzgvj8XU56Dz1Zls429ZVhTwdAGQP_Lj-LUg2CmyPR-PmVPKOE6VjI4InJTbDZaecTAsHPQKfrJOh7GK5YiurcRaLvg9_vOZozYKYSibhRWsf2o3ke5ldGXkg_2csEBsJXDMDDRoS-t29u51ev4J5yW3Id-8b0KvNztWPAeoGNUg&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://t.me/dva_majors/74902

[82] https://belta dot by/politics/view/strategicheskaja-platforma-buduschego-ryzhenkov-zajavil-o-stremlenii-belarusi-k-polnopravnomu-725020-2025/

July 11, 2025, 7:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on July 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US President Donald Trump announced on July 10 that the United States will sell NATO weapons, including air defense systems and interceptors, that NATO can then give to Ukraine. Trump stated in an interview with NBC News that the United States will sell NATO an unspecified number and type of American-made weapons, including Patriot air defense systems and interceptors, that NATO will then give to Ukraine.[1] Axios reported on July 11 that sources stated that NATO allies discussed the possibility of the United States using NATO as an intermediary to sell weapons to Ukraine at the most recent NATO Summit on June 24 to 25, and that these weapons could include both air defense support as well as offensive weaponry.[2] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on July 10 that Ukraine requested 10 Patriot air defense systems and additional interceptors, and that Germany is ready to purchase two Patriot systems from the United States for Ukraine, and that Norway is willing to purchase another one.[3] It remains unclear how many Patriot air defense systems or other weapons the United States will sell to NATO. ISW continues to assess that US-provided Patriot systems and interceptors are critical for Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russian long-range overnight strikes and protect its civilian population, particularly against Russian ballistic missiles.[4]

Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide additional aid and pursue joint production initiatives with Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB). The Ukrainian Ministry of Finance announced on July 11 that the United Kingdom (UK) approved a 1.7-billion-pound (roughly $2.3 billion) loan to finance improving Ukraine’s air defense capabilities.[5] The European Commission and Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation announced that Europe and Ukraine will partner in the BraveTech EU Initiative, which will work to accelerate the European DIB’s innovation cycle.[6] The European Commission reported that the BraveTech EU Initiative will expand on existing European Defense Fund (EDF) projects and will expand relationships between Ukrainian and European defense companies beginning in Fall 2025. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on July 10 that Ukraine signed an agreement with NATO Command Transformation allowing Ukrainian personnel to attend the Joint NATO-Ukraine Analysis, Training, and Education Center (JATEC).[7]

Ukraine continues to expand its production and innovation of interceptor drones for use against Shahed-type drones. Kyiv City Military Administration Head Timur Tkachenko announced on July 11 that Kyiv City will allocate 260 million hryvnia ($6.2 million) to Ukraine’s Clean Sky program aimed at using interceptor drones to defend Kyiv against nightly Russian long-range drone strikes.[8] Tkachenko stated that the program will fund additional equipment, the creation of an interceptor drone training center, and several mobile interceptor drone units. Tkachenko stated that the project has downed 550 Russian drones over Kyiv City in the last four months. Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk estimated that the project has downed almost 650 drones over Kyiv Oblast more broadly.[9] Ukrainian Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov stated that interceptor drones are downing dozens of Russian long-range drones each night.[10] Ukraine’s interceptor drones will play a critical role in lowering the cost of defense against nightly Russian drone and missile strikes, although US-provided Patriot air defense systems remain the only system capable of downing Russian ballistic missiles.

Ukrainian intelligence assesses that Russian forces are unlikely to realize the Kremlin’s goal of seizing the entirety of Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2025, which is consistent with ISW’s ongoing assessment of Russia’s offensive capabilities. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov assessed on July 11 that Russia’s goal of seizing all of Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2025 is “not realistic.”[11] Budanov stated that the Russian military command has also tasked Russian forces with advancing into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and establishing another 10-kilometer-deep buffer zone in the oblast. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa stated on June 5 that Russia intends to seize and occupy the full extent of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by September 1, 2025.[12] The Economist assessed on July 9 that it would take Russian forces until February 2028 to seize the remainder of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts (which Russia has illegally annexed) at their current rate of advance.[13] Russian efforts to seize Donetsk Oblast, enter Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and establish a 10-kilometer-deep buffer zone will likely exacerbate existing constraints in the Russian military by further extending the already degraded Russian Southern and Central groupings of forces that have been engaged in near constant combat operations in Donetsk Oblast since October 2023. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are taking very high casualties in return for disproportionately small gains in pursuit of their political and territorial ambitions.[14] It remains unclear on what basis the Russian military command imagined that it could seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast by September 2025.

Kremlin officials continue to justify the Kremlin’s ongoing censorship efforts and appear to be seizing on Russia’s hypercontrolled information space to push the Kremlin’s informal state ideology. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told Russian business magazine Expert on July 11 that the “situation that [Russia is] in” geopolitically and in relation to the increasing speed of information necessitates military censorship and that the Russian government is “justified” in its ongoing efforts to eliminate media outlets that are critical of the Kremlin.[15] Peskov praised the Russian media’s increase in positive “patriotic” content that generates feelings of loyalty to and pride in Russia. Peskov stated that he believes that the “patriotic” trend will continue and that the Kremlin will take into account the “mistakes” of the past when outlets, such as Russian opposition outlet Meduza, were allowed to criticize Russia broadly. Peskov stated that Russia will demand a “softer” informational policy in the future and that this will allow a number of “neutral” outlets to emerge. The Kremlin is unlikely to take an impartial view of the neutrality of media outlets in the future, however. Peskov stated in September 2024 that Russian media will shift to “freedom of information” if Russia emerges from this period of “acute inflammation,” referring to its war in Ukraine and the geopolitical situation.[16] The refusal to acknowledge that Russia is, in fact, engaged in a major war is part of the Kremlin’s general efforts to shape and distort the Russian information space.

Peskov’s recent statements signal that the Kremlin has not abandoned its wartime efforts to censor and centralize control over the Russian information space and is setting conditions to continue censorship efforts post-war. The Kremlin has been engaged in a wide censorship campaign aimed at controlling the narrative of the full-scale invasion since 2022. Russian officials have limited access to foreign websites and platforms, attempted to eliminate access to opposition media, and arrested administrators of Telegram channels that were publicly critical of Russian political and military leadership over the last three years.[17] The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions for long-term control of the information space as it attempts to leverage social media and traditional news outlets to create future generations less likely to question Kremlin decision-making and narratives. The Kremlin is currently establishing an informal state ideology that promotes Russian nationalism, perpetuates the idea that the West unfairly and unjustly seeks to collapse the Russian state, and mythologizes veterans of the Russian military.[18] The Kremlin’s efforts to encourage “patriotic” media are only one avenue through which the Kremlin is encouraging military service and loyalty to the Russian government throughout Russian society amid ongoing efforts to expand extracurricular youth military-political organizations and military education programs in Russian schools.[19]

Key Takeaways:

US President Donald Trump announced on July 10 that the United States will sell NATO weapons, including air defense systems and interceptors, that NATO can then give to Ukraine.

Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide additional aid and pursue joint production initiatives with Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB).

Ukraine continues to expand its production and innovation of interceptor drones for use against Shahed-type drones.

Ukrainian intelligence assesses that Russian forces are unlikely to realize the Kremlin’s goal of seizing the entirety of Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2025, which is consistent with ISW’s ongoing assessment of Russia’s offensive capabilities.

Kremlin officials continue to justify the Kremlin’s ongoing censorship efforts and appear to be seizing on Russia’s hypercontrolled information space to push the Kremlin’s informal state ideology.

Ukrainian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy and western Zaporizhia oblasts, and near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Toretsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 11.

Russian forces continued attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 10 and 11.[20] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[21]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near Tetkino and regularly attack Tetkino in groups of three to five personnel.[22]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[23]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military infrastructure and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities in the Russian deep rear. Sources in Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on July 11 that Ukrainian forces conducted a sabotage operation and damaged a Russian gas pipeline near Langepas, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug.[24] GUR sources told Suspilne that the pipeline supplies Russian DIB plants in Chelyabinsk, Orenburg, and Sverdlovsk oblasts and assessed that it will take Russia roughly a month to repair the pipeline. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 11 that Ukrainian drones struck the Voronin Aviation Plant in Lukhovitsy, Moscow Oblast.[25] Ukraine’s Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on July 11 that the Voronin Aviation Plant produces and modernizes Russian MiG aircraft, including the MiG-29 and MiG-31; develops new models of combat aircraft; and participates in the Shahed drone modernization cycle.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian special forces and security agencies struck the Shipunov Instrument Design Bureau in Tula, Tula Oblast, which produces missiles for the Zenit Missile and Zenit Missile-Gun anti-aircraft systems.[27]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 10 indicates that Russian forces advanced into northern Myropillia (northeast of Sumy City).[28]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Ryzhivka (northwest of Sumy City) and Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[29]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy City near Ryzhivka and Bezsalivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on July 10 and 11.[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Beszalivka, north of Sumy City, near Kindrativka and Andriivka, and northeast of Sumy City near Oleksiivka.[31]

Order of Battle: Drone and artillery elements of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz, including its Gunter Detachment, are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the direction of Oleksandrivske (northwest of Sumy City).[32] Drone elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast.[33] Drone elements of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly coordinating Russian air strikes on Ukrainian positions in Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[34] Elements of the 1434th “Akhmat-Chechnya” Regiment (1st Motorized Rifle Battalion) reportedly participated in the recent seizure of Novomykolaivka (north of Sumy City).[35] Elements of the 104th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Yunakivka.[36]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Zelene, Vovchansk, and Starytsya on July 10 and 11.[37]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported on July 11 that Russian forces continue attacking in small groups in Vovchansk and surrounding settlements, including at night, and are wearing anti-thermal ponchos in an attempt to hide from Ukrainian drones.[38] Shamshyn stated that Russian forces continue unsuccessful attempts to push Ukrainian positions away from the Vovcha River and that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant.

A Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the Kharkiv direction published footage on July 11 of Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drones striking and reportedly destroying a Pantsir-S1 air defense system in an unspecified area of Kharkiv Oblast.[39]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Kindrashivka (northwest of Kupyansk).[40]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[41]

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Petro-Ivanivka and Zapadne, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on July 10 and 11.[42]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported on July 11 that Russian forces attempted to modify a damaged bridge near Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk) in order to transfer infantry across the Oskil River, but that Ukrainian forces destroyed the bridge.[43]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Kontora Group (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kupyansk direction.[44] Elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kindrashivka.[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 10 that Russian forces advanced towards Borivska Andriivka (northeast of Borova).[46]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Novoyehorivka on July 10 and 11.[47] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces repelled several Ukrainian counterattacks near Bohuslavka (northeast of Borova) in the past week.[48]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[49] Russian sources are typically conservative when reporting on Ukrainian advances, indicating that Ukrainian forces likely advanced within Ridkodub.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 10 shows elements of the Russian 1428th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) operating in western and central Zelena Dolyna (north of Lyman), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[50] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 11 that Russian forces seized Zelena Dolyna.[51]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Karpivka, Zelena Dolyna, Serednie, and Novyi Myr; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske and the Serebryanske forest area on July 10 and 11.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 11 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zelena Dolyna, Yampolivka (northeast of Lyman), and Katerynivka (north of Lyman).[53]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[54]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka and toward Vyimka on July 10 and 11.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[56]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of and within southwestern Chasiv Yar.[57]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne, Bila Hora, and Stupochky; and immediately west of Chasiv Yar near Mykolaivka on July 10 and 11.[58]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Koptieve (west of Toretsk).[59]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating northwest of Toretsk advanced along the T-0516 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway, northwest of Yablunivka, southwest of Katerynivka, southeast of Rusyn Yar, and east of Popiv Yar.[60]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka, Popiv Yar, Poltavka, and Rusyn Yar; and toward Pleshchiivka, Katerynivka, and Stepanivka ; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on July 10 and 11.[61]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 10th Tank Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Oleksandro-Kalynove (northwest of Toretsk).[62] Elements of the 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating between Romanivka (southwest of Toretsk) and Katerynivka.[63] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) and drone operators of the 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (Toretsk) direction.[64]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 10 that Russian forces advanced north of Hrodivka (east of Pokrovsk).[65]

Russian forces continued assaults near Pokrovsk; northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Malynivka, and Razine and toward Rodinske; east of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka, Zvirove, and Shevchenko; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and toward Serhiivka on July 10 and 11.[66]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Typhoon Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[67]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Footage published on July 7 and geolocated on July 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in western Novoserhiivka (northwest of Novopavlivka).[68]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) and an unspecified Russian Spetsnaz Brigade recently advanced into central and south of Myrne (south of Novopavlivka).[69] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces seized Hrushivske (southwest of Novopavlivka).[70]

Russian forces continued assaults toward Novopavlivka; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Oleksiivka; south of Novopavlivka near Fedorivka, Yalta, Zaporizhzhia, Piddubne, and Myrne and Dachne, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Tovste and toward Novokhatske on July 10 and 11.[71]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction stated that Russian forces are concentrating many motorized rifle units near Horikhove and that many of these units are degraded.[72] The spokesperson stated that Russian infantry walk 10 to 15 kilometers to frontline positions before attacking due to the pervasiveness of Ukrainian drones in the area.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Muravka.[73] Elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly attacking near Piddubne and toward Oleksandrohrad (southwest of Novopavlivka).[74]

Russian forces attacked in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole and toward Voskresenka and Maliivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and Zelene Pole on July 10 and 11.[75]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Voskresenka.[76] Elements of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating southwest of Vilne Pole.[77] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[78] Drone operators of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Sichneve (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[79]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on July 11 but did not advance.[80]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Chervone (east of Hulyaipole).[81] Elements of the 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Hulyaipole direction.[82]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 11 indicates that Russian forces advanced into southern Plavni (west of Orikhiv).[83]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north and east of Kamyanske (west of Orikhiv).[84]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kamyanske.[85]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 108th and 247th Airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Kamyanske.[86] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohirya and Novodanylivka, and west of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka, and Stepnohirsk.[87] Drone operators of the 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novodanylivka.[88]

Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on July 10 and 11 but did not advance.[89]

Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with VDV and “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky on July 11 and inspected a Russian command post likely in occupied Kherson Oblast.[90]

Ukrainian forces recently struck Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on July 11 that GUR detonated a munition at a Russian military logistics hub in occupied Melitopol, killing five Rosgvardia personnel and destroying a satellite communications system.[91] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko, who frequently reports on Russian military activities in occupied southern Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts, published footage of a Ukrainian strike against a train carrying 20 Russian tanks between occupied Tokmak and Chernihivka on July 10 and reported on July 11 that the strike destroyed five of the tanks.[92]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 10 and 11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 79 Shahed-type strike drones and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[93] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 44 Shahed-type drones and that 16 drones were ”lost” or suppressed by electronic warfare (EW). Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes damaged residential infrastructure and injured at least 20 civilians in Kharkiv and Odesa cities.[94]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russian and Belarusian officials plan to develop a domestically trained artificial intelligence (AI) bot, likely to consolidate control over the information space within the Union State framework. State Secretary of the Union State Sergei Glazyev, a former Russian economic official, announced on July 11 that Russian and Belarusian officials plan to create an AI bot based on “traditional values.”[95]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.nbcnews.com/nightly-news/video/exclusive-phone-interview-with-president-trump-243043909525

[2] https://www.axios.com/2025/07/11/trump-ukraine-weapons-nato-allies-sell

[3] https://suspilne dot media/1063763-zelenskij-e-vsi-neobhidni-politicni-signali-pro-vidnovlenna-postacanna-dopomogi-vid-ssa/

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070325 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125

[5] https://mof.gov dot ua/uk/news/ukraine_will_receive_17_billion_under_the_uk_guarantee_to_strengthen_its_defense_capabilitiesthe_minister_of_finance_ceremonially_signed_the_loan_agreement-5238

[6] https://suspilne dot media/1064287-bravetech-eu-ek-z-mincifri-zapustili-iniciativu-z-rozvitku-oboronnih-innovacij-miz-es-i-ukrainou/ ; https://ec.europa dot eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1794

[7] https://mod dot gov.ua/news/pidtrimka-vijskovih-ta-vzayemosumisnist-ukrayina-ta-nato-pogliblyuyut-spivpraczyu-cherez-jatec; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/10/pidtrymka-vijskovyh-ta-vzayemosumisnist-ukrayina-ta-nato-poglyblyuyut-spivpraczyu-cherez-jatec/ ; https://suspilne dot media/1063937-minoboroni-i-nato-pidpisali-tehnicnu-ugodu-pro-spivpracu-spilnogo-centru-jatec-so-vona-peredbacae/

[8] https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1064179-proekt-ciste-nebo-u-kievi-zapuskaut-sistemu-perehoplenna-droniv/; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1480; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/11/u-kyyevi-zapuskayut-systemu-perehoplennya-vorozhyh-droniv-shho-vona-peredbachaye/

[9] https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/6232; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/11/12-ekipazhiv-i-ponad-600-znyshhenyh-bpla-yak-na-kyyivshhyni-praczyuyut-drony-perehoplyuvachi/

[10] https://suspilne dot media/1064317-droni-perehopluvaci-fedorov-rozpoviv-aka-robota-vedetsa-u-comu-napramku/

[11] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-11/ukraine-spy-chief-says-40-of-russian-ammunition-is-north-korean ; https://archive.ph/Vp790

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060625

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071025

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071025

[15] https://expert dot ru/mnenie/zhurnalistika-epokhi-transformatsii/

[16] https://tass dot ru/politika/21788727

[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011425 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/July%2014%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-12-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120724

[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025;

[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/primer-russian-cognitive-warfare https://isw.pub/UkrWar062225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123124; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122124

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026u6PngsoGtJzLBvk82QCLt1jBm3AzQqgoTpc4zLypSZJ6eZFwTxaPe8owozsLBcWl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02yRRHCfvbHVhNWbHFmZ4WmTroXVT8586t2bmd2nLhKXzwvUoDNo4cuXdxaAevTVAul; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0A2AWWhVC6tQ84bXXEfnG3c9bkZxUimr6YbaLz5KSCKfyrHF9BnQH7U6GMT8LsgbJl

[21] https://t.me/dva_majors/75134; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31129

[22] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31129

[23] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31104

[24] https://suspilne dot media/1064611-u-tumenskij-oblasti-rf-stavsa-vibuh-na-truboprovodi-akij-zabezpecue-gazom-rosijskij-vpk-dzerela/; https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1943686362462326923

[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cGSkrvNpVCMZoYByASrmsT6tGPCWsbazi1jnZPS9ZFWDJcReNC3fFAgpYi2EeTJGl ; https://suspilne dot media/1064549-sili-oboroni-vdarili-po-dvoh-zavodah-rosijskogo-vpk-u-moskovskij-ta-tulskij-oblastah/

[26] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9512 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/11/u-moskovskij-oblasti-rf-urazhenyj-aviazavod-shho-vygotovlyaye-vynyshhuvachi-mig-29-ta-mig-31/

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cGSkrvNpVCMZoYByASrmsT6tGPCWsbazi1jnZPS9ZFWDJcReNC3fFAgpYi2EeTJGl ; https://suspilne dot media/1064549-sili-oboroni-vdarili-po-dvoh-zavodah-rosijskogo-vpk-u-moskovskij-ta-tulskij-oblastah/

[28] https://www.instagram.com/reel/DL6kmxKtRXh/?igsh=MWs0OHh3enZ6eTIzaQ%3D%3D; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9564

[29] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31104; https://t.me/wargonzo/27807

[30] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31104; https://t.me/wargonzo/27807

[31] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31093; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38434; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31129

[32] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5830

[33] https://t.me/bella_Ciao44/9401

[34] https://t.me/dva_majors/75200

[35] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5831

[36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31104

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026u6PngsoGtJzLBvk82QCLt1jBm3AzQqgoTpc4zLypSZJ6eZFwTxaPe8owozsLBcWl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02yRRHCfvbHVhNWbHFmZ4WmTroXVT8586t2bmd2nLhKXzwvUoDNo4cuXdxaAevTVAul; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0A2AWWhVC6tQ84bXXEfnG3c9bkZxUimr6YbaLz5KSCKfyrHF9BnQH7U6GMT8LsgbJl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13567

[38] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1064085-okupanti-namagautsa-pronikati-na-teritoriu-agregatnogo-zavodu-u-vovcansku-v-antiteplovizijnih-ponco-otu-harkiv/

[39] https://t.me/fedorenkoys/1396; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/11/probyly-panczyr-na-harkivshhyni-urazyly-rosijsku-systemu-ppo/

[40] https://t.me/mangustzzzz/808; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1943390785518604631; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1943390788047769821; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1943390790564352048 ; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1943390785518604631; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1943423460870398091

[41] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9565 ; https://t.me/brigade_14/3349

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026u6PngsoGtJzLBvk82QCLt1jBm3AzQqgoTpc4zLypSZJ6eZFwTxaPe8owozsLBcWl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02yRRHCfvbHVhNWbHFmZ4WmTroXVT8586t2bmd2nLhKXzwvUoDNo4cuXdxaAevTVAul; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0A2AWWhVC6tQ84bXXEfnG3c9bkZxUimr6YbaLz5KSCKfyrHF9BnQH7U6GMT8LsgbJl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13567

[43] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1064085-okupanti-namagautsa-pronikati-na-teritoriu-agregatnogo-zavodu-u-vovcansku-v-antiteplovizijnih-ponco-otu-harkiv/

[44] https://t.me/dva_majors/75178; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95575

[45] https://t.me/mangustzzzz/808 ; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1943390785518604631 ; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1943390788047769821; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1943390790564352048 ; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1943390785518604631; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1943423460870398091

[46] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95557

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026u6PngsoGtJzLBvk82QCLt1jBm3AzQqgoTpc4zLypSZJ6eZFwTxaPe8owozsLBcWl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02yRRHCfvbHVhNWbHFmZ4WmTroXVT8586t2bmd2nLhKXzwvUoDNo4cuXdxaAevTVAul; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0A2AWWhVC6tQ84bXXEfnG3c9bkZxUimr6YbaLz5KSCKfyrHF9BnQH7U6GMT8LsgbJl;

[48] https://t.me/tass_agency/324849

[49] https://deepstatemap.live/en#13/49.1762610/37.7984619; https:// t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31128; https:// t.me/motopatriot78/38447

[50] https://t.me/operationall_space/5111; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9558; https://t.me/rian_ru/304512; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1943698048263291044; https://t.me/osintpen/1409;

[51] https://t.me/tass_agency/324887; https://t.me/mod_russia/54591; https://t.me/dva_majors/75173 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95582 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38447 ; https://t.me/sashakots/54851; https://t.me/tass_agency/324900; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95587; https://t.me/tass_agency/324904; https://t.me/mod_russia/54595; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65784 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65789; https://t.me/rybar/72074; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/20204; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31128

[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026u6PngsoGtJzLBvk82QCLt1jBm3AzQqgoTpc4zLypSZJ6eZFwTxaPe8owozsLBcWl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02yRRHCfvbHVhNWbHFmZ4WmTroXVT8586t2bmd2nLhKXzwvUoDNo4cuXdxaAevTVAul; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0A2AWWhVC6tQ84bXXEfnG3c9bkZxUimr6YbaLz5KSCKfyrHF9BnQH7U6GMT8LsgbJl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13567; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31143

[53] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31128; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31143;

[54] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31088

[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026u6PngsoGtJzLBvk82QCLt1jBm3AzQqgoTpc4zLypSZJ6eZFwTxaPe8owozsLBcWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02yRRHCfvbHVhNWbHFmZ4WmTroXVT8586t2bmd2nLhKXzwvUoDNo4cuXdxaAevTVAul ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0A2AWWhVC6tQ84bXXEfnG3c9bkZxUimr6YbaLz5KSCKfyrHF9BnQH7U6GMT8LsgbJl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13567 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31088

[56] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31088

[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31140 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38456

[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026u6PngsoGtJzLBvk82QCLt1jBm3AzQqgoTpc4zLypSZJ6eZFwTxaPe8owozsLBcWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02yRRHCfvbHVhNWbHFmZ4WmTroXVT8586t2bmd2nLhKXzwvUoDNo4cuXdxaAevTVAul ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0A2AWWhVC6tQ84bXXEfnG3c9bkZxUimr6YbaLz5KSCKfyrHF9BnQH7U6GMT8LsgbJl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13567 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31140 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38456

[59] https://www.instagram.com/reel/DL98N51M1FX/?igsh=MTE4aW9mdHpjZGJiZw%3D%3D; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9567

[60] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31098 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38408 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75134 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27807 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38461

[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026u6PngsoGtJzLBvk82QCLt1jBm3AzQqgoTpc4zLypSZJ6eZFwTxaPe8owozsLBcWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02yRRHCfvbHVhNWbHFmZ4WmTroXVT8586t2bmd2nLhKXzwvUoDNo4cuXdxaAevTVAul ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0A2AWWhVC6tQ84bXXEfnG3c9bkZxUimr6YbaLz5KSCKfyrHF9BnQH7U6GMT8LsgbJl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13567

[62] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14021

[63] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38408

[64] https://t.me/dva_majors/75130 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31104 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38461

[65] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31096

[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026u6PngsoGtJzLBvk82QCLt1jBm3AzQqgoTpc4zLypSZJ6eZFwTxaPe8owozsLBcWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02yRRHCfvbHVhNWbHFmZ4WmTroXVT8586t2bmd2nLhKXzwvUoDNo4cuXdxaAevTVAul ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0A2AWWhVC6tQ84bXXEfnG3c9bkZxUimr6YbaLz5KSCKfyrHF9BnQH7U6GMT8LsgbJl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13567 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31096

[67] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38462; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38431

[68] https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1943604608305119460; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38240

[69] https://t.me/dva_majors/75134 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95570 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38435 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38458 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38467 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65808

[70] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65810

[71] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171988 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026u6PngsoGtJzLBvk82QCLt1jBm3AzQqgoTpc4zLypSZJ6eZFwTxaPe8owozsLBcWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02yRRHCfvbHVhNWbHFmZ4WmTroXVT8586t2bmd2nLhKXzwvUoDNo4cuXdxaAevTVAul ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0A2AWWhVC6tQ84bXXEfnG3c9bkZxUimr6YbaLz5KSCKfyrHF9BnQH7U6GMT8LsgbJl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13567

[72] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/11/chymalo-vzvodiv-rot-bataljoniv-vtratyly-boyezdatnist-poblyzu-pokrovska-desantnyky-peremelyuyut-rosiyan/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA

[73] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38416

[74] https://t.me/voin_dv/15931

[75] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026u6PngsoGtJzLBvk82QCLt1jBm3AzQqgoTpc4zLypSZJ6eZFwTxaPe8owozsLBcWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02yRRHCfvbHVhNWbHFmZ4WmTroXVT8586t2bmd2nLhKXzwvUoDNo4cuXdxaAevTVAul ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0A2AWWhVC6tQ84bXXEfnG3c9bkZxUimr6YbaLz5KSCKfyrHF9BnQH7U6GMT8LsgbJl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13567 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38444

[76] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38471

[77] https://t.me/voin_dv/15931

[78] https://t.me/voin_dv/15924

[79] https://t.me/voin_dv/15922

[80] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02yRRHCfvbHVhNWbHFmZ4WmTroXVT8586t2bmd2nLhKXzwvUoDNo4cuXdxaAevTVAul; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0bxKHKH6ENpjmY6CLZTv65nBFe6Eb6v4xdLBuDEgXWgZ2TPEBocXA82Lk7jWucDUcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0A2AWWhVC6tQ84bXXEfnG3c9bkZxUimr6YbaLz5KSCKfyrHF9BnQH7U6GMT8LsgbJl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13567

[81] https://t.me/voin_dv/15920

[82] https://t.me/voin_dv/15923

[83] https://t.me/krulaomegu/697; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9566

[84] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38438

[85] https://t.me/dva_majors/75134; https://t.me/wargonzo/27807

[86] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31104

[87] https://t.me/dva_majors/75200

[88] https://t.me/dva_majors/75132

[89] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02yRRHCfvbHVhNWbHFmZ4WmTroXVT8586t2bmd2nLhKXzwvUoDNo4cuXdxaAevTVAul; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0bxKHKH6ENpjmY6CLZTv65nBFe6Eb6v4xdLBuDEgXWgZ2TPEBocXA82Lk7jWucDUcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0A2AWWhVC6tQ84bXXEfnG3c9bkZxUimr6YbaLz5KSCKfyrHF9BnQH7U6GMT8LsgbJl;

[90] https://t.me/mod_russia/54599; https://t.me/mod_russia/54600

[91] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/hurkit-u-melitopoli-znyshcheno-piatero-zaharbnykiv-ta-vorozhu-stantsiiu-upravlinnia-viiskamy.html

[92] https://t.me/andriyshTime/40175; https://t.me/andriyshTime/40142

[93] https://t.me/kpszsu/38164

[94] https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2796 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1063875-rosia-atakuvala-harkiv-bezpilotnikami-vranci-11-lipna-naslidki/ ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1063881-nicna-ataka-na-cuguiv-harkivskoi-oblasti-11-lipna-e-postrazdali-poskodzenij-medzaklad-ta-pidpriemstvo/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/11/vorog-atakuvav-harkiv-shahedamy-9-postrazhdalyh-vybuhamy-zachepylo-pologovyj-budynok/; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2801; https://t.me/synegubov/15702 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15715 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2799 ; https://t.me/astrapress/86212; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1063973-odesa-pid-atakou-rosijskih-bpla-u-misti-cutno-vibuhi/; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1064133-ataka-na-odesu-e-travmovani-poskodzeno-budivli-avto-ta-stajnu/;

[95] https://belta dot by/society/view/gossekretar-sg-nasha-zadacha-razrabotat-sobstvennyj-ii-osnovannyj-na-traditsionnyh-tsennostjah-725782-2025/; https://belta dot by/society/view/glazjev-strategiju-formirovanija-edinogo-informprostranstva-my-dolzhny-predstavit-do-kontsa-goda-725775-2025/; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/323091; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/323081; https://suspilne dot media/1064575-rf-ta-bilorus-planuut-stvoriti-vlasnij-stucnij-intelekt-zasnovanij-na-tradicijnih-cinnostah/

Anna Harvey, Jessica Sobieski, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, and Karolina Hird

July 9, 2025, 6:15 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on July 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces conducted the largest combined drone and missile strike of the war so far on the night of July 8 to 9 with 741 total drones and missiles — an about 34 percent increase from the previous record high of 550 Russian drones and missiles launched on the night of July 3 to 4.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 728 Shahed-type strike and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[2] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched seven Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles from Engels Raion, Saratov Oblast and from Kursk Oblast, and six Kh-47M2 Khinzhal aeroballistic missiles from Lipetsk Oblast airspace. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 718 of the drones and missiles, including seven Kh-101/Iskander-K missiles shot down, 296 Shahed-type drones shot down, and 415 drones “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted Lutsk, Volyn Oblast, and Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes damaged a warehouse, private enterprise, and civilian areas in Lutsk.[3] Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes also hit residential areas, an enterprise, and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[4] Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk reported that the July 8 to 9 Russian strike was one of the largest strikes targeting Kyiv Oblast and that the strikes lasted for over seven hours.[5] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces used interceptor drones to repel the strike and downed “tens” of drones.[6]

The New York Times reported on July 9 that military analysts estimate that Russia will be able to routinely launch over 1,000 drones per strike package by Fall 2025, echoing a recent warning from Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Commander Major Robert Brovdi that Russia could escalate its strike packages to include over 1,000 Shahed-type drones per day.[7] Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov estimated on June 20 that Russia has increased Shahed production sevenfold and forecasted that Russian strike packages may soon incorporate up to 800 Shaheds — a forecast that is in line with the July 8 to 9 Russian strike package.[8] ISW previously reported that Russia is significantly expanding its long-range drone production capabilities for modified Geran-2 drones (the Russian-made analogue of the Iranian-origin Shahed-136 drones), including by opening production lines with companies in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).[9]

The continued increase in the size of strike packages is likely intended to support Russian efforts to degrade Ukrainian morale in the face of constant Russian aggression. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that Russian forces used over 400 decoy drones in this strike package in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense.[10] Russian forces have equipped their decoy long-range drones with warheads and have also modified their strike drones with warheads designed to inflict a wide spread of damage, indicating that Russian forces aim to maximize damage against areas in Ukraine writ large — which disproportionately affects civilian areas.[11] Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vitaly Sarantsev stated in an interview with the Washington Post on July 9 that recent Russian strikes against Ukrainian military registration and enlistment offices seek to disrupt Ukrainian force generation efforts.[12] Sarantsev stated that Russia aims to sow fear among Ukrainians and create the perception that it is dangerous to go to recruitment and enlistment offices. ISW assessed in previous years that Russia has used strike packages targeting civilian areas to generate a morale effect in Ukraine, as seems to be the case with the most recent strikes.[13]

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found that Russian forces and pro-Russian separatists engaged in illegal military activity in Ukraine between 2014 and 2022. The ECHR found Russian forces and pro-Russian separatists guilty of a pattern of human rights abuses during conflicts in eastern Ukraine and in the first months of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine between May 2014 and September 2022, including indiscriminate military attacks, torture, summary executions, the use of rape as a weapon of war, and the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children.[14] The ECHR noted that Russia ceased to be a member of the European Convention as of September 16, 2022, and that Russia remains culpable for actions prior to this date. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rejected the ECHR’s findings as “null and void” and insignificant.[15] ISW has previously assessed that Russia perpetuates a systemic pattern of conflict-related human rights abuses, including the consistent deportation and indoctrination of Ukrainian children, torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians, the use of chemical weapons on the battlefield, and indiscriminate military actions that disproportionately affect civilians. These abuses have continued well beyond September 2022 and remain a core part of Russia’s military culture, style of offensive operations, and policy of occupation to this day.[16]

The ECHR also determined on July 9 that Russia is responsible for the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) in 2014, which killed 298 passengers and crew, including Dutch nationals.[17] The ECHR concluded that Russia had not followed proper safety measures when firing the missile and did not conduct an “effective investigation” in the aftermath of the event.

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces conducted the largest combined drone and missile strike of the war so far on the night of July 8 to 9 with 741 total drones and missiles — an about 34 percent increase from the previous record high of 550 Russian drones and missiles launched on the night of July 3 to 4.

The continued increase in the size of strike packages is likely intended to support Russian efforts to degrade Ukrainian morale in the face of constant Russian aggression.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found that Russian forces and pro-Russian separatists engaged in illegal military activity in Ukraine between 2014 and 2022.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 9.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 8 and 9.[18] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked in the directions of Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[19]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) and 91st Sapper-Engineer Regiment (reportedly under the operational command of the Northern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly operating in the Kursk Oblast border area.[20]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Mohrytsia (northeast of Sumy City).[21]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast, including north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on July 8 and 9.[22] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka (north of Sumy City), Oleksiivka, and Kindrativka.[23]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division, 155th Naval Infantry (Pacific Fleet), Smuglyanka Detachment, and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[24]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[25]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Kharkiv City toward Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on July 8 and 9.[26]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Kupyansk near Kalynove, Radkivka, and Holubivka and toward Hryhorivka and Ambarne (both near the international border); northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and Krasne Pershe and toward Petro-Ivanivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Novoosynove on July 8 and 9.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Milove (north of Kupyansk near the international border).[28]

A Ukrainian drone regiment commander operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces are trying to expand their bridgehead on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River and bypass Kupyansk from the north, cutting off Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs).[29]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[30] Drone operators of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk.[31]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Kopanky (east of Borova).[32]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zahryzove on July 8 and 9.[33]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Borova direction reported on July 9 that Ukrainian forces used unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for the first time to conduct a ground assault, seize positions, and force Russian forces to surrender.[34] The brigade stated that Ukrainian forces also used first-person view (FPV) drones during the assault.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Kopanky.[35]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Hlushchenkove and west of Lypove (both north of Lyman), as well as north of and within central Zelena Dolyna (northeast of Lyman).[36]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Lyman toward Serednie and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Karpivka, and Novyi Myr; northeast of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna; and east of Lyman near Torske on July 8 and 9.[37] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ridkodub, Yampolivka (northeast of Lyman), and Torske.[38]

An officer in a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces are attacking in small platoons consisting of 20 to 25 personnel, who divide into two to three squads and accumulate in different areas throughout the day.[39] The officer stated that Russian forces are trying to seize dominant tactical heights in order to conduct drone strikes against Ukrainian logistics.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly operating near Zelena Dolyna.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into northeastern Siversk.[41] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger rejected claims that Russian forces advanced into Siversk, claiming that Russian forces have not yet consolidated positions along the Serebryanka-Verkhnokamyanske line (northeast to east of Siversk) and still need to cross about five kilometers of open fields before reaching the outskirts of Siversk.[42] The milblogger stated that Ukrainian fortifications and drone operations will impede Russian attempts to advance on Siversk.

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka and Ivano-Darivka on July 8 and 9.[43]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized a large portion of Verkhnokamyanske, indicating that Russian forces likely do not have full control over the settlement.[44]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, Stupochky, and Predtechyne on July 8 and 9.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bila Hora.[46]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian claims of the seizure of Predtechyne are unconfirmed.[47]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) and artillery elements of the 106th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Chasiv Yar.[48]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently recaptured positions northwest of and in western Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk).[49]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 8 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Nelipivka (northwest of Toretsk).[50]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north and northwest of Zorya (west of Toretsk).[51]

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Toretsk; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka, Rusyn Yar, Popiv Yar, and Poltavka and toward Katerynivka, Oleksandro-Kalynove, and Pleshchiivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on July 8 and 9.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dyliivka.[53]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces have reduced the intensity of their ground attacks in the Toretsk direction.[54]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 3rd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) and 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Yablunivka.[55] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[56]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces continued ground attacks toward Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk toward Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske, Razine, Novoekonomichne, and Malynivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, Mykolaivka, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Promin and Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, and Zvirove and toward Novopidhorodne on July 9 and 10.[57]

Trehubov stated that Russian forces are attempting to reach Kostyantynivka from the Pokrovsk direction after having failed to reach Kostyantynivka from the Chasiv Yar and Toretsk directions.[58] Trehubov reported that Russian forces have deployed additional forces to the Pokrovsk direction and have now concentrated roughly 100,000 personnel in the area, likely including personnel in the Russian near-rear and rear.[59] A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are now using scooters rather than motorcycles in assaults and are attempting to achieve tactical surprise against Ukrainian forces by employing new tactics.[60]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 37th Railway Brigade (Russian Railway Troops) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[61]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 9 shows Russian forces raising a flag in Tovste (southwest of Novopavlivka), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[62] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 9 that Russian forces seized Tovste.[63] Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) with the seizure of Tovste.[64]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Tovste, north of Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka), north of Dachne (southeast of Novopavlivka in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast), and in southwestern Myrne (south of Novopavlivka).[65]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka, Zelenyi Kut, and Horikhove; and south of Novopavlivka near Yalta, Myrne, Zaporizhzhia, Piddubne, and Komar on July 8 and 9.[66]

Trehubov denied claims that Russian forces seized Dachne and stated that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the settlement.[67] A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction stated that small Russian assault groups are trying to break through to Dachne but that Russian forces have not seized the settlement.[68]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Muravka, and elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Fedorivka (south of Novopavlivka).[69] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Myrne.[70]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 6 and 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west and southwest of Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[71]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Voskresenka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[72]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Voskresenka, Vilne Pole, and Shevchenko; west of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on July 8 and 9.[73]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Komyshuvakha (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[74] Elements of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[75]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on July 8 and 9 but did not advance.[76]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern and southeastern Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv) and south of Plavni (just north of Kamyanske).[77]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka and west of Orikhiv near Plavni on July 9.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kamyanske.[79]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Nemets group of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[80] Elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[81] Elements of the 108th and 247th airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 7th VDV Division) and 1152nd Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (58th CAA) are reportedly operating near Kamyanske.[82]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on July 8 and 9 but did not advance.[83]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2025

[2] https://t.me/kpszsu/38013

[3] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15019; https://www.facebook.com/Rudnytskyi.Ivan/posts/pfbid0KP3hZgzfMEqm9wjHAeTyHpfwSG2JNyW7RGS81y129TTnPaiBKKyazmL7L4VZfpzUl?ref=embed_post; https://t.me/volynskaODA/8334; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/09/ataka-rf-po-volyni-vorog-vypustyv-50-bpla-i-5-raket/; https://suspilne dot media/lutsk/1061985-pid-cas-rosijskoi-povitranoi-ataki-u-lucku-lunali-vibuhi/; https://www.facebook.com/ihor.polishchuk/videos/1709625623251693/?__cft__[0]=AZUsFRDye8TgigHjuZgUofdk1Lf5IzIE0mhDao2jzk3wiFKzHHHLSgi9ZmcK6Lq-p4Vj2qwIqljEcI384XffXiT04mL7LGyHYP6PrDnWzFSN0Mta1ZRBq9CCBDEzGXkZ5jWxK60EucsRN7gnj08gSyhkY60aPQ8P34vrQyfH0kguXLzkNdYlMj3Xt-30SDzymNRZLdCDxzVVyeR8PK_kY9G0&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[4] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15019; https://t.me/synegubov/15607; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1062171-vogon-pidijsov-vpritul-do-budinkiv-deaki-poskodiv-aki-masstabi-zajmanna-pidpriemstva-na-kiivsini-pisla-ataki-rf/; https://t.me/kyivoda/30884; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/09/kyyivshhyna-zaznala-odniyeyi-z-najmasovanishyh-atak-v-ova-rozpovily-pro-naslidky/; https://t.me/zhytomyrskaODA/13007; https://suspilne dot media/zhytomyr/1062055-masovana-ataka-armii-rf-na-zitomirsini-poskodzenni-virobnici-primisenna-i-zitlovi-budinki/

[5] https://t.me/kyivoda/30884; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/09/kyyivshhyna-zaznala-odniyeyi-z-najmasovanishyh-atak-v-ova-rozpovily-pro-naslidky/

[6] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15019

[7] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/09/world/europe/russia-ukraine-attack-weapons-trump-putin.html; https://kyivindependent dot com/there-will-be-1-000-units-per-day-ukrainian-commander-warns-of-increased-russian-shahed-drone-attacks-06-2025/

[8] https://www.unian dot ua/weapons/shahedi-flesh-poyasniv-chogo-varto-boyatisya-ukrajincyam-13043865.html?fbclid=IwY2xjawLCS41leHRuA2FlbQIxMABicmlkETEwelp1SjhtSFduUU5WTHRIAR4ExaFHF65wLqRNeMe8MtCVzA-P9oV_yVrEZwUBA55z_fGmwK343klOfWUHSg_aem_uhBpFekZtpfod4L1XooAZw#goog_rewarded; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062125;

[9] https://isw.pub/ForceGen061125 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-14-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-8-2025

[10] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/09/litaky-gelikoptery-zenitni-drony-u-povitryanyh-sylah-povidomyly-yak-vidbyvaly-rekordnu-vorozhu-ataku/

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-6-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070425 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/primer-russian-cognitive-warfare

[12] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/07/09/ukraine-russia-recruitment-centers/

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar123022 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121622; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2023

[14] https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/press-q-a-ukraine-netherlands-russia-eng; https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-russia-european-human-rights-court-mh17-1bac36842f8a4cfe0e3e787f0fab0c1f

[15] https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/686e5e699a7947fa5f30a2bc; https://t.me/tass_agency/324533

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20January%209%2C%202025%20%28PDF%29.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-may-5-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlins-occupation-playbook-coerced-russification-and-ethnic-cleansing-occupied; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-june-17-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060225; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21-2023; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080723; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-19-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2023;

[17] https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/press-q-a-ukraine-netherlands-russia-eng; https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-russia-european-human-rights-court-mh17-1bac36842f8a4cfe0e3e787f0fab0c1f

[18] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26446; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02c7htTnBPGQ7rm8WjJV5Azkd8xB5RD3hJiVWA9ZySJPzAAJgYDo7QTy8x7X2hHfCsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DzvY3F4cdyRgtJrQVMrPy6LupRSkwmQe9qtZrJkBZdaFHrqLE85nMVV9EWVk4Y8Fl

[19] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31028; https://t.me/dva_majors/74983; https://t.me/wargonzo/27770

[20] https://t.me/tass_agency/324489; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30992

[21] https://t.me/rybar/72004

[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26446; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02c7htTnBPGQ7rm8WjJV5Azkd8xB5RD3hJiVWA9ZySJPzAAJgYDo7QTy8x7X2hHfCsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DzvY3F4cdyRgtJrQVMrPy6LupRSkwmQe9qtZrJkBZdaFHrqLE85nMVV9EWVk4Y8Fl; https://t.me/rybar/72007; https://t.me/rybar/72004

[23] https://t.me/rybar/72004; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31014; https://t.me/dva_majors/74983

[24] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30992; https://t.me/dva_majors/74975; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171806

[25] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30977?single

[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26446; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02c7htTnBPGQ7rm8WjJV5Azkd8xB5RD3hJiVWA9ZySJPzAAJgYDo7QTy8x7X2hHfCsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DzvY3F4cdyRgtJrQVMrPy6LupRSkwmQe9qtZrJkBZdaFHrqLE85nMVV9EWVk4Y8Fl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13411; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30977?single

[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26446; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02c7htTnBPGQ7rm8WjJV5Azkd8xB5RD3hJiVWA9ZySJPzAAJgYDo7QTy8x7X2hHfCsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DzvY3F4cdyRgtJrQVMrPy6LupRSkwmQe9qtZrJkBZdaFHrqLE85nMVV9EWVk4Y8Fl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13411; https://t.me/rybar/72012

[28] https://t.me/dva_majors/74983

[29] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/09/vse-guste-ryasne-buyaye-protyvnyk-czym-korystuyetsya-poblyzu-kupyanska-vorog-ne-zalyshaye-sprob-ruhatysya-vpered/

[30] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95411

[31] https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/8604; https://t.me/voin_dv/15892

[32] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1942709807884165133 https://t.me/operationall_space/5064

[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02c7htTnBPGQ7rm8WjJV5Azkd8xB5RD3hJiVWA9ZySJPzAAJgYDo7QTy8x7X2hHfCsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DzvY3F4cdyRgtJrQVMrPy6LupRSkwmQe9qtZrJkBZdaFHrqLE85nMVV9EWVk4Y8Fl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13411

[34] https://t.me/ab3army/5702; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/09/bezpreczedentna-operacziya-rosiyany-vpershe-v-istoriyi-kapitulyuvaly-pered-nazemnymy-robotamy/

[35] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1942709807884165133 https://t.me/operationall_space/5064

[36] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38311; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171859; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31025

[37] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13411; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DzvY3F4cdyRgtJrQVMrPy6LupRSkwmQe9qtZrJkBZdaFHrqLE85nMVV9EWVk4Y8Fl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DzvY3F4cdyRgtJrQVMrPy6LupRSkwmQe9qtZrJkBZdaFHrqLE85nMVV9EWVk4Y8Fl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26446; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02c7htTnBPGQ7rm8WjJV5Azkd8xB5RD3hJiVWA9ZySJPzAAJgYDo7QTy8x7X2hHfCsl

[38] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38334; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/20187

[39] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1061773-nastup-rosijskoi-armii-na-limanskomu-napramku-zahlinuvsa-oficer-3-mehanizovanogo-bataljonu-115-ombr/

[40] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38311

[41] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171859

[42] https://t.me/rybar/72023

[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26446; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02c7htTnBPGQ7rm8WjJV5Azkd8xB5RD3hJiVWA9ZySJPzAAJgYDo7QTy8x7X2hHfCsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DzvY3F4cdyRgtJrQVMrPy6LupRSkwmQe9qtZrJkBZdaFHrqLE85nMVV9EWVk4Y8Fl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13411

[44] https://t.me/smotri_z/46109

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26446; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02c7htTnBPGQ7rm8WjJV5Azkd8xB5RD3hJiVWA9ZySJPzAAJgYDo7QTy8x7X2hHfCsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DzvY3F4cdyRgtJrQVMrPy6LupRSkwmQe9qtZrJkBZdaFHrqLE85nMVV9EWVk4Y8Fl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13411; https://t.me/rusich_army/24603

[46] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95428

[47] https://t.me/rusich_army/24603

[48] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1942950410047865016; https://t.me/rodnaya98vdd/1682; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30992

[49] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1942701234760343754 https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/23728

[50] https://t.me/voron1OO/180; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1942842365582200949

[51] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31948

[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26446; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02c7htTnBPGQ7rm8WjJV5Azkd8xB5RD3hJiVWA9ZySJPzAAJgYDo7QTy8x7X2hHfCsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DzvY3F4cdyRgtJrQVMrPy6LupRSkwmQe9qtZrJkBZdaFHrqLE85nMVV9EWVk4Y8Fl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13411; https://t.me/rusich_army/24603

[53] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95428

[54] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1062277-rf-zoseredila-osnovni-sili-na-pokrovskomu-ta-novopavlivskomu-napramkah-zsu-strimuut-nastup/

[55] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1942701234760343754 https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/23728; https://t.me/nm_dnr/14016

[56] https://t.me/tass_agency/324501

[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26446; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02c7htTnBPGQ7rm8WjJV5Azkd8xB5RD3hJiVWA9ZySJPzAAJgYDo7QTy8x7X2hHfCsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DzvY3F4cdyRgtJrQVMrPy6LupRSkwmQe9qtZrJkBZdaFHrqLE85nMVV9EWVk4Y8Fl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13411;

[58] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1062277-rf-zoseredila-osnovni-sili-na-pokrovskomu-ta-novopavlivskomu-napramkah-zsu-strimuut-nastup/

[59] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1062277-rf-zoseredila-osnovni-sili-na-pokrovskomu-ta-novopavlivskomu-napramkah-zsu-strimuut-nastup/

[60] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/09/navchyty-motoczyklista-i-obnulyty-za-odyn-shturm-rosiyany-poblyzu-pokrovska-vygaduyut-novi-taktyky/

[61] https://t.me/mod_russia/54524

[62] https://t.me/osintpen/1391; https://t.me/voin_dv/15899; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9547; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1942868625876213977; https://x.com/voin_dv/status/19428634455700622;

[63] https://t.me/mod_russia/54532; https://t.me/mod_russia/54535; https://t.me/mod_russia/54530

[64] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1942868625876213977; https://x.com/voin_dv/status/1942863544455700622; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65749; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95456

[65] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65748; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38314 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38296; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38291 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171859

[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26446; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02c7htTnBPGQ7rm8WjJV5Azkd8xB5RD3hJiVWA9ZySJPzAAJgYDo7QTy8x7X2hHfCsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DzvY3F4cdyRgtJrQVMrPy6LupRSkwmQe9qtZrJkBZdaFHrqLE85nMVV9EWVk4Y8Fl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13411; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171830

[67] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1062277-rf-zoseredila-osnovni-sili-na-pokrovskomu-ta-novopavlivskomu-napramkah-zsu-strimuut-nastup/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8

[68] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1062169-rf-namagaetsa-prorvatisa-do-dacnogo-na-dnipropetrovsini-sili-oboroni-trimaut-rubiz-37-obrmp/

[69] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38329; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38333; https://t.me/voin_dv/15903

[70] https://t.me/voin_dv/15896

[71] https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1GGwAFkqj4/; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9544; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DL4JVrHKiX6/?igsh=bWhpeTAxYXljbThq; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9546

[72] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38333

[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26446; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02c7htTnBPGQ7rm8WjJV5Azkd8xB5RD3hJiVWA9ZySJPzAAJgYDo7QTy8x7X2hHfCsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DzvY3F4cdyRgtJrQVMrPy6LupRSkwmQe9qtZrJkBZdaFHrqLE85nMVV9EWVk4Y8Fl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13411

[74] https://t.me/voin_dv/15895

[75] https://t.me/voin_dv/15897

[76] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02c7htTnBPGQ7rm8WjJV5Azkd8xB5RD3hJiVWA9ZySJPzAAJgYDo7QTy8x7X2hHfCsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DzvY3F4cdyRgtJrQVMrPy6LupRSkwmQe9qtZrJkBZdaFHrqLE85nMVV9EWVk4Y8Fl; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0GYuSeKGVrFPAbE6wRHGGqp7pwZkGuLNQVjPpu5LT4VQf84gjtWqLRFGMQighaeUEl

[77] https://t.me/rybar/72007; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65736

[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26446; https://t.me/rybar/72007; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65736

[79] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31007

[80] https://t.me/wargonzo/27764

[81] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31007

[82] https://t.me/rybar/72003; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95431; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30992; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31007; https://t.me/wargonzo/27775

[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26446; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02c7htTnBPGQ7rm8WjJV5Azkd8xB5RD3hJiVWA9ZySJPzAAJgYDo7QTy8x7X2hHfCsl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0GYuSeKGVrFPAbE6wRHGGqp7pwZkGuLNQVjPpu5LT4VQf84gjtWqLRFGMQighaeUEl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DzvY3F4cdyRgtJrQVMrPy6LupRSkwmQe9qtZrJkBZdaFHrqLE85nMVV9EWVk4Y8Fl