Jennie Olmsted, Olivia Gibson, Christina Harward, Daria Novikov, Grace Mappes, and Karolina Hird

July 17, 2025, 7:15 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Russia’s Central Bank continues efforts to maintain the facade of domestic economic stability by pursuing economic policies that will likely exacerbate Russia’s economic instability. Bloomberg reported on July 17, citing the Russian Central Bank’s June 2025 monthly report, that Russia’s seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of inflation decreased to four percent in June 2025, in line with Russia’s four percent target inflation rate.[1] Bloomberg assessed the decrease in the SAAR of inflation as the first indicator that the Central Bank’s efforts to lower the inflation rate have been successful. The Russian Central Bank report cautioned that the official annual inflation rate remains at nine percent, but assessed that if the current trajectory continues, the inflation rate could hit the target of four percent sometime in 2026. The SAAR is a short-term measurement, however, and its decrease is unlikely to positively impact the Russian economy in the long term. The Russian Central Bank reported that the cost of interest-bearing instruments — financial assets that generate interest — significantly decreased in June 2025, and that investors expect an average key interest rate below 18 percent between August 2025 and October 2025. The Russian Central Bank’s report claimed that a strong Russian ruble significantly contributed to the SAAR decrease. A strong ruble increases Russia’s purchasing power on the global market, which in turn decreases the ruble cost of imported goods such as machinery and technology, lowering input costs (expenses to produce goods or services) and inflationary pressure (that increases the price of goods and services over time) on firms that rely on imported components. A strengthened ruble softens the blow of Western sanctions as it makes parallel imports cheaper and keeps substitutes affordable. ISW assesses that secondary sanctions will likely further impact the Russian economy by undercutting Russian oil revenues and cheaper imports using the strengthened ruble, both of which are essential for the Kremlin’s financing of its war against Ukraine. The Russian Central Bank reported two potential complicating factors in lowering the interest rate: the eventual waning of effects from earlier bouts of ruble strengthening that helped slow price growth in June 2025, and the ongoing rise in the cost of services, despite a stabilization of the exchange rate and cost of goods sensitive to credit.

Russia’s unsustainably high payments to soldiers and the impacts of the resulting domestic labor shortage will likely further destabilize the Russian economy, regardless of the Kremlin’s claims of economic stability. Russia’s strategy of incentivizing volunteer recruitment by offering large one-time payments to recruits and simultaneous efforts to rapidly expand its defense industrial base (DIB) since 2022 has required Russia to significantly increase payments to both sustain military recruitment and to augment the DIB’s labor force.[2] Russia has had to significantly increase the federal and regional one-time bonuses to incentivize Russians to sign military contracts rather than take other jobs, given high Russian casualty rates.[3] Competition between Russia’s DIB and civilian enterprises is raising the average salary for these positions and is raising prices in service industries writ large. These factors, coupled with labor shortages in the civilian and defense sectors, are likely contributing to the divergence between the cost of goods and services in the Central Bank’s report by limiting Russian economic growth, force generation efforts, and defense industrial production. ISW continues to assess that Russia cannot indefinitely replace its forces at the current casualty rate without an involuntary reserve mobilization, which Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown great reluctance to order, nor can it sustain increasingly high payments to recruits, which the Russian economy cannot afford.[4] Russia is effectively burning the candle at both ends by simultaneously loosening monetary policy to stimulate short-term growth, while expanding fiscal expenditure to feed the military effort. This strategy will likely adversely affect the Russian economy by weakening consumer purchasing power, devaluing the ruble in the medium- to long-term, and creating deeper macroeconomic instability.

Russian bankers are reportedly privately expressing concerns over a growing number of non-performing (late and unpaid) loans despite the Russian Central Bank’s claims of economic stability. Bloomberg reported on July 17 that unspecified top executives at “some of Russia’s largest banks” have privately discussed seeking a state-funded bailout if the level of non-performing loans on their books continues to grow through 2025.[5] Bloomberg reported that it reviewed documents that indicate that three of Russia’s systemically important lenders (financial institutions whose potential failure could disrupt the broader financial system and economy) may need to recover funds lost from the non-performing loans. Bloomberg reported that non-performing loans issued by Russian banks have grown by 1.2 percent in 2025 and could rise to six or seven percent from their current rate of four percent by 2026. ISW is unable to independently verify Bloomberg’s report about these unspecified large Russian banks and lenders, but has observed indications that Russian officials are growing concerned about economic stability in the wake of Russian Central Bank policy changes. Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina previously downplayed the risk of systemic economic crisis, claiming that the Russian banking system has capital reserves of eight trillion rubles (about $102.5 billion).[6] Bloomberg reported that the Russian Central Bank has advised lenders to focus on restructuring credit with the borrowers and absorbing the bad loans, reflective of Russia’s risky and contradictory economic policies, rather than recognizing the full extent of sourcing loans.[7] The Russian Central Bank is therefore likely disinterested in bailing out Russian major banks – an action that could cause liquidity problems and, in the worst case, cause bank failure. Any failure of a major Russian bank would undercut Russian President Vladimir Putin’s long-standing narrative that neither the war in Ukraine nor Western sanctions are hurting the Russian economy.[8]

Reports that Ukrainian forces targeted Moscow City and St. Petersburg overnight on July 16 and 17 are likely overreacting to standard Russian statements about Ukraine’s longstanding deep strike campaign aimed at degrading Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed two Ukrainian long-range Neptune missiles and 308 aircraft-type drones overnight on July 16 to 17 over Bryansk, Orlov, Belgorod, Lipetsk, Oryol, Kursk, Smolensk, Voronezh, Moscow, Kaluga, Leningrad, and Tula oblasts.[9] Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin claimed that Russian forces downed three drones flying toward Moscow City, and Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko claimed that Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems downed two drones over Kirovsky Raion.[10]

Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian DIB assets in areas around Moscow and St. Petersburg, including Smolensk and Tula oblasts, may be mischaracterized as targeting St. Petersburg and Moscow Oblast, respectively, due to their geographical proximity and the direction of flight. Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev claimed that Russian forces downed seven drones over Tula Oblast.[11] Russian opposition outlet Astra and Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that the Shchekinoazot United Chemical Plant in Pervomaysky, Tula Oblast, suspended operations after at least four drones struck the facility and caused a fire.[12] Kovalenko noted that the chemical plant manufactures industrial chemical products, including ammonia, methanol, and urea, that support the production of explosives, solid rocket fuel, and synthetic materials.[13] Smolensk Oblast Governor Vasily Anokhin claimed on July 17 that Russian forces downed 14 drones in Smolensk Oblast.[14] Astra reported on July 17 that a drone may have struck Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec’s 720th Flight Support Equipment Repair Plant in Roslavl, Smolensk Oblast.[15] It is unlikely that Ukrainian drones struck targets in either Moscow or Leningrad oblasts, given the lack of footage and Russian and Ukrainian official reporting that ISW typically observes accompanying successful strikes against Russian DIB assets, particularly those in or near major cities such as Moscow and St Petersburg. Ukrainian drone strikes in the direction of or against Moscow and Leningrad oblasts do not represent an inflection in Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign, as Ukrainian forces regularly conduct strikes against legitimate military and DIB targets in these oblasts and oblasts between the Ukrainian border and Moscow and St. Petersburg cities. Ukraine’s strike campaign differs from Russia’s in that Ukrainian forces chiefly target legitimate military targets and avoid incurring disproportionate civilian casualties, whereas Russian strike packages are designed to maximize damage to civilian areas. The Kremlin previously employed an informational campaign that leveraged unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian strikes to discredit Ukraine during temporary ceasefire periods and may recycle this campaign in an attempt to influence Western policy discussions regarding support for Ukraine.[16]

Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on July 17, in accordance with agreements reached during negotiations in Istanbul on June 2. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) reported that Russia released the bodies of 1,000 deceased Ukrainian soldiers and that Ukrainian authorities will examine and identify the bodies.[17] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky stated that Ukraine released the bodies of 19 deceased Russian soldiers.[18] Kremlin newswires TASS and RIA Novosti claimed that a source close to the Russian negotiation team reported that Russia is prepared to exchange the bodies of 3,000 deceased Ukrainian soldiers in accordance with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s previous statement and that the July 17 exchange is the first exchange involving these 3,000 bodies.[19] ISW has previously observed Ukrainian reports that Russian authorities included the bodies of Russian soldiers KIA in previous KIA exchanges, likely to artificially inflate the number of bodies Russia claims to return to Ukraine and undermine the efficacy of this confidence-building measure.[20]

The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada approved the appointment of former Ukrainian Minister of Economy Yulia Svyrydenko as Ukraine’s new prime minister, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed former Justice Minister Olha Stefanishyna as a special representative to the United States. The Rada supported Svyrydenko’s new Cabinet of Ministers on July 17, including former Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal as defense minister; former Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov as first deputy prime minister; former Deputy Minister of Economics Tara Kachka as the deputy prime minister for European integration; former Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko as the justice minister; former Environmental Protection and Natural Resources Minister Svitlana Hrynchuk as the energy minister, and former First Deputy Minister of Economy Oleksiy Sobolev as the minister of economy.[21] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha and Internal Affairs Minister Ihor Klymenko remain in their positions. Zelensky appointed Stefanishyna as the Ukrainian presidential special representative for the development of cooperation with the United States.[22]

Key Takeaways:

Russia’s Central Bank continues to posture Russian economic stability and growth to maintain the facade of economic stability by pursuing economic policies that will likely exacerbate Russia’s economic instability.

Russia’s unsustainably high payments to soldiers and impacts of the resulting domestic labor shortage will likely further destabilize the Russian economy, regardless of the Kremlin’s efforts to posture stability.

Russian bankers are reportedly privately expressing concerns over a growing number of non-performing loans despite the Russian Central Bank’s claims of economic stability.

Reports that Ukrainian forces targeted Moscow City and St. Petersburg overnight on July 16 and 17 are likely overreacting to standard Russian statements about Ukraine’s longstanding deep strike campaign aimed at degrading Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB).

Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on July 17, in accordance with agreements reached during negotiations in Istanbul on June 2.

The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada approved the appointment of former Ukrainian Minister of Economy Yulia Svyrydenko as Ukraine’s new prime minister, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed former Justice Minister Olha Stefanishyna as a special representative to the United States.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Borova.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population, and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 17.

Russian forces continued ground attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 16 and 17.[23] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Glushkovo and Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and near Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[24]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 17 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces likely maintain positions in most of Kindrativka and have partially encircled Russian forces near Oleksiivka (both north of Sumy City).[25]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Sumy City near Ryzhivka and Bezsalivka; north of Sumy City near Varachyne; and northeast of Sumy City near Myropillya.[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Sadky and Yablunivka.[27]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that an unspecified battalion of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD), and the 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC, LMD) are operating in the Kindrativka-Oleksiivka area and are no longer combat effective due to heavy casualties.[28] Mashovets reported that elements of the 11th and 83rd separate airborne (VDV) brigades, with the reinforcement of one battalion from the 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, are operating in the Yablunivka-Varachyne area. Mashovets stated that elements of the 104th, 234th, and 237th VDV regiments (all part of the 76th VDV Division) are operating northeast of Sumy City, including near Yunakivka. Drone operators of the Russian 106th VDV Division reportedly continue striking Ukrainian forces in northern Sumy Oblast.[29]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and crossed the Vovcha River into southern (left bank) Vovchansk.[30]

Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kharkiv City toward Kudiivka and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Zelene on July 16 and 17.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchansk.[32]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are operating in Vovchansk.[33] Elements of the Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion are reportedly operating near Vovchansk.[34]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Dehtyarne (north of Velykyi Burluk along the international border).[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west and southwest of Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[36] Mashovets stated that Russian forces advanced 200 meters toward Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[37]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and toward Ambarne and Khatne on July 16 and 17.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Milove.[39]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 45th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are attacking toward Ambarne.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 17, but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Kindrashivka and from Dvorichna toward Kutkivka (all north of Kupyansk).[41]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Stroivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Novoyehorivka and toward Pishchane on July 16 and 17.[42]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Radkivka (northwest of Kupyansk) is a contested “gray zone” and refuted claims that Russian forces reached Myrove (northwest of Kupyansk).[43]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army ([GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[44]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Borivska Andriivka (northeast of Borova).[45]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Kolisnykivka (northeast of Borova).[46]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Zelenyi Hai; east of Borova near Nadiya; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Novoyehorivka on July 16 and 17.[47]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Karpivka and Novyi Myr; northeast of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna, Kolodyazi, and Yampolivka; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on July 16 and 17.[48]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces advanced south of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[49]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on July 16 and 17.[50] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryhorivka.[51]

Mashovets refuted Russian claims that Russian forces seized Hryhorivka and stated that Russian forces have still not established control over Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk).[52] ISW assessed that Russian forces seized Verkhnokamyanske as of October 9, 2024.[53]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 127th Motorized Rifle Brigade (reportedly of the 3rd CAA) are reportedly operating near Hryhorivka.[54] Elements of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating near Vyimka.[55]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north and south of Chasiv Yar.[56]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, Predtechyne, and Stupochky on July 16 and 17.[57]

The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated that Russian forces occasionally conduct mechanized assaults in this area and have sustained 5,000 casualties in the Chasiv Yar direction in the past year.[58] The commander also stated that the Russian military command is constantly replenishing elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division operating in Chasiv Yar with poorly-trained penal colony recruits or personnel who have signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for the financial incentives, resulting in the fact that the division is no longer an “elite” formation. This is consistent with ISW’s longstanding assessment that Russian assault tactics in Ukraine have degraded the reputation and functionality of many units that were considered “elite” prior to the full-scale invasion.[59]

Kramatorsk City Military Administration Head Oleksandr Honcharenko stated on July 17 that Russian forces struck Kramatorsk (northwest of Chasiv Yar) with six guided glide bombs, three Geran-2 long-range strike drones, and two KUB-2 reconnaissance and strike drones.[60]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division, including its 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion and 1065th Separate Artillery Regiment, are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[61] Drone operators of the BARS-27 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kramatorsk (Chasiv Yar) direction.[62]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction, but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed on July 17 that Russian forces seized Popiv Yar (northwest of Toretsk).[63] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and west of Popiv Yar, east of Poltavka (northwest of Toretsk), and near Novospaske (west of Toretsk).[64]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Oleksandro-Kalynove, Poltavka, and Yablunivka, and toward Nelipivka and Pleshchiivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Novospaske on July 16 and 17.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Popiv Yar.[66]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russia’s guided glide bomb strikes in the Toretsk direction are supporting Russian ground advances.[67] The milblogger claimed that the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) are fielding a new guided glide bomb modification with increased noise immunity (a weapon system’s ability to function correctly despite electronic interference) and accuracy.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) and artillery elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Shcherbynivka.[68] Drone elements of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) and artillery elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Rusyn Yar.[69]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southeastern Novoekonomichne (east of Pokrovsk).[70]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within eastern Udachne, near Zvirove (both southwest of Pokrovsk), and in Chunyshyne (south of Pokrovsk).[71]

Russian forces attacked toward Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk toward Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk toward Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne, Mykolaivka, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, Kotlyne, and toward Molodetske on July 16 and 17.[72] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked west of Kotlyne.[73]

Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, stated that Russian forces struck a shopping mall in Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk) with a guided glide bomb, killing four people.[74]

Order of Battle: A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) with the recent seizure of Mykolaivka.[75] Elements of the Typhoon Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[76] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Bilozerske (northwest of Pokrovsk).[77]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on July 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets stated on July 17 that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) advanced 3.5 kilometers near Piddubne (southwest of Novopavlivka) in the past day and that elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) advanced at least 2.5 kilometers west of Myrne (southwest of Novopavlivka).[78] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka), north of Zaporizhzhia (south of Novopavlivka), and northeast and west of Novokhatske (southwest of Novopavlivka).[79]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Novoukrainka, Oleksiivka, and Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Yalta; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Piddubne, Voskresenka, Myrne, and Zelenyi Hai on July 16 and 17.[80] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka), Muravka, Dachne, and Horikhove.[81]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Novokhatske.[82]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 17, but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets reported on July 17 that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) advanced 1.5 kilometers in the area north of Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) in the past day.[83]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Shevchenko and toward Komyshuvakha, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole and toward Temyrivka on July 16 and 17.[84]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are operating north of Zelene Pole.[85] Drone operators of the 30th Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Yanvarske (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[86]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on July 17.

Russian forces continued ground assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv) and credited elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 108th and 247th VDV regiments, with the claimed seizure.[87] A Russian milblogger claimed Russian forces advanced south of Plavni (west of Orikhiv).[88]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Kamyanske.[89]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on July 17, but did not advance.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued attacks on unspecified islands in the Dnipro River Delta.[90]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 104th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in west (right) bank Kherson Oblast.[91]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 64 strike and decoy drones, of which 59 were Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[92] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 36 drones and that five decoy drones were lost or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts.[93]

The Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that Russian forces conducted a “double tap” strike using first-person view (FPV) drones against civilians and emergency workers in Nikopol, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, on the evening of July 16.[94]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] ttps://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-17/russia-notches-long-awaited-win-in-fight-against-inflation ; https://www dot cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/57021/bulletin_25-05.pdf

[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-15-2025 ; https://isw.pub/ForceGen060625 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2024

[4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage

[5] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-17/russian-banks-have-discussed-seeking-bailouts-within-next-year

[6] https://ria dot ru/20250703/dolya-2026931910.html?ysclid=md7v0gh1o604045280

[7] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-17/russian-banks-have-discussed-seeking-bailouts-within-next-year

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925

[9] https://t.me/tass_agency/325714 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54759 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54742 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54741 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54737 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54736 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/325653 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/325624 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/325622

[10] https://t.me/drozdenko_au_lo/7589 ; https://t.me/drozdenko_au_lo/7590 ; https://t.me/mos_sobyanin/15933 ; https://t.me/mos_sobyanin/15934

[11] https://t.me/dmilyaev/6156 ; https://t.me/dmilyaev/6143

[12] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9532 ; https://t.me/astrapress/86820

[13] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9532

[14] https://t.me/anohin67/7259

[15] https://t.me/astrapress/86775

[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041925

[17] https://t.me/Koord_shtab/13806

[18] https://t.me/vr_medinskiy/2667

[19] https://ria dot ru/20250717/peredacha-2029649659.html; https://tass dot ru/politika/24537929

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925

[21] https://suspilne dot media/1068649-novij-starij-urad-hto-vidteper-ocolue-ministerstva-ukraini/

[22] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1945791717363617962

[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739

[24] https://t.me/dva_majors/75544; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31399

[25] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2866

[26] https://t.me/dva_majors/75544; https://t.me/wargonzo/27880; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31399;

[27] https://t.me/dva_majors/75544; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172690; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31399;

[28] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2866

[29] https://t.me/bella_Ciao44/9554; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172715; https://t.me/mod_russia/54758

[30] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65985; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95946; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13625

[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903

[32] https://t.me/wargonzo/27880

[33] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2867

[34] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5842

[35] https://t.me/mod_russia/54753;

[36] https://t.me/wargonzo/27880; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65985

[37] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2867

[38] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65985; https://t.me/dva_majors/75544; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95971

[39] Warning: graphic content

https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172672

[40] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2867

[41] https://t.me/rybar/72216

[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903

[43] https://t.me/rybar/72216

[44] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172711

[45] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1945884101497745548 ; https://t.me/rubaka_77/137

[46] https://t.me/rybar/72216

[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903

[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903

[49] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2868

[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903

[51] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2868

[52] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2868

[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2024

[54] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2868

[55] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2868

[56] https://t.me/wargonzo/27880

[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903

[58] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/17/transformuyetsya-i-degraduye-yak-vtraty-v-chasovomu-yari-motyvuyut-rosiyan-zdavatysya/

[59] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2024 https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-14-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-30-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2023

[60] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1068521-vnoci-vijska-rf-zavdali-sim-udariv-po-kramatorsku/; https://www.facebook.com/alexander.vasilyevich.goncharenko

[61] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31376; https://www.facebook.com/24th.brigade/posts/pfbid02PLq1sETKbvugD6WPT3mhuLQP2SsbsvkwujovZaYGRiEBW1mE1WKkyUZBkpsanWmgl ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1068325-u-casovomu-aru-vijskovi-24-brigadi-vzali-v-polon-desantnikiv-98-i-divizii-rf/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/16/elitu-rosijskoyi-armiyi-popovnyly-zekamy-u-chasovomu-yaru-vzyaly-v-polon-desantnykiv-z-kryminalnym-mynulym/ ; https://x.com/24th_brigade/status/1945513659498922041; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/17/transformuyetsya-i-degraduye-yak-vtraty-v-chasovomu-yari-motyvuyut-rosiyan-zdavatysya/

[62] https://t.me/mod_russia/54758

[63] https://t.me/mod_russia/54753

[64] https://t.me/dva_majors/75544; https://t.me/rybar/72208

[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903; https://t.me/dva_majors/75544; https://t.me/wargonzo/27880

[66] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65993

[67] https://t.me/rybar/72223

[68] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1945601870237471055 ; https://t.co/qfCRrrR782 ; https://t.co/sRnfcv4Yrm; https://t.me/nm_dnr/14055

[69] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14056

[70] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1945644258343453017 https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/319

[71] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65977; https://x.com/clement_molin/status/1945598718704558323

[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65977; https://t.me/rybar/72208; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38994

[73] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65983

[74] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1945550959003811874; https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/9690 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/16/aviaudar-po-tcz-u-dobropilli-rosiyany-skynuly-kab-500-ye-zagybli-j-poraneni/ ; https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/9700 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/16/udar-po-dobropillyu-odna-lyudyna-zagynula-kilkist-poranenyh-zrosla-do-21/; https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/9708 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/16/novi-dani-pislya-udaru-po-tcz-v-dobropilli-dvoye-zagyblyh-i-26-poranenyh/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/46272 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/17/dsns-zavershyly-avarijno-ryatuvalni-ta-poshukovi-roboty-na-misczi-udaru-v-dobropilli-shho-vidomo/ ;

[75] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95944

[76] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38994

[77] https://t.me/milinfolive/153060

[78] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2869

[79] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32053; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172739

[80] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95941; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65983; https://t.me/voin_dv/16033

[81] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65983; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65977

[82] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1068713-rosijski-vijska-kontroluut-novohatske-boi-trivaut-poblizu-bagatira-osuv-hortica/

[83] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2869

[84] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903

[85] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2869

[86] https://t.me/voin_dv/16028

[87] https://t.me/mod_russia/54753 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54757 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96007 ; https://t.me/sashakots/54969 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/325713

[88] https://t.me/wargonzo/27880

[89] https://t.me/wargonzo/27880

[90] https://t.me/dva_majors/75544

[91] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31376

[92] https://t.me/kpszsu/38621

[93] https://suspilne dot edia/dnipro/1068719-armia-rf-zavdala-dronovih-udariv-po-krivomu-rogu-poraneno-ludinu-vinikla-pozeza/; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22950; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22943 ; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1068509-vijska-rf-vdarili-po-dnipru-ta-trom-rajonam-oblasti-poraneni-10-ludej-stalisa-pozezi/; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22970; https://t.me/synegubov/15841; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/37159 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/17/armiya-rf-zavdala-masovanogo-udaru-po-shostkynshhyni/

[94] https://t.me/mvs_ukraine/52057

Stay informed with the most important Ukraine breaking news today. This page compiles the top headlines and critical updates from across Ukraine, offering a real-time snapshot of key developments.

Whether it’s military updates, political changes, or international reactions — we bring you the latest Ukraine news as it happens. All reports are carefully curated from verified sources and KyivPost correspondents on the ground.

Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, Grace Mappes, and Karolina Hird

July 16, 2025, 8:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45am ET on July 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin is recycling several longstanding informational narratives, including nuclear threats, in a renewed effort to break the United States away from Ukraine and the NATO alliance. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reaffirmed on July 16 that all provisions of Russia’s nuclear doctrine, including the responsibility of nuclear countries to not “incite” non-nuclear states, remain in effect and that nuclear states must “answer” for “inciting” non-nuclear states.[1] Russia updated its nuclear doctrine in Fall 2024 to include a clause stipulating that Russia will consider aggression against it by a non-nuclear state with the support or participation of a nuclear power as a joint attack on Russia, likely in an effort to deter Western support for Ukraine during critical Western policy discussions in late 2024.[2] Peskov claimed that “Europeans maintain a rabid militaristic attitude towards Moscow” in response to a question regarding the US President Donald Trump-led effort to provide increased military aid to Ukraine via NATO member states.[3] Peskov also called on the international community to pressure Ukraine into bilateral negotiations with Russia ­­­­­­­­­­— a reversal of Western calls to pressure Russia into meaningful bilateral negotiations to end the war — likely to falsely portray Russia as willing to negotiate while undermining Ukraine’s credibility.[4] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on July 15 that Russia’s war in Ukraine is aimed at eliminating “the threats that NATO has created” on Russia’s borders.[5] The Kremlin is employing the same rhetorical lines that it has continuously used throughout the war to deter Western support for Ukraine, but has shifted its objective from preventing new support for Ukraine to reversing recent support and breaking the United States away from its transatlantic allies, likely in response to President Trump‘s recent demonstration of the United States’ reinvigorated commitment to arming Ukraine and supporting NATO. Trump reaffirmed in late June 2025 that the United States will uphold NATO’s Article 5 collective defense clause and recently demanded that Russia agree to a ceasefire agreement by September 2 or risk stringent US secondary tariffs.[6] The Kremlin is prioritizing informational campaigns aimed at undermining NATO unity and stoking discontent between the United States and its European allies in order to degrade Ukraine’s defense capabilities and achieve its longstanding war aims that amount to Ukraine’s capitulation.

Western officials provided additional details about the new US-led effort to arm Ukraine. US President Donald Trump responded on July 15 to a question about when the first Patriot air defense systems will arrive in Ukraine as part of this effort.[7] Trump stated that the US Patriot missile systems are “already being shipped” to Ukraine from Germany and that NATO member states will pay for “everything,” referring to future US military deliveries to Ukraine. Unspecified US officials told the New York Times (NYT) on July 15 that nearly all weapons that NATO member states are expected to purchase for Ukraine from the United States — including Patriot air defense systems, unspecified missiles, and ammunition — are ”immediately available” to send to Ukraine.[8] An unnamed NATO representative told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) fund will coordinate NATO purchases of US weapons for Ukraine.[9] The representative also stated that Germany, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Finland have confirmed participation in this US-led effort, in addition to these states’ existing commitments to the NSATU fund, the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format), and various bilateral and multilateral agreements with Ukraine.

Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on July 15 to 16, heavily targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied Crimea and 400 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea on the night of July 15 and 16.[10] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 198 Shahed-type drones and that 145 decoy drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the Russian strike package largely targeted Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; Kharkiv Oblast; and Vinnytsia City, Vinnystia Oblast, and Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes also damaged civilian, industrial, and energy infrastructure in Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts.[11] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the Russian strikes mainly damaged energy infrastructure and that authorities were working to restore power to Kryvyi Rih.[12] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast officials and Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile each against both Kryvyi Rih and Odesa Oblast.[13] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces only launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile overnight, and Odesa Oblast officials did not report a ballistic missile strike in the oblast, so it is unclear whether Russian forces launched two ballistic missiles overnight.[14] Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that Russian forces continue targeting Ukrainian cities with large drone swarms.[15]

The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) accepted the resignation of Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal on July 16, dissolving the current Ukrainian government. Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Oleksiy Honcharenko reported that the Verkhovna Rada will vote on the composition of the new government on July 17.[16] Zelensky announced that he nominated Shmyhal to be the new Ukrainian defense minister and subordinated the Ministry of Strategic Industries to the Ministry of Defense (MoD).[17]

Key Takeaways:

The Kremlin is recycling several longstanding informational narratives, including nuclear threats, in a renewed effort to break the United States away from Ukraine and the NATO alliance.

Western officials provided additional details about the new US-led effort to arm Ukraine.

Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on July 15 to 16, heavily targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure.

The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) accepted the resignation of Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal on July 16, dissolving the current Ukrainian government.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Borova, Lyman, and Novopavlivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 16.

Russian forces continued assaults in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 15 and 16.[18] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Glushkovo, Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[19]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced into western Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[20]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Ryzhivka and Bezsalivka (both northwest of Sumy City).[21]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Varachyne on July 15 and 16.[22] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, Yablunivka, Sadky, and Zapsillya.[23]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Machine Gun Artillery Division, 68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and unspecified Russian Airborne (VDV) units reportedly continue to operate near Ryzhivka.[24] Artillery elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and drone operators of the 11th and 83rd VDV brigades reportedly continue to operate in northern Sumy Oblast. [25]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the Oil Extraction Plant in northern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and in a forested area northwest of Vovchansk.[26]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Tykhe, Vovchansk, and Prylipka on July 15 and 16.[27] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Prylipka and Vovchansk.[28]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Dehtyarne (north of Velykyi Burluk) and from Milove toward Khanty (both northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[29]

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Milove and Dehtyarne on July 15 and 16.[30]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[31]

Russian forces attacked toward Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe, Stroivka, and Synkivka and toward Bolohivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane on July 15 and 16.[32]

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces conduct ground assaults and glide bomb strikes at all times of day and night, including during poor weather conditions.[33] The deputy commander stated that Russian forces in the Kupyansk direction conduct ground assaults in small groups and frequently send lone soldiers on to conduct assaults.

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 15 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Hrekivka (southeast of Borova).[34]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove; east of Borova near Nadiya; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Novoyehorivka and toward Cherneshchyna on July 15 and 16.[35]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Karpivka (northwest of Lyman).[36]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced one kilometer near Zelena Dolyna (north of Lyman).[37]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna and toward Novyi Myr; north of Lyman near Karpivka and Hlushchenkove and toward Shandryholove; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on July 15 and 16.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 16 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk); south of Novoselivka (east of Siversk); and west of Ivano-Darivka (southeast of Siversk).[39]

Russian forces conducted ground assaults northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on July 15 and 16.[40]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground assaults near Chasiv Yar itself; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora; and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne and Stupochky on July 15 and 16.[41]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kramatorsk (Chasiv Yar) direction reported on July 16 that Russian infantry are hiding from Ukrainian drones in pipes, drainage sewers, and windbreaks.[42]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are supporting Russian ground attacks near Chasiv Yar.[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on July 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground assaults near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk toward Nelipivka and Poltavka and near Oleksandro-Kalynove, Rusyn Yar, Popiv Yar, and Yablunivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Novospaske and Romanivka on July 15 and 16.[44]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian targets near Yablunivka and Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 15 that Russian forces seized Rodynske (northeast of Pokrovsk).[46] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Razine, southeast of Pankivka and into western Boikivka (all northeast of Pokrovsk); northeast of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk); and near Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[47]

Russian forces attacked toward Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske, Razine, and Fedorivka and toward Rodynske; east of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne, Mykolaivka and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Shevchenko; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on July 15 and 16.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rodynske.[49]

A Ukrainian brigade spokesperson operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces in the brigade’s area of responsibility are focusing on efforts to advance toward Shakhove (northeast of Pokrovsk) and conducting highly attritional infantry-led assaults.[50] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces attack in fireteams of three soldiers: one fully-armored soldier with a weapon, one soldier with no armor carrying ammunition and additional weapons, and a final soldier bringing up the rear. The spokesperson reported that Russian forces have intensified glide bomb strikes in the Pokrovsk direction.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novotroitske (southwest of Pokrovsk) and Razine.[51] Drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Razine.[52] Drone operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Sofiivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[53] Elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[54]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 16 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Novokhatske (southwest of Novopavlivka).[55] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian milbloggers credited elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) with seizing Novokhatske.[56]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west and northeast of Novokhatske and toward Oleksandrohrad and Maliivka (both southwest of Novopavlivka).[57]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Dachne, and Oleksiivka; south of Novopavlivka near Zaporizhzhia, Yalta, and toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Piddubne, Myrne, Lisne, and Novokhatske on July 15 and 16.[58]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Russian forces are primarily attacking in small infantry formations using four-wheelers and motorcycles, but sometimes attack using heavy equipment, including infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) or armored personnel carriers (APCs), and sometimes multi-purpose armored fighting vehicles (MTLBs) and one to two tanks.[59] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces cover these heavy armored vehicles with protective structures and electronic warfare (EW) systems and that Russian forces continue to struggle with armored vehicle shortages. A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Russian forces are regrouping and transferring a significant number of forces to the Novopavlivka direction after failing to secure tactically significant advances in the Pokrovsk direction.[60]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) and 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Oleksandrohrad.[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized 2.5 square kilometers of territory near southeastern Komyshuvakha (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and 1.5 square kilometers of territory near southeastern Temyrivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[62]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Maliivka and toward Komyshuvakha and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and Zelene Pole and toward Temyrivka on July 15 and 16.[63]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 30th Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[64]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on July 16 but did not make confirmed advances.[65]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Olhivske (northeast of Hulyaipole) and west of Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[66]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Plavni and south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka on July 16.[67]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 247th VDV Regiment, and of the 4th Military Base (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[68]

Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction on July 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivsky Bridge and southwest of Kherson City near Zabych and Kozulyskyi islands, on July 15 and 16.[69]

A Ukrainian deputy company commander operating in the Dnipro (Kherson) direction reported that Russian drone activity in this direction has greatly increased.[70] The deputy commander stated that Russian forces field three to four reconnaissance drones at a time and are fielding first-person view (FPV) drones with a greater range than previously observed. The deputy commander also stated that Russian forces are effectively using drones as mines by planting camouflaged drones on roads and streets and waiting for them to detonate when Ukrainian forces pass by.

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 31st Separate VDV Brigade and drone operators of the 104th Guards VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[71] Elements of the 80th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[72]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Russian Federation Council ratified a protocol on July 16 that will allow Belarusian citizens who are permanent residents of Russia to vote in local Russian government elections.[73] Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko signed the protocol on March 13, and the Russian State Duma (lower parliament) ratified the protocol on July 15.[74]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://tass dot ru/politika/24526193 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/325532

[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111924

[3] https://tass dot ru/politika/24526193

[4] https://tass dot ru/politika/24526233

[5] https://t.me/MID_Russia/62677

[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071425 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025

[7] https://x.com/CNBCTV18News/status/1945330411732918520

[8] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/15/world/europe/ukraine-weapons-us-nato.html

[9] https://suspilne dot media/1067577-evropejski-souzniki-ta-kanada-profinansuut-vijskovu-dopomogu-ukraini-cerez-novij-mehanizm-nato/

[10] https://t.me/kpszsu/38567

[11] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0m3hEvcBcMGJ3bJUUxPgRbwobDde4t5K5nNGKkpbdsRSp4gjJ12qu7LPYHdgLBMyKl ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/16/vorog-atakuvav-izmayil-udarnymy-bezpilotnykamy-poshkodzhena-infrastruktura/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/10538

[12] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1945381927411966087 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15132

[13] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0m3hEvcBcMGJ3bJUUxPgRbwobDde4t5K5nNGKkpbdsRSp4gjJ12qu7LPYHdgLBMyKl?__cft__[0]=AZW1XMsTpxuOYPi-i-01LitpKhIxsGhp6JHo4iadrHwL8h9YfKHdiIdIK4PCKguvxFe4nIFErhqEi0-_UsVLG7AtC8m4vvbRpdolQWaRfu5xzC5w_HnVMtoIN_fyyvcy9HXuHLmZVal8dkNPMRQICCuEB13lD4eJd1dlbKTrRgikHw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://www.facebook.com/PvKPivden/posts/1122519176593446?ref=embed_post ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1067841-rf-atakuvala-odesinu-balisticnou-raketou-ta-dronami-castinu-povitranih-cilej-zniseno/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/16/takogo-shhe-ne-bulo-rosiyany-atakuvaly-kryvyj-rig-balistykoyu-ta-odrazu-28-shahedamy/; https://t.me/vilkul/11706

[14] https://t.me/kpszsu/38567 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/16/vorog-atakuvav-izmayil-udarnymy-bezpilotnykamy-poshkodzhena-infrastruktura/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/10538

[15] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9528

[16] https://kyivindependent dot com/ukraines-parliament-dismisses-government/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/16/verhovna-rada-zvilnyla-premyer-ministra-denysa-shmygalya-uryad-jde-u-vidstavku/;https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/14/pereformatuvannya-kabminu-hto-mozhe-ocholyty-uryad-i-minoborony/ ; https://suspilne dotmedia/1068017-rada-vidpravila-smigala-ta-jogo-urad-u-vidstavku/ ;https://www.youtube.com/live/r-UUVbCFewg

[17] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15144

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SVyUs6QS53PnDj5KyenYro1u9BnLj9kVVXAB5qZw6NrsywzyA8JZYp8KNNFGenDUl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26700

[19] https://t.me/dva_majors/75472 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75491 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31352

[20] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1945363736719712298; https://t.me/morpex_V/5281

[21] https://t.me/dva_majors/75472

[22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SVyUs6QS53PnDj5KyenYro1u9BnLj9kVVXAB5qZw6NrsywzyA8JZYp8KNNFGenDUl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26700 ; https://t.me/rybar/72181 ; https://t.me/rybar/72178 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27862 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75472

[23] https://t.me/rybar/72181 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95861 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75472 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75490

[24] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31352

[25] https://t.me/mod_russia/54708 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31329 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31329 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172557

[26] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9610; https://t.me/murchiki57/46 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1945432387422179371

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SVyUs6QS53PnDj5KyenYro1u9BnLj9kVVXAB5qZw6NrsywzyA8JZYp8KNNFGenDUl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26700; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13843; https://t.me/rybar/72194; https://t.me/wargonzo/27862; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31340

[28] https://t.me/rybar/72194; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31340; https://t.me/tass_agency/325443

[29] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31319; https://t.me/rybar/72194

[30] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31319; https://t.me/dva_majors/75472

[31] https://t.me/tass_agency/325476

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SVyUs6QS53PnDj5KyenYro1u9BnLj9kVVXAB5qZw6NrsywzyA8JZYp8KNNFGenDUl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26700; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13843

[33] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/16/diye-vnochi-vden-siryj-chas-poblyzu-kupyanska-rosiyany-v-ataky-jdut-poodynczi-ale-postijno/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iZRs_wcxLMM

[34] https://x.com/blinzka/status/1945097683753980096; https://t.me/Ci4team_4mb/399

[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26700

[36] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9608; https://t.me/ombr66/1861

[37] https://t.me/tass_agency/325480

[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SVyUs6QS53PnDj5KyenYro1u9BnLj9kVVXAB5qZw6NrsywzyA8JZYp8KNNFGenDUl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26700; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13843

[39] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32039

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SVyUs6QS53PnDj5KyenYro1u9BnLj9kVVXAB5qZw6NrsywzyA8JZYp8KNNFGenDUl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26700; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13843

[41] https://t.me/wargonzo/27862; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SVyUs6QS53PnDj5KyenYro1u9BnLj9kVVXAB5qZw6NrsywzyA8JZYp8KNNFGenDUl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26700; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13843

[42] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/16/lizut-v-truby-j-gynut-nashi-drony-zalitayut-u-shovanky-okupantiv-i-nyshhat-yih-zseredyny/; https://t.me/fifthbrUA/1037

[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31329

[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SVyUs6QS53PnDj5KyenYro1u9BnLj9kVVXAB5qZw6NrsywzyA8JZYp8KNNFGenDUl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26700; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13843; https://t.me/rybar/72181; https://t.me/wargonzo/27862

[45] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14040;

[46] https://t.me/wargonzo/27849

[47] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95899 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32033; https://t.me/z_arhiv/3202 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31363

[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SVyUs6QS53PnDj5KyenYro1u9BnLj9kVVXAB5qZw6NrsywzyA8JZYp8KNNFGenDUl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26700 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13843 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75472

[49] https://t.me/wargonzo/27862

[50] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/16/vony-nazyvayut-yih-sobakamy-poblyzu-pokrovska-odni-okupanty-zhenut-vmyraty-inshyh/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo

[51] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14041

[52] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14040; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172595

[53] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172540

[54] https://t.me/mod_russia/54708

[55] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1945403480744817055 https://t.me/voin_dv/16011; https://t.me/osintpen/1442

[56] https://t.me/mod_russia/54727 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95921 ; https://t.me/sashakots/54944 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/16011

[57] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95921

[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SVyUs6QS53PnDj5KyenYro1u9BnLj9kVVXAB5qZw6NrsywzyA8JZYp8KNNFGenDUl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26700 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13843

[59] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/16/bagato-myasa-i-vono-bizhyt-u-nash-bik-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-vykorystovuyut-try-varianty-shturmiv/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iZRs_wcxLMM

[60] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/16/za-rahunok-pihoty-yaku-zhenut-na-ubij-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku-posylyvsya-tysk-zhyvoyu-syloyu/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnrp2S2L6qk

[61] https://t.me/voin_dv/16008

[62] https://t.me/voin_dv/16001

[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26700; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13843

[64] https://t.me/voin_dv/16015

[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0m3hEvcBcMGJ3bJUUxPgRbwobDde4t5K5nNGKkpbdsRSp4gjJ12qu7LPYHdgLBMyKl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13843

[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31337

[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0m3hEvcBcMGJ3bJUUxPgRbwobDde4t5K5nNGKkpbdsRSp4gjJ12qu7LPYHdgLBMyKl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27862

[68] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31334; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31329 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/152962

[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26700

[70] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/16/osoblyvo-doshkulyayut-korychnevogo-koloru-na-prydniprovskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-narostyly-dronovyj-teror-z-povitrya/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iZRs_wcxLMM

[71] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31333 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31329 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54724

[72] https://t.me/mod_russia/54728

[73] https://t.me/tass_agency/325527; https://belta dot by/society/view/parlament-rf-zavershil-ratifikatsiju-protokola-dajuschego-pravo-belorusam-uchastvovat-v-mestnyh-726677-2025/

[74] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2025

Stay informed with the most important Ukraine breaking news today. This page compiles the top headlines and critical updates from across Ukraine, offering a real-time snapshot of key developments.

Whether it’s military updates, political changes, or international reactions — we bring you the latest Ukraine news as it happens. All reports are carefully curated from verified sources and KyivPost correspondents on the ground.

Jessica Sobieski, Jennie Olmsted, Olivia Gibson, Angelica Evans, and Kateryna Stepanenko

July 18, 2025, 6:15 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00 pm ET on July 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

The European Council of the European Union (EU) approved its 18th sanctions package on July 18, mainly targeting Russian oil revenues and sanctions evasion schemes.[1] The EU announced a landmark oil cap to contain Russian oil prices at 15 percent of the average market price that will automatically adjust semi-annually, and noted that the current price cap is set at $47.60 per barrel – well below the previous $60 per barrel cap.[2] The EU imposed a full transaction ban on any transactions related to the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, which will prevent the completion, maintenance, and operation of the pipelines. The EU also ended Czechia’s exemptions for Russian oil imports. The EU sanctioned an additional 105 vessels of the Russian shadow fleet, increasing the overall number of sanctioned tankers to 444. The EU sanctioned Russian and international companies managing the shadow fleet, an oil refinery in India in which the Russian state oil company Rosneft is a main shareholder, the captain of a shadow fleet vessel, a private operator of an international flag registry, and one entity in the Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector. The EU also imposed an import ban on refined petroleum products made from Russian crude oil and imported from any third country, with the exception of Canada, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Russian government reportedly accounted for some decrease in oil and gas revenue as part of Russia’s upcoming national budget, although the EU oil cap and shadow fleet sanctions will likely further degrade Russian oil revenues beyond what the Kremlin previously expected.[3] The EU measures target both Russia’s current ability to sell oil at advantageous pricing and undermines Russia’s long-term ability to sell oil to Europe. The EU noted that oil revenues constitute one-third of Russia’s overall revenue, and that recent declines in Russia’s oil revenues in combination with a decrease in market earning potential poses a risk to the Russian federal budget.

The EU’s new sanctions target Russia’s ability to engage with international markets. The EU fully banned EU-based specialized financial messaging services from conducting transactions with 22 Russian banks, in addition to the 23 previously sanctioned Russian banks already subject to the ban.[4] The European Union lowered the threshold for sanctioning third-country financial, credit, and crypto-asset service providers that are connected to the Russian Central Bank’s System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS) or generally supporting Russian sanctions evasion schemes. The EU banned any transaction with the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), its sub-funds and companies, and any companies investing in or owned by the RDIF. The EU also banned the sale, supply, transfer, and export of software management systems and banking and financial sector software to Russia. The EU sanctions target an existing vulnerability within the Russian banking and financial sector, decreasing Russia’s ability to maintain a strong presence in international trade and diversify its economy.

The EU’s new sanctions package also targets actors directly supporting Russian military capabilities. The EU sanctioned three entities based in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and eight companies operating in Belarus that sell goods to the Russian military.[5] The EU also imposed a full transaction ban on Belarusian specialized financial messaging services and embargoed arms imports from Belarus. The EU tightened export restrictions on 26 entities involved in dual-use goods and technologies, including 11 entities in third countries other than Russia. The EU approved over 2.5 billion euros worth of other export bans on items that could support Russia’s war effort, including computer numerical control machines and chemicals for propellants. The EU also sanctioned several individuals involved in indoctrinating Ukrainian children, crimes in occupied Ukraine, and spreading Russian propaganda.

Russian officials continued to falsely claim that sanctions do not have an impact on the Russian economy in response to the EU’s new sanctions package. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the EU’s new sanctions package is illegal, that Russia has already gained immunity and adapted to life under restrictive measures, and that Russia will analyze the effects of the new package and minimize their effects.[6] Peskov added that each new sanctions package disadvantages those who authorized it. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev responded to the EU’s newest sanctions by claiming that the package will not change Russia’s position and that the Russian economy will survive and Russia will continue to fight Ukrainian forces.[7] Medvedev threatened to target Kyiv City and other Ukrainian cities with increasing force in response to the EU’s sanctions package. Medvedev claimed that Russia must learn to “hate” the EU and its “Russophobia” as much as Russia’s ancestors did and that “how this ends for Europe is known.” CEO of the RDIF and Presidential Special Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries, Kirill Dmitriev, claimed that the EU’s newest sanctions package is hurting Europe more than Russia and limiting European energy supply by closing Russian markets to European companies.[8] Head of the Russian State Duma Committee on Financial Markets Anatoly Aksakov claimed that the new EU sanctions on Russia’s financial system are just a fluctuation in the air, as Russian banks have already been under restrictions from the EU.[9]

Select Russian officials are acknowledging the impact of sanctions on the Russian economy despite the Kremlin’s efforts to disguise and dismiss such impacts. The Moscow Times reported on July 17 that Russian Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev recently told the Russian Federation Council that Russian oil companies are struggling to procure parts to repair refineries due to Western sanctions.[10] Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina notably stated at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 19 that Russia has exhausted many of its “free resources“ since the start of Russia‘s full-scale war against Ukraine and needs to think of a new growth model.[11] Russia’s Minister of Economic Development, Maxim Reshetnikov, stated at SPIEF that Russia is on the “brink of recession.”[12] Russia’s ongoing sanctions evasion schemes, including via the PRC, are a key aspect of the Kremlin’s strategy to offset Western sanctions and relieve pressure on the Russian economy. Russia has created a network of actors to circumvent Western sanctions and is reconfiguring its economic policy and business models to withstand sanctions in the long term, although more extensive Western sanctions will complicate this effort. The EU’s newest sanctions are a positive step, but wider Western compliance and enforcement are necessary to inflict maximum economic pressure on Russia.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed former Defense Minister Rustem Umerov as Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council on July 18.[13] Umerov stated that he will oversee the coordination of arms deliveries, joint production efforts, and defense partnerships, as well as advance Ukraine’s negotiation track with Russia.[14]

The Kremlin continues to advance its long-term censorship efforts to assert greater control over the Russian online information space. First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Committee on Information Policy Anton Gorelkin warned on July 18 that the popular WhatsApp messenger should prepare to leave the Russian market, as it is “highly likely” that it will fall under restrictive measures.[15] Gorelkin added that the Kremlin-controlled messaging platform MAX will become a replacement for WhatsApp’s users. Russian State Duma Information Policy Committee member Anton Nemkin opined that WhatsApp’s presence in Russia’s digital space constitutes a breach in national security and proposed that Russia consider Telegram as an alternative, while admitting that MAX is the primary choice for replacing WhatsApp.[16] Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that WhatsApp is the most popular messenger in Russia, with roughly 84 million daily users, and that two sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration stated that Russian authorities are almost guaranteed to ban WhatsApp.[17] Another source close to the Presidential Administration told Meduza that Russian authorities are likely to tolerate Telegram as it hosts many Kremlin-affiliated channels and the Kremlin has been able to establish an entire information infrastructure. WhatsApp is owned by Meta, which the Kremlin has designated as an extremist organization.[18] Russian President Vladimir Putin recently ordered the government to impose additional restrictions on the use of software from “unfriendly countries.”[19]

ISW previously noted that the Kremlin planned to designate MAX as its national messenger and that the Kremlin may attempt to ban Telegram and other social media connected to the Western world in the medium- to long-term if the rollout of the new national messenger application is successful.[20] The Kremlin will very likely continue to implement increasingly repressive measures that aim to insulate and censor Russian citizens and promote the Kremlin’s war efforts.

Key Takeaways:

The European Council of the European Union (EU) approved its 18th sanctions package on July 19, mainly targeting Russian oil revenues and sanctions evasion schemes.

Russian officials continued to falsely claim that sanctions do not have an impact on the Russian economy in response to the EU’s new sanctions package.

Select Russian officials are acknowledging the impact of sanctions on the Russian economy despite the Kremlin’s efforts to disguise and dismiss such impacts.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed former Defense Minister Rustem Umerov as Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council on July 18.

The Kremlin continues to advance its long-term censorship efforts to assert greater control over the Russian online information space.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 18.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 17 and 18.[21] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Glushkovo and Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and toward Novyi Put (east of Tetkino) from Pavlivka, Sumy Oblast (south of Novyi Put).[22]

Ukrainian open-source intelligence group CyberBoroshno published satellite imagery on July 17 that shows damage at Russia’s Energiya chemical and weapons component plant, indicating that Ukrainian forces likely struck the plant during a drone strike in Yelets, Lipetsk Oblast, on July 15.[23]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Varachyne (northeast of Sumy City).[24]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced farther southwest of Varachyne than July 18 geolocated footage indicated.[25] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into northeastern Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[26]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Varachyne on July 17 and 18.[27] Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka and Andriivka, and northeast of Sumy City near Sadky and Yablunivka.[28]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Sumy direction stated on July 17 that Russian forces are sending sabotage and reconnaissance groups to Ukrainian rear areas to interdict Ukrainian logistics routes.[29] The spokesperson noted that Russian drone operators drop supplies and ammunition to the sabotage and reconnaissance groups once the groups establish positions in the rear, and then the Russian military command deploys “disposable” assault groups to pressure Ukrainian defenses and disrupt their logistics.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[30]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[31]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Starytsia, and Zelene on July 17 and 18.[32]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Kanada Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Kozacha Lopan (northwest of Kharkiv City).[33] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the direction of Vovchansk.[34]

Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 18 but did not advance.

A Russian miblogger claimed that Russian forces continue attacking in the Velykyi Burluk direction and Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) and that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Milove.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk near Radkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane on July 17 and 18.[36]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Zelenyi Hai and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Hrekivka and toward Cherneshchyna and Druzhelyubivka on July 17 and 18.[37]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove, Korovii Yar, and Serednie; north of Lyman near Kaprivka, Novyi Myr, and Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on July 17 and 18.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on July 17 and 18.[39]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported that the intensity of Russian offensive operations in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR) has noticeably declined due to Ukrainian forces destroying better-trained Russian forces.[40] The NCO reported that Russian forces are training new units and that the situation remains tense. The NCO reported that Russian forces are using large numbers of motorcycles across the entire frontline but noted that 90 percent of Russian motorcycles are of poor quality and from the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, Predtechyne, and Stupochky on July 17 and 18.[41]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have developed effective tactics for downing Ukrainian drones in the Chasiv Yar direction, thereby reportedly enabling Russian forces to advance despite Ukrainian drone superiority in the area.[42]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 299th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th Airborne Division) reportedly continue to operate in Chasiv Yar.[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on July 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Popiv Yar (northwest of Toretsk) and Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[44]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Oleksandro-Kalynove, Popiv Yar, and Poltavka, and toward Nelipivka, Stepanivka, Katerynivka, and Pleshchiivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Novospaske on July 17 and 18.[45]

A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported on July 17 that Russian forces are constantly attacking despite sustaining high casualties.[46] The servicemember reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Novospaske and that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are attempting to raise Russian flags on the outskirts of the settlement to falsely claim control of the settlement.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC] Eastern Military District [EMD]), including its 2nd Separate Artillery Battalion, are reportedly operating near Popiv Yar.[47]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) and likely seized the settlement.[48]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Novotoretske, Myrolyubivka, and Novoekonomichne and toward Rodynske; east of Pokrovsk toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Zvirove; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne, and toward Molodetske on July 17 and 18.[49]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions north and northeast of Pokrovsk.[50] Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk).[51] Drone operators of the Typhoon Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Pokrovsk direction.[52]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently retook Yalta (south of Novopavlivka).[53] Additional geolocated footage published on July 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Komar (south of Novopavlivka).[54] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Ukrainian forces recently retook Yalta and Voskresenka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[55] ISW previously noted that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in key frontline areas to slow Russian advances.[56]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) advanced in an area one kilometer in depth and two kilometers wide southwest of Piddubne (southwest of Novopavlivka).[57]

Russian forces continued attacks toward Novopavlivka; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Dachne, and Oleksiivka; south of Novopavlivka toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zirka, Piddubne, Myrne, and Voskresenka and toward Oleksandrohrad on July 17 and 18.[58]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly struck Ukrainian positions near Oleksandrohrad.[59]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Shevchenko and toward Komyshuvakha and west of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole and Novopil and toward Temyrivka on July 17 and 18.[60]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are operating toward Maliivka and Sichneve (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[61] Drone operators of the 30th Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA) and the 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA) are reportedly also operating near Sichneve.[62]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on July 18 but did not advance.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces intensified fighting near Marfopil (southwest of Hulyaipole).[63]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohiria, south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka, and southwest of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka and Stepove.[64]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske on July 17 and 18.[65]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including drone operators of its 108th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[66]

Russian forces continued limited attempts to cross the Dnipro River in the Kherson direction on July 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attempted to cross the Dnipro River northeast of Kherson City toward Sadove, Prydniprovske, and Kozatsky Island and southwest of Kherson City toward Dniprovske and Hola Prystan on July 18.[67]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 17 to 18. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 29 Shahed drones and six decoy drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and targeted Ukrainian frontline positions in eastern Ukraine.[68] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 11 drones and that six decoy drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck locomotives and civilian infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, killing one person.[69]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russia continues to rely on Belarusian defense companies to produce weapons components for Russia’s war effort and to evade sanctions. Ukrainian TV channel Kanal 24 reported on July 17 that Russian defense companies are increasingly using Belarusian-made microcircuits, capacitors, stabilizers, and other components in Russian missiles, including Kh-101 and Kh-69 cruise missiles and Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles, and S-300 and S-400 air defense systems.[70] Kanal 24 obtained a letter from the Russian Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade Kirill Lusogorsky to the Belarusian State Military-Industrial Committee Head Dmitry Pantus requesting Belarusian defense companies, namely the Minsk-based Integral and Peleng facilities, supply microelectronics to Russia. Kanal 24 reported that Russia also uses Belarusian microchips in guided glide bombs and unguided missiles.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/18/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-18th-package-of-economic-and-individual-measures/

[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eus-new-russia-sanctions-aim-more-effective-oil-price-cap-2025-07-18/; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-18/eu-backs-revised-russia-oil-price-cap-and-new-russia-sanctions

[3] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-09-23/russia-sees-oil-and-gas-revenue-shrinking-for-next-three-years

[4] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/18/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-18th-package-of-economic-and-individual-measures/

[5] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/18/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-18th-package-of-economic-and-individual-measures/

[6] https://t.me/tass_agency/325915

[7] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/598; https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/87

[8] https://t.me/kadmitriev/163

[9] https://t.me/tass_agency/325956

[10] https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2025/07/17/vrossii-iz-za-sanktsii-nachalis-problemi-sremontom-npz-a169109

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925

[13] https://www.president dot gov.ua/documents/4962025-55709

[14] https://x.com/rustem_umerov/status/1946125164158070960 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15175

[15] https://t.me/webstrangler/4310

[16] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/24548611

[17] https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/07/18/99-chto-eto-sluchitsya-1-ostavim-na-malo-li-chto ; https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/07/18/voyna

[18] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/24548299 ; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/16427317

[19] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/24543571

[20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2025

[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772

[22] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31421;

[23] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/satellite-confirms-strike-on-protected-building-at-russia-s-energia-plant/#google_vignette; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/11765?single

[24] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1945984391978643768; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DMNSSx5iYfU/; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1946005382461014242

[25] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31439

[26] https://t.me/wargonzo/27900

[27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31439; https://t.me/dva_majors/75601; ttps://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772

[28] https://t.me/dva_majors/75601; https://t.me/wargonzo/27900

[29] https://t.me/OSHP_225/5044; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/17/spochatku-dyversanty-potim-myaso-nova-taktyka-rosiyan-na-sumskomu-napryamku/

[30] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31414

[31] https://t.me/wargonzo/27900

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964

[33] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5845

[34] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96034

[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31405 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75601

[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964

[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66007

[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964

[40] https://www.youtube.com/live/ZVMUSS0B0yo?si=SQi52gl6yTizHiXb ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1069955-na-doneccini-54-brigada-fiksue-spad-nastupalnogo-potencialu-rf/

[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/24765

[42] https://t.me/rusich_army/24765

[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31414

[44] https://t.me/rybar/72241 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27900 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/325820

[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964

[46] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/17/dyversijna-grupa-namagalasya-vstanovyty-prapor-poblyzu-toreczka-shturmy-pochynayutsya-o-tretij-nochi/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo

[47] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14057

[48] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1945974942522036545 https://t.me/echo_2_25/612; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1945991088646312173

[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75601 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75602 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31429 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27900

[50] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14058

[51] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172771

[52] t.me/motopatriot78/39004

[53] https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1946108213516005661 ; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1946113299575099569 https://youtu.be/MyYW6wXLkHk?si=Qr9fjJm0dPq1_RK5 https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1945929547091763686; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9612; https://www.facebook.com/20armycorps/videos/1359756871756913/

[54] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9618; https://t.me/burpobeda/13844

[55] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/18/syly-oborony-ukrayiny-vstanovyly-prapory-u-voskresenczi-ta-yalti/ ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1359756871756913&rdid=q1PZmeBdtVjMSlo4

[56] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071425

[57] https://t.me/voin_dv/16048

[58] https://t.me/dva_majors/75601 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl

[59] https://t.me/voin_dv/16046

[60] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl

[61] https://t.me/voin_dv/16048

[62] https://t.me/voin_dv/16045 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/16042

[63] https://t.me/wargonzo/27900

[64] https://t.me/wargonzo/27900

[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02m2vteSHE6k2VBHQxBmQwYMm4HvugsTYCaT4ize8Sonn34wMxewHqJeFc6vdtp3Eyl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12756 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl

[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31414 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/153139

[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl

[68] https://t.me/kpszsu/38692

[69] https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/7110; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22975; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/18/rosijski-drony-atakuvaly-dnipropetrovshhynu-zagynuv-mashynist-potyaga/;

[70] https://24tv dot ua/bilorus-prichetna-do-obstriliv-ukrayini-yak-vigotovlyaye-mikroshemi_n2870664 ; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/investigation-belarusian-defense-industry-aids-russia-in-missile-production/