July 12, 2025, 5:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00 pm ET on July 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia launched another large-scale drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of July 11 to 12 — the third combined strike with over 500 drones and missiles in July alone. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 339 Shahed-type drones and 258 decoy drones (597 drones total) from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 26 Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 319 Shahed-type drones and 25 Kh-101 cruise missiles and that 258 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged critical electrical networks and administrative and civilian infrastructure in Chernivtsi, Cherkasy, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lviv, Sumy, and Volyn oblasts.[2] Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported that Russian strikes killed two civilians in Chernivtsi City and injured 14.[3] Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk reported that Ukraine’s Clean Sky program, which uses interceptor drones to defend Kyiv Oblast against nightly Russian long-range drone strikes, downed over 50 drones during Russia’s overnight strike.[4] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s ongoing large-scale strikes are intended to degrade Ukrainian and Western morale and underscore Ukraine’s need for continued Western support for Ukraine’s interceptor drone program and for the continued supply of Western air defense systems, especially US-provided Patriot systems.[5]

Russian forces recently advanced from the international border toward Velykyi Burluk in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast — likely in an effort to connect Russian operations near Vovchansk with those near Dvorichna, possibly to facilitate Russian efforts to establish a buffer zone along the international border. Geolocated footage published on July 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[6] Elements of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th Army Corps [AC], LMD) first advanced into central Milove in early July 2025.[7] Elements of the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment defended against limited Ukrainian attacks into northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast in March and April 2025, and elements of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division participated in retaking Kursk Oblast and attacking into northern Sumy Oblast in Spring and early Summer 2025.[8] Some elements of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly continuing to operate in northern Sumy Oblast, although the Russian military command appears to have recently redeployed other elements of the division and the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment to the Velykyi Burluk direction.[9]

This area of the international border between the Vovchansk and Kupyansk direction has been largely inactive over the last two years of the war, and the redeployment of elements of a regiment and a division to the area indicates that the Russian military command may be preparing to launch a more concerted offensive operation in this area. Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn stated on July 8 that Russian forces have intensified their attacks near Milove and are leveraging artillery and drone support to strike Ukrainian positions in the area.[10] Russian milbloggers claimed on July 12 that Russian forces are shelling Khatnie (southwest of Milove) and Velykyi Burluk in order to facilitate further advances toward Khatnie and Ambarne (south of Milove).[11] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are also attacking near Chuhunivka (northwest of Milove).[12] Russian and Ukrainian sources previously suggested in January 2025 that Russian forces intended to advance to Velykyi Burluk from the northwest near Vovchansk and the southeast near Dvorichna, and ISW noted at the time that Russian forces could spend six months to a year attempting to advance toward Velykyi Burluk from these areas before they could truly threaten the settlement.[13] Russian forces have failed to make any substantive advances toward Velykyi Burluk from Vovchansk or Dvorichna over the last six months, and the Russian military command appears to be activating another avenue of advance toward the settlement.

Russian forces have advanced roughly five kilometers from the international border over the last 10 days and appear to maintain positions roughly 16 kilometers northeast of Velykyi Burluk. Russian forces will likely attempt to widen their salient northeast of Velykyi Burluk and seize Khatnie before attacking further toward the settlement. Russian forces will also have to contend with water features in the area, including the Velykyi Burluk River that runs along the Shevchenkove-Mykhailivka-Velykyi Burluk line. This line of settlements situated along the river could pose a significant challenge for Russian troops should Ukrainian forces choose to defend here. The Russian military command almost certainly must further reinforce the units in this area if it intends to conduct an organized offensive operation against Velykyi Burluk, and Russia may reinforce this effort more rapidly if Russian forces are able to advance quickly in this previously inactive area. A Russian seizure of Velykyi Burluk would complicate Ukraine’s defenses in the Vovchansk and Dvorichna directions, as Russian forces would likely be able to operate tube artillery from close enough to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and strike frontline and near rear Ukrainian positions in both directions. The collapse of Ukraine’s defense in the Vovchansk and Dvorichna areas would allow Russian forces to establish their envisioned buffer zone to defend Belgorod Oblast from Ukrainian shelling in at least one area of northern Kharkiv Oblast.[14] The Vovchansk-Velykyi Burluk-Dvorichna line could also serve as a significant defensive line within a Russian buffer zone in northern Kharkiv Oblast if Russian forces are able to join their advances from these three directions in the medium- to long-term.

Ukraine signed several strategic agreements with Western defense companies to bolster Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB) during the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome. Ukrainian Minister of Strategic Industries Herman Smetanin reported on July 12 that Ukraine secured five agreements in the defense sector with international partners on July 11 and 12.[15] Ukraine signed agreements with D&M Holding Company, an American defense manufacturer that specializes in ammunition and primers, to launch a joint production of special chemicals in the United States needed for ammunition production, including gunpowder. Ukraine also concluded agreements with the Italian Ministry of Defense to promote cooperation between unspecified Ukrainian and Italian defense companies to address demands for components and raw materials; the Italian Industries Federation of Aerospace, Defense, and Security (AIAD) to establish cooperation initiatives in aviation with unspecified Italian companies and to create a joint working group and integrate joint research and production initiatives with the Ukrainian Council of Gunsmiths; and the Italian company IDV, which specializes in armored vehicle production, to establish the joint development and possible production of military equipment.

Key Takeaways:

Russia launched another large-scale drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of July 11 to 12 — the third combined strike with over 500 drones and missiles in July alone.

Russian forces recently advanced from the international border toward Velykyi Burluk in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast — likely in an effort to connect Russian operations near Vovchansk with those near Dvorichna, possibly to facilitate Russian efforts to establish a buffer zone along the international border.

Ukraine signed several strategic agreements with Western defense companies to bolster Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB) during the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 12.

Russian forces continued attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 11 and 12.[16] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked in unspecified areas along the Kursk Oblast border.[17]

A Russian source claimed that Russian forces are attempting to advance into northern Sumy Oblast from Guyevo.[18]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 12 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 11 that Ukrainian forces advanced into central Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[19]

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of northern Sumy Oblast on July 11 and 12.[20]

A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) from Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City) to Kindrativka (west of Oleksiivka) in order to reinforce elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) trapped in the settlement by advancing Ukrainian forces.[21]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment are reportedly operating in the Sumy and Chernihiv border areas, including near Katerynivka (northwest of Sumy City).[22]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 12 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 12 that Russian forces advanced toward Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[23]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Zelene and Vovchansk on July 11 and 12.[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchansk.[25]

See topline text for reports of Russian advances in the Velykyi Burluk direction.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk toward Petro-Ivanivka, Kindrashivka, Radkivka, and Holubivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane and Novoosynove on July 11 and 12.[26]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove; east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka, Hlushchenkove, Cherneshchyna, and Novoyehorivka on July 11 and 12.[27]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Cherneshchyna.[28]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Karpivka and Serednie and toward Shandryholove, north of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna and Novyi Myr, northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, and east of Lyman near Torske and Dibrova and the Serebryanske forest area on July 11 and 12.[29]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk toward Dronivka, north of Siversk toward Serebryanka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka and Vyimka on July 11 and 12.[30]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 12 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Markove and south of Maiske (both northwest of Chasiv Yar).[31]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne and Stupochky, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Bila Hora on July 11 and 12.[32]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on July 12 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating northwest of Toretsk advanced southeast of Poltavka and that Russian forces operating west of Toretsk advanced west of Novospaske, east of Shcherbynivka, and east of Rusyn Yar and seized Popiv Yar.[33]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Popiv Yar, and Yablunivka, and toward Katerynivka, Pleshchiivka, and Stepanivka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Novospaske on July 11 and 12.[34]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Popiv Yar.[35]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced south of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[36]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Volodymyrivka, into southern Novotoretske, west of Razine, and northwest of Novoekonomichne (all northeast of Pokrovsk).[37]

Russian forces attacked toward Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk toward Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk toward Volodymyrivka, Novoekonomichne, and Krasne Lyman and near Razine, Myrne, and Myrolyubivka; east of Pokrovsk toward Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Serhiivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, and Kotlyne and toward Molodetske on July 11 and 12.[38]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on July 12 that Russian forces are attempting to leverage foliage to obscure Russian advances from Ukrainian drone operators.[39] The NCO reported that the Russian military command is positioning drone operators as close to the front lines as possible to facilitate strikes in Ukrainian rear areas, and that Russian forces are using motorcycles and other light vehicles in lieu of armored vehicles in the area.

A Russian milblogger posted footage on July 12 purportedly showing a Russian Geran-2 drone striking Ukrainian forces near Dobropilliya (northwest of Pokrovsk).[40]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novoukrainka.[41] Drone operators of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Udachne.[42] Drone operators of the Typhoon Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA) are operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[43]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into northwestern Novokhatske (southwest of Novopavlivka).[44]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of and up to the administrative borders of Novokhatske but noted that Russian forces have not seized the settlement.[45] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced up to the eastern outskirts of Fedorivka (south of Novopavlivka).[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) advanced 2 kilometers north of Piddubne (south of Novopavlivka).[47]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Dachne, and Oleksiivka; south of Novopavlivka near Komar and Zaporizhzhia and toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka toward Zelenyi Hai and near Myrne, Piddubne, Voskresenka, Tovste, and Novokhatske on July 11 and 12.[48]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk border area.[49] Elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating toward Voskresenka.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 11 and 12 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Komyshuvakha (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and southeast of Temyrivka, Zaporizhia Oblast (west of Velyka Novosilka).[51]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and toward Komyshuvakha, west of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole and Novosilka and toward Temyrivka, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novovpil and Novosilka on July 11 and 12.[52]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly operating near Komyshuvakha.[53]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported on Russian assaults in the Hulyaipole direction on July 12.

Russian forces continued assaults southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske and Plavni and toward Stepnohirsk on July 11 and 12 but did make any confirmed advances.[54]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 11 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Kamyanske.[55]

Geolocated footage published on July 11 shows that Ukrainian forces struck a bridge over the Karachokrak River in occupied Vasylivka (southwest of Kamyanske).[56]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[57]

Russian forces continued assaults in the Kherson direction on July 11 and 12 but did not advance.[58]

Order of Battle: Artillery of the 7th VDV Division is reportedly striking Ukrainian positions on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River in the Kherson direction.[59]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Ukrainian military-focused outlet Militarnyi reported on July 12 that Belarus has developed a new “Antidrone” weapon system combining quadcopter interceptor drones with small arms.[60] Belarusian media outlet RadioSignal claimed that the system is capable of targeting first-person view (FPV) and reconnaissance drones that come within 100 meters of the system and that the system notably does not emit electronic signals and can thereby mask its location. Belarus appears to be attempting to replicate Ukraine’s recent success using interceptor drones to down Russian Shahed drones.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/kpszsu/38277

[2] https://suspilne dot media/chernivtsi/1064797-raketi-ta-droni-akou-bula-nicna-ataka-u-cerniveckij-oblasti/ ; https://www.facebook.com/RuslanZaparaniuk/videos/687090224290706/ ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/45959; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/12/chernivczi-palayut-vid-rosijskyh-udariv-ye-zhertvy-ta-znachni-rujnuvannya/ ; https://www.facebook.com/RuslanZaparaniuk/videos/687090224290706/; https://suspilne dot media/1064757-komitet-senatu-ssa-shvaliv-500-mln-dopomogi-ukraini-tramp-vidreaguvav-na-obstril-pologovogo-budinku-1235-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1752331655&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://suspilne dot media/cherkasy/1064819-poskodzeni-budinki-ta-piv-sotni-abonentiv-bez-svitla-naslidki-raketno-dronovoi-ataki-na-cerkasinu/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/15740; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/12/seriya-vybuhiv-u-harkovi-misto-pid-masovanoyu-atakoyu-droniv-i-aviabomb/ ; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/23982; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/12/pravoohoronczi-pokazaly-naslidky-udariv-po-harkovu-ye-postrazhdali/ ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2808 ; https://t.me/andriysadovyi/2995; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/12/naslidky-nichnoyi-ataky-na-lviv-poshkodzheno-budynky-dytsadok-i-desyatky-avto/ ; https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/22592; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/12/u-lvovi-zbilshylas-kilkist-postrazhdalyh-vnaslidok-nichnoyi-ataky/ ; https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/22604 ; https://suspilne dot media/lviv/1064785-vnoci-12-lipna-u-lvovi-lunali-vibuhi-so-vidomo/ ; https://t.me/kobzarartemsn/4744; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/12/dvoye-lyudej-zagynulo-vnaslidok-rosijskogo-udaru-po-selu-pid-sumamy/ ; https://suspilne dot media/lutsk/1064783-vibuhi-u-lucku-misto-atakuut-rosijski-bpla/ ; https://www.facebook.com/Rudnytskyi.Ivan/posts/pfbid0YuWFzPpDBmUh4BUT1TsuMGG6bJybUtrWofuAjE8GtpMB7F9KezSReptUxhaRBLJrl ; https://t.me/mayorpolishchuk/1789; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/12/rosijska-ataka-na-luczk-zrujnovanyj-budynok-pozhezha-poshkodzheni-avtivky/

[3] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/45959; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/12/chernivczi-palayut-vid-rosijskyh-udariv-ye-zhertvy-ta-znachni-rujnuvannya/

[4] https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/6248

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071025

[6] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9569;https://t.me/army_3otbr/2017

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2025

[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-14-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2025

[9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-11-2025

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-8-2025

[11] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31198 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172091

[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar013125

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042224

[15] https://t.me/herman_smetanin_msp/708

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9l; https://t.me/dva_majors/75217

[17] https://t.me/dva_majors/75217

[18] https://t.me/tass_agency/324975

[19] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38522

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9l

[21] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38522; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38605 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38606 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38607

[22] https://t.me/epoddubny/24121 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172146; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172146

[23] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31202

[24] ttps://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13641

[25] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31202

[26] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13641

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13641

[28] https://t.me/voin_dv/15951

[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13641

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13641

[31] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31974

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13641

[33] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95605 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31977

[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9l ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95605

[35] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14023

[36] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1943824655917494753; https://t.me/blackhussars/5028

[37] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31983

[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13641

[39] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/12/vorog-majzhe-ne-vykorystovuye-vazhku-tehniku-aerorozvidnyk-pro-boyi-za-pokrovsk/; https://youtu.be/kwqMIw9Hta4

[40] https://t.me/milinfolive/152794

[41] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14022

[42] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1943824655917494753; https://t.me/blackhussars/5028

[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38476

[44] https://t.me/sicariofly/58; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9568; https://t.me/osintpen/1411; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/29590

[45] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38475; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95611;

[46] https://t.me/wargonzo/27818; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31983

[47] https://t.me/voin_dv/15952

[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13641

[49] https://t.me/voin_dv/15948

[50] https://t.me/voin_dv/15952

[51] https://t.me/voin_dv/15952

[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13641; https://t.me/voin_dv/15952

[53] https://t.me/voin_dv/15941 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15946

[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75217 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27818

[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31150

[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31166

[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9l

[59] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31166

[60] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/belarus-develops-antidrone-system-equipped-with-interceptors-and-buckshot-defense/ ; https://radiosignal dot news/news/v-minske-otkryilas-oruzheynaya-vyistavka-milex/

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 10, 2025

Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Daria Novikov, Jennie Olmsted, Olivia Gibson, Jessica Sobieski, and Karolina Hird

July 10, 2025, 7:00pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45 am ET on July 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed frustration following a July 10 meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov about Russia’s lack of progress towards ending the war in Ukraine.[1] Rubio stated after the meeting with Lavrov that he conveyed US President Donald Trump’s frustration with Russia’s insufficient “flexibility” to end the war.[2] Rubio stated that he and Lavrov shared ideas about “a new or different approach” from Russia and that there must be a “roadmap moving forward” about how the war can end. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that Rubio and Lavrov discussed their “mutual intention” to find a solution to the war.[3] Kremlin officials’ public statements continue to demonstrate that Russia remains committed to achieving its original war goals in Ukraine and is not interested in good faith negotiations to end the war, however. Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova reiterated on July 9 Russia’s original war demands for Ukrainian regime change and “demilitarization.”[4] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 10 that Russia prefers to achieve its war goals through peaceful and diplomatic means but that the war continues and the “realities on the ground” are changing every day.[5] Kremlin officials often call for Ukraine to recognize the “realities on the ground” (a reference to the frontline in Ukraine) to allude to the idea that Russia is in a stronger negotiating position given the battlefield situation and to demand that Ukraine concede to Russia’s unwavering demands amounting to complete capitulation to Russia.[6]

The Kremlin continues efforts to use its diplomatic engagements with the United States in an effort to divert attention from the war in Ukraine and toward the potential restoration of US-Russian relations. The Russian MFA readout of the Rubio-Lavrov meeting heavily emphasized Rubio and Lavrov’s reported discussions about bilateral US-Russian issues unrelated to the war in Ukraine, including the restoration of US-Russian contacts, economic and humanitarian cooperation, direct air traffic, and diplomatic missions.[7] The Russian MFA’s readout concluded that the United States and Russia will continue dialogue about a “growing range of issues of mutual interest.” Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on July 10 there has been no “slowdown in progress” in developing US-Russian relations.[8] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin attempted to use economic incentives unrelated to the war in Ukraine and the prospect of US-Russian arms control talks to extract concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine.[9] ISW also recently assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin unsuccessfully attempted to use Iranian nuclear negotiations and offers to mediate the Israel-Iran war to pose himself to Trump as an effective negotiator as part of efforts to secure concessions on the war in Ukraine.[10] The Kremlin is likely attempting to push the United States to suspend its diplomatic efforts to end the war in Ukraine in exchange for developing US-Russian bilateral relations and economic opportunities.

The Economist assessed that it would take Russia about 89 years to seize all of Ukraine at its current relatively accelerated rate of advance, which has fluctuated throughout the war and is unlikely to remain constant.[11] The Economist published an analysis on July 9 about the ongoing Russian Summer 2025 offensive campaign, which the Economist assessed started on May 1. The Economist found that Russia has seized an average of about 15 square kilometers per day during this offensive effort — roughly the area of the Los Angeles International Airport — cohering with ISW’s own assessment of the Russian rate of advance since May 2025.[12] ISW assesses that Russian forces seized a total of 498.53 square kilometers in May 2025 and 466.71 square kilometers in June 2025, averaging about 15.8 square kilometers per day in May and June 2025. The Economist assessed that it would take Russian forces 89 years to seize the remainder of Ukraine at this rate of advance and until February 2028 to seize the remainder of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts, which Russia has illegally annexed. The Russian rate of advance of 15.8 square kilometers per day is unusually high compared to the Russian rate of advance in Winter 2024-2025 and Spring 2025, and is unlikely to remain constant. The rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has significantly varied throughout the war depending on multiple factors, including the number of active Russian offensive operations on various sectors of the front, the time of year and associated weather and terrain conditions, and Russian and Ukrainian forces’ respective staffing levels and materiel stocks.[13] The Russian rate of advance will very likely continue to fluctuate in the coming months with the onset of the autumn rains and muddy terrain that affect maneuverability, as it has in the prior three years of war.[14]

Russia continues to expend staggeringly high amounts of manpower for its disproportionately small gains. The Economist used a modelling system that factors in “trends in war intensity, territory shifts, and credible open-source and intelligence assessments of losses” to assess Russian personnel casualties.[15] The Economist used this model to estimate that Russia has suffered between 900,000 and 1.3 million personnel casualties since February 24, 2022, including between 190,000 and 350,000 killed-in-action (KIA). The Economist also estimated that Russia may have suffered about 31,000 KIA since May 1 in its Summer 2025 offensive and that Russia has gained about 0.038 square kilometers of territory (or about nine acres) per KIA soldier since about July 2024. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa previously stated that Russia was sustaining roughly 167 KIA and wounded in action (WIA) per square kilometer of advance as of June 4, or about 0.0059 square kilometers or 1.45 acres per WIA or KIA soldier.[16] Russian forces will likely continue to burn through personnel in ongoing summer offensive operations that aim to seize the remainder of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts and advance into Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy oblasts.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg in Rome on July 9.[17] Zelensky noted that the discussion largely centered around arms supplies, strengthening Ukraine’s air defense, and joint weapons production and localization against the backdrop of increased Russian strikes. Zelensky and Kellogg also discussed possible harsher US sanctions on Russia and those who support its energy and banking sector.

The United States reportedly resumed some military aid shipments to Ukraine. The Associated Press (AP) and Reuters, citing two US officials, reported on July 9 that the United States resumed military aid deliveries to Ukraine, including shipments of 155mm artillery shells and Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rockets.[18] The officials did not specify the quantity of weapons in the resumed shipments or whether a new shipment has already arrived in Ukraine.

Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine. The United Kingdom (UK) announced on July 10 a defense agreement with Ukraine that includes additional military assistance and joint defense production.[19] The agreement will provide Ukraine with over five thousand air defense interceptors from Belfast-based Thales Air Defense, a subsidiary of the French defense company Thales Group.[20] The UK will also commit an additional £283 million (roughly $384 million) in bilateral assistance for Ukraine over the 2025-2026 financial year, including £10.5 million (roughly $14 million) for the Ukrainian Governance Reform Program and £1 million (roughly $1.3 million) for Ukraine‘s Green Transition Office. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated on July 10 that Germany is prepared to purchase Patriot air defense systems for Ukraine from the United States.[21] The Czech Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on July 9 that the Czech government approved an F-16 training program for up to eight Ukrainian pilots, aiming to provide 150 hours of flight training per pilot by 2026.[22]

Russia launched another large-scale missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of July 9 to 10 that heavily targeted Kyiv City, resulting in civilian casualties and significant damage to civilian infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 397 Shahed-type strike drones and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast – of which about 200 were Shahed-type drones.[23] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched eight Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast, six Kh-101 cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast airspace; and four S-300 air defense missiles at ground targets from Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 178 total projectiles, including 164 drones, all eight Iskander-M ballistic missiles, and all six Kh-101 cruise missiles, and that 204 drones and missiles were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that the main targets of the Russian strike series were Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast and that Russian strikes also damaged Chernihiv, Sumy, Poltava, Kirovohrad, and Kharkiv oblasts.[24] Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast officials reported that the Russian strikes damaged residential, medical, educational, commercial, and transport infrastructure, killing at least two civilians and injuring 26.[25

Russia’s strike tactics, coupled with the increased scale and concentrated targeting of Russia’s recent strike packages, aim to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and are resulting in significant damage. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger stated that Russian forces are employing new strike tactics, which involve targeting massive strike packages against one or two main target cities.[26] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian air defenses protecting the cities are unable to repel such large-scale and concentrated strike packages. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reiterated that Russian forces are launching drones and missiles from different directions and at different altitudes, which complicates Ukrainian air defense measures.[27] Ihnat noted that Ukrainian forces are working to destroy Russian reconnaissance drones that use repeaters to fly deep into Ukraine’s rear and that relay real-time targeting data to Russian forces. ISW previously observed reports of Russian forces adapting their strike tactics by launching missiles and drones from varying directions and altitudes.[28] Russia continues to use these tactics while increasing the size of its strike packages and targeting particular cities to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and increase damage. ISW continues to assess that Russia’s large-scale strike packages in recent weeks aim to maximize damage against Ukraine, are disproportionately affecting civilian areas, and support wider Russian efforts to degrade Ukrainian morale.[29] Russia’s recent large-scale strike packages underscore Ukraine’s need for both continued Western support to Ukraine’s interceptor drone development and production capabilities and for the contribution of Western air defense systems like US Patriots. Ukraine requires both indigenous and partner-provided air defense integrated into its wider air defense umbrella in order to secure its cities.

Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed Deputy Foreign Minister and Presidential Special Representative to the Middle East and Africa Mikhail Bogdanov on July 9.[30] Kremlin newswire TASS, citing unnamed sources, claimed that Putin released Bogdanov from his duties at Bogdanov’s request for unspecified personal reasons.[31] Bogdanov was heavily involved in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)’s efforts to provide military support to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in exchange for a Russian Red Sea naval base, as the Critical Threats Project’s Africa File previously assessed.[32] Sudan provides an alternative base for Russian efforts to project power into the Mediterranean and Red Seas and provide logistic support for its military operations across Africa given its bases in Syria are in jeopardy after the fall of the Assad regime.[33] Putin may have dismissed Bogdanov in favor of a replacement who can better manage the situation in the MENA region following the fall of Assad.

Key Takeaways:

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed frustration following a July 10 meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov about Russia’s lack of progress towards ending the war in Ukraine.

The Kremlin continues efforts to use its diplomatic engagements with the United States in an effort to divert attention from the war in Ukraine and toward the potential restoration of US-Russian relations.

The Economist assessed that it would take Russia about 89 years to seize all of Ukraine at its current relatively accelerated rate of advance, which has fluctuated throughout the war and is unlikely to remain constant.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg in Rome on July 9.

The United States reportedly resumed some military aid shipments to Ukraine.

Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.

Russia launched another large-scale missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of July 9 to 10 that heavily targeted Kyiv City, resulting in civilian casualties and significant damage to civilian infrastructure.

Russia’s strike tactics, coupled with the increased scale and concentrated targeting of Russia’s recent strike packages, aim to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and are resulting in significant damage.

Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed Deputy Foreign Minister and Presidential Special Representative to the Middle East and Africa Mikhail Bogdanov on July 9.

Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 10.

Russian forces continued attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 9 and 10.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Glushkovo and Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[35]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Tetkino.[36]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) advanced south of Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City).[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Yunakivka and Varachyne (both northeast of Sumy City).[38]

Russian forces attacked in the Sumy Oblast border area near Ryzhivka (northwest of Sumy City) and Bezsalivka on July 9 and 10.[39] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bezsalivka, Andriivka, and Kindrativka (both north of Sumy City).[40]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian counterattacks in Sumy Oblast are complicating Russian advances and threatening to encircle Russian forces operating in Andriivka.[41] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces are transferring reserves to reinforce Russian forces near Andriivka and Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City).[42]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Sumy Oblast.[43] Elements of the Russian 76th and 106th VDV divisions and the 11th and 83rd Separate VDV brigades are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[44] Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating in Kindrativka and near Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City), respectively.[45] Drone operators of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Pysarivka and Khotin (both north of Sumy City).[46] Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating near Kindrativka.[47]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced within Vovchansk and across the Siverskyi Donets River east of Buhruvatka (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[48]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Starytsya on July 9 and 10.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Vovchansk.[50]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar Volunteer Detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Vilcha (northeast of Kharkiv City).[51]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed Russian forces seized Holubivka (north of Kupyansk) and advanced west of Kamyanka and northwest and west of Topoli (both northeast of Kupyansk).[52]

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Radivka, Petro-Ivanivka, Ambarne, and Holubivka and toward Hryhorivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Novovasylivka, Krasne Pershe, and Kamyanka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane and toward Novoosynove on July 9 and 10.[53]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar Volunteer Detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Bolohivka (northeast of Kupyansk near the international border).[54]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Borivska Andriivka (northeast of Borova).[55]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Borivska Andriivka and west of Zahryzove (northeast of Borova).[56]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Novoyehorivka on July 9 and 10.[57]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman); seized Zelena Dolyna and advanced west and south of Zelena Dolyna; and advanced within, east, and south of Karpivka; west and south of Novyi Myr; and south of Hlushchenkove (all north of Lyman).[58]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Karpivka, Zelena Dolyna, and Novyi Myr and toward Serednie; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske and the Serebryanske forest area on July 9 and 10.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Katerynivka (north of Lyman).[60]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are reportedly operating near Karpivka, Zelena Dolyna, and Kolodyazi.[61]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 10 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[62]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka and toward Vyimka on June 9 and 10.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[64]

A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction stated on July 9 that about 30 percent of Russian drones in the Siversk direction are fiber optic drones.[65]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating north of Vyimka.[66] Elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly fighting in western Verkhnokamyanske.[67]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, Predtechnye, and Stupochky on June 9 and 10.[68] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bila Hora.[69]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[70]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 10 indicates that Russian forces advanced along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway north of Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk).[71]

Unconfirmed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Dachne (north of Toretsk).[72]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk toward Pleshchiivka, Katerynivka, Stepanivka, Rusyn Yar, Popiv Yar, Shakhove, and Poltavka; and west of Toretsk toward Shcherbynivka on June 9 and 10.[73]

A Ukrainian brigade published footage indicating that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a Russian reduced platoon-sized mechanized assault consisting of two tanks in the Toretsk direction, reportedly near Dyliivka.[74]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and drone operators of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk) direction.[75] Drone operators of the 3rd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Yablunivka.[76] Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating along the railroad toward Oleksandro-Shultyne (north of Toretsk).[77]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Razine, Novoekonomichne, Myrne, and Mykolaivka and toward Novotoretske and Rodynske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Promin and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne and toward Molodetske and Novopidhorodne on July 9 and 10.[78]

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on July 10 that Russian forces continue to attack in small groups but are showing signs of exhaustion.[79] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces continue to use heavy equipment primarily to transport personnel.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating near Novoukrainka.[80] Drone operators of the Typhoon Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Cental Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Pokrovsk direction.[81] Artillery elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[82] Drone operators of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA) are also reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[83]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Voskresenka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[84]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into eastern Voskresenka and north and west of Tovste (southwest of Novopavlivka).[85]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Oleksiivka, and Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Yalta, Zaporizhzhia, Piddubne, Myrne, Hrushivske, and Komar; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Tovste on July 9 and 10.[86] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Myrne.[87]

A Ukrainian servicemember of a brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Russian forces are increasingly relying on North Korean weapons, especially mortars, artillery, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).[88] The servicemember noted that North Korean munitions often do not explode.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Novoukrainka.[89] Elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Tovste and toward Novokhatske (southwest of Novopavlivka), and elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Myrne.[90]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 10 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD), are advancing toward Komyshuvakha (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[91]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko, Komyshuvakha, Maliivka, and Vilne Pole; and west of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole and Novopil on July 9 and 10.[92]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Temyrivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[93]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on July 10.[94]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1466th Motorized Rifle Regiment (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Malynivka.[95]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations southwest of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka and Kamyanske on July 9 and 10.[96] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kamyanske and Plavni (just north of Kamyanske).[97]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and 108th and 247th airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Kamyanske.[98] Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[99] Drone operators of the Nemets group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[100]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on July 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground assaults in the Kherson direction, including toward Prydniprovske (east of Kherson City in west [right] bank Kherson Oblast) and Bilohrudnyi Island (southwest of Kherson City), on July 9 and 10.[101]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 31st Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions on the west bank of Kherson Oblast.[102]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/rubio-meet-russias-lavrov-kuala-lumpur-us-official-says-2025-07-10/

[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/rubio-meet-russias-lavrov-kuala-lumpur-us-official-says-2025-07-10/

[3] https://t.me/MID_Russia/62472

[4] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2034998/

[5] https://tass dot ru/politika/24480935

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-16-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20March%2012%2C%202025%20PDF-compressed%20%281%29.pdf ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025

[7] https://t.me/MID_Russia/62472

[8] https://tass dot ru/politika/24484767

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022525

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-july-9-2025

[11] https://www.economist.com/interactive/graphic-detail/2025/07/09/russias-summer-ukraine-offensive-looks-like-its-deadliest-so-far; https://archive.is/bCzlk

[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2025

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051325 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122324 ;

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120422 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar100823; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112123; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120223; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110623

[15] https://www.economist.com/interactive/graphic-detail/2025/07/09/russias-summer-ukraine-offensive-looks-like-its-deadliest-so-far; https://archive.is/bCzlk

[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060525

[17] https://suspilne dot media/1062769-zelenskij-zustrivsa-z-kellogom-u-rimi/

[18] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-military-delivering-some-weapons-ukraine-after-pause-2025-07-09/; https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-weapons-shipments-trump-a1a39c136bce749debe36646f69b5196

[19] https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-russia-latest-updates-european-leaders-attend-kyiv-aid-conference-rome-2025-07-10/?arena_mid=8MolQq7miapjzCKur8ct; https://www.gov.uk/government/news/british-investment-boost-in-ukraine-to-benefit-both-countries

[20] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/british-investment-boost-in-ukraine-to-benefit-both-countries

[21] https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-russia-latest-updates-european-leaders-attend-kyiv-aid-conference-rome-2025-07-10/?arena_mid=PpfhOod3yxiP5oXakCmX; https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-russia-latest-updates-european-leaders-attend-kyiv-aid-conference-rome-2025-07-10/

[22] https://mocr dot mo.gov.cz/informacni-servis/zpravodajstvi/ceska-armada-zajisti-letecky-vycvik-osmi-ukrajinskych-pilotu-259298/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/10/chehiya-pidgotuye-ukrayinskyh-pilotiv-dlya-vynyshhuvachiv-f-16/; https://suspilne dot media/1062761-do-kinca-2025-roku-cehia-pidgotue-vismoh-ukrainskih-pilotiv/

[23] https://t.me/kpszsu/38093

[24] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnrp2S2L6qk ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/10/sposterigalysya-navit-povitryani-kuli-v-povitryanyh-sylah-rozpovily-pro-nebezpeku-vorozhyh-rozvidnykiv/; https://t.me/kpszsu/38093; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15040; https://t.me/synegubov/15641; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/10/sposterigalysya-navit-povitryani-kuli-v-povitryanyh-sylah-rozpovily-pro-nebezpeku-vorozhyh-rozvidnykiv/

[25] https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1465 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/10/vnaslidok-masovanoyi-ataky-rf-na-kyyiv-zagynuly-dvi-lyudyny-shhe-14-postrazhdaly/ ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/45796 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/10/zagybla-policzejska-poshkodzheni-budynky-gurtozhytky-ta-trcz-naslidky-rosijskoyi-ataky-na-kyyiv/; https://t.me/UA_National_Police/44036 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/10/zagybla-policzejska-poshkodzheni-budynky-gurtozhytky-ta-trcz-naslidky-rosijskoyi-ataky-na-kyyiv/; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/12845; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1062885-kiiv-zaznav-udariv-droniv-i-raket-e-zagibli-i-poraneni-rujnuvanna-u-kilkoh-rajonah/; https://t.me/sazanovicholeksandr/128; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1445; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1446; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1449; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4976; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1452; https://t.me/Klymenko_MVS/1590; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4989; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1473; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1474 ; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/12845 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/10/kilkist-poranenyh-u-kyyevi-zrosla-do-19-poshkodzheno-shist-rajoniv-mista/; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zTbTAL3UQiArSYEKfJJhngU8YRxXtu6Xf1rH9Brvkwdqu1MH8S3ZY7rZ852k9Yiel; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/6213; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1063027-primisenna-5-kanalu-bulo-poskodzene-vnaslidok-ataki-na-kiiv/; https://www.5 dot ua/suspilstvo/5-kanal-poshkodzhenyi-vnaslidok-masovanoi-povitrianoi-ataky-na-kyiv-355182.html?fbclid=IwQ0xDSwLcPyhleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHsxZ8r-zW6YK8WkBtNZpE-_De1NPiRrzyTt3pyjOVCX6OeQk3KWqHXsBb-4R_aem_QrDukX3njSvn3L3izN7vXg#mcx0mxvgqsk4cb9harh; https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukrainian-air-defences-repel-russian-drone-attack-kyiv-2025-07-10/

[26] https://t.me/rybar/72044

[27] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/10/sposterigalysya-navit-povitryani-kuli-v-povitryanyh-sylah-rozpovily-pro-nebezpeku-vorozhyh-rozvidnykiv/

[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-22-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2025

[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070925

[30] http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202507090029; https://ria dot ru/20250709/bogdanov-2028228489.html ; https://t.me/tass_agency/324605

[31] https://t.me/tass_agency/324607

[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-may-16-2024-russian-outreach-across-africa ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-february-13-2025-saf-announces-government-plan-and-russian-naval-base-drc-concedes-to-direct-talks-with-m23-turkeys-growing-defense-partnerships-in-africa ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-march-27-2025-saf-liberates-khartoum-burundi-and-rwanda-tensions

[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-may-31-2024-russian-red-sea-logistics-center-sudan ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-special-edition-external-meddling-red-sea-exacerbates-conflicts-horn-africa ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-may-9-2024-america-and-russias-shifting-roles-in-west-africa-is-africa-media-russias-morphing-stance-in-sudan ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-february-13-2025-saf-announces-government-plan-and-russian-naval-base-drc-concedes-to-direct-talks-with-m23-turkeys-growing-defense-partnerships-in-africa

[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dYGeCgwNDuLE1Xqr6DmwcvwxS8VVedZQzzCGVUL33XFZ4B6Qqaa4a9rHuhiCwSAzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl

[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31069; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13582; https://t.me/wargonzo/27791

[36] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95524

[37] https://t.me/mod_russia/54574

[38] https://t.me/dva_majors/75057

[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dYGeCgwNDuLE1Xqr6DmwcvwxS8VVedZQzzCGVUL33XFZ4B6Qqaa4a9rHuhiCwSAzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl

[40] https://t.me/mod_russia/54574; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38362

[41] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38362; https://t.me/wargonzo/27791; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38399

[42] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38399

[43] https://t.me/rodnaya98vdd/1691

[44] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31045

[45] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38362

[46] https://t.me/dva_majors/75040

[47] https://t.me/dva_majors/75044

[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31035

[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dYGeCgwNDuLE1Xqr6DmwcvwxS8VVedZQzzCGVUL33XFZ4B6Qqaa4a9rHuhiCwSAzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13582; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13487; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31035

[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31035

[51] https://t.me/epoddubny/24089

[52] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31957 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31958 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31970

[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dYGeCgwNDuLE1Xqr6DmwcvwxS8VVedZQzzCGVUL33XFZ4B6Qqaa4a9rHuhiCwSAzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13487 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1062731-rf-namagalasa-prorivati-oboronu-v-rajoni-vovcanska-ta-grigorivki-na-pivnoci-harkivsini-osuv-hortica/

[54] https://t.me/epoddubny/24089

[55] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9552; https://t.me/msb_company/100

[56] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31961

[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dYGeCgwNDuLE1Xqr6DmwcvwxS8VVedZQzzCGVUL33XFZ4B6Qqaa4a9rHuhiCwSAzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13487

[58] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95479 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38369 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38390 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171925 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38373

[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dYGeCgwNDuLE1Xqr6DmwcvwxS8VVedZQzzCGVUL33XFZ4B6Qqaa4a9rHuhiCwSAzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13487

[60] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95479

[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38369 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38390 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38373

[62] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31967

[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dYGeCgwNDuLE1Xqr6DmwcvwxS8VVedZQzzCGVUL33XFZ4B6Qqaa4a9rHuhiCwSAzl?__cft__[0]=AZV5MZSLPFxT-ju3Wh_aabVP_miwtR9j32sLLsBhaVUhtBbtR0RVHQH_daoLbxT_JdutJrpBnmS21_kdvCk8iU8fbuKgXJYcsN7oqfvlisKTvU6-0Rq4qDJMtOWi1GqidimpeDJLbutDHIJQgzJXPRWOlMp-y5bOEfuvVFVK5xQYuw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l?__cft__[0]=AZWQmIglTSbUIso3FUNMxr0EVJc8eaY-Pq4gczqCj76b8tHeweAWd8dFN39IuQSgjrBfJ6uHhzhqJNXRjzArDQoNxoYHitVXKZcAvFUJoG6CmxRUrlwkLjN_BG_iFRTELCBOmQaqD6DogBCT7oP8YLyLRwOuNi_j2mIvjlyAFqYxlw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl?__cft__[0]=AZVeVrqdpXNxRcAuwzW8NqNOANq1e6In3UhPyf7aprRwZ9RNKvMswgcXySlboBsBU3UgcfJXdQdNN9m4W34heM0L1HQjsyp8CHUp_2GfFkGRj27zlhE4Imx5rAbxfZdOPP99PwphdHvW8meYdXELFMf5FpJc6vpcBoVppjwvLVRvPQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R;

[64] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38391

[65] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1062805-rosijski-vijska-vikoristovuut-na-siverskomu-napramku-blizko-30-droniv-na-optovolokni-vid-zagalnoi-kilkosti/; https://youtu.be/WY8sDvZdWEA

[66] https://t.me/VestovoyDP/8545; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1943320115417674116

[67] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38391

[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dYGeCgwNDuLE1Xqr6DmwcvwxS8VVedZQzzCGVUL33XFZ4B6Qqaa4a9rHuhiCwSAzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13487; https://t.me/rybar/72039; https://t.me/wargonzo/27791

[69] https://t.me/wargonzo/27791

[70] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31045

[71] https://t.me/ua_marines_36brigade/3332; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9550

[72] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38356

[73] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dYGeCgwNDuLE1Xqr6DmwcvwxS8VVedZQzzCGVUL33XFZ4B6Qqaa4a9rHuhiCwSAzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13487;

[74] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2944379535735799&rdid=8zzbCSKz6UUfCfJs; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/ukrainian-defenders-repel-tank-assault-near-toretsk/;

[75] https://t.me/dva_majors/75078; https://t.me/sashakots/54827; https://t.me/dva_majors/75112

[76] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14018

[77] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38356

[78] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dYGeCgwNDuLE1Xqr6DmwcvwxS8VVedZQzzCGVUL33XFZ4B6Qqaa4a9rHuhiCwSAzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13487

[79] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OD9Bs6ZLiNQ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/10/vtratyv-mavik-jdesh-na-shturm-poblyzu-pokrovska-postijni-ataky-vysnazhuyut-vorozhyh-pihotyncziv/

[80] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14017

[81] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38370

[82] https://t.me/mod_russia/54548

[83] https://t.me/Sib_army/6102

[84] https://www.facebook.com/31ombr/videos/1371969470768471/; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9551

[85] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38368

[86] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13487 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dYGeCgwNDuLE1Xqr6DmwcvwxS8VVedZQzzCGVUL33XFZ4B6Qqaa4a9rHuhiCwSAzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15919

[87] https://t.me/voin_dv/15919

[88] https://suspilne dot media/1062857-u-rimi-rozpocinaetsa-konferencia-z-vidnovlenna-ukraini-zelenskij-zustrivsa-z-kellogom-1233-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1752135650&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[89] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14017

[90] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38368 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38383 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15919

[91] https://t.me/voin_dv/15919

[92] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13487 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dYGeCgwNDuLE1Xqr6DmwcvwxS8VVedZQzzCGVUL33XFZ4B6Qqaa4a9rHuhiCwSAzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl

[93] https://t.me/voin_dv/15919

[94] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13487

[95] https://t.me/voin_dv/15919

[96] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12722; https://t.me/wargonzo/27791?single

[97] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31053; https://t.me/wargonzo/27791; https://t.me/dva_majors/75057

[98] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95486; https://t.me/wargonzo/27790; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95546; https://t.me/dva_majors/75057

[99] https://t.me/dva_majors/75057

[100] https://t.me/wargonzo/27799

[101] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dYGeCgwNDuLE1Xqr6DmwcvwxS8VVedZQzzCGVUL33XFZ4B6Qqaa4a9rHuhiCwSAzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0C74TH3yhou5KT786xANP3X91J4mRvbPGNiycsCPJBw9oZvhS9agHpSr7d91sojY2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0miZzHe7UHvas8YB4MpsNAUSY9JT8dmGYuuEfmejB2gMKseDid1AFs6fQx7sXW9Lsl ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1AfGDc6HHV/; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12722

[102] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31045; https://t.me/mod_russia/54548

July 26, 2025, 4:15 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on July 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces conducted a combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of July 25 to 26 and appear to be increasingly integrating missiles into overnight strike packages after mainly relying on drones in Spring and early Summer 2025. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on July 26 that Russian forces launched 12 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh, Kursk, and Rostov oblasts, Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Crimea; eight Iskander-K cruise missiles from Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai and Voronezh and Rostov oblasts; and seven Kh-59/69 guided missiles from the airspace over Belgorod Oblast and occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 208 Shahed-type and decoy drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed and suppressed 183 unspecified drones and 17 unspecified missiles and that 25 drones and 10 drones struck nine unspecified locations in Ukraine.

The Russian military has used a denser concentration of missiles in recent strikes and ISW has observed various reports indicating that the Russian defense industry is increasing its missile and drone production capabilities.[2] Russia’s increasing missile and drone production will likely allow Russia to continue conducting increasingly larger strikes against Ukraine during Fall 2025, and ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may be able to strike Ukraine with up to 2,000 drones in a single night by November 2025 should the current pattern of growth in nightly Russian drone usage continue.[3] Increasingly large Russian strike packages highlight the critical importance of Western assistance in bolstering Ukraine’s air defense capabilities, particularly with US-made Patriot air defense systems that can effectively counter Russian ballistic missile threats.

Russia is increasingly targeting densely populated cities as part of a cognitive warfare effort to weaken Ukrainian resolve and to undermine Ukraine’s long-term defense capacity. Kharkiv Oblast and City officials reported on July 26 that Russia targeted the city with four guided glide bombs (KABs), two ballistic missiles, and 15 Shahed-type drones, injuring civilians and first responders.[4] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and Dnipro City officials reported on July 26 that Russian forces conducted a combined missile and drone strike against Dnipro City, killing and injuring civilians and damaging multi-story residential buildings and industrial enterprises.[5] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 26 that Russian forces launched 100 Shahed-136 (Geran-2) drones and up to 15 Iskander missiles against Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and 40 Shahed-136 (Geran-2) drones against Kharkiv City.[6] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces targeted the Dnipropetrovsk Electromechanical Plant in Yelyzavetivka (northwest of Dnipro City) and the HARTRON-ARKOS research and production enterprise in Kharkiv City, suggesting that Russian forces used over half of their 208 drones and 27 missiles to target two specific areas.

Ukraine’s Western partners continue to provide critical air defense and military assistance to Ukraine. Lithuanian Defense Minister Dovilė Šakalienė announced on July 26 that Lithuania plans to allocate up to 30 million euros (roughly $35 million) to purchase Patriot air defense systems for Ukraine.[7] Ukrainian Ambassador to Germany Oleksii Makeiev stated on July 25 that Germany is preparing to send an additional IRIS-T air defense system to Ukraine. Germany is also prepared to work with Ukrainian manufacturers to produce additional air defense systems.[8] German defense company HENSOLDT announced on July 24 that it received an order worth over 340 million euros (roughly $399 million) to provide Ukraine with TRML-4D and SPEXER radar systems for air defense needs.[9] The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) announced on July 24 that the US State Department approved a Foreign Military Sale (FMS) of $150 million to Ukraine to enhance Ukrainian capabilities for maintenance, repair, and overhaul of the M109 155mm self-propelled howitzer.[10]

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces conducted a combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of July 25 to 26 and appear to be increasingly integrating missiles into overnight strike packages after mainly relying on drones in Spring and early Summer 2025.

Russia is increasingly targeting densely populated cities as part of a cognitive warfare effort to weaken Ukrainian resolve and to undermine Ukraine’s long-term defense capacity.

Ukraine’s Western partners continue to provide critical air defense and military assistance to Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Velykyi Burluk and Lyman. Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces conducted limited attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 25 and 26.[11]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating on the international border between Kursk and Sumy oblasts.[12]

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a radio electronics plant in Stavropol Krai on the night of July 25 and 26. Geolocated footage published on July 26 shows a drone striking the Signal radio plant in Stavropol, Stavropol Krai.[13] Ukrainian sources reported on July 26 that drone strikes damaged at least two factory buildings housing expensive imported equipment and production lines, and that the plant produces the SAP-518 and SAP-518SM electronic warfare (EW) systems for Su-34, Su-35S, and Su-27SM3 fixed wing aircraft; EW for air defense systems; the Redut EW system for the Tu-160 strategic bombers; active radio jamming systems, including the Khibiny jamming system for Russian fixed wing aircraft; the Bars system for the Russian Liana reconnaissance satellite; and electronics for Russian weapons‘ guidance systems.[14] A Ukrainian reserve officer stated that the plant supplies cathodic protection systems for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Halileh, Iran.[15] Stavropol Krai Governor Vladimir Vladimirov claimed that Ukrainian drones struck industrial facilities and caused a small fire in Stavropol Krai.[16]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: A Ukrainian source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported that Ukrainian forces retook Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[17]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Sumy City near Varachyne, Sadky, and Yunakivka and northwest of Sumy City near Bezsalivka on July 26.[18] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Varachyne, Sadky, and Yunakivka.[19]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[20] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and the 106th Airborne (VDV) Division and elements of the 11th VDV Brigade are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke, Starytsia, and Vovchansk and toward Lyptsi and north of Kharkiv City toward Kozacha Lopan and Kudiivka on July 25 and 26.[21]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported that Russian forces are storming Ukrainian defenses in small groups and using drones in search of weak spots at different points along the frontline in Kharkiv Oblast.[22] Shamshyn reported that Russian forces shift their focus between Milove or Ambarne (both northeast of Velykyi Burluk) and other sectors such as Kozacha Lopan, but noted that Russian forces remain focused on seizing Vovchansk. A drone operator of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction stated that Russian forces are sending two to three personnel for reconnaissance missions and five to seven personnel for assaults on Ukrainian positions.[23] The drone operator stated that Russian forces operating near Vovchansk use fiber-optic drones to strike Ukrainian logistics routes.

Order of battle: Drone operators of the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly struck Kharkiv City.[24]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Velykyi Burluk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove.[26]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk near Myrne; north of Kupyansk near Radkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Petro-Ivanivka, Stroivka, Krasne Pershe, Kamyanka, Dvorichna, and Fyholivka; east of Kupyansk near Pishchane; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on July 25 and 26.[27]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn stated on July 26 that Russian forces rarely use armored vehicles in the Kupyansk direction due to effective Ukrainian drone operations in the area and ongoing armored vehicle shortages.[28]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kupyansk and drone operators of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (southeast of Kupyansk).[29]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai, and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on July 25 and 26.[30]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 25 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Dibrova (east of Lyman) in the Serebryanske forest area.[31]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Serednie, Karpivka, and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr and Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, Zelena Dolyna, and Yampolivka; east of Lyman near Torske and Dibrova; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on July 25 and 26.[32]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 25 and 26th shows elements of the Russian 1234th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and the 169th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) raising Russian flags north and northeast of Serebryanka (northeast of Siversk) in the southern part of the Serebryanske forest area, indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[33]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, southeast of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and Vyimka, and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on July 25 and 26.[34]

Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on July 26 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian motorized assault comprised of up to 80 unspecified pieces of armored and motorized vehicles near Siversk, Hryhorivka, Serebryanka (northeast of Siversk), and Vyimka.[35] A Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Siversk direction reported on July 26 that the unit repelled a Russian motorized assault near Bilohorivka (east of Hryhorivka) that included infantry and both light and heavy armored vehicles.[36] The Ukrainian unit reported that drone operators destroyed two tanks, an armored tank, and a civilian vehicle. It is unclear if Russian forces recently advanced near Serebryanka as a result of either of these motorized assaults, or if Ukrainian sources are providing differing accounts of a singular assault

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Predtechyne on July 25 and 26.[37]

Order of Battle: Snipers of the Russian 299th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) and drone operators of the 98th VDV Division reportedly continue to operate in the Chasiv Yar direction.[38]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Rusyn Yar (northwest of Toretsk).[39]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Poltavka, and Popiv Yar and toward Katerynivka and Pleshchiivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on July 25 and 26.[40]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in Oleksandro-Kalynove (northwest of Toretsk) and elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly operating near Kleban-Byk (northwest of Toretsk).[41]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups have advanced to Zakhysnykiv Ukrainy Street in central Pokrovsk.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 506th and 589th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are operating in southern Pokrovsk and that elements of the 30th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA) advanced into Troyanda (immediately south of Pokrovsk).[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced in northern Novopavlivka (immediately southeast of Pokrovsk).[44]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Novotoretske, Razine, Boikivka, Rodynske, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Novopavlivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne, and toward Molodetske and Novopidhorodne on July 25 and 26.[45]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on July 26 that Russian forces are using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) in the Pokrovsk direction.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups were able to break into Pokrovsk during a recent Starlink outage along the frontline.[47]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in Zelenyi Hai (southwest of Novopavlivka) and likely seized the settlement.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) participated in the seizure of Zelenyi Hai.[49]

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai, Tovske, Novokhatske, Oleksandrohrad, and Voskresenka on July 25 and 26.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack near Voskresenka.[51]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Oleksandrohrad and Sichneve (southwest of Novopavlivka).[52] A reconnaissance battalion of the 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) is reportedly operating near Fedorivka.[53]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in Maliivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), and likely seized the settlement.[54] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) seized Maliivka.[55]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and toward Komyshuvakha and west of Velyka Novosilka near Temyrivka on July 25 and 26.[56]

A Russian source claimed on July 26 that Russian forces destroyed a bridge and two Ukrainian positions in Velykomykhailivika, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), indicating that Russian forces may intend to continue pushing west from the Velyka Novosilka area into southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA) are reportedly operating near Maliivka.[58]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on July 26.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the southern outskirts of Stepnohirsk and into Plavni (both west of Orikhiv).[59]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Novopokrovka and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Plavni, and Kamyanske on July 25 and 26.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stepnohirsk and Plavni.[61]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast reported on July 24 that it repelled a reinforced platoon-size Russian mechanized assault consisting of a tank, three BMP infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and four buggies near Novopokrovka on July 23.[62]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Chechen Yug-Akhmat Battalion are reportedly operating near Robotyne (south of Orikhiv).[63] Drone operators of the 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kamyanske.[64] Elements of the 4th Military Base (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[65]

Russian forces continued limited attacks in unspecified parts of the Kherson direction on July 26 but did not advance.[66]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 104th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division) and 328th VDV Regiment (104th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Krynky (northeast of Kherson City).[67]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/kpszsu/39275

[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060325

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072025

[4] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1076011-harkiv-majze-tri-godini-perebuvav-pid-masovanou-kombinovanou-atakou-rosii-terehov/ ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2898 ; https://t.me/astrapress/87714 ; https://t.me/synegubov/16081

[5] https://meduza dot io/news/2025/07/26/rossiyskie-voyska-obstrelyali-raketami-i-dronami-dnepropetrovskuyu-oblast-pogibli-dva-cheloveka-esche-pyat-raneny ; https://t.me/borys_filatovv/2644 ; https://t.me/borys_filatovv/2645 ; https://t.me/borys_filatovv/2654

[6] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/22256

[7] https://kam dot lt/jav-ir-lietuvos-santykiai-dar-niekada-nebuvo-tokie-stiprus-vasingtone-aptarti-bendri-saugumo-prioritetai/

[8] https://interfax.com dot ua/news/general/1090570.html

[9] https://www.hensoldt dot net/news/hensoldt-strengthens-ukraines-air-defence

[10] https://www.dsca.mil/Press-Media/Major-Arms-Sales/Article-Display/Article/4254520/ukraine-m109-self-propelled-howitzer-maintenance-repair-and-overhaul-capability

[11] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27050; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27017; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27015

[12] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96578

[13] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1948973843894223165; https://x.com/clashreport/status/1948969475115454830

[14] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9569; https://suspilne dot media/1076133-droni-sbu-urazili-zavod-radioelektroniki-u-stavropoli-dzerelo/

[15] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1949019638429614118

[16] https://meduza dot io/news/2025/07/26/v-rostovskoy-oblasti-v-rezultate-ataki-ukrainskih-dronov-pogibli-dva-cheloveka-v-stavropole-pod-udar-popal-radiozavod-signal

[17] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/22226

[18] https://t.me/dva_majors/76075; https://t.me/wargonzo/28073; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96578

[19] https://t.me/wargonzo/28073

[20] https://t.me/severnnyi/4660; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/22226; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173690; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31687

[21] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27050; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27017; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27015; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14467; https://t.me/dva_majors/76075; https://t.me/severnnyi/4659

[22] https://suspilne dot media/1075977-u-nato-pidtverdili-peregovori-sodo-patriot-dla-ukraini-zelenskij-hoce-viroblati-do-1000-droniv-sodna-1249-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1753528661&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[23] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/26/znyshhuyut-zhduniv-piloty-vazhkyh-bomberiv-na-vovchanskomu-napryamku-ne-dayut-zhyttya-vorozhym-bpla-zasidkam/

[24] https://t.me/sashakots/55137

[25] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/29857; https://t.me/army_3heavy/2023

[26] https://t.me/dva_majors/76075; https://t.me/severnnyi/4659

[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27050; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27017; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27017; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14467; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66193; https://suspilne dot media/1075977-u-nato-pidtverdili-peregovori-sodo-patriot-dla-ukraini-zelenskij-hoce-viroblati-do-1000-droniv-sodna-1249-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1753528661&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[28] https://suspilne dot media/1075977-u-nato-pidtverdili-peregovori-sodo-patriot-dla-ukraini-zelenskij-hoce-viroblati-do-1000-droniv-sodna-1249-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1753528661&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[29] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96542; https://t.me/voin_dv/16177

[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27050; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27017; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27015; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14467

[31] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1948852422384009424; https://t.me/operationall_space/5391

[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27050; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27017; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27015; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14467

[33] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9663; https://t.me/osintpen/1500; https://t.me/operationall_space/5405; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1948948891644166465; https://t.me/sanya_florida/26799

[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27017 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27015

[35] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14467

[36] https://t.me/feniksdpsu/962 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/26/vtekty-ne-vdalosya-nikomu-prykordonnyky-vidbyly-kombinovanyj-shturm-pid-bilogorivkoyu/; https://t.me/DPSUkr/27800

[37] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14467 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27017 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27015 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27050

[38] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31687

[39] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1949132259564360041; https://t.me/bbc44ombr/79

[40] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14467 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27017 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27015 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27050 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66190 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66190

[41] https://t.me/dva_majors/76075 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66190

[42] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66188

[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39593; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39596 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39598 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39620 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39621 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/24401

[44] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39598

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27050 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27017 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27015 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14467 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28073 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173693 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/24107

[46] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/26/buly-vypadky-koly-znyshhuvaly-do-50-motoczykliv-za-den-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-okupanty-lyublyat-pokatatys/

[47] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173693

[48] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9665; https://t.me/osintpen/1501; https://t.me/voin_dv/16170; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1949018440691503321

[49] https://t.me/voin_dv/16170 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/76098 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96598 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/16170 ; https://t.me/rybar/72423

[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27050 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27017 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27015 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14467

[51] https://t.me/voin_dv/16166

[52] https://t.me/voin_dv/16176

[53] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14112

[54] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9667; https://t.me/osintpen/1502; https://t.me/voin_dv/16172

[55] https://t.me/voin_dv/16172 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/55007 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/76098 ; https://t.me/rybar/72423 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/16172 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/16175

[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27050 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27017 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27015 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14467

[57] https://t.me/tass_agency/327546

[58] https://t.me/voin_dv/16169

[59] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66192

[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27050; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27017; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27015; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96533; https://t.me/dva_majors/76075; https://t.me/wargonzo/28073; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/21602; https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1CFQUohbY6/

[61] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66192

[62] https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1CFQUohbY6/; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/21602

[63] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5864

[64] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31687

[65] https://t.me/vrogov/21282

[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27050; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27017; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27015

[67] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31690

Olivia Gibson, Jessica Sobieski, Christina Harward, Jennie Olmsted, Grace Mappes, and George Barros

July 24, 2025, 9:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on July 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia will likely implement new policies to augment its military administrative capacity to significantly expand the rate at which Russia can call up a larger volume of conscripts and reservists. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov introduced a bill to the Russian State Duma on July 22 that would change the Russian military conscription administrative process to a year-round cycle, as opposed to the current system, which only processes conscripts during Russia’s semi-annual spring and fall cycles.[1] Kartapolov claimed that this change would streamline the work of military registration and enlistment offices, which would work year-round, and relieve emergency workload pressure that military registration and enlistment offices currently experience during the traditional semi-annual conscription selection periods in the spring and fall. This new system proposed in the bill does not institute new conscription cycles beyond Russia’s traditional spring and fall conscription cycle periods. Kartapolov added that the new model would ensure a uniform load on military registration and enlistment offices and make the process more convenient for Russian citizens, as conscripts would be able to undergo their medical examination, obtain military occupational specialty (MOS) assignments, and complete other necessary procedures throughout the year without rushing during the traditional three-month conscription periods. Kartapolov claimed that the new model would not make the Russian military increase its conscription quotas, although the Kremlin has been increasing conscription classes over the past three years.[2]

The bill would likely mitigate bureaucratic bottlenecks that complicate Russia’s force generation efforts during large-scale involuntary call-ups. Russia’s military conscription registration and enlistment centers that process mobilized and conscripted personnel currently only operate for six months of the year in spring and fall to support Russia’s semi-annual conscription cycles. These offices and administrative personnel rush to call up, evaluate, and process a large number of military-aged men within the six months, reducing Russia’s ability to facilitate large-scale call-ups of reservists and conscripts outside of spring and fall. The law’s proposal to have these processing centers operate year-round would institute a permanent military administrative bureaucracy able to facilitate Russian reserve call-ups to permanently augment Russia’s ability to process large numbers of mobilized personnel, regardless of the time of year. Keeping military processing centers and their staff working all year presents significant implications for the rate at which Russia can conduct mobilization, as the Russian military administration will have fewer constraints holding back the rate at which mobilized personnel can be processed and assigned to units.

The Kremlin is setting other legal conditions to facilitate the streamlining of future larger conscriptions. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on April 21 that simplified conscription procedures for military-aged men who were selected for semi-annual conscription but did not dispatch for compulsory military service.[3] The law specifies that conscripts who underwent conscription processes, such as medical commissions, but were not assigned to military service, could be called up to military service within one year without needing to repeat the conscription procedures. The Russian military’s transition to a year-round conscription structure coheres with Russia’s broader strategic effort to augment and streamline its force generation capabilities – a move that will have far-reaching implications for its war in Ukraine and a possible broader confrontation with NATO.

Russia has planned the gradual expansion of the Russian military since 2022, and the proposed changes to Russia’s personnel processing system are likely intended to support ongoing efforts to increase the size of the Russian military. Structural problems with Russia’s mobilization capacity and bureaucratic ability to process mass quantities of conscripts at one time severely complicated Russia’s partial involuntary reserve call-up in September 2022.[4] Then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in December 2022 that Russian military leadership planned to significantly expand the Russian military, including plans to increase the size of the Russian Armed Forces and to create new formations.[5] Russian military expansion requires an increase in the number of servicemembers, and Russia is likely pursuing efforts to increase its bureaucratic capacity to process and conscript Russians into military service. Putin ordered the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to increase Russia‘s military to 2.38 million people in 2025.[6] Putin has signed annual decrees increasing the size of the Russian military by 137,000 in 2022 to 170,000 in 2023 and 180,000 in 2024.[7] The Kremlin has also executed other measures since 2022 to expand the Russian military, including by reopening Soviet-era military academies to rebuild the officer corps, lowering the age of conscription, digitalizing draft summonses, increasing fines for draft dodgers, lowering conscription and volunteer eligibility requirements, and recruiting prisoners and those with health issues.[8]

The expansion of Russia’s administrative capacity to process conscripts and mobilized personnel would allow Russia to mobilize forces faster and more efficiently both during a protracted war in Ukraine and a possible future war against NATO. Russian citizens who have previously deferred or were ineligible for conscription may be eligible for conscription at a later date should Russian conscription legislation change. Kartapolov’s July 22 bill for a permeant conscription bureaucracy that works year-round and the April 2025 law to simplify conscription procedures will significantly reduce the bureaucratic hurdles that Russian authorities would face to process these citizens’ renewed conscription more quickly. Russia’s efforts to reduce the bureaucratic bottlenecks hindering the conscription process will affect Russia’s force generation mechanisms in the war in Ukraine. Putin has so far been reluctant to conduct another partial involuntary reserve call-up due to the risk of severe societal backlash, but these reforms to Russia’s conscription processes would allow Russian authorities to process another potential call-up in the future more smoothly and efficiently than the one in September 2022, getting soldiers from the military enlistment and registration offices to the frontline more quickly and thus mitigating societal backlash from poor bureaucratic procedures.[9] These reforms will also put the necessary administrative infrastructure in place year-round, allowing the Kremlin to conduct another call-up at any time of the year without having to mobilize additional bureaucratic resources that would slow down the conscription process.

Reductions in the bottlenecks in the Russian conscription process would also impact Russia’s ability to wage future wars. ISW continues to assess that Russia’s military reforms, including the restructuring of the Western Military District (WMD) into the Leningrad and Moscow military districts (LMD and MMD), demonstrate Russia’s longer-term preparation for a possible future conflict with NATO.[10] Russia’s ability to more quickly conduct large-scale call-ups will have significant implications for NATO and its ability to deter or even defend against future Russian aggression.

Kremlin officials continued to signal Russia’s unwillingness to engage substantively in efforts to establish a lasting peace in Ukraine during the third round of bilateral talks in Istanbul. Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov stated on July 23 that the Ukrainian delegation outlined three key priorities at the third round of Istanbul negotiations: a full and unconditional ceasefire, including halting all strikes on civilian and critical infrastructure; organizing a summit between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Russian President Vladimir Putin, US President Donald Trump, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, preferably by the end of August 2025; and the return of all Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), civilians, and illegally deported children.[11] Umerov stated that the Russian delegation agreed to return POWs who have been in Russian captivity for more than three years, the seriously wounded, and young people, and to exchange over 1,200 people.[12] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, who led the Russian delegation in Istanbul, stated that Russia’s and Ukraine’s positions remain far apart and that Russia proposed continued negotiations at the working group level.[13] Medinsky claimed that Russia proposed to establish virtual working groups to handle political, humanitarian, and military issues and to discuss possible short-term humanitarian ceasefires, lasting between 24 to 48 hours, to collect dead and wounded soldiers from the battlefield.[14] Medinsky asserted that Russian and Ukrainian leaders – referring to Putin and Zelensky – cannot meet until Russia and Ukraine agree on a full peace settlement and a full ceasefire is in effect.[15] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov similarly claimed that Russia’s proposals were ”concrete and constructive” but maintained that a meeting between Putin and Zelensky before the end of August 2025 is unlikely due to the differences in the two sides’ negotiation positions.[16] Russia’s rejection of a presidential summit before a permanent peace settlement is a continuation of Kremlin efforts to dictate the terms and timing of peace negotiations, as Russia did in early 2025 by rejecting Ukraine’s and the United States’ calls for a longer-term ceasefire to precede peace negotiations.[17] Russia’s proposal to establish virtual working groups is likely part of efforts to posture itself as a proactive, engaged negotiator while not committing to any substantive measures to meaningfully progress the peace process.[18] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to delaying the negotiation process so as to continue making gains on the battlefield and extract concessions from Ukraine and the West – in stark contrast to Ukraine’s continued willingness to engage in the negotiation process to end the war.[19]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky submitted a draft bill to the Ukrainian parliament on July 24 aimed at bolstering the independence of Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies in response to public backlash against the controversial bill that Zelensky signed on July 22. Zelensky submitted to the Verkhovna Rada (parliament) draft law No. 13533, which is designed to safeguard the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAP).[20] The bill would limit the Prosecutor General’s Office’s ability to give instructions to SAP prosecutors and require that the deputy prosecutor general, who is also the head of SAP, approve all the Prosecutor General’s Office’s written administrative orders regarding SAP’s activities.[21] The bill would additionally require NABU personnel with access to classified information to undergo a polygraph test within six months; prohibit most foreign travel for NABU employees during martial law; authorize NABU to receive more cases from other law enforcement bodies; enable SAP to transfer NABU cases that may jeopardize NABU’s objectivity to other agencies; and authorize SAP prosecutors to give written instructions to NABU detectives and discipline NABU detectives who refuse these orders. NABU’s and SAP’s press services reported that the bill would restore all procedural powers and guarantees of independence and called on the Verkhovna Rada to adopt the bill.[22]

The US State Department approved two Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Ukraine totaling $322 million. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) announced on July 23 that the US State Department approved an FMS to Ukraine for Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and maintenance and repair equipment valued at $150 million, and that the agency has notified Congress.[23] The US State Department also approved an FMS to Ukraine valued at $172 million for equipment and services related to the HAWK Phase III missile system, including MIM-23 HAWK missile spare parts, five-ton cargo trucks, HAWK system spare parts, refurbishment and system overhaul of HAWK air defense fire units, tool kits, test and support equipment, and US Government and contractor technical assistance.[24]

Ukraine and Russia conducted their ninth prisoner of war (POW) exchange on July 23, in accordance with agreements reached during the June 2 bilateral negotiations in Istanbul. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Ukraine and Russia exchanged 250 POWs each on July 23.[25] Zelensky stated that Ukraine has brought back more than 1,000 Ukrainian POWs since the beginning of the exchanges in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements and noted that the majority of the Ukrainian POWs returned on July 23 had been in Russian captivity for more than three years.[26] The Russian MoD reported that Ukraine also returned two wounded Russian POWs on July 23.[27]

Key Takeaways:

Russia will likely implement new policies to augment its military administrative capacity to significantly expand the rate at which Russia can call up a larger volume of conscripts and reservists.

Russia has planned the gradual expansion of the Russian military since 2022, and the proposed changes to Russia’s personnel processing system are likely intended to support ongoing efforts to increase the size of the Russian military.

The expansion of Russia’s administrative capacity to process conscripts and mobilized personnel would allow Russia to mobilize forces faster and more efficiently both during a protracted war in Ukraine and a possible future war against NATO.

Reductions in the bottlenecks in the Russian conscription process would also impact Russia’s ability to wage future wars.

Kremlin officials continued to signal Russia’s unwillingness to engage substantively in efforts to establish a lasting peace in Ukraine during the third round of bilateral talks in Istanbul.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky submitted a draft bill to the Ukrainian parliament on July 24 aimed at bolstering the independence of Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies in response to public backlash against the controversial bill that Zelensky signed on July 22.

The US State Department approved two Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Ukraine totaling $322 million.

Ukraine and Russia conducted their ninth prisoner of war (POW) exchange on July 23, in accordance with agreements reached during the June 2 bilateral negotiations in Istanbul.

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Kupyansk, Borova, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population, and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity, even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 24.

Russian forces conducted attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 23 and 24.[28]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Machine Gun Artillery Division, 68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[29]

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against oil infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai on the night of July 23 to 24. Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone strikes, reported on July 24 that there was an explosion at an oil depot in Sochi, Krasnodar Krai.[30] Geolocated footage published on July 23 and 24 shows an explosion at the Sochi Airport and the Lukoil oil depot near Sirius, Krasnodar Krai (immediately southeast of Sochi).[31] Sirius Federal Territory Head Dmitry Plishkin claimed on July 23 that a drone hit an oil depot on Tavricheskaya Street – likely referring to the Lukoil oil depot, and Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratev claimed that drone debris fell on an oil depot.[32] Sochi Mayor Andrey Proshunin claimed on July 24 that drone debris fell on Aviatsionnaya Street near the Sochi Airport, starting a fire.[33]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[34]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[35]

Russian forces attacked in northern Sumy Oblast, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Yunakivka, on July 23 and 24.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[37]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces complained that the current leading cause of death of Russian forces attacking near Sadky (northeast of Sumy City) is dense minefields that Russian forces laid when Ukrainian forces withdrew from Kursk Oblast as part of efforts to prevent Ukrainian forces from crossing the border again.[38] The milblogger claimed that the second leading cause of death in northern Sumy Oblast is friendly fire incidents and that elements of the Russian 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) and 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) recently fired upon each other. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces in the area are struggling to coordinate their areas of responsibility (AoRs) and that Russian elements are competing to be the first to seize Sadky. The milblogger implied that North Korean forces are moving from Rylsk (north of Glushkovo) toward Zvannoye (just northwest of Glushkovo) after claiming on July 23 that roughly a battalion’s worth of North Korean forces arrived in Rylsk.[39] The milblogger claimed on July 23 that the North Korean forces would relieve Russian forces currently in Rylsk, allowing these Russian forces to deploy to the frontline.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Bezsalivka (northeast of Sumy City), and drone operators of the 83rd Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly operating in northern Sumy Oblast.[40] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kindrativka, and drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces along the Sumy Oblast international border.[41]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[42]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on July 23 and 24.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Synelnykove (just southwest of Vovchansk).[44]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City).[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 24 but did not advance.[46]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Milove.[47]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Radkivka (north of Kupyansk) and likely seized the settlement.[48]

Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Kutkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Dvorichna and Kamyanka and toward Petro-Ivanivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane on July 23 and 24.[49]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kupyansk Vuzlovyi (east of Kupyansk), and drone operators of the Russian Anvar Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk).[50]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Olhivka (southeast of Borova).[51]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near Zelenyi Hai, Zahryzove, Bohuslavka, and Borivska Andriivka; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Druzhelyubivka and Cherneshchyna on July 23 and 24.[52]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Lyman direction on July 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground assaults northwest of Lyman toward Shandrylohove, Serednie, and Karpivka; north of Lyman near Novyi Mir; northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka, Kolodyazi, and Zelena Dolyna; and east of Lyman near the Serebryanske forest area on July 23 and 24.[53]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka and northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, Shypylivka, and Serebryanka on July 23 and 24.[54]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Serebryanka.[55]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced toward the southern outskirts of Maiske (northwest of Chasiv Yar) and within southeastern and southwest of Chasiv Yar.[56]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Stupochky on July 23 and 24.[57]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[58]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 24 shows Russian forces raising a flag in eastern Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk), indicating that Russian forces likely seized the settlement.[59] A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) with seizing the settlement.[60]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment advanced into Oleksandro-Kalynove (northwest of Toretsk) from Yablunivka.[61] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Poltamy vka, Yablunivka, Popiv Yar, and Rusyn Yar (all northwest of Toretsk); , and southwest of Toretsk near Romanivka.[62]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; and northwest of Toretsk near Oleksandro-Kalynove, Rusyn Yar, Popiv Yar, and Poltavka, and toward Stepanivka and Berestok on July 23 and 24.[63]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk-Kostyantynivka direction.[64] Elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are operating in Poltavka.[65] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Poltavka.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) and Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk).[66] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into central Leontovychi (just southwest of Pokrovsk), and Russian sources claimed that Russian forces, reportedly elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD), advanced into southwestern Pokrovsk, and that fighting is ongoing in Pokrovsk itself.[67]

Russian forces attacked toward Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk toward Rodynske and Sukhetske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrne, Novotoretske, Volodymyrivka, Mayak, Pankivka, Sukhetske, Mykolaivka, and Novoekonomichne and toward Zatyshok; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and toward Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Novokostyantynivka, Udachne, and Kotlyne on July 23 and 24.[68] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Molodetske (southwest of Pokrovsk).[69]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on July 24 that over 100,000 Russian forces are operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[70] Trehubov stated that the Russian military command seeks to bypass Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad to the east and that Russian forces are renewing their efforts to advance west of Pokrovsk. An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on July 24 that Russian forces are using more motorcycles due to a fear of using armored vehicles.[71] The spokesperson of a different Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are moving in groups of two to four personnel along windbreaks for ground assaults.[72]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating near Volodymyrivka.[73] Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Hrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[74]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 23 indicates that Russian forces likely seized Dachne (south of Novopavlivka).[75]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka, south of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Yalta, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Oleksandrohrad, Tovste, and Voskresenka.[76]

Russian forces conducted ground assaults south of Novopavlivka near Dachne, Zirka, and Zaporizhzhia; southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka; southwest of Novopavlivka toward Oleksandrohrad near Piddubne, Voskresenka and Maliivka on July 23 and 24.[77]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 24 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and west of Zelene Pole (west of Velyka Novosilka).[78]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole and toward Komyshuvakha and west of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole and toward Temyrivka on July 23 and 24.[79]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on July 24.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1466th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and drone operators of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces near Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[80]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced in central and north of Plavni, northeast of Shcherbaky, and north of Kamyanske (all west of Orikhiv).[81]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and Bilohirya and west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Shcherbaky, Kamyanske, and Plavni and toward Stepnohirsk on July 23 and 24.[82]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on July 23 that Russian forces are intensifying drone strikes against Ukrainian forces’ ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that run from Mykolaiv City to Kherson City.[83]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on July 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Kherson City toward Sadove and Prydniprovske and southwest of Kherson City toward Dniprovske on July 23 and 24.[84]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[85]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russia conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 23 to 24. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four Iskander-K cruise missiles and 103 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Cape Chauda and Hvardiiske, occupied Crimea.[86] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed and suppressed one Iskander-K cruise missile and 90 Shahed-type and decoy drones in northern, eastern, southern, and central Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that over 30 Russian drones damaged Primorsky Boulevard – a UNESCO World Heritage site – and a market, a gas station, and multi-story residential buildings in Odesa City.[87] Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported that Russian drone strikes damaged residential areas in Zaporizhzhia City.[88] Cherkasy City and Oblast officials reported that four Russian cruise missiles, presumably Iskander-K missiles, damaged educational, healthcare, and residential areas in Cherkasy City and injured 12 people.[89] Kharkiv City and Oblast officials reported that Russian Geran-2 (Russian-made equivalent of Shahed drones) and guided glide bomb strikes against Kharkiv City damaged residential areas.[90]

The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on July 24 that Russian forces struck Kharkiv City with two guided glide bombs equipped with a new modification of the universal joint glide munition (UMPB), referred to as the UMPB-5, and that the UMPB-5s have an approximate range of 100 kilometers.[91] Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes injured 42 civilians and damaged a multi-story residential building. Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office Spokesperson Spartak Borisenko stated that the UMPB-5 weighs 250 kilograms and has a thicker metal casing than Russian D-30 glide bombs.[92]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/22/07/2025/687fc0419a79479f70d91a1b ; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24581547; https://sozd dot duma.gov.ru/bill/973851-8

[2] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c36718p52eyo; https://kyivindependent dot com/putin-orders-compulsory-military-draft-of-160-000-men-the-largest-in-14-years/

[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-30-2025

[4] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignSept22; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21

[6] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-orders-russian-army-grow-by-180000-soldiers-become-15-million-strong-2024-09-16/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-11-2025

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-1-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2024;

[8] https://united24media dot com/latest-news/russia-overhauls-military-education-system-to-train-for-future-conflicts-9711; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-18-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-4-2025

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071725; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2025

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020525; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2025

[11] https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/posts/pfbid0Pedmec8ev6GkVdCxHVy4WLcJ4xVvrwfuPoGowoDBev2RZFNdNwq96fmdNEQjekqQl?__cft__[0]=AZWh2XUlqyHca0kIEa2DBzOTdujF8hiAGOa8dNbl8J5Ti42tB85DpEerTRFWQnnkGhpUz-fqCdvMsxJAuWcMnoEISqNSZFFZKaX8ilheOw-rRJR9SEW4YgAFZn-TiyPRLtMHiQ4VhSrb8Z5MUYP2gV6TpouUvsdcM28Yz9wh7KW9Ew&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/24/peregovory-u-stambuli-ukrayina-nazvala-try-priorytety/

[12] https://suspilne dot media/1074055-ukraina-zaproponuvala-rf-provesti-zustric-lideriv-do-kinca-serpna-umerov/

[13] https://t.me/tass_agency/326926 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/326931 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/326933 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/326935 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/62968 ;

[14] https://t.me/MID_Russia/62968

[15] https://t.me/tass_agency/326926 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/326931 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/326933 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/326935 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/62968

[16] https://ria dot ru/20250724/peskov-2031091677.html

[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022625

[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060525

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051925

[20] https://itd.rada.gov dot ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/56899

[21] https://suspilne dot media/1074901-zelenskij-vnis-do-radi-zakon-pro-posilenna-povnovazen-nabu-i-sap/ ; https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-polytics/4018519-deputati-zareestruvali-zakonoproekt-pro-zmicnenna-povnovazen-sap-ta-zahist-nezaleznosti-nabu.html

[22] https://t.me/nab_ukraine/3302

[23] https://www.dsca.mil/Press-Media/Major-Arms-Sales/Article-Display/Article/4253473/ukraine-bradley-infantry-fighting-vehicles-and-maintenance-repair-and-overhaul

[24] https://www.dsca.mil/Press-Media/Major-Arms-Sales/Article-Display/Article/4253428/ukraine-hawk-phase-iii-missile-system-and-sustainment

[25] https://t.me/mod_russia/54931 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1948104337177092563

[26] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1948104337177092563

[27] https://t.me/tass_agency/326722; https://t.me/mod_russia/54905

[28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oNu9ie3SdoNjPVezZu4ELoB26t7QE85MpdxGWPwyNKAYVtjsw5MrETfY3iArWCbtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v5aX7w9LhhxRvRwFC2gYQYFsMLykWHr2befb8jnVKVdqYQP5iddYQbrrX7PNz7V6l

[29] https://t.me/severnnyi/4643

[30] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9559

[31] https://x.com/Archer83Able/status/1948150667794903471; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/10540; https://t.me/plishkin_ds/1604 ; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/1948163712441028727; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1948341682333700536 ; https://t.me/supernova_plus/41726

[32] https://t.me/plishkin_ds/1604; https://t.me/kondratyevvi/9141

[33] https://t.me/agproshunin/2216

[34] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/29829; https://t.me/skala425/627

[35] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/10419

[36] ttps://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oNu9ie3SdoNjPVezZu4ELoB26t7QE85MpdxGWPwyNKAYVtjsw5MrETfY3iArWCbtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v5aX7w9LhhxRvRwFC2gYQYFsMLykWHr2befb8jnVKVdqYQP5iddYQbrrX7PNz7V6l; https://t.me/rybar/72366 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75936 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28028; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/10419

[37] https://t.me/dva_majors/75936 ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/10419

[38] https://t.me/severnnyi/4646

[39] https://t.me/severnnyi/4648; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2025

[40] https://t.me/severnnyi/4643; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/31543 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/24162

[41] https://t.me/dva_majors/75956 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173462

[42] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/10419

[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oNu9ie3SdoNjPVezZu4ELoB26t7QE85MpdxGWPwyNKAYVtjsw5MrETfY3iArWCbtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v5aX7w9LhhxRvRwFC2gYQYFsMLykWHr2befb8jnVKVdqYQP5iddYQbrrX7PNz7V6l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14342; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/10419

[44] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/10419

[45] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173462

[46] https://t.me/wargonzo/28028

[47] https://t.me/wargonzo/28028

[48] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9653; https://www.facebook.com/114TerritorialDefenceBrigade/videos/1245858349970558/

[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oNu9ie3SdoNjPVezZu4ELoB26t7QE85MpdxGWPwyNKAYVtjsw5MrETfY3iArWCbtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14342

[50] https://t.me/voin_dv/16130; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173462

[51] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9650; https://t.me/Ci4team_4mb/402

[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oNu9ie3SdoNjPVezZu4ELoB26t7QE85MpdxGWPwyNKAYVtjsw5MrETfY3iArWCbtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14342

[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oNu9ie3SdoNjPVezZu4ELoB26t7QE85MpdxGWPwyNKAYVtjsw5MrETfY3iArWCbtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14342

[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v5aX7w9LhhxRvRwFC2gYQYFsMLykWHr2befb8jnVKVdqYQP5iddYQbrrX7PNz7V6l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14342

[55] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39326

[56] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173495 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66163 ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/10419

[57] ttps://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v5aX7w9LhhxRvRwFC2gYQYFsMLykWHr2befb8jnVKVdqYQP5iddYQbrrX7PNz7V6l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14342

[58] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31659 ;

[59] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9651; https://t.me/dva_majors/75986; https://t.me/osintpen/1487

[60] https://t.me/dva_majors/75986 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75987

[61] https://t.me/milinfolive/153480 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75987 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28028 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173530 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66166 ;

[62] https://t.me/rybar/72355 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32102 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/153480 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66166 ;

[63] ttps://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v5aX7w9LhhxRvRwFC2gYQYFsMLykWHr2befb8jnVKVdqYQP5iddYQbrrX7PNz7V6l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14342 ; https://t.me/rybar/72366 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75936 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28028 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66166

[64] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96418

[65] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39401

[66] https://t.me/mod_russia/54954

[67] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66148; https://t.me/tass_agency/327017 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39387 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96461

[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oNu9ie3SdoNjPVezZu4ELoB26t7QE85MpdxGWPwyNKAYVtjsw5MrETfY3iArWCbtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v5aX7w9LhhxRvRwFC2gYQYFsMLykWHr2befb8jnVKVdqYQP5iddYQbrrX7PNz7V6l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14342; https://t.me/dva_majors/75936; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66148

[69] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66148

[70] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/24/u-rosiyan-ye-ambicziya-obijty-poblyzu-pokrovska-vorog-zibrav-stotysyachne-ugrupovannya/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[71] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/24/duzhe-ne-spodobavsya-nash-pryjom-poblyzu-pokrovska-teplo-zustrily-chergovyh-motoshturmovykiv/

[72] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/24/tupi-shturmy-vidverto-kazhuchy-bilya-pokrovska-protyvnyk-probuye-vykorystovuvaty-bronetehniku/

[73] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14098

[74] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173543

[75] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1948278352273354861; https://t.me/vog_vsemogytnij/95

[76] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32108; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32111; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32114

[77] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oNu9ie3SdoNjPVezZu4ELoB26t7QE85MpdxGWPwyNKAYVtjsw5MrETfY3iArWCbtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v5aX7w9LhhxRvRwFC2gYQYFsMLykWHr2befb8jnVKVdqYQP5iddYQbrrX7PNz7V6l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14342

[78] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32108

[79] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oNu9ie3SdoNjPVezZu4ELoB26t7QE85MpdxGWPwyNKAYVtjsw5MrETfY3iArWCbtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v5aX7w9LhhxRvRwFC2gYQYFsMLykWHr2befb8jnVKVdqYQP5iddYQbrrX7PNz7V6l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14342

[80] https://t.me/voin_dv/16149 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/16142

[81] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66153 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/327152 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32105 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173495 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66153 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28028 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96430 ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/10419

[82] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oNu9ie3SdoNjPVezZu4ELoB26t7QE85MpdxGWPwyNKAYVtjsw5MrETfY3iArWCbtl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02aVaKBnPfoaU7Z2fzNMREHVKfRMdCT5v6NKGYKNEk8M4uBDT2UiyhDfmjsXc2GxSkl ; https://t.me/rybar/72355 ; https://t.me/rybar/72366 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75936 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66153

[83] https://suspilne dot media/1073165-zelenskij-pidpisav-zakonoproekt-sodo-nabu-ta-sap-umerov-ocolit-delegaciu-ukraini-na-peremovinah-z-rf-1246-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1753289691&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[84] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v5aX7w9LhhxRvRwFC2gYQYFsMLykWHr2befb8jnVKVdqYQP5iddYQbrrX7PNz7V6l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oNu9ie3SdoNjPVezZu4ELoB26t7QE85MpdxGWPwyNKAYVtjsw5MrETfY3iArWCbtl

[85] https://t.me/dva_majors/75954; https://t.me/dva_majors/75955

[86] https://t.me/kpszsu/39131

[87] https://t.me/odeskaODA/10635 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02aVaKBnPfoaU7Z2fzNMREHVKfRMdCT5v6NKGYKNEk8M4uBDT2UiyhDfmjsXc2GxSkl ; https://od.gp dot gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=395419; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1074257-prokuratura-vidkrila-provadzenna-pisla-ataki-na-odesu-ponad-30-droniv-cetvero-poranenih-i-poskodzenna-v-seredmisti/ ; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9559

[88] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/22757

[89] https://t.me/bondmerche/3099 ; https://t.me/cherkaskaODA/14706 ; https://t.me/cherkaskaODA/14683

[90] https://t.me/synegubov/15960 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15984 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15994 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15995 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15998 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2855

[91] https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/24121 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1074641-rosia-atakuvala-harkiv-aviabombami-novoi-modifikacii/;

[92] https://newsukraine.rbc dot ua/news/russia-may-have-hit-ukraine-s-kharkiv-with-1753360027.html

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