Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 22, 2025 – Institute for the Study of War

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 6, 2025

Russian forces are unlikely to be able to make such large advances in such a narrow time frame, given Russia’s current offensive capabilities and assuming that the flow of Western aid to Ukraine continues. Russian forces have spent the last 15 months advancing between 30 and 50 kilometers from the outskirts of Avdiivka to their current positions northeast and southwest of Pokrovsk. A senior Ukrainian official reported that the Russian military intends to seize half of Ukraine by the end of 2026. A map of purported Russian operational objectives suggests that Russian forces will attempt to seize and leverage positions in Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk to support concurrent efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts prior to September 1, 2025. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. The data cut-off for this product was 11:45 am ET on June 6, and it will be updated monthly. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

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Daria Novikov, Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, and George Barros with Nate Trotter and William Runkel

June 6, 2025, 8pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45 am ET on June 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

A senior Ukrainian official reported that the Russian military intends to seize half of Ukraine by the end of 2026. Russian forces are highly unlikely to be able to make such large advances in such a narrow time frame, given Russia’s current offensive capabilities and assuming that the flow of Western aid to Ukraine continues. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa told reporters on June 5 that Russia likely seeks to seize the full extent of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by September 1, 2025, and create a buffer zone along the northern Ukrainian-Russian border by the end of 2025.[1] Palisa also stated that Russia intends to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River and seize Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts by the end of 2026, depriving Ukraine of access to the Black Sea. Western sources published a map on June 4 and 6 that Palisa reportedly presented to US officials and journalists.[2] The map suggests that Russia intends to seize roughly 222,700 additional square kilometers of Ukrainian territory and hold a total of 336,300 square kilometers by the end of 2026 – almost double the roughly 162,000 total square kilometers that Russia held as of the first month of Russia’s initial full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The total area of Ukraine is roughly 603,500 square kilometers.

Palisa’s map of purported Russian operational objectives suggests that Russian forces will attempt to seize and leverage positions in Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts to support concurrent efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts prior to September 1, 2025. Palisa’s map suggests that the Russian military command does not intend for Russian forces to seize Zaporizhzhia City by September 1. Palisa’s map suggests that Russian forces seek to leverage these positions to eventually seize Zaporizhzhia City, which is consistent with the Russian government’s formal territorial demands for all Zaporizhia Oblast.[3]

It remains unclear on what basis the Russian military may be able to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast within the next three months or even advance the 50 to 80 kilometers from the current Russian frontline to the administrative boundaries of Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces have spent the last 15 months advancing between 30 and 50 kilometers from the outskirts of Avdiivka to their current positions northeast and southwest of Pokrovsk, a far slower rate of advance than the one necessary to seize all of Donetsk Oblast by September 1. The rate of Russian advance as depicted by the map also appears to assume that Russian forces will be able to fight through the Kostyantynivka-Kramatorsk-Slovyansk fortress belt – a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions in Donetsk Oblast – at a rate never demonstrated by Russian forces at any point during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian forces have not fought through a comparable town since Russian forces engaged in a year-long and pyrrhic effort to seize Bakhmut that ended in May 2023.[4]

Palisa’s assessment posits that Russian forces would then sequentially attempt to seize the remainder of Kherson Oblast and create a “buffer zone” along the international border in northern Ukraine by the end of 2025. Palisa’s map suggests that Russian forces would attempt to ford the Dnipro River, retake the remainder of Kherson Oblast, marginally advance further in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and establish a defensible buffer zone along the international border in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts by the end of 2025.[5] The Russian military command would likely have to redeploy significant Russian forces from other areas of the frontline to accomplish these objectives, assuming Ukraine’s international partners continue supporting Ukraine.

Russian forces would struggle to seize the remainder of Kherson Oblast, as it would require crossing the Dnipro River, establishing a lodgement on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River, seizing Kherson City, and then advancing further west and north to the oblast’s administrative borders. Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces have successfully conducted cross-river operations at scale across the Dnipro River since Russia’s withdrawal to east (left) bank Kherson Oblast in November 2022, and the establishment of significant Ukrainian defenses in west bank Kherson Oblast since liberating this area will only further hamper Russia’s ability to seize the remainder of Kherson Oblast.[6]

A series of intensified, simultaneous Russian offensives into northern Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts would spread Russia’s manpower and materiel along the entire thousand-kilometer-long frontline and likely exacerbate existing constraints. Russia’s reported operational objectives through the end of 2025 are consistent with long-standing Russian demands that Ukraine concede the illegally annexed Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea, however.[7]

The Russian military command’s purported objectives for 2026 extend far beyond Russia’s formal territorial demands and aim to seize a significant part of central Ukraine and most of southern and eastern Ukraine. Palisa’s map suggests that Russian forces intend to seize the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River, which includes the rest of unoccupied Zaporizhia Oblast, and all of Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Poltava oblasts; and half of Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Palisa’s map suggests that Russian forces also intend to seize parts of southern Ukraine west of the Dnipro River, including most of Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts. Russian forces will have to seize nine currently unoccupied oblast capitals – Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, and Poltava cities – with an estimated pre-war population of over 5.6 million people.[8] Russia has not captured an oblast capital city since March 2022, when Russian forces seized Kherson City and subsequently lost it eight months later. This goal would require Russian forces to advance over 300 kilometers from the furthest point of the international border to Kyiv City within the next 18 months.

Russia’s purported military campaign plans for 2025 and 2026 are consistent with long-standing Russian territorial objectives and recent statements by pro-Kremlin voices in the information space. Kremlin officials have repeatedly demanded that Russia create a “buffer zone” along the international border in northern Ukraine to defend Russian cities in Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts against Ukrainian drone and artillery strikes and ground operations.[9] Kremlin officials also routinely invoke the Kremlin’s concept of “Novorossiya” – which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine – to justify ever-expanding Russian territorial ambitions in eastern and southern Ukraine.[10] Russian officials have previously characterized Kharkiv and Odesa cities as “Russian” cities.[11] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov told Kremlin newswire TASS on May 31 that Ukraine risks losing Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Sumy, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Mykolaiv cities if Ukraine refuses a peace settlement in the near future.[12]

Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated in April 2025 that the “return” of the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River to Russia is “fundamentally important” and an “absolute priority.”[13] Saldo called for Russia to completely control the areas of the Dnipro River that pass through Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts – a call for Russia to not only gain control over parts of Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy but to control parts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, which Russia has not formally claimed or illegally annexed. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev recently reiterated his previous calls for Russia to occupy most of Ukraine as a buffer zone – apart from a relatively small area of Volyn and Lviv oblasts along Poland’s border – and leave Ukraine as a rump state, which underscores the extent of long-term Russian territorial objectives in Ukraine.[14] Palisa’s map does not suggest whether Russia may have military plans to seize additional territory of Ukraine beyond 2026, but it is unlikely that Russian President Vladimir Putin would be satisfied with seizing slightly more than half of Ukraine if Russian forces could fulfill their purported 2026 plans.

The Russian military is likely unable to achieve its purported 2026 objectives, given the significant manpower and materiel losses Russian forces have sustained over the last three years of war and the Russian forces’ inability to achieve operational maneuver on the battlefield. Putin’s theory of victory depends on the Western alliance backing Ukraine, abandoning Ukraine as a necessary condition to bring about this scale of advance.[15] Russian forces have thus far failed to restore operational maneuver on the battlefield in Ukraine and conduct the kind of rapid, mechanized maneuver necessary to make operationally significant breakthroughs of Ukrainian defensive lines, and have not done so since 2022.[16] Western sources estimated that Russia has suffered almost one million casualties and lost well over 10,000 tanks and armored vehicles over the last three years of war.[17] Russian forces would also be pursuing complicated offensive operations in the face of mined gray zones, Ukrainian defensive lines, Ukrainian drones, and populated Ukrainian towns and cities along a thousand-kilometer-long frontline. Any operational plan that would require the Russian command to spread its limited offensive capabilities along the entire frontline to make significant advances from Odesa to Chernihiv oblasts would likely exacerbate Russian combat power shortage issues and undermine the Russian military’s ability to achieve its objectives.[18]

Russian forces would only be able to achieve these reported operational objectives if the situation along the frontline changes dramatically in the near future, such as Russia suddenly restoring operational maneuver or the sudden collapse of Ukrainian defensive lines. ISW previously assessed that delays in Western aid provision to Ukraine in 2023 and 2024 provided Russian forces with sufficient leverage to regain the battlefield initiative and make operationally significant gains, and that the Kremlin is currently engaged in an effort aimed at convincing the West that Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable and that the West should abandon supporting Ukraine.[19] Russia’s only real hope of winning its war in Ukraine is to convince the West to abandon Ukraine, and Putin is therefore seeking to prevent the future supply of Western military aid to Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Western aid remains vital to Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against Russian aggression and is crucial for ensuring a just and enduring peace in Ukraine and long-term security in Europe.[20] Russia is very unlikely to seize half of Ukraine if the international coalition continues supporting Ukraine.

Russian forces conducted the second-largest series of missile and drone strikes of the war overnight on June 5 to 6. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on June 6 that Russian forces launched 452 projectiles, including 407 Shahed and mock drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[21] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched six Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Kursk and Voronezh oblasts; 36 Kh-101 cruise missiles from airspace over Saratov Oblast and the Caspian Sea; two Iskander-M cruise missiles from occupied Dzhankoy, Crimea; and one Kh-31P anti-radar missile from airspace over the Black Sea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 406 drones and missiles, including 199 Shahed and decoy drones, of which 169 were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW); four Iskander-M/KN-23 missiles, and an additional two of these missiles were lost and did not reach their targets; 30 Kh-101 cruise missiles; and two Iskander-K cruise missiles.

Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes hit 19 locations, including civilian infrastructure, high-rise buildings, and energy infrastructure in Kyiv, Lviv, Ternopil, Chernihiv, and Kremenchuk cities and elsewhere in Kyiv, Volyn, Sumy, Poltava, Khmelnytskyi, and Cherkasy oblasts.[22] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that these Russian strikes injured at least 49 civilians and killed at least three.[23] The Ukrainian Attorney General’s Office reported that Russian strikes against Kyiv City alone killed at least three and injured 22.[24] Russian forces notably conducted their largest strike series of the war with 479 total drones and missiles less than a week prior, on the night of May 31 to June 1.[25]

Ukrainian forces continue efforts to innovate and expand their air defense umbrella to counter Russian strike packages. Ukrainian Deputy Strategic Industries Minister Anna Hvozdiar reported that Ukrainian forces are testing drones to intercept other strike drones and that Ukrainian forces have downed over 160 Shahed drones over Kyiv Oblast since February 2024 using these interceptors.[26] Russian forces have recently been adapting their strike packages and drone strike packages to effectively penetrate and overwhelm Ukraine’s air defense umbrella and inflict maximum damage, and attempting to combat Ukraine’s drone and counter-drone capabilities.[27]

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian military facilities, airfields, and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities overnight on June 5 to 6. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Engels Air Base in Saratov Oblast and at Dyagilevo Air Base in Ryazan Oblast, damaging at least three fuel and lubricant tanks at Engels and causing a fire and secondary explosions in the area.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that it is still clarifying the damage at Dyagilevo Air Base but that there are reports of a large fire in the area. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko published footage showing fires at an oil depot in Engels and the Dyagilevo Air Base.[29] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin and other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian drones struck an industrial enterprise in Engels and caused a fire.[30] Kovalenko reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the JSC Progress Plant in Michurinsk, Tambov Oblast, which produces stabilization and control systems for missile, artillery, and aviation systems.[31] Kovalenko also implied that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified Russian military facility in Bryansk Oblast.[32] A geolocated image shows a large fire with possibly secondary detonations at the Bryansk International airport near Oktyabrskoye.[33] Russian opposition media, citing sources in the Russian Ministry of Emergency Services, reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Mi-8 combat helicopter and damaged a Mi-35 combat helicopter parked at the Bryansk airport.[34] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 174 drones over Russia and occupied Ukraine overnight, including an unspecified number of drones in Bryansk, Saratov, Ryazan, and Kursk oblasts.[35]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 6 that Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against Russian military command posts of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), including its 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment, near Kulbaki, Kursk Oblast.[36]

Russia’s Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the first time since September 2022, likely prematurely due to increased Kremlin pressure to project economic stability. The Russian Central Bank announced on June 6 that it had lowered its key interest rate from a 22-year high of 21 percent to 20 percent.[37]

ISW has observed reports of rising tensions between Kremlin officials and the Central Bank, namely between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina, over Russia’s compounding economic constraints related to sanctions and labor shortages that very likely factored into the Central Bank’s decision.[38] The Kremlin intensified pressure on Nabiullina to lower the key interest rate from 21 percent and maintain the facade that Russia’s economy is stable. Putin postured the Russian economy as “stable and reliable” in December 2024, soon after Nabiullina raised the key interest rate to 21 percent – the highest since 2003 – in October 2024 to combat rising inflation rates and blamed Nabiullina for mishandling rising interest rates.[39] ISW observed unverified reports in March 2025 of a federal audit of the Central Bank, and Russian officials indicated in the days leading up to the announcement that they “expect” the Central Bank to lower the key interest rate.[40]

The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that the Russian inflation rate hovered around nine to 10 percent, when the actual figure is likely closer to 20 percent as of March 2025.[41] The Kremlin’s efforts to pressure the Central Bank into prematurely lowering its key interest rate to maintain the facade of economic stability will likely drive further economic instability and contribute to elevated levels of inflation.

Key Takeaways:

. Russia’s purported military campaign plans for 2025 and 2026 are consistent with long-standing Russian territorial objectives and recent statements by pro-Kremlin voices in the information space.

Russian forces conducted the second-largest series of missile and drone strikes of the war overnight on June 5 to 6.

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian military facilities, airfields, and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities overnight on June 5 to 6.

Russia’s Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the first time since September 2022, likely prematurely due to increased Kremlin pressure to project economic stability.

Russian forces recently advanced in Belgorod and Sumy oblasts and near Lyman and Velyka Novosilka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian and Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 5 that Ukrainian forces re-entered and established positions within Guyevo (southwest of Glushkovo).[42]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked southwest of Glushkovo near Tetkino and Popovo-Lezhachi; and south of Glushkovo and in the direction of Novyi Put on June 5 and 6.[43] Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 5 and 6.[44]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) and the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Tetkino.[45]

Russian forces recently advanced in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[46]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on June 6.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 5 shows that Russian forces recently advanced south of Andriivka (north of Sumy City) and likely seized the settlement.[47] Additional geolocated footage published on June 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[48]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced to Varachyne (north of Sumy City) and north of Zapsillya and Myropillya (both northeast of Sumy City).[49]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Oleksiivka, Novomykolaivka, and Andriivka; and northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka and Yunakivka on June 5 and 6.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pysarivka (north of Sumy City).[51]

Order of Battle: Drone elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade reportedly continue to operate in Sumy Oblast.[52] Elements of the 40th and 155th naval infantry brigades (both Pacific Fleet) reportedly participated in the recent claimed seizure of Kindrativka and continue fighting in the area.[53] Elements of two regiments of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Andriivka.[54] Elements of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions between Volodymyrivka and Bilovody (both northeast of Sumy City).[55] Elements of the 76th and 106th VDV divisions are reportedly operating near Yunakivka.[56]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Starytsia, and Vovchanski Khutory on June 5 and 6.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian “Anvar” Spetsnaz detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Velykyi Burluk direction (east of Kharkiv City).[58]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, reportedly elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), seized Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk).[59] Other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have not yet seized all of Kindrashivka and that Ukrainian forces remain in southern Kindrashivka.[60] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Kindrashivka.[61]

Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and toward Holubivka, Dovhenke, and Putnykove; northeast of Kupyansk toward the international border near Krasne Pershe; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on June 5 and 6.[62]

Russian sources published footage on June 6 of Russian forces conducting an airstrike against a bridge near Kupyansk.[63] Kupyansk Military Administration Head Andriy Besedin confirmed that Russian forces struck the bridge and noted that Russian forces strike the bridge weekly.[64]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[65] Elements of the Russian BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Valuyki (in Belgorod Oblast northeast of Kupyansk) direction.[66]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Olhivka on June 5 and 6.[67]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 4 indicates that Russian forces advanced in the Serebryanske forest area (east of Lyman), and additional geolocated footage published on June 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Zelena Dolyna (north of Lyman) and northwest of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[68]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Lyman toward Karpivka; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr, Ridkodub, Lypove, Novomykhailivka, and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske and the Serebryanske forest area on June 5 and 6.[69]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces suffered 3,200 personnel casualties – about a brigade’s worth – in the Lyman direction in Spring 2025, including 840 casualties in May 2025 alone.[70] A soldier in another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are conducting assaults in groups of five to 10 motorcycles and that Russian training for motorcycle assaults has improved.[71] The Ukrainian soldier reported that Russian forces carry out electronic warfare (EW) during these assaults, complicating Ukrainian defensive operations. The soldier stated that the Russian military command docks the salaries of Russian soldiers to fund the purchase of Chinese-produced motorcycles for these assaults.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Siversk toward Serebryanka, northeast of Siversk toward Hryhorivka, and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on June 5 and 6.[72]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Siversk direction reported on June 6 that Russian forces are hiding from Ukrainian drones in basements, pipes, and damaged equipment whenever they hear Ukrainian drones fly overhead and that Russian forces are struggling to counter Ukrainian drones with shotguns and other small arms fire.[73] The Ukrainian drone unit commander reported that Russian forces cannot use unmanned ground vehicles, likely due to the difficult terrain and large elevation differences in this direction.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Chasiv Yar itself, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and Bila Hora, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Predtechyne on June 5 and 6.[74]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) reportedly continue operating near Chasiv Yar, and drone operators of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in the Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka direction.[75]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on June 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk), in western Yablunivka, and south of Oleksandro-Kalynove (both northwest of Toretsk).[76] A Russian milblogger claimed Russian forces advanced from Yablunivka and Dyliivka to the Kleban-Byk Reservoir (northwest of Toretsk).[77] The milblogger stated that Russian forces’ operation near the Kleban-Byk Reservoir seeks to encircle Ukrainian forces operating in the vicinity of Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk), Novospaske (southwest of Toretsk), Katerynivka (southwest of Toretsk), and Oleksandro-Kalynove.

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Kleban-Byk, Popiv Yar, Poltavka, Yablunivka, Pleshchiivka, and Nelipivka and toward Stepanivka, Oleksandro-Kalynove, and Rusyn Yar; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on June 5 and 6.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zorya (southwest of Toretsk).[79]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[80]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Malynivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[81] Russian milbloggers first claimed that Russian forces seized Malynivka on May 13.[82] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Malynivka, east of Myrolyubivka (northeast of Pokrovsk), and north of Yelyzavetivka (east of Pokrovsk).[83]

Russian forces continued offensive operations on June 5 and 6 toward Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko Pershe, Malynivka, Myrolyubivka, and Myrne and toward Koptieve; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Novotoretske, and toward Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Kotlyne, and toward Zvirove.[84] A Russian milblogger claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Myrolyubivka.[85]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian National Guard brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are using electric scooters to conduct rapid infantry assaults against Ukrainian positions and are also using motorcycles to deliver ammunition and supplies to the frontline.[86]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 6 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed Claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized eastern Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and advanced southwest of Bohdanivka (southeast of Novopavlivka) and that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) advanced north of Horikhove (both east of Novopavlivka).[87]

Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Novopavlivka near Nadiivka, Novoserhiivka, Novooleksandrivka, and Muravka and east of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Nadiivka on June 5 and 6.[88]

A servicemember in a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported on June 6 that Russian forces are rarely using armored vehicles in the area due to Ukrainian drone operations and that Russian forces are fielding an average of eight to 10 motorcycles per day.[89]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on June 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Bahatyr, Andriivka, and Oleksiivka on June 5 and 6.[90] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 5 and 6 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr and Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[91]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Odradne.[92]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 6 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Fedorivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[93] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed on June 6 that Russian forces seized Fedorivka.[94]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Fedorivka.[95] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near and in southern Komar (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), south of Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), in the area between Vilne Pole and Zelene Pole (west of Velyka Novosilka), and west of Novopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[96]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Komar and Fedorivka; west of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Shevchenko; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole, Rivnopil, Novopil, and Novosilka on June 5 and 6.[97] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Fedorivka, Komar, Novopil, and Zelene Pole.[98]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue to operate in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[99]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults in the Hulyaipole direction on June 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka and toward Poltavka on June 5 and 6.[100]

A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported that Russian forces restarted active ground operations near Malynivka on June 5 after this area of the front had been inactive for a long time, and are attacking in groups of seven with little to no equipment.[101] The source noted that neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces are using a large number of drones in the area.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Luhivske (southeast of Orikhiv).[102]

Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Pyatykhatky and toward Novoandriivka; and west of Orikhiv toward Pavlivka on June 5 and 6.[103]

A servicemember of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported on June 6 that Russian forces rarely use armored vehicles in assaults and instead conduct regular motorcycle assaults with an average of eight to ten motorcycles per day in the Orikhiv and Novopavlivka directions.[104]

Order of Battle: Elements of the “Nemets” group of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[105]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on June 6 but did not advance.[106]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2025/06/05/ukraine-reveals-russias-larger-war-strategy-00390707

[2] https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1930898823611621733; https://x.com/HelloLauraKelly/status/1930384195454439436; https://x.com/ak_mack/status/1930385027377836107

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-22-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2024

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut

[5] https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1930898823611621733; https://x.com/HelloLauraKelly/status/1930384195454439436; https://x.com/ak_mack/status/1930385027377836107

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030424; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022224; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051824

[8] https://index.minfin.com.ua/ua/reference/people/town/; https://datacommons.org/ranking/Count_Person/City/country/UKR?h=wikidataId%2FQ160584&hl=ru

[9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051724

[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlins-occupation-playbook-coerced-russification-and-ethnic-cleansing-occupied; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar05022025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225

[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlins-occupation-playbook-coerced-russification-and-ethnic-cleansing-occupied; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar05022025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar053125

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125 ; https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/23734449

[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2024

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/denying-russia%E2%80%99s-only-strategy-success

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-and-problem-restoring-maneuver-contemporary-war

[17] https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-battlefield-woes-ukraine ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010425 ; https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-many-tanks-has-russia-lost-in-ukraine

[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar120524

[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv

[20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25-2025

[21] https://t.me/kpszsu/35833

[22] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1930889182802506190; https://mfa.gov dot ua/news/andrij-sibiga-prokomentuvav-nichni-udari-rosiyi-po-ukrayinskih-mistah; https://www.facebook.com/lomako.oleksandr/posts/pfbid0MBsRuuPseBNdpnNfm8iifisk68B2xnRhrHYQryTPyjabaXNkCcCaCmbGvSecDsdSl; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/06/vybuh-za-vybuhom-vnochi-chernigiv-atakuvaly-odrazu-troma-typamy-rosijskoyi-zbroyi/ ; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/21281; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/5681; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/06/tryvozhnyj-ranok-u-stolyczi-shho-vidomo-pro-rujnuvannya-v-shesty-rajonah-kyyeva-pislya-kombinovanogo-udaru/ ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/43811 ; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/12175; https://suspilne dot media/ternopil/1035821-unaslidok-nicnoi-ataki-na-ternopil-e-travmovani/; https://t.me/V_Negoda_TODA/3424; https://t.me/V_Negoda_TODA/3426; https://t.me/V_Negoda_TODA/3425; https://t.me/V_Negoda_TODA/3438; https://t.me/V_Negoda_TODA/3439; https://t.me/V_Negoda_TODA/3440 ;

[23] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1930889182802506190;

[24] https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/30418

[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125

[26] https://suspilne dot media/1035475-mi-ne-zenemosa-za-tim-sob-povtoriti-sahed-gvozdar-z-minstrategpromu-pro-ukrainski-droni-ta-udari-po-rosii/v

[27] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052425

[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25188

[29] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9361

[30] https://t.me/busargin_r/8847 ; https://t.me/smi_saratov/25112 ; https://t.me/smi_saratov/25113 https://t.me/smi_saratov/25115 ; https://t.me/smi_saratov/25117 ; https://t.me/oko_gora/15506 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/149866 ; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/1869 ; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/1870; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/1871; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/1872

[31] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9361

[32] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9359

[33] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1930732635367653616; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1930733258213585146;

[34] https://t.me/astrapress/83145 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/38032 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/38033 ; https://t.me/astrapress/83029; https://t.me/astrapress/83031 ;

[35] https://t.me/tass_agency/318612 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53481

[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25188

[37] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/24161557

[38] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032325

[39] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122424

[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-6-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2025

[41] https://swedenherald.com/article/svantesson-wants-to-expose-russian-economic-bluff ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2025

[42] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36776

[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29738; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92963; https://t.me/rusich_army/24004; https://t.me/wargonzo/26998

[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170

[45] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92963

[46] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/28705; https://t.me/striks_zsu/76

[47] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/28694; https://t.me/khornegroup/3159; https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1930640353608061036

[48] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/28707; https://t.me/OMBR156/628; https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1930942881176400305

[49] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36828; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31791

[50] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36776; https://t.me/wargonzo/26998; https://t.me/rybar/71036; https://t.me/rybar/71030; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36828

[51] https://t.me/rybar/71030

[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29713

[53] https://t.me/rybar/71030

[54] https://t.me/dva_majors/72829; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1931009251398611075

[55] https://t.me/rybar/71030

[56] https://t.me/rybar/71030

[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11569

[58] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92953

[59] https://t.me/wargonzo/26994 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36784 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36781 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31789; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64881

[60] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36809; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29751

[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36781; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36809

[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11569

[63] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167422; https://t.me/mod_russia/53497

[64] https://suspilne dot media/1035771-nato-nadast-ukraini-20-mlrd-dopomogi-tramp-prosiv-putina-ne-davati-vidpovid-na-operaciu-pavutina-1199-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1749221642&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[65] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92962

[66] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64903

[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11569

[68] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9322; https://t.me/ombr_63/1242; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9323; https://t.me/bbps_vidarr/219

[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11569; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167429; https://t.me/dva_majors/72851

[70] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/06/sterly-czilu-brygadu-v-66-ombr-rozpovily-pro-rezultaty-vesnyanogo-vorozhogo-nastupu/

[71] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/06/myasni-shturmy-na-motoczyklah-yak-rosijski-komandyry-zmushuyut-soldativ-platyty-za-vlasnu-smert/

[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11569

[73] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/06/truba-ne-ryatuye-na-siverskomu-napryamku-okupantiv-lovlyat-u-najnespodivanishyh-shovkah/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mIvKxmpdGEU

[74] https://t.me/wargonzo/26998; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11569

[75] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29713; https://t.me/Liniya_fronta6/3848 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36810

[76] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167429 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29695 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36783

[77] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64884

[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11569 ; https://t.me/rybar/71042 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170

[79] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29695

[80] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36792

[81] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167429

[82] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14-2025

[83] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64878 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29698

[84] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26998 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11569 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64878 ; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21962

[85] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64878

[86] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11535 ; https://t.me/spartan_ngu/2435

[87] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36783 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36806 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64879 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64879 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23380

[88] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11569 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29698

[89] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/06/vyyizhdzhayut-shhob-buty-znyshhenymy-boyecz-pro-shhodenni-moto-ataky-rosiyan-na-zaporizhzhi/

[90] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0MMGCGZwbKaqbCzzUrYzFxb7eSk766jsUJDqixEvny8J2uxyVuYMUPPnUzMtbcNZSl ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64872

[91] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29693 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15347

[92] https://t.me/army29th/286 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1931016103809155530

[93] https://x.com/creamy_caprice/status/1930918444431486990; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9326; https://t.me/voin_dv/15341; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9320; https://t.me/voin_dv/15333; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1930946958954274991; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1930914807752053019

[94] https://t.me/mod_russia/53488 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29752 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53490 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/23684 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27007 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93006 ; https://t.me/sashakots/54135 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23381 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64895

[95] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64843

[96] https://t.me/wargonzo/26998 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64883 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23381 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64895 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29693 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26981

[97] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0MMGCGZwbKaqbCzzUrYzFxb7eSk766jsUJDqixEvny8J2uxyVuYMUPPnUzMtbcNZSl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11569 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/72851 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15347 ; https://t.me/rybar/71039 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64895 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64872

[98] https://t.me/wargonzo/26998 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15347 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29693

[99] https://t.me/voin_dv/15336

[100] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21962 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23382 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170

[101] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21962

[102] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31794

[103]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0MMGCGZwbKaqbCzzUrYzFxb7eSk766jsUJDqixEvny8J2uxyVuYMUPPnUzMtbcNZSl

[104] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/06/vyyizhdzhayut-shhob-buty-znyshhenymy-boyecz-pro-shhodenni-moto-ataky-rosiyan-na-zaporizhzhi/

[105] https://t.me/wargonzo/27010

[106] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0MMGCGZwbKaqbCzzUrYzFxb7eSk766jsUJDqixEvny8J2uxyVuYMUPPnUzMtbcNZSl

Source: Understandingwar.org | View original article

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 21, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s long-term demands for full Ukrainian capitulation remain unchanged. Putin told Sky News Arabia on June 20 that Ukraine needs to accept neutrality, reject foreign alliances, and agree to nuclear non-proliferation. Putin also claimed that Ukrainian leaders are being guided by the interests of “external parties” rather than national interest. ISW continues to assess that Russia is not interested in peace negotiations with Ukraine and remains committed to its pre-war demands, which amount essentially to the elimination of Ukraine as a sovereign country independent of Russian control. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated that Russian soldiers bring “only death, destruction, and devastation” wherever they step. Russian Security Council Deputy Chair Dmitry Medvedev claimed on June 21 that Russia would respond with a tactical bomb against Ukraine if a dirty bomb was used against the country. Russian officials have said that there is no evidence that Russia intends to use a nuclear weapon against Ukraine but noted that a response would be “catastrophic”

Read full article ▼

Anna Harvey, Olivia Gibson, Jennie Olmsted, Angelica Evans, Jessica Sobieski, William Runkel, and Kateryna Stepanenko

June 21, 2025, 4:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on June 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s long-term demands for full Ukrainian capitulation remain unchanged. Putin told Sky News Arabia on June 20 that Ukraine needs to accept neutrality, reject foreign alliances, and agree to nuclear non-proliferation before Russia and Ukraine can establish long-term peace.[1] Putin insisted that Kyiv recognize Russian control over the illegally annexed, partially occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts or risk future Russian aggression. Putin also claimed that Ukrainian leaders are being guided by the interests of “external parties” rather than national interest, reiterating a long-term Russian narrative accusing Ukraine of being controlled by the West and denying the Ukrainian government agency to make its own decisions and defend itself.[2] Putin claimed that Ukraine deserves a “better fate” than to be used by other countries as a tool against Russia. Putin also stated that no future settlement can be reached unless Russia and Ukraine resolve “outstanding humanitarian issues.” Russian officials had repeatedly issued the same pre-war demands that Russian officials presented at negotiations in Istanbul in 2022, which included recognition of occupied Ukraine as Russian territory and the “demilitarization” of Ukraine.[3] ISW continues to assess that Russia is not interested in peace negotiations with Ukraine and remains committed to its pre-war demands, which amount essentially to the elimination of Ukraine as a sovereign country independent of Russian control.[4]

Ukrainian officials responded to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 20 statements at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) and urged the international community to take more decisive action against Russia.[5] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky responded to Putin’s statement that Russia owns everywhere a “Russian soldier steps” and emphasized that Putin clearly laid out Russia’s intention to seize all of Ukraine during this speech. Zelensky noted that this ideology implies that Russia could also lay claim to Belarus, the Baltic states, Moldova, the Caucasus, and Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan.[6] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated that Russian soldiers bring “only death, destruction, and devastation” wherever they step.[7] Sybiha stated that the only way that Putin will accept peace would be if the West forced his hand through increased support for Ukrainian defense, severe economic sanctions, the recognition of Russia as a terrorist state, and complete diplomatic isolation. Sybiha called on the international community to push back against Putin’s continued aspirations toward new territorial gains. ISW has previously noted that Putin’s theory of victory is based on the assumption that Russia can outlast Ukraine’s will to fight and the Western coalition supporting Ukraine, and that reducing US military aid to Ukraine will neither lead to a sustainable peace in Ukraine nor compel Putin to reassess his theory of victory.[8]

Kremlin officials appear to be reviving the false narrative that Ukraine intends to use a “dirty bomb” against Russia, likely in an attempt to influence Western discussions about providing additional military assistance to Ukraine. Putin responded to a question from the panel moderator at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 20 about if Ukraine will use a dirty bomb (a conventional explosive laced with radioactive material that is not a nuclear weapon) against Russia and stated that it would be a “colossal mistake” and that Russia will respond proportionately to all threats.[9] Putin underscored that Russia’s response to Ukraine using a dirty bomb would be “catastrophic” for Ukraine but noted that there is no evidence that Ukraine intends to use a dirty bomb. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev seized on Putin’s statement and claimed on June 21 that Russia would respond with a tactical nuclear weapon if Ukraine used a dirty bomb against Russia.[10] Russian officials previously intensified the “dirty bomb” narrative and nuclear blackmail in March and October 2022, and ISW assessed that Russian officials used this narrative to slow Western discussions of providing additional military assistance to Ukraine and to undermine Western resolve.[11] Russian officials are likely reintroducing this narrative amid ongoing debates in the United States and Europe about further aiding Ukraine.

US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk on June 21.[12] The two discussed international developments and bilateral relations.[13] US Deputy Special Envoy to Ukraine John Coale announced on June 21 that the United States brokered a deal with Belarus to free 14 Belarusian political prisoners.[14] The meeting marks the first high-profile public meeting between senior US and Belarusian officials since 2020.[15]

Russia continues to field modernized Shahed drones, expand domestic drone production capabilities, and innovate long-range strike tactics. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy Beskrestnov told Ukrainian news agency UNIAN on June 20 that he estimates that Russia has increased its Shahed production capabilities sevenfold.[16] Beskrestnov noted that Russia is attempting to reduce its dependency on Iran by producing modernized Shahed drones with mostly Russian- and Chinese-made components and that Russia is equipping newer Shahed models with antennas that are more resistant to electronic warfare (EW) interference. Beskrestnov stated that Russian forces are constantly innovating Shahed tactics to improve strike accuracy and evade Ukrainian air defense systems and units. Beskrestnov reported that Russia is preparing to build another Shahed production facility in an unspecified location and forecasted that Russian strike packages may soon incorporate up to 800 Shaheds, compared to the 300 to 400 that Russia typically launches in nightly strikes against Ukraine.

Head of the Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office Spartak Borisenko reported on June 20 that Russia is modernizing its Geran-2 drones (Russian-made analogue of the Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones).[17] Borisenko reported that Ukrainian authorities have observed downed Geran-2 drones with a modified four-cylinder two-stroke engine, increased warheads, and new antennas and fuel systems, which are different from the components that Russia used in Shahed drones as of April 2025. Borisenko noted that Russia now has two factories producing modernized Geran-2 drones that use both Russian and imported dual-purpose components. ISW has recently reported on data indicating that Russia is expanding its long-range drone production capabilities.[18]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and a Russian milblogger claimed on June 21 and 20 that Russian forces are increasingly utilizing Geran-2 drones for strikes along the frontline, marking a departure from the Russian forces’ previous pattern of using long-range Shahed/Geran drones against Ukraine’s rear and deep rear.[19] The milblogger noted that Russian forces are using Geran-2 drones to strike targets five to seven kilometers from the frontline, which Russian forces used to strike with glide bombs or missiles. Russian forces’ increased use of Shaheds to strike frontline and near-rear Ukrainian positions is another indicator of Russia’s enhanced drone production capabilities.

The Russian government formally announced its intention to reassess Russia’s territorial waters in the Baltic Sea over a year after the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published and subsequently deleted a similar proposal.[20] The Russian government published a list of coordinates on June 20 that Russian officials intend to reassess Russia’s territorial waters and suggested that Russia should adjust the maritime border coordinates in the Gulf of Finland in the zone of Jähi, Sommers, Gogland, Rodsher, Malyy Tyuters, and Vigrund islands, and near the northern delta of the Narva River. Sommers, Gogland, Rodsher, Malyy Tyuters, and Vigrund islands are under Russian control, while Russia and Finland share control over Jähi island. The northern delta of the Narva River is located between Russia and Estonia. The Russian MoD published a similar proposal on May 21, 2024, that suggested Russia reassess maritime border coordinates near Jähi, Sommers, Gogland, Rodsher, Malyy Tyuters, and Vigrund islands, the northern delta of the Narva River, and the islands and capes around Kaliningrad Oblast.[21] The Russian government’s June 2025 proposal does not include the islands and capes around Kaliningrad Oblast. Russian officials denied that Russia planned to change its maritime borders in late May 2024, but the Russian government’s June 2025 proposal suggests that Russia may attempt to reassess a smaller portion of its territorial waters, mainly in the Gulf of Finland.[22]

Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s long-term demands for full Ukrainian capitulation remain unchanged.

US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk on June 21.

Russia continues to field modernized Shahed drones, expand domestic drone production capabilities, and innovate long-range strike tactics.

Russian forces advanced near Novopavlivka and Velyka Novosilka.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 20 and 21.[23] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and in the Glushkovo direction.[24]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on June 21.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on June 21 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces recaptured Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[25]

Russian forces attacked near Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka, Yunakivka, and Sadky on June 20 and 21.[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City), Andriivka, and Yunakivka.[27]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on June 21 that 52,000 Russian forces are attacking in the Sumy direction and that Russian forces are directing 23 percent of all strikes across the frontline in the Sumy direction.[28]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating south of Yunakivka.[29]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and Zelene and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on June 20 and 21.[30]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces attacked in the Kupyansk direction on June 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and Kamyanka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepove Novoselivka on June 20 and 21.[31]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove; and southeast of Borova near Hrekvivka, Olhivka, and toward Cherneshchyna on June 20 and 21.[32]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 21 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) advanced in central Novyi Myr (northeast of Lyman).[33]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Novyi Myr, and Zelena Dolyna and toward Karpivka and Hlushchenkove and east of Lyman near Torske on June 20 and 21.[34] Geolocated footage published on June 20 indicates that Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful assault with support from a tank and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) in northeastern Serebryanka (east of Lyman).[35]

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces are leveraging drone support in 80 percent of their operations in the Lyman direction.[36] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces operating in the Lyman direction have a numerical manpower advantage but are poorly trained and inexperienced in combat.[37]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA) are reportedly operating in Karpivka.[38]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on June 20 and 21.[39]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar toward Predtechyne, Stupochky, and Bila Hora on June 20 and 21.[40]

A Ukrainian officer of a brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported on June 21 that Russian forces are trying to seize positions near Olkesiivka-Druzhivka (west of Chasiv Yar) in order to cut off Ukrainian forces in the area and bypass Toretsk.[41] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported that Russian forces are transferring forces to this direction, but are struggling to provide units with provisions and sufficient logistical support.[42]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion and 299th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on June 21 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Oleksandro-Kalynove and advanced in northeastern Yablunivka (both northwest of Toretsk).[44]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Dyliivka, northwest of Toretsk near Poltavka and Yablunivka, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on June 20 and 21.[45]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[46] Elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Oleksandro-Kalnyove.[47] Drone operators of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Poltavka.[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to northern Novoekonomichne, near Koptieve (both northeast of Pokrovsk), and toward Novotroitske and Molodatske (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[49]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Koptieve, Malynivka, Myrne, Shevchenko Pershe, Razine, and Myrolyubivka and toward Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Myrnohrad, and Yelyzavetivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Novopidhorodne, Shevchenko, Novotroitske, and Kotlyne on June 20 and 21.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kotlyne.[51]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhzhia (south of Novopavlivka) and likely seized the settlement.[52] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers credited elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) with seizing the settlement.[53]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing beyond Zaporizhzia toward Yalta (northwest of Zaporizhzhia) and Zirka (west of Zaporizhzhia) and that Russian forces advanced from Komar (south of Zaporizhzhia) toward Piddubne (just northwest of Komar).[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Novomykolaivka, and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka, Nadiivka, and Sribne; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Odradne, and Bahatyr; and south of Novopavlivka near Myrne, Yalta, Fedorivka, and Vesele on June 20 and 21.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Piddubne (south of Novopavlivka).[56]

The commander of a Ukrainian artillery brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported on June 21 that Russian forces are using electric scooters in assaults to try and rapidly advance through the contested “gray zone” that Russian and Ukrainian drones have created along the frontline.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Special Purpose Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating near Novoserhiivka.[58]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and likely seized the settlement.[59]

Unconfirmed claims: One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in northern Shevchenko.[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka toward Voskresenka and Maliivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and west of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Shevchenko on June 20 and 21.[61]

Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Hulyaipole direction on June 21 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on June 20 and 21 that Russian forces advanced east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka.[62]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself and east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 20 and 21.[63]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Poltavka (east of Hulyaipole).[64]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske and toward Novoandriivka on June 20 and 21.[65]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to Russian Airborne [VDV] Forces) and elements of the “Nemets” group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[66]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near the Antonivsky Bridge (east of Kherson City) on June 21 but did not advance. [67]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 20 to 21. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles from airspace over Tambov Oblast, four Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea, two Iskander-K cruise missiles from Belgorod Oblast, and 272 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[68] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed three Kalibr cruise missiles, one Kh-47M2 air-launched ballistic missile, and one Iskander-K cruise missile. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 140 drones and that 112 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes targeted Odesa, Kharkiv, and Poltava oblasts and damaged civilian and energy infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast and Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast.[69]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

See topline text.

[1] https://www.skynewsarabia dot com/world/1804376-بوتين-لسكاي-نيوز-عربية-أوكرانيا-تستحق-مصيرا-أفضل

[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030825; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/03/06/marko-rubio-zayavil-chto-ssha-pomogaya-ukraine-vedut-proksi-voynu-s-rossiey; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vYbwqRwNZGw; https://lenta dot ru/news/2024/08/12/putin-obvinil-zapad-v-proksi-voyne-s-rossiey-rukami-ukraintsev/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-invasion-update-25; https://www.npr.org/2022/12/22/1145004513/russia-ukraine-us-proxy-war-zelenskyy-visit; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62389537; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/26/russia-accuses-nato-of-proxy-war-in-ukraine-as-us-hosts-crucial-defence-summit; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/reframing-us-policy-debate-%E2%80%98long-war%E2%80%99-ukraine; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051525; https://kyivindependent dot com/russia-pushes-for-resuming-peace-talks-in-istanbul-based-on-2022-terms-situation-on-the-ground-ushakov/; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051525

[5] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/20/06/2025/685582719a79474b7e0ee61b ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025

[6] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14807 ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/koli-vbivcya-kazhe-sho-hoche-vbiti-mi-sprijmayemo-ce-vidpovi-98565

[7] https://x.com/andrii_sybiha/status/1936115377437606091?s=46&t=JHHzChDbvSf3JHpnTV6Hcg; https://suspilne dot media/1047955-odin-miljon-soldativ-dva-miljoni-nig-v-mzs-vidpovili-na-zaavi-putina/

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525

[9] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77222

[10] https://t.me/tass_agency/321588 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/591 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/80

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-23 ; https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Radiological%20Chemical%20False%20Flag%20Warning.pdf

[12] https://president.gov dot by/ru/events/vstreca-so-specposlannikom-prezidenta-ssa-kitom-kellogom ; https://t.me/pul_1/17259 ; https://belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-vstretilsja-so-spetsposlannikom-prezidenta-ssha-kitom-kellogom-722207-2025/ ; https://t.me/pul_1/17257; https://belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-vstretilsja-so-spetsposlannikom-prezidenta-ssha-kitom-kellogom-722207-2025/; https://suspilne dot media/1048295-kit-kellog-vidvidav-bilorus-ta-zustrivsa-z-lukasenkom/ ; https://t.me/tass_agency/321640

[13] https://t.me/belta_telegramm/318996 ;

[14] https://x.com/johnpcoale/status/1936415572511875439

[15] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/trumps-ukraine-envoy-meet-belarus-lukashenko-sources-say-2025-06-17/

[16] https://www.unian dot ua/weapons/shahedi-flesh-poyasniv-chogo-varto-boyatisya-ukrajincyam-13043865.html?fbclid=IwY2xjawLCS41leHRuA2FlbQIxMABicmlkETEwelp1SjhtSFduUU5WTHRIAR4ExaFHF65wLqRNeMe8MtCVzA-P9oV_yVrEZwUBA55z_fGmwK343klOfWUHSg_aem_uhBpFekZtpfod4L1XooAZw#goog_rewarded

[17] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1047615-rosiani-atakuvali-harkiv-bpla-z-bilsou-bojovou-castinou-i-potuznisim-dvigunom-so-znacat-ci-zmini/

[18] https://isw.pub/ForceGen061125 ; https://isw.pub/ForceGen061125 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-14-2025

[19] https://t.me/milinfolive/151274 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53971 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53959

[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2024 ; publication.pravo.gov dot ru/document/0001202506190024?index=2 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/321290

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2024

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2024

[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730

[24] https://t.me/dva_majors/73867 ; https://t.me/rybar/71533

[25] https://t.me/yurasumy/23641

[26] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65307 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73867 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23641 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/23976

[27] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65307 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/23976

[28] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14804

[29] https://t.me/sashakots/54438

[30]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73867

[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730

[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730

[33] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37639

[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730;

[35] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/29103; https://t.me/umftteam/524; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/dron-zaletiv-cherez-paradni-dveri-na-lymanshhyni-znyshheno-shturmovu-grupu-shho-shovalasya-v-hati/

[36] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/21/pochuly-dron-i-zgurtuvalysya-v-odnomu-misczi-rosiyany-sami-sproshhuyut-yihnye-znyshhennya/

[37] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/21/pochuly-dron-i-zgurtuvalysya-v-odnomu-misczi-rosiyany-sami-sproshhuyut-yihnye-znyshhennya/

[38] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37639

[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730; https://t.me/rybar/71533

[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730; https://t.me/wargonzo/27377

[41] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/21/taktyka-yak-u-bahmuti-rosiyany-namagayutsya-vidrizaty-kostyantynivku-vid-logistyky/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[42] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/21/yidut-na-tak-zvanyh-bronetaksi-speczyfika-shturmiv-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku/

[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30289

[44] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37669

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23640 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73867 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/24276 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65324

[46] https://t.me/dva_majors/73867

[47] https://t.me/yurasumy/23640

[48] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13947

[49] https://t.me/dva_majors/73867 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23636 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94210 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23635

[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730 ; https://t.me/rybar/71537 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73867 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94210 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65324

[51] https://t.me/wargonzo/27377

[52] https://t.me/osintpen/1250; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9432; https://t.me/voin_dv/15598; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1936348907002622296

[53] https://t.me/mod_russia/53978 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94204 ; https://t.me/vrogov/20827 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15598

[54] https://t.me/yurasumy/23632 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65309 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65309 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65319 ; https://t.me/rybar/71533 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27377

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65319 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73867 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23635

[56] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65309

[57] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/21/vorog-lize-navit-na-elektrosamokatah-vijskovi-pro-boyi-bilya-dnipropetrovshhyny/

[58] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13948

[59] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9431 ; https://t.me/BBS_110/391 ; https://www.facebook.com/31ombr/videos/739260038677333/

[60] https://t.me/yurasumy/23633

[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65319 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23633

[62]https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65311 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/169638 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73867 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27377

[63]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65311

[64] https://t.me/voin_dv/15587

[65]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730

[66] https://t.me/rogozin_do/7225 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73863 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73876

[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730

[68] https://t.me/kpszsu/36774

[69] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/21/pryame-vluchannya-vorog-atakuvav-energetychnu-infrastrukturu-poltavshhyny/; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/24005; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/24005; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1048209-na-odesini-ppo-zbila-ponad-20-bezpilotnikiv/; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1048041-v-odesi-prolunali-vibuhi-so-vidomo-35/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/21/vorog-ne-prypynyaye-teror-harkivshhyny-drony-rakety-ta-zrujnovana-infrastruktura/; https://t.me/synegubov/15195; https://t.me/synegubov/15193; https://t.me/synegubov/15192; https://t.me/synegubov/15193

Source: Understandingwar.org | View original article

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 9, 2025

ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine is updated daily. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool. Russian forces recently advanced to the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk administrative border. Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate that Russia has wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea. ISW continues to assess that Russia is not interested in peace negotiations with Ukraine and is preparing for a protracted war in order to make further battlefield gains. The Kremlin appears to be dangling the prospect of bilateral arms control talks with the United States to extract preemptive concessions from the U.S. about the war in Ukraine. The Russian offensive campaign assessment will cover subsequent reports in the June 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. It will also update this time-lapse map archive monthly. The data cut-off for this product was 1:15 pm ET on June 9.

Read full article ▼

Anna Harvey, Christina Harward, Daria Novikov, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, and George Barros

June 9, 2025, 7:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15 pm ET on June 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces recently advanced to the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk administrative border as Kremlin officials continued to demonstrate that Russia has wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea. Geolocated footage published on June 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk administrative border northwest of Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka).[1] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 9 that Russia’s Central Grouping of Forces seized more territory in unspecified areas of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 8 and 9 that Russian forces, including elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]), are fighting near and across the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[3] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on June 9 that Russia has begun an offensive into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast “within the framework of the creation of a buffer zone” in Ukraine.[4] First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Alexei Zhuravlev claimed that Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is now within the “sphere of interests” of the Russian military.[5] Chairperson of the Federation Council Committee on Constitutional Legislation and State Building Andrei Klishas claimed that Russia’s offensive into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast indicates the beginning of Russia’s “denazification” of the oblast – a reference to Russia’s longtime demand for regime change in Ukraine.[6] Chairperson of the Duma Defense Committee Dmitry Sablin claimed that Russia will “definitely take” Dnipro City and other unspecified Ukrainian cities if Ukraine “does not make peace on [Russia’s] terms.”[7] Russian officials are likely setting information conditions to illegally declare Dnipropetrovsk Oblast annexed, as ISW has previously assessed.[8] Kremlin officials have repeatedly signaled that Russia maintains territorial ambitions beyond the four oblasts that Russia has already illegally annexed, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov notably repeated a longstanding Kremlin claim that Odesa City is a “Russian” city as recently as June 9.[9] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa stated on June 5 that Russia likely seeks to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River, including parts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and to seize Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts by the end of 2026.[10] ISW continues to assess that Russia is not interested in peace negotiations with Ukraine and that Russia is preparing for a protracted war in order to make further battlefield gains.[11]

ISW continues to assess that current Russian tactical activity in the vicinity of southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is a continuation of ongoing Russian offensive efforts in southwestern Donetsk Oblast — not the beginning of a new major offensive operation to seize operationally significant territory in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[12] ISW will continue to assess the situation in southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and update its assessment.

The Kremlin appears to be dangling the prospect of bilateral arms control talks with the United States to extract preemptive concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on June 9 to a question about Russia ending its moratorium on the deployment of land-based missiles prohibited under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty by claiming that Russia retains “freedom of action” – mirroring Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov’s June 7 claim that Russia’s “unilateral moratorium” on the deployment of such missiles is nearing its “logical conclusion.”[13] Ryabkov claimed on June 9 that Russia and United States need a “reliable … military-political foundation” in order to resume arms control talks and that the United States must be willing to respect Russia’s “fundamental interests” in order to normalize bilateral relations.[14] Ryabkov claimed that the United States’ actions regarding the war in Ukraine could demonstrate the seriousness of the United States’ intentions to improve relations with Russia. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov further claimed on June 9 that Russia will be ready to resume strategic stability talks with the United States when the discussions will be on equal footing.[15] Kremlin officials appear to be asserting that Russia’s willingness to engage in arms control talks with the United States in the future is contingent on Russia gaining preemptive concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine. Russia notably violated the INF Treaty by developing, testing, and deploying intermediate-range missiles, leading the United States to suspend its participation in the treaty in February 2019.[16] ISW assessed in early 2025 that Russia was using economic incentives that are unrelated to the war in Ukraine to extract concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine, and Russia’s use of incentives related to arms control talks appear to be the latest iteration of this overall effort.[17]

Western security officials continue to assess that Russia is preparing for a protracted confrontation with NATO. NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte stated on June 9 that intelligence assesses that Russia will produce 1,500 tanks, 3,000 armored vehicles, and 200 Iskander missiles in 2025.[18] It is unclear whether these vehicle production assessments are only referring to Russia’s production of new vehicles or also include vehicles from Russia’s Soviet-era stockpiles that Russia is refurbishing. Rutte stated that Russia is cooperating with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran and that Russia is reconstituting its forces with Chinese technology. Rutte announced that NATO states’ defense ministers agreed on June 5 to increase air and missile defense spending by 400 percent in order to protect against large-scale drone and missile strikes like those that Russia is launching against Ukraine. Rutte also stated that Russia could be capable of launching military operations against NATO within five years. ISW assesses that Russia does not need to reconstitute its forces to pre-2022 levels before posing a threat to NATO states and could launch military operations against a NATO state before 2030.

Russian forces conducted the largest combined missile and drone strike of the war overnight on June 8 and 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 499 projectiles, including 479 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[19] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched four Kh-47M2 “Kinzhal” aeroballistic missiles from Tambov Oblast; 10 Kh-101 cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast; three Kh-22 cruise missiles and two Kh-31P anti-radar missiles from airspace over the Black Sea; and one Kh-35 anti-ship cruise missile from occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 277 Shahed and decoy drones and that 183 drones “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down all 10 Kh-101 cruise missiles, all four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal missiles, two Kh-22 cruise missiles, both of the Kh-31P anti-radar missiles, and the one Kh-35 cruise missile. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes hit Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Kyiv, Rivne, and Volyn oblasts, damaging civilian infrastructure.[20]

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat stated on June 9 that Russian forces continue to adapt their strike packages against Ukraine, using large numbers of drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems and distract from subsequent cruise and ballistic missile launches.[21] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the June 8 to 9 strike series was part of Russia’s response to Ukraine’s ”Operation Spider Web” long-range drone strike series against Russian air bases on June 1.[22] ISW has notably observed a significant increase in the scale of Russia’s drone and missile strike packages against Ukraine prior to ”Operation Spider Web.”[23]

Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian military and defense industrial targets that are involved in Russia’s long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 9 that Ukrainian forces, including elements of the Special Operations Forces, struck Savasleyka Airbase in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast where Russian forces base MiG-31K fighter jets that carry Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that preliminary information indicated that Ukrainian forces hit two aircraft, which the Ukrainian General Staff assesses are likely a MiG-31 fighter jet and a Su-30/34 fighter jet. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on June 9 that Ukrainian forces, including elements of the Unmanned Systems Forces, struck the All-Russian Research Institute of Relay Engineering (VNIIR)-Progress enterprise in Cheboksary, Chuvashia Republic with at least two drones, causing a large-scale fire.[25] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that VNIIR-Progress manufactures navigation equipment, including unified planning and correction modules (UMPK) for glide bombs. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko added that VNIIR-Progress also makes electromechanical drives, hydraulic systems, and control units for heavy military equipment, including howitzers and Iskander missiles, and satellite navigation modules that Russian forces use in Shahed drones and Iskander-M, Kalibr, Kh-101, and Kh-69 cruise missiles.[26] Geolocated footage published on June 9 shows smoke at the VNIIR-Progress plant.[27] Chuvashia Republic Head Oleg Nikolaev claimed on June 9 that two drones fell on the VNIIR-Progress facility, temporarily suspending operations.[28]

Ukraine and Russia on June 9 conducted the first round of the prisoner of war (POW) exchanges that the parties agreed to during the latest bilateral talks in Istanbul on June 2 as Russian officials continued to baselessly accuse Ukraine of failing to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on June 9 that Ukraine and Russia exchanged an unspecified number of POWs as part of the first round of POW exchanges.[29] Zelensky stated that further exchanges will continue in several stages over the coming days and that the two sides are currently exchanging wounded POWs and prisoners under 25 years of age. Russian officials, including Chairperson of the Russian Federation Council’s Committee on Foreign Affairs Grigory Karasin, continued to baselessly accuse Ukraine on June 9 of refusing to exchange the bodies of KIA Ukrainian soldiers.[30] Zelensky stated on June 8 that Russia’s failure to deliver its promised list of over 1,000 Ukrainian POWs and servicemembers are hampering Ukrainian efforts to repatriate KIA Ukrainians.[31] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated on June 9 that Ukrainian officials expect to receive more information regarding a potential KIA exchange over the coming days.[32]

Key Takeaways:

The Kremlin appears to be dangling the prospect of bilateral arms control talks with the United States to extract preemptive concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine.

Western security officials continue to assess that Russia is preparing for a protracted confrontation with NATO.

Russian forces conducted the largest combined missile and drone strike of the war overnight on June 8 and 9.

Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian military and defense industrial targets that are involved in Russia’s long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman. Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Kurakhove.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Kursk Oblast, including southwest of Glushkovo near Tetkino, on June 8 and 9.[33] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 8 that Ukrainian forces attempted to enter Kursk Oblast from Ryzhivka, Sumy Oblast (southeast of Tetkino).[34] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 9 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to enter Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[35]

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian duty station near Rylsk, Kursk Oblast on June 9 during a HIMARS strike.

Geolocated footage posted on June 9 suggests that Ukrainian forces struck the duty station of an unspecified Russian unit in northeast Rylsk (northwest of Glushkovo).[36] A Ukrainian OSINT analyst claimed that Ukrainian forces launched four Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) rockets against the duty station.[37] Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein claimed on June 9 that Ukrainian forces struck a cultural and recreational center in Rylsk.[38]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on June 9.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on June 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 8 that Russian forces advanced in northern Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[39]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Sumy City in Yablunivka on June 9.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are attempting to counterattack in an unspecified area in the Sumy direction.[41]

Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on June 9 that Russian forces are transferring large quantities of military equipment and ammunition from occupied Crimea and Kherson Oblast to Sumy Oblast.[42] Russian forces are reportedly transporting air defense systems, at least 40 trucks carrying personnel and ammunition, and at least 10 self-propelled guns.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[43] Elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Andriivka and Oleksiivka (both north of Sumy City).[44] Elements of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Khotin (north of Sumy City).[45]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 8 that Russian forces advanced 160 meters in the direction of Vovchanski Khutory (northeast of Kharkiv City).[46]

Russian forces conducted ground operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Tykhe, Vovchanski Khutory, and Vovchansk and northwest of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke on June 8 and 9.[47]

Kharkiv Oblast Service for Restoration and Development of Infrastructure reported on June 9 that Russian forces shelled critical infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast, damaging a bridge and injuring an employee.[48]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[49]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk).[50]

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Radkivka and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Hlushkivka on June 8 and 9.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[52]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in southern Kindrashivka and that Radkivka (south of Kindrashivka) and the area southeast of Kindrashivka are contested “gray zones.”[53]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Kolisnykivka, Zahryzove, and Bohuslavka and southeast of Borova toward Chereshchyna, Olhivka, and Hrekivka on June 8 and 9.[55]

A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Borova direction reported on June 8 that Russian forces recently conducted assaults with seven motorcycles, then with three motorcycles and two vehicles with fire support from an unspecified number of tanks.[56]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Karpivka (north of Lyman) and Torske (east of Lyman).[57]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Novyi Myr, Ridkodub, Lypove, Karpivka, and Zelena Dolyna and east of Lyman near Torske and the Serebryanske forest area on June 8 and 9.[58]

An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on June 8 that Russian forces are trying to bypass Lyman, seize dominant heights in the area, and interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[59]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on June 8 and 9.[60]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in an industrial area northeast of Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[61]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) seized Stupochky.[62]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Chasiv Yar itself, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka, and south of Chasiv Yar toward Bila Hora and Predtechyne on June 8 and 9.[63]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion and 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (both of the 98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[64] Drone operators of the Russian Bars-27 detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Kramatorsk-Druzhivka (Chasiv Yar) direction.[65]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Toretsk.[66] Geolocated footage published on June 8 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into southern Oleksandro-Kalynove (west of Toretsk), but it is unclear whether Russian forces maintain enduring positions in this area.[67]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of and further north of Toretsk.[68] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Oleksandro-Kalynove.[69] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Dyliivka, north of Krymske, north of Dachne (all north of Toretsk), northwest of Nova Poltavka, in western Yablunivka (both northwest of Toretsk), south of Yablunivka, and west of Popiv Yar (west of Toretsk).[70] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk) and Petrivka (west of Toretsk).[71]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; and northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka, Poltavka, Popiv Yar, and Oleksandro-Kalynove and toward Kleban-Byk.[72]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating north of Dyliivka.[73] Elements of the “Afipsa” Storm Battalion and 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating toward Toretsk.[74] Drone operators of the “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment near Yablunivka.[75]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 8 and 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed Russian forces advanced north of Myrne and Shevchenko Pershe (both northeast of Pokrovsk), northwest of Yelyzavetivka (east of Pokrovsk) and Dachenske (south of Pokrovsk), and in central Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[76]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka and Myrne and toward Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, Mykolaivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Zvirove on June 8 and 9.[77]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported on June 9 that the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway direction remains the most intense sector of the frontline and that Russian forces are concentrating a large number of forces in this area in an attempt to surround Ukrainian positions in eastern Pokrovsk and advance toward Kostyantynivka.[78] A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces have not changed their tactics and are storming Ukrainian positions on foot or motorcycles primarily in small groups of one to three personnel but noted that Ukrainian drones are effectively countering these attacks.[79]

Russian forces recently advanced in Novopavlivka direction.

See topline text for assessed Russian advances in the Novopavlivka direction.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 9 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka), northwest of Novomykolaivka (just southwest of Novoserhiivka), and southwest of Bohdanivka (southeast of Novopavlivka).[80]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Novomykolaivka, and toward Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Bohdanivka on June 8 and 9.[81]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Novopavlivka direction, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) awarded on June 9 elements of the 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division) for seizing Bohdanivka, which ISW assesses Russian forces seized as of May 24.[82]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 9 shows elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) raising flags over central Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove), indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[83]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Oleksiivka and advanced northeast and southwest of Oleksiivka, north and northwest of Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove), and northwest of Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[84] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces entered Zelenyi Kut (just west of Oleksiivka).[85]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove toward Zaporizhzhia, west of Kurakhove near Bahatyr, and southwest of Kurakhove near Odradne on June 8 and 9.[86] A Russian milblogger claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novoukrainka (west of Kurakhove).[87]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 656th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Oleksiivka.[88]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Komar (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and north of Vilne Pole (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[89]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Komar, Vilne Pole, Vesele, and Shevchenko and toward Voskresenka and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka, Zelene Pole, Novopil, and Rivnopil on June 8 and 9.[90] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Komar.[91]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Vremivka (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[92] Elements of the 691st Howitzer Battalion (reportedly of the 36th CAA, EMD) and 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[93]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 8 and 9.[94]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Malynivka and Poltavka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[95] Drone operators of the 38th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], EMD) are reportedly operating near Malynivka.[96]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 8 that Russian forces advanced north of Robotyne (south of Orikhiv).[97]

Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka and Nesteryanka and west of Orikhiv near Stepove and toward Pavlivka on June 8 and 9.[98]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[99]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on June 8 and 9 but did not advance.[100]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for reports of Russian strikes against Ukraine.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

[1] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9343; https://t.me/Sib_army/5540; https://t.me/osintpen/1161; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1931944308325945592

[2] https://t.me/mod_russia/53590

[3] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64945; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167769 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36982; https://t.me/dazbastadraw/8218 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27048; https://t.me/sashakots/54198; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64957 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/81350; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93144; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167769

[4] https://t.me/tass_agency/319090

[5] https://news dot ru/vlast/v-gosdume-raskryli-kakoj-region-ukrainy-pereshel-v-sferu-interesov-rossii ; https://nmosknews dot ru/politics/2025/06/09/210684.html

[6] https://t.me/tass_agency/319001

[7] https://news dot ru/vlast/v-gosdume-nazvali-ukrainskij-gorod-kotoryj-mozhet-perejti-pod-kontrol-rf ; https://www dot pnp.ru/politics/deputat-sablin-rasskazal-pri-kakikh-usloviyakh-gorod-dnepr-pereydet-rossii.html

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060625

[9] https://t.me/ssigny/139445 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/19243; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925

[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar053125; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020825

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060825

[13] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1030375; https://t.me/tass_agency/319092; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060825

[14] https://tass dot ru/politika/24172453

[15] https://www.interfax dot ru/world/1030459

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2025

[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022525

[18] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_235867.htm; https://www.youtube.com/live/Gtq_OeASgfE

[19] https://t.me/kpszsu/36042

[20] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22032; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1037723-robota-ppo-pozeza-ataka-bpla-ta-artilerieu-rosijski-vijska-cilili-po-troh-rajonah-dnipropetrovsini-aki-naslidki/; https://t.me/synegubov/14870; https://t.me/kyivoda/29550; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1264; https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/24336; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/5738; https://t.me/policekyivregion/11472; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1037731-armia-rf-atakuvala-kiiv-ta-oblast-dronami-u-stolici-poskodzeno-ofisnu-budivlu/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/09/unaslidok-rosijskoyi-ataky-poshkodzheno-ofisnu-budivlyu-v-kyyevi/; https://t.me/oleksandrkoval_rv/5926; https://t.me/kpszsu/36020; https://t.me/oleksandrkoval_rv/5929; https://www.facebook.com/police.in.Rivne.region/posts/pfbid02AkJQXq3okwaisVZaFdgBvfLVsGMdEvpSyjQ89ogHcn28hu3brENNoWRvwUeGEZN6l?locale=uk_UA; https://suspilne dot media/rivne/1037711-civilna-ludina-otrimala-poranenna-na-rivnensini-pid-cas-povitranogo-udaru-rf/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/09/duzhe-vazhka-nich-rivnenshhyna-zaznala-potuzhnogo-povitryanogo-udaru/; https://t.me/astrapress/83462; https://t.me/astrapress/83465; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/23650; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1037733-u-mirgorodskomu-rajoni-cerez-padinna-ulamkiv-bpla-poskodzeno-liniu-elektroperedac/; https://suspilne dot media/lutsk/1038207-odin-z-pacientiv-u-reanimacii-v-likarni-zalisautsa-dvoe-travmovanih-vnaslidok-ataki-rf-u-lucku-6-cervna; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1931781241826627651; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1931241395274109211; https://t.me/UkrainianRedCross/28279

[21] https://suspilne dot media/1038277-vse-zalezit-vid-spromoznostej-rosijskoi-oboronki-u-ps-rozpovili-ci-zbilsit-armia-rf-kilkist-povitranih-atak/

[22] https://t.me/mod_russia/53588; https://t.me/severrealii/30667; t.me/belta_telegramm/316558

[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525

[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25276

[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25275

[26] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9378

[27] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/11574

[28] https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1931886994180678001

[29] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14554; https://suspilne dot media/1037777-ukraina-ta-rosia-proveli-obmin-polonenimi-3/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/09/nashi-vdoma-volodymyr-zelenskyj-ogolosyv-pro-pochatok-bagatoetapnogo-obminu-polonenymy/ ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/81344; https://t.me/mod_russia/53591

[30] https://www dot gazeta.ru/politics/news/2025/06/09/25992302.shtml ; https://ria dot ru/20250609/zelenskiy-2021702689.html ; https://russian dot rt.com/ussr/news/1490181-plyaski-na-kostyah-zelenskii ; https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/06/09/v-gosdume-prokommentirovali-otkaz-zelenskogo-zabirat-tela-ukrainskih-voenny/; https://iz dot ru /1900762/2025-06-09/karasin-rasskazal-o-posledstviiakh-otkaza-ukrainy-priniat-tela-svoikh-soldat; https:// osnmedia dot ru/svo/dmitruk-prizval-zelenskogo-ujti-v-otstavku-iz-za-otkaza-zabirat-tela-pogibshih/

[31] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/rosijski-namiri-ne-zminyuyutsya-i-vse-zalezhit-vid-nashih-vo-98329

[32] https://suspilne dot media/1038491-ukraina-zorstko-obstoue-svoi-pozicii-usov-pro-peregovornij-proces-sodo-spiskiv-na-obmin-polonenimi/

[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25261; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25258; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25294; https://t.me/wargonzo/27050 https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29871; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29856

[34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29856; https://t.me/dva_majors/73017; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/31001

[35] https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/31001; https://t.me/dva_majors/73017

[36] https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1931999963849834604; https://t.me/DniproOfficial/6191

[37] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/6191

[38] https://t.me/Hinshtein/12323

[39] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93122

[40] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167785; https://t.me/dva_majors/73017

[41] https://t.me/dva_majors/73017

[42] https://t.me/andriyshTime/38517; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93153

[43] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13363

[44] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36990; https://t.me/dva_majors/73055

[45] https://t.me/dva_majors/73064

[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29856

[47] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29856; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25294 https://t.me/synegubov/14870; https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/06/09/pid-vovchanskom-vorog-jde-po-vlasnyh-trupah-v-osuv-hortyczya-rozpovily-pro-sytuacziyu-na-fronti/

[48] https://www.facebook.com/kh.ukravtodor/posts/pfbid024RaEWWHi8grvvBEVTLqc2cgEYvTS4etE7BmyejyiMEaFFDSC9V1X1nQkmBqapiq3l?__cft__[0]=AZVKDqQATWg5ezNqNYSap_bMEC_JERKgped2zDagKi5h37omFwJ8nSfj1yPzRPzJPYaFW2RKlfyJzHIEqBwpVF-L7fbRlBj77h5LJXkE9sTkDZFaK4Cbs0gb8ATE5ijvnloYxEp3PvMkpRrNfHuemEwmelNrK3a8HuH6jdzXnvW0-g&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1037795-na-harkivsini-rosia-obstrilala-mist-poranenij-pracivnik-akij-pracuvav-nad-jogo-rekonstrukcieu/

[49] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13370; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13379

[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29852

[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25294; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25261; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25258; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11793; https://t.me/synegubov/14870; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29852

[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29852

[53] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29852

[54] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93121; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93130; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93169

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25294; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25261; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25258; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11793

[56] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/08/u-nyh-bulo-try-motoczykly-dvi-avtivky-i-tank-rechnyk-pro-nevdalyj-vorozhyj-shturm-poblyzu-borovoyi/

[57] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1931763394148962528; https://t.me/operationall_space/4457; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1931950619482296707; https:// t.me/mod_russia/53576

[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25294; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25261; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25258; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11793

[59] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/08/rik-tovchutsya-majzhe-na-tomu-samomu-misczi-vijskovyj-pro-nastup-voroga-v-rajoni-lymanu/

[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25261; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25258

[61] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9349; https://t.me/sashakots/54201

[62] https://t.me/sashakots/54201; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167794; https://t.me/yurasumy/23437; https://t.me/rybar/71139

[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25294; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25261; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25258 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11793; https://t.me/rybar/71139

[64] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29862

[65] https://t.me/tass_agency/319007

[66] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1932007847551729850; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1932010348111876562; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1932010942826512676;

[67] https://x.com/creamy_caprice/status/1931785447274946608; https:// t [dot] me/creamy_caprice/9341; https:// t [dot] me/osirskiy/1179; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1931838841033249024

[68] https:// t.me/boris_rozhin/167760

[69] https:// t.me/voenkorKotenok/64950 ; https:// t.me/boris_rozhin/167760

[70] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167760 ; https:// t.me/z_arhiv/31828 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167698 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73017 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31831 ; https:// t.me/z_arhiv/31828

[71] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64950

[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25261 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25258 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11793 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64950 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73017

[73] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1932055841529565492; https://t.me/z4lpr/1043; https://t.me/z4lpr/1047; https://t.co/OzE6K3trIy; https://t.co/joFZ2eAaYX

[74]https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1932095654370631705 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93124 ; https://t.me/batAfipsa/630 ; https://t.me/batAfipsa/631

[75] https://t.me/mod_russia/53594

[76] https:// t.me/boris_rozhin/167760 ; https:// t.me/z_arhiv/31831 ; https:// t.me/z_arhiv/31828

[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25294 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25261 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25258 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11793

[78] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/09/pid-vovchanskom-vorog-jde-po-vlasnyh-trupah-v-osuv-hortyczya-rozpovily-pro-sytuacziyu-na-fronti/

[79] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/08/taktyka-ne-zminylas-sunut-po-odnomu-po-dvoye-vijskovyj-syl-oborony-pro-vorozhi-shturmy-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/

[80] https:// t.me/z_arhiv/31828 ; https:// t.me/z_arhiv/31825

[81]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25261 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25258 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11793 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25294

[82] https://t.me/wargonzo/27062 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53573 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2025

[83] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9351; https://t.me/mo114rf/94; https://t.me/osintpen/1169 https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1932104837430489113;

[84] https://t.me/wargonzo/27050; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167760; https://t.me/wargonzo/27067

[85] https://t.me/yurasumy/23430

[86] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11793; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25258 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25261; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25258; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11793

[87] https://t.me/voin_dv/15396

[88] https://t.me/army29th/290; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1932100368034664683;

[89] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31825; https://t.me/wargonzo/27050; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29873

[90] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11793; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25258 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25261; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25258; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11793; https://t.me/yurasumy/23430; https://t.me/dva_majors/73017

[91] https://t.me/voin_dv/15396

[92] https://t.me/voin_dv/15391

[93] https://t.me/voin_dv/15382; https://t.me/voin_dv/15388

[94] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25261 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0ADwb1wmiwjs5nCXM74Qfxhd987e8XtmckJsyC1j3w6zrXH7SzfrmPDf9tZdAB2L5l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25258

[95] https://t.me/voin_dv/15389; https://t.me/voin_dv/15384

[96] https://t.me/voin_dv/15385; https://t.me/voin_dv/15397

[97] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29854

[98] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25294; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25261 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0ADwb1wmiwjs5nCXM74Qfxhd987e8XtmckJsyC1j3w6zrXH7SzfrmPDf9tZdAB2L5l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25258

[99] https://t.me/dva_majors/73063

[100] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25294; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25261 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0ADwb1wmiwjs5nCXM74Qfxhd987e8XtmckJsyC1j3w6zrXH7SzfrmPDf9tZdAB2L5l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25258

Source: Understandingwar.org | View original article

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 20, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that Russians and Ukrainians are one nation and all of Ukraine is effectively Russian as part of efforts to justify his continued conquest of Ukraine. Putin’s commitment to this narrative underscores his ongoing commitment to destroying the Ukrainian state and subjugating the Ukrainian people. Putin and other Kremlin officials are using the guise of “buffer zones” to expand Russia’s territorial demands in Ukraine. Russian forces are slowly making marginal advances at the cost of significant manpower and materiel losses in the face of significant Ukrainian drone-based defenses. Putin claimed on June 20 that it would be better for Ukraine to stop fighting because the battlefield and geopolitical situation will only worsen for Ukraine, and that Ukraine will have to negotiate from a weaker position. The data cut-off for this product was 11 am ET on June20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. The full report is available on ISW’s website and will be updated monthly. It is available in English, Russian, and Spanish.

Read full article ▼

Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, Jennie Olmsted, and Kateryna Stepanenko

June 20, 2025, 6:15 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11 am ET on June 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that Russians and Ukrainians are one nation and all of Ukraine is effectively Russian as part of efforts to justify his continued conquest of Ukraine. Putin answered a question after his speech at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 20 about why Russian forces are advancing beyond the territories in Ukraine that Russia has illegally annexed, claiming that he considers Russian and Ukrainian people to be “one people in reality” and that “Ukraine is [Russia’s].”[1] Putin has repeatedly demonstrated that he does not consider Ukraine as an independent state with its own history, identity, and culture separate from Russia, as evidenced by his 2021 “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” essay and his repeated false assertion that Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians are all part of one historical people.[2]

ISW has previously noted that the Kremlin’s ongoing information operation attempting to portray Russians and Ukrainians as one unified nation and culturally and historically homogeneous is one of its most significant information operations aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and justifying the war effort to the Russian people. Putin’s commitment to this narrative underscores his ongoing commitment to destroying the Ukrainian state and subjugating the Ukrainian people.[3]

Putin asserted that Russia will be able to achieve its goals through a protracted war in Ukraine. Putin claimed on June 20 that it would be better for Ukraine to stop fighting because the battlefield and geopolitical situation will only worsen for Ukraine, and that Ukraine will have to negotiate from a weaker position.[4] Putin attempted to posture Russia as interested in engaging in negotiations to end the war, claiming that Russia is not seeking “Ukrainian capitulation,” yet insisted that Ukraine recognize the “realities that have developed on the ground.”[5] Kremlin officials often call for Ukraine to recognize the “realities on the ground” (a reference to the frontline in Ukraine) to allude to the idea that Russia is in a stronger negotiating position given the situation on the battlefield and to demand that Ukraine concede to Russia’s unwavering demands.[6]

Putin’s claim that Ukraine must recognize the “realities on the ground” and should negotiate before the situation worsens also coheres with Putin’s theory of victory, which assesses that Russian forces will be able to win a war of attrition by indefinitely sustaining gradual advances along the frontline despite the high costs of such creeping advances.[7] Putin’s statement ignores that the true “realities on the ground” show a complicated and hotly contested frontline situation in which Russian forces are slowly making marginal advances at the cost of significant manpower and materiel losses in the face of significant Ukrainian drone-based defenses.

Putin and other Kremlin officials are using the guise of “buffer zones” to expand Russia’s territorial demands in Ukraine. Putin claimed that Russian forces are “ending up” in territories beyond the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed in accordance with the “logic of military actions,” then recalled the saying “where the foot of a Russian soldier steps, that is [Russia’s].”[8] Putin stated that he does not rule out Russia seizing Sumy City “in principle” but claimed that Russia is not pursuing this objective at the moment.[9] Putin claimed that Russian actions in northern Sumy Oblast are due to Ukraine’s shelling of Russian border areas. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on June 19 in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS at SPIEF that a “buffer zone” should be 20 to 30 kilometers deep to protect occupied Luhansk Oblast from Ukrainian fiber optic drone strikes.[10] First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Alexei Zhuravlev called on June 18 for Russia to create a buffer zone into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast up to the Dnipro River in order to protect occupied Donetsk Oblast from Ukrainian HIMARS strikes.[11]

Kremlin officials previously justified the Russian offensive into northern Kharkiv Oblast as an effort to protect Belgorod City from Ukrainian shelling and MLRS strikes.[12] Pasechnik’s and Zhuravlev’s envisioned buffer zones would extend into eastern Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts – two oblasts that Russia has not illegally annexed yet. Russian officials have recently made similar calls for Russia to expand its territorial ambitions, asking Putin to seize Sumy City and calling for Russia to take control of the part of the Dnipro River that passes through Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[13] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa also stated on June 5 that Russia likely seeks to create a buffer zone along the northern Ukrainian-Russian border by the end of 2025 and intends to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River, including eastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and all of Kharkiv Oblast, by the end of 2026.[14]

The Kremlin continues to demonstrate that it will not be satisfied with the seizure of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and will use the guise of buffer zones to justify its territorial ambitions beyond these four oblasts.

The Kremlin continues to prioritize maintaining the facade of economic stability by pursuing economic policies that will likely exacerbate Russia’s economic instability. Putin claimed during SPIEF on June 20 that Russia’s debt is not growing and refuted claims that Russia’s economy is declining.[15] Putin claimed that the idea that Russia’s economy is only tied to raw materials and is dependent on hydrocarbon exports is “outdated,” but that Russia aims to increase its non-oil and gas exports.[16] Putin claimed that inflation in Russia decreased to 9.6 percent as of June 16 and that he expects inflation to fall to seven percent by the end of 2025.[17] Putin used his speech to focus on reductions in the poverty level in Russia.[18] Putin also highlighted Russia’s low unemployment rate, claiming that the rate has stabilized around 2.3 percent since October 2024. Putin did not speak about Russia’s labor shortages that are causing this low employment rate, however, in contrast to his 2024 SPIEF speech in which he acknowledged that Russia was suffering from labor shortages and highlighted the need for skilled migrant labor to increase Russia’s economic growth.[19] Putin may be attempting to gloss over his ongoing efforts to leverage migrants to mitigate ongoing labor shortages amid increasing anti-migrant sentiments in Russia.[20]

The Kremlin has repeatedly attempted to posture the Russian economy as strong and stable, claiming in recent months that inflation was between nine and 10 percent when the actual figure was likely closer to 20 percent.[21] Putin’s June 20 claim that Russian inflation is 9.6 percent is likely also false. ISW has observed reports that domestic consumers in Russia continue to face rising prices for staple food items, such as potatoes and butter.[22] Putin also failed to acknowledge the growing detrimental effects of high interest rates of 20 percent on the Russian industrial sector. Russian steel company Severstal head, Alexander Shevelev, warned on June 19 that metallurgical production facilities are at risk of shutting down due to low consumer demand and high interest rates.[23] Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina notably stated at SPIEF on June 19 that Russia’s economy grew at a high rate for two years because Russia was using “free resources,” including Russia’s workforce, production capacity, import substitution, the liquid assets of the National Welfare Fund, and the banking system’s capital reserve, but that Russia has exhausted many of these resources and needs to think of a new growth model.[24] ISW previously assessed in early June 2025 that the Russian government was likely pressuring Nabiullina to lower Russia’s key interest rate to reduce the impact of high interest rates on the Russian budget and civilian industries.[25]

Putin’s efforts to frame the Russian economy as stable and growing are part of his efforts to balance social support programs with Russia’s military needs and maintain his support among the Russian population despite the growing economic costs of his war in Ukraine.[26] ISW continues to assess that Kremlin efforts to pressure the Central Bank into prematurely lowering the key interest rate to maintain the facade of economic stability may backfire and contribute to elevated levels of inflation.[27]

Putin is attempting to obfuscate the reality that increased investment in Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) has come at the cost of Russia’s civilian economic sectors. Putin stated during his speech at SPIEF that Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) has increased by over four percent annually over the last two years, but claimed that Russia’s GDP growth is not solely due to Russia’s oil and gas or defense industrial sectors.[28] Putin claimed that Russia’s agricultural, construction, logistics, financial, and information technology (IT) sectors have also expanded over the last two years. ISW reported in September 2024 that Russia’s 2025 federal budget allocated 13.5 trillion rubles ($145 billion) toward “National Defense” expenditures and another 3.5 trillion rubles ($37 billion) toward “National Security,” meaning that Russia committed about 41 percent of its 2025 expenditures to defense and security expenses.[29] Russia allocated 6.4 trillion rubles ($69 billion) to its 2025 “Social Policy” budget in comparison, which underscores the disparity between Russia’s investment in its defense industrial sectors compared to its civilian sectors.

Putin highlighted Russia’s DIB growth during his speech and called for further integration of civilian and defense industrial sectors in order to facilitate greater innovation and increase dual-use goods production.[30] Putin claimed that Russia’s DIB has increased its output “many times over” and is “mastering” new equipment and weapons. Putin called for Russia to move away from dividing companies between the defense industrial and civilian sectors of the economy and to quickly implement innovations from the civilian sector into Russia’s defense and security. Putin called for Russia to decrease the time between formulating an idea and its implementation and called for Russian military commanders and heads of defense industrial enterprises to be more involved in production decision-making processes. Putin pointed to drones, which Putin called the most effective means to destroy expensive military equipment, as an area where Russia can increase efficiency to ensure Russia’s security and solve problems in Russia’s DIB. Putin framed Russia’s investments in artificial intelligence (AI) as purely focused on economic development and civilian sectors during his speech at SPIEF, although Russia is already working to integrate greater AI and machine learning (ML) capabilities into drones along the frontline.[31] Russia undertook a concerted campaign to centralize Russian drone units and drone production efforts in late 2024, but Putin appears to be acknowledging that Russia’s new drone production and testing mechanisms must retain a rapid innovation cycle.[32]

Open-source intelligence suggests that Russia is increasing its T-90M tank production capabilities. Georgia-based open-source intelligence organization Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) reported on June 20 that an unnamed “reliable analytical source” stated that Russia’s annual production rate of T-90M tanks was roughly 280 T-90M tanks as of 2024.[33] The CIT noted that Russia has been undertaking systemic efforts to increase tank production since before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and estimated that pre-war production rates and Russia’s transition to a constant production schedule since 2022 have likely allowed Russia’s primary tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod to produce 60 to 70 T-90M new tanks in 2022; 140 to 180 new tanks in 2023; and 250 to 300 new tanks in 2024. The CIT noted that Russia is currently using fewer tanks and armored vehicles on the battlefield in Ukraine and that Russia’s armored vehicle and tank loss rates have been decreasing since late 2024, which is consistent with a recent assessment from a social media source tracking equipment at Russian military depots via satellite imagery.[34] The CIT assessed that Russia will likely be able to maintain its current armor levels throughout the Russian military for “at least several more years,” assuming that Russia’s tank production and consumption rates remain at their current levels.

ISW previously assessed that Russia’s 2023 and 2024 vehicle loss rates were unsustainable in the medium- to long-term, given the limitations of Russia’s defense industrial capacity and Soviet-era weapons and equipment stocks.[35] Ongoing Russian efforts to offset and limit tank and armored vehicle losses by increasingly relying on motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and other motorized vehicles may enable Russia to sustain its war effort in Ukraine in the medium term.[36]

Ukraine and Russia conducted the sixth prisoner of war (POW) exchange in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements. Ukrainian officials and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Ukraine and Russia exchanged an unspecified number of severely wounded and sick POWs on June 20.[37]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Brigadier General Hennadii Shapovalov as Commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces on June 19.[38] Shapovalov most recently served as the Ukrainian representative to the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) center in Germany and served as the Commander of Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command in 2024.[39]

Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that Russians and Ukrainians are one nation and all of Ukraine is effectively Russian as part of efforts to justify his continued conquest of Ukraine.

Putin asserted that Russia will be able to achieve its goals through a protracted war in Ukraine.

Putin and other Kremlin officials are using the guise of “buffer zones” to expand Russia’s territorial demands in Ukraine.

The Kremlin continues to prioritize maintaining the facade of economic stability by pursuing economic policies that will likely exacerbate Russia’s economic instability.

Putin is attempting to obfuscate the reality that increased investment in Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) has come at the cost of Russia’s civilian economic sectors.

Open-source intelligence suggests that Russia is increasing its T-90M tank production capabilities

Ukraine and Russia conducted the sixth prisoner of war (POW) exchange in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Brigadier General Hennadii Shapovalov as Commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces on June 19.

Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 19 and 20.[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and near Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[41]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Machine Gun Artillery Division, 68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Tetkino.[42] Elements of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[43]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on June 20.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on June 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces seized Novomykolaivka (north of Sumy City).[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the forest north of Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[45]

Russian forces attacked in northern Sumy Oblast, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and toward Varachyne and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on June 19 and 20.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka, Andriivka, Oleksiivka, Novomykolaivka (all north of Sumy City), and Yunakivka.[47]

Ukraine’s Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated on June 20 that the number of Russian small group infantry assaults with quad bikes and motorcycles along the Sumy Oblast border has decreased recently.[48] A servicemember of a Ukrainian regiment operating in Sumy Oblast reported that Russian forces are deploying five to seven first-person view (FPV) drone crews on a small section of the front of an unspecified width.[49]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Machine Gun Artillery Division, 68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[50]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on June 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Zelene and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Ohirtseve on June 19 and 20.[51]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported on June 20 that Russian forces intensified assaults toward Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[52] Shamyshyn stated that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the Aggregate Plant in Vovchansk.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Dovhenke (northeast of Kupyansk).[53]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 20 that elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) seized Moskovka (just northeast of Kupyansk).[54]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk near Dvorchina, Kamyanka, and Stroivka, north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on June 19 and 20.[55]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported on June 20 that Russian forces are trying to expand their bridgehead along the Oskil River near Dvorchina but will need to establish pontoon crossings over the river in order to threaten Kupyansk from the north along the west (right) bank of the river.[56]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Borova near Nadiya and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Olhivka on June 19 and 20.

Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on June 20 that Russian forces used motorized vehicles to move assault groups to positions near Olhivka (southeast of Borova).[57]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Novyi Myr, Karpivka, and Zelena Dolyna and toward Hlushchenkove; northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka; and east of Lyman near Torske on June 19 and 20.[58]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 20 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in northeastern Serebryanka (northeast of Siversk).[59]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on June 19 and 20.[60]

Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported that Russian forces in the Siversk direction are attacking using armored vehicles and tanks.[61] ISW has observed reports indicating that Russian forces have been largely utilizing motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) in assaults across the theater since late Fall 2024, likely due to the threat of Ukrainian strike drones and dwindling Russian vehicle supplies, and reports that Russian forces are fielding armored vehicles are notable.[62] A platoon commander operating in the Siversk direction reported that Russian forces recently conducted a reduced-platoon-sized mechanized assault consisting of a tank and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), but that Russian forces are constantly attacking in small infantry groups or even lone infantrymen.[63] The platoon commander reported that Russian infantry are attacking at night while wearing anti-heat cloaks to evade detection and Ukrainian drones.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within and on the southern outskirts of Chasiv Yar.[64]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations within and near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne and Stupochky and toward Bila Hora on June 19 and 20.[65]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated that Russian forces are regrouping, accumulating forces, and concentrating new “battalion-tactical groups” (BTGs) in the area.[66] Russian forces have not operated in BTGs since late 2022, and it is unclear if the Ukrainian spokesperson is referencing BTGs specifically or battalion-sized units more generally.[67] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces may be preparing for larger-scale assault operations in the Kramatorsk direction in the near future and assessed that elements of the Russian 163rd Tank Regiment and 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and unspecified “Storm-V” or “Storm-Z” assault units already operating in the area are the most likely units to conduct these future operations. ISW has observed reports that elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division are operating both northwest and southwest of Toretsk, and the spokesperson may be referring to an area inclusive of both the Chasiv Yar direction and part of the Toretsk direction.[68]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment and 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (both of the 98th VDV Division) reportedly continue operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[69]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 19 and 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Toretsk and in central Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk).[70]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Oleksandro-Kalynove (west of Toretsk).[71]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka, Rusyn Yar, Poltavka, and Oleksandro-Kalynove and toward Pleshchiivka and Katerynivka; and west of Toretsk near Novospaske and Shcherbynivka on June 19 and 20.[72]

Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported that Russian forces have intensified offensive operations in the Toretsk direction.[73] Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces conducted assaults with 23 pieces of equipment, 13 motorcycles, and more than 100 personnel in waves of 20-minute intervals in the past day.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th AA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[74]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 20 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on June 19 that Russian forces advanced west of Shevchenko Pershe (northeast of Pokrovsk), to western Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk), and south of Udachne.[75]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Koptieve, Malynivka, Myrne, and Myrolyubivka and toward Volodymyrivka and Novotoretske; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Yelyzavetivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Kotlyne on June 19 and 20.[76] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Udachne.[77]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 9th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[78] Drone operators of the “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Rubizhne (north of Pokrovsk).[79]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 20 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka), east and south of Zaporizhzhia, north of Komar, and west of Fedorivka (all south of Novopavlivka).[80]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and toward Novopidhorodne; east of Novopavlivka near Nadiivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Sribne, Horikhove, Oleksiivka, Odradne, Novoukrainka and Bahatyr; and south of Novopavlivka near Zaporizhzhia, Komar, Dniproenerhiya, and Perebudova on June 19 and 20.[81] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Muravka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and Zaporizhzhia.[82]

A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Russian forces are conducting rapid assaults with up to five soldiers or in pairs on motorcycles in an effort to overwhelm Ukrainian drone operators.[83] The servicemember added that Russian motorcyclists typically shelter in forested areas and then infiltrate areas one or two at a time, and that Russian forces have a manpower advantage in the Novopavlivka direction.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Odradne, Fedorivka, and Komar.[84]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 20 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 19 that Russian forces advanced south of and within Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[85]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on June 19 and 20.[86]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a reconstituted Soviet unit) and 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Shevchenko.[87]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[88]

Russian forces continued ground assaults east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 19 and 20.[89]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on June 20 that Russian forces conducted a mechanized assault of an unspecified echelon using “several” armored vehicles in Malynivka a few days ago, but that this was an isolated mechanized assault.[90] Voloshyn reported that Russian forces continue to primarily attack near Malynivka using motorcycles, buggies, and quad bikes that are more maneuverable in order to quickly overcome the “death zone” – likely referring to the area of the frontline saturated by drones.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations southwest of Orikhiv toward Novoandriivka on June 20.[91]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), including from the “Nemets” group of its 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment, reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[92]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on June 20 but did not advance.[93]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 19 to 20. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 86 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast: Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[94] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 34 drones and that 36 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian and industrial infrastructure in Kharkiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[95]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russian and Belarusian authorities continue economic and industrial cooperation through the Union State framework. Tver Oblast Governor Igor Rudenya and Belarusian State Committee for Standardization Chairperson Elena Morgunova signed an agreement on trade, economic, and industrial cooperation during a meeting at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 20.[96] Rudenya emphasized the importance of bilateral cooperation in high-tech industries, including microelectronics and mechanical and machine tool building.

[1] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/20/06/2025/685582719a79474b7e0ee61b

[2] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/66181 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2023

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011425

[4] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/20/06/2025/685582719a79474b7e0ee61b

[5] https://tass dot ru/politika/24302651

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-16-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20March%2012%2C%202025%20PDF-compressed%20%281%29.pdf ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024

[8] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/20/06/2025/685582719a79474b7e0ee61b

[9] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24303197

[10] https://tass dot ru/politika/24286957

[11] https://news dot ru/vlast/nado-byt-gotovymi-v-gd-zayavili-o-novyh-celyah-posle-udara-vsu-po-donecku

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051724

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125

[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025

[15] https://aif dot ru/politics/putin-citatoy-marka-tvena-prokommentiroval-sluhi-o-problemah-v-ekonomike-rf

[16] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77222; https://t.me/tass_agency/321499

[17] https://t.me/tass_agency/321499; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77222; https://t.me/tass_agency/321499

[18] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77222; https://t.me/tass_agency/321499

[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024

[20] https://isw.pub/ForceGen052125

[21] https://swedenherald.com/article/svantesson-wants-to-expose-russian-economic-bluff ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025

[22] https://meduza dot io/cards/tseny-na-kartofel-v-rossii-za-god-vyrosli-pochti-vtroe-do-istoricheskogo-maksimuma-pochemu-produkt-tak-silno-podorozhal-i-kogda-podesheveet ; https://ura dot news/news/1052936283 ; https://72 dot ru/text/economics/2025/06/02/75524336/ ; https://agroreview dot com/ru/novosti/czeny-kartofel-rossyy-vyrosly-rekordnogo/

[23] https://www.interfax dot ru/business/1032064

[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925

[25] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-6-2025

[26] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage

[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060625

[28] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77222

[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2024

[30] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77222

[31] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/battlefield-ai-revolution-not-here-yet-status-current-russian-and-ukrainian-ai-drone

[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-efforts-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-11-2025

[33] https://notes.citeam dot org/eng_t90; https://x.com/CITeam_ru/status/1935941181671981438

[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061625 ; https://notes.citeam dot org/eng_t90; https://x.com/CITeam_ru/status/1935941181671981438

[35] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage

[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-7-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061625

[37] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14789 ; https://t.me/Koord_shtab/13262 ; https://suspilne dot media/1047439-vidbuvsa-novij-etap-obminu-miz-ukrainou-ta-rf/ ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1936023512734388291 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1936023508837916826 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1936038074464846125

https://t.me/mod_russia/53950 ;

[38] https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/4122025-55385

[39] https://kyivindependent dot com/zelensky-appoints-brigadier-general-shapovalov-as-new-ground-forces-commander/

[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681;

[41] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37512; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30265; https://t.me/rybar/71486 ; https://t.me/rybar/71487; https://t.me/dva_majors/73792; https://t.me/wargonzo/27343

[42] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/169487

[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30265

[44] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94077; https://t.me/rybar/71486;

[45] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94077

[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94130; https://t.me/rybar/71486; https://t.me/rybar/71487

[47] https://t.me/wargonzo/27343; https://t.me/rusich_army/24269 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/169570; https://t.me/rybar/71487; https://t.me/dva_majors/73792 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94077

[48] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/vorog-prytyh-prykordonnyky-fiksuyut-zmenshennya-sprob-proryvu-na-sumshhyni/

[49] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ormmShy2BtY ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/tak-korejczyamy-voyuvaly-tak-i-svoyimy-voyuyut-na-sumshhyni-taktyka-rosiyan-zalyshayetsya-nezminnoyu/

[50] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/169514

[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514

[52] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/vovcha-oskil-i-berlin-try-garyachi-tochky-na-mapi-harkivshhyni/

[53] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9425; https://t.me/viddmaks/209

[54] https://t.me/mod_russia/53945 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/321385; https://t.me/mod_russia/53948

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73792

[56] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/vovcha-oskil-i-berlin-try-garyachi-tochky-na-mapi-harkivshhyni/

[57] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514

[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1935793736115798262; https://t.me/ombr_63/1257

[59] https://x.com/klinger66/status/1936093212424180182 ; https://t.me/umftteam/524

[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514

[61] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/pobyly-rosiyan-i-zabraly-motoczykly-yak-voyuyut-syly-oborony-na-toreczkomu-napryamku/

[62] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2025

[63] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ormmShy2BtY ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/zaborona-poodynokogo-shturmu-na-siverskomu-napryamku-prodovzhuyut-peremelyuvaty-rosijskyh-pihotyncziv/

[64] https://t.me/rybar/71487 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/321334 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27343

[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514 ; https://t.me/rybar/71487 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27343

[66] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/nevypadkovi-gosti-vijny-z-kryminalnym-bagazhem-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku-v-polon-berut-perevazhno-kolyshnih-vyazniv/

[67] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29

[68] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2025

[69] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30260

[70] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1935830910106030518 ; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/1222 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9428 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73831 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1936031932003107088

[71] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/169566

[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73792

[73] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/pobyly-rosiyan-i-zabraly-motoczykly-yak-voyuyut-syly-oborony-na-toreczkomu-napryamku/

[74] https://t.me/dva_majors/73831

[75] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65277 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30252 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65274 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30252

[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514 ; https://t.me/rybar/71477 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65274

[77] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65274

[78] https://t.me/wargonzo/27361

[79] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/169488

[80] https://t.me/voin_dv/15581 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65279 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/169566

[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65274 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27343

[82] https://t.me/wargonzo/27343 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30252

[83] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/nashi-vijskovi-rozpovily-pro-vynahid-dlya-borotby-z-motoshturmamy-okupantiv/

[84] https://t.me/rybar/71490 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/20679

[85] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65279

[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27343

[87] https://t.me/voin_dv/15580

[88] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9430 ; https://t.me/banditskiy_nestor/5125

[89] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02bM2b21W3a9q9CwFgrDzXfqkj7xrA4iXBxdG9nruwbfj9rTpE2A8Tb5Jzg1FeeeCkl

[90] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/20/motobanda-letyt-u-mertvu-zonu-v-stepah-pid-gulyajpolem-spravzhnye-kladovyshhe-rosijskyh-bajkeriv/

[91] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704

[92] https://t.me/dva_majors/73789 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27341 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27341 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/19439

[93] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02bM2b21W3a9q9CwFgrDzXfqkj7xrA4iXBxdG9nruwbfj9rTpE2A8Tb5Jzg1FeeeCkl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681

[94] https://t.me/kpszsu/36671

[95] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1935984999385170389 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15161 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14778 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/44666 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/vybuhy-u-harkovi-postrazhdalo-chetvero-lyudej-sered-yakyh-dity/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/15149 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15150 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15151 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15152 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2691 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2692 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2697 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15157 ; https://t.me/suspilnenews/51912 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15157 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25698 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25699 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/10142 ; https://t.me/suspilnenews/51911 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/44644 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/44687 ; https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1151161637050650&id=100064704725226&mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=TVd6vuq8ubwXmbON ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02bM2b21W3a9q9CwFgrDzXfqkj7xrA4iXBxdG9nruwbfj9rTpE2A8Tb5Jzg1FeeeCkl ; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/7037 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/44118

[96] https://t.me/belta_telegramm/318695 ; https://belta dot by/society/view/belarus-i-tverskaja-oblast-na-pmef-opredelilis-s-perspektivnymi-napravlenijami-sotrudnichestva-721956-2025/

Source: Understandingwar.org | View original article

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