Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, Jennie Olmsted, and Kateryna Stepanenko

June 20, 2025, 6:15 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11 am ET on June 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that Russians and Ukrainians are one nation and all of Ukraine is effectively Russian as part of efforts to justify his continued conquest of Ukraine. Putin answered a question after his speech at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 20 about why Russian forces are advancing beyond the territories in Ukraine that Russia has illegally annexed, claiming that he considers Russian and Ukrainian people to be “one people in reality” and that “Ukraine is [Russia’s].”[1] Putin has repeatedly demonstrated that he does not consider Ukraine as an independent state with its own history, identity, and culture separate from Russia, as evidenced by his 2021 “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” essay and his repeated false assertion that Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians are all part of one historical people.[2]

ISW has previously noted that the Kremlin’s ongoing information operation attempting to portray Russians and Ukrainians as one unified nation and culturally and historically homogeneous is one of its most significant information operations aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and justifying the war effort to the Russian people. Putin’s commitment to this narrative underscores his ongoing commitment to destroying the Ukrainian state and subjugating the Ukrainian people.[3]

Putin asserted that Russia will be able to achieve its goals through a protracted war in Ukraine. Putin claimed on June 20 that it would be better for Ukraine to stop fighting because the battlefield and geopolitical situation will only worsen for Ukraine, and that Ukraine will have to negotiate from a weaker position.[4] Putin attempted to posture Russia as interested in engaging in negotiations to end the war, claiming that Russia is not seeking “Ukrainian capitulation,” yet insisted that Ukraine recognize the “realities that have developed on the ground.”[5] Kremlin officials often call for Ukraine to recognize the “realities on the ground” (a reference to the frontline in Ukraine) to allude to the idea that Russia is in a stronger negotiating position given the situation on the battlefield and to demand that Ukraine concede to Russia’s unwavering demands.[6]

Putin’s claim that Ukraine must recognize the “realities on the ground” and should negotiate before the situation worsens also coheres with Putin’s theory of victory, which assesses that Russian forces will be able to win a war of attrition by indefinitely sustaining gradual advances along the frontline despite the high costs of such creeping advances.[7] Putin’s statement ignores that the true “realities on the ground” show a complicated and hotly contested frontline situation in which Russian forces are slowly making marginal advances at the cost of significant manpower and materiel losses in the face of significant Ukrainian drone-based defenses.

Putin and other Kremlin officials are using the guise of “buffer zones” to expand Russia’s territorial demands in Ukraine. Putin claimed that Russian forces are “ending up” in territories beyond the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed in accordance with the “logic of military actions,” then recalled the saying “where the foot of a Russian soldier steps, that is [Russia’s].”[8] Putin stated that he does not rule out Russia seizing Sumy City “in principle” but claimed that Russia is not pursuing this objective at the moment.[9] Putin claimed that Russian actions in northern Sumy Oblast are due to Ukraine’s shelling of Russian border areas. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on June 19 in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS at SPIEF that a “buffer zone” should be 20 to 30 kilometers deep to protect occupied Luhansk Oblast from Ukrainian fiber optic drone strikes.[10] First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Alexei Zhuravlev called on June 18 for Russia to create a buffer zone into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast up to the Dnipro River in order to protect occupied Donetsk Oblast from Ukrainian HIMARS strikes.[11]

Kremlin officials previously justified the Russian offensive into northern Kharkiv Oblast as an effort to protect Belgorod City from Ukrainian shelling and MLRS strikes.[12] Pasechnik’s and Zhuravlev’s envisioned buffer zones would extend into eastern Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts – two oblasts that Russia has not illegally annexed yet. Russian officials have recently made similar calls for Russia to expand its territorial ambitions, asking Putin to seize Sumy City and calling for Russia to take control of the part of the Dnipro River that passes through Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[13] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa also stated on June 5 that Russia likely seeks to create a buffer zone along the northern Ukrainian-Russian border by the end of 2025 and intends to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River, including eastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and all of Kharkiv Oblast, by the end of 2026.[14]

The Kremlin continues to demonstrate that it will not be satisfied with the seizure of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and will use the guise of buffer zones to justify its territorial ambitions beyond these four oblasts.

The Kremlin continues to prioritize maintaining the facade of economic stability by pursuing economic policies that will likely exacerbate Russia’s economic instability. Putin claimed during SPIEF on June 20 that Russia’s debt is not growing and refuted claims that Russia’s economy is declining.[15] Putin claimed that the idea that Russia’s economy is only tied to raw materials and is dependent on hydrocarbon exports is “outdated,” but that Russia aims to increase its non-oil and gas exports.[16] Putin claimed that inflation in Russia decreased to 9.6 percent as of June 16 and that he expects inflation to fall to seven percent by the end of 2025.[17] Putin used his speech to focus on reductions in the poverty level in Russia.[18] Putin also highlighted Russia’s low unemployment rate, claiming that the rate has stabilized around 2.3 percent since October 2024. Putin did not speak about Russia’s labor shortages that are causing this low employment rate, however, in contrast to his 2024 SPIEF speech in which he acknowledged that Russia was suffering from labor shortages and highlighted the need for skilled migrant labor to increase Russia’s economic growth.[19] Putin may be attempting to gloss over his ongoing efforts to leverage migrants to mitigate ongoing labor shortages amid increasing anti-migrant sentiments in Russia.[20]

The Kremlin has repeatedly attempted to posture the Russian economy as strong and stable, claiming in recent months that inflation was between nine and 10 percent when the actual figure was likely closer to 20 percent.[21] Putin’s June 20 claim that Russian inflation is 9.6 percent is likely also false. ISW has observed reports that domestic consumers in Russia continue to face rising prices for staple food items, such as potatoes and butter.[22] Putin also failed to acknowledge the growing detrimental effects of high interest rates of 20 percent on the Russian industrial sector. Russian steel company Severstal head, Alexander Shevelev, warned on June 19 that metallurgical production facilities are at risk of shutting down due to low consumer demand and high interest rates.[23] Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina notably stated at SPIEF on June 19 that Russia’s economy grew at a high rate for two years because Russia was using “free resources,” including Russia’s workforce, production capacity, import substitution, the liquid assets of the National Welfare Fund, and the banking system’s capital reserve, but that Russia has exhausted many of these resources and needs to think of a new growth model.[24] ISW previously assessed in early June 2025 that the Russian government was likely pressuring Nabiullina to lower Russia’s key interest rate to reduce the impact of high interest rates on the Russian budget and civilian industries.[25]

Putin’s efforts to frame the Russian economy as stable and growing are part of his efforts to balance social support programs with Russia’s military needs and maintain his support among the Russian population despite the growing economic costs of his war in Ukraine.[26] ISW continues to assess that Kremlin efforts to pressure the Central Bank into prematurely lowering the key interest rate to maintain the facade of economic stability may backfire and contribute to elevated levels of inflation.[27]

Putin is attempting to obfuscate the reality that increased investment in Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) has come at the cost of Russia’s civilian economic sectors. Putin stated during his speech at SPIEF that Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) has increased by over four percent annually over the last two years, but claimed that Russia’s GDP growth is not solely due to Russia’s oil and gas or defense industrial sectors.[28] Putin claimed that Russia’s agricultural, construction, logistics, financial, and information technology (IT) sectors have also expanded over the last two years. ISW reported in September 2024 that Russia’s 2025 federal budget allocated 13.5 trillion rubles ($145 billion) toward “National Defense” expenditures and another 3.5 trillion rubles ($37 billion) toward “National Security,” meaning that Russia committed about 41 percent of its 2025 expenditures to defense and security expenses.[29] Russia allocated 6.4 trillion rubles ($69 billion) to its 2025 “Social Policy” budget in comparison, which underscores the disparity between Russia’s investment in its defense industrial sectors compared to its civilian sectors.

Putin highlighted Russia’s DIB growth during his speech and called for further integration of civilian and defense industrial sectors in order to facilitate greater innovation and increase dual-use goods production.[30] Putin claimed that Russia’s DIB has increased its output “many times over” and is “mastering” new equipment and weapons. Putin called for Russia to move away from dividing companies between the defense industrial and civilian sectors of the economy and to quickly implement innovations from the civilian sector into Russia’s defense and security. Putin called for Russia to decrease the time between formulating an idea and its implementation and called for Russian military commanders and heads of defense industrial enterprises to be more involved in production decision-making processes. Putin pointed to drones, which Putin called the most effective means to destroy expensive military equipment, as an area where Russia can increase efficiency to ensure Russia’s security and solve problems in Russia’s DIB. Putin framed Russia’s investments in artificial intelligence (AI) as purely focused on economic development and civilian sectors during his speech at SPIEF, although Russia is already working to integrate greater AI and machine learning (ML) capabilities into drones along the frontline.[31] Russia undertook a concerted campaign to centralize Russian drone units and drone production efforts in late 2024, but Putin appears to be acknowledging that Russia’s new drone production and testing mechanisms must retain a rapid innovation cycle.[32]

Open-source intelligence suggests that Russia is increasing its T-90M tank production capabilities. Georgia-based open-source intelligence organization Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) reported on June 20 that an unnamed “reliable analytical source” stated that Russia’s annual production rate of T-90M tanks was roughly 280 T-90M tanks as of 2024.[33] The CIT noted that Russia has been undertaking systemic efforts to increase tank production since before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and estimated that pre-war production rates and Russia’s transition to a constant production schedule since 2022 have likely allowed Russia’s primary tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod to produce 60 to 70 T-90M new tanks in 2022; 140 to 180 new tanks in 2023; and 250 to 300 new tanks in 2024. The CIT noted that Russia is currently using fewer tanks and armored vehicles on the battlefield in Ukraine and that Russia’s armored vehicle and tank loss rates have been decreasing since late 2024, which is consistent with a recent assessment from a social media source tracking equipment at Russian military depots via satellite imagery.[34] The CIT assessed that Russia will likely be able to maintain its current armor levels throughout the Russian military for “at least several more years,” assuming that Russia’s tank production and consumption rates remain at their current levels.

ISW previously assessed that Russia’s 2023 and 2024 vehicle loss rates were unsustainable in the medium- to long-term, given the limitations of Russia’s defense industrial capacity and Soviet-era weapons and equipment stocks.[35] Ongoing Russian efforts to offset and limit tank and armored vehicle losses by increasingly relying on motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and other motorized vehicles may enable Russia to sustain its war effort in Ukraine in the medium term.[36]

Ukraine and Russia conducted the sixth prisoner of war (POW) exchange in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements. Ukrainian officials and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Ukraine and Russia exchanged an unspecified number of severely wounded and sick POWs on June 20.[37]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Brigadier General Hennadii Shapovalov as Commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces on June 19.[38] Shapovalov most recently served as the Ukrainian representative to the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) center in Germany and served as the Commander of Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command in 2024.[39]

Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that Russians and Ukrainians are one nation and all of Ukraine is effectively Russian as part of efforts to justify his continued conquest of Ukraine.

Putin asserted that Russia will be able to achieve its goals through a protracted war in Ukraine.

Putin and other Kremlin officials are using the guise of “buffer zones” to expand Russia’s territorial demands in Ukraine.

The Kremlin continues to prioritize maintaining the facade of economic stability by pursuing economic policies that will likely exacerbate Russia’s economic instability.

Putin is attempting to obfuscate the reality that increased investment in Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) has come at the cost of Russia’s civilian economic sectors.

Open-source intelligence suggests that Russia is increasing its T-90M tank production capabilities

Ukraine and Russia conducted the sixth prisoner of war (POW) exchange in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Brigadier General Hennadii Shapovalov as Commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces on June 19.

Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 19 and 20.[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and near Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[41]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Machine Gun Artillery Division, 68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Tetkino.[42] Elements of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[43]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on June 20.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on June 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces seized Novomykolaivka (north of Sumy City).[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the forest north of Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[45]

Russian forces attacked in northern Sumy Oblast, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and toward Varachyne and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on June 19 and 20.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka, Andriivka, Oleksiivka, Novomykolaivka (all north of Sumy City), and Yunakivka.[47]

Ukraine’s Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated on June 20 that the number of Russian small group infantry assaults with quad bikes and motorcycles along the Sumy Oblast border has decreased recently.[48] A servicemember of a Ukrainian regiment operating in Sumy Oblast reported that Russian forces are deploying five to seven first-person view (FPV) drone crews on a small section of the front of an unspecified width.[49]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Machine Gun Artillery Division, 68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[50]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on June 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Zelene and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Ohirtseve on June 19 and 20.[51]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported on June 20 that Russian forces intensified assaults toward Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[52] Shamyshyn stated that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the Aggregate Plant in Vovchansk.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Dovhenke (northeast of Kupyansk).[53]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 20 that elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) seized Moskovka (just northeast of Kupyansk).[54]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk near Dvorchina, Kamyanka, and Stroivka, north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on June 19 and 20.[55]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported on June 20 that Russian forces are trying to expand their bridgehead along the Oskil River near Dvorchina but will need to establish pontoon crossings over the river in order to threaten Kupyansk from the north along the west (right) bank of the river.[56]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Borova near Nadiya and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Olhivka on June 19 and 20.

Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on June 20 that Russian forces used motorized vehicles to move assault groups to positions near Olhivka (southeast of Borova).[57]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Novyi Myr, Karpivka, and Zelena Dolyna and toward Hlushchenkove; northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka; and east of Lyman near Torske on June 19 and 20.[58]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 20 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in northeastern Serebryanka (northeast of Siversk).[59]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on June 19 and 20.[60]

Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported that Russian forces in the Siversk direction are attacking using armored vehicles and tanks.[61] ISW has observed reports indicating that Russian forces have been largely utilizing motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) in assaults across the theater since late Fall 2024, likely due to the threat of Ukrainian strike drones and dwindling Russian vehicle supplies, and reports that Russian forces are fielding armored vehicles are notable.[62] A platoon commander operating in the Siversk direction reported that Russian forces recently conducted a reduced-platoon-sized mechanized assault consisting of a tank and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), but that Russian forces are constantly attacking in small infantry groups or even lone infantrymen.[63] The platoon commander reported that Russian infantry are attacking at night while wearing anti-heat cloaks to evade detection and Ukrainian drones.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within and on the southern outskirts of Chasiv Yar.[64]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations within and near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne and Stupochky and toward Bila Hora on June 19 and 20.[65]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated that Russian forces are regrouping, accumulating forces, and concentrating new “battalion-tactical groups” (BTGs) in the area.[66] Russian forces have not operated in BTGs since late 2022, and it is unclear if the Ukrainian spokesperson is referencing BTGs specifically or battalion-sized units more generally.[67] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces may be preparing for larger-scale assault operations in the Kramatorsk direction in the near future and assessed that elements of the Russian 163rd Tank Regiment and 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and unspecified “Storm-V” or “Storm-Z” assault units already operating in the area are the most likely units to conduct these future operations. ISW has observed reports that elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division are operating both northwest and southwest of Toretsk, and the spokesperson may be referring to an area inclusive of both the Chasiv Yar direction and part of the Toretsk direction.[68]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment and 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (both of the 98th VDV Division) reportedly continue operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[69]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 19 and 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Toretsk and in central Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk).[70]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Oleksandro-Kalynove (west of Toretsk).[71]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka, Rusyn Yar, Poltavka, and Oleksandro-Kalynove and toward Pleshchiivka and Katerynivka; and west of Toretsk near Novospaske and Shcherbynivka on June 19 and 20.[72]

Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported that Russian forces have intensified offensive operations in the Toretsk direction.[73] Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces conducted assaults with 23 pieces of equipment, 13 motorcycles, and more than 100 personnel in waves of 20-minute intervals in the past day.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th AA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[74]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 20 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on June 19 that Russian forces advanced west of Shevchenko Pershe (northeast of Pokrovsk), to western Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk), and south of Udachne.[75]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Koptieve, Malynivka, Myrne, and Myrolyubivka and toward Volodymyrivka and Novotoretske; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Yelyzavetivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Kotlyne on June 19 and 20.[76] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Udachne.[77]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 9th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[78] Drone operators of the “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Rubizhne (north of Pokrovsk).[79]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 20 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka), east and south of Zaporizhzhia, north of Komar, and west of Fedorivka (all south of Novopavlivka).[80]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and toward Novopidhorodne; east of Novopavlivka near Nadiivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Sribne, Horikhove, Oleksiivka, Odradne, Novoukrainka and Bahatyr; and south of Novopavlivka near Zaporizhzhia, Komar, Dniproenerhiya, and Perebudova on June 19 and 20.[81] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Muravka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and Zaporizhzhia.[82]

A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Russian forces are conducting rapid assaults with up to five soldiers or in pairs on motorcycles in an effort to overwhelm Ukrainian drone operators.[83] The servicemember added that Russian motorcyclists typically shelter in forested areas and then infiltrate areas one or two at a time, and that Russian forces have a manpower advantage in the Novopavlivka direction.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Odradne, Fedorivka, and Komar.[84]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 20 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 19 that Russian forces advanced south of and within Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[85]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on June 19 and 20.[86]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a reconstituted Soviet unit) and 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Shevchenko.[87]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[88]

Russian forces continued ground assaults east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 19 and 20.[89]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on June 20 that Russian forces conducted a mechanized assault of an unspecified echelon using “several” armored vehicles in Malynivka a few days ago, but that this was an isolated mechanized assault.[90] Voloshyn reported that Russian forces continue to primarily attack near Malynivka using motorcycles, buggies, and quad bikes that are more maneuverable in order to quickly overcome the “death zone” – likely referring to the area of the frontline saturated by drones.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations southwest of Orikhiv toward Novoandriivka on June 20.[91]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), including from the “Nemets” group of its 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment, reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[92]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on June 20 but did not advance.[93]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 19 to 20. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 86 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast: Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[94] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 34 drones and that 36 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian and industrial infrastructure in Kharkiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[95]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russian and Belarusian authorities continue economic and industrial cooperation through the Union State framework. Tver Oblast Governor Igor Rudenya and Belarusian State Committee for Standardization Chairperson Elena Morgunova signed an agreement on trade, economic, and industrial cooperation during a meeting at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 20.[96] Rudenya emphasized the importance of bilateral cooperation in high-tech industries, including microelectronics and mechanical and machine tool building.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/20/06/2025/685582719a79474b7e0ee61b

[2] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/66181 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2023

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011425

[4] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/20/06/2025/685582719a79474b7e0ee61b

[5] https://tass dot ru/politika/24302651

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-16-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20March%2012%2C%202025%20PDF-compressed%20%281%29.pdf ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024

[8] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/20/06/2025/685582719a79474b7e0ee61b

[9] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24303197

[10] https://tass dot ru/politika/24286957

[11] https://news dot ru/vlast/nado-byt-gotovymi-v-gd-zayavili-o-novyh-celyah-posle-udara-vsu-po-donecku

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051724

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125

[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025

[15] https://aif dot ru/politics/putin-citatoy-marka-tvena-prokommentiroval-sluhi-o-problemah-v-ekonomike-rf

[16] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77222; https://t.me/tass_agency/321499

[17] https://t.me/tass_agency/321499; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77222; https://t.me/tass_agency/321499

[18] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77222; https://t.me/tass_agency/321499

[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024

[20] https://isw.pub/ForceGen052125

[21] https://swedenherald.com/article/svantesson-wants-to-expose-russian-economic-bluff ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025

[22] https://meduza dot io/cards/tseny-na-kartofel-v-rossii-za-god-vyrosli-pochti-vtroe-do-istoricheskogo-maksimuma-pochemu-produkt-tak-silno-podorozhal-i-kogda-podesheveet ; https://ura dot news/news/1052936283 ; https://72 dot ru/text/economics/2025/06/02/75524336/ ; https://agroreview dot com/ru/novosti/czeny-kartofel-rossyy-vyrosly-rekordnogo/

[23] https://www.interfax dot ru/business/1032064

[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925

[25] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-6-2025

[26] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage

[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060625

[28] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77222

[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2024

[30] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77222

[31] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/battlefield-ai-revolution-not-here-yet-status-current-russian-and-ukrainian-ai-drone

[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-efforts-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-11-2025

[33] https://notes.citeam dot org/eng_t90; https://x.com/CITeam_ru/status/1935941181671981438

[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061625 ; https://notes.citeam dot org/eng_t90; https://x.com/CITeam_ru/status/1935941181671981438

[35] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage

[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-7-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061625

[37] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14789 ; https://t.me/Koord_shtab/13262 ; https://suspilne dot media/1047439-vidbuvsa-novij-etap-obminu-miz-ukrainou-ta-rf/ ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1936023512734388291 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1936023508837916826 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1936038074464846125

https://t.me/mod_russia/53950 ;

[38] https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/4122025-55385

[39] https://kyivindependent dot com/zelensky-appoints-brigadier-general-shapovalov-as-new-ground-forces-commander/

[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681;

[41] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37512; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30265; https://t.me/rybar/71486 ; https://t.me/rybar/71487; https://t.me/dva_majors/73792; https://t.me/wargonzo/27343

[42] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/169487

[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30265

[44] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94077; https://t.me/rybar/71486;

[45] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94077

[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94130; https://t.me/rybar/71486; https://t.me/rybar/71487

[47] https://t.me/wargonzo/27343; https://t.me/rusich_army/24269 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/169570; https://t.me/rybar/71487; https://t.me/dva_majors/73792 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94077

[48] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/vorog-prytyh-prykordonnyky-fiksuyut-zmenshennya-sprob-proryvu-na-sumshhyni/

[49] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ormmShy2BtY ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/tak-korejczyamy-voyuvaly-tak-i-svoyimy-voyuyut-na-sumshhyni-taktyka-rosiyan-zalyshayetsya-nezminnoyu/

[50] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/169514

[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514

[52] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/vovcha-oskil-i-berlin-try-garyachi-tochky-na-mapi-harkivshhyni/

[53] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9425; https://t.me/viddmaks/209

[54] https://t.me/mod_russia/53945 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/321385; https://t.me/mod_russia/53948

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73792

[56] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/vovcha-oskil-i-berlin-try-garyachi-tochky-na-mapi-harkivshhyni/

[57] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514

[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1935793736115798262; https://t.me/ombr_63/1257

[59] https://x.com/klinger66/status/1936093212424180182 ; https://t.me/umftteam/524

[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514

[61] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/pobyly-rosiyan-i-zabraly-motoczykly-yak-voyuyut-syly-oborony-na-toreczkomu-napryamku/

[62] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2025

[63] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ormmShy2BtY ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/zaborona-poodynokogo-shturmu-na-siverskomu-napryamku-prodovzhuyut-peremelyuvaty-rosijskyh-pihotyncziv/

[64] https://t.me/rybar/71487 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/321334 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27343

[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514 ; https://t.me/rybar/71487 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27343

[66] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/nevypadkovi-gosti-vijny-z-kryminalnym-bagazhem-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku-v-polon-berut-perevazhno-kolyshnih-vyazniv/

[67] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29

[68] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2025

[69] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30260

[70] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1935830910106030518 ; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/1222 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9428 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73831 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1936031932003107088

[71] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/169566

[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73792

[73] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/pobyly-rosiyan-i-zabraly-motoczykly-yak-voyuyut-syly-oborony-na-toreczkomu-napryamku/

[74] https://t.me/dva_majors/73831

[75] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65277 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30252 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65274 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30252

[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514 ; https://t.me/rybar/71477 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65274

[77] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65274

[78] https://t.me/wargonzo/27361

[79] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/169488

[80] https://t.me/voin_dv/15581 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65279 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/169566

[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65274 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27343

[82] https://t.me/wargonzo/27343 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30252

[83] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/nashi-vijskovi-rozpovily-pro-vynahid-dlya-borotby-z-motoshturmamy-okupantiv/

[84] https://t.me/rybar/71490 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/20679

[85] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65279

[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27343

[87] https://t.me/voin_dv/15580

[88] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9430 ; https://t.me/banditskiy_nestor/5125

[89] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02bM2b21W3a9q9CwFgrDzXfqkj7xrA4iXBxdG9nruwbfj9rTpE2A8Tb5Jzg1FeeeCkl

[90] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/20/motobanda-letyt-u-mertvu-zonu-v-stepah-pid-gulyajpolem-spravzhnye-kladovyshhe-rosijskyh-bajkeriv/

[91] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704

[92] https://t.me/dva_majors/73789 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27341 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27341 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/19439

[93] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02bM2b21W3a9q9CwFgrDzXfqkj7xrA4iXBxdG9nruwbfj9rTpE2A8Tb5Jzg1FeeeCkl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681

[94] https://t.me/kpszsu/36671

[95] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1935984999385170389 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15161 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14778 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/44666 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/vybuhy-u-harkovi-postrazhdalo-chetvero-lyudej-sered-yakyh-dity/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/15149 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15150 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15151 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15152 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2691 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2692 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2697 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15157 ; https://t.me/suspilnenews/51912 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15157 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25698 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25699 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/10142 ; https://t.me/suspilnenews/51911 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/44644 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/44687 ; https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1151161637050650&id=100064704725226&mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=TVd6vuq8ubwXmbON ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02bM2b21W3a9q9CwFgrDzXfqkj7xrA4iXBxdG9nruwbfj9rTpE2A8Tb5Jzg1FeeeCkl ; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/7037 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/44118

[96] https://t.me/belta_telegramm/318695 ; https://belta dot by/society/view/belarus-i-tverskaja-oblast-na-pmef-opredelilis-s-perspektivnymi-napravlenijami-sotrudnichestva-721956-2025/

Stay informed with the most important Ukraine breaking news today. This page compiles the top headlines and critical updates from across Ukraine, offering a real-time snapshot of key developments.

Whether it’s military updates, political changes, or international reactions — we bring you the latest Ukraine news as it happens. All reports are carefully curated from verified sources and KyivPost correspondents on the ground.

June 28, 2025, 3:15 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:00 am ET on June 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against Russian military infrastructure and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities from June 26 to 28. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on June 28 that the SBU conducted a drone strike that destroyed a Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense system and three combat helicopters — Mi-8, Mi-26, and Mi-28 — at the Kirovske Air Base in occupied Crimea on the night of June 27 and 28.[1] The SBU noted that the strike also caused a secondary explosion at the airfield. A local Crimean source reported on June 28 that the strike caused five to six explosions and likely damaged an ammunition depot, warehouses, and air defense facilities, and set at least one combat helicopter on fire.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 27 that Ukrainian Special Forces and the SBU struck the Marinovka Air Base in Volgograd Oblast on the night of June 26 and 27 and damaged four Su-34 aircraft and a technical maintenance facility.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff is conducting ongoing battle damage assessments (BDA). An unspecified intelligence source told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on June 28 that Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted several drone strikes targeting facilities linked to the 120th arsenal of the Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU) in Bryansk Oblast and that Ukrainian authorities are conducting BDA.[4] An unspecified intelligence source reported on June 26 that the GUR conducted a drone strike against a fuel and lubricants depot located at the GRU’s 1061st MTZ Center in Bryansk Oblast on the night of June 26 and 27.[5] Residents reported heavy gunfire and a series of explosions and noted that the oil depot was on fire.[6]

Russia’s deployment of an experimental Grom-1 missile-bomb and likely efforts to increase its Shahed production are part of ongoing efforts to adapt Russian strike packages against Ukraine to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and cause maximum damage. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported on June 28 that Ukrainian air defenses downed a Russian Grom-1 hybrid missile-bomb on the outskirts of Dnipro City.[7] A local Ukrainian air defender in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on June 28 that Russian forces may have deployed an experimental KAB guided glide bomb as part of ongoing efforts to increase the range of KAB bombs.[8] The local source stated that Russia has long used jet engines on the bomb to increase its range and likely used a bomb with a lighter warhead against Dnipro City to decrease the weight and increase the range of the bomb. The source also stated that Russian forces may have launched the bomb from a plane as close to Dnipro City as possible. Ukrainian political scientist and design engineer at satellite and rocket design enterprise Pivdnenne Design Office Oleksandr Kochetkov told Suspilne on June 28 that Russia created the Grom-1 as part of an effort to increase the range and accuracy of KAB bombs in order to preserve Russian aircraft that launch the bombs.[9] Kochetkov stated that Grom-1 is a hybrid of a glide bomb and the Kh-38 air-to-air missile and uses the Kh-38 missile’s engine, which gives the bomb a range of 100 to 150 kilometers. Kochetkov noted that Russian forces used the Grom-1 possibly for the first time in August 2024 during a strike against Kostyantynivka, Donetsk Oblast, and that Russia is not yet mass producing Grom-1 missile-bombs.

Ukrainian outlet New Voice assessed on June 27 that satellite imagery from early October 2024 and June 2025 shows that Russia is expanding its Shahed factory in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) near Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan.[10] The imagery shows that Russia has built four new sites at the Alabuga SEZ spanning about 163 hectares between October 2024 and June 2025, and that another 30-hectare site is currently under construction. New Voice reported that the new construction includes dormitories for factory workers and that Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) previously assessed in June 2025 that laborers are Russia’s main need to increase its drone production. New Voice noted that the GUR reported on June 21 that Russia produces up to 170 Shahed and decoy drones daily and that production rates may increase to 190 drones per day by the end of 2025. Japanese outlet NHK reported on June 19, citing unspecified Western and Russian diplomatic sources, that North Korea is “considering” sending 25,000 workers to drone production facilities at the Alabuga SEZ, and dormitory construction may be related to this possible influx of workers in the future.[11]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against Russian military infrastructure and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities from June 26 to 28.

Russia’s deployment of an experimental Grom-1 missile-bomb and likely efforts to increase its Shahed production are part of ongoing efforts to adapt Russian strike packages against Ukraine to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and cause maximum damage.

Ukrainian forces advanced near Lyman. Russian forces advanced near Novopavlivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on June 28.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified parts of Kursk Oblast on June 27 and 28.[12] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Novyi Put (southeast of Glushkovo) and in the Tetkino (west of Novyi Put) and Glushkovo directions.[13]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on June 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced in Yunakivka over the last week and have seized over half of Yunakivka (north of Sumy City) and that Russian forces have pushed Ukrainian forces back 14 kilometers from the international border.[14]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakiva and Sadky on June 27 and 28.[15] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Yablunivka, Khrapivshchyna, Pysarivka, and Khotin.[16]

Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that Russian forces are attempting to send reinforcements to attack in Sumy Oblast, but that Russian personnel are refusing to conduct assaults.[17]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Pysarivka and Khotin.[18] Elements of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Yablunivka and Khrapivshchyna.[19] Elements of the 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) and 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating in northern Sumy Oblast.[20]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on June 28 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 27 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Kharkiv City in Vovchansk.[21]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vochanski Khutory on June 27 and 28.[22] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 27 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Vovchansk.[23]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Anvar” Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kharkiv direction.[24]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 28 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced one kilometer near Kolisnykivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[25]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, north of Kupyansk toward Petro-Ivanivka and Putnykove, northeast of Kupyansk near Holubivka, east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pischane on June 27 and 28.[26]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on June 28 that Russian forces intensified their assaults in June 2025 and that Russian forces are unsuccessfully attacking near Zahryzove (northeast of Borova).[27] The commander stated that Russian forces recently attacked with lightly armored vehicles, tanks, and infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), but noted that this behavior is abnormal. The commander stated that Russian forces are also attempting to advance toward the Oskil riverbank to establish platoon crossings.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Novoplatonivka; northeast of Borova toward Bohuslavka; east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai and Nadiya; and southeast of Borova near Tverdokhlibove and Hrekivka and toward Shyikivka, Novoserhiivka, and Olhivka on June 27 and 28.[28]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Svatove (Borova) direction.[29]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage posted on June 27 indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced in northern Torske (east of Lyman).[30]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Hlushchenkove (north of Lyman).[31]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Lypove, and Zelena Dolyna and toward Hlushchenkove and Shandryholove; northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka and Novyi Myr; and east of Lyman near Torske on June 27 and 28.[32]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA) are reportedly operating near Ridkodub.[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on June 27 and 28.[34]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Kalinina (northeast of Chasiv Yar) and toward Bila Hora (south of Chasiv Yar).[35]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, northwest of Chasiv Yar near Maiske, north of Chasiv Yar near Markove and Novomarkove, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Kalinina, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne and toward Bila Hora on June 27 and 28.[36]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion and 299th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[37]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on June 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne, and toward Pleshchiivka; northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka and Oleksandro-Kalynove and toward Rusyn Yar, Popiv Yar, and Poltavka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Novospaske; and southwest of Toretsk near Leonidivka.[38]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly attacking in the direction of Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[39] Drone operators of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Donetsk Directorate are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[40] Drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[41]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrne, Malynivka, and toward Koptieve, Novotoretske, and Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Myrolyubivka, and Promin and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and toward Novopidhorodne and Molodetske; and northwest of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on June 27 and 28.[42]

An intelligence officer of a Ukrainian detachment operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are attacking during rainy weather when it is more difficult for Ukrainian forces to operate drones and are taking advantage of foliage for cover and concealment from Ukrainian drones.[43] The intelligence officer stated that Russian personnel who conduct motorcycle assaults are better equipped than infantrymen and that Russian forces are attacking on motorcycles in the early morning but not at night.[44] The commander of a Ukrainian mortar battery operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces attack in fireteams of no more than three soldiers and often attack in one area for five to 10 days.[45]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian “Typhoon” Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[46]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 28 indicates that elements of the Russian 36th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) advanced into northern Zirka (southwest of Novopavlivka) and likely seized the settlement.[47] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also claimed that Russian forces seized Zirka.[48]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces crossed the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary and seized positions in Biliakivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[49] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have seized Dachne (south of Novopavlivka, just across the administrative boundary).[50] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces are gradually advanced in the fields southeast of Novopavlivka between Bohdanivka and Oleksiivka.[51]

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Novomykolaivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka and Troitske; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Oleksiivka; and south of Novopavlivka near Dachne, Zaporizhzhia, Yalta, Fedorivka, Perebudova, and Komar and toward Myrne and Voskresenka on June 27 and 28.[52]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]), 30th Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA, EMD), and 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) are reportedly operating near Myrne.[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 28 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Shevchenko and toward Maliivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (both northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[54]

Russian forces attacked north of Velyka Novosilka near Dniproenerhiya and northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole and toward Maliivka on June 27 and 28.[55]

Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated on June 28 that Russia is transferring troops from training camps near occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, and Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast to the Pokrovsk direction.[56]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued assaults in the Hulyaipole direction on June 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[57]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Separate 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Vysoke (east of Hulyaipole).[58]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed Claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along the E-105 Vasylivka-Kamyanske highway in central Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv).[59]

Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske on June 27 and 28.[60]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to Russian Airborne (VDV) Forces) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[61]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on June 28 but did not make confirmed advances.[62]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 27 to 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 23 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[63] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 21 drones and that one drone was “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted Odesa Oblast. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian and residential infrastructure facilities in Kharkiv and Odesa oblasts and that a Russian missile struck civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast.[64]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/SBUkr/15181

[2] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/82050

[3] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25979 ; https://suspilne dot media/1053495-sili-oboroni-vrazili-aerodrom-u-volgogradskij-oblasti-rf-de-bazuutsa-litaki-su-34/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/syly-oborony-vrazyly-chotyry-litaky-su-34-na-rosijskomu-aerodromi-u-volgogradskij-oblasti/

[4] https://suspilne dot media/1053839-droni-gur-urazili-arsenal-minoboroni-rf-u-bransku-dzerelo/

[5] https://suspilne dot media/1052611-droni-gur-vdarili-po-skladah-zberiganna-raketnogo-paliva-u-bransku-dzerela/

[6] https://unn dot ua/en/news/the-main-intelligence-directorate-gur-congratulated-bryansks-military-facilities-on-ukraines-constitution-day-drones-hit-a-russian-ministry-of-defense-arsenal ; https://suspilne dot media/1052611-droni-gur-vdarili-po-skladah-zberiganna-raketnogo-paliva-u-bransku-dzerela/

[7] https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1053849-gibrid-aviabombi-j-raketi-h-38-so-vidomo-pro-bombu-raketu-grom-1-aku-armia-rf-skeruvala-na-dnipro/; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22527

[8] https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1053753-rosijski-vijska-jmovirno-vperse-zapustili-kab-po-dnipru-so-kazut-u-povitranih-silah/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/28/u-peredmisti-dnipra-syly-ppo-zbyly-rosijsku-bombu-raketu-grom-1-ova/

[9] https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1053849-gibrid-aviabombi-j-raketi-h-38-so-vidomo-pro-bombu-raketu-grom-1-aku-armia-rf-skeruvala-na-dnipro/

[10] https://nv dot ua/ukr/ukraine/events/rosiya-buduye-novi-maydanchiki-dlya-virobnictva-shahediv-z-yavilis-suputnikovi-znimki-50525607.html

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-26-2025

[12] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26020; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25984; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25980

[13] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30521; https://t.me/dva_majors/74309; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37851 ; https://t.me/condottieros/11691; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170599 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27549

[14] https://t.me/tass_agency/322865 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/322873

[15] https://t.me/wargonzo/27549 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37843 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30551 ; https://t.me/ua_dshv/6174 ; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/ukrainian-forces-repel-russian-motorcycle-assault-in-sumy-region/

[16] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170603 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30551 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30551

[17] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9464

[18] https://t.me/dva_majors/74335

[19] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170603

[20] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94641 ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=708569328606457 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/28/rozstril-voyina-zsu-polonenyj-na-sumshhyni-rosijskyj-morpih-ziznavsya-u-voyennomu-zlochyni/

[21] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30517 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30521

[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26020 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25984 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25980; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12904 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30517 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30521 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74309

[23] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30517 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30521

[24] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94635

[25] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30528

[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26020; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25984; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25980; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12904

[27] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/28/suyiczydalnyj-geroyizm-rosijskyh-shturmovykiv-vorog-peretynaye-richku-oskil-na-plotah-chovnah-i-vbrid/

[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26020; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25984; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25980; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12904

[29] https://t.me/notes_veterans/24063

[30] https://t.me/operationall_space/4833; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1938802942259458097

[31] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31916

[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26020; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25984; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25980; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12904

[33] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37869

[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26020; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25984; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25980; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12904

[35] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31906; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37875

[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26020; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25984; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25980; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12904; https://t.me/wargonzo/27549; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30520 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30521

[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30526

[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26020; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25984 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25980; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12904; https://t.me/dva_majors/74309

[39] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37832

[40] https://t.me/dva_majors/74314

[41] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13968

[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26020; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25984 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25980; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12904

[43] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/28/hto-v-plashhi-hto-v-poncho-nashi-vijskovi-rozpovily-pro-ekipiruvannya-rosijskyh-soldativ/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fK-Gdsssq9Y

[45] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/28/yakshho-ne-vyzhyly-vden-dobyut-vampiramy-dolya-rosiyan-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/

[46] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37839; https://t.me/dva_majors/74315 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74329

[47] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1938883324648530151; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1938885210894147916; https://x.com/voin_dv/status/1938881305057599687 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9477; https://t.me/voin_dv/15712

[48] https://t.me/tass_agency/322901 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/322906 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54227 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54231

[49] https://t.me/wargonzo/27549

[50] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37865

[51] https://t.me/rybar/71729

[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26020 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25984 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25980 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12904

[53] https://t.me/voin_dv/15715 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37855

[54] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37834 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74309 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170593 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/17059

[55] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12904 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27549

[56] https://t.me/andriyshTime/39507

[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30521

[58] https://t.me/voin_dv/15718

[59] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94636

[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25984 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25980 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/16dVvztPfc/ ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12640

[61] https://t.me/rogozin_do/7261

[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25984 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25980 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/16dVvztPfc/ ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12640

[63] https://t.me/kpszsu/37197

[64] https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/23749 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/udar-po-pidpryyemstvu-v-chuguyevi-ataka-drona-na-harkiv-ye-poraneni/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/15328 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/28/shahed-lanczet-chornyczya-ta-rakety-okupanty-obstrilyaly-harkiv/ ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1053583-v-odesi-prolunali-vibuhi-misto-pid-atakou-droniv-vidno-pozezu/ ; https://t.me/suspilnenews/52326 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/10265 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/10265 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/10264 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/10264 ; https://t.me/truonline/6417; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1053603-cerez-ataku-droniv-na-odesu-zaginulo-podruzza-dron-vluciv-u-ihnu-kvartiru/; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1053727-stali-vidomi-imena-zagiblih-vnaslidok-rosijskoi-ataki-na-odesu/; https://t.me/truonline/6420 ; https://www.facebook.com/groups/314287552619917/posts/1688605705188088/ ; . https://t.me/dsns_telegram/45132 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/28/nichnyj-raketnyj-udar-po-bagatopoverhivczi-v-odesi-masshtabni-pozhezhi-ye-zhertvy/ ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/10274 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/28/v-odesi-zbilshylas-kilkist-poterpilyh-sered-nyh-troye-ditej/

June 23, 2025, 6:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11 am ET on June 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin continues to only diplomatically support Iran, showcasing the limitations in the Russian-Iranian strategic relationship. Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov, and Chief of the Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU) Igor Kostykov met with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi in Moscow on June 23.[1] Putin claimed that Russia’s position on the Israel-Iran conflict is well-known and that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has raised Russia’s concerns at the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Putin also claimed that recent Israeli and American strikes against Iran were unprovoked and unjustified and that Russia is making every effort to help the Iranian people. Araghchi thanked Russia for its strong condemnation of the strikes against Iran and claimed that Iran regularly consults with Russia on issues of global security, as Russia and Iran’s relations have become “strategic in nature.” Unspecified Iranian sources told Reuters on June 23 that Iran has not been impressed with Russia’s support so far and wants Putin to do more to back Iran against Israel and the United States.[2] Reuters reported that an Iranian source stated that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei sent Araghchi to Moscow to deliver a letter from Khamenei to Putin requesting more assistance from Russia. ISW continues to assess that Russia is constrained in its ability to provide direct support to Iran due to its war in Ukraine and has likely resigned itself to providing diplomatic overtures for the time being.[3]

Russian officials are attempting to influence conversations about increasing NATO defense spending by misrepresenting Russia’s ongoing efforts to restructure and expand Russia’s military capabilities as a defensive reaction to NATO. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with graduates of Russia’s military academies on June 23 and acknowledged that NATO member states will likely announce a significant increase in defense spending and efforts to increase NATO military capabilities at the upcoming summit on June 24 and 25.[4] Putin claimed that this meeting would clarify that NATO is the party provoking “global militarization” – not Russia. Putin stated that Russia will continue to take steps to strengthen Russia’s security and develop the Russian Armed Forces to guarantee Russia’s sovereignty. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko told the Russian state news agency RIA Novosti on June 23 in an article ahead of the upcoming NATO summit that the European Union (EU) is accelerating its militarization and that Russia will take all necessary measures and countermeasures, “including preemptive ones,” to ensure Russia’s security.[5] Grushko reiterated that Russia considers the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO to be a “direct threat” to Russia’s security and stated that Russia is seeking “ironclad” guarantees that Ukraine will not join NATO, which Grushko stated includes repealing the 2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration that welcomed Ukraine’s and Georgia’s intention to join NATO.[6] ISW has previously reported that Russian officials leverage escalatory rhetoric and threats during key moments of Western debates on military assistance for Ukraine in order to scare Western leaders into inaction, and Russian officials are likely again attempting to leverage threats to dissuade NATO member states from supporting increased defense spending.[7]

Putin announced during his speech to the graduates on June 23 that Russia will complete some of its ongoing force restructuring efforts in 2025.[8] Putin stated that Russia is urgently working to increase the Russian Armed Forces’ combat capabilities and reiterated that Russia is standing up the Unmanned Systems Forces as a new branch of the Russian military. Putin stated that Russia will complete the formation of the Moscow and Leningrad military districts (MMD/LMD) and will reorganize Russia’s naval infantry brigades into divisions in 2025. Putin stated that Russia is also undertaking a long-term technical modernization effort in the army and navy, modernizing its Strategic Missile Forces, beginning serial production of Oreshnik ballistic missiles, and producing new ships and submarines for the Russian Navy. Former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced Russia’s intention to form the MMD and LMD and reorganize Russia’s naval infantry brigades into divisions in the medium-term in December 2022.[9] Russian officials had not previously provided a firm date for the completion of these efforts. ISW continues to assess that Russia’s military reforms, particularly in the MMD and LMD in western Russia along its border with NATO, demonstrate Russia’s longer-term preparation for a possible future conflict with NATO.[10] These military reforms come after Kremlin officials have repeatedly threatened NATO states, including the Baltic states and Finland.[11]

Putin also acknowledged his ongoing efforts to empower Russia’s internal security services in order to safeguard regime stability and internal security. Putin stated during his speech to the graduates that the Russian government understands that protecting Russia from internal and external threats requires coordination between Russia’s law enforcement agencies, special services, and other security agencies.[12] ISW reported in 2023 and early 2024 that the Kremlin was working to expand Rosgvardia’s capabilities by allowing Rosgvardia to operate military equipment and subordinating special Russian units and some irregular units under Rosgvardia, particularly after the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion in June 2023.[13] The Kremlin has been similarly expanding the Federal Security Service (FSB) force generation capabilities.[14]

Russian forces conducted a large-scale combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of June 22 to 23 that largely targeted Kyiv City and killed at least seven people and injured 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 352 drones, including up to 160 Shaheds, from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[15] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 11 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Taganrog, Rostov Oblast, and Bryansk Oblast and five Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed all five Iskander-K missiles and seven Iskander-M/KN-23 missiles and that three Iskander-M missiles were “locally lost.” The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 146 drones and that 193 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[16] The strikes heavily targeted Kyiv City, with Ukrainian officials reporting that Russian forces struck residential buildings in the city and damaged the campus of the Ihor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute.[17] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky highlighted that Russia is targeting Ukrainian cities and civilians, noting that Russian forces damaged five apartment buildings in Kyiv City and hit a hospital in Bila Tserkva, Kyiv Oblast.[18] Russia has been increasingly targeting Kyiv City in its overnight drone and missile strikes.[19]

Ukraine’s Western partners continue to allocate military aid to Ukraine and collaborate with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB). Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on June 22 that Norway plans to allocate $400 million to purchase Ukrainian weapons for the Ukrainian military.[20] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 22 that Norway will focus on investing in drones.[21] Zelensky noted that Norwegian defense company Kongsberg Defense and Aerospace opened an office in Ukraine, and Umerov stated that Ukraine will collaborate with Kongsberg to develop joint projects related to air defense.[22] New Zealand announced on June 23 a package worth 16 million NZD (about $9.54 million) for Ukraine that allocates four million NZD (about $2.38 million) toward the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) fund, four million NZD toward the UK- and Latvia-led drone coalition, seven million NZD (about $4.17 million) worth of humanitarian aid, and one million NZD (about $596,500) for displaced Ukrainians.[23]

Key Takeaways:

The Kremlin continues to only diplomatically support Iran, showcasing the limitations in the Russian-Iranian strategic relationship.

Russian officials are attempting to influence conversations about increasing NATO defense spending by misrepresenting Russia’s ongoing efforts to restructure and expand Russia’s military capabilities as a defensive reaction to NATO.

Putin also acknowledged his ongoing efforts to empower Russia’s internal security services in order to safeguard regime stability and internal security.

Russian forces conducted a large-scale combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of June 22 to 23 that largely targeted Kyiv City and killed at least seven people and injured 28.

Ukraine’s Western partners continue to allocate military aid to Ukraine and collaborate with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).

Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Borova, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka and in Sumy Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 22 and 23.[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Kursk Oblast from Ryzhivka and Bezsalivka (south and east of Tetkino in Sumy Oblast) and toward Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), Glushkovo, and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[25]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Ukrainian forces liberated a village in the Sumy direction in mid-June 2025.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 20 and 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Kindrativka (north of Sumy City) and liberated Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[26] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on June 14 that Ukrainian forces liberated Andriivka, and a Russian milblogger acknowledged on June 21 that Russian forces withdrew from the settlement.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 23 that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) previously replaced elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) that were operating in Andriivka but that the naval infantry elements had to withdraw from the settlement.[28]

Russian forces attacked in northern Sumy Oblast, including north of Sumy City near Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on June 22 and 23.[29]

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on June 22 that Ukrainian forces are conducting assault operations toward Yunakivka and that Ukrainian forces likely advanced between 200 and 700 meters in the settlement over the course of a week.[30] Syrskyi characterized Yunakivka as a contested “gray zone” and stated that Russian forces’ reliance on small assault groups without armored support enabled Ukraine’s counterattacks. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are using Andriivka to develop attacks towards Kindrativka (northwest of Andriivka) and Oleksiivka (east of Andriivka), which are located roughly four kilometers from Andriivka.[31] Ukraine’s Siversk Group of Forces Spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk stated on June 22 that Russian forces are attempting to leverage superior manpower reserves with light vehicles to conduct infantry attacks in the North Slobozhansk direction (northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts) and that Russian forces are not using armored equipment within 10 to 15 kilometers of the frontline.[32] Mysnyk also stated that Russian forces in the area are struggling to maneuver across difficult terrain with ravines, small rivers, and forests with vehicles. Ukraine’s Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated on June 23 that Russian forces have reduced the tempo of their assaults in Sumy Oblast and hypothesized that Russian forces likely lack the personnel to maintain a higher operational tempo with greater assaults.[33]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade and drone and artillery elements of the 11th Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly operating near Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[34] Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction, including near Myropillia (northeast of Sumy City).[35] Elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade are reportedly operating in Oleksiivka.[36] Drone elements of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly coordinating Russian FAB-3000 air strikes against Ukrainian positions near Kindrativka.[37] Elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Kindrativka.[38]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the Vovchanski Khutory direction (northeast of Kharkiv City).[39]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on June 22 and 23.[40]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the Kharkiv direction stated on June 23 that Russian forces have become more active near Vovchansk.[41] The commander stated that Russian forces were deploying forces with 30 to 45 days of training in January 2025, but are now deploying forces with a maximum of 14 days of training in order to more quickly replenish losses. The commander stated that Russian forces are using lightly armored vehicles sporadically. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian border guards brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction stated on June 23 that Russian forces launch up to 10 assaults daily and have recently increased the number of personnel deployed in each assault to up to 25 personnel per assault, compared to previous assaults with three to 10 personnel.[42] The Ukrainian Border Guard Service reported on June 23 that Russian forces in the Vovchansk direction continue to attack using infantry on motorcycles.[43]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk).[44]

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Dvorichna and toward Kutkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Stroivka and Fyholivka and toward Dvorichanske; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pischane on June 22 and 23.[45]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in Kharkiv Oblast stated on June 23 that Russian forces are intensifying efforts in the Kupyansk direction and supplementing efforts with untrained infantry units and small vehicles.[46]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[47]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 23 shows Russian forces raising a flag in central Hrekivka (southeast of Borova), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[48]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zeleny Hai and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Tverdokhlibove and toward Olhivka.[49]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Karpivka, and Zelena Dolyna, and toward Novyi Myr; and northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi on June 22 and 23.[50]

A Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction reported that Ukrainian drone operators struck a “Mur” surveillance system and a “Sylok-M1” electronic warfare (EW) system in the Lyman direction.[51]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on June 22 and 23.[52]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Verkhnokamyanske.[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, north of Chasiv Yar toward Novomarkove, southeast of Chasiv Yar toward Mykolaivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Predtechnye and Bila Hora on June 22 and 23.[54]

A chief sergeant in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated that Russian forces learned during offensive operations against Pokrovsk that it is difficult to conduct frontal assaults on large settlements and are avoiding attacking Kostyantynivka. The chief sergeant stated that Russian forces are instead attempting to strike Ukrainian logistics and rear areas near Kramatorsk and Druzhkivka to disrupt Ukrainian logistics in the area.[55] The chief sergeant stated that the Russian military command has redeployed significant elements of “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies from the Pokrovsk direction to the Chasiv Yar direction. The chief sergeant suggested that these redeployments may indicate Russian prioritization of this sector of the front. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated that the Russian military command is actively committing elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division in hopes of seizing Chasiv Yar.[56] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces conduct small infantry assaults “almost continuously,” including with motorcycle support.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on June 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk toward Pleshchiivka; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka, Novospaske, Novoolenivka, Yablunivka, and Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Toretsk near Leonidivka on June 22 and 23.[57]

Geolocated footage published on June 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian vehicle storage facility of the 24th Spetsnaz Brigade (Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff [GRU]) in occupied Velyka Shyshivka (east of Donetsk City).[58]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[59]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces have established positions in Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) and advanced into Novotoretske (north of Novoekonomichne).[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrne and Malynivka and toward Volodymyrivka, Shakhove, Razine, and Novotoretske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and toward Molodetske on June 22 and 23.[61]

A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Pokrovsk direction noted that Russia’s use of motorcycles and buggies is relatively effective.[62] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces used Geran-2 drones (Russian-made analogues of the Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones) to strike Ukrainian positions near Razine and Sofiivka (further northeast of Pokrovsk and west of Toretsk).[63] ISW has observed recent reports that Russia is using Geran-2 drones for strikes along the frontline, marking a departure from Russia’s previous pattern of using long-range Shahed/Geran drones against Ukraine’s rear and deep rear and indicating Russia’s enhanced drone production capabilities.[64]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th “Sparta” Separate Mechanized Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novoekonomichne and Koptieve (northeast of Pokrovsk).[65] Drone operators of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[66]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Vesele (south of Novopavlivka).[67]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka), west of Dachne, southwest of Horikhove (both southeast of Novopavlivka), west of Komar, west and southwest of Fedorivka, and east of Yalta (all south of Novopavlivka).[68]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; south of Novopavlivka near Yalta; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka and Bahatyr on June 22 and 23.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Perebudova (south of Novopavlivka).[70]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhzhia (south of Novopavlivka).[71] Elements of the 1444th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[72]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole and toward Voskresenka and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on June 22 and 23.[73]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Shevchenko.[74]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 22 that Russian forces advanced toward Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[75]

Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 22 and 23.[76]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 1295th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (reportedly of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA]) are reportedly operating near Malynivka.[77]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and southwest of Orikhiv near Mali Shcherbaky and Stepove and toward Novoandriivka on June 22 and 23.[78]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the “Nemets” group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[79]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on June 23 but did not advance.[80]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[81]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg acknowledged on June 23 that he led a US delegation to Belarus on June 21.[82] Kellogg stated that the US and Belarusian delegations discussed the war in Ukraine and US-Belarusian bilateral relations and that the parties negotiated the release of 14 political prisoners from Belarus, including prisoners from Japan, Poland, and four other countries. Belarusian opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya announced that Belarus had freed Belarusian opposition leader Sergey Tikhanovsky as part of the exchange.[83]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77237; https://t.me/MID_Russia/61646

[2] https://archive.ph/dh6OM; https://www.reuters.com/world/china/irans-supreme-leader-asks-putin-do-more-after-us-strikes-2025-06-23/

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-18-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2025

[4] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77240

[5] https://ria dot ru/20250623/grushko-2024695639.html

[6] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/weakness-lethal-why-putin-invaded-ukraine-and-how-war-must-end

[8] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77240

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-military-restructuring-and-expansion-hindered-ukraine-war ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020525

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121723 ;

[12] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77240

[13] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-28-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010324

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2023

[15] https://t.me/kpszsu/36914

[16] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/23/poshkodzheno-pyat-bagatokvartyrnyh-budynkiv-ye-zagybli-ta-poraneni-prezydent-pro-naslidky-udaru-po-kyyevu/; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14819?single; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25803; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1049301-klimenko-pro-ataku-rf-na-kiiv-u-sevcenkivskomu-rajoni-jmovirno-bulo-prame-vlucanna-fugasnoi-raketi/; https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/30725; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4877; https://t.me/andriyshTime/39230; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4878 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4888; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/23/u-kyyevi-vnaslidok-udaru-rf-zagynuly-try-lyudyny-shhe-13-postrazhdaly/; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4880; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4883; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1352; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/44862; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/14862; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/14861; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1048879-vijska-rf-atakuvali-ocakiv-na-mikolaivsini-poraneno-troe-ludej-sered-nih-diti/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/22/zagarbnyky-vdaryly-po-ochakovu-troye-poranenyh-zokrema-dity/; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02zwS3JNtXQFSEKyVHFLuaKT2Zjas9JWnBQsaWhrXqUPEudyKvwEoKBsB2meS1SWHcl; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12625; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1937136591568318559 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14829; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/23/pid-zavalamy-mozhut-buty-vykladachi-oleg-kiper-pro-udar-balistykoyu-po-navchalnomu-zakladu-na-odeshhyni/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/10192; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02zwS3JNtXQFSEKyVHFLuaKT2Zjas9JWnBQsaWhrXqUPEudyKvwEoKBsB2meS1SWHcl

[17] https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4877; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4883; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1352 ; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1049301-klimenko-pro-ataku-rf-na-kiiv-u-sevcenkivskomu-rajoni-jmovirno-bulo-prame-vlucanna-fugasnoi-raketi/; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4878 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4888; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/23/u-kyyevi-vnaslidok-udaru-rf-zagynuly-try-lyudyny-shhe-13-postrazhdaly/; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4880; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1362; https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/30725; https://t.me/presinfokpi/7922

[18] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14819

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052425

[20] https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/12996

[21] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/zhodnogo-poshirennya-yadernoyi-zbroyi-v-suchasnomu-sviti-ne-98573

[22] https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/posts/pfbid02T3Qu9x3EyzZz7LgePAYhn5fwDfURVRKvy4z32sSJX1h5BqhxKbcevDYwHt947Pngl; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/zhodnogo-poshirennya-yadernoyi-zbroyi-v-suchasnomu-sviti-ne-98573

[23] https://www.beehive dot govt.nz/release/new-zealand-announces-further-aid-ukraine

[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785

[25] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30344; https://t.me/dva_majors/73968; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30367

[26] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1936781662026879313; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1936783135133544731; https://t.me/pentagonkh/277; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1937138889699033276; https://t.me/morpex_V/5044

[27] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1936783135133544731; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1936781662026879313; https://t.me/pentagonkh/277; https://suspilne dot media/1042467-na-sumskomu-napramku-perebuvaut-ponad-50-tisac-vijskovih-rf-zelenskij/; https://t.me/severnnyi/4392; https://t.me/yurasumy/23641

[28] https://t.me/severnnyi/4392; https://t.me/severnnyi/4409

[29] https://t.me/dva_majors/73968; https://t.me/wargonzo/27433; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812

[30] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/ukraine-launches-assault-near-yunakivka-after-recapturing-andriyivka/; https://t.me/osirskiy/1192

[31] https://t.me/severnnyi/4409

[32] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/22/sumskyj-relyef-proty-vorozhyh-mashyn-okupanty-zmusheni-minimalno-vykorystovuvaty-bronyu-ta-legku-tehniku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[33] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/23/napevno-syl-u-voroga-nedostatno-na-sumshhyni-rosiyany-znyzyly-aktyvnist-shturmiv/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30354; https://t.me/rusich_army/24321

[35] https://t.me/c/1852634939/29405 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4392; https://t.me/dva_majors/74008

[36] https://t.me/severnnyi/4409

[37] https://t.me/dva_majors/74013

[38] https://t.me/severnnyi/4409

[39] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30371

[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652

[41] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/23/shhob-ruhalysya-yak-strumochok-na-harkivshhyni-vorog-aktyvno-zaluchaye-svij-najdeshevshyj-resurs/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ScdUZNkwcYc

[42] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/23/mali-shturmovi-grupy-vyrosly-u-vovchansku-vorog-bezperestanku-shturmuye-i-kopaye-fortyfikacziyi/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kA5EvhyCugE

[43] https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1G2WtkkURo/

[44] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1937187909515506004; https://t.me/Ochi151/105

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13465; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1936817437682581972; https://t.me/operationall_space/4742

[46] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/23/shhob-ruhalysya-yak-strumochok-na-harkivshhyni-vorog-aktyvno-zaluchaye-svij-najdeshevshyj-resurs/

[47] https://t.me/dva_majors/73992

[48] https://x.com/creamy_caprice/status/1937075996928127375; https://t.me/mi_s_toboy_sp/3429; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9442; https://t.me/osintpen/1271

[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788

[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652

[51] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/23/voroga-na-lymanshhyni-zalyshyly-bez-ochej-ta-vuh-znyshheno-kompleksy-murom-ta-reb-sylok/; https://t.me/umftteam/527

[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652; https://t.me/dva_majors/73968

[53] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/20027

[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652; https://t.me/wargonzo/27433

[55] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/23/chorni-vorony-proty-vorozhogo-rubikona-na-donechchyni-zhorstoki-bytvy-povitryanyh-asiv/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L35LL58ugFk

[56] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/23/bila-abo-chervona-plyama-na-misczi-budynkiv-u-chasovomu-yaru-pislya-boyiv-vid-kvartaliv-ne-zalyshylosya-j-stin/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L35LL58ugFk

[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652

[58] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1936901117839122834; https://t.me/supernova_plus/40288?single

[59] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9444; https://t.me/spartan_ngu/2490

[60] https://t.me/basurin_e/19492

[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652

[62] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/22/smiyalys-ale-cze-diyevyj-metod-poblyzu-pokrovska-rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-tysk-na-syly-oborony/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[63] https://t.me/mod_russia/54078

[64] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2025

[65] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13953

[66] https://t.me/voin_dv/15637

[67] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1937119925421686807; https://t.me/ZSU_141OMBr/1149

[68] https://t.me/rybar/71570; https://t.me/wargonzo/27433; https://t.me/voin_dv/15621; https://t.me/rybar/71570

[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785; https://t.me/rybar/71570; https://t.me/rybar/71574

[70] https://t.me/voin_dv/15621

[71] https://t.me/rybar/71570; https://t.me/tass_agency/321899; https://t.me/mod_russia/54073

[72] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/20742

[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25785 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12652

[74] https://t.me/voin_dv/15629

[75] https://t.me/voin_dv/15621

[76] https://t.me/wargonzo/27433; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1936826019065057737; https://t.me/voin_dv/15620

[77] https://t.me/voin_dv/15636 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1936826019065057737 https://t.me/voin_dv/15620

[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02zwS3JNtXQFSEKyVHFLuaKT2Zjas9JWnBQsaWhrXqUPEudyKvwEoKBsB2meS1SWHcl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30346; https://t.me/wargonzo/27433

[79] https://t.me/wargonzo/27423 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73957

[80] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25812; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25788

[81] https://t.me/dva_majors/74015

[82] https://x.com/generalkellogg/status/1937140616757936336?s=46&t=oKaeT_EpUFQGPYnee_AK3w

[83] https://www.cnn.com/2025/06/21/europe/belarus-opposition-freed-us-intl

Daria Novikov, Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, Angelica Evans, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, and Frederick W. Kagan

June 27, 2025, 7:20 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on June 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin continues to downplay the social and economic costs of Russia’s war in Ukraine and inflated military spending. Russian President Vladimir Putin told journalists on June 27, following the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) summit in Minsk, that sanctions cannot hurt Russia’s economy and that Russia’s economic indicators are “satisfactory.”[1] Putin acknowledged that Russia’s economy is still contending with high inflation and that Russia’s economic growth in 2025 will be “much more modest to combat inflation.” Putin also claimed that Russia’s military budget is currently 6.3 percent of its GDP, or 13.5 trillion rubles (roughly $172 billion), and that Russia plans to steadily decrease defense spending beginning in 2026. Russia notably increased its defense budget by 25 percent between the 2024 and 2025 federal budgets and has been increasing its investments in Russia’s defense industry throughout 2025.[2]

Putin’s statements likely seek to portray the Russian government as committed to social and civilian expenditures and to downplay recent indicators of the societal and economic toll of Russia’s war against Ukraine and corresponding prioritization of military-industrial sector investment. Russian officials previously claimed that the 2025-2027 federal budgets would prioritize civilian and social sector investments, despite the September 2024 draft budgets indicating Russia will spend roughly 41 percent of its annual expenditures in 2025 on national security and defense.[3] The Russian Finance Ministry more than tripled its budget deficit target for 2025 in May – from 0.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 1.7 percent of GDP – after several months of staggeringly low oil and gas profits.[4] Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina notably stated at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 19 that Russia has exhausted many of its “free resources“ since the start of Russia‘s full-scale war against Ukraine, including Russia’s workforce, production and import substitution capacities, and reserves of the National Welfare Fund and Russia’s banking sector.[5] Russia’s military force generation strategy currently hinges on large recruitment and pension payouts, and it remains unclear how the Kremlin intends to fund these payments in the medium- to long-term, as Russia reportedly depleted the entire 2025 federal recruitment budget fund between January and March 2025.[6] Russia is also making significant financial investments in its domestic drone production capacity and committed 243 billion rubles (about $3 billion) to Russian drone companies between 2023 and 2024.[7] Any sharp decrease in Russia’s defense spending will likely depress the Russian economy in the medium term, as Russia’s defense industrial base now accounts for a significant portion of overall Russian domestic production.

Putin also reiterated Kremlin narratives aimed at discrediting Ukraine and blaming the West and NATO for his decision to invade Ukraine. Putin claimed that Russia has agreed to conduct a third round of negotiations, is ready to meet with Ukraine in Istanbul, and has demonstrated its willingness to negotiate through prisoner of war (POW) and killed-in-action (KIA) exchanges.[8] Putin claimed that Ukraine is refusing to accept the bodies of some deceased servicemembers, an unsubstantiated claim that is part of an ongoing Russian information campaign depicting Ukraine as spoiling POW exchanges and KIA repatriations in order to provoke discontent and demoralize Ukrainian society and to discredit the Ukrainian government.[9] Putin reiterated Russia’s long-term claim that NATO promised Russia it would never expand east and claimed that Russia was “crudely deceived.”[10] Putin claimed that Western countries in opposition to Russia will “soon die” themselves. Putin also reiterated that Russia will only conclude its war against Ukraine on Russia’s terms and claimed that Russian defense spending is designed to achieve this goal. ISW has previously noted that Russia’s terms – the “denazification” and “demilitarization” of Ukraine, which Russia has demanded since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 – amount to demands for regime change, the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Ukraine, and significant limitations on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression.[11]

Open-source data suggests that Russia is increasingly investing in its defense industry and expanding its drone, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and aircraft production and shipbuilding capabilities – several of the key platforms that Russia would likely rely on in a future war with NATO. Data from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-affiliated Center of Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting published on June 26 indicates that Russia increased its industrial production by 2.6 percent between April and May 2025 and that the majority of this increase is due to a “sharp” increase in Russia’s defense industrial output.[12] The center reported that Russia’s monthly aircraft production rate increased by 16.9 percent in May 2025 compared to April 2025 and is 1.6 times greater than Russia’s 2024 monthly production rates. The center reported that Russia increased its naval and aircraft production capacity by 16 percent between February and May 2025. The center’s data suggests that Russia is attempting to expand its shipbuilding and aircraft production capacity, which are medium- to long-term efforts and likely part of Russia’s ongoing force restructuring and regeneration efforts in preparation for a longer-term conflict with NATO.

Satellite imagery of select armored vehicle repair plants in Russia provides further evidence that Russia is increasing its ability to produce IFVs. A social media source tracking equipment at Russian military depots and repair facilities via satellite imagery reported on June 26 that Russia is now able to refurbish and produce more BMPs than before an unspecified time and that Russia’s decreased use of armored vehicles and tanks since Winter 2024-2025 is allowing Russia to stockpile IFVs.[13] The source noted that the Kurganmashzavod remains the sole publicly known Russian facility capable of producing Soviet-era BMP-3 IFVs. The source stated that satellite imagery indicates that some Russian armor repair plants appear to have used most of their Soviet IFV stocks, although at least one production plant in Rubtsovsk, Altai Krai, appears to have dramatically improved its modernization capabilities. It remains unclear whether Russia is aiming to stockpile materiel in preparation for a larger offensive operation against Ukraine in the near to medium term or to reconstitute the Russian military in preparation for broader future conflict with NATO. Additional open-source intelligence indicates that Russia is successfully increasing its T-90M tank production capabilities, further underscoring Russia’s ongoing investment in long-term tank and armored vehicle production capacity.[14]

Russia’s ongoing efforts to expand drone production are having a more immediate impact on the frontline in Ukraine, although Russia will continue to benefit from enhanced drone production capabilities during any future conflict. Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov visited various Russian military industrial facilities in Novgorod Oblast on June 27, including a fiber-optic drone production site that produced Russia’s first model of fiber-optic “Prince Vandal Novgorodsky” drones[15] The Russian government’s press release of the visit reported that Russia is now capable of domestically producing hundreds of thousands of fiber-optic drones per month and fully satisfying the needs of the Russian Armed Forces. Manturov also visited a series of other defense companies in Novgorod Oblast, including companies that specialize in electronic components, and inspected the Intelligent Electronics-Valdai Innovative Scientific and Technological Center’s new semiconductor materials science laboratory.[16] Manturov instructed the Ministry of Industry and Trade to examine the possibility of recapitalizing Novgorod Oblast’s industrial development fund to support the production of high-tech products. ISW previously noted that Russian fiber optic production has allowed Russian forces to impose new battlefield dilemmas on Ukrainian forces starting in mid-2024 because these drones were resistant to electronic warfare (EW) interference, enable precision strikes on armored equipment, and are scalable due to their simplicity.[17]

Russian forces continue to implement tactical innovations that correspond with technological weapons system advancements. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 27 that Russian forces are increasingly utilizing Geran 2 and 3 drones – Russian analogues of the Iranian origin Shahed-136 – over guided glide bombs for short- to mid-range frontline strikes.[18] The milblogger noted that Russian forces began reprioritizing the use of Geran drones last winter when Russia began mass producing modernized Geran 2 drones with improved speed, range, and carrying capacities, and claimed that Russian forces are using these drones to target Ukrainian storage areas, command posts, and strongholds on the frontline and in the near rear. The milblogger noted that elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA] (formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) have pioneered mass frontline use of Geran drones and that Russia’s Central Grouping of Forces, operating largely in the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions, will reportedly soon adopt the use of Geran 2 drones once Russian manufacturers further increase production rates. The milblogger assessed that Russian forces may be able to replace 500- and 1000-kilogram KAB glide bombs with Geran 3 drones if Russian developers are willing to compromise on the drone’s range to account for an increased payload. The Russian milblogger’s analysis largely coheres with ISW’s observations that Russian forces are increasingly using Shahed-like drones to strike Ukrainian targets along the frontline.[19] Russia’s defense industrial base has thus far successfully increased Geran drone production rates and improved the Geran drone’s precision and operability, which have enabled Russian forces to more readily deploy such drones along the frontline.[20]

Russia continues to use chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces and civilians in direct violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory. The Ukrainian Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security reported on June 27 that Ukrainian forces recorded 888 cases of Russian forces using chemical weapons in May 2025, including in grenades.[21] The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) published a report on June 26 confirming that environmental sample testing indicates that Russian forces used a first-person view (FPV) drone equipped with grenades containing chlorobenzalmalonodinitrile (CS) gas, a riot control agent (RCA) banned in modern warfare under the CWC, against Ukrainian forces near the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary in June 2025.[22]

Key Takeaways:

The Kremlin continues to downplay the social and economic costs of Russia’s war in Ukraine and inflated military spending.

Putin’s statements likely seek to portray the Russian government as committed to social and civilian expenditures and to downplay recent indicators of the societal and economic toll of Russia’s war against Ukraine and corresponding prioritization of military-industrial sector investment.

Putin also reiterated Kremlin narratives aimed at discrediting Ukraine and blaming the West and NATO for his decision to invade Ukraine .

. Open-source data suggests that Russia is increasingly investing in its defense industry and expanding its drone, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and aircraft production and shipbuilding capabilities – several of the key platforms that Russia would likely rely on in a future war with NATO.

Russia’s ongoing efforts to expand drone production are having a more immediate impact on the frontline in Ukraine, although Russia will continue to benefit from enhanced drone production capabilities during any future conflict.

Russian forces continue to implement tactical innovations that correspond with technological weapons system advancements.

Russia continues to use chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces and civilians in direct violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory.

Ukrainian forces advanced near Lyman. Russian forces advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast and near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on June 27.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 26 and 27.[23] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Glushkovo, Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[24]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 91st Sapper-Engineer Regiment (reportedly under the operational command of the Northern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[25]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued assaults in northern Sumy Oblast on June 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 26 that Russian forces advanced in Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[26]

Russian forces continued attacks in the Sumy Oblast border area, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka on June 26 and 27.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and toward Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka, Novomykolaivka, Yunakivka, and Sadky.[28]

Ukraine’s Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko reported on June 27 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are conducting fewer attacks in the Sumy Oblast international border area.[29] Demchenko assessed that Russian forces may be regrouping in the area. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian regiment operating in northern Sumy Oblast reported on June 27 that Russian forces continue to probe for weak spots in Ukrainian defenses in the area.[30] The deputy commander reported that neither Ukrainian nor Russian drone operators currently have drone superiority in the area.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Smuglyanka” Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Andriivka.[31] Drone operators of the “Tiger” drone detachment of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in northern Sumy Oblast.[32] Elements of the 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) reportedly continue operating in northern Sumy Oblast.[33]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces crossed the Vovcha River and advanced in western Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) on the southern bank of the river.[34]

Russian forces conducted ground assaults north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on June 26 and 27.[35]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction said that Russian forces are constantly attacking in small fireteams of two to three soldiers and are using motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) when the weather conditions are good, but leverage armored vehicles during rainy weather.[36] Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported on June 27 that Russian forces are constantly attacking near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[37]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 27 indicated that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Hlushkivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[38]

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and Krasne Pershe; east of Kupyansk towards Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on June 26 and 27.[39]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported on June 27 that Russian forces are constantly attacking along the Oskil River near Kupyansk and are trying to surround Kupyansk.[40] Shamshyn reported that Russian forces are trying to establish a river crossing over the Oskil River in order to transfer armored vehicles across the river, but are currently moving all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and motorcycles to the right (west) bank of the Oskil River on boats and rafts. A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Kharkiv direction reported that Russian forces are taking advantage of the good weather to optimize logistics and intensify assaults north and east of Kupyansk.[41] An officer in another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces are using artillery more conservatively and are increasingly relying on air strikes and glide bombs in the area.[42]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Nova Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova), but one milblogger claimed that the settlement remains a contested “gray zone.”[44]

Russian forces continued ground assaults north of Borova near Novoplatonivka; northeast of Borova toward Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Olhivka on June 26 and 27.[45]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Lozova (northeast of Borova).[46]

Ukrainian forces likely recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Ukrainian Advances: Russian milbloggers claimed on June 26 and 27 that Ukrainian forces conducted successful counterattacks and regained positions in northwestern Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[47] ISW is therefore expanding Ukrainian advances into Ridkodub.

Russian forces continued ground assaults north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Zelenya Dolnya, and Shandryholove and toward Novyi Myr and Serednie; northeast of Lyman toward Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske on June 26 and 27.[48]

A Ukrainian division commander operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are struggling with low-quality Russian- and North Korean-produced ammunition.[49]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground assaults northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on June 26 and 27.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Chasiv Yar and within central and southern Chasiv Yar, including in Shevchenko Microrain (southwestern Chasiv Yar).[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Bila Hora and the northern outskirts of Stupochky (both south of Chasiv Yar).[52]

Russian forces continued ground assaults in Chasiv Yar itself; northeast of Chasiv Yar near Bondarne; north of Chasiv Yar near Markove and Novomarkove; and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne, Stupochky, and toward Bila Hora on June 26 and 27.[53]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kramatorsk (Chasiv Yar) direction reported that Russian forces are sending reinforcements to the Kramatorsk direction and that the Russian servicemen often do not have any prior knowledge about where they are being sent.[54] The NCO reported that Russian forces are leveraging windy and rainy weather conditions to accumulate forces and conduct assaults on foot while the weather constrains Ukrainian drone operations. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones have low-altitude air superiority and are preventing Russian forces from completely seizing Chasiv Yar.[55]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (Chasiv Yar) direction.[56] Drone operators of the “Burevestnik” volunteer detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[57] Elements of the “Nevsky” Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Soledar-Bakhmut (Chasiv Yar) direction.[58]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 26 indicates that Russian forces advanced in northwestern Dyliivka (north of Toretsk) and likely seized the settlement.[59]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Oleksandro-Kalynove and Yablunivka (both northwest of Toretsk).[60]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northeast of Toretsk near Dachne; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka and Oleksandro-Kalynove and toward Poltavka, Pleshchiivka, Stepanivka, Rusyn Yar, and Katerynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Romanivka on June 26 and 27.[61]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA}, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[62] Elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[63] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[64]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Andriivka highway northeast of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).[65]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have advanced to within one kilometer of Molodetske (southwest of Pokrovsk) and are attempting to bypass Udachne (east of Molodetske).[66]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka, Myrne, and Shevchenko Pershe and toward Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Kotlyne and toward Novopidhorodne on June 26 and 27.[67]

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on June 27 that Russia has concentrated roughly 111,000 personnel in the Pokrovsk direction.[68] A communications officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are concentrating assaults south of Pokrovsk and are attacking with motorcycles from Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk) toward Shevchenko.[69] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position near Shakhove (northeast of Pokrovsk) with a Geran-2 (Russian-produced Shahed variant) drone.[70]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating near Pokrovsk.[71]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and east of Yalta (south of Novopavlivka) and north of Komar (south of Novopavlivka).[72]

Russian forces continued ground attacks toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Novomykolaivka, and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka and Troitske; southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka, Novoukrainka, Bahatyr, Odradne, and Zeleny Kut; and south of Novopavlivka near Zirka, Zaporizhzhia, Fedorivka, Myrne, and Komar and toward Yalta on June 26 and 27.[73]

Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian drone operators struck a North Korean-made artillery system in the Novopavlivka direction.[74]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly participated in the seizure of Yalta.[75]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 27 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Shevchenko, west of Vilne Pole (both northwest of Velyka Novosilka), and south of Novopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[76]

Russian forces continued ground assaults northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and toward Voskresenka and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole on June 26 and 27.[77]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced within southern and central Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[78]

Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 27.[79] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Malynivka.[80]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Hulyaipole.[81]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the E-105 Vasylivka-Kamyanske highway into central Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv).[82] Additional geolocated footage published on June 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into southeastern Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[83]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske on June 26 and 27.[84] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked southwest of Orikhiv near Robotyne.[85]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), including its 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment, are reportedly operating near Tokmachka and within Mala Tokmachka, respectively.[86] Elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 108th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[87]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on June 27 but did not advance.[88]

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) posted footage on June 26 and reported that GUR drone operators struck a Russian S-400 air defense system in an unspecified part of occupied Crimea, damaging the system’s missile launcher, two multi-functional 92N2E control radars, and two 91N6E detection radars.[89]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 26 to 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles from airspace over Ryazan Oblast, six Kalibr cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea, and 363 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Oryol, and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast, and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[90] The Ukrainian Air Forces reported that Ukrainian forces downed six Kalibr cruise missiles and 211 drones and that 148 drones were ”lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted Starokostyantyniv, Khmelnytskyi Oblast. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes targeted Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, and Kherson oblasts and damaged civilian and energy infrastructure in Kherson, Kyiv, and Kharkiv oblasts.[91]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russia and Belarus are leveraging the Union State framework to further militarize their societies and indoctrinate youth into an anti-Western ideology, likely in preparation for a future conflict with NATO. Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed the plenary session of the 12th annual Russian and Belarusian regions forum on June 27 and highlighted the importance of youth “military-patriotic” programs.[92] Putin stated that Russia and Belarus dedicated the 12th forum to policies aimed at encouraging youth to participate in “spiritual, moral… and traditional” values, patriotism, and military service. Putin stated that the Union State is implementing a specialized “road map” for youth policy through 2027 and is developing a medium-term strategy for the development of youth policy. Several organizations currently oversee Russia’s various youth military-patriotic programs, and the Russian federal government is attempting to centralize control over these efforts.[93]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77316; https://eec.eaeunion dot org/en/comission/department/dep_razv_integr/strategicheskie-napravleniya-razvitiya.php

[2] https://meduza dot io/en/feature/2024/10/03/russia-s-2025-federal-budget-outlines-record-military-and-top-secret-spending-and-tax-hikes-for-ordinary-citizens; https://isw.pub/RussianForceGen050725; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-14-2025; https://isw.pub/ForceGen061125; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-30-2025

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar102824

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062225

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-18-2025

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-21-2025

[8] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77316

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061625; https://szru.gov dot ua/news-media/news/szru-poperedzhaie-rosiya-planuie-na-nastupnomu-tyzhni-kulminatsiyu-kampanii-z-dyskredytatsii-ukrainy-u-konteksti-obminiv-shcho-tryvayut; https://suspilne dot media/1043951-rf-prodovzit-namaganna-diskredituvati-ukrainu-sodo-obminiv-a-kulminacia-provokacij-zaplanovana-na-20-cervna-szr/

[10] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77316

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates

[12] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-06-27/russia-sharply-boosted-drone-output-in-may-think-tank-reports ; http://www.forecast dot ru/_ARCHIVE/Analitics/PROM/2025/PR-OTR_2025-06-26.pdf

[13] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1938330257863455203

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025

[15] http://government dot ru/news/55471/

[16] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/72316

[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/battlefield-ai-revolution-not-here-yet-status-current-russian-and-ukrainian-ai-drone

[18] https://t.me/yurasumy/23742

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062125 ; https://isw.pub/ForceGen052125 ;

[20] https://isw.pub/ForceGen061125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125

[21] https://suspilne dot media/1053313-armia-rf-u-travni-majze-900-raziv-vikoristovuvala-himicnu-zbrou-na-vijni-proti-ukraini/ ; https://www.facebook.com/StratcomCentreUA/posts/pfbid021GSNZ3Jya2H6dL5QGGt3J3H5oUDPTMGXW8EHLaNMM2zqHA8tWs6ZVQ5UupH5TUUxl

[22] https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2025/06/opcw-issues-report-third-technical-assistance-visit-ukraine-following; https://t.me/spravdi/47601

[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928;

[24] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30489; https://t.me/dva_majors/74241

[25] https://t.me/mod_russia/54204

[26] https://t.me/rybar/71701

[27] https://t.me/rybar/71701;

[28] https://t.me/dva_majors/74241

[29] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/ne-taki-i-myasni-vzhe-na-sumshhyni-suttyevo-vpala-aktyvnist-vorozhyh-dyversijnyh-grup/

[30] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/zmina-taktyky-ukrayinczi-gotuyut-fpv-drony-dlya-znyshhennya-shahediv/

[31] https://t.me/dva_majors/74229

[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30494

[33] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/ukrainian-armed-forces-take-15-russian-invaders-prisoner-in-the-sumy-region/; https://t.me/ua_dshv/6167; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/chornyj-den-dlya-morpihiv-rf-na-sumshhyni-rozgromyly-elitnyj-pidrozdil-shho-zahoplyuvav-krym/; https://youtu.be/Yun3_2xTdRc

[34] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65457

[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928

[36] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CSjUUAfd7Lo; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/buly-obbyti-zdorovymy-sarayamy-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-vorog-namagavsya-atakuvaty-vazhkoyu-tehnikoyu/

[37] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/pereprav-nemaye-ale-plany-nikudy-ne-dilysya-okupanty-ne-zalyshayut-sprob-otochyty-kupyansk/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[38] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9476; https://t.me/feniksdpsu/910

[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872

[40] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/pereprav-nemaye-ale-plany-nikudy-ne-dilysya-okupanty-ne-zalyshayut-sprob-otochyty-kupyansk/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[41] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ScdUZNkwcYc; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/27/epoha-koly-fpv-panuyut-u-povitri-vorog-prodovzhuye-bezperervno-atakuvaty-syly-oborony-na-richczi-oskil/

[42] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/vorog-uzhe-ne-syple-snaryadamy-yak-ranishe-zmina-taktyky-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku/

[43] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94566

[44] https://t.me/tass_agency/322753; https://t.me/dva_majors/74259 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54200 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54201 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/24058 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94603 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37814

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928

[46] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94603

[47] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30489 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37794

[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928

[49] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/bilshe-na-zaboronu-praczyuyut-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-tryvayut-artylerijski-poyedynky/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CSjUUAfd7Lo

[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928 ; https://t.me/rybar/71701

[51] https://t.me/rybar/71696 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/24379 ; https://t.me/rybar/71706

[52] https://t.me/wargonzo/27529

[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/24379 ; https://t.me/rybar/71706 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27529

[54] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-mwW_smfVas; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/chasto-ne-rozumiyut-kudy-jdut-na-kramatorskyj-napryamok-vorog-zavozyt-pihotu-zvidusil/

[55] https://t.me/rusich_army/24379

[56] https://t.me/russian_airborne/10607; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37809

[57] https://t.me/rybar/71706

[58] https://t.me/BTGR_NEVSKIY/2935 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/46354

[59] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1938351857476186231; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1938349962892288190; https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/688; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9472

[60] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170424; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37793

[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928

[62] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37793

[63] https://t.me/vanek_nikolaev/33987

[64] https://t.me/dva_majors/74231

[65] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9474; https://t.me/ombr_155/422;

[66] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65458

[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30489 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65458

[68] https://t.me/osirskiy/1198 ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1053063-blizko-111-tisac-vijskovih-rf-vouut-na-pokrovskomu-napramku-sirskij-pro-situaciu-na-fronti/

[69] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/27/sytuacziya-dosyt-pekelna-poblyzu-pokrovska-rosiyany-prosuvayutsya-na-mototehniczi-za-pidtrymky-artyleriyi/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CSjUUAfd7Lo

[70] https://t.me/mod_russia/54194 ; https://t.me/sashakots/54557

[71] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170416

[72] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170419 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37782

[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94571 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27529

[74] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/27/podarunok-vid-kim-chen-yna-ne-doyihav-ukrayinskyj-dron-spopelyv-ridkisnu-pivnichnokorejsku-rszv/ ; https://www.facebook.com/61563854736481/videos/697619009809671/ ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12877

[75] https://t.me/voin_dv/15696

[76] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30495; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37801 ; https://t.me/rybar/71696

[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12872

[78] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30502; https://t.me/vrogov/20875

[79] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30502

[80] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30502

[81] https://t.me/voin_dv/15703

[82] https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1938559793943171316; https://t.me/proofs_dnepr/54965; https://x.com/UkraineDailyUpd/status/1938444339799031917

[83] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9470; https://t.me/Polk70/31562

[84] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37788; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94583; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94578

[85] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30502

[86] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94583; https://t.me/ZS42MSD/3589

[87] https://t.me/rogozin_do/7257

[88] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25968; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25932; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25928; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12637

[89] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6290 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/26/ochi-rosijskoyi-ppo-v-krymu-osliply-gur-zavdalo-udaru-po-kompleksah-s-400/

[90] https://t.me/kpszsu/37115

[91] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/raketnyj-udar-po-dnipropetrovshhyni-ye-zhertvy/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/27/rosijska-raketna-ataka-na-samar-5-zagyblyh-ponad-dva-desyatky-poranenyh/ ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/06/27/rossiyskie-voyska-nanesli-raketnyy-udar-po-gorodu-samar-v-dnepropetrovskoy-oblasti-est-pogibshie-i-ranenye ; https://t.me/istories_media/9864 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/82298; https://t.me/bbcrussian/82296; https://t.me/bbcrussian/82295; https://t.me/synegubov/15306; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2727; https://t.me/synegubov/15322; https://suspilne dot media/1052639-gur-atakuvalo-skladi-raketnogo-paliva-u-bransku-es-ne-zmig-uhvaliti-spilnu-zaavu-z-pidtrimki-ukraini-1220-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1751007074&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/6007; https://suspilne dot media/1052639-gur-atakuvalo-skladi-raketnogo-paliva-u-bransku-es-ne-zmig-uhvaliti-spilnu-zaavu-z-pidtrimki-ukraini-1220-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1751023120&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://www.facebook.com/alexandr.prokudin.7/posts/10021585731286434?ref=embed_post ; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/38252 ; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/9118

[92] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77312

[93] https://www.minobrnauki.gov dot ru/upload/2024/10/%D0%94%D0%BE%D0%BA%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B4_%D0%9F%D0%9C2023_%D0%AD%D0%A6%D0%9F_%D0%9F%D0%B5%D1%82%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B01.10.24.pdf ; https://ngkub dot ru/obshchestvo/shkolnikov-obuchat-upravleniyu-dronami-i-taktike-strelkovogo-boya ; www.dosaaf dot ru/upbringing/metodiceskie-rokomensacii-i-opit-peredovoj-raboti.php