United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres on Monday issued yet another impassioned call for ambitious climate action after a trip to Antarctica and amid preparations for the U.N. Climate Change Conference later this week.

“I have just returned from Antarctica—the sleeping giant. A giant being awoken by climate chaos. Together, Antarctica and Greenland are melting well over three times faster than they were in the early 1990s,” he told reporters in New York City.

“It is profoundly shocking to stand on the ice of Antarctica and hear directly from scientists how fast the ice is disappearing,” the U.N. leader said of his trip to the continent last week, pointing out that “this year, Antarctic sea ice hit an all-time low.”

“Leaders must not let the hopes of people around the world for a sustainable planet melt away.”

Scientists project that 2023 will be the hottest year in 125,000 years. Recent research has also shown that Antarctica is warming faster than widely cited models predicted, and even if humanity significantly cuts planet-heating pollution from fossil fuels, the West Antarctic Ice Sheet faces an “unavoidable” increase in melting this century.

Guterres stressed Monday that “what happens in Antarctica doesn’t stay in Antarctica. We live in an interconnected world. Melting sea ice means rising seas. And that directly endangers lives and livelihoods in coastal communities across the globe. Floods and saltwater intrusion imperil crops and drinking water—threatening food and water security.”

“The movement of waters around Antarctica distributes heat, nutrients, and carbon around the world, helping to regulate our climate and regional weather patterns,” he explained. “But that system is slowing as the Southern Ocean grows warmer and less dense. Further slowdown—or entire breakdown—would spell catastrophe.”

“The cause of all this destruction is clear: the fossil fuel pollution coating the Earth and heating the planet,” he stressed. “Without changing course, we’re heading towards a calamitous 3°C temperature rise by the end of the century.”

That’s according to a U.N. analysis of currently implemented policies, released last week ahead of the COP28 summit—which will be hosted in the United Arab Emirates by Abu Dhabi National Oil Company CEO Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber, who has allegedly used meetings about the upcoming climate talks to push for fossil fuel deals with other governments.

“If we continue as we are, and I strongly hope we will not, the Greenland and West Antarctica ice sheets will cross a deadly tipping point. This alone would ultimately push up sea levels by around 10 meters. We are trapped in a deadly cycle,” Guterres declared Monday. “At COP28, which starts later this week, leaders must break this cycle.”

“Leaders must act to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C, protect people from climate chaos, and end the fossil fuel age,” the U.N. chief said, referencing a key goal of the 2015 Paris agreement. He called for tripling renewables, doubling energy efficiency, bringing clean power to all, a “clear and credible commitment” to phasing out fossil fuels, and “climate justice.”

“Antarctica is crying out for action,” Guterres said. “Leaders must not let the hopes of people around the world for a sustainable planet melt away. They must make COP28 count.”

In an interview last year, California Governor Gavin Newsom accused politicians on the right of shapeshifting to gain votes. Now it seems the governor is engaging in some strategic shape-shifting of his own.

In the inaugural episode that came out earlier this month, Newsom hosted conservative super influencer Charlie Kirk on his new podcast, “This Is Gavin Newsom,” where he conceded ground on identity politics. This a surprising 180-shift since last summer when he signed a law preventing schools from outing trans and gay kids to their parents without the student’s permission. Newsom’s shrewd pivot is part of a broader realignment in Democratic politics: By tapping into the new media landscape that shaped the last election, Newsom and the Democratic party aim to influence the next one.

On Friday, The New York Times commented on the governor’s strategy, saying, “Democrats need to get better at speaking to people who don’t share their assumptions and at long-form conversations.” The party, columnist Michelle Goldberg argues, failed to appeal to young men in the age of podcasts.

Following a devastating defeat in November, it’s clear Democrats are thinking hard about messaging and communication. President Trump reached an average of 23.5 million American adults during election season through podcasts, compared with 6.4 million for Vice President Harris.

Yet calls for the left to create their own version of superstar podcaster Joe Rogan may be hard for Newsom to meet. Whereas Rogan’s popularity is rooted in his “authenticity,” Newsom has been called a “slimy used car salesman.” His podcast’s emphasis on “affordability, quality of life, and the cultural moments shaping our world” with “No spin…just real talk” practically screams voter pandering.

It’s clear from Newsom’s discussion with Kirk that his change of heart on identity politics is part of a political strategy. Newsom described the presence of trans athletes in women’s sports as “deeply unfair.” However, the real reason he cares about this issue now is because the right has “weaponized” trans issues to win elections. “We’re getting crushed on [trans issues]. Crushed. Crushed,” Newsome told Kirk in the 71-minute sit down.

During the discussion, Newsom lambasted voter repellents such as defunding the police, cancel-culture, and the unpopular PC term “Latinx.” Democrats struggled with Latinos in the last election, losing a record number, especially Latino men. Different sources show different results, but the bottom line is there was a massive double-digit swing of male Latino voters away from the Democratic candidate. A previously reliable voting block for Democrats is now split roughly down the middle, and Gavin Newsom is sending the signal that he wants them back.

Newsom is not the only Democrat slamming his own party post-election. In February, Arizona Senator Rubin Gallego said that Democrats must reach out to working-class Latino men more effectively. Bronx Congressman Ritchie Torres posted on X immediately after the election that terms like “Defund the Police” and “Latinx” alienated “historic numbers of Latinos, Blacks, Asians, and Jews from the Democratic Party.”

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AB 566: Unnecessary legislation that disrupts customer choice and harms small businesses Sitting down and chatting with the enemy may be the flavor of this political month. As young people move to podcasts that favor long-form conversations between people who disagree, Newsom’s previously combative tone has turned soft, evidenced by a discussion with Kirk based on respect and finding common ground. He credits Bill Maher’s cross-partisan approach on his HBO talk show “Real Time” as his inspiration.

Maher recently launched a cross-partisan talk show called “We Never Had This Conversation.” Another new online show, “The Grudge,” is co-hosted by progressive Luke Beasley and conservative Isabella Moody. Hosted by a group of progressives, “Pod Save America” has moved to platform more conservatives within the last few years.

Newsom’s move to embrace the new information landscape and American’s hunger to break bread with the other side may be to prepare for a 2028 presidential run. If Newsom can communicate to tens of millions of voters that his vibes are authentic and he cares about the bread-and-butter issues that hit home for them, he may be able to build a new Democratic coalition.

Joey T. McFadden is a journalist and artist in Brooklyn, NY. He is a Contributor at Young Voices, host of the “In Response…” podcast, art critic at “Fair Observer,” and the managing editor for the NYC Braver Angels Substack. His paintings can be seen on Instagram.

As efforts intensify to purge anyone and anything from Western culture that offends the illiberal left’s sensitivities, the fanaticism which drives the Great Awokening has become abundantly evident. To question the 1619 project’s factual veracity, for example, is seen as evidence of implicit racism. Any confidence that the American Founding has something to teach the world is considered an instance of what Marxists call “false consciousness.” References to reason, evidence, rule of law, or the West’s Jewish and Christian heritages are viewed as the language of someone hopelessly in thrall to “Eurocentric” outlooks.

What impresses me, however, is less the historically-illiterate justifications offered for the decapitation of statutes of Christopher Columbus, than the righteous fury visible in the eyes of those shouting slogans like “Rhodes Must Fall!” Prudence, circumspection, and subtly are out. Raw emotion and ideological purity are in. You are either with us or against us. And if you don’t endorse everything that we—the woke—think, say and do, be prepared to face the consequences.

The problem is that once that particular tiger gets out of its cage, putting it back in is extremely difficult. There are always plenty on the left willing to be more radical than thou, and who will interpret any reticence to affirm wholeheartedly their positions as prima facie evidence of backsliding or outright treachery. That’s a dynamic which we’re seen before with people like Che Guevara and Lenin. But the standard-setter for such behavior was the French Revolution’s most violent stage, commonly known as la Terreur.

From Hope and Anticipation, to Fear and Trembling

Few events have been more thoroughly parsed, praised, and castigated as the French Revolution. That owes something to the sense that the Revolution was one of those rare occasions that represented a decisive break with the past. Contemporary witnesses describe the millenarian-like hopes that permeated French society in the immediate aftermath of 1789. But fascination with the French Revolution also has much to do with another factor: the penchant for frenzied violence which raised its head right from the beginning.

Every Revolution has its casualties. Loyalists were among those of the American Revolution. Many of them were subject to anti-Tory laws which ranged from being disenfranchised to large fines. Compared, however, to other revolutions, the Loyalists got off lightly. The Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917 was followed by the targeting of anyone officially designated by the new regime as “former people.” Arbitrary imprisonment, confiscation of property, and terror were used ruthlessly against groups like the nobility, but gradually extended to categories who had hardly been friends of the Czarist regime: classical liberals, constitutionalists, businessmen, etc.

It was, however, the French Revolution which established the modern benchmark for systematic violence against anyone insufficiently in sync with the political views of whoever is in charge at any given moment. Many of the Revolution’s early leaders—people like the American Revolutionary hero, the Marquis de Lafayette—quickly became persona non grata as the revolutionary tumult escalated through successive thresholds of rage. Those revolutionaries who managed to transition through each stage were few in number. Many eventually found themselves strapped to a guillotine. Others eked out miserable existences in exile alongside the royalists who preceded them.

Over the past two centuries, many explanations have been offered for the frantic character of the Revolution’s violence. They include pent-up resentment against the old regime, fears of fifth columnists who might help invading foreign armies, concerns about counter-revolutionary plots, and the outbreak of full-scale popular uprisings in 1793 against the Paris government in provinces ranging from the Vendée to Brittany and cities like Marseille and Lyon. Virtually all historians of the Revolution underscore the widespread paranoia that occupied the minds of Revolutionary leaders but also many ordinary citizens, particularly those living in cities and for whom politics had become the be-all and end-all of life.

There was, however, something else at work which became apparent after Louis XVI’s execution on January 21, 1793, and the subsequent acceleration of tensions between the two groups which then dominated Revolutionary politics: the Girondins and the Jacobins. While the former were considered more moderate than the latter, both groups were firmly on the left of the revolutionary scale. That, however, didn’t save the Girondins from being destroyed by the logic that came to direct French political life and which resulted in thousands being executed before the Terror ended with the guillotining of the man most associated with it on July 28, 1794.

One Single Will

Given his public reputation as the Terror’s chief architect, many are surprised to learn that Maximilian Robespierre wasn’t the most extreme Jacobin. As a group, those associated with the Jacobin Club were divided into factions constantly at odds with each other. Some like Jacques Hébert, leader of the Hébertistes and editor of the radical newspaper Le Père Duchesne, were far to Robespierre’s left. Neither the Hébertistes’ inclination to militant atheism nor their desire for direct state control of much of the economy were to Robespierre’s taste. Others, such as Georges Danton, eventually gravitated to Robespierre’s right. Danton had played a major role in the Monarchy’s overthrow in August 1792 and did nothing to stop the September Massacres which followed. By late-1793, however, Danton had become convinced of the folly of persecuting the Church and was calling for an end to extreme revolutionary violence.

In a way, however, the details of these policy differences were unimportant to Robespierre and close allies like Louis Antoine de Saint-Just. What really mattered to Robespierre was that there could be no differences. According to Robespierre, France needed what he famously called une volonté une (one single will). In this ideal, he believed, was to be found the Revolution’s ultimate security and salvation from its enemies, foreign and domestic.

As a scholarship boy at one of France’s most prestigious schools, the Lycée Louis-le-Grand, Robespierre had been influenced by two sets of writings which featured significantly during the late-French Enlightenment. The first were classical texts which extolled the virtues of the Roman Republic and its leaders. The second were the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, especially his 1762 book Du contrat social (The Social Contract), and his popularization of what was called la volonté générale.

Words like “compromise,” “tolerance,” and “moderation” do not form part of the lexicon of wokery.

For Rousseau, the “general will” didn’t necessarily mean what an actual majority of people in a given political society wanted. Rather, it was the basis for the legitimacy of any government that acted for the well-being of all the people rather than sectional interests. Robespierre took this concept of the general will, but conflated the government and the people at the expense of the latter. “The Government,” he once proclaimed, “has to defend itself against all the factions which attack it; the punishment of the people’s enemies is death.” To criticize the government was thus to be against the people. Ergo, the government could claim that any strike which it launched against its opponents was a strike against “the people’s enemies.”

As Robespierre saw it, Revolutionary France was riddled with factions (including those which split the Jacobins) and threatened by those who wished to overthrow the government. Consequently, it was the responsibility of the virtuous to strike ruthlessly, in a manner akin to Marcus Junius Brutus’ slaying of Gaius Julius Caesar, against those who stood in the way of the “one single will.” For Robespierre, such enemies of the Republic included those Girondins who had compromised their revolutionary credentials by working with Louis XVI before August 1792, promotors of faction like Danton and Hébert, and those simply incapable of attaining republican virtue (nobles, old regime officials, clergy loyal to Rome, etc.). Expelling these disparate groups from the body politic was how you ensured the general will prevailed and finally realized a united, indivisible and virtuous Republic—that is, one single will.

Naturally, there was a raw power-play dimension to all this. Robespierre saw people like Hébert and Danton as threating his dominance of the government. But it is impossible to underestimate the effects of the depth of Robespierre’s commitment to his ideology: one which led to the inexorable conclusion that being a virtuous citizen of the Republic (like Brutus) meant being willing to use extreme violence (like Brutus) against its foes. Robespierre spelt this out in a speech in February 1794 when the Terror was at its height:

If virtue be the spring of a popular government in times of peace, the spring of that government during a revolution is virtue combined with terror: virtue, without which terror is destructive; terror, without which virtue is impotent. Terror is only justice prompt, severe and inflexible; it is then an emanation of virtue; it is less a distinct principle than a natural consequence of the general principle of democracy, applied to the most pressing wants of the country.

Such thinking is what resulted in about 17,000 people being officially “kissed by Madame Guillotine,” as the saying went, in the name of virtue.

Beware the Coming of the Reign of Wokedom

Two things eventually brought Robespierre undone. The first was the economic crisis which engulfed France in the form of food-shortages and rampant inflation throughout 1794. Given his preeminence in the revolutionary regime, Robespierre become increasingly unpopular among Paris’s hyper-politicized population.

More importantly, enough Revolutionary leaders recognized that the logical conclusion of Robespierre’s outlook was the destruction of anyone who did not fully adopt his positions, and therefore a series of continuous purges with no apparent endpoint. On July 26, 1794, Robespierre effectively confirmed such trepidations when he gave a speech to the National Convention and then to the Jacobin Club arguing that the time had come to “Punish the traitors, purge the bureau of the Committee of General Security, purge the Committee itself, and subordinate it to the Committee of Public Safety, purge the Committee of Public Safety itself and create a unified government under the supreme authority of the Convention!”

This call for the elimination of anyone not 100 percent behind Robespierre led enough Convention members to summon up the courage to purge the master-purger himself. After a short and violent political struggle, Robespierre and 21 of his supporters were guillotined on July 28 at the Place de la Révolution. The Terror was over. But it seared France’s political culture for decades afterward.

The parallels between the France of 1793-1794 and our present Great Awokening are not exact. The historical circumstances are very different. We are not living in the shadow of an old regime. The woke have not seized the levers of political power in the way that Robespierre and his followers did.

The primary similarity between revolutionaries like Robespierre and twenty-first century wokedom is a yearning for ever-increasing ideological purity, something which lends itself to identifying more and more categories of people and ideas as unacceptable. That generates chronic instability as people can never quite know if they and their ideas remain among the elect. Indeed, cancel culture cannot help but actively seek out opponents whose existence is seen as obstructing the creation of a new world purified of error. For without new enemies, it loses its raison d’être.

In this light, those contemporary Girondins who dominate larger municipal governments throughout America and who rule the universities throughout Western countries, would be foolish to imagine that the illiberal left can somehow be placated by letting them riot, loot small businesses, and destroy public monuments. Words like “compromise,” “tolerance,” and “moderation” do not form part of the lexicon of wokery. After all, once “one single will” has been established, such habits become superfluous.

Perhaps at some point, the woke will turn on themselves as they try to outdo each other in showing whose consciousness has been raised the most. Unless or until that happens, however, anyone who sits on the vast spectrum from the liberal-minded left through to conservative traditionalists should have no illusions that the woke—like Robespierre—will be satisfied with anything less than complete submission. And that would represent the end of liberty in any meaningful sense as well as the civilization which gave rise to it.

The birth of the Great Awokening is said to be around 2010-2014. The abrupt surge in prejudice-denouncing terms such as racism, sexism and homophobia in the media preceded the political emergence of Donald Trump and has continued since he left office. Further work confirmed similar dynamics in UK and Spanish news media.

More recently, I have investigated the prevalence of the same terms in the academic literature. What I found is that in contrast to news media content, where the number of references to different prejudice types has been fairly flat since the 1970s and then rises sharply post-2010, in academic literature the prominence of prejudice terms has been steadily rising for several decades.

The figure below shows how academic focus on ethnic prejudice has been growing for almost a century through four distinct waves. The first wave occurred right after World War II, the second one after 1968, the third during the so-called “politically correct” 1990s and the fourth wave takes place post-2010. Notice also how after each wave, the base level remains elevated, thus establishing a new normal.

In contrast to ethnic prejudice, the concept of gender prejudice was virtually unheard of in the academic literature prior to the 1970s and it then emerges swiftly. The prominence of this topic in scholarly content then remains relatively constant for about 30 years and grows again post-2010.

Academic interest on sexual orientation prejudice rises mostly after 1980, coinciding with the devastation caused by the AIDS epidemic. The concepts of gender identity prejudice (i.e. transphobia) and Islamophobia are relatively recent phenomena in academic content and only start to increase in prominence after the turn-of-the-century.

Academic focus on anti-Semitism reveals a completely different dynamic. Mentions of anti-Semitism in scholarly content grew prior to and during World War II. The topic then drops in prominence during the 1950s and it has stayed relatively flat from then on in stark contrast with all the other prejudice types.

The relationship between academic focus on racism and sexism after the civil rights movement of the 1960s is of interest. It is worth noting in the figure below how the sudden rise in the prominence of gender prejudice in the academic literature happens slightly later than the second wave of interest in ethnic prejudice. Words commonly used to denounce ethnic prejudice rise rapidly during the late 1960s and early 1970s. In contrast, words often used to denounce gender prejudice rise throughout the 1970s. This trend is consistent with the idea of gender scholars in the 1970s building up the concept of gender prejudice by mimicking previous work on ethnic prejudice

It is also worth directly comparing the relationship between the prominence of different prejudice topics in academia and news media content. The next figure shows how the first wave of attention to ethnic prejudice in academic content after the Second World War was mostly not echoed in news media. The post-civil rights wave however manifested itself in both institutions. The third wave (during the “politically correct” 1990s) was very prominent in scholarly papers but not very noticeable in news media, suggesting a disconnect at the time between academia and mainstream news media on this topic.

These results over the last century suggest that the concept of prejudice has been building gradually in academic content for many decades prior to its post-2010 explosion in news media. Increasing academic focus on prejudice could be a consequence of the growing Left-leaning skew of academics, since concern about prejudice ranks higher among individuals that espouse Left-wing politics.

But the mystery remains as to what triggered the post-2010 explosion in prejudice themes in news media. The answer is likely multifactorial. One plausible contributing factor might have been universities graduating a continuous stream of future producers and consumers of news media content that were increasingly attuned to the concept of prejudice. A confluence of additional factors around 2010, such as the emergence of social media and its incentives to leverage emotional and negative language to maximise virality of news content, likely also played a role. The polarised Trump presidency might have also contributed to consolidate or exacerbate the pre-existing trend.

These results suggest that often, but not always, different prejudice concepts emerge first in academic content before they enter mainstream news media discourse. But mainly, the results provide robust evidence about the increasing frequency with which both institutions, academia and news media, mention terms often used to denounce prejudice. It is unclear what this means for America on a sociological level, but given the ever-growing intensity of the culture war, the explosion in the use of these terms can hardly be taken as an indicator that we are moving onto greener, more peaceful, pastures.

A new fear stalks white American Democrats. While those who describe themselves as “liberal” — i.e. Left-wing — are horrified by Donald Trump, by inequality, by restrictions on abortion rights, they are horrified too, it seems, by themselves: by the colour of their skin; by the wrongs done by white people and by the system they set up.

This horror is something that simply did not exist 10 years ago. According to painstaking research by Zach Goldberg of Georgia State University, there have been a series of “seismic attitudinal shifts” among white liberals in recent years. Using data from the most reputable non-partisan sources available, Goldberg shows how attitudes have shifted in a short space of time, a phenomenon commonly known as “the Great Awokening”.

So, for example, in 2016 more than 60% of white liberals thought the black-white achievement gap was caused by discrimination, a figure that was 42% in 2012. There is a similar change in answers to the question, “is the US justice system biased against black people?” White liberals were evenly split on the subject until around 2012 but now, overwhelmingly, think the system is biased.

And on the positives of a multi-racial society white Democrats have leapfrogged black party members: in 2016, 78% of them thought a greater racial mix made the nation a “better” place to live. The figure for black Democrats was 57%.

Is there a practical impact of this new white racial radicalism? Very much so, and we are seeing it already. It is hurting Joe Biden, the “white-est” of all the candidates in the race to become the Democrats’ 2020 candidate. This is the man who has talked openly of how he used to do deals with the racist senators who still strutted their stuff back when he started his political career in the early 1970s — and seen now by many Left-wing white Democrats as toxic.

Oh the irony! Because Joe Biden is easily, comfortably, unquestionably, the most favoured candidate among… black Democrats.

In South Carolina — the first primary where black voters will have a significant impact on the Democratic race for the 2020 nomination — Biden is hugely favoured by African-American electors, around 40% of whom back him. The other candidates, including the people of colour, are, at best, in low double digits.

But back in (nearly) all-white Iowa, where the first caucus is held in frigid snow-white January, the white folks are openly hostile to poor Joe and much more in love with candidates who properly embrace the horror of white oppression.

This may in part account for the recent surge in Iowa polling of the young and highly polished mayor of South Bend Indiana, Pete Buttigieg, who has a plan to consider reparations for slavery — a policy which many believe would tear the country apart however fundamentally justified it might be. If Buttigieg were to win in Iowa and Bernie Sanders in New Hampshire (which borders his home state of Vermont, thus giving him a natural advantage) it would leave Biden needing a huge win in the third contest in South Carolina to get back on track. It might be too late for him.

There is a real and growing chance that white liberal Democrats will effectively veto the choice of black Democrats because they think he’s not properly conscious of racial issues. White privilege, anyone? To complain about it and to use it all at the same time: so 2019.

That’s the electoral impact on the Democratic primary, but is there a deeper psychological cringe that the Democratic party ignores at its peril? Self-awareness is a universally acknowledged good; so is a healthy measure of self-criticism. But the level of dislike white liberal Democrats seem to have for themselves is quite something. Could it play with their heads and those of their supporters? How positive about America will they feel they can be before coming up against the mental stumbling block that they have decided race is a massive unresolved scar on the face of their nation?

This matters hugely in 2020 because a sunny disposition and a stable calm outlook on the world might well (for obvious reasons) be enough to win it. “And …. breathe!” could well be a winning slogan. John Kerry suggested as much to me on The Today Programme a year ago: all that would be required would be for the Democratic candidate to be moderate and competent, he suggested. That’ll do it.

At the time I thought this a foolishly complacent approach, but now, after another year of Trump? After the Kurds? Ukraine? Not for the first time, I think Senator Kerry displayed a better grasp of American politics than me.

But if the white liberals in his party have their way, this relaxed, genial route to power is going to be blocked by racial tensions that they themselves stoke. Who cares, they might respond: we have lost the redneck vote and frankly we don’t want it back. We can win with the suburbs, with educated women, with people of colour whose caution in these matters will be seen to have been an understandable mistake. Maybe: but these groups like sunshine too. Indeed, post -Trump, they crave it.

And it remains the case that although lefty Democrats have “found race”, most Americans have not. 41% of voters think that white people are advantaged in modern society, according to an exit poll conducted last year after the mid-terms by the respected company Pew Research.

It’s an impressive number in many respects — but it’s not a majority, and 19% (of a nation of 300 million) actually think the opposite: that white Americans are at a disadvantage to racial minorities.

Even among the 41% I wonder if there are plenty who want to acknowledge what they see as perfectly obvious injustices but not to beat themselves up quite as enthusiastically as some liberal Democrats would like.

By concentrating on these issues Democrats would be picking a fight with majority opinion, and being less sunny about their country than many Americans want them to be. They would also be doing it on their own, racially speaking, because a striking feature of this fashion is how much it seems to be all about white people. The books that inform it, like the New York Times bestseller White Fragility, Why it’s so hard for White People to talk about Racism, are overwhelmingly written by whites.

In fact, the non-partisan pressure group More in Common has suggested that those who believe America was “established by socially dominant groups like straight white men, for their own benefit,” are the most racially homogenous political group in the country.

White people telling others how to live. Is this really the 2020 look the Democrats want to embrace? At least Barack Obama would enjoy the joke.