TERRY GROSS, HOST:

This is FRESH AIR. I am Terry Gross. Democrats are still asking questions like, why didn’t Joe Biden end his reelection campaign sooner? Why did he even run for reelection, knowing that he would have been 82 when he started his second term and 86 when it ended? Why didn’t his staff tell him he wasn’t up to the job? How did Kamala Harris lose to Trump after Trump tried to overturn the results of the 2020 election and was convicted of 34 felonies?

My guest, Chris Whipple, explores these questions from different perspectives in his new book, “Uncharted: How Trump Beat Biden, Harris, And The Odds In The Wildest Campaign In History.” Whipple’s previous book was about the first two years of the Biden presidency. He’s also the author of “The Spy Masters: How The CIA Directors Shape History And The Future,” and “The Gatekeepers: How The White House Chiefs Of Staff Define Every Presidency.” Biden’s chief of staff during the first two years of his presidency, Ron Klain, was a major source for the new book about the 2024 election, as was Biden’s final chief of staff, Jeff Zients. Chris Whipple is also a documentary filmmaker and has won a Peabody and an Emmy. Chris Whipple, welcome to FRESH AIR.

CHRIS WHIPPLE: Great to be with you. Thanks for having me.

GROSS: So you write, the truth was that Joe Biden was too old to run for reelection, much less govern effectively in a second term. His advisers knew this or should have known it but refused to face that fact. None ever discussed with the president whether he was too old to serve a second term. Instead, they walled Biden off from the outside world, limiting the number of people who interacted with him. How do you know for sure that no one ever discussed with Biden whether he was too old to serve?

WHIPPLE: Well, you know, this is what makes the book such an extraordinary story, I think. It’s really remarkable the extent to which Biden’s inner circle, not just his family but his close advisers, were operating in a kind of fog of delusion and denial. I – you know, I differ with people who say that this was a cover-up in the classic Watergate sense of the word, and that suggests that you’re hiding something that you know to be true. What’s so remarkable about this story is that Biden’s closest advisers really were all in on this delusional notion that he could – that Joe Biden could function effectively for another four years as president at the age of 82 or 86 by the end of that term. And I find it just a really remarkable story.

To answer your specific question, you know, at one point, Bill Daley, President Obama’s second White House chief of staff, spoke to Tom Donilon, who is the brother of maybe Joe Biden’s closest adviser, Mike Donilon, his alter ego. And he said, you know – Daley said, how the hell is this going on? He used a more colorful adjective. And Tom Donilon said, you know, not even my brother has had this conversation about Joe – with Joe Biden about his age. And you can be sure that if Mike Donilon didn’t have that conversation, it’s almost certain no one else did.

GROSS: What are some of the ways in which you say he was walled off from the outside world and his staff limited the number of people who interacted with him?

WHIPPLE: Well, you know, I had my own reasons for wondering if the Biden White House staff was hiding the president because when I was writing my book on the first two years of the administration, I asked for an interview with the president. I was told I could email questions and I would get written answers in reply. You know, clearly, they were uncomfortable even then with the prospect of the president having an interview in real time with a reporter.

GROSS: A major source for your new book was Ron Klain, who was Biden’s chief of staff during his first two years in the White House. And, you know, in your book about chiefs of staff, you say that one of the main jobs of a chief of staff, a good chief of staff, is to tell the president what the president doesn’t want to hear, but is true. And you think that Ron Klain was a terrific chief of staff. At the same time, Ron Klain never acknowledged that Biden should, you know, shouldn’t be running. And he saw up close what Biden’s condition was. So how do you explain that?

WHIPPLE: Well, here’s the thing. As I say, I think that this is much more interesting and not nearly as simple as the notion of a cover-up. In other words, I am convinced that Joe Biden’s inner circle was convinced that Joe Biden was capable of governing, and they believed that he could do it for another four years. And we can’t dismiss the fact that Biden on the very last day, July 21, that Sunday when his aides came to hammer out his abdication statement. Joe Biden was on the phone parsing the details of a complex multination prisoner swap. He was on top of every detail.

People who visited Biden in the Oval Office to talk about the Middle East said he was on top of every nuance of Middle Eastern policy. This is not – this was not Woodrow Wilson. This was not somebody over in the corner who was incapacitated while, you know, all the president’s men ran the government. Joe Biden, behind closed doors, was governing capably, whether you liked his policies or not. So there’s no question that he was a shadow of the campaigner that he once was, and that was true from 2020 all the way to the end. But you can’t dismiss the fact – it’s an inconvenient fact for people who say it was a cover-up – that Biden was capable.

GROSS: So on the one hand, like, you say that you don’t think there was a cover-up, but at the same time, you also say that there was a conscious campaign to limit his exposure to the outside world, including, you know, people one on one. So is that a form of cover-up, limiting his exposure so that people wouldn’t see the shape that he was?

WHIPPLE: What I’m saying is the inner circle – and I spent a lot of time talking to his closest aides, and I’m talking about Mike Donilon and Steve Ricchetti and Bruce Reed and others. And four months after that debate, I went to the White House, and I interviewed Ricchetti and Reed, and they were still in this – trapped in this kind of force field of denial. They still believed that Biden would have been reelected, could have been reelected, would have governed capably for another four years until he was 86. Now, I find that to be misguided and delusional, but they believe it. And Mike Donilon went to the Harvard Kennedy School months after the election and said he thought the party had lost its mind by walking away from the guy who got 81 million votes in 2020. So all I’m saying is that those guys weren’t covering up somebody that they thought was incapable of governing. They believed he was still on his game.

GROSS: The days leading up to that disastrous debate with Trump did not find Biden in good shape, and Ron Klain saw it up close. What were some of the most disturbing signs that he saw that he told you about?

WHIPPLE: He was in a terrible state. He was absolutely exhausted. He was unable really to follow what was happening in the campaign. He was tuned out. He was obsessed with NATO and with foreign policy, particularly with Emmanuel Macron of France and Olaf Scholz of Germany kept talking about how they said he was doing such a great job. Klain wondered, half jokingly if Biden thought he was president of NATO and not president of the U.S. He didn’t really have anything to say about his second-term plans. And early on, he walked out of a session in the Aspen Lodge, the president’s cabin, went over to the pool, sank into a lounge chair and just fell sound asleep.

GROSS: There were two mock debates that were scheduled, and Klain ended one prematurely because Biden just didn’t seem to be up for it. And Biden ended one after about 15 minutes because he was so exhausted. The campaign was considering canceling the debate but decided not to. Why not?

WHIPPLE: Well, I don’t know if the campaign ever formally considered canceling the debate. I said to Ron, given the condition of the president that he described, I said, did you think about, wait a minute, we should put this off? And Klain said, no, it – look, it just wasn’t politically feasible to do that given the sensitivity, given the fact that his cognitive condition was such a huge issue. They had to go forward. They couldn’t – they had no choice, in Klain’s view. But as you said, and as I report in the book, Biden was – Klain was trying every trick in the book to bring the president up to speed. He got him on the phone with Melinda French Gates, who loves to talk about child care, try – hoping that that might kindle some interest in talking about his second-term plans for that. And it worked for a minute, but then Biden lost interest. So it was – it was not a pretty picture, that Camp David preparation.

GROSS: Maybe this shouldn’t have surprised me, but I didn’t know that this kind of thing happens. Spielberg and producer Jeffrey Katzenberg both prepped Biden for the debate. Is that a typical thing, where, like, mega-Hollywood directors and producers prepare candidates before debate?

WHIPPLE: It was a typical thing for Joe Biden, and it was almost like producing a Hollywood movie literally because Jeffrey Katzenberg and Steven Spielberg were on a Zoom call with him before he went to Camp David, advising him on how to answer questions. And Katzenberg in particular specialized in body language. Katzenberg was there during the whole week at Camp David prior to the debate, again, trying to help Biden look more authoritative with his movements on camera.

And Bruce Reid, the deputy chief of staff, was really impressed by how Spielberg was able to coach Biden for the State of the Union speech, the one that everybody concedes he hit out of the park when the – he was heckled by the MAGA Congresspeople, and he really owned them in the moment. So it’s unusual but not for Biden.

GROSS: How was the final decision made to drop out of the race?

WHIPPLE: So Joe Biden is at Rehoboth Beach with only his closest aides. He’s there with Jill Biden and with Annie Tomasini, deputy White House chief, and with Anthony Bernal, the first lady’s senior advisor – other than that, just secret service. Sunday morning, his closest aides – Steve Ricchetti, Mike Donilon – come over and they sit down with him, and they have this pivotal talk.

And they walk him through. They talk about the polls. They talk about the party. Ricchetti says to Joe Biden that, look, there’s a path for you, but it’s a brutal path. It’s a lonely path, and it’s a real fight. There’s a narrow path that you can walk to victory in the swing states. You can do it, but the party leaders are against you. It’s going to be divisive, and it’s going to be a real battle. But Ricchetti was nevertheless, all in, if he was ready to go there, if he wanted to run for reelection.

And again, I find this kind of extraordinary because, you know, the reality was, the truth was, that there really was no path in the battleground states by that time. And the party leaders, of course, were arrayed against against him. And I think what was decisive was that all three of them – Ricchetti, Donilon and Joe Biden, obviously most important of all – they realized that the party leadership would come down on him like a ton of bricks come Monday, that if he didn’t make that decision, in all likelihood, the party leaders would go publicly against him, and there was really no way out.

GROSS: Let’s take a short break here, and then we’ll talk some more. If you’re just joining us, my guest is journalist Chris Whipple, author of the new book “Uncharted: How Trump Beat Biden, Harris, And The Odds In The Wildest Campaign In History.” We’ll be right back. This is FRESH AIR.

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GROSS: This is FRESH AIR. Let’s get back to my interview with Chris Whipple, author of the new book “Uncharted: How Trump Beat Biden, Harris, And The Odds In The Wildest Campaign In History.” The Biden team was really angry with Obama. How come?

WHIPPLE: You know, the whole relationship between Joe Biden and Barack Obama is so complex and fascinating and with so many levels to it. I mean, on the one hand, there’s no question about the fact that they really they really bonded over Beau Biden’s tragic death. And Barack Obama took Joe Biden under his wing, and they developed a closeness there. But at the same time, you know, there’s a real competitiveness between them. And the Obama camp, for example, was not amused when Biden’s staffers were going around early in his first term and talking about how the American Rescue Plan was so much bigger than Obama’s stimulus package back in 2009. They’re just competitive, these two camps. And the other major factor here is that Joe Biden never forgave Barack Obama or putting his thumb on the scale for Hillary Clinton to become the nominee in 2016. That was a really deep wound for Joe Biden. And in the end, it became clear that during that fateful weekend of July 2021 that Barack Obama wasn’t really there. He just wasn’t there for Joe Biden.

One of Biden’s closest friends told me that the thing that really got him was that Obama never picked up the phone and called him and just said, you know, Joe, jeez, are you sure you’re up to this? That never happened. There was a phone call earlier after the debate saying, hey, you know, it was just a bad night – don’t worry about it. But when things went south and Biden was on the ropes, Barack Obama never picked up the phone.

GROSS: It sounds to me from your book that when Biden dropped out, the Harris campaign was kind of prepared for that. The Harris campaign was waging what you describe as a stealth campaign to try to be prepared in case Biden did drop out. Tell us about that stealth campaign.

WHIPPLE: Yeah, you know, this is really previously unreported. But what I learned in writing the book was that prior to that weekend when Biden made his decision, you know, up to that point, Harris had to be absolutely scrupulous. You know, she was walking through a minefield. I mean, she had to be so careful not to give any hint that she was thinking about taking over the top spot on the ticket. But the truth was that she was quietly and secretly preparing. Her camp had reached out to democratic political operatives who were looking at the rules and getting ready and making sure that when that day came, I think they thought, that she would be ready to go. And sure enough, she was. But not only were those operatives looking at the rules and figuring out how she could grasp the nomination, they were also putting out the word to some senators that they needed to come out in favor of Joe Biden stepping aside.

GROSS: What are some of the suggestions you heard about how she could have differentiated herself more and become more of a change agent in the eyes of the public?

WHIPPLE: Well, the No. 1 thing was that she had to be prepared for the $64,000 question, which they knew was coming. And that was, what would you do differently from Joe Biden? And when that day came, when Kamala Harris was appearing on the ABC program “The View,” it was a disaster. She fumbled the answer. She was asked that very question, which she was prepared for. And inexplicably, she said, well, I can’t think of a single thing, was how she began the answer.

That was immediately turned into a campaign commercial by the Trump team, which was devastating. And that was a real turning point of the campaign. She wasn’t prepared for that question – she was prepared, but she couldn’t answer the question. And I think the reason is that fundamentally, Kamala Harris was loyal to Joe Biden. That’s what her campaign staffers told me, that they told her. They’d had several meetings, one of them in which David Plouffe had said, you have to separate yourself, and you have to rip this Band-Aid off. She couldn’t do it.

One of the ironies here is that her top campaign officials, Jen O’Malley Dillon, Lorraine Voles, had gone to the White House and specifically sat down with Jeff Zients, Joe Biden’s chief of staff, and in effect asked for permission to separate themselves from Biden. And Zients told them go for it, you know, do whatever you have to do. Not only that, Joe Biden personally called Kamala Harris and said, look, I get it. You know, you need to win this campaign, and don’t worry about hurting my feelings, in effect – not in those words. So it’s fascinating to me that even then, she was unable to make that break.

GROSS: Well, we need to take another break here, so let me reintroduce you. If you’re just joining us, my guest is Chris Whipple. He’s author of the new book “Uncharted: How Trump Beat Biden, Harris, And The Odds In The Wildest Campaign In History.” We’ll be right back after a short break. I’m Terry Gross, and this is FRESH AIR.

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GROSS: This is FRESH AIR. I’m Terry Gross. Let’s get back to the interview I recorded on Friday with Chris Whipple, author of the new book “Uncharted: How Trump Beat Biden, Harris, And The Odds In The Wildest Campaign In History.” He’s also author of the book “The Gatekeepers” about White House chiefs of staff and the book “The Spymasters” about heads of the CIA.

You think – or a lot of people told you that – you know, your sources – that part of the problem with the Harris campaign was the decision to really focus on the threat to democracy, as opposed to focusing more on, like, personal finance issues and, you know, economic issues. The threat to democracy, that really resonated with a lot of people. But talk a little bit more about the controversy about how much to stress that in the campaign.

WHIPPLE: I think what happened was that the campaign took a page from the 2022 midterms. And you may recall that during those midterms, the Democrats really leaned heavily on democracy and women’s reproductive rights and defied the odds and did so much better than anyone thought they would do during those midterms. So I think the campaign took a page from that, not realizing that they’re very different animals. Midterms are different from presidential elections. Those issues didn’t have the same resonance in the presidential election, which is really all about the two candidates more than it is about issues, no matter how effective or resonant they might’ve been in the midterms.

So I think a number of former presidential campaign managers I spoke to just felt that that was the wrong emphasis, that the real message had to be the economy, had to be bringing down costs, had to be trying to become a change candidate in an election where there was just a tidal wave of anti-incumbent sentiment. You know, around the world, something like 50 out of 85 elections, in those elections, incumbents lost since 2020. So there was a real wave of anti-incumbent sentiment, and she never got out ahead of that.

GROSS: The Harris campaign was criticized for running a really good, more traditional campaign, knocking on doors to get out the vote, going on mainstream media. Whereas the Trump campaign did a lot, like, podcasts, including with people on the right, went on Joe Rogan. And Harris considered going on Joe Rogan’s podcast but decided not to. How consequential do you think the decision was to take a more, like, mainstream approach to getting out the vote and being on the media compared to Trump?

WHIPPLE: Well, I think there’s no question that Trump tapped into a very powerful network of alternative media, and Harris did not. And, of course, missing the Rogan interview was part of that. When I spoke to Susie Wiles, who, by the way, is just an absolutely fascinating character in my view…

GROSS: And Susie Wiles ran Trump’s successful 2024 campaign and is now his chief of staff.

WHIPPLE: That’s correct. Her story is really not well known. But Susie Wiles was emphatic and candid about what she thought the mistakes were by the Harris campaign. And she said she never had any doubt whatsoever that the Trump campaign would win. She said – and again, not mincing words – she said, we couldn’t believe how bad she was, referring to Kamala Harris. And part of what she meant by that was that she felt that, just like Biden’s handlers in 2020, that they were hiding her, not in the basement this time, but they were hiding her coming out of the convention – that there was a period of a couple of weeks where she wasn’t doing interviews. Jen O’Malley Dillon, Harris’ campaign chair, would dispute that. But Susie Wiles was just really emphatic about the fact that they just couldn’t believe how ineffective Harris was and never doubted they were going to win.

GROSS: I want to talk with you about Susie Wiles. And Wiles managed Trump’s 2024 successful presidential campaign and is now his White House chief of staff. One of the things you say – and I mentioned this before – about chiefs of staff is that they have to be able to say no to presidents. They have to be able to tell the truth to the president when it’s not something the president wants to hear. They have to be able to contradict the president and set the president on what they perceive to be the right course. How is Susie Wiles doing in that job? And I’m just thinking about the tariffs and letting loose Elon Musk and taking advice from right-wing conspiracy theorist Laura Loomer about who to fire from, you know – like, what national security experts to fire.

WHIPPLE: Well, let me start on the plus side when it comes to Susie Wiles. First of all, her relationship with Trump is absolutely fascinating, and she has a certain magic with him. And I think it goes back to the fact that she’s the daughter of Pat Summerall, the famous sportscaster who struggled with alcoholism, and Susie Wiles knows something about handling difficult men. But that’s another story. To talk about now, I think that on the one hand, this is not Trump 1.0. The Trump White House is no longer a battlefield of backstabbers and leakers, and there’s not anything like the drama that happened during Trump’s first term. And that’s largely because of Susie Wiles. She has a kind of magic with Trump that none of her predecessors had.

You remember Reince Priebus and John Kelly, Mick Mulvaney. You know, he went through chiefs of staff at a rapid clip. I think Susie Wiles is going to be there for a while because he trusts her. On the minus side of the ledger, you’re right – the most important part of the White House chief of staff’s job is walking into the Oval Office, closing the door and telling the president what he doesn’t want to hear. Now, you know, I’ve talked to Susie Wiles since she’s been in this job a number of times. She says that she has fought these battles with him. One of them was in the case of the pardoning, doing a blanket pardon of the January 6 insurrectionists. I said to her, did it ever occur to you to say to the president, wait a minute, maybe we should take a look at these one by one instead of a sweeping get out of jail free card? And she said, yes, that’s exactly the conversation I had with him. I lost that argument. Well, she’s lost a lot of battles. And so that suggests that, you know, this is going to be a long, rough road for her. And I’ll add one other thing she said, which is particularly timely at the moment. She told me that there were a bunch of, as she put it, tariff zealots running around in the Trump White House. And we have certainly seen the result of that in recent days.

GROSS: Well, let’s take another break here, and then we’ll talk some more. If you’re just joining us, my guest is Chris Whipple, author of the new book “Uncharted: How Trump Beat Biden, Harris, And The Odds In The Wildest Campaign In History.” We’ll be right back. This is FRESH AIR.

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GROSS: This is FRESH AIR. Let’s get back to the interview I recorded Friday with Chris Whipple about his new book “Uncharted: How Trump Beat Biden, Harris, And The Odds In The Wildest Campaign In History.” One of your earlier books, “The Gatekeepers,” is about White House chiefs of staff. And you describe the chief of staff position as being, you know, one of the most important positions. Why is it so important? Explain what a chief of staff actually does.

WHIPPLE: Well, it really is the second most powerful job in government. And that was my principal takeaway when I wrote the book back in 2017. It’s – he’s critical because every president learns – sometimes the hard way – that you cannot govern effectively without empowering a chief of staff as first among equals to No. 1, execute your agenda, No. 2, be the gatekeeper, who’s the person who gives the president time and space to think. You have to be the keeper of the message, making sure that everybody’s on the same page. You have to be the president’s heat shield. Jack Watson, Jimmy Carter’s last White House chief, calls that – he calls him the javelin catcher, taking the heat for the president.

It’s just an extraordinarily critical job. And again, to circle back to a question you raised earlier, he is – he or she, at the end of the day, is the person who has to be able to tell the president what he doesn’t want to hear. Don Rumsfeld, who was a very good chief of staff for Gerald Ford way back in the day, said, you know, he’s the one person besides the president’s wife who can look him straight in the eye and say, you cannot go down this road. Trust me, it’s a mistake.

GROSS: The position of chief of staff is relatively new. It started under President Eisenhower. Why did he create the position?

WHIPPLE: Well, Eisenhower was smart enough to know that you really need to have a chief of staff to make things work. And he had a guy named Sherman Adams, who was gruff and tough, and they called him the Abominable No-Man. He was the…

GROSS: Oh, ’cause he said no all the time?

WHIPPLE: Yes, exactly. He was the governmental equivalent of an Army chief of staff, which is probably why Ike came up with the position. But anyway, it began with Eisenhower and really what we – what I’ve discovered in writing the book was that, you know, no modern president has really been able to succeed without an empowered White House chief of staff. There would have been, in my view, no Reagan revolution without Jim Baker, and Bill Clinton might well have been a one-term president without Leon Panetta, who really turned his White House around. So it’s a very important job. I mean, Dick Cheney told me that – and Cheney, of course, was Gerald Ford’s second White House chief at the age of 33 or 34, I think. Cheney told me that the White House chief has more power than the vice president. That’s true, except when Cheney was vice president.

GROSS: Yes. What did Leon Panetta do as chief of staff to turn around the Clinton White House?

WHIPPLE: Well, it was fascinating because Bill Clinton came into office thinking he was so smart that he could run the White House by himself. He was hardly the only president to think that. Jimmy Carter thought the same thing and learned the hard way that he can’t. Bill Clinton came in with his kindergarten friend, Mack McLarty, who was very talented and smart but just unable to discipline, you know, the larger-than-life Clinton. Sound familiar?

And what happened was that at about a year and a half into his presidency, he was really dead in the water. Clinton was in real trouble. Remember Travelgate and Whitewater and all kinds of – couldn’t get any traction. And it was largely because Clinton really couldn’t prioritize and focus on what he needed to do. There was a kind of intervention staged by Hillary Clinton and Al Gore. They had their eye on Leon Panetta, the OMB director who was tough and disciplined. They took him to Camp David and virtually locked him in a cabin until he would agree to do it. He wanted to stay on as OMB director. But Leon Panetta came in, and he just turned things around. He was able to tell the president hard truths, and he organized the White House and drove it forward with help from Erskine Bowles, his deputy, and John Podesta. And the rest is history. He went on to be reelected.

GROSS: You wrote a book about Biden’s first two years as president. And now you’ve written a book about the Biden, Harris and Trump campaigns. Have your views on Biden changed from the book about his first two years in the White House to the book about the end of his presidency and the end of his campaign?

WHIPPLE: For sure. I mean, what’s changed, of course, is the unbelievably dramatic ending of the story. I mean, it’s Shakespearean with all of the plot twists and turns and the betrayals and the tragedy, if you want to call it that, which I think it is for Joe Biden and for Kamala Harris. But I think history is going to judge Biden and his inner circle harshly. I think that it’s unquestionable that there was just an abdication of leadership, starting within that inner circle. The inability of any of those guys or women to sit the president down and say, look, you know, you need to look at this clear-eyed and realize that you’re going to be 86 years old and you’re not up to this, and everybody knows it.

That never happened. And again, I think it’s in part because there’s this gravitational pull when you’re in the rarefied air of the Oval Office. In that inner circle, sometimes you just don’t see clearly. But my views have changed because I think that – in this sense. I mean, I think Biden was in some ways a transformational president. I mean, some of the achievements – rallying NATO, pulling the economy out of a free fall, managing the pandemic. In a number of ways, he was transformative. But the story is a sad story and a tragic ending, and I’m afraid it was self-inflicted.

GROSS: Something that surprised me is how much Jill Biden, Biden’s wife, supported his run. Like, I would have thought she would be really concerned about his health and his ability to endure all of the stresses – physical, emotional, spiritual, intellectual – of the presidency. It’s, you know, maybe the hardest job in the world. But she seemed to really be supporting his continued campaign. You write that after the disastrous debate, she said to him, like, you did great. You answered all the questions. Well, answering the questions, it’s a pretty low bar after a debate. Do you have any insights into Jill Biden’s continued support of her husband’s campaign?

WHIPPLE: Yeah, that was an extraordinary and telling moment when she back at the hotel, after that disastrous debate, you would think, at least I was thinking as I watched the debate go on, that she would want to take him aside and say, listen, Joe, are you sure you want to go ahead with this? You know, or we need to have a doctor look at you. And, you know, that was, are you OK? I mean, maybe she did have that conversation privately. But publicly, moments after that debate or minutes after it, she was gushing about what a great job he’d done. So it’s extraordinary, and she was, at the end of the day, all about wanting to help Joe Biden do what he wanted to do. So as I said, we can’t know what they said behind closed doors, but she was certainly all in on reelection.

GROSS: Chris Whipple, thank you so much for talking with us.

WHIPPLE: My pleasure. Thanks for having me, Terry.

GROSS: Chris Whipple is the author of the new book “Uncharted: How Trump Beat Biden, Harris, And The Odds In The Wildest Campaign In History.” This Thursday will mark the hundredth anniversary of “The Great Gatsby’s” publication. After we take a short break, book critic Maureen Corrigan will tell us why she’s one of the many who consider it the great American novel. She wrote a book about “Gatsby.” This is FRESH AIR.

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This is an occasional roundup of people who voted for Donald Trump and are shocked to find out no one is immune from the damage and pain he causes. Many are now grappling with the consequences of their choice as it affects them and their loved ones—and possibly regretting their vote.

Just this past week, following the Boulder, Colorado, attack against people protesting for Hamas to release Israeli hostages, President Donald Trump announced a new travel ban targeting many Muslim-majority nations. Notably, Egypt—where the Boulder attacker was from—wasn’t on the list.

“It should come as no surprise that Trump’s racist travel ban overwhelmingly targets Black and brown people from countries in Africa, the Middle East, and the Caribbean,” said Michigan Rep. Rashida Tlaib in a statement. “These policies are rooted in white nationalism and will only increase hate, xenophobia, and Islamophobia in our country.”

Tlaib, notably, refused to endorse Democratic nominee Kamala Harris for president last year. And she wasn’t alone.

Former Vice President Kamala Harris, shown in 2018.

In 2020, heavily Muslim Dearborn, Michigan, backed Joe Biden, giving him 69% of their vote. In 2024, only 36% of the city voted for Harris, while 42% backed Trump. Another 18% backed Green Party candidate Jill Stein. As Politico summarized in a headline, “Dearborn’s Arab Americans feel vindicated by Harris’ loss.”

Ah yes, sweet, sweet vindication. Weirdly, there aren’t many protests outside the White House. Where are the numerous rallies against “Killer Vance”? Where are the chants of “Genocide Don”? Curious, isn’t it?

These Trump-backing Muslim voters were already having second thoughts before the new ban. Back in November, Rabiul Chowdhury, chair of the Abandon Harris campaign in Pennsylvania and co-founder of the group Muslims for Trump, told reporters, “Trump won because of us and we’re not happy with his secretary of state pick and others.”

And yet they helped hand him the win.

In February, another group—Arab Americans for Trump, chaired by Bishara Bahbah—changed its name to Arab Americans for Peace after Trump held a press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and floated the idea of the U.S. taking “ownership” of the Gaza Strip.

Thanks to their efforts, peace in Gaza is now further out of reach.

Now, with Trump doing basically the same thing he did the first time—now with more chaos, fear, and destruction—those same voices aren’t loudly opposing him. And the communities they claimed to represent—the voters they helped sway away from Harris—are the ones bearing the consequences.

After bruising election loss, what next for Kamala Harris?

5 January 2025 Share Save Courtney Subramanian BBC News Reporting from Washington DC Share Save

REX/Shutterstock On Monday Vice-President Harris will certify Trump’s election victory against her

Exactly two months after her election loss to Donald Trump, Vice-President Kamala Harris will preside over the certification of her own defeat. As president of the Senate, on Monday she will stand at the House Speaker’s rostrum to lead the counting of Electoral College votes, officially cementing her rival’s triumph two weeks before he returns to the White House. The circumstances are painful and awkward for a candidate who decried her opponent as an urgent threat to American democracy, but Harris aides insist she will conduct her constitutional and legal duty with seriousness and grace. It is not the first time a losing candidate will lead the joint session of Congress to count their opponent’s presidential electors – Al Gore endured the indignity in 2001 and Richard Nixon in 1961.

But it’s a fitting coda to an improbable election that saw Harris elevated from a back-up to the nation’s oldest president to the Democratic standard bearer – whose fleeting campaign provided a jolt of hope to her party before a crushing loss exposed deep internal faultlines. Harris and her team are now deliberating her second act, and weighing whether it includes another run for the White House in 2028 or pursuing a bid for the governor’s mansion in her home state of California. While recent Democratic candidates who lost elections – Al Gore, John Kerry, Hillary Clinton – have decided against seeking the presidency again, aides, allies and donors argue that the groundswell of support Harris captured in her unsuccessful bid and the unusual circumstances of her condensed campaign proves there’s still scope for her to seek the Oval Office. They even point to Donald Trump’s own circuitous political path – the former and future president’s bookend wins in 2016 and 2024, despite losing as the incumbent in 2020. But while many Democrats do not blame Harris for Trump’s win, some – stung by a bruising loss that has called the party’s strategy into question – are deeply sceptical of giving her another shot at the White House. A host of Democratic governors who coalesced behind the vice-president in 2024 but have ambitions of their own are seen by some strategists as fresher candidates with a much better chance of winning.

Reuters Trump and Harris in their TV debate in September

Harris herself is said to be in no rush to make any decisions, telling advisers and supporters she is open to all the possibilities that await her after Inauguration Day on 20 January. She is assessing the last few months, which saw her launch an entirely new White House campaign, vet a running-mate, lead a party convention and barnstorm the country in just 107 days. And aides point out that she remains the US vice-president, at least for another two weeks. “She has a decision to make and you can’t make it when you’re still on the treadmill. It may have slowed down – but she’s on the treadmill until 20 January,” said Donna Brazile, a close Harris ally who advised the campaign. “You can’t put anyone in a box. We didn’t put Al Gore in a box and it was obvious the country was very divided after the 2000 election,” said Brazile, who ran Gore’s campaign against George W Bush and pointed to his second life as an environmental activist. “All options are on the table because there’s an appetite for change and I do believe that she can represent that change in the future.” But the nagging question that shadows any potential 2028 run is whether the 60-year-old can separate herself from Joe Biden – something she failed to do in the election campaign.

Her allies in the party say that Biden’s choice to seek re-election despite worries about his age, only then to ultimately drop out of the race with months to go, doomed her candidacy. Though Trump swept all seven battleground states and is the first Republican in 20 years to win the popular vote, his margin of victory was relatively narrow while Harris still won 75 million votes, an outcome her supporters argue can’t be ignored as a currently faceless Democratic party rebuilds over the next four years. On the other side, those close to Biden remain convinced he could have defeated Trump again, despite surveys showing he had been bleeding support from key Democratic voting blocs. They point out that Harris fell short where the president didn’t in 2020, underperforming with core Democratic groups like black and Latino voters. Critics continue to bring up her 2019 campaign to become the Democratic presidential nominee, which sputtered out in less than a year. “People forget that had there been a real primary [in 2024], she never would have been the nominee. Everyone knows that,” said one former Biden adviser. The adviser, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive matter, applauded Harris for reviving the Democratic base and helping key congressional races, but said Trump’s campaign successfully undercut her on critical campaign issues including the economy and the border.

Reuters Biden and Harris at the Democratic National Convention in August, a high point for her campaign

Members of Trump’s team, however, including his chief pollster, have acknowledged that Harris performed stronger as a candidate than Biden on certain issues like the economy among voters. Yet there’s no escaping that any Democratic primary contest for 2028 would be a tough fight, with rising stars like Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer, Illinois Governor JB Pritzker and California Governor Gavin Newsom already weighing presidential runs. Some Democrats say that Harris would nonetheless start ahead of the pack, with national name recognition, a much-coveted mailing list and a deep bench of volunteers. “What state party would not want her to come help them set the table for the 2026 midterm elections?” Brazile said. “She’s going to have plenty opportunities not only to rebuild, but to strengthen the coalition that came together to support her in 2024.” Others have suggested she could step out of the political arena entirely, running a foundation or establishing an institute of politics at her alma mater, Howard University, the Washington-based historically black college where she held her election night party. The former top state prosecutor could also be a contender for secretary of state or attorney general in a future Democratic administration. And she’ll need to decide if she wants to write another book. For all of her options, Harris has told aides, she wants to remain visible and be seen as a leader in the party. One adviser suggested that she could exist outside the domestic political fray, taking on a more global role on an issue that matters to her, but that’s a difficult perch without a platform as large as the vice-presidency.

Reuters Harris helps with emergency aid packages after Hurricane Helene in North Carolina

In the waning days of the Biden-Harris administration, she plans to embark on an international trip to multiple regions, according to a source familiar with the plans, signalling her desire to maintain a role on the world stage and build a legacy beyond being Biden’s number two. For Harris and her team, the weeks since the election have been humbling, a mix of grief and resolve. Several aides described the three-month sprint that began when Biden dropped out as having begun with the campaign “digging out of a hole” and ending with their candidate more popular than when she began, even if she didn’t win. “There’s a sense of peace knowing that given the hand we were dealt, we ran through the tape,” said one senior aide. Following the election, Harris and her husband, Second Gentleman Doug Emhoff, spent a week in Hawaii with a small group of aides to relax and discuss her future. During a staff holiday party at her official residence before Christmas, Harris recounted election night and how she delivered a pep talk to her family as the results became clear. “We are not having a pity party!” she told the crowd of her reaction that night.

Advisers and allies say she is still processing what happened, and wants to wait and see how the new administration unfolds in January before staking out any position, let alone seeking to become the face of any so-called Trump “resistance”. Democrats have found the resistance movement that took off among liberals in the wake of his 2016 win no longer resonates in today’s political climate, where the Republican has proven that his message and style appeals to a huge cross-section of Americans. They have adopted a more conciliatory approach in confronting the incoming president’s agenda. As several Democrats put it: “What resistance?” Though she’s kept a relatively low profile since her loss, Harris provided a glimpse of her mindset at an event for students at Prince George’s Community College in Maryland in December. “The movements for civil rights, women’s rights, workers’ rights, the United States of America itself, would never have come to be if people had given up their cause after a court case, or a battle, or an election did not go their way,” she said. “We must stay in the fight,” she added, a refrain she has repeated since her 2016 Senate win. “Everyone of us.”

EPA-EFE/REX/Shutterstock Former US President Barack Obama campaigned with Kamala Harris

The Republican-led Congress is considering plans to cut Medicaid to help pay for tax cuts, with the House budget resolution targeting $880 billion or more in potential reductions to federal Medicaid spending. Medicaid is the primary program providing comprehensive health and long-term care to one in five people living in the U.S and accounts for nearly $1 out of every $5 spent on health care. Reductions in Medicaid could have implications for enrollees as well as plans, providers, and state budgets. While there are several policy options under consideration in Congress to achieve savings, it is not clear how much support there is from Republicans (including President Trump) about these specific policies. The discussions in Congress come at a time when support for the Medicaid program continues to be strong. According to KFF polling, Medicaid is viewed favorably by a large majority (77%) of the public and an even larger share of those on the program (84%). As Congress considers reducing Medicaid spending, nearly half (46%) of all people and nearly two-thirds (62%) of Medicaid enrollees believe the federal government is currently not spending enough on the program.

To better understand the experiences of Medicaid enrollees and their perceptions of potential changes to the program, KFF conducted five virtual focus groups in January, including three groups with participants who had voted for President Trump in the 2024 election and two groups with participants who had voted for Vice President Harris. Focus group participants were asked about their experiences with their Medicaid coverage, views on government’s role in health care, and perceptions of the recent election. Participants were also asked for their reaction to current proposals to reduce federal spending on Medicaid and impose work requirements. Despite differences in who they voted for in November 2024, participants had consistently favorable experiences with Medicaid and concerns with potential cuts to the program. Key findings from our groups include the following:

Many Trump and Harris voters said that their top voting issue in the 2024 election was the economy, though some Trump voters cited immigration, and some Harris voters cited women’s rights as their top issues, and most participants said they did not recall hearing about changes to health care programs (including Medicaid) during the campaign. Most participants said the government has a role to play in making health care more affordable and accessible, but some Trump voters argued the private sector does a better job of controlling costs. When asked about fraud in the Medicaid program, many participants said they thought fraud exists, but views differed on whether it is a major issue and what was the primary cause. Several Trump voters believed the problem was due to people enrolled who were not eligible; however, other participants, including both Trump and Harris voters countered that state verification procedures prevent individuals from defrauding the program on a large scale and that providers and insurance companies were more likely the main source of program fraud.

At the time of the focus groups, most participants had not heard about proposals to reduce federal spending on Medicaid, and while most did not know why the reductions were proposed, some Trump voters suggested they were part of the crackdown on illegal immigration and aimed at removing undocumented immigrants from the program (undocumented immigrants are not eligible for federally-funded Medicaid). Participants opposed cutting Medicaid funding to pay for tax cuts that they did not believe would benefit them. Both Trump and Harris voters expressed fears that these changes would jeopardize the program, take away access to health care, result in worse health outcomes, and increase out-of-pocket costs. A few Trump voters did not believe Trump would follow through on the cuts to Medicaid because they believed he understood their financial struggles.

Both Trump and Harris voters valued their Medicaid coverage and the access to health care services, mental health services, and medications for themselves and their children it provides. Participants also valued Medicaid because it helps to protect them from financial disaster, alleviates stress, improves health outcomes and often supports their ability to work. Participants said losing Medicaid would “be devastating” and lead to serious consequences for their physical and mental health and exacerbate pre-existing financial challenges.

If work requirements were introduced to Medicaid, participants who were working generally felt confident in their ability to meet the requirements; however, they worried about the burden of monthly reporting requirements when those were described to them. Many participants across parties noted that access to treatment for chronic conditions, including prescription medications and mental health treatment, were key in helping to support their ability to work. More Trump voters supported a work requirement but some who were not working were convinced they would qualify for an exemption. Other participants, including both Trump and Harris voters, who were not currently working felt they would face challenges in meeting the requirements. Those who were not working said they wanted to work (and many had been previously working for many years) but were generally unable to because of disability or because they were caring for young children or a sick parent.

Both Trump and Harris voters wanted policymakers to focus on improving Medicaid instead of cutting it. For example, some participants said they would like to see enhanced dental benefits, increased doctor availability, and fewer prior authorization requests. Focus group participants wanted policymakers to consider the implications of federal cuts to Medicaid for people, their health, financial stability, and ability to be productive members of society.

General Situation

Most focus group participants were experiencing financial challenges and were managing an array of physical and/or mental health conditions. Medicaid eligibility requirements mean those on the program, by definition, have low incomes. Most participants described struggling with high food prices and noted the past few years have been financially difficult. Some focus group participants reported difficulties with the current job market or described injuries or disabilities that made it difficult to find employment. Focus group participants were managing an array of health conditions including high blood pressure, diabetes, physical disabilities, chronic pain, asthma, and anxiety and depression. Some were managing more complex and potentially disabling conditions, such as cystic fibrosis and hidradenitis suppurativa (HS). Along with managing their own conditions, some participants were also caring for parents or other family members in nursing care.

“Times are tough right now. You know, everything’s overpriced and no one’s working and can’t afford anything and my health is terrible, so it’s kind of tough times.” 50-year-old, White female

(Trump voter, Nevada)

Experiences with Medicaid

Participants valued their Medicaid coverage and the access to health care services, mental health services, and medications for themselves and their children it provides. Along with regular physical exams for themselves and their children, focus group participants reported using Medicaid to see specialists, access mental health and substance use disorder treatment, receive necessary surgeries, and get prescription medications. Some participants with health conditions requiring frequent visits with specialists or multiple daily medications said they could not imagine day-to-day life without Medicaid.

“Doctor’s visits, I take 30 pills a day, so it covers all that, which is nice. I see the ENT like every other week.” 35-year-old, White female

(Trump voter, North Carolina) “I’m really grateful for it. When I first got on it, it covered for 90 days for me to go to a rehab and then it has covered my prescriptions with no questions asked.” 33-year-old, White female

(Trump voter, Arizona)

Participants described Medicaid coverage as affordable, noting that it protects them from financial disaster and alleviates stress. Participants expressed gratitude that they could access necessary medications with little to no cost sharing, and in general were appreciative that they had no premiums and low out-of-pocket costs. Participants said that having Medicaid reduces stress related to unexpected medical costs. Prior to enrolling in Medicaid, many participants had been uninsured and had gone long periods of time without seeing a doctor. These participants were grateful that they were now able to access regular care. Those who had previously looked into or been enrolled in private insurance described Medicaid as a more affordable source of coverage.

“I never took insurance from where I was employed at because it was always so expensive. By the time they would take out the money, there wasn’t much of a check. So I was basically gonna be paying for insurance, which I know a lot of people have to do. Went a while without anything so Medicaid’s been really great as far as helping me out with doctor appointments, used to help me out with dental. I used it a little bit for mental therapy when I lost my daughter unexpectedly. So it’s been good.” 61-year-old, White female

(Trump voter, Kentucky)

While participants said Medicaid was generally working well for them, some would like to see improvements, including enhanced dental benefits, increased doctor availability, and fewer prior authorization requests. Participants noted that it can be difficult to find doctors accepting Medicaid and frustrating to navigate prior authorizations for needed care. Other complaints included high turnover rates among providers at clinics that accept Medicaid and certain prescriptions not being covered by the program. Many focus group participants also wished that their state either covered dental benefits or had more generous dental benefits.

“There’s not like every doctor available, thankfully the doc I had before, I still am on the same doctor ’cause he is under my Medicaid, which is good. But there’s not coverage everywhere and certain things, so that’s kind of, you know, slight disadvantage there.” 59-year-old, White male

(Harris voter, Pennsylvania)

Views on Government’s Role in Health Care

Participants felt that being able to easily access affordable health care services is essential to ensuring they can work and lead productive lives. Across voting parties, most participants felt that everyone deserved access to affordable health coverage, with many saying that people should not have to pay for what they described as “life or death” care. Some participants noted that being able to access health care services helps them to work, be more productive, and contribute to society. However, a few Trump voters talked about the need for people to take responsibility for their health suggesting that they did not believe health care was a right for everyone.

“Healthcare is a right because you want the American people to work. So in order for the American people to work, they need to be healthy to work.” 52-year-old, Black female

(Trump voter, Pennsylvania) “If we’re healthier, it makes our country healthier and we produce. If you got a bunch of sick people that have no insurance, all you’re gonna do is cause debt, death, and god knows what else.” 56-year-old, White male

(Harris voter, Ohio)

Most participants said the government has a role to play in making health care more affordable and accessible; however, some Trump voters opposed government playing too large a role in running the health care system. Both Trump and Harris voters said the government has a role in making coverage more affordable, but some Trump voters noted that they felt private businesses may be more effective at keeping health care costs affordable than the federal government. More Harris voters (and some Trump voters) felt that the government should play a role in helping everyone access health care and in making the system work better. Both Trump and Harris voters compared the U.S. to other countries with nationalized health care systems, though takeaways from these comparisons differed. Some Trump voters referenced long wait times for care in other countries as evidence for why they did not think the U.S. should move to a socialized medicine model. Others (including both Trump and Harris voters) noted that the government should offer free care for all citizens, similar to other countries.

“It should be available for everybody. And it should be affordable. Because not everybody can afford the same thing… it’s usually the private sector does a better job with lowering costs and making things affordable and having options for people, not the government. I pay enough already in taxes that I don’t need to control anymore what I have to pay taxes for.” 45-year-old, Black male

(Trump voter, Kentucky) “It shouldn’t be an issue in a country this rich that people are going without it. I mean, it shouldn’t even be a question. It should be cut and dry. And we look at other countries, you know, it’s something they already have that the citizens have. And for a country that’s rich as America, it shouldn’t be your money or your life. You shouldn’t have to choose between medicine or buying food, or medicine and paying your life bill. It’s a right of an American citizen.” 61-year-old, Black female

(Harris voter, Kentucky)

Election Experiences

Many Trump and Harris voters said that their top voting issue in the 2024 election was the economy. Most Trump and Harris voters cast their ballot based on economic concerns and which candidate they thought would address their pocketbook issues, including housing costs and grocery prices. Some Trump voters noted that their standard of living was better under the first Trump administration while some Harris voters were worried that Trump would cut benefits. Immigration was a top voting issue for some Trump voters, especially for those living in border states. A few Harris voters cited women’s issues and preserving democracy as the motivations for their votes.

“When Trump was in office from ‘16 to ‘20, you know, my standard of living was better than it is now.” 43-year-old, White male

(Trump voter, Pennsylvania) “Someone who’s not about to cut food stamps, cut housing, cut WIC, cut many stuff that we everyday people need.” 45-year-old, Black female

(Harris voter, Ohio)

Most participants said they did not recall hearing either candidate mention changes to health care programs (including Medicaid) during the campaign. Because other issues, including immigration and the economy, dominated the campaign, most participants were unaware of either candidate’s health care priorities and any policy changes they planned to make. Some Harris voters recalled Harris discussing women’s health care and abortion access, and a couple of participants said they heard that Trump would either try to get rid of Obamacare (the Affordable Care Act) or would fix it. However, for the most part, health care issues were not a dominant factor in the election for these voters.

“I didn’t hear a peep about healthcare. Nope. It’s immigration for me.” 56-year-old, White male

(Trump voter, Arizona) “I think Kamala talked about healthcare like for women’s rights a lot. I feel like that was kind of one of her main points… I had never really heard Donald Trump talk about it. I heard about it in like Project 2025.” 25-year-old Black female

(Harris voter, Pennsylvania)

Proposals to Reduce Federal Medicaid Spending

At the time of the focus groups, most participants had not heard about proposals to reduce federal spending on Medicaid, but Trump and Harris voters had different opinions on why the cuts were being proposed. No Trump voters and only a very few Harris voters said they were aware of proposals in Congress to reduce federal spending on Medicaid, and many were surprised to hear of the proposed cuts. Although most participants were not sure why the spending reductions had been proposed, some Trump voters theorized that it was part of the administration’s crackdown on illegal immigration and an effort to remove undocumented immigrants from the program (undocumented immigrants are not eligible for federally-funded Medicaid). A few Trump voters did not think Trump would follow through on the cuts because they believed he understood their financial struggles. Some Harris voters felt the proposals reflected a pattern by Republican lawmakers to reduce benefits for poor Americans.

“I’m a border state, so we’ve had so many illegals coming through and the previous administration they got all free social services. So I imagine that’s part of the thing that we were giving Medicaid to people who have been here hours and stuff. And so it’s one way to prevent or to get some cost cutting.” 59-year-old, Hispanic female

(Trump voter, Arizona) “Their goal is to make sure that we don’t have anything. So why they’re taking everything outta everything because the rich wanna get richer.” 58-year-old, Black female

(Harris voter, Ohio) “I think Trump knows that people are struggling right now, and I don’t think he’s gonna do, at least not right now, cut anything Medicaid because he just knows people’s financial problems right now.” 45-year-old, Hispanic male

(Trump voter, Arizona)

When asked specifically about fraud and abuse in Medicaid, some participants across both groups believed there is fraud and abuse in the Medicaid program, but opinions were mixed on whether the source of the fraud is people enrolled who should not be or providers and insurance companies taking advantage of the system. The Trump administration has tied current actions to reduce federal spending to eradicating fraud, waste, and abuse within government programs. Many focus group participants agreed there was fraud in the Medicaid program; however, some described fraud as a major problem in the program and others reasoned there is fraud in Medicaid because there is fraud everywhere. When identifying the source of fraud in Medicaid, several Trump voters believed fraud was primarily due to people enrolled who were not eligible. Other participants, including both Trump and Harris voters countered that it would be too difficult for individuals to defraud the program on a large scale, describing how their states verify their income and other information at application and renewal. Some participants believed that providers and insurance companies overcharging the program or billing for services they did not provide were to blame rather than individuals. These participants offered examples of providers in their states who were convicted of fraud.

“Fraud is probably pretty prevalent, just like it was in everything else… People can abuse anything, so. If they have access to that, I’m sure there’s been some fraud over the years with Medicaid.” 56-year-old, White male

(Trump voter, Arizona) “I think it’s organizations more than people. I think it’s kind of hard to defraud with Medicaid. I mean, what are you doing going and asking for prescriptions and then selling them on the side? I mean, I don’t know how you would or having a high paying job and pretending you don’t work. I mean everything is available now on the internet. Everything’s tied in. Like me, our local Medicaid in Arizona was able to access my paychecks even before I saw what I was going to get one time they had it already on their screen.” 59-year-old, Hispanic female

(Trump voter, Arizona) “Most of the fraud that I’ve heard about comes from the actual provider billing for things they didn’t do.” 45-year-old, Black female

(Harris voter, North Carolina)

Both Trump and Harris voters opposed cuts to the program fearing that Medicaid spending reductions would jeopardize the program and take away access to health care for poor people. Likely because of their reliance on the Medicaid program, participants opposed reducing spending on Medicaid, and many used strong language to describe the dire consequences of making major cuts to the program. Some participants predicted people would lose coverage if cuts were made to the program, and one participant suggested the economy would suffer because many of the people currently on the program would no longer be able to get the care they need. Others anticipated that states would cut benefits, particularly for prescription medications and mental health care, and that providers would stop participating in the program.

“We shouldn’t have to suffer because of somebody wanting to propose cuts to it, you know, because we, we didn’t do anything. So, you know, let it, it can come from somewhere else. I just, I would oppose it.” 60-year-old, Black male

(Trump voter, Missouri) “People would be unable to take care of themselves and be healthy and get mental health issues taken care of, to get vision and dental; people would suffer. They wouldn’t be able to work. And the economy would suffer.” 55-year-old, White female

(Trump voter, Oklahoma) “I would oppose [cutting Medicaid] just because there’s a lot of people who need it, who would be affected by it negatively.” 29-year-old, White male

(Trump voter, Pennsylvania)

Participants opposed cutting Medicaid funding to pay for tax cuts that they did not believe would benefit them. Participants explained that because they had low incomes and were already in a low tax bracket, they did not expect their taxes would change much under any tax cut proposal. Both Trump and Harris voters said they would prefer Medicaid coverage to continue unchanged, arguing that the negative consequences of any changes to Medicaid would outweigh any small benefits they would experience from tax cuts. They said other government spending should be targeted to finance tax cuts.

“I don’t make much money to get my taxes affected by that. It would hurt my Medicaid, my medical more.” 50-year-old, White female

(Trump voter, Nevada) “They need to start taxing the right people properly first and then we can discuss that matter. Because we’re the only ones that are paying the taxes… They could put more into the programs if they tax the proper people properly.” 56-year-old, White male

(Harris voter, Ohio)

Participants expected significant changes to the Medicaid program if federal funding were reduced and they worried they would lose coverage or face higher costs. Possible Medicaid spending cuts felt very personal to participants who expected they would be negatively affected by the proposed changes. Participants expressed anxiety over how reduced federal spending may affect out-of-pocket expenses, doctor availability, and covered benefits. Some described life and death consequences of not being able to access mental health care and prescription medications to manage their chronic conditions. Others focused on the financial implications of losing coverage and the impact that would have on their ability to work as well as on out-of-pocket costs for needed care. For participants with family members in nursing homes, the challenge of caring for them at home seemed daunting.

“I would be very worried. It would [mean] not being able to get my antidepressants [and] see a psychiatrist. Yeah, it would, it might crush me.” 45-year-old, Hispanic male

(Trump voter, Arizona) “States are gonna have to start dropping people off the rolls. People like us who are probably single and childless.” 45-year-old, Hispanic male

(Harris voter, Arizona) “It’s gonna be higher out of pocket costs for sure. You know, and that’s something I can’t afford. It’s not just me, it’s me and five other people, you know. So I can’t afford that for me, nonetheless them.” 45-year-old, Black female

(Harris voter, Ohio)

Work Requirements

While some participants were working full-time, many who were working part-time or not working said they wanted to work or work more hours but were unable to because of disability or because they were caring for young children or a sick parent. Participants were working a variety of jobs, including home health aide, dental assistant, tax preparer and gig and contract work, but they needed Medicaid because they were not offered insurance through their work. Several said they were working part-time or not working because of illness or disability or because they were caring for young children or aging parents. Others said that they wanted to be working but have been unable to find employment. For those who were not working for a reason other than disability or illness, several said that to be able to work, they would need supports like affordable childcare, transportation, internet access, or better opportunities in their communities.

“I do self work with Instacart because …I get to pick and choose the days I’m able to work and dealing with my dad, getting in that nursing home and also dealing with my mom now because she’s getting into that phase where she’s needing more doctor appointments.” 52-year-old, Black male

(Trump voter, Missouri) “I can’t work right now because of my back. And I mean, I believe that my back got as bad as it did because I couldn’t go to the doctor when I didn’t have insurance.” 41-year-old, White female

(Trump voter, North Carolina) “Ever since I haven’t been working, I haven’t been able to find a job that’s legal or decent enough for working from home…They all want somebody in the office to stand up or sit down for long periods of time. I can’t even walk to my vehicle without being in pain. Or get into a vehicle and drive that vehicle because of the stress all behind that.” 51-year-old, Black female

(Harris voter, Oklahoma)

Participants who were working said having Medicaid meant they could get the care they needed, especially medications, and provided financial peace of mind that enabled them to work. With high rates of chronic disease among focus group participants, the ability to manage their conditions was described as critical to their ability to work. This was especially true for participants who said their work sometimes exacerbated their health conditions, such as asthma or chronic pain. Keeping Medicaid was important to participants who were working, and several participants noted the challenge of managing work hours to maintain eligibility. One participant described how she lost coverage for one month because she worked too many hours. The income volatility that many workers on Medicaid experience can put them at risk of losing coverage and access to needed prescriptions and health care for a month or longer.

“I can say that even doing the part-time work, if I did not have Medicaid or wasn’t able to do pain management, I wouldn’t even be able to do those, those small amount of hours.” 45-year-old, Black female

(Harris voter, North Carolina) “It would be really hard for me to work a full-time, 9-5 job with all my doctor’s appointments as well as I’m immunocompromised. It’s definitely positive that I can do something I like, something I wanna do and not work as much and still be able to get insurance.” 35-year-old, White female

(Trump voter, North Carolina) “I found out with Medicaid that there’s a cap on how much I can earn. I wasn’t aware of that. And so actually in the fall I was kicked off for about a month because I apparently had earned too much.” 59-year-old, Hispanic female

(Trump voter, Arizona)

Some participants who were not currently working expressed concerns about imposing work requirements in Medicaid, saying they would face challenges meeting the requirements, while others who supported the policy were convinced they would qualify for an exemption. While most participants had not heard about proposals to introduce work requirements for Medicaid, many Trump and Harris voters who were not working said they did not think they would be able to meet the requirements because of chronic pain or other disabilities. Although not currently working, several of these participants described the high demands of jobs they previously held, noting they had to leave those positions because of injuries or other health conditions. More Trump voters than Harris voters supported a work requirement policy, but several Trump voters who were not working and supported the idea of work requirements strongly believed they would qualify for an exemption because they have a disability or caregiving responsibilities. However, most participants with a disability were not receiving disability income and, therefore, may not meet disability exemptions, which in past proposals have been based on receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI).

“I can’t because I have chronic pain and I just can’t. I worked until I couldn’t work no more.” 57-year-old, White female

(Trump voter, Missouri) “There’s nothing out here from miles and miles. I live in between two towns and it’s still nothing, you know, so people don’t always have the resources or availability to do what they ask.” 39-year-old, Black female

(Harris voter, North Carolina) “I mean, if you’re able bodied then, then you should still be working and trying and proving to them that you’re able to, ’cause like I said earlier, I want to work, but because of daycare costs, financially I can’t.” 34-year-old, White female

(Trump voter, Kentucky) “I already know I am exempt because I’ve seen this proposal and I already know I was exempt from it. But no, I wouldn’t be able to meet it if I wasn’t exempt.” 57-year-old, White male

(Harris voter, Pennsylvania)

Participants who were working generally felt confident in their ability to meet the requirements; however, some worried about the burden of monthly reporting requirements. Given the number of hours they were working, most participants who were working felt that they would be able to meet any new requirements. But on the issue of reporting on work status monthly, participant opinions diverged. Some said that they were already submitting this information regularly to programs such as SNAP, so they were not worried about this requirement also being required in Medicaid. Others, however, expressed concern about having to report to the state each month, noting that they are human and prone to forget and that reporting requirements can be onerous. They also worried about the consequences of losing coverage for a month if they forget to report their work information in a month. As an alternative to submitting additional paperwork, some suggested an automated system, similar to how income is verified at renewal, would be more efficient.

“Required? Oh yeah. Easy. Oh yeah, absolutely. Mind you, I can’t do certain jobs. I can’t drive, if you will, but yeah, I can, I could do it. I can make it work.” 45-year-old, Hispanic male

(Harris voter, Arizona) “It’s gonna be devastating and upsetting to, you know, if you lose your health insurance if I forget as we tend to, we are only humans, sometimes we forget things. So if I don’t do this [report work hours], it affects the rest of my household and I don’t like that.” 45-year-old, Black female

(Harris voter, Ohio) “I would be very worried about them making mistakes. There’s been many times I’ve sent in paperwork and they didn’t get it and coverage was stopped. You know, a lot of room for clerical error and things like that.” 50-year-old, White female

(Trump voter, Nevada)

Consequences of Losing Medicaid Coverage

Both Trump and Harris voters said that losing Medicaid coverage would be “devastating” and would lead to serious consequences for their physical and mental health. Participants emphasized that the health care services and prescriptions they and their children receive through Medicaid helps them “survive.” Across groups, participants said that losing their Medicaid coverage would create financial challenges and expressed anxiety at the thought of being unable to afford prescriptions, doctor visits, or higher premiums on top of pre-existing financial challenges if there were major changes to Medicaid. Although focus group participants were not aware of the nuances of congressional proposals, all participants were residing in Medicaid expansion states and those who were eligible due to Medicaid expansion could be especially vulnerable to proposed changes in the program.

“I think obviously, not having access to healthcare, or having to have the financial ability to pay for your medical needs, your basic medical needs, is something that we shouldn’t have to worry about because we worry about how we’re going to eat. We worry about how we’re gonna pay our bills… Not having Medicaid would be, not distressful, it would be detrimental because I need to see a primary care doctor, I need to see my specialist.” 58-year-old, Black female

(Harris voter, Ohio) “For me it would, it would probably lead to death, and that’s kinda harshly speaking, but it’s the way that it would be. I’ve relied upon Medicaid for myself in order to survive. For my son, it would be survivable, but it would be difficult. He has real bad allergies, he wouldn’t be able to hear.” 55-year-old, White female

(Trump voter, Oklahoma)

When asked to respond to proposals to reduce federal Medicaid spending, participants appealed to policymakers to consider how these changes would negatively impact people. Participants felt that reducing federal funding for Medicaid would have serious consequences and hurt many people on the program. Some participants pointed out that many people enrolled in Medicaid could not afford any other alternatives and would have no way to access care if they were to lose coverage. The message of several Trump voters to policymakers was to focus on improving Medicaid instead of cutting it. Across groups, participants asked policymakers to remember the human impact of potential changes to the program.

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In the aftermath of Donald Trump’s victorious reelection bid, Democrats are searching for an explanation of Kamala Harris’s loss in order to begin rebuilding for the future. So it goes every election cycle—a loss, a scramble for causality, and competing narratives begin to set.

Just one week out from Election Day, there are multiple dissenting and overlapping arguments being made to try to make sense of the results. In 2016, many Democrats believed that Trump’s attack on trade policies was core to his victory. As a result, the Biden-Harris administration pursued Trump-like policies on trade, none of which seems to have made a significant difference in increasing the union vote share, reducing Trump’s likelihood of victory, or stemming the flow of working-class voters out of the Democratic Party.

Now, again, various parts of the Democratic coalition are seeking to define the party’s loss. But what do we actually know about why the Democrats were defeated? There are still theories forming, but on today’s episode of Good on Paper, I talk with the former Republican strategist and current host of The Bulwark Podcast, Tim Miller, about the postelection narratives jockeying for power.

“But for those of us who do have a belief that there’s something kind of special about the American system and that have revered America, that understand that America is flawed and has made mistakes, that still is a unique experiment in the world. That ‘America is an idea’ type of thing. The idea is pretty dim at this point,” Miller argued.

The following is a transcript of the episode:

[Music]

Jerusalem Demsas: In the aftermath of a bruising electoral loss, the losing party begins participating in a well-worn democratic tradition: slinging takes about what happened.

This is democracy! When the voters send a dissatisfied response, the messy work of recalibration requires parsing the signal from the noise.

Were voters mad because of a global inflationary environment that no Democrat could dig their way out of? Did they want to see specific breaks between Harris and Biden on policy? Were they frustrated by a candidate they saw as too left on cultural issues?

There are data points in favor of many different theses. Here’s where I’d put my stake in the ground, with the caveat that we still don’t have a complete analysis on subgroup dynamics, or even a final vote count on all the races:

First, incumbents worldwide were facing tough election odds. Electorates were frustrated by the COVID inflationary years and were clearly seeking change. In Australia, Sweden, the Netherlands, France, and beyond, ruling coalitions lost power across the political spectrum.

Second, I don’t think Kamala Harris was ever going to be a great candidate. After Biden’s disastrous debate effort in late June and it seemed he might be pressured to drop out, I wrote an article calling on Democrats not to coronate their vice president, and pointing to key vulnerabilities she displayed and the value of an open democratic process.

Figuring out how much of this is in the campaign’s control—would it really have mattered that much if she’d gone on Joe Rogan’s podcast?—or figuring out what this means for America’s two political parties will take months, if not years. As you’ve heard on this podcast, I’m still arguing about what 2016 really meant on trade and immigration.

My name’s Jerusalem Demsas, I’m a staff writer at The Atlantic, and this is Good on Paper, a policy show that questions what we really know about popular narratives. As a disclaimer, I worked for the Harris primary campaign in 2019 before becoming a journalist, and my guest today, Tim Miller, is a political strategist who was Jeb Bush’s 2016 communications director on his presidential campaign. He’s been an anti-Trump conservative since then and is the host of The Bulwark Podcast.

Today we’re going to talk through some of these inchoate narratives and debate which ones we think are likely to hold water.

[Music]

Demsas: Tim, welcome to the show.

Tim Miller: Hey Jerusalem. What’s happening?

Demsas: Well, we’re recording this six days after Election Day. And—as you have seen on Twitter, and I’m sure in your various interviews—the takes are already coming in very, very hot. And this is a show where we often look at narratives that have already baked, and kind of look at the research and data behind how these narratives formed and what truth is there and what sorts of things have gotten ahead of themselves.

But we’re in an interesting moment right now where we’re seeing very important narrative formation happen in real time. In the aftermath of an election, everyone’s scrambling to define what happened in order to maybe wrest control of the future of the party from an ideological perspective or just a pure power perspective. And so we’re seeing a bunch of people arguing about why Trump won and why Harris lost in a time where there’s a bunch of unknowns. So we’re going to go through a few of these different narratives that are coming up.

But Tim, right off the bat, I wanted to ask you: What’s your perception of why Trump won and Harris lost?

Miller: I’m going to preempt my answer by saying that I think that uncertainty is important in this moment, and that false certainty can lead to some very mistaken and disastrous results. I say this from experience, having worked on the Republican autopsy in 2013, when the conventional wisdom congealed very quickly that Republicans, in order to win again, needed to moderate on immigration and cultural issues to appeal more to Hispanics and women. And not only was that wrong, but the person that became the nominee and then the president used that autopsy for toilet paper and went exactly the opposite direction.

It also always didn’t also work out in Trump’s favor. In 2022, the conventional wisdom was that Trumpism was badly hurt and that Ron DeSantis was ascendant. Right? So anyway, in the week after the election, bad takes abound.

Demsas: [Laughs.]

Miller: That said, my answer is, I’m open to a variety of different things that the Democrats might have to do, among them being maybe nothing and watch Trump self-implode. Might be as simple as that. That said, the one thing that I think is certain that the Democrats need to reflect on when it comes to this question of why Trump won and why Harris lost—it’s that the Democratic message is not landing outside of a particular demographic of middle- to upper-income, college-educated, not particularly religious, urban- and suburban-dwelling white Americans, in addition to Black women, right? Those are the demos that the Democrats are doing well with, that Kamala Harris grew her share with from last time, at least in the case of college-educated women. And I think that the Democrats are doing a very poor job of communicating to people in all of those other demographics.

On what they need to do, I’m very open to various possibilities about whether it’s about affect or vibe or policy or whatever. But I’m certain that there is—fair or unfair, there’s a perception that the Democrats don’t care about these other demographics, particularly working-class demographics, particularly working-class men. And that they did not offer them something that was more appealing than the nostalgia and promises of gold bullion that they got from Donald Trump. And so we can hash through all the different theories about why that was. But I think the fact that what happened—you can’t argue with.

Demsas: Yeah. I think that that’s very descriptively true. But I guess what I would want to know from you is do you feel like there are specific things that Democrats have done that tipped the scales against them? I think that what you’re outlining here is very sound. There’s a difference between why Harris may have lost and what the Democrats need to do going forward to be a more electorally relevant party at the presidential level. And so from your perspective, though, is there something about the Democratic argument around the economy or other issues that you think was particularly relevant this time around?

Miller: I think that, for starters, people were unhappy with the economy. And I don’t think that the Democrats presented a message to them about how they plan to change that for the better. But, again, I’m also not even really ready to concede that, with the exception of inflation being annoying and that broadly hurting people, the Democrats were hurt based on their economic argument. It might simply be cultural. It might be the way that they spoke, and having people feel like they weren’t being heard.

I think the Democrats in particular—I always want to immediately go to, What is the policy prescription that would have appealed? And I’m like, It’s possible that there wasn’t one.

Demsas: Yeah. An important backdrop that I think you’re alluding to here, as well, is that the inflationary environment was really, really bad for incumbents across the world, right? You’re kind of going into an election where the fundamentals are sort of rigged against incumbents because the inflationary episode was just really, really hard for people. I think one narrative that I’m seeing come up a lot is about campaign strategy. And this seems like something that’s going to be hashed out significantly. But I guess the question I have here is whether you think Harris could have won with a campaign run differently, even given the shortened timeline.

Miller: I’m giving another “I don’t know” answer to that question: I don’t know. I think that she, by all accounts, ran a strong campaign that was based on her strengths. And I think she had an undeniably dominating debate performance. They ran a nice convention. Her speeches were good. The messaging pivot, the launch was good. There wasn’t a lot of drama inside the campaign, right? There are other things that she isn’t particularly strong at. I don’t think that she is that great in unscripted moments. Sometimes she’s better than others.

And so then that’s the other thing that people come to, which is like, Oh, she should have done Rogan and all this. And I agree. I think she should have done more of those interviews, but they also weren’t really her strong suit. And I think that this was something that might’ve borne out had there been a longer primary, and maybe somebody else would have emerged. But that said, I don’t think so. I think Kamala Harris was going to emerge from a primary, no matter when Joe Biden dropped out.

And so I’m not saying, Oh, this was inevitable. Just give up. Life is pain. [Laughs.] That’s not really what I’m saying. Any specific thing that people are like, Oh, if this tactic had been different, that would have helped—I don’t really buy that. I mean, I think that broadly speaking, her having the ability to separate herself from the administration would have been helpful, and I think that was very challenging to do given the situation Joe Biden left her in and the time period that was left. And I think that it’s very likely that she might have separated herself from the administration more and still lost, and we would have been here on this podcast with people saying, Why did she distance? [Laughs.] You know what I mean? Why did she break up the Democratic coalition?

Demsas: Yeah. I mean, it’s funny. I think that, on the tactics, I’m sort of with you here. I was looking at some of the data analyses that are coming out now, and it looks like, at this point, given the data we have, while the national average from 2020 to 2024 shifts roughly six points, in battlegrounds, that number is going to end up closer to three points. And that speaks to campaign effects. That speaks to the fact that in battleground states where, again, the majority of the money is going, people are putting ads in battleground states, the campaign is putting rallies there, she’s visiting, they’re really working the press in those places to get her story and message out in a way that you’re not really going to do in a safe, Dem county in Illinois or something.

And so as a result, what they see is that the campaign effects were good on a tactical level. Their ads were persuasive. There’s evidence from Dan Rosenhack at The Economist that it looks like the campaign effects were more effective than Trump’s on things like—indicating things like ads and rallies were better for Harris.

I think on this kind of broader meta question that you kind of raised, right, about Harris as the nominee, I don’t think this is inevitable. I mean, I wrote an article on July 9th arguing that she was unlikely to be a good nominee and the party shouldn’t coronate her, and Nancy Pelosi to The New York Times—I don’t know if you saw this quote, after Harris’s loss—she says that she had expected that if the president were to step aside that there would be an open primary. And that maybe Kamala would have been stronger going forward if she’d gone through a primary and that the president endorsed Kamala Harris immediately, which made it impossible to have a primary at the time. But it sounds like you’re saying that you think that, regardless, this would not have really changed the game that much.

Miller: Yeah, I mean, I think that had Joe Biden followed the—you can argue whether it was a promise or whether it was an indication that he was going to be a one-term [president] and pass the torch. And had there been a two-year process, maybe Kamala Harris does not emerge. But, look, there are three things that I think of when I hear this counterfactual about what would have happened had it been a more open process. The first thing is, the Democrat—one of the things that the Democrats have a lot of baggage around is identity politics. I think it would have been very challenging for a Black woman to be passed over.

Demsas: But the Democratic primary voters did this in 2019, right? There was this argument being made, but they said, no, we care most about electability and they chose Joe Biden.

Miller: Right, that’s true. But Joe Biden had been the vice president in that case. Kamala Harris was the vice president. You already saw this on social media. I saw this on social media, and I was basically for Kamala but also, at the same time, was like, maybe I think it’d be healthy to have an open process. And I guess if you could wave a magic wand, I probably would want Shapiro, Whitmer. Because hopefully that would win two of the three states you need to win the presidency. And that just seems like a safer bet to me. That was my position: It was like pro-Kamala and/but. And I had hundreds of people calling me a racist over that.

So, I think that it would have caused a lot of turmoil within the party.

Now, again, in a longer, two-year process, is that a lot of heat that then just dies out after a while, and you settle on something that’s a little bit more electable and everybody gets behind it except for a few people who have hurt feelings? Maybe.

No. 2, an open process opens up Gaza [as a] wound and rips that apart even wider, and I think creates potentially even greater turmoil than she already was dealing with on that issue. And that’s cost her, frankly. And then No. 3 is then if the theory of the case is a more electable person with someone that could get more distance from the Biden-Harris administration, that assumes that the Democratic voters were looking for somebody to do that.

And that is really where the tension is here, Jerusalem, because if you look at the data, a majority of the Biden-Harris Democrats were basically happy with the administration, right? There were surely big parts of the Democratic coalition, particularly younger voters, particularly working-class Black and Hispanic voters, the types of people that they lost ground with, that were unhappy with the Biden administration. But I think that there was a plurality within the party that was not going to be for somebody—look at the response to Dean Phillips, not exactly the most talented candidate, but total rejection and mockery for somebody who ran trying to get distance from the Biden-Harris administration.

So I think it would have been very challenging to run as a candidate and get distance. So to me, it’s like if we lived in an imaginary world where identity politics wasn’t an issue, Gaza wasn’t an issue, and there was no backlash to distancing yourself from Biden, then certainly the Democrats could have come up with a stronger option.

We don’t live in an imaginary world. And I think that within the world that we live in, within all those constraints, I think it’s very challenging to see a situation where you end up with somebody stronger than Harris.

Demsas: Yeah, I mean, all those points I think are very well taken. And I think I’m seeing a lot of people make that argument of both Harris’s inevitability as the vice president, and also this sort of sense of It would have been a worse candidate. I do think that kind of my general belief is sort of, when you think you’re behind, you run a high-variance play. If you’re gonna lose anyway, you just kind of throw everything you can at the kitchen sink.

And on this kind of inevitability point, right, I think there is this burgeoning sense that Democrats were just repudiated across the board here. You kind of brought this up, this idea that Democrats do not have a good answer on economic issues or on the issues that Americans care about.

But I don’t know, how do you reconcile that with the clear ticket-splitting you see going on here? [Nebraska’s Dan] Osborne ran seven points ahead of the Harris ticket. [Montana Senator Jon] Tester ran seven points ahead of the ticket. Amy Klobuchar ran six points ahead. That’s just in the Senate. And in the House, we see over-performances from everyone from AOC to Jared Golden in Maine, who’s a much more moderate member of the Democratic coalition. Doesn’t that indicate at some level that candidate quality was important here and that there were other candidates that were much more electable?

Miller: For starters, running the presidential race is so far different from running a Senate or House race that it’s almost not even the same sport.

It’s literally like T-ball versus the major leagues. What people expect from their—I mean, nobody’s like, Oh man, does Amy Klobuchar have to go on Joe Rogan? Nobody watches Amy Klobuchar’s debates. Obviously it’s a little different in Montana, where you’re running a competitive race. But again, just the interest in Senate races is different. I think that the Democrats have a coalition that is perfectly durable and able to win nonpresidential elections. I think that this trade in the voters that has happened where the Democrats are picking up more high-trust, more middle- to high-income, more college-educated voters, and the Republicans are picking up more low-trust, more middle- to low-income, and less educated voters. As a trade, that accrues to Democrats benefits in off-year elections and midterms and special elections, just because it’s the type of person that shows up for those types of things, and it accrues to the Republicans benefit in presidential elections. So that’s not good when the Republicans are nominating Donald Trump, and the Republicans’ presidential nominee is an existential threat to the fabric of our republic. And so that’s a problem.

And so I agree that you can’t look at the data and say, oh, the Democratic brand is irreparably harmed. Like, no, the Democrats won. And a lot of these Senate races are going to end up very narrow minorities, in the House and the Senate, that they will probably be able to win back in the midterms, depending on what happens.

But I think that there are two things, which is, No. 1, the Democrats are not well suited to running presidential elections right now, in this media environment, and then No. 2 is that the Democrats have abandoned huge parts of the country where they are not viable. And that’s particularly problematic, given the Senate and Electoral College and the way that’s set up.

So okay, back to No. 1. Democrats are really good at running campaigns that are set pieces. They have professionals that are running these campaigns: the ads, the conventions, the speeches, the going to the editorial-board meetings, the 2004-type campaigns. And that’s how Senate and House campaigns are basically still run in most of the country, and even governor’s races, right? People just don’t care about those races at that deep of a level. But the presidential race is—the media environment around it is so different. I mean, people are consuming information about the presidential race on their TikTok, listening to sports talk, listening to their random podcasts that aren’t about sports at all that are cultural, on women’s blogs, at a school function, people are talking about it casually, you know what I mean?

I’m a parent, and obviously this is a little bit of selection bias since I’m in politics and people know that, but people don’t come up to me and ask me what I think about the House race in my district. Nobody’s mentioned Troy Carter to me at any events,, at any school functions or any of my kids’ sporting events.

Demsas: He’s got to get his name out there. [Laughs.]

Miller: And so the information environment is just a total category difference. And Trump and even J. D. Vance in certain ways were able to take advantage of that by running campaigns that are a little bit more unwieldy, that are better for viral clips, that are also better for sitting down for two hours and broing out with the Theo Von and talking about how you can’t even do coke in this country anymore because the fentanyl is in it, right?

She wasn’t doing any of that. And doing one of those interviews isn’t really the answer, right? It’s like, can you communicate in a way that feels authentic? It might be fake authenticity, but in a way that feels authentic to people in their Instagram Stories, in their TikTok, in their podcasts, whatever.

And Democrats are not producing a lot of candidates who I feel are good at that.

Demsas: But I think there’s also this broad concern that the media ecosystem itself is not producing convincing, progressive-sounding or left-leaning media personalities. There’s a 2017 AER study that I remember being very, very shocking to people when it first came out, right after Trump’s election in 2016. And there are a couple economists, they look at the effect of Fox News, and they find that watching Fox News for an additional 2.5 minutes per week increases the vote share by 0.3 percentage points. But watching MSNBC has essentially no effect, and they see that Fox News is actually able to shift viewers’ attitudes rightward. And they look at 2004 and 2008 and find that Republican presidential candidates’ share of the two-party vote would have been more than three points lower in 2004, and six points lower in 2008 without Fox News.

And so that’s something where I’m just like—there is something to the fact that the media ecosystem does not have that sort of targeted apparatus. But my usual belief about these sorts of things is that we’re discounting the fact that so much of the media is so liberal that Fox News can have this large effect because it I think stands out among a pack of more liberal institutions, but I am kind of surprised at MSNBC.

Miller: Yeah, I mean, as a person on MSNBC, did that study go on before I was a political contributor? I think it did. So we might need to update the study and have them focus on my hits and see if that changes anything.

I guess I want to noodle on that for a little bit. That does surprise me a little bit as well, but I would say this: I think that I’m less concerned. I think there’s a category of person out there, and maybe this is right, that is focused on Republicans have better propaganda outlets than the Democrats do.

Demsas: Yeah.

Miller: And maybe that’s true. I don’t know. So to me, then the question is, okay, what can be done? What is realistic in this media environment? And it goes back to this question of, can the Democrats speak more through using existing outlets or finding a candidate who has a compelling story in their own right, or compelling communication skills to figure out how to speak to people that don’t watch mainstream news?

And that’s just really what it comes down to. The Democrats are very good at talking to people that are high-information, high-engagement, high-education, middle-to-high-income, and offering persuasive arguments. I think that they’re not good at talking to anybody else. And Obama was good at that, and Clinton was good at that. And we’re in a totally different media environment now than we were back then. But I think that there’s still things that can be learned from that.

[Music]

Demsas: After the break, why the abortion-ballot-measure strategy didn’t pan out for the Harris campaign.

[Break]

Demsas: I want to pull us out of this media conversation here, because I think that there’s also this, let’s say things go a little bit differently—and again, the margins here are not very big—and Harris has won.

I think one of the big things we’d be hearing right now is that she won because of abortion, right? And looking at Election Night, you see a lot of wins for abortion. There are 10 states that have referendums on abortion policies, and seven of them win: New York, Maryland, Arizona, Nevada, Colorado, Montana, Missouri. And in Florida, where it loses, the threshold is 60 percent and it earns 57 percent, so it lost, but there’s clearly a majority in favor.

And, going in, I mean, especially after the midterms, there was a real feeling, kind of the big narrative that came out of those midterms was that abortion is the place where Democrats can clearly distinguish and can clearly win over Republican candidates, even in deeply Republican states, and especially in deeply purple states.

And I’m trying to think through this. What explains in your mind the sort of difference between how many voters were saying, Yes, I do have more liberal views on abortion; I’m willing to express those in these ballot measures; but no, I’m not going to then reward Democratic presidential candidate Kamala Harris for it?

Miller: Well, a couple of things. No. 1, this tension has always existed as old as time, and it’s particularly existed as old as time in places like Florida. I did one of these, you know, time is a flat circle—

Demsas: [Laughs.]

Miller: I forget which election it was at this point, but it was like, how did the minimum-wage-increase ballot initiative in Florida pass at the same time that Ron DeSantis won by 18 points or whatever, whichever election that was.

And it’s like, voters are complicated. Voters have complex views. And so you see this as kind of just a common thing in voter habits. In this case, I think that there are a couple of complicating factors in addition. No. 1 was, Donald Trump muddied the waters on his views.

Demsas: Yeah.

Miller: And I think that Donald Trump’s whole brand and vibe—I know we’re getting outside of the data space that you like to be in, Jerusalem, but there’s a certain group of people that are like, Yeah, that guy’s not gonna ban abortion. You know what I mean? And there’s just some percentage of voters out there that that’s just it. He doesn’t come off like Ted Cruz on abortion. He comes off as different, because they assume that he paid for an abortion or whatever, that he doesn’t care about it, and that he’s not gonna—this isn’t gonna be what he’s focused on. There are going to be people that are pro-choice that prioritize their economic views or their nativist views, right?

So that is going to be some of it. I think less so in Florida, but more in Arizona. To me, I think that there is actually a strategic backfiring of having these ballot initiatives on the ballot almost gave some people an out to do both, right? People that did not like Kamala Harris or that were more center-right and said, Oh, okay, great, I can protect abortion in Arizona and also vote for Donald Trump. I can have my cake and eat it, too.

Demsas: Yeah, I mean, I think my read of it is more that when you think about the specific argument being made about abortion, it was largely, he’s to blame for all these horrible things that are happening to women in states that have made abortion inaccessible. And by he, I mean Trump is to blame for that. And also, you know, he appointed these Supreme Court nominees who overturned Roe v. Wade. But as a prescription for the future, I feel like there was not a real clear argument made to voters of how Kamala Harris is going to actually protect abortion.

But again, it all comes back to the overarching question, did voters view this as an abortion election? And it seems clear that they viewed it as an inflation election. That was the core thing that they were focused on. And I think that one thing that I’ve heard a lot is what this means for understanding America, right?

So after 2016, people were just, I think, in shock, and were saying, I can’t believe this is the country I live in. And again here I’m hearing the sort of question of, you know, this is a black mark on the conscience of America, that people would vote for someone who threatened to overturn the results of the 2020 election, who talks with such liberal disdain for women and immigrants.

Something someone said to me in 2016 was really interesting: If your entire perception of America would have shifted if a few hundred thousand people voted differently, maybe don’t completely change everything you believe about everyone. And to me, I think that this framing about Trump’s reelection means something really dark about all the people that voted for him doesn’t really sit well with me because it seems like people are voting based on cost of living. At the same time, too, I think they’re taking their signal from Democrats who, if they’d taken their own warnings about the threat of fascism or the threat to our institutions, I think would have behaved very differently over the past couple of years in trying to win.

Miller: Yeah. It doesn’t change my view of the American people, really, that there are good people and bad people everywhere, that we all have good and bad inside of us. I’ll say that what it does impact for me—and maybe this is wrong and maybe I’m raw and it’s six days out—but for those of us who do have a belief that there’s something kind of special about the American system and that have revered America, that understand that America is flawed and has made mistakes but still is a unique experiment in the world. You know, the “America is an idea” type of thing.

The idea is pretty dim at this point. And, to me, that is the change, having him win again, that I’m having trouble getting over. Mentally, it’s not that it makes me look poorly at my neighbors, but that we just might be at the end of the experiment and the sense that America is something different than Hungary or Switzerland or whatever, any country—you name the country.

It was the old fight with Republicans and Democrats during the Obama years, which is, Obama doesn’t think of America as any different than Belgium. Obama believes in Belgian exceptionalism. And that to me is kind of where I am. I think that we’re about to move into an era where America’s flaws, in addition to all of our existing flaws like gun violence and our history of racism, et cetera—the American system’s flaws look a lot more like what flaws look like in other countries.

There’s going to be oligarchy, kleptocracy, corruption. There’s no special sense that the huddled masses around the world are welcome here any more than they might be welcome anywhere else. They frankly are probably going to be welcome here less than they’re welcome in certain other places.

And so to me, that is what I see differently. I reserve the right to change my mind about that at some point, but that’s where I’m at right now.

Demsas: Yeah. I think in contrast to this large view about the American idea of maybe being different than we believed beforehand is this, I think, really popular take that’s picking up steam, which is about just Democrats need to moderate on cultural issues, whether it’s about immigration, or it’s the issue of trans women and girls in sports. They’re just too left of the median voter, and you don’t actually need to do a bunch else other than accept that people are where they are on those places and not go so far away from it.

The data point that’s kind of in favor of this, particularly on the trans-girls-in-sports one, is Kamala Harris’s leading super PAC, Future Forward, finds that the most effective, or one of the most effective, Trump ads is one of the “Kamala is for they/them, President Trump is for you” ads. They find that it shifted the race 2.7 percentage points in Trump’s favor after people watched it.

How relevant do you think that the Democratic Party’s leftward shift on cultural issues is to Harris’s loss? And I mean, there’s some people who I think are really making the claim that you could just really focus on this and you don’t need to make these kind of larger arguments about strategy or how we’re speaking to America on economic policy.

Miller: I don’t think that this was alone to account for Harris’s loss or even maybe the biggest thing to account for her loss. I think that she didn’t really respond to that ad in particular quite well, and that maybe that was a strategic mistake. I think her campaign—and she didn’t run like an overly “woke,” culturally left campaign. Ao the question is, did the Democratic brand on those issues drag her down? I think possibly.

To me, look, could Kamala Harris have squeaked out a victory this time while holding the same positions on trans issues had inflation been 20 percent better? Maybe. Probably. It was a clear victory for Trump, but it wasn’t, you know, Reagan ’84.

A couple of things changed, and had that one, the cultural stuff stayed static, could she have still won? Clearly. I mean, Biden won in 2020, when all of those issues were more high-salience, I think, than they were this time. Biden, not a Black woman—so maybe there’s something to that as well, that he was able to be a little bit more resilient against attacks on those issues.

So maybe that’s worth thinking about. I would say this, though. If the Democrats want to have 60 senators again ever, then yeah, they got to moderate on cultural issues. You know what I mean? There are two ways to look at this: Can Democrats still win elections by maintaining their views on everything? Yes. Are the Democrats giving away huge swaths of the country by not really even engaging with their concerns about the leftward shift of the party on a wide array of issues? Yeah, they are. I get the land-doesn’t-vote thing, I get it, but look at the map.

Demsas: [Laughs.] We’ve all seen the map.

Miller: The map is still the map, you know what I mean?

And Trump gained in all of those little red counties out there where it’s just land, all right? But he gained. There are a handful of people out there, and he got more of them, in every county. And the Democrats’, I think, choice to just say, Well, we’re just giving up on that and we’re just going to focus on the more dynamic parts of the growing parts of the country and, eventually, demographics are destiny and blah, blah, blah, that looks like a pretty bad bet today.

I’m not out here being like, yeah, you got to throw trans people or migrants under the bus for them to win. But certainly the cultural leftward shift has created a ceiling on Democratic support that I think has a negative effect for the party, but also for progress on a lot of those issues.

Demsas: Yeah. I think it’s obviously very up in the air here, how people are gonna take this mantle of how you should moderate, and I think that there’s bad and good ways that people can take this. And I think that there’s a level to which people—you don’t have to be throwing trans people under the bus. Maybe we need to figure out ways, whether it’s how Democrats responded to this with gay rights, where they talked about federalism a lot and made sure the country moved toward the issue before making it a national issue.

But I think the most important and damning thing that Democrats are clearly responsible for in the choices they have made is about the poor governance in blue cities and states. This is one of my hobbyhorses, but you see massive shifts, as you mentioned, in high-cost-of-living places that are heavily democratic, in New York and in California and in a lot of the Northeast. And I think it’s hard to see that as anything other than just a repudiation of Democratic governance and particularly the cost of living and the cost of housing in these places.

And so, to me, when you talked about the Democratic brand, I mean, when you’re in a cost-of-living election, yes, there are marginal effects on these cultural issues we’re talking about here. Yes, there are things that campaigns can do better. Yes, there are candidate effects. But if people are asking themselves, What does it look like, how does it feel to my pocketbook to live in a Democratically run state versus a Republican one? I feel like they’re being told a very clear story.

Miller: I think that that’s true. I’ve been ruminating on this a lot over the past week. I live in Louisiana, so there is the kind of emotional guttural response I have to this, which is, do you think Louisiana is being governed that well? Because I don’t.

Demsas: Yeah. Well, on cost, though, right? It’s cheaper, obviously, to have a house in Louisiana.

Miller: It’s cheaper to have a house in Louisiana because of the economic destruction of the state over the past couple of decades and the fact that everybody that grows up in parts of the state that’s not this corridor between New Orleans and Baton Rouge leave home. And a lot of people in these places leave home, too, looking for better economic opportunities. And that’s sad for the state.

That is my initial response, which is emotional, which is like, okay, sure. But why does Kamala Harris have to carry the baggage for the place I used to live—Oakland—but Donald Trump doesn’t have to carry the baggage for the hollowing out of big parts of Louisiana? That said, it’s true that it hurt the Democrats, right? And it’s also true that the Democrats have been badly managing these big cities. And if you just look at the numbers, suburban Democrats—and this could be a counterargument. Now, I’m going to really give you a galaxy brain, Jerusalem, to your original data point earlier that the three-point effect in the battleground states versus national speaks to a campaign effect? Maybe.

Maybe it also speaks to the fact that a lot of these battleground states are made up of places that have mixed governance and big suburbs where the Democrats are doing better. Democrats are doing better in suburban America because they know they’re not feeling the acute pain of governing issues that have plagued a lot of the big cities. And surely there are a couple of big cities in those seven swing states, but none of the ones you think of when you think of major disruptions, and that maybe that explains it and that the Republican gains were in a lot more of those places like that, Illinois, New Jersey, California. Anyway, just something to noodle on.

But I think that it is objectively true that Democrats are doing better in places that have not been plagued by some of these bad governing decisions on crime and on housing that we’ve seen for in Democratic cities, and the Democratic mayors and Democratic governors in blue states should fix that.

And it’s the No. 1 thing—the last thing I’ll say on this is—the No. 1 thing that comes to mind when I already hear stupid parlor-game stuff about 2028 and it’s like Gavin Newsom and J. B. Pritzker. And to me, the No. 1 thing Gavin Newsom and J. B. Pritzker need to do if they want to run in 2027 is make Illinois and California run better in the meantime. Otherwise, nothing against either of those two guys, but I think that they’re going to carry this baggage that you’re talking about.

Demsas: Well, I could go on about housing in blue states forever. And there’s an article popping, I think today, listeners, as you’re hearing about this, about why I think this was a big issue for the election.

But Tim, always our last and final question.

Miller: Okay.

Miller: What is something that you once thought was a good idea but ended up only being good on paper?

Miller: Oh, okay. Hold on. I wasn’t prepared for this. I misread the question. I thought it was an idea that was only good on paper that then ended up being not good on paper.

Demsas: Idea could be good.

Miller: No, no, no. I’ll come up with one where I’m wrong. I’m happy to bet where I’m wrong. I was just saying the ideas are endless on those.

Demsas: Oh. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Something that you held, yeah, yeah, yeah.

Miller: An idea that I thought that was good on paper that ended up not being good on paper. Well, I guess I have to give the obvious answer to that question, sadly. I don’t get to rant about daylight savings time as I hoped to—an idea that was certainly good on paper in the 1800s or whenever they came up with it that’s no longer good. Falling back, that is. Permanent daylight saving time: good idea.

Changing times: not good.

Demsas: Four hundred electoral votes for whoever does this.

Miller: Yeah. The idea that I thought that was good on paper that is relevant to this podcast—because I literally put it on paper and wrote it—was the aforementioned 2013 GOP autopsy.

Demsas: Oh, yeah.

Miller: Well, how great! Compassionate conservatism. Republicans can diversify their party by getting softer on cultural issues and reaching out to the suburbs and reaching out to Hispanic voters and Black voters, criminal-justice reform, and that through criminal-justice reform and immigration reform and softening on gays, that Republicans can have a new, diverse electorate, and we can all move into a happy, bipartisan future.

That was a great idea on paper that backfired spectacularly, and now the Republicans have their most diverse electorate that they’ve had ever, I think, voting for Donald Trump after rejecting all of those suggestions that I put on paper. So there you go.

Demsas: As one vote of confidence for younger Tim, there are very many ways that history could have gone. I think that people often forget how contingent things are and how unique of a figure Trump is. And right now we’ve talked through a bunch of different ways that people are reading this moment, but there are a lot of ways that people can go, depending on what candidates do and say and how they catch fire and their charisma and what ends up being relevant in two years and in four years. So a little bit of sympathy for younger Tim.

Miller: I appreciate that. And that is true. Who the hell knows, right?

Demsas: Yeah, exactly.

Miller: Had Donald Trump not run that time and he decided he wanted to do some other scam instead, then maybe Marco Rubio is the nominee and those things do come to pass.

Demsas: [Laughs.] Yeah. If Obama doesn’t make fun of him at the White House Correspondents’ Dinner, we’re not even sitting here on this podcast.

Miller: Great job, Jon Lovett, or whoever wrote that joke.

Demsas: [Laughs.]

Miller: I’m just joking.

Demsas: Yeah. Well, thank you so much, Tim. Thanks for coming on the show.

Miller: Thank you, Jerusalem.

[Music]

Demsas: Good on Paper is produced by Jinae West. It was edited by Claudine Ebeid and engineered by Erica Huang. Our theme music is composed by Rob Smierciak. Claudine Ebeid is the executive producer of Atlantic audio. Andrea Valdez is our managing editor.

And hey, if you like what you’re hearing, please leave us a rating and review on Apple Podcasts.

I’m Jerusalem Demsas, and we’ll see you next week.