China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is reportedly building a new command center in the capital, Beijing, that, upon completion, will be at least 10 times larger than the US Pentagon.

Financial Times said that the construction of the mega-sized facility, which has been widely reported in mainstream media, has raised alarm among Western intelligence agencies, which think Beijing is preparing for a large-scale or even nuclear war.

The FT report said newly-analyzed satellite images showed that the project under construction is on a 1,500-acre site 30 kilometers southwest of Beijing. The images showed at least 100 cranes operating over a five-square-kilometer area.

The report said military experts believe that the facility will include heavily fortified bunkers to protect Chinese Communist Party (CCP) top leaders if a large-scale war breaks out. It said the construction of the facility began in mid-2024.

Intelligence analysts have reportedly nicknamed the project “Beijing Military City” as it will become the world’s largest military command center once completed.

FT said its reporters had tried to get close to the construction site but were blocked by security guards. A local shopkeeper told the outlet that the site is a military area.

The report coincided with US President Donald Trump’s call for building an expansive, next-generation “Iron Dome” missile defense shield for the mainland US. The shield, which will have a much larger coverage than Israel’s, will be designed to shoot down hypersonic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

China’s Foreign Ministry has not yet responded to the FT report and Trump’s Iron Dome program as the country celebrates the Chinese New Year from January 28 to February 4.

It is no secret, however, that China already has nuclear bunkers and underground military command centers. In 2017, China Central TV reported that the PLA’s command headquarters in Xishan in southwest Beijing is 100 meters underground. It said PLA officers have started giving commands for military exercises from there since 2013.

“Our country adopts an active defense strategy,” Qian Qihu, a Chinese military engineer, told CCTV in an interview in August 2022. “As we don’t fire the first shot, we need to protect ourselves from our enemy’s first attack, then we can fight back.”

“Our strategic weapons must be fully protected. We must be able to keep ourselves safe from any of the enemy’s attacks, including nuclear strikes,” Qian said. “As the enemy’s means of attacks continue to evolve, our defense methods also need to evolve. And we should not rely on a single defense method.”

After graduating from Harbin Engineering University in 1961, Qian was sent to the Soviet Union’s Kuybyshev Military Engineering Academy, which is now known as the Combined Arms Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, to study military engineering and geology.

In Kuybyshev (known as Samara before 1935 and after 1991), Qian learned how the Soviet Union built a bunker for its supreme leader Joseph Stalin in 1942.

The facility, 37 meters below the ground, was aimed to be Stalin’s alternative military command headquarters. But Stalin never used it and was even a tourist site in the 1990s.

After China successfully tested its first hydrogen bomb in June 1967 with the help of the Soviet Union, Qian led China’s development of nuclear-resistant buildings.

In the 1980s, Qian led a team of researchers to design underground bunkers as the West developed massive ordnance penetrators (MOP) that could destroy targets tens of meters below the ground.

Today, the United States’ GBU-57A/B MOP can penetrate 60-meter-thick cement and as far as 200 meters underground.

Hsu Yen-chi, a researcher of the Council on Strategic and Wargaming Studies, a Taipei-based think tank, told the media that the ongoing construction project in Beijing is bigger than a military school and is more like an administrative organization or a large training base than a nuclear bunker.

In fact, the PLA has already identified a nearby site to build its nuclear bunker.

In January 2018, Qin Dajun, a deputy researcher at the Institute of Geology and Geophysics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, told the South China Morning Post that Chinese researchers found a solutional cave suitable for building a nuclear-resistant bunker.

He said the spacious limestone cave, located at the Xishan Forest Park, 20 kilometers southwest of Beijing, has a natural water source. He said the cave is 2,000 meters underground, compared with the depth of 2,200 meters of Krubera Cave in Georgia.

Qin’s comments came after North Korea defied Beijing’s warnings to test its nuclear bombs in 2017.

Some commentators said even if the CCP has the capability and a deep cave to build a nuclear bunker, it would not be wise to hide all party leaders in a single place during wartime.

Canada-based Chinese commentator Wen Zhao says on his YouTube channel that when a war breaks out, CCP leaders should hide in different places to maximize their survival chances. He says a mega-military command center will attract more military attacks from the enemy than usual.

In fact, some other observers said it’s likely that CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping will move to Xian in Shaanxi during wartime as the city is well protected by high mountains and missile systems.

In 1900, when the troops of the Eight-Nation Alliance, led by the US, France and Germany, marched into Beijing, Qing Empress Cixi fled to Xian, where she claimed to enjoy hunting, and stayed there for a year.

Yong Jian is a contributor to the Asia Times. He is a Chinese journalist who specializes in Chinese technology, economy and politics.

Read: Why China’s Ice Silk Road has Trump up in Arctic arms

The new US administration has made digital finance an early priority, championing three pieces of legislation governing digital assets—the GENIUS Act, the CLARITY Act, and the CBDC Anti-Surveillance State Act.

The first bill was signed into law by President Donald Trump on July 18, while the latter two recently advanced to the Senate. The laws have given a boost to advocates of digital assets, but face harsh criticism from consumer advocacy groups and experts over safety and stability concerns.

As US policymakers continue to consider the promise and perils of digital finance, they should look toward the experience of India, a global leader in digital payments and digital public infrastructure, for critical lessons on the centralization and adoption of consumer-facing digital finance.

Public foundations, private applications

Although the bills collectively clarify the federal regulation of many digital assets for the first time, they broadly sideline the federal government from the developing ecosystem of digital finance.

The clearest manifestation of this trend is the ban on Federal Reserve digital currencies in the CBDC Anti-Surveillance State Act, a policy that—if enacted—would make the United States an international outlier.

For its part, the CLARITY Act would effectively reduce federal scrutiny of digital assets like cryptocurrencies. These aspects of the new legislation represent components of a broader agenda of deregulation, but they carry particular risks for the development of secure and successful digital finance in the United States.

India offers a useful lesson in productive state-led digital finance, demonstrating a healthy balance between public-led initiatives and private sector partnerships that ultimately deliver quality options to consumers.

India’s central government has proactively developed “digital public infrastructure” (DPI) under the India Stack framework and positioned the state as a provider of digital public goods.

In India’s digital payments ecosystem, for instance, the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) oversees the Unified Payments Interface (UPI) and serves as the central hub for real-time transactions between banks, payment service providers, and consumers.

However, because of UPI’s openness and interoperability, private sector platforms are among the biggest winners of India’s digital finance revolution, including US firms—Google Pay and PhonePe (owned by Walmart) process nearly 90% of transactions.

Moreover, government involvement through the centralized hub unlocks improved consumer data protection and record-keeping to combat fraud and financial crime.

Achieving adoption

India’s experience also demonstrates the key role of adoption in the transition to digital finance.

Certainly, many of the initial applications of stablecoin technology will be for back-end transactions in financial markets, but US companies will eventually look to harness consumer-facing stablecoins to ease retail payment costs and enable new offers or discounts.

As consumers adapt to novel technologies and navigate a potential proliferation of digital asset offerings, adoption will be a major roadblock—especially given the sluggish US shift to digital payments.

India’s digital finance adoption has been remarkable. With difficult initial conditions, the Asian country has emerged as the global leader in real-time digital payments, processing 18 billion transactions each month.

The Indian government achieved this rapid adoption through forward-looking initiatives that laid the groundwork for the digital finance ecosystem, including the aggressive implementation of the “JAM trinity” of banking, identification, and mobile access.

Then, in designing the ecosystem, NPCI prioritized simplicity, convenience, and cross-platform integration—all boons for otherwise reluctant or unaccustomed consumers.

Lastly, political initiatives played a major role in pitching digital finance to the wider population, exemplified by the public-facing Digital India program.

Due to variations in economy and demography, the Indian experience does not map directly onto the United States, but policymakers should heed the universalizable lessons on the importance of complementary digital infrastructure, consumer-friendly principles, and awareness-building.

Policy outlook

How can US officials integrate these insights into the policy agenda for digital assets? First, the US government should embrace centralization, either through proactive public development or—more likely—through pointed regulation of private sector players.

For back-end stablecoin applications, the development of a central hub akin to NPCI would lend stability to the emerging digital financial system, as well as improved documentation and cybersecurity.

For consumer-facing applications, although the US government is unlikely to develop or require a unified digital assets platform, regulations aimed at ensuring openness and interoperability will help stem the growth of a complicated landscape of siloed proprietary stablecoins.

Second, if the administration intends on making the United States the “undisputed leader in digital assets,” it must take adoption seriously. To build up complementary infrastructure, India proliferated bank accounts and mobile phones—the US government could focus on augmenting connectivity or spreading access to new financial technologies like digital wallets.

Moreover, adoption relies on trust. If regulators continue to underdeliver on consumer protection, the United States will struggle to maintain leadership on digital assets for retail applications. But if the US government follows the Indian example, companies and consumers alike will benefit from the new era of digital assets.

Andrew Gordan is a Motwani Jadeja US-India fellow at the Pacific Forum, where he researches Indian tech diplomacy. He also serves as a junior fellow in the South Asia Program at The Stimson Center think tank. He received his BA in Government from Harvard and is a recipient of the Boren and Fulbright-Nehru scholarships. He has previously worked at The Council on Foreign Relations, Wilson Center and Harvard’s Davis Center.

In a geopolitical arena increasingly defined by shadows and silence, few conflicts exemplify the dynamics of proxy warfare better than the ongoing militancy in Pakistan’s Balochistan province.

On July 15, geopolitical commentator Brian Berletic reignited this debate by alleging that Washington may be quietly enabling Baloch militants to accelerate militant activities, particularly against the Chinese engineers and Pakistani security forces in the province.

While the veracity of his claims remains contested, they tap into a growing body of evidence suggesting that Baloch militancy is no longer a purely domestic insurgency and is becoming a lever in a broader strategic tug-of-war between two powers.

In the last two weeks, Balochistan has witnessed a dozen militant attacks that killed more than 50 people, including two major rank officers of the Pakistan Army.

Balochistan, long a flashpoint of political dissent and insurgency, has now become a fault line in a larger global confrontation. Bordering Iran and Afghanistan and home to the strategic Gwadar Port, the province is a linchpin in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Gwadar’s connectivity offers Beijing a trade route bypassing the Malacca Strait, thereby unsettling the strategic calculus of Washington and its allies. Against this backdrop, each explosion targeting Chinese assets seems to echo not just domestic discontent but also certain international anxieties.

While there is no smoking gun linking the US to Baloch separatists, circumstantial indicators have become difficult to dismiss.

Reports by institutions such as the US Institute of Peace, Foreign Policy and Radio Free Europe have chronicled how abandoned American weapons in Afghanistan, left in the wake of America’s hasty 2021 withdrawal, have found their way into the hands of militant groups, including the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Such proliferation of US materiel, even if unintended, becomes part of the strategic ecosystem shaping violence in the region, especially in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The narrative becomes murkier when considering ideological affinities. Baloch insurgents, unlike jihadist movements, couch their rhetoric in secular nationalism, democratic rights and ethnic self-determination, terms that align comfortably with Western liberal values.

This alignment has earned them platforms in Washington and Brussels, with diaspora organizations such as the Baloch American Congress advocating openly for US congressional intervention and global scrutiny of Pakistani counterinsurgency policies.

While public lobbying does not equate to covert sponsorship, the optics are telling. The same BLA that has claimed responsibility for suicide bombings against Chinese nationals in the recent past is the subject of panel discussions and briefings in Western capitals.

The US government’s 2019 designation of the BLA as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) appears, on closer inspection, more cosmetic than consequential. Little effort has apparently been made to stem the group’s transnational networking, fundraising or narrative-building efforts.

This duality is not unprecedented. From Latin America to the Middle East, the US has a long history of maintaining a diplomatic posture in public while facilitating, or at least tolerating, destabilizing elements in private.

In Syria, for instance, American condemnation of jihadist violence was accompanied by covert support to anti-Assad forces. The lines between rebels and terrorists were often redrawn depending on the utility they offered against regional rivals.

In insurgent-riddled Balochistan, the strategic logic is not so different. Baloch militants disrupting China’s infrastructure investments serve a purpose, even if Washington’s hands appear clean.

The same logic applies to Iran, where Baloch-dominated areas in Sistan and Baluchestan remain hotspots of insurgent activity. Tehran has consistently accused the US and Israel of fostering groups like Jaish al-Adl – a Sunni militant group responsible for attacks on Iranian security forces.

Whether these claims are true or false, the persistent instability in these borderlands benefits actors looking to contain Iran’s regional reach.

India’s role further complicates the equation. Wary of growing China-Pakistan cooperation, New Delhi has been accused by Islamabad of funding Baloch separatists from Dubai, the UAE and other Gulf states. With the Taliban now in power and reshuffling regional alliances, the question of who continues to aid the BLA has resurfaced.

Pakistan’s muted response to these developments is telling. Despite a litany of attacks on security forces and Chinese personnel in Pakistan, Islamabad has avoided naming the US as a potential stakeholder in the insurgency.

Instead, the blame is largely directed at India, or vaguely attributed to “hostile intelligence agencies.” This diplomatic restraint is not without reason. Pakistan’s economic fragility—underscored by recurring bailouts from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and reliance on Western financial systems—leaves it ill-equipped to confront Washington directly.

Yet silence carries its own risks. By refusing to confront the full scope of the insurgency’s geopolitical entanglements, Pakistan allows the crisis to metastasize. Equally damaging is the state’s failure to differentiate between legitimate political dissent and armed rebellion.

Baloch youth, academics and civil rights activists are often swept into the same security net as armed insurgents. The resulting alienation fuels resentment, creating a fertile ground for both radicalization and foreign manipulation.

The case of imprisoned Mahrang Baloch, a civil rights advocate whose peaceful calls for justice have been met with suspicion and surveillance, illustrates this conflation. In the eyes of the Pakistani state, a protester with a placard is often indistinguishable from a militant with a gun.

This securitized lens has not only delegitimized meaningful political dialogue but has also deprived Islamabad of moderate Baloch interlocutors capable of bridging the widening trust deficit.

In this vacuum of political disengagement, external actors are pursuing their strategic interests. The less space Pakistan provides for peaceful negotiation and catharsis, the more attractive insurgency becomes, not just for disillusioned Baloch youth, but for global players seeking soft targets in their strategic contestations.

Proxy wars, after all, do not require formal alliances; they merely need alignment of interests. And align they do. Baloch militants are disrupting China’s economic vision, challenging Iran’s border security and exposing Pakistan’s internal fissures—all without implicating Western capitals in overt complicity.

This is the new face of hybrid conflict: wars fought without declarations, allies backed without acknowledgment and casualties incurred without consequence.

For Pakistan, the path forward requires more than military operations and international complaints. It demands an honest reckoning with its internal policies and external dependencies.

Until the state distinguishes political grievances from armed rebellion, invests in inclusive governance and navigates its foreign partnerships with clarity and conviction, Balochistan will remain vulnerable – not just to insurgency, but to the invisible hands that steer it for great strategic interests.

In the chessboard of 21st-century geopolitics, militancy is rarely merely a domestic affair. It is a mirror reflecting the ambitions of distant capitals. To ignore this is to mistake the symptom for the cause, and in doing so, to risk losing both the province and the peace in Balochistan.

As Israel continues its attacks on Iran, US President Donald Trump and other global leaders are hardening their stance against the Islamic Republic.

While considering a US attack on Iran’s nuclear sites, Trump has threatened Iran’s supreme leader, claiming to know his location and calling him “an easy target.” He has demanded “unconditional surrender” from Iran.

Meanwhile, countries such as Germany, Canada, the UK and Australia have toughened their rhetoric, demanding Iran fully abandon its nuclear program. So, as the pressure mounts on Iran, has it been left to fight alone? Or does it have allies that could come to its aid?

Has Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’ fully collapsed?

Iran has long relied on a network of allied paramilitary groups across the Middle East as part of its deterrence strategy. This approach has largely shielded it from direct military strikes by the US or Israel, despite constant threats and pressure.

This so-called “axis of resistance” includes groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq, the Houthi militants in Yemen, as well as Hamas in Gaza, which has long been under Iran’s influence to varying degrees. Iran also supported Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria before it was toppled last year.

Members of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) carry images of comrades killed in US airstrikes in western Iraq in 2024. Photo: Ahmed Jalil / EPA via The Conversation

These groups have served both as a regional buffer and as a means for Iran to project power without direct engagement. However, over the past two years, Israel has dealt significant blows to the network.

Hezbollah — once Iran’s most powerful non-state ally — has been effectively neutralised after months of attacks by Israel. Its weapons stocks were systematically targeted and destroyed across Lebanon. And the group suffered a major psychological and strategic loss with the assassination of its most influential leader, Hassan Nasrallah.

In Syria, Iranian-backed militias have been largely expelled following the fall of Assad’s regime, stripping Iran of another key foothold in the region.

That said, Iran maintains strong influence in Iraq and Yemen. The PMF in Iraq, with an estimated 200,000 fighters, remains formidable. The Houthis have similarly-sized contingent of fighters in Yemen.

Should the situation escalate into an existential threat to Iran — as the region’s only Shiite-led state — religious solidarity could drive these groups to become actively involved. This would rapidly expand the war across the region.

The PMF, for instance, could launch attacks on the 2,500 US troops stationed in Iraq. Indeed, the head of Kata’ib Hezbollah, one of the PMF’s more hardline factions, promised to do so:

If America dares to intervene in the war, we will directly target its interests and military bases spread across the region without hesitation.

Iran itself could also target US bases in the Persian Gulf countries with ballistic missiles, as well as close the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20% of the world’s oil supply flows.

Houthi supporters hold anti-US and Israel placards and wave the flags of the Iran-backed ‘axis of resistance’ during a protest in Yemen’s capital. Photo: Yahya Arhab / EPA via The Conversation

Will Iran’s regional and global allies step in?

Several regional powers maintain close ties with Iran. The most notable among them is Pakistan — the only Islamic country with a nuclear arsenal.

For weeks, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has tried to align Iran more closely with Pakistan in countering Israel’s actions in Gaza.

In a sign of Pakistan’s importance in the Israel-Iran war, Trump has met with the country’s army chief in Washington as he weighs a possible strike on its neighbour.

Pakistan’s leaders have also made their allegiances very clear. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has offered Iran’s president “unwavering solidarity” in the “face of Israel’s unprovoked aggression.” And Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif recently said in an interview Israel will “think many times before taking on Pakistan.”

These statements signal a firm stance without explicitly committing to intervention.

Yet, Pakistan has also been working to de-escalate tensions. It has urged other Muslim-majority nations and its strategic partner, China, to intervene diplomatically before the violence spirals into a broader regional war.

In recent years, Iran has also made diplomatic overtures to former regional rivals, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, in order to improve relations.

These shifts have helped rally broader regional support for Iran. Nearly two dozen Muslim-majority countries — including some that maintain diplomatic relations with Israel — have jointly condemned Israel’s actions and urged de-escalation.

It’s unlikely, though, that regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey would support Iran materially, given their strong alliances with the US.

Iran’s key global allies, Russia and China, have also condemned Israel’s strikes. They have previously shielded Tehran from punitive resolutions at the UN Security Council.

However, neither power appears willing — at least for now — to escalate the confrontation by providing direct military support to Iran or engaging in a standoff with Israel and the US.

Theoretically, this could change if the conflict widens and Washington openly pursues a regime change strategy in Tehran. Both nations have major geopolitical and security interests in Iran’s stability.

This is due to Iran’s long-standing “Look East” policy and the impact its instability could have on the region and the global economy. However, at the current stage, many analysts believe both are unlikely to get involved directly.

Moscow stayed on the sidelines when Assad’s regime collapsed in Syria, one of Russia’s closest allies in the region. Not only is it focused on its war in Ukraine, Russia also wouldn’t want to endanger improving ties with the Trump administration.

China has offered Iran strong rhetorical support, but history suggests it has little interest in getting directly involved in Middle Eastern conflicts.

Ali Mamouri is research fellow, Middle East Studies, Deakin University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Between June 13 and 24 Iran launched 574 missiles attacking Israel. Some of them got through, despite Israeli and US efforts to stop them. Until now we have lacked convincing data allowing some cogent analysis of the results of missile defenses. That information is partly supplied by a new study by the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, a Washington-based think tank that is pro-US defense and pro-Israel.

There are some surprises. The biggest one is the role of THAAD operated by US personnel in Israel and in the Gulf.

THAAD is the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system. It is designed to intercept short-, medium- and long-range ballistic missiles. THAAD interceptors cost $12.7 million each, making them expensive, but not nearly as costly as the AEGIS SM-3 Block 2A interceptor that is priced at just under $28 million per shot.

THAAD is a hit-to-kill, or kinetic kill, interceptor that does not use explosives. It has an operational ceiling of around 92 miles, so it is not capable of exoatmospheric intercepts (310 to 620 miles). Israel’s high altitude interceptor, Arrow 3, is said to be capable of intercepts in the exoatmosphere.

According to the JINSA report, in the June conflict THAAD intercepted 47.7 percent of all the missiles fired at Israel, an unexpectedly high proportion. In doing so, the US expended at least 14% of its total THAAD interceptor stockpile. JINSA says it will take Lockheed, which manufactures the THAAD interceptors, around eight years to replenish the US stockpile, assuming the rate of production is not significantly increased.

Take Note: We only know the number of Iranian missiles shot down by THAAD (92). We do not know how many THAAD interceptors were launched to shoot down the Iranian missiles. The 14% figure represents the claimed kills, not the actual number fired. Thus the remaining inventory of THAAD interceptors may be smaller than stated in the report.

There are a couple of important caveats. The first is that the US is supplying other countries with THAAD systems. Saudi Arabia has a THAAD system delivered from the United States and 50 interceptors. However, it has ordered 360 interceptors, which will take years to manufacture.

Saudi THAAD personnel. Photo: Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense

The UAE reportedly has 192 THAAD interceptors, although it is not clear all have been delivered.

The US also has THAAD systems in South Korea (where there are now reports North Korea is boosting its missile production) and in Hawaii, Guam and Wake Island. Given the Chinese missile threat and regional volatility, the US may have to beef up supplies for the Pacific. The alternative is to reply on AEGIS, a very expensive system that operates at sea and therefore is not capable of fully protecting US and allied bases in the region.

The second problem is intercepting hypersonic missiles. Iran reportedly used some of these attacking Israel. China and Russia already have them (e.g., DF-17 with DF-2F hypersonic glide vehicles and Russia’s Avangard and Oreshnik ballistic missiles, plus Kinzhal and Zircon). THAAD probably needs to have longer range and speed to counter hypersonic missiles, something that has been proposed (THAAD-ER) but not yet approved.

Israel has Arrow 2 and Arrow 3, the latter able to operate in the exoatmosphere. In the recent conflict, Israel says it intercepted more than 200 Iranian missiles, Another 258 missiles were not intercepted because Israel determined they were not going to hit populated areas or critical infrastructure. THAAD intercepted 92 Iranian missiles.

According to Israeli reports, that left 57 Iranian missiles that got through and did damage.

What the information tells us is that more than half of Iran’s missiles were inaccurate (for one reason or another). It tells us that Israel does not have an adequate missile intercept inventory or launcher capability. Apparently Israel recognizes this shortcoming, but it depends on US manufacturing to help fill the gaps.

It also tells us that Israel cannot defend its territory without the United States. The great importance of THAAD for defending Israel is critical.

The JINSA report does not take into account Iranian and other drones fired at Israel. However, that threat will also multiply in future. (Israel has Iron Dome and Iron Beam, and can also use its air force to shoot down drones,)

Patriot also played a role in the conflict, mainly to defend al Udeid air base in Qatar. The Iranians fired 14 short and medium range missiles at the air base on the last day of the conflict, and the US was warned about the attack ahead of time by Iran. In response the US launched 30 Patriots and intercepted 13 out of 14 Iran’s missiles. One missile got through and damaged a communications dome on the base.

Before and after photos of damage at Al Udeid Air Base last month. Photo: Planet Labs

In practice this means it takes at least two Patriot interceptors for every enemy missile fired. As is well known, the US is in short supply of Patriot, which the US, its allies and friends rely on for air defense. This has caused significant controversy in connection with supplies of Patriots for Ukraine. The Pentagon has made clear that stockpiles are at a critical level and it does not want to deplete them further in support of Ukraine.

Instead, at President Donald Trump’s initiative, Germany has agreed to supply Patriot interceptors (model unclear, as there are different Patriot interceptors, the most important PAC-3), but Germany does not have enough. The German Defense Minister, Boris Pistorius, is negotiating with his European counterparts, to “find” the missiles Ukraine needs. Allegedly, Germany will pick up the bill for replacing them later., but the Germans now want US guarantees.

The JINSA paper also points out that Israel destroyed some 250 Iranian missile launchers (only after they fired their missiles). This is a luxury that Ukraine, for example, does not have and it is a challenge for the US and its Pacific allies, because finding and destroying adversary launchers (e.g., potentially China’s or Russia’s) is a far bigger challenge than Iran.

The future

The US and Israeli ability to manufacture air defense missiles is inadequate against Russian, Chinese, Iranian and maybe North Korean factories’ ability to produce ballistic missiles. What is true for the defense of Israel, supplementation of Israel’s local air defenses with US assets, also is true for Europe and Asia. NATO has very limited air defenses, well below what Israel has but a need to protect a massively bigger territory.

The United States’ Asian allies Japan and South Korea also have limited air defenses, mainly relying on their own Patriot systems or on Patriot plus AEGIS in the case of Japan. Taiwan has Patriot PAC-3, but not enough systems or missiles. The US, at present, would find it extremely difficult to backstop NATO against a massive attack by Russia, or to support Japan and South Korea, let alone Taiwan, with de minimis stockpiles and too few systems.

There is THAAD in Korea, but not in Japan or Taiwan. Japan even rejected AEGIS Ashore to protect its territory, although it does have four AEGIS-equipped ships. Taiwan publicly rejected THAAD, an incredibly foolish move.

To make a long story short, the US and its allies are not well prepared against saturation missile attacks and don’t have enough coverage to protect military installations, command and control centers, airfields, naval ports or even logistic centers and factories (putting aside attacks focused on critical infrastructure, as we see on a daily basis in Ukraine).

It should be obvious that the US industrial base is not ready for the challenge, that there are not enough factories and that efficiency (understood in terms of output) is low. The Pentagon is still relying on ordering missile production from existing factories rather than really trying to reform the manufacturing infrastructure so we can match the output of Russia, China or even Iran.

Stephen Bryen, a special correspondent to Asia Times and a former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, also previously served as executive director of the JINSA think tank. This article, which originally appeared in his Substack newsletter Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.