What Drones Can—and Cannot—Do on the Battlefield
What Drones Can—and Cannot—Do on the Battlefield

What Drones Can—and Cannot—Do on the Battlefield

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Diverging Reports Breakdown

I Fought in Ukraine and Here’s Why FPV Drones Kind of Suck – War on the Rocks

First-person view drones are unmanned aerial vehicles with four propellers located at the four corners of the craft. They are controlled by an operator wearing virtual-reality goggles that receive the image from the drone’s forward-facing camera. Proponents of drones, especially in Silicon Valley, have claimed that drones might completely replace artillery. The first has to do with how commanders choose how to employ first-Person view drones, writes Alexander Nekrassov. There is a certain logic to this logic, he says, but commanders were not paying for the drones out of their own pockets, he writes.. A mortar shell costs about $500 in materiel, less than $100 of these drone sorties, he adds, and they are usually not available to commanders. The most common types of drone are single-use: They fly directly into their target, where they detonate an explosive charge of up to 1.5 kilograms. They can supposedly react quickly and strike moving targets or targets in difficult-to-reach locations, such as bunkers, basements or inside buildings.

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In 2024 and 2025, I served for six months as an international volunteer on a first-person view attack drone team in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. My team was deployed in the Donbas region, in one of the hottest sectors of the front. When I joined the team, I was excited to work with a cutting-edge tool. By the end of my deployment, I was a bit disillusioned. Let me tell you why.

First-person view drones are unmanned aerial vehicles with four propellers located at the four corners of the craft, roughly in the shape of a square of seven to 12 inches in length on each side. They are controlled by an operator wearing virtual-reality goggles that receive the image from the drone’s forward-facing camera (hence the name first-person view). The most common types of first-person view drones are single-use: They fly directly into their target, where they detonate an explosive charge of up to 1.5 kilograms. These drones are touted as a cheap and accessible solution that can give troops on the tactical level their own organic precision-strike capability. They can supposedly react quickly and strike moving targets or targets in difficult-to-reach locations, such as bunkers, basements, or inside buildings. Proponents of first-person view drones often repeat the claim that as much as 60 to 70 percent of all battlefield casualties in the Russo-Ukrainian War are now caused by drones. This statistic is probably broadly accurate, though it does not differentiate between casualties caused by first-person view drones and other types of uncrewed aerial systems.

Some authors, including experienced military officers writing in these pages, go even further and claim that first-person view drones will precipitate a revolution in how wars are fought, akin to the introduction of muskets. Among other things, they will make concealment and the massing of troops and equipment in the combat zone nearly impossible. Any concentration of troops or vehicles will supposedly be observed immediately and butchered by swarms of cheap, fast drones. Proponents of drones, especially in Silicon Valley, have claimed that drones might completely replace artillery.

Whether or not we believe these far-reaching claims, we’ve certainly all seen the videos on social media of these drones performing impressive, highly precise attacks. We’ve seen them striking a Russian tank on the move, flying through the open back hatch of an infantry fighting vehicle, or entering a building to surprise the enemy, sometimes literally, with their pants down. But those impressive strikes are rare exceptions. The cases when first-person view drones actually do that are few and far between.

During my time in Ukraine, I collected statistics on the success of our drone operations. I found that 43 percent of our sorties resulted in a hit on the intended target in the sense that the drone was able to successfully fly all the way to the target, identify it correctly, hit it, and the drone’s explosive charge detonated as it was supposed to. This number does not include instances when our higher command requested a sortie but we had to decline because we knew that we could not strike the target for reasons such as weather, technical problems, or electronic interference. If this type of pre-aborted mission is included in the total, the success rate drops to between 20 and 30 percent. On the face of it, this success rate is not bad, but that is not the whole story.

I began to notice that the vast majority of our sorties were against targets that had already been struck successfully by a different weapons system, most commonly by a mortar or by a munition dropped by a reusable drone (in other words, not a first-person view drone). Put differently, the goal of the majority of our missions was to deliver the second tap in a double-tap strike against a target that had already been successfully prosecuted by a different weapons system. The proportion of missions when we successfully carried out a task that only a first-person view drone can fulfill — delivering a precision strike on a target that could not be hit by other means — was in the single-digit percent.

There are two reasons why these drones rarely successfully do what they were designed to do. The first has to do with how commanders choose to employ first-person view drones. Presumably, our commanders decided that they had first-person view drones as a capability, so they might as well use them, even if there were other weapons systems that could also do the job. There is a certain logic to this, and the commanders were not paying for the expended drones out of their own pockets. They were more focused on the immediate mission. While first-person view drones are cheap, they are usually not the cheapest option available to commanders. This is the problem with using them in double-tap strikes or for missions that can be achieved by other systems. One of these drone sorties costs about $500 in materiel. A mortar shell costs less than $100. A munition dropped from a reusable drone, usually also something like a modified mortar shell or 40-millimeter grenade, also costs less than $100.

The second reason why these drones rarely do what they were designed to do is technical. They are finicky, unreliable, hard to use, and susceptible to electronic interference. Few first-person view drones have night-vision capability. Those that do are in short supply and cost twice as much as the base model. In Ukraine, in the winter, it’s dark for 14 hours a day. Wind, rain, snow, and fog all mean a drone cannot fly.

A solid quarter of all these drones have some sort of technical fault that prevents them from taking off. This is usually discovered only when they are being prepped for launch. The most common is a fault in the radio receiver that receives inputs from the control panel, or in the video transmitter that transmits the signal to the operator’s virtual-reality goggles. Sometimes this fault can be fixed through a software update in the field. Often, it cannot. Many faulty drones are simply cannibalized for spare parts, because there is no better use for them. Even once a drone is airborne, batteries often die mid-flight. In about 10 percent of sorties, the drone hits the target, but its warhead does not detonate.

Once airborne, operating a first-person view drone successfully is not easy. These drones were originally designed to be toys for rich people. Before they were press-ganged into service as tools of war, they were used either in aerobatic displays or in races where a group of operators would compete in flying through an obstacle course. In either case, the drones were not meant to be easy to fly. They were meant to be highly maneuverable, but also unstable. First-person view drones cannot really hover, fly slowly, or linger above a target. The assumption among hobbyists is that enthusiasts will invest the time and money to become proficient at flying. As a result, training a highly proficient operator can take months. A standard, base-level course for Ukrainian drone pilots takes about five weeks. The quality of operators it prepares is questionable, and graduates of the course need extra on-the-job experience to become truly proficient. Most drone pilots I encountered did not go through this course. Instead, they learned to fly drones on the job. Even experienced operators routinely miss their targets and crash into trees, power lines, or other obstacles.

To keep costs down, the first-person view drones used by Ukrainian forces have no navigational aids, such as a compass, a GPS receiver (though it should be noted that using GPS often would not be possible anyway due to widespread GPS signal jamming), or an inertial navigation system. The operator relies on their knowledge of the local terrain and on verbal instructions from a navigator, who usually has access to the video from the first-person view drone itself and from other reconnaissance assets that are tracking the target.

But the greatest obstacle to the successful use of these drones by far is the unreliability of the radio link between the operator and the drone. One of the reasons why hitting a target at ground level with precision is difficult is that when first-person view drones get close to the ground, due to obstacles, they start to lose their radio connection to the operator, often located up to 10 kilometers away. In some cases, drones cannot attack a target if it is simply on the wrong side of a tall building or hill because the building or hill blocks the line of sight between the drone and the operator. Sometimes, the operator can work around the loss of signal close to the ground by climbing, pointing the drone at the target, and hoping inertia will take it to its target once they have lost control. When striking a small target like a doorway, a window, or the entrance to a basement, this degrades precision significantly.

Drones also operate in a cluttered segment of the electromagnetic spectrum. First-person view drones use unencrypted analog radio signals, and in hot parts of the front, as many as a dozen drone teams may be competing for use of a handful of frequencies (a consequence of using cheaper components). This results in the need for sophisticated de-confliction procedures that, quite simply, do not always work. Even when de-confliction works, sometimes a team must wait as long as half an hour for a frequency to become available before takeoff. If it does not work and two drones find themselves in the air on the same channel at the same time, they will interfere with each other’s signals, usually resulting in a crash. On top of that, the enemy’s drones also fly on the same frequencies, which can also result in interference and a crash. Interference from another drone, whether friendly or hostile, resulted in the failure of at least three percent of our missions.

In addition to interference and the physical limitations of radio communication, first-person view drones are also highly susceptible to electronic-warfare jamming. Both sides of the Russo-Ukrainian War make extensive use of jamming. When our side turned on its jammers, they usually informed us in advance. That meant our drones simply could not take off, sometimes for a period of several hours. About three percent of our sorties failed because we did not get advanced warning that our own jamming systems would be operational, causing our drones to fall out of the sky. On top of that, sometimes, even the best efforts at de-confliction were not enough, simply because Ukrainian infantry or individual vehicles are often equipped with small portable jammers. When they heard a drone, they simply activated the jammer without waiting to find out whether the drone was friendly or not.

Of course, when the other side activated its jammers, we got no advance warning whatsoever. Enemy electronic warfare downed a full 31 percent of our sorties. This number could have been lower, but for our command’s occasional stubborn insistence that we fly even though it was almost certain that enemy jammers were operating in the target area. When enemy jammers were operating, the enemy’s own drones also could not fly, putting them in the same dilemma that our side also suffered. Nevertheless, when jammers were available and switched on, first-person view operations became effectively impossible.

Some of the problems with first-person view drones will eventually be resolved as technology matures. Better production standards will ensure that a larger percentage of drones actually take off. In Ukraine, there are countless assembly lines that build drones from cheap, off-the-shelf components sourced from dubious suppliers. A single unit often sources its drones from numerous organizations, each with its own production processes. More standardization, better quality control, and less reliance on cheap components could improve reliability. Better transmitters and receivers that are more resistant to interference will improve the connection between drone and operator. Digital signal transmission and frequency hopping are starting to appear in some first-person view drones, though these are still rare. Putting re-translators that amplify the drone’s signal on a second drone that hovers somewhere between the operator and the first-person view drone can also improve the quality of the connection. Improved and standardized procedures for training operators would cut down the time needed to become proficient.

To be sure, the technology has already evolved since I left the battlefield. Today, some Ukrainian and Russian units are also using drones controlled by fiber-optic cable, rather than radio, though I had no personal experience with this type of drone in my unit. This technology is often touted as the next step in the evolution of drone warfare. It would seem to address some of the major problems with radio-controlled drones I experienced, and compared to radio-controlled drones, fiber-optic drones may indeed have a number of advantages. Fiber optics make jamming impossible and deconflicting frequencies unnecessary. The absence of an energy-guzzling radio transmitter can extend battery life and even allow for some innovative tactics, such as landing the drone next to a road and waiting for several hours until a vehicle passes by.

Fiber optic drones do, however, have a number of drawbacks that mean they might not fully replace radio-controlled drones. The wire that connects the drone to the operator limits the maneuverability of the drone. Snagging it on any kind of obstacle can result in a loss of control. Fiber-optic drones cannot really double back over their route or circle a target, as this could tangle their control wire and also result in a loss of control. As a result, fiber-optic drones are said to be even more difficult to fly than radio-controlled drones. Because of these limitations, several drone operators I spoke to actively resist using fiber-optic drones. Furthermore, though cost will probably come down, at present the cost of the cable means that a fiber-optic drone with 10 kilometers of cable costs about twice as much as a radio-controlled model of similar range. Finally, production capacities available to Ukraine for fiber-optic cables are, at present, fairly limited compared to radio-controlled drones, meaning they are chronically in short supply.

All that said, if a member of a NATO military were hypothetically to ask me whether NATO countries should acquire first-person view drone capabilities, based on my experience and given the current state of the technology, I would probably say no, whether they are radio-controlled or fiber-optic. The vast majority of first-person view drone missions can be completed more cheaply, effectively, or reliably by other assets. Furthermore, other authors have noted that drones still do not come close to matching the effects that can be achieved by massed artillery fires. Additionally, experts on artillery systems consistently note the greater reliability and range of artillery.

Scaling up drone use would also involve scaling up the drones’ logistical tail. This means more complicated and expensive logistics for drones that would compete for resources with other types of weapons. For the time being, first-person view drones are unlikely to fully replace other weapons systems. No military leader is yet seriously advocating doing away with artillery completely in favor of first-person view drones. This means that the military will have two competing logistical tails: one for first-person view drones and one for artillery.

For sophisticated NATO militaries, instead of investing heavily in the development of first-person view drone capabilities, I would, first of all, recommend ensuring that troops in the field have well-trained organic mortar support with an ample supply of ammunition. Mortars, like artillery, can’t be stopped by bad weather, jamming, or crowded frequencies. Nor can they be impeded by the dark. A well-trained mortar crew can reliably put rounds on a target in less than five minutes. Our first-person view sorties took about 15 minutes from the initial request to the moment the drone struck the target, and that was only when conditions were optimal. A mortar’s price per shot is lower than a first-person view drone. Drones can nominally have an advantage over mortars in range, but this is variable and depends on the terrain, the specific location of the mortars relative to the drone launch site, and the deployment of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets that find the targets for drones or mortars. In practice, I don’t remember a single case when we struck a target that was beyond the range of mortars, and we certainly never struck a target that was beyond the range of artillery.

Secondly, for the rare cases when troops actually need tactical-level, organic precision-strike capability, and when actually carrying out such a strike is feasible, I would recommend something a little bit more high-end than a first-person view drone. NATO countries and their allies already produce high-quality loitering munitions, like the Switchblade. Such loitering munitions provide greater precision in day and night, more ease of use, and higher resistance to electronic interference than first-person view drones. They are also more expensive, but their cost is, like first-person view drones, coming down. The investment in quality seems to justify the greater expense, especially since, at most, one in ten first-person view sorties is a precision strike.

Jakub Jajcay is a former officer in the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, where he served in a number of elite units. He is currently working on his Ph.D. in the Department of Middle Eastern Studies of Charles University in Prague.

Image: Ukrainian Ministry of Defense photo by Vitaliy Pavlenko

CORRECTION: A critical word was removed from the article by mistake during the late stages of the editorial process. The sentence in question originally read as published, “On the face of it, this success rate is bad, but that is not the whole story.” It was, however, intended to say, “On the face of it, this success rate is not bad, but that is not the whole story.”

Source: Warontherocks.com | View original article

What Drones Can—and Cannot—Do on the Battlefield

Michael C. HOROWITZ is the former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Development and Emerging Capabilities. Lauren A. KAHN is Senior Research Analyst at the Center for Security and Emerging Technology at Georgetown

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MICHAEL C. HOROWITZ is Senior Fellow for Technology and Innovation at the Council on Foreign Relations and Richard Perry Professor and Director of the Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania. He is the former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Development and Emerging Capabilities.

LAUREN A. KAHN is Senior Research Analyst at the Center for Security and Emerging Technology at Georgetown University.

JOSHUA A. SCHWARTZ is Assistant Professor of International Relations and Emerging Technology at the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology. He is a former Grand Strategy, Security, and Statecraft Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Source: Foreignaffairs.com | View original article

Fibre optic drones: The terrifying new weapon changing the war in Ukraine

Rodynske is about 15km (9 miles) north of the city of Pokrovsk. Russia has been trying to capture it from the south since the autumn of last year. Ukrainian forces have so far managed to stop Russian soldiers from marching in.

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An acrid smell hangs over the town of Rodynske. A couple of minutes after we drive into the city we see where it’s coming from.

A 250kg glide bomb has ripped through the town’s main administrative building, and taken down three residential blocks. We’re visiting a day after the bomb struck, but parts of the wreckage are still smoking. From the edges of the town we hear the sound of artillery fire, and of gunshots – Ukrainian soldiers shooting down drones.

Rodynske is about 15km (9 miles) north of the embattled city of Pokrovsk. Russia has been trying to capture it from the south since the autumn of last year, but Ukrainian forces have so far managed to stop Russian soldiers from marching in.

So Russia has changed tactics, moving instead to encircle the city, cutting off supply routes.

In the past two weeks, as hectic diplomatic efforts to bring about a ceasefire in Ukraine have failed, Russia has intensified its push, making its most significant advances since January.

We find proof of that in Rodynske.

Within minutes of us arriving in town, we hear a Russian drone above us. Our team runs to the closest cover available – a tree.

Source: Bbc.co.uk | View original article

Operation Sindoor: Akash System, AI Drones, And Why India Can’t ‘Outsource’ Security

A nation that lacks the capacity to manufacture its own armaments finds itself vulnerable to the whims of key defence exporting countries. Atmanirbharta, or self-reliance, in defence transcends mere rhetoric. Despite still being the world’s second-largest arms importer, India has shifted course since 2014. The focus has moved beyond mere procurement towards co-development, co-production, and indigenous innovation. Indian forces intercepted all hostile drones and missiles with 100% success, demonstrating real-time net-centric warfare capabilities powered by domestic radar, telemetry, and sensor integration. The Tejas fighter jet, the DRDO-developed anti-satellite missile (ASAT), and the Agni-V intercontinental ballistic missile are no longer isolated achievements, they reflect the emergence of a broader, self-sustaining military-industrial ecosystem. Simultaneously, technology transfer agreements and licensed production under the Strategic Partnership Model are enabling Indian firms to move up the value chain. India is no longer content being a passive buyer, it is steadily becoming a sovereign producer.

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Strategic autonomy remains an illusion in the absence of technological sovereignty. A nation that lacks the capacity to manufacture its own armaments finds itself vulnerable to the whims of key defence exporting countries. Its military strategies are contingent upon supply chains beyond its influence, and its ability to deter adversaries is compromised by reliance on others. Theoretical frameworks derived from realist international relations, especially structural realism, indicate that in an anarchic world system, the primary imperative for the state is survival. Survival is an endeavour that cannot be delegated to others. When the integrity of national security relies on external validation, even the most formidable diplomatic efforts become ineffective against embargoes, export restrictions, or the unpredictable nature of geopolitical dynamics.

Learning From The Past

History presents stark reminders. In 1965, India’s military endeavours were significantly hindered by a US arms embargo. In 1991, amidst the Gulf War, Saudi Arabia, despite possessing an abundance of Western armaments, depended wholly on the United States for the protection of its oil fields. In stark contrast, Israel has not only endured but flourished, and through strategic alliances and a steadfast commitment has developed its own capabilities. Therefore, countries that delegate their defence industrial capabilities relinquish control over their strategic destiny. Atmanirbharta, or self-reliance, in defence transcends mere rhetoric.

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This strategic realisation is beginning to pay dividends for India. Despite still being the world’s second-largest arms importer, accounting for 8.3% of global imports, just behind Ukraine’s 8.4% according to SIPRI, India has shifted course since 2014. The focus has moved beyond mere procurement towards co-development, co-production, and indigenous innovation. The aim is no longer just to acquire weapons but to build the capacity to design and produce them domestically. Initiatives such as the Defence Industrial Corridors in Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh, the corporatisation of the Ordnance Factory Board, and the launch of Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX) signal a structural push towards developing in-house defence R&D. Successes like the Tejas fighter jet, the DRDO-developed anti-satellite missile (ASAT), and the Agni-V intercontinental ballistic missile are no longer isolated achievements, they reflect the emergence of a broader, self-sustaining military-industrial ecosystem. Simultaneously, technology transfer agreements and licensed production under the Strategic Partnership Model are enabling Indian firms to move up the value chain. India is no longer content being a passive buyer, it is steadily becoming a sovereign producer. Atmanirbharta in defence is not a distant goal. It is fast becoming the country’s strategic posture.

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All That Was Used In Op Sindoor

Operation Sindoor has given us the clearest evidence of how far India has come as far as innovation in defence tech is concerned. The mission, launched in retaliation to the April 2025 Pahalgam terror attack, was conducted entirely without crossing the Line of Control, relying on high-precision, domestically engineered strike and surveillance systems. Among the most crucial was the Akash Surface-to-Air Missile System, which provided short-range protection against incoming aerial threats. Backed by the Akashteer Air Defence Control and Reporting System, Indian forces intercepted all hostile drones and missiles with 100% success, demonstrating real-time net-centric warfare capabilities powered by domestic radar, telemetry, and sensor integration. The Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) served as the backbone of coordination, linking airbases, radar units, and weapon platforms across the services under a single digital command structure.

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For offensive capabilities, SkyStriker loitering munitions, manufactured domestically under technology transfer from Israel’s Elbit Systems, enabled deep penetration and destruction of enemy radar and missile installations. These AI-enabled kamikaze drones hovered over target zones, identified high-value assets, and struck with zero collateral damage. The Indian Air Force also deployed long-range drones for real-time ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), while DRDO-developed electronic warfare systems successfully jammed Pakistan’s Chinese-supplied radar and missile infrastructure, completing the mission in under 23 minutes, without any loss of Indian assets. Ground forces remained on high alert using a layered defensive posture comprising legacy systems like Pechora and OSA-AK, and new-generation assets like Akash-NG and LLQRM (Low-Level Quick Reaction Missiles). The Indian Army’s Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS) grid and shoulder-fired missiles formed the first layer of protection, reinforced by low-level air defence (LLAD) guns and electro-optical tracking systems.

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Notably, India’s indigenous satellite assets, including those from ISRO, provided 24×7 strategic situational awareness. More than 10 satellites were operational in monitoring India’s 7,000-km coastline and the northern theatre during the mission, highlighting the seamless integration of space-based sensors into real-time tactical decision-making. The operation also exposed and neutralised advanced foreign-origin platforms deployed by Pakistan, including PL-15 air-to-air missiles, Turkish-origin UAVs, and Chinese-made quadcopters, all of which were rendered ineffective by India’s domestic air defence ecosystem.

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A Decade Of Work

Behind the success of Operation Sindoor lies a decade of focused investment in building indigenous capacity. The iDEX platform, Strategic Partnership Model, Defence Industrial Corridors in Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh, and the ban on imported drones in 2021 catalysed the rise of Indian firms in the UAV and defence electronics space. Firms like Alpha Design Technologies, Paras Defence, and Tata Advanced Systems are now core contributors to India’s tactical autonomy. India’s drone market, projected to reach $11 billion by 2030, is rapidly emerging as a key pillar of national security.

Let The Momentum Remain

To consolidate Operation Sindoor’s gains and realise full-spectrum strategic autonomy, India must urgently address key gaps across its defence ecosystem. The most pressing is the development of indigenous jet engines. Despite progress in airframe design, India remains reliant on foreign propulsion systems, which is a critical vulnerability. We still rely on GE engines for Tejas, and deliveries are behind schedule. Reviving the Kaveri engine programme, backed by a National Aero-Engine Mission with global partnerships and IP retention, is imperative.

Equally important is scaling the indigenous drone ecosystem. India must accelerate the development of HALE/MALE drones, autonomous loitering munitions, and AI-powered drone swarms. The CATS Warrior and TAPAS-BH platforms must be supported with robust R&D funding, domestic payload production, and regulatory clarity.

In parallel, India must localise avionics, AESA radars, mission computers, and electronic warfare (EW) suites. Modern warfare is increasingly software-defined, and foreign dependence for these components creates the risk of supply chain disruption or strategic denial. DRDO’s Uttam radar and integrated EW systems must be expanded across all military platforms.

On the missile front, India must invest in hypersonic glide vehicles, scramjet propulsion, and advanced seekers. While systems like Agni-V and BrahMos have established deterrence, the next phase requires indigenising guidance, propulsion, and warhead technologies to reduce exposure to sanctions.

Don’t Forget Navy

Naval self-reliance is equally essential. India must develop indigenous nuclear propulsion, air-independent systems for submarines, and sonar suites for warships. The strategic shipbuilding base, strengthened by projects like INS Vikrant, needs technological depth and private-sector integration to meet future maritime threats.

Space-based defence infrastructure must be hardened and expanded, especially satellite surveillance, communication, and navigation systems. ISRO’s constellation of military satellites proved effective in Operation Sindoor, but micro-satellite swarms, missile early-warning sensors, and secure relay networks are the next frontier.

India must also invest in cyber and AI warfare. A dedicated Defence Cyber Command is needed to build offensive and defensive capabilities, alongside AI tools for battlefield management, autonomous weapons, and predictive logistics.

Finally, defence-grade electronics, semiconductors, embedded systems, and secure microcontrollers must be domestically produced. India’s semiconductor mission must explicitly include military applications to secure its electronic backbone.

The next decade will determine whether India merely reduces dependence or truly rewires its defence ecosystem for self-sufficiency. The challenge now is not one of intent but of scale, speed, and strategic discipline. As defence technology becomes increasingly complex, interdisciplinary, and software-defined, India must foster deep integration between research labs, private industry, and operational commands. This will require not just funding or policy reform, but a cultural shift, one that values iterative innovation, tolerates risk, and treats defence R&D as a national strategic asset rather than a budget line.

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

[Aditya Sinha writes on geopolitical and macroeconomic issues]

Source: Ndtv.com | View original article

Have Drones Made Traditional Warfare Obsolete?

As drones impede the massing of troops and heavy equipment, they may render conventional armed invasions obsolete. It is possible that this development will have considerable consequences not only for the stalemated war in Ukraine, but also for a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. A massive amphibious landing requiring thousands of ships to transport invading troops would be very difficult, as many military analysts have emphasized. In addition, guerrilla warfare by some 20 million of the 20 million people living in Taiwan may also prove an important deterrent in the Strait of Taiwan, writes Peter Bergen. He says drones are not only effective but relatively easy to obtain, and Ukraine can make drones in tiny machine shops, and it has been producing them each year by the hundreds of thousands or even millions. The U.S. has sent Ukraine some 31 Abrams tanks, each costing something like $10 million. But most of these have been incapacitated by far less costly drones, and along with other vehicles, they have mostly been taken off the front lines.

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Drone age. As drones impede the massing of troops and heavy equipment, they may render conventional armed invasions obsolete. Image Credit: Anton Petrus/Getty Images

For the past year or two, there has been quite a bit of discussion about how inexpensive drones have been revolutionizing warfare in Ukraine. A “key effect,” notes analyst Anatol Lieven, is that they “make it extremely difficult to create the local mass necessary for a decisive breakthrough.” He points out that “tanks cannot be brought up to the front line at all” and that “infantry can only be brought up in tiny packets.” Others have come to similar conclusions.

Although it is far too early to be certain, it is possible that this development will have considerable consequences not only for the stalemated war in Ukraine, but also for a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. At the extreme, it can even be taken to suggest that the opposed invasion of one country by another may have become physically obsolete.

Any discussion of the issue must necessarily be speculative, however, because drone warfare in the Russo-Ukraine War remains an area that is still developing, and the same holds for counter-drone defenses. For example, if drone communications are jammed, drone operators can change frequencies or tether their drones to 10-mile-long fiber optic cables that circumvent jamming. And we are only in the infancy of applying artificial intelligence to either using or countering drones—AI might lead to drones that can operate autonomously. And both Ukrainian and Russian forces are increasingly applying thermal technology so their drones can operate at night. There have also been tests of weapons that may be able to fry drone electronics.

Some argue, however, that tanks will still likely remain viable in the drone age. And others suggest that eventually drones might become entirely preoccupied with taking each other out, leading to a return of conventional warfare to the battlefield below. Either way, the heavy use of drones in that conflict will yield useful lessons about the future of warfare.

Ukraine

If the current patterns observed by Lieven and others continue to hold, drones may have made it impossible, barring a complete collapse of one side, for either Russia or Ukraine to “win” the war militarily. As a former commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine observed in April, “The drone revolution has created a hardened and unyielding environment. Any visual sighting or electronic broadcast often leads to an attack within seconds, preventing either side from achieving a decisive breakthrough, even when willing to sustain heavy losses. Mobility is being sacrificed for protection, and stalemate has ensued.”

The United States has sent Ukraine some 31 Abrams tanks, each costing something like $10 million. But most of these have been incapacitated by far less costly drones, and along with other vehicles, they have mostly been taken off the front lines. Moreover, infantry cannot be massed due to drone strikes, and it is commonly estimated that drones are now inflicting 70% or 80% of the war’s casualties.

In addition, it appears that drone attacks have substantially replaced attacks by less accurate and far more expensive artillery. Troops can survive all but direct hits by artillery by diving into a trench when the sound of incoming is heard, but locked-in drones can’t be outrun and can follow their intended victim into the trench. Despite these problems, Russian forces were able to advance slightly during 2024 and may be able to continue to do so—but at that rate of advance, it would take them 116 years to conquer the rest of Ukraine.

Drones are not only effective but relatively easy to obtain. Ukraine can make drones in tiny machine shops, and it has been producing them each year by the hundreds of thousands or even millions. For example, one such shop in Kyiv, making use of the services of people such as a former expert cross-stitcher who has decided to put her skills to work to defend her country, produces over 1,000 drones per year. And there are more than a dozen such shops in just that city alone. Overwhelmingly, drones are fabricated from commercially available hardware and open-source software. And classes on drone-making are available online.

Thus, if drones have made tanks and troop aggregations impossible, they may have made the stalemate essentially permanent, and they possibly can continue to do so without a whole lot of fancy and expensive Western aid.

Taiwan

Drones may also prove to be an important added deterrent in the Taiwan Strait. The problems attendant on an amphibious attack from a tempestuous sea are already likely to be sobering to Chinese planners as they consider an invasion of Taiwan. A massive amphibious landing requiring thousands of ships to transport invading troops would be very difficult, as many military analysts have emphasized.

In addition, resistance in the form of guerrilla and urban warfare by some of the 20 million intensely hostile residents of Taiwan could prove to be extensive. The island’s interior is mountainous, with many tunnels and narrow passes that could be mined or closed by bombs or snipers. The judgment of the CIA in 2023, according to its director William Burns, is that “President Xi and his military leaders have doubts today about whether they could accomplish that invasion” and that “if they look at Putin’s experience in Ukraine, that’s probably reinforced some of those doubts.”

The prospect of drone attacks on the seas makes the costs of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan even more prohibitive, and American military leaders have reportedly studied the Ukrainian experience to see if any lessons can be learned, should China make a move to attack Taiwan. As The New York Times has noted, in the early days of the war in Ukraine, “Russian warships, visible from shore, menaced the coast.” Three years later, however, Russian ships only “rarely” enter the area, “while its navy has pulled most of its valuable assets from ports in the occupied Crimean Peninsula, fearing Ukrainian attack.”

This important change, observes The Times, occurred because “crude Ukrainian robotic vessels packed with explosives” were able to “sail hundreds of miles across choppy waters to target enemy ships.” As the commander of Ukraine’s naval forces points out, “while traditional naval weapons and warships remained necessary,” drones have “ushered in a new era in maritime operations.” Moreover, the admiral continues, “This is not just a tactical tool but a strategic shift in the approach to naval warfare,” and he credits the drones with “altering the balance of power in the Black Sea.”

At present, Taiwan is developing drones only in the tens of thousands, but it may need far more than that to deal with a Chinese invasion. It has been urged to lessen the gap, however, and it is clearly capable of doing so.

Invasion

Speculating more widely, conventional armed invasions may have become physically obsolete. If drones can continue to significantly impede troop concentrations and the accompanying use of heavy equipment, would-be invaders are likely to view their prospects with dismay. Invasion requires vehicles and masses of occupying troops, and it only makes sense in the drone age if the defenders are likely to fall apart. Sometimes, of course, such collapses have happened, as for the Communists in Vietnam in 1975; the Russians in Crimea in 2014; the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2021; the rebels in Syria in 2024; the U.S. in the Gulf War, Panama and Grenada; and the initially successful invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.

Although the Ukrainians failed to oblige in 2022, that was likely Putin’s expectation when he launched his invasion. But his pre-war boast that his soldiers “could be in Kyiv in two days” has, to say the least, proved to be hollow. A problem, as political theorist Richard Ned Lebow has noted, is that such miscalculation and self-delusion have very often prevailed in the history of warfare, including in the post-World War II era. It can only be hoped that the vivid and revolutionary experience with drones in the Russo-Ukrainian War will help cut through such miscalculations.

Source: Discoursemagazine.com | View original article

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